Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government

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185PERCEPIONS, Wnter 2012, Volume XVII, Number 4, pp. 185-208.

Introducton

Ts paper analyses urksh oregnpolcy towards the Kurdstan RegonalGovernment (KRG) and examnesthe overall mportance o the Kurds oIraq snce the establshment o the rstKurdsh de acto state entty n May 1992n the atermath o the Second Gul Warn 1991.1 A couple o decades earler,no one could ever have magned thatwe would be dscussng urksh oregnpolcy towards the Kurdstan Regon oreven a change n avour o the KRG,let alone the current transormaton nthe regonal balance o power wth the

Arab Sprng and the Syran crss whchs currently n progress. Te uture andthe role o Syra are hghly mportant

as they are key actors n the creatono the post-Assad envronment n Syra,and subsequently the entre regonalpoltcal settng. Consderng the rseo sectaransm n the broader MddleEastern regon, t seems that utureallances wll be ramed by the Sunn-Sha dscourse. Wthn ths context, I

wll explan the growng mportance o

Maranna CHAROUNAKI*

urksh Foregn Polcy and the KurdstanRegonal Government

Abstract

Ts paper examnes the Kurdstan Regons

ncreasng sgncance or regonal poltcs,ncludng ts role n urksh oregn polcy. Italso dscusses urkeys oregn polcy towards theKurdstan Regonal Government (KRG) sncets creaton and descrbes the stages the relatonsAnkara and Erbl have undergone snce the1991 Gul War. Four dferent phases o urkeysoregn polcy practce towards the KRG arepnponted n ths paper. Conclusons are alsodrawn concernng the KRGs ncreasng role

n a possble transormed post-Assad poltcalsettng and what ths means or the regonalbalance o power, especally the Kurds o Syra succeed n achevng autonomy. Fnally,the studys theoretcal mplcatons are alsohghlghted, consderng ts relevance n currentnternatonal relatons lterature.

Key Words

urksh oregn polcy, KRG, Kurds oSyra, PKK, Baghdad, Sunn-Sha dvde.

* Dr. Marianna Charountaki is a post-doctoralfellow at Reading University (UK). Herresearch interests range from internationalrelations and foreign policy analysis to theinternational relations of the broader MiddleEast. She is the author of the bookTe Kurdsand US Foreign Policy: International Relationsin the Middle East since 1945, (London,Routledge, 2010).


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Marianna Charountaki

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o Iraq.3 Yet there are ew up-to-datescholarly works on the blateral relatons

between urkey and KRG.4

Consequently, I wll demonstrate the

changes n ths relatonshp, ts regonaleects as well as the nuence o theKRGs and the PKKs (Partya KarkernKurdstan, the Kurdstan WorkersParty) oregn polces on urkeysoregn polcy, and how these nuences

have ormed the urksh governmentsatttude towards the KRG n partcularand the regon n general. Fnally, atheoretcal reecton o the studysemprcal ndngs wll be also rased.

Te Geness: Te Orgns o

urksh-KRG RelatonsTe ormaton o the KRG as the

result o Iraq wthdrawal rom the northon account o the no-y zone thatprevented Iraq ar orces rom operatngabove the 36th parallel was an accdentaloutcome o the US, Brtsh, French and

urksh collectve humantaran planto protect Iraqs Kurdsh populaton.Te US-backed UN Securty Councl(UNSC) Resoluton 688 (5 Aprl1991) whch called on Iraq to end thesuppresson o ts Kurdsh populaton,and urgut zals support or the creatono the Sae Haven n Aprl 1991 dd

not only am at avertng a second reugeecrss (ollowng the Anal campagn o

urksh relatons wth the Kurds o Iraq

snce the creaton o the KRG n 1992.

Te contrbuton o ths research s not

lmted to ts emprcal ndngs through

content analyss o reports and artcles on

smlar subjects- as there are hardly any

books addressng ths case study- as wellas newspapers and ntervews wth both

urksh and Kurdsh poltcal gures n

both the Kurdstan Regon and urkey.Furthermore, the dearth o lterature on

relatons between urkey and the KRG

s a very contemporary matter, and the

subjects theoretcal mplcatons s also o

great mportance as t s stuated wthn

the broader puzzle o the nteractonbetween state and non-state actors n

nternatonal relatons.

Te man works on ths partcular

topc that have been publshed so ar

concentrate on urksh oregn polcy

towards northern Iraq seen through

the prsm o urkeys Iraq oregnpolcy perspectve, urkeys Kurdsh

perspectves,2 or on urksh-Iraqrelatons n connecton to the Kurds

Te uture and the role o Syraare hghly mportant as theyare key actors n the creatono the post-Assad envronmentn Syra, and subsequently theentre regonal poltcal settng.


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Turkish Foreign Policy and the KRG

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Ts very rst stage o urksh- Kurdshrelatons, whch came about as a result

o urksh support or the creaton othe KRG n the early 1990s wth thedeployment o 100,000 troops along theIraq-urksh border and the approval othe USs plans to attack Saddam romurkeys ncrlk ar base on 18 January1991,6 along wth the closure o theKrkuk Yumurtalk ppelne between

urkey and Iraq on 8 August 1990, andthe urksh embargo on trade wth Iraqreect urksh polces towards the Kurdso Iraq rather than towards the KRG asan entty, and hence were subsumedwthn urkeys overall Iraq polcy.7

Lkewse, zals Kurdsh polcy at thattme amed to restore urkeys external

relatons as the way out o the countryssolated poston and to ncrease urkeyseconomc and cultural domnaton,whch was ounded on zals prncpleo urksm, whch had the goal opreventng any negatve mpact on theagenda o urkeys Kurds caused byIraqs Kurdsh clams, and on sustanng

a strong US- urksh partnershp gventhe mportance o urkeys ntegratonwth the West, as well as to mantan thestatus quo or ear o the repercussonsthat potental regonal mbalances mghthave on the urksh economy andntegrty. urksh polces towards theKurds o Iraq should also be examned

wthn zals oregn polcy objectves tocontrol hs countrys borders wth Iraq

1988 and the Kurdsh uprsng o March

1991) on the urksh and Iranan borders

on the heels o Second Gul War, butalso to obtan US permsson to operate

n the north o Iraq and to pursue PKK

rebels n exchange, a urksh polcy n

place untl today.5

Tere s thus a certan rony n urkshoregn polcy havng contrbuted to

the renassance o Iraqs Kurds through

Operaton Provde Comort (renamed

Operaton Posed Hammer n 1997

and later Operaton Northern Watch).

Te ormaton o the KRG not only

sowed the seeds or the post-Saddam

era, but also acltated US plans or

transormng the Mddle East through

the Greater Mddle East Intatve n

November 2003, and sgnalled the

emergence o Iraqs Kurds as a regonal

equalser n the democratc change whch

the Mddle East s currently undergong,

especally snce the KRGs empowermentater 2005.

zals Kurdsh polcy at that

tme amed to restore urkeysexternal relatons as the wayout o the countrys solatedposton and to ncreaseurkeys economc and culturaldomnaton.


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wth Saddam, a process that endedn the Washngton Agreement (17

September 1998) between MassoudBarzan and Jalal alaban, urtherconrms ths argument and also revealsAnkaras ears that the PKK mghthave taken advantage o the vacuum opower.9 Smlarly, urkeys nterest nmaxmsng ts regonal nuence andexertng control n the north, thereby

endangerng the poltcal monopolyo the Unted States n the regon andnally resolvng Iraqs Kurdsh ssue orts own benet, reveals the mportanceo the Kurdstan Regon or urkshoregn polcy. Ts benet could havebeen the annexaton o the northernol-rch regons o Iraq or a ederaton

wth the urkmen and the Kurds n Iraqunder urksh auspces based on zalspolcy o neo-Ottomansm.10 Smlarly,urkeys rst large attack aganst thePKK on 10 October 1992 was sad tohave been encouraged by Saddamsupplyng the PKK wth weapons andby the KDP and the PUK- Iraqs man

Kurdsh partes- earng that Abdullahcalan ntended to take control o theKurdsh Regon n Iraq.11 However,ths does not mply that all sdes werenot playng one aganst the other or theacltaton o ther own oregn polcygoals. urkeys then polcy towards IraqsKurds was dented by nstant allances

n the same ven as pror to the 1990swhen one Kurdsh group was played

and to upgrade urkeys regonal role.8Tus urkeys nterventon n regonal

poltcs mmedately ater the SecondGul War as a medator n a search ora soluton to Iraqs Kurdsh reugeecrss resulted n the strengthenngo the geostrategc mportance o thestate, whch s at the crossroads o Asa,the Caucasus and Europe, especally nterms o US oregn polcy n the post-

Cold War system.Tus the rst phase o the relatons

between urkey and the Kurds o Iraqhas as ts startng pont urkeys ad hocpolcy o protectng the Kurdsh northaganst Baghdad durng the absenceo a unted Kurdsh ront n Iraq vs--vs nter and ntra Kurdsh conctsthat culmnated n a our-year cvl warbetween 1994 and 1998. Ts shows thatwe can hardly talk about a structured andnsttutonalsed urksh oregn polcytowards the KRG, at least not untlthe uncaton agreement between theKurdstan Democratc Party (KDP) and

the Patrotc Unon o Kurdstan (PUK)on 21 January 2006.

Ankaras determnaton through tsunsuccessul reconclaton eorts nthe Ankara Process n October 1996to take on the role o the medator nthe KDP-PUK rvalry between May1994-September 1998 over tax revenues,

power, land and derng opnonsas to the most eectve polcy to deal


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each others terrtory as well as n aseres o other agreements such as the

Border Securty and CooperatonAgreement (October 1984), and aSecurty Protocol between Ankaraand Baghdad that allowed rads onthe PKK encampments n northernIraq. Te capture o Abdullah calann Kenya, Narob, on 15 February1999, drectly ater the Washngton

Agreement was agreed to, whch wasollowed by Ankaras constant dsregardo hs plea rom August 1999 onwardsor a poltcal soluton to the Kurdshssue,15 are ndcatve examples o thencreasng mportance that the PKKbears n urksh poltcs n vew o tsgrowng strength n the atermath o the

Trd Gul War (2003) and ts urtherempowerment snce the erupton o thecrss n Syra.

Yet, the heart o urkeys PKKssue today les n the reluctance o theurksh bureaucracy to nd a poltcalsoluton to the Kurdsh ssue unless thePKK lays down ts arms, as well as the

PKKs unwllngness to sht ts polcyrom a mltarstc approach towardsthe poltcsaton o ts struggle unlessconsttutonal guarantees are granted tothe Kurds. In astatement regardng hscommtment to a new round o talkswth PKK, urksh Prme MnsterRecep ayyp Erdoan sad Tere

s a mltary dmenson, a securtydmenson whch s separate and wll

aganst the other, just as t was up to theend o the 1990s.

Indeed, urkeys relatons wth KDPwas encouraged by an allance betweenSyra, Iran, the PUK and the PKK12aganst the KDP, whch led to an Iraq-KDP coalton (31 August 1996)13 wth asuccesson o urksh operatons, namelyn 1992, 1995 and 14 May 1997 whenurkey statoned 50,000 troops n the

north o Iraq aganst the Syran-backedPKK. 14

Te PKK Factor n urksh

Foregn Polcy

urkeys PKK conrontaton polcy,

whch has contnued untl the presenttme, demonstrates an unaltered urkshstrategy to elmnate the PKKs poweron the one hand, and on the other toprevent the PKK rom becomng adetermnng actor n the ormulatono urksh oregn polcy, ncludng tsstrategy towards the Kurds o Iraq, a

poston urkey has held snce the zalera.

Te emergence o the PKK rom1984 onwards as pvotal agent n themplementaton o urkeys MddleEastern oregn polcy was evdent nthe Fronter Securty and Cooperaton

Agreement (February 1983) between

urkey and Iraq, whch provded oroperatons aganst armed groups on


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show the states resstance to move onwth the necessary structural changes

so that a compromse can be achevedbetween both sdes.19 urkeys ears ora potental establshment o a de actoKurdsh state or the PKKs empowermentn the case o a settlement n IraqsKurdsh cause20 has nowadays becomean unambguous realty, especally aterthe urksh meddlng n the Syran crss.

Only when ths s accepted can Ankaramove orwards wth the completon ots Europeansaton and democratsatonprocesses.21

Te Iraq War n March 2003,ollowng the 9/11 attacks, and the roleo Iraqs Kurds as a strategc US ally orthe mplementaton o the US polcy

o regme change n Baghdad, alongwth the KRGs stablsaton as a sem-ndependent state entty, ound theKurdsh movement at large partcularlyactve, whle urkeys polcy on ts ownKurdsh ssue appears connected todevelopments n the Kurdstan Regonvs--vsthe rsng power o the KRG asnuental regonal actor.

urkeys Foregn Polcytowards the KRG(2003-2007)

Te atermath o Saddams overthrow

marks the second stage n Ankaras rela-tons wth the KRG, a tme dented

contnue but besde ths there s[also] a dplomatc, soco-economc and

psychologcal dmenson. Tus AnkarasKurdsh polcy today appears trapped na Catch-22 stuaton.16

Beyond any doubt, the AKPs (Adaletve Kalknma Parts, the Justce andDevelopment Party) rse to powern 2002 has opened a new page notonly or urksh poltcs but also or

Ankaras Kurdsh polces. Te KurdshIntatve n 2009 was ollowed by theOslo talks the same year between thePKK and urkeys Natonal IntellgenceOrgansaton (MI, Mll Isthbarateklat) that negotated threeprotocols on how to settle the Kurdshcause n urkey as well as the stages or

a poltcal soluton had a postve eecton the progress o urkeys relatons wththe KRG, as wll be dscussed urther.17Nonetheless, the negotatons were cutsuddenly durng the 2011 June electonsand the arrests o approxmately 8,000BDP [Partiya At Demokrasiy, Peaceand Democracy Party] members that

ollowed sted any chance or a poltcalsoluton henceorth.18 Te AKP seems tohave a long way to go n ts battle orurkeys urther reormaton n vew othe stalemate n current Kurdsh-urkshtalks, and the nsttutonalsaton osubstantal changes stll watng to beullled. Cross-border operatons n

Iraq and the governments ntenton tolt the mmunty o nne BDP deputes


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Indeed, a seres o events that revealedthe consoldaton o the KRGs autono-

mous status and even urther ts nde-pendent oregn polcy practce alarmedAnkara to the extent that Erdoan de-clared n 2007 that;

I met wth the Iraq Presdent andPrme Mnster. I wont meet wth anytrbe leader... I wont meet wth Barzanor someone else, and that the KDPsupports PKK.24

urksh oregn polcys hostle atttudetowards the KRG was stmulated by aUS Congressonal bll (FY2008, HR1585, September 2007) that recognsedIraqs ederal structure and the Kurdshregon as legal enttes, and the KRGsndependent contractng o ol dealswth oregn (ncludng Amercan) com-panes enshrned nto ts own RegonalPetroleum Law, and rated on 6 August2007.

Te dscovery o new ol elds, suchas awke, aq-aq, and the Barsarn-Sargelu-Alan-Mus (BSAM) reservor,among others, have today extended the

KRGs actvtes so that we can nowspeak o about 50 ol and gas contractssgned by the Kurdsh government naddton to Baghdads acceptance osettlng ol payment dsputes only re-cently wth oregn companes workngn the Kurdstan Regon,25 whereas theKRGs regonal and nternatonal recog-

nton- whch does not necessarly passthrough the UN- has been reected n

by a deep crss o condence, the em-powerment o the KRG, and the onset

o ts de acto ndependence that sowedthe seeds or the thrd transormaton ourkeys relatons wth Iraqs Kurds ntoan ofcal, drect and nsttutonalsedrelatonshp rom 2008 onwards, unlkethe occasonal urksh-KDP nteractonso the past.

urkeys reusal to ally wth the Unted

States; the Sulamanya ncdent22

on 4July 2003, whch has beendescrbed asthe worst crss o condence [betweenurkey and the KRG]23 by GeneralHlm zkk; urkeys parlamentaryapproval on 17 October 2007 or amltary strke aganst PKK rebels n Iraq(whch took place on 2 December 2007);

Kurdsh demands or the normalsatono Krkuk accordng to Artcle 140 (2)vaa reerendum (ntally planned or 15November 2007); and later on urkshthreats on 27 Aprl 2007 o a potentalmltary nterventon nto the KurdstanRegon based on a so-called mdnghtmemorandum not only reectedurkeys domestc problems vs--vsthe

AKPs struggle to stablse ts power andcontrol the countrys mltary apparatusgven an unsuccessul electronc coup-among other events- but also Ankarasears o the urther empowerment othe KRG n the event o the potentalncorporaton o the ol-rch regono Krkuk mmedately ater the all o

Saddam and ts desperate wsh to keepthe Kurdsh ssue n urkey n check.


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Massoud Barzan on 31 October 2009as well as n the rst hstorc meetng o

Presdent Barzan wth urkeys prmemnster on 4 June 2010. In turn, PMRecep ayyp Erdoan became the rsturksh premer to vst [the KurdstanRegon] [on March 2011] snce Iraqwas created29; a seres o regular vststhen ollowed.30

Ts change was not easy and t tooka whle to happen as urkey mght nothave been ready to accept that Baghdadwould not have ull control o the areaand was dealng only wth Baghdad untl2003. Tereore there was no drectnteracton [between Ankara and KRG]or a certan tme. At rst, urkey tred

to deal drectly wth Baghdad throughthe establshment o consulates n Mosuland Basra [2008-2009]31 and thesgnng o 48 varous agreements andMOUs (memoranda o understandngs)n November 2009 pertanng to energyand other economc ssues,32 as part othe eort to establsh the Hgh Level

Strategc Cooperaton Councl n 2009,an ntatve to expand urther blateral

ts constant nteractons gven the USpresdents rst nvtaton to Presdent

Massoud Barzan on 25 October

2005,whch are all ndcators o the KRGs sta-ble and ndependent regonal role andIraqs Kurds sel-exstence wthn nter-natonal relatons.26

urkeys Foregn Polcytowards the KRG versusBaghdad: Te Impact oChange

Te year 2008 was a breakthrough andmomentous tme or urksh-Kurdshrelatons gven the urksh governmentsofcal recognton o the KRG n deeds

rather than n words.27

Indeed, the rstdrect hgh level meetng (1/05/2008)between the KRG and urkey was held nBaghdad on 1 May 2008, where KRGsPrme Mnster Nechrvan Barzan andurkeys Specal Envoy or Iraq Muratzelk, together wth then cheoregn polcy advser AhmetDavutolu,decded to put asde ther derences.Both sdes dscussed areas o cooperatonn both economc and poltcal elds,ncludng an agreement to nd a peaceulsoluton to the PKK ssue.28 Tereater,the postve eect o Erdoans 2009Kurdsh Intatve on urksh oregnpolcy towards the KRG was shown

when urksh Mnster o Foregn AarsDavutolu met wth KRG Presdent

urkey, Iraq, the KRG, andthe US also establshed arlateral Mechansm to developcooperaton wth a vew oeradcatng the PKK n Iraqterrtores.


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and the legalty o ol contracts awardedby the Kurdsh government to major

ol companes, such as ExxonMobl(conrmed n February 2012), Chevron,the Englsh Gul Keystone, otal oFrance, Gazprom o Russa, and urkshGenel Energy, whch Baghdad rejectedas llegal, has brought Ankara closerto Erbl.35 In addton, the doctrnalapproach o urkeys regonal polcy36

based on a sectaran dscourse vs--vsderences between Al-Malks Shte-led government and Erdoans SunnIslamc dscourse remnd us o the longlastng rvalry between the Ottomanand Saavds empres that seems to becomng to the oreront once agan.

Ankaras accusatons that Al-Malk

monopolses power by suppressngSunn Arabs and other groups whleat the same tme protectng arq Al-Hashem, Iraqs Sunn vce presdent whowas charged wth terrorsm n hs owncountry on 19 November 2011, standsn comparson to Al-Malks allegatonso urkeys hostle regonal polces

and ts drect ntererence n Iraq aarsn vew o Davutolus ofcal vst toErbl and aterwards to Krkuk on 1-2

August 2012 to dscuss Syran Kurdshaars wth Kurdsh leaders, wthoutpror notcaton to the Iraq oregnmnster, events whch led to DevletBahel (char o Natonalst Movement

Party) beng dened a vsa to vst Krkukby Baghdad.37 All these developments

relatons. In 2008, urkey, Iraq, the KRG,and the US also establshed a rlateral

Mechansm to develop cooperaton wtha vew o eradcatng the PKK n Iraqterrtores.

A seres o varables explan the sht nurksh oregn polcy n avour o theKRG whch seems to overrde urkshrelatons wth Baghdad, especally aterthe US mltary wthdrawal rom Iraq n

December 2011, whch resulted n theourth stage o ther relatonshp.

urkeys Foregn Polcy andthe KRG Snce 2008

Te sectaran dspute n Baghdad

between Shte Iraq Prme MnsterNour Al-Malk and the Sunnopposton rom 2011 onwards hasdmnshed Iraqs poltcal role n theregon whle Al-Malks steady approachtowards ehran has probably madeurkey realze that the Kurdstan Regons a sae place to deal wth as part o Iraq

because the people who control theborders n terms o trade and commercewere the Kurds accordng to the head othe oregn relatons o the KRG.33 Tentenscaton o the dsputes betweenthe central government and the KRGover varyng ssues ncludng derenceson how to run oregn polcy,34 the

management o the hydrocarbonresources n the north o the country,


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the urksh request or Barzansmedaton or a peaceul soluton to

the Kurdsh ssue n urkey durng hsvst to the US, whch when combnedwth the Kurdsh leaders meetngswth Kurdsh representatves rom Syrawho have recently ganed control overKurdsh-populated ctes along theurksh border, as well as wth leadersrom the man Syran opposton group

(the Syran Natonal Councl, the SNC,on 30 July 2012), plus the recent ol andgas ppelne deals sgned n May 2012between Ankara and the KRG have ledto a drect exchange wth urkey orthe rst tme wth the am to buld adedcated ol ppelne wth the capactyto transmt 1 mllon barrels per day

(bpd) o ol between KRG and urkey byAugust 2013, along wth an expansono the exstng Krkuk-Ceyhan ppelneshppng crude ol rom Basra by 2014.

Indeed, the Kurdstan Regon s a majormarket or urksh exports.40 Accordngto the urksh Consul General n Erbl,

Tere are about ve urksh banks,

17 urksh schools, 600 urkshconstructon companes, [and] 17,000urksh ctzens permanent resdents nErbl, drect ghts are also operatngdaly between the KR and urkey, aact whch has boosted toursm whlethe overall trade volume betweenurkey and Iraq s about US$12bllon, whle more than 70% s wththe KRG, let alone that more than hal

o the oregn companes regsteredn the KR are urksh. urkey enjoysmassve economc benets rom a

have brought Ankara closer to the KRGand pont to the drecton whch Iraq-

urksh relatons are currently headng.

Te Role o the KRG n AKPsForegn Polcy Strategy

Te current volatle poltcal settng nthe Mddle East vs--vsthe Arab Sprngthat has swept the Arab world and let

ew countres unaected, ncludngthe Kurdsh ssue whch gave t aregonal dmenson because the Kurdsare now collaboratng more closely thanbeore,38 urkeys polcy o showng thatt can play a key role n the ormaton othe post-Assad era through ts meddlngnto the Syran crss and the worsenng

o urksh-Iraq relatons rom 2012onwards counter to the exercse oKRGs de acto ndependence regardngvarous ol and gas contracts sgned bythe Kurdsh government over Baghdadsobjectons not only rases the KurdstanRegons mportance as an energy hubor ol and gas mports to the urksh

markets, but also sgnes Baghdadsgradual solaton, and the onset o astrategc partnershp between the KRGand Ankara that runs n parallel wthurkeys Iraq oregn polcy.

Sgncant developments towardsthe strengthenng o relatons between

Ankara and Erbl can be seen n the

urksh motto or ull socal andeconomc ntegraton wth the KRG,39


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to have good relatons wth KRG. Buthavng good relatons wth Baghdad

does not necessarly mean that you havegood relatons wth the KRG and urkeyhas understood the mportance o theKR beng poltcally and economcallystrong, argues Falah Mustaa.43 TeKRGs stablty, gven ts ol wealthand the ncreased oregn nvestment,aganst the power struggle between

Sha and Sunn Arab poltcal actonsn Baghdad, and ultmately the AKPsrealsaton that the KRGs oregn polcyneeds to be consdered n the comngregonal changes n whch Ankara sheavly nvolved, ncludng the need oKRGs cooperaton n varous regonalcrses, explan the expanson o the

urksh-KRG securty and dplomatcrelatons and the nteracton o strategcand economc nterests.44

Tus, urkeys close cooperatonwth the KRG appears mportant as ts

closer economc cooperaton wth theKRG whose current budget approaches

US$13 bllon.41

Te urksh rapprochement wth theKRG should be also examned wthnthe scope o the AKPs governance.Davutolus Strategc Depth doctrnethat he developed n 2001 as regardsthe urksh role n the Mddle East sprmarly based on urkeys strategcnterests n peace, stablty, securty,and prosperty n ts neghbourhood,appled through tools o sot power, suchas the economy. Undoubtedly, urkeysnuence has grown n the Mddle Eastunder the AKPs rule. Ankaras StrategcDepth polcy requres [urkey] toengage wth the countres wth whch[t] share[s] a common past and

geography n a way that wll promoteshared nterests and create a mutuallybenecal ramework or cooperatonand dalogue.42 Te strengthenngo the economc tes between Ankaraand the KRG has gven rse to urkshnvestments o about US $16 bllondollars n the Kurdstan Regon. Te

openng o the urksh Consulate nErbl n 2010, Ankaras realsaton othe economc opportuntes that aprosperous Kurdstan Regon can oer,together wth the role the KRG canplay n the Kurdsh ssues o urkey andSyra, s revealng o the mportance othe KRG as a strategc regonal player.

urkey realzed that n order to havegood relatons wth Baghdad you need

Davutolus Strategc Depthdoctrne that he developed n2001 as regards the urksh role

n the Mddle East s prmarlybased on urkeys strategcnterests n peace, stablty,securty, and prosperty nts neghbourhood, appledthrough tools o sot power.


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the same border wth that consttutes

the best brdge to buld a mutually

benecary relatonshp [through whch]we can reach Europe vs--vsthe current

problematc status n Iran and Syra.48

Currently, the settlement o Krkuks

status and the PKKs resortng to volence

are consdered the che stckng ponts

n the development o sold, robust

and sncere KRG-urksh relatons as

descrbed by the urksh Consul General

n Erbl.49 Yet both sdes have agreed to

cooperate and urkey has understood

that the KRG does not acltate the

PKK n the border-controlled areas.50

However, there are stll voces n the

urksh opposton clamng that the

KRG does not do ts utmost toward

the eradcaton o the PKK51 and that

the Krkuk queston wth ts urkmen

populaton are elements that can beactors o close tes or dvson.52

oregn polcy seems to have been letwth not many optons, especally ater

ts nvolvement n the Syran crss. Tealure o Davutolus zero problemswth the neghbours polcy, whchamed at the transormaton o ourneghborhood, nto a rendshp andcooperaton basn45- a tradtonal goal ourksh oregn polcy- and a desre oran ndependent oregn polcy detached

rom the US juggernaut gven ts spltwth regonal strategc alles, .e. Israeland Iran, as well as wth Syra, has rasedthe Kurdsh actor as a guarantor o theregonal balance o power consderng theKurdsh leadershps close cooperatonwth the rest o the Kurdsh movements.46

Te AKPs oregn polcy that has

avoured Erbl at the expense oBaghdad, combned wth the lattersear or the uture o the countrys ol-rch dsputed areas n a post-Assadsettlement, s evdent n the July 2011announcement o Iraqs DeenceMnstry o the ormaton o the grsOperatonal Command to be n charge o

securty ssues n the Dyala, Krkuk andSalahaddn governorates, whch ncludemost o the dsputed areas.47 Baghdadsworres were also hghly reected n thencdent o the deployment o the Iraqarmy orces on 23 July 2012 at the Rababorder between Syra and Iraq. On tssde, KRG ofcals have also understood

urkeys mportance as protector o theregon and a partner country (we) share

Consderng that Ankarasnternal poltcs and ts meddlngn any regonal crss as part o

ts oregn polcy has let thecountry wth ew substantalregonal alles, there s a needor a Kurdsh polcy that runsn parallel wth urkeys Iraqpolcy.


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that urkey should take qucker stepsand more consstent ones to resolve ts

Kurdsh ssue through democratc means[even though] a perect soluton thatmeets the needs o all sdes does notexst.56

Consderng that Ankaras nternalpoltcs and ts meddlng n any regonalcrss as part o ts oregn polcy has letthe country wth ew substantal regonal

alles, there s a need or a Kurdshpolcy that runs n parallel wth urkeysIraq polcy. Te Kurdstan Regon s aborderng neghbour and thus mportantor urksh securty nterests that requrea stable Kurdsh north or Ankaraseconomc progress, whch s the mannstrument o ts sot power oregn

polcy, whle the Kurdstan Regonsncreasng role n a transormed post-

Assad poltcal settng could potentallyrase the KRG to the status o the onlystable Sunn neghbourng ally or

Ankara aganst Iran, Iraq and Syra,especally the Kurds o Syra succeed nachevng autonomy and thus expand to

the Medterranean Sea.57

urksh-KRG BlateralRelatons n the Context oRegonal Concts: owardsa Teoretcal Framework

urksh relatons wth the KRGwere ntated at the begnnng o the

urkeys oregn polcy today has todeal wth both nternal and external

open ronts. Internally, ncdents suchas CHP (Cumhuryet Halk Parts, theRepublcan Peoples Party) DeputyMahmut anals crmnal complantto the top prosecutors ofce to closethe AKP and open proceedngs aganstthe prme mnster or ntererng nthe judcary,53 and Metropolls survey

showng that 60% o urksh ctzenssupport Abdullah Gls canddacy orthe presdency and that 51% avourGl compared to the 23% who preerErdoan reveal domestc tensons andthe struggle Erdoan aces to mantanhs power.54 Also, the Syran crss hasdentely created a vacuum o power

that the PKK s currently llng. Tsmeans that any poltcal settlemento the Kurdsh ssue n urkey as aregulatory actor o Kurdsh poltcs nSyra would be or the benet o urkshpoltcs. Te AKPs Kurdsh Intatven 2009, whch consttuted the bass othe Kurdsh-urksh dalogue, appears

the only green lght at the moment thatcould end the long perod o Kurdshwatng.55 Only then could urkeysoregn polcy dogma o peace at home,peace n the world be acheved. Tedea that Kurdsh unty has grown n theregon and that Presdent Barzan seeksto lead ths process s general among

urksh poltcal crcles. Accordng toCHPs Deputy Charman, Ts tells us


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Te urksh stance towards theKurdstan Regon remaned unaltered

throughout the 1990s. urkeysnterventon n solvng Iraqs Kurdshcrss n 1998 shows ts determnaton totake on a leadng role n regonal poltcsas s the case today, thereby preventngthe PKK rom takng advantage o apotental power vacuum and keepng atthe same tme both Iraqs Kurdsh ssue

and ts own Kurdsh problem n check.Opportunstc allances wth the KDPaganst other Kurdsh groups urtherexplan urkeys polcy towards theKurds o Iraq at that tme.

Te AKPs rse to power n 2002and the consoldaton o the Kurdshautonomous status n Iraq as an

ndspensable US ally- regardless o tsnon-state status- n ts Iraq polcy oregme change altered the regonalbalance o power n the atermath othe 2003 Iraq War. Te Iraq War, theofcal recognton o the KRG n the2005 Iraq consttuton, and the 2006uncaton o the Kurds ater the nternal

concts o the past oblged urkshoregn polcy to deal wth the KRG asa stable and consderable regonal player.Davutolus new and more open oregnpolcy acltated ths re-orentaton andresulted n the recognton o the KRGas a ederal unt n Iraq. AKPs nvtatonto Presdent Barzan to attend ts ourth

conventon on 30 September 2012 sllumnatng.

post-Cold War perod. Te urksh

contrbuton to the creaton o the

rst Kurdsh de acto state entty asthe rst stage o the urksh-Kurdsh

nteractons were prmarly ad hoc

polces towards the Kurds o Iraq n the

orm o humantaran ad rather than a

structured urksh polcy towards the

KRG as an entty. Ts was the case

not only because o the lack o a unted

Kurdsh ront n Iraq gven the nterand ntra Kurdsh concts, but also

due to the ntenton o urksh oregn

polcy to control the north o Iraq, to

avert any major reugee crss on the

Iraq-urksh borders, to ste urkeys

Kurdsh movements aspratons gven

the long-lastng struggle o the Kurds n

Iraq or sel-determnaton, and nallyto nd an opportunty to combat PKK

rebels by exertng control n the north.

In addton, Ankaras objectves avoured

Iraqs terrtoral ntegrty and stablty.

Tereore urkeys polcy towards the

Kurds o Iraq was subjugated to ts Iraq

oregn polcy, rather than beng allowed

to develop relatons o mutual respect

and nterest wth the KRG.

Davutolus new and more openoregn polcy acltated ths re-orentaton and resulted n therecognton o the KRG as aederal unt n Iraq.


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the use o sot power as dctated by thecountrys economc nterests opened up

lnes o communcaton whch resultedn an ofcal, drect and nsttutonalsedrelatonshp between Ankara and theKRG rom 2008 onwards. Even more,ths transormaton nto an nteractonwth poltcal and economc dmensonsas the thrd phase o ther relatons wasextended dramatcally n the atermath

o the US wthdrawal rom Iraq nDecember 2011.

At the begnnng o 2012, the USwthdrawal rom Iraq saw the expansono relatons between urkey and the KRGnto a strategc allance as the ourth shto ther relatons.

Tere was a marked change n Erdoansdscourse rom hs 2007 statement thatI met wth the Iraq Presdent andPrme Mnster. I wont meet wth anytrbe leader... I wont meet wth Barzanor someone else58 versus hs 2010 speechexpressng hs determnaton Tat [we]wll buld a very sold brdge n blateral

relatons between Iraq and urkey andbetween the Kurdstan Regon andurkey especally. We [Erdoan andBarzan] wll be n touch. Te twocountres also engage n economccooperaton. We wll act together onenergy and nrastructure. Ts changes an example o the transormatons that

the regonal poltcal pattern s currentlyundergong.59

Intally though, Erdoans struggle tocontrol the mltary and mantan hs

domestc power, together wth an nstantreeze n US-urksh relatons ollowngthe war, eroded relatons between Ankaraand Erbl. Te ncreasng stablsatono the KRG and the development o anndependent oregn polcy dd not onlyrase ears on the urksh sde but alsoworsened relatons to the extent that

urkey threatened the KRG wth annterventon n 2007 ollowng Kurdshclams or the settlement o the statuso Krkuk as provsoned by the Iraqconsttuton. Ts second phase ourksh oregn polcy towards the KRGrom 2003 to 2007, ths tme as a soldentty, was marked by Ankaras reluctance

to recognse the new status o ederalIraq, and the Kurds were perceved assource o regonal nstablty.

From 2008 to 2011, urkeys relatonswth the KRG underwent a thrd rapdtransormaton. Te tradtonal urksh

oregn polcy goal o expandng tspoltcal nuence regonally through

At the begnnng o 2012,the US wthdrawal rom Iraqsaw the expanson o relatons

between urkey and the KRGnto a strategc allance as theourth sht o ther relatons.


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and the Amercan nterest n keepngAnkara and Erbl together as potental

alles, apart rom Israel, aganst a Shaaxs gven the undened ormatono the power relatons n a post-Assadera consttute a seres o consderabledetermnants that urther show themplcatons o urksh relatons wth theKRG on the regonal balance o power.

What s notceable today s the rseo a urksh polcy n avour o theKRG qute ndependent rom AnkarasIraq polcy. Undoubtedly, the KRGs no longer a problem or Ankara andt s now a valuable regonal ally n theupcomng transormed regonal poltcalsettng. Yet, the stablty o urkeys

relatons wth the KRG wll also bedetermned by a seres o actors such asurkeys nternal balance o power; thepublcs acceptance o ths relatonshp;the role o the KRG as a medator n thePKK ssue; the actual poltcal resolutono urkeys own Kurdsh ssue wthna certan perod o tme; and nally

whether a potental ameloraton n therelatons between Baghdad and Ankara

urkeys steps to buld relatons wththe KRG were not only the result o the

KRGs ncreasng power as a strategcUS ally and that t s an ol-rch regon.urkeys realsaton that Baghdad wouldnot have ull control o the KRG, themportance or Kurdsh oregn polcyo havng a stable neghbourng countryand or a lnk to Europe, combnedwth Amercas nterest n encouragng

the KRG to contnue mprovng tsrelatonshp and coordnaton wthurkey as well as wth Baghdad sothat Iraq can take ts rghtul place asa major ol-producng country60 or thepreservaton o the regonal status quoare among the actors that explan theurksh-Kurdsh rapprochement. Te

role o Iraqs Kurdsh leadershp n thenegotatons or the poltcal resolutono the Kurdsh ssue n both Syra andurkey, not to menton ts medatonn allevatng the PKK-urksh conct,combned wth Erdoans preerence ora Sunn leadershp aganst ehran andSyra, can all eectvely explcate urksh

oregn polcys postve reorentatontowards the KRG whle showng tsmportance or urksh poltcs.

Most mportantly, urkeys largeenergy demands and ts need orthe KRGs ol reserves; the alure oDavutolus Strategc Depth doctrneor an ndependent oregn polcy wth

zero problems wth the neghbours; theambvalent poltcal clmate n Baghdad

Te KRG s no longer a problemor Ankara and t s now avaluable regonal ally n theupcomng transormed regonalpoltcal settng.


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nsttutonalsaton o ther status arekey actors n urksh and US oregn

polces aganst a Sha-led coalton nthe regon.

Fnally, the nteracton between urkeyand the KRG also has a theoretcaldmenson. Inadequate attenton bythe nternatonal relatons dscplneto the nteracton between states andnewly emergent non-state actors adds

a conceptual reason or addressng thspartcular case study. Ts nteractonclearly shows that non-state actors havean ncreasngly mportant and drect

role n nternatonalrelatons (and not

just on states oregnpolces), as seen bythe mpact o theKRGs oregn polcypractces on ths

nteracton, but also on regonal poltcswthn the KRGs operatons wth stateenttes on regonal and nternatonallevels snce 1992.62 Tus, oregn polcy

no longer seems to be among a statesprvleges as the very concept o powerhas been expanded. Te same can be alsoargued about non-state groups such asthe PKK.

On ths bass, I would argue thatcurrent theores are unable to explanthe subject o ths paper gven ther

unlateral overemphass ether on the roleo structural actors or on nternatonal

mght prove nversely proportonal tothe urksh-Kurdsh relatonshp.61

radtonally, urkey has wantedto mantan ts regonal power andurther maxmse ts regonal nuence.

Ankara seems to have realsed that stablerelatons wth the KRG are n ts benet,devod o the taboos o the past when theKurdstan Regon was perceved as sourceo nstablty. Besdes that, Erdoans

decson to meddle n the Syran crsshas urther red up the Kurdsh ssuen a sense that a potental overthrowo Assad could empower the Kurdshmovement overall, strengthen the Sunnront n the MddleEast, and weakenehrans regme.

Such developmentsn combnaton wthurkeys deteroratngrelatons wth mosto the regonal state powers makethe Kurdstan Regon poltcally andeconomcally mportant or urkey, soa strategc allance wth KRG appears

mperatve snce the road to Baghdadseems to pass through there. Tus, thePKKs strengthenng ater the outbreako the Syran crss, the rse o the KRGsmportance as a stable regonal ally,the Amercan nterest n keepng theregonal status quo n ts avour, urkeyshostle relatons wth Israel and Syra

as well as ts antagonstc relatons wthIran, the rsng o the Kurds and the

Foregn polcy no longer seemsto be among a states prvleges

as the very concept o power hasbeen expanded.


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lmted to transnatonal corporatonsand nternatonal nsttutons o an

economc nature, and neo-lberals appearto be restrcted to structural explanatonso the states polces.

Concluson

Tus the exstng paradgms cannotprovde an adequate explanatory

ramework snce the consttutveelement o such rameworks s the state.Tey have also allen nto the same trapo ether beng constraned by partcularpremses and thus applyng ther deaseverywhere regardless o context, tme orspace and connng themselves to endlesscrtques.66 Indeed, crtcal theores and

meta-theores have posed mportantchallenges to manstream nternatonalrelatons, but the oten excessve zeal orcontradctng orthodoxy and structuraland state-centrc explanatons, meantthey aled to transorm InternatonalRelatons nto a coherent and applcabletheory.67

On the other hand, whle the lteratureon non-state actors has ncreasedconsderably n the past decade, most o tseems ocused on accounts o ther statusrather than on ther relatons. Nethercurrent lterature nor the man schoolso thought wthn the nternatonalrelatons seem to go ar enough to be

able to cover relatons between states(such as, or nstance, urkey and non-

actors, such as the states, at the expenseo non-state actors n nterpretng the

uncton o the nternatonal system, andsubsequently there s a satsy scholarlydemand or a coherent theory thattakes nto account not only the role ostructures and agents n the ormatono the oregn polcy decsons, but alsoor a theory that elevates the relatonsbetween state and non-state actors n

nternatonal relatons.63

Whereas most nternatonal relatonstheores have been useul n explanngspecc nternatonal phenomena andoerng solutons to varous problemsthat arose durng the era o theremergence, ther man nadequacy s thelack o consderaton o the nteracton

between state and non-state actors as theyargue n avour o the superorty o stateswhle gnorng the dramatc role thatnon-state actors can play.64 For nstance,realsts and lberals ocus on state actors,the eect o the structures and natonalnterests, whle constructvsts emphassethe role o deas and how actors, n

partcular states, aect and are aectedby the structures. Lkewse, even thoughneoclasscal realsm can explan thenteracton between the nternal and theexternal that s seen n oregn polcymakng, stll t s conned to state actorsollowng the tradton o the earlerrealst schools o thought.65 Smlarly,

both lberals, who overemphasse therole o non-state actors but are stll


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actors, though wthout aproravourng

ether type o actor. Te model also

recognses the nteractve mportanceo the materal and the deatonal n the

mutual shapng o structures and agents

n ths multdmensonal nteractve set o

dynamcs.In my theoretcal map, then,

I have used a conceptual model, whch

could be urther elaborated n detal n

another paper that vews nternatonal

relatons as multdmensonal nter-relatons, takes nto account the triptych

o IR, oreign policy and politics as parts

o a uniied whole, and stresses the

need or nternatonal relatons to move

away rom mere nter-state explanatons

whereas the role o structures (whether

deatonal or materal) s central to the

nterplay between state and non-stateenttes (other than the economc actors

overemphassed by the current lterature)

that are pursung ther own nterests.71

Te artcle has demonstrated thus

on the one hand the mpact that non-

state actors, such as the KRG, have on

urkeys oregn polcy, and on the other,showed that states oregn polcy can

also be aected by, and nteracts wth,

non-state enttes.

state actors such as the KRG or PKK)ether emprcally or theoretcally. I and

when they do so, ther ocus s connedto the role played by non-state actors andspeccally to ther ncreasng mportancen nternatonal relatons, accordngto scholarly narratves o ther statusand perspectves.68 Tus, nternatonalrelatons remans constraned by theway they ocus ether on one or another

agency, rather than vewng suchnteractons as a two-way process.69 Tusar, the analyses o the nterplay betweenstate and non-state actors that exsttoday have ether remaned at a generallevel or have lmted themselves to howstates perceve and behave towards non-state actors, or occasonally the other

way around.70

I have thereore rased the need or amore general analyss nstgated by thesubject matter under scrutny and to thsend suggested a model that conceveso nternatonal relatons as a complexeld o multdmensonal nterrelatonsbetween and among actors at the local,

sub-state, trans-state, state, regonaland global spheres. In partcular, tdraws attenton to the role-both drectand ndrect-that s played by non-state


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Endnotes

1 In ths artcle, the IranIraq War (198088) s reerred to as the Frst Gul War; Saddamsnvason o Kuwat (19901991) s called the Second Gul War; whle the US nvason oIraq (2003) s reerred to as the Trd Gul War.

2 Mahmut Bal Aykan, urkeys Polcy n Northern Iraq, 1991-95,Mddle Eastern Studes,Vol. 32, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 343-366. urkeys Kurdsh perspectves could be oundn, Bll Park, urkeys Polcy owards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectves, AdelphPaper 374, London, Routledge, Internatonal Insttute or Strategc Studes, May 2005.

3 Phlp Robns, Te Overlord State: urksh Polcy and the Kurdsh Issue, InternatonalAfars, Vol. 69, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 657-676; Mesut zcan, urksh Foregn Polcy

owards Iraq n 2009, Perceptons: Journal o Internatonal Afars, Vo. 14, No. 3-4 (Autumn-Wnter 2010), pp. 113-132; Henr J. Barkey, urkey and Iraq: Te Perls (and Prospects) oProxmty, Specal Report o the Iraq and ts Neghbours Seres, USIP, July 2005, at http://www.usp.org/les/resources/sr141.pd [last vsted 12 February 2013].

4 Te US perspectve on Ankara-Erbl relatons ocused manly on ts economc dmenson,whch supports ths papers argument or the postve sht n urkeys poltcal atttudetowards the KRG, has been recently completed by, Matthew J. Bryza, urkeys DramatcSht toward Iraq Kurdstan: Poltcs beore Peace Ppelnes, urksh Polcy Quarterly, Vol.11, No.2 (September 2012), pp. 53-61.

5 See, Maranna Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy: Internatonal Relatons n theMddle East snce 1945, London, Routledge, 2010, p. 169.

6 Stephen F. Larrabee, urkey Redscovers the Mddle East, Foregn Afars, Vol. 86, No. 4(July-August 2007), p. 104.

7 Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy, p. 175.

8 Sedat Laner, urgut zal Perod n urksh Foregn Polcy: zalsm, at www.turkshweekly.net/artcle/333/turgut-ozal-perod-n-turksh-oregn-polcy-ozalsm.html

[last vsted 22 January 2013]. Also see, Alan Makovsky, Te New Activism in urkishForeign Policy, SAIS Review, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-activism-in-turkish-oreign-policy, [last visited March 2013].

9 Intervew by the researcher wth CHP MP and head o CHPs Foregn Relatons Osmananey Korutrk, Istanbul, 29 Aprl 2012.

10 Laner, urgut zal Perod n urksh Foregn Polcy.

11 Intervew by the researcher wth Specal Envoy o Massoud Barzan Mohsn Dzayee,Salahaddn, 13 June 2007 n, Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy, p. 178.

12 Najm Jarrah, Iraq Kurdstan: Peace alks Fal, Mddle East Internatonal, No. 509 (22September 1995), p.8.


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13 Lokman I. Meho and Mchel Nehme, Te Kurdsh Queston n US Foregn Polcy: ADocumentary Sourcebook,Westport, Conn., Praeger, 2004, p. 6.

14 Kerm Yldz, Te Kurds n Iraq: Past, Present and Future, London, Pluto Press, 2004, p. 80.15 Declaraton by Abdullah calan, Imral, Voce o Kurdstan- Magazne o the Natonal

Lberaton Front o Kurdstan, 2 August 1999, p. 5.

16 urksh PM Sgnals alks wth PKK Possble, Hrryet, 27 September 2012.

17 Intervew by the researcher wth Ahmed Denz, Koma Cvaken Kurdstan (KurdstanCommuntes Unon) Spokesman and Che o Foregn Aars, Qandl, 8 September 2012.

18 Ibd.

19 Cross-border mandate n Parlament, Hrryet, 1 October 2012.20 Te urks eared that the Washngton agreement represented the rst step toward the

establshment o an ndependent Kurdsh state and would provde the PKK wth theopportunty to become more actve n Iraq, wth more opportuntes to penetrate ntourkey, n Mahmut Bal Aykan, Te urkshSyran Crss o October 1998: A urkshVew,Mddle East Polcy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (June 1999), p. 180.

21 See Maranna Charountak, Te Kurdsh Factor n urksh Poltcs: Impedment orFacltator to urkeys European prospects?, n Almes Heshmat, Alan Dlan and SermanBaban (eds.), Perspectves on Kurdstans Economy and Socety n ranston, Nova Scence

Publshers, New York, 2012.22 Accordng to theWashngton mes, US orces caught eleven urksh commandos and

nneteen members o the Iraq urkmen Front who were sad to have attempted to assassnateKrkuks governor. See, Te US had Substantal Intellgence that the urks Were n ActvtyAganst the Local Leadershp, Washngton mes,8 July 2003.

23 Ncholas Burns, Detenton Strans Already ense USurksh Relatons, Chrstan ScenceMontor, 15 July 2003.

24 Recep ayyp Erdoan: PM Barzan s a rbe Leader, Supports PKK, Hrryet, 6 August

2007.25 John Lee, KRG Expects Baghdad Ol Payment Next Week, Iraq Busness News, 24

September 2012.

26 See, Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy, p.234.

27 Durng the Fourth Congress o the rulng AKP (Ankara, 30 September 2012), Erdoansaddress to the KRG and the Presdent o the KRG was a vague call to hs Kurdsh brothers.

28 Scenesetter or Nechrvan Barzans Vst at http://wkleaks.org/cable/2008/05/08BAGHDAD1526.html [last vsted October 2012]; urkish DelegationMeets Iraqi President, Kurdistan PM at http://www.ekurd.net/msmas/artcles/msc2008/5/government1389.htm [last vsted March 2013].


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29 Intervew by the researcher wth Consul General o the Republc o urkey Aydn Selcen,Erbl, May 2012.

30 For nstance, Presdent Barzan was receved by Erdoan on 19 Aprl 2012, and by PresdentAbdullah Gl and Mnster o Foregn Aars AhmetDavutolu on 20 Aprl 2012, durng atwo-day ofcal vst to urkey to hold talks on blateral relatons and regonal developments.Ater that, Prme Mnster Nechrvan Barzan also met wth the urksh Mnster o ForegnAars on 4 June 2012 on the occason o hs partcpaton n the Internatonal EconomcForum.

31 Intervew by the researcher wth Head o Foregn Relatons n the Kurdstan RegonalGovernment n Iraq Falah Mustaa Bakr, Erbl, May 2012.

32 Intervew wth Aydn Selcen.

33 Intervew wth Falah Mustaa.

34 Baghdads current polcy s rather centralzed, and reects only Malks polcy. For nstance,we want Iraq to have a neutral polcy towards Syra and urkey, Intervew by the researcherwth Head o Foregn Relatons at Kurdstan Democratc Party Hemen Hawram, Erbl, 6September 2012.

35 Iraqs Deputy Prme Mnster Hussen al Shahrstan stated that ol contracts sgned by theKRG had to be rewrtten n Shahrstan Retans Hard Lne on KRG Ol Contracts, IraqBusness News, 12 October 2011.

36 Intervew wth Ahmed Denz.

37 Iraq Denes Vsa Request or urksh Opposton Leaders Krkuk Vst, odays Zaman, 15August 2012.

38 Intervew by the researcher wth Member o the Foregn Relatons Commttee o the urkshGrand Natonal Assembly (BMM) and Deputy Charman o the CHP Dr. Osman FarukLoolu, Istanbul, 29 Aprl 2012.


40 KR mported around US $5.5 bllon worth o goods rom urkey n 2011, makng theprovnce urkeys eghth-bggest export destnaton n Khour Al Rad, Kurds and urks:Busness as usual- For Now, Haaretz, 29 July 2012.


42 Intervew wth Ahmet Davutolu,AUC Caro Revew, Egypt, 12 March 2012.

43 Intervew wth Falah Mustaa Bakr.


45 Intervew wth Ahmet Davutolu.

46 I say that ths polcy has aled as a polcy t s not new the development o tradeand economc relatons wth our neghbours s a good thng (but) all o our problems wth


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our neghbours reman unresolved whle new troubles constantly arsets deteroratedrelatonshp wth Israel has dsqualed urkey rom playng any meanngul role n theMddle East peace process, Intervew wth Kemal Kldarolu, urksh Polcy Quarterly,

Vol. 9, No. 4 (11 March 2011), p. 27.

47 Bassem Francs, KRG Ol Revenueops US $2 Bllon, Debate Wth Baghdad Drags On,Al-Montor, 6 September 2012, at www.al-montor.com/pulse/busness/2012/09/raq-kurdsh-ol-revenue-exceed.html [last vsted 29 September 2012].

48 Intervew wth Falah Mustaa.


50 Intervew wth Hemen Hawram.

51 Intervew wth Osman aney Korutrk.

52 Intervew wth Dr. Osman Faruk Loolu.

53 CHPs anal Asks or AKPs Closure, Hrryet, 25 September 2012.

54 Majorty o urks avor Gl or presdent over Erdoan, odays Zaman, 25 September2012.

55 See, Charountak, Perspectves on Kurdstans Economy and Socety n ranston.

56 Intervew wth Dr. Osman Faruk Loolu.

57 Te AKP government promotes the dea, envsoned by the West, o creatng a Sunnte beltn the larger Mddle East regon and hopes or ts leadershp to create a strong ront aganstthe Sha, more precsely aganst Iran n Osman aney Korutrk, Arab Revoluton: ShouldWe Stll Call It Sprng?, urksh Polcy Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4 (29 Aprl 2012).

58 Recep ayyp Erdoan, Hrryet.

59 Barzan, Erdoan Fnd Common Ground Aganst Malk Government, odays Zaman, 20Aprl 2012.

60 Scenesetter or Nechrvan Barzans Vst; Some Sauds ear that the U.S. wants Iraq toreplace Saud Araba as ts key ol-producng partner n the Mddle East n Roy Gutman,As U.S. Departs Iraq, t Leaves wo Alles Tat Arent Speakng, McClatchy Newspapers,at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/12/18/133219/as-us-departs-raq-t-leaves-behnd.html, [last vsted 3 March 2013].

61 I urkey does not solve Kurdsh Issue n urkey, t cannot buld relatons based on mutualnterest wth KRG, Intervew by the researcher wth the coordnator o KJB (Koma JnenBllnd, Conederaton o Hgh Women)Fatma Dersm, Qandl, 8 September 2012.

62 See, Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy, pp. 249-250.

63 Lsa Anderson, A Comparatvsts Perspectve, Polty Forum, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Wnter 1996),pp. 307, 310.


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64 Jack Donnelly, Realsm and Internatonal Relatons, Cambrdge, Cambrdge Unversty Press,2000, p. 93.

65 See Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy, p. 14.66 Ibd, p. 250.

67 Ibd, p. 249.

68 Daphne Josseln, Back to the Front Lne; rade Unons n a Global Age, n DaphneJosseln and Wllam Wallace (eds.), Non-State Actors n World Poltcs,London and NewYork, Palgrave Macmllan, 2001.

69 See, Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy, p. 247.

70 Josseln, Back to the Front Lne, pp. 4- 5.

71 See, Charountak, Te Kurds and US Foregn Polcy, p.253.

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Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government