Turkish Development Policy in the Southeast, Reconstructing or Deconstructing the Kurdish Social Structure[1]

8/6/2019 Turkish Development Policy in the Southeast, Reconstructing or Deconstructing the Kurdish Social Structure[1]

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Turkish development policy in the southeast: Reconstructing or deconstructingthe Kurdish social structure

Dr Anthony DerisiotisTeaching staff,

Department of Turkish and Modern Asian studies,University of Athens

AbstractTurkeys ambition to develop its southeast provinces, by exploiting the waters of Tigris and Euphrates, through the Gneydou Anadolu Projesi, has beencharacterised as important, bold, difficult to implement, and controversial. From M. Kemal until R.T. Erdoan, the state has failed to gain the trust of the dominant Kurdish population in the southeast. The Kurds have been caught in the crossfirebetween the PKK and the Turkish army and have suffered the consequences. Turkeyis trying to rediscover its neglected southeast provinces through economicdevelopment. In the process it needs to reconstruct the Kurdish society and adapt it tothe new reality brought in the southeast by the GAP. Evidence shows that thereconstruction process tends to lean towards deconstruction of the rural social structure of the indigenous Kurdish population.

Keywords: Kurds, Turkey, dam, water, agriculture, energy, social structure

By the end of the 1990s the Turkish governments focused on stabilising the rapidly

developing, but volatile, economy of the state, on redefining Turkeys role as a

member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation especially in the Middle East- and

on pursuing the European integration of the state. Economic stability would push

forward Turkeys application for integration in the E.U.1; it would propel the

development of the country and push forward Turkey towards assuming a leading role

in the Middle East.

Achieving these targets is subject to a number of conditions. Political stability

and energy self-sufficiency are two equally important factors. Turkey has suffered by

the lack of them both in the 1970s and in the near past, when its ambitions where

hampered, in conjunction with the deadly earthquakes of 1999.


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The Gneydou Anadolu Projesi (GAP - Southeastern Anatolia Development

project), conceived in the mid-1960s, after the completion of the Keban dam, has been

the biggest development project ever undertaken by Turkey. Its importance lies in

agricultural production, hydroelectric power production, political stability and

reinforcement of the social structure. It consists of 22 dams and 19 hydropower

plants, and its target is to transform, up to 10% of the total state land mass in the

southeastern Turkish provinces to arable land and produce 27 billion kWh per annum.

Irrigating 1.7 million hectares2 in total, 1.1 in the valley of the Euphrates and a further

0.6 million in Tigris,3 is expected to double the agricultural production of the state and

to affect 25% of the population. The aim is to transform the GAP area to an Agro-

related Export Base.4 The regions basic activity will be export-oriented agriculture

and produce in excess of $4 billion5

The effects of such a project are neither simple, nor few, and certainly they

will not be only positive. It is not yet possible to assess the project in a holistic

manner, as the GAP is far from completed. Additionally, a project of this size will

continue to produce effects many years after it is completed. It is possible, however,

to assess its effects on the Kurdish population and its social structure in southeast

Turkey, to date, since a large part of the project has been completed and the big dams

have been operating for several years.

Brief history of southeast Turkey

Although the GAP is an economically oriented project, its role is multidimensional, as

it has serious socio-political effects, some of which derive from the actual economic

progress of the area that the government is targeting through the project. It is expected

that putting an end to traditional government policies, aiming at downgrading the


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area, and thus improving the living conditions of the local predominantly Kurdish

populations, will eventually ease their anti-Turkish feelings.

In 1984, when the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan)6 has officially began its

operations in Turkey,7 8 the local Kurds have suffered both from the separatist militia

and the Turkish armed forces, resulting to a rather negative view of their government

and of the PKK. They were caught in the crossfire and forced to choose sides and on

numerous occasions they suffered the consequences of the latter. The PKK is a

political organisation that has been performing terrorist acts. As such, its funding

comes from illegal activities, such as drug smuggling. For a certain period of time, the

Kurdish mafia of Istanbul and of west European countries has been promoting the

organisation.9

The 1980s were difficult years for the southeast Turkish provinces. PKK and

Turkish army offensives reached their peak between 1987-1989. During that time, the

Kurdish extremist guerrillas killed a large number of soldiers, and whole families of

landowners, including women and children in the provinces of Mardin, iirt and

Hakkar10 On the other hand, the army responded in an equally brutal manner. The

governments reasoning was that only if the Kurds are more afraid of Ankara, will the

army be able to defeat the PKK. Such a strategy would probably be successful in a

prosperous society that would actually have something to lose. However, such was the

state of the Kurds in the southeastern provinces, especially after the 1980 coup detat

that further hardened government intervention in the area that it could only work in

favour of the PKK guerrillas.11

The 1990s brought some changes in the conflict. The president at the time was

Turgut zal,12who reformed the state policy in the Kurdish areas, through a political

approach of the Kurds in the southeast, by abolishing law 293213

in 1991.14

He also


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proceeded in censuring the role of the armed forces in the southeast and in proposing

the transmission of Kurdish programs from GAPs radio and television channel. He

even attempted to approach the PKK through dialogue with the pro-kurdish political

parties Demokrasi Partisi (DEP, Democracy Party) and Halkn Emek Partisi(HEP,

Popular Workers Party). This innovative attitude towards the Kurdish issue was not

welcomed by the Turkish elite, however, A. Oalan, in his interview to journalist

Mehmet Ali Birand on March 1991, commented on the legalisation of the Kurdish

language: To tell the truth, I did not expect him to display such courageIn this

context he shamed usHe has taken an important step.15

In December 1991, Prime Minister S. Demirel with members of the

government and the Chief of the Turkish Army General Staff, Gen. Doan Gre

toured the southeast provinces of Turkey in order to underline the kurdish reality16

in Turkey.17 1993 marks the death of president zal and his innovative policies. Tansu

iller is elected prime minister and vows to continue the war against the PKK. In an

attempt to cut off the supplies of the terrorists, the government proceeded in the

forceful relocation of the inhabitants of the Kurdish villages. This attempt reaches its

peak in the autumn of 1994 when, during a search for PKK members, the army

destroyed thirty Kurdish villages in the Tunceli province.18

What needs to be noted at this point, is that although the conservative turkish

elite supports the traditional kemalist nationalistic approach, zals policies, have

brought some changes in the political view of the kurdish issue, although in a very

slow manner. The turkish armed forces continued to operate in the southeast after

S.Demirel succeded the late president zal as head of state and Turkey, based on the

Lausanne Treaty,19 maintained its invariable policy of granting minority status only to

the non-Muslim populations. However, towards the end of the decade, a revised


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policy towards the kurds of the southeast was clearly needed; a fact that was

becoming more pressing due to Turkeys pursued european integration.

The continuous clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK guerrillas

underlined the need for fundamental changes in the southeast. One of the main causes

of the conflict, that has begun in the late 1970s, is the constant economic stagnation of

the southeast provinces. Under these circumstances, thawing kurdish nationalism and

integrating the local population into the turkish society seemed impossible. This

situation and Turkeys need to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel after the 1970s

crisis were the trigger for the conception of the Gneydou Anadolu Projesi. The two

leading figures in the project were Turgut zal and Suleyman Demirel. The late

president was an engineer and during his political career he studied the potential of

the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. Mr Demirel, on the other hand, was a hydraulic

engineer and eventually he became the head of the Devlet Su leri(DS Directorate

of State Water Works). His long and turbulent political career was set back twice by

the military coup detats of 1971 and 1980. His political views have always

overlapped with Turkeys needs for alternative energy sources, especially during the

tough years of the 1970s. He worked hard to develop hydropower in Turkey and to

complete several irrigation projects. His initial occupation, as the Head of the

Directorate of State Water Works earned him the nickname King of the dams. Even

today, there is still nothing that can excite Mr Demirel as a well built dam.20

Positive effects

The Southeastern Anatolia Development Project failed to meet its initial deadline that

was set at 2005. The new deadline was set at 2030,21

although most of the major water


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projects have been completed and according to theGAP Master Plan they focus in

four major points:

i. Develop and manage soil and water resources for irrigation, industrial and

urban uses in an efficient manner;

ii. Improve land use through optimal cropping patterns and agricultural practises;

iii. Promote agro-industry and other types of industry based on indigenous

resources;

iv. Provide better social services, education and employment opportunities to

control migration and to attract qualified personnel to the area.22

There is little doubt that the first three components of the GAP Master Plan will be

met eventually, since this is a primarily water related project in an agricultural region

and its direct results will involve water and agriculture as well as energy production.

The example of the anlurfa-Harran plains provides a clear view of the potential of

the project. A pilot irrigation scheme was applied and the results were impressive: the

annual production from $31.5 million rose to $120.6, while cropping intensity

increased from 89% to 134%.23

Also, there is little doubt that major changes will be taking place as far as the

local population is concerned. As a result of rapid population increase and rural-to-

urban migration there is more pressure on existing urban infrastructure; a fact that

gives rise to many social and economic problems. Difficult subsistence in rural areas

and perceived attractiveness of urban centres are globally the leading reasons

motivating rural people to migrate. The same is applicable in the case of the GAP

region, but there are also, scores of local inhabitants that have been forced to migrate


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locally and nationally, as their homes and land were lost under the waters of the

reservoirs. Urbanisation has and will continue to hit most of the remaining

settlements, villages and towns and their population will continue to rapidly increase.

Building roads, industrial estates and housing projects, ensuring that the dams

will be accompanied by water treatment, wastewater and sewerage projects is the first

step towards the upgrading of the infrastructure. A number of cities were the first in

line to benefit from the various related projects. Sewage network implementation

projects have been completed in 27 settlements in Adyaman, Batman, Gaziantep,

Diyarbakr, Mardin, iirt, Sanlurfa and rnak.24 There is also the "GAP Region

Transport and Infrastructure Project" (BUA), dated 1991, that aimed at developing

sewage, drinking water supply, wastewater treatment, solid waste management,

electricity and telecommunication projects for 45 settlements in the region, whose

population was expected to reach or exceed 10,000 in 2005.25 This project consists of

134 sub-projects, has been completed and is fully operational.

Also, an inovative project for the "Treatment of Urban Wastewater in Small

and Medium Size Settlements and its Use for Agricultural Irrigation in the GAP

Region" was developed, as a pilot initiative to improve irrigation with wastewater.

The project is the first of its kind in Turkey and it aims at tackling, through recycling,

the problems emanating from the heavy pressure put on available water resources by

rapid population growth, industrialisation, uncontrolled and unplanned

urbanisation.26Additionally, there is the "GAP Urban Sanitation and Planning

Project". Its objective is to provide integrated planning for the socioeconomic

development of the GAP region and ensure that urban infrastructure can cope up with

steadily growing urban centres and urbanisation in the region. The project covers

Solid Waste Management in Diyarbakr, anlurfa, Mardin and Siverek; drinking


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water treatment plants in 56 settlements; establishment of an Urban Planning and

Geographical Information System in Diyarbakr and rehabilitation of existing

drinking water supply networks in Viranehir and Kabala.27

The above projects are parts of the necessary infrastructure works that need to

accompany a large scale development project, such as the GAP. A number of these

are still pilot-scale projects and it remains to be seen whether and when they will be

expanded and how much of the GAP region they will be covering.

As far as the health sector is concerned, there has been improvement, fuelled

also by the World Bank,28 mainly in terms of infrastructure; however, the region is

still well under the countrys average health services. Additionally, according to the

GAP Health Sector Implementation Plan, health problems of the region cannot be

abstracted from those of the country. The various problems29 need to be addressed in a

holistic manner otherwise it will not be possible to extend the services needed by the

region.30

Industrial development has taken several steps forward. Between 1995 and

2000 industries in the southeast have doubled and have been increasing continuously

since then. There are 11 Organized Industry Zones (OSB) and 25 Small Industry

Zones (KSS) in the GAP Region, while more are under construction.31 Also, the

largest international cargo airport of Turkey was completed and is operational since

2006, in anlurfa.

Transportation projects and the road network of the GAP region were also in

need of development. Today, there are 28,420km of village roads, of which 26.7% is

asphalted, 49.2% is stabilised and 20.7% is levelled. Over 98% of the villages have

been connected to the main road network.32 The 196km anlurfa-Gaziantep

motorway, including the Gaziantep ring-road, has been completed; it constitutes the


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main artery of transportation in the region and its cost rose to $580.000.00033 Also, by

the end of 2007, a six-way motorway will connect the Mersin harbour to anlurfa.34

In the southeast there are six more airports operating (Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakr,

Gaziantep, Mardin, iirt), apart from the anlurfa international cargo airport. Two

main railway projects have been planned in 1991, the 469 km long Southern line,

including a 137 km long Nizip-Birecik-Sanliurfa line 35 and the "Mardin Free Trade

Zone Railway". However, there has yet been no spending for the "Southern Line", due

to resource constraints.36

Negative effects

Large scale, multidimensional development projects will always have their negative

side. The weaknesses usually emanate from the sheer size of the project; since it is

very difficult to keep everything under control, something is bound to go wrong.

However, occasionally there are other factors of negativity, deriving from corruption

within the state officials, powerful private interests and even negligence from the

state.

The GAP is no exception to the rule. It is difficult to assess its negative, as

well as its positive effects in a holistic manner since it is not complete and fully

operational yet. Therefore, one can assess the negative effects from parts of the

project that are already in operation, and can speculate on parts that are either under

construction or still at the drawing board.

The negative effects of the GAP relate to several aspects of the project, such

as agriculture, the environment, the cultural heritage and the political and socio-

economic reality.


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Agriculture is the primary, therefore the water projects are to take advantage

of the potential of the land and to improve the quality and quantity of agro-related

products. However, in order to construct the dams, large land surfaces are flooded,

farmland and villages are submerged and villagers are forcibly relocated. The rural

population of the southeast, predominantly Kurds, are farmers. Losing their land and

getting compensation was never a solution. On the one hand, the compensation was

never going to be enough; on the other, the loss for these people is not just a piece of

their assets, but their means to live and prosper. To quote an example:

Before we had work, animals. Now there is nothing. What are we to eat or

drink? We had to move in to an unfinished house. The girls have grown up

now and could work. But there is no work. We have no land. All our land is

flooded. The compensation is not even what we would earn in one harvest of

our pistachios. I feel like crying .37

Villagers like Ms Nahiya Baak, a Kurdish woman from a village near the Birecik

dam on the Euphrates, were forced to leave their houses when the Birecik reservoir

was filling up. They were given one months notice before their villages were

submerged. These, however, are the lucky ones. A large number of local farmers,

either do not possess the deeds of their land, or did not have land of their own and

used to work on the farmland of local landowners, either subletting land or as

workers. These people are left with nothing to do, as the land they used to cultivate is

submerged and the landowners got the state compensation.38 Instead they were forced

to move to nearby hills in new settlements that were built to relocate them. Problems

occurred in this as well, since the need was for 2000 houses and they got only 200.39

It


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is clear therefore that the local people not only lost their way of life and got a small

compensation or nothing at all, but they were also deprived of every incentive to

remain in the area. The international guidelines state that any resettlement plan should

involve local people as early as possible in the project40

It is understood that the GAP is aiming at the development of agriculture and,

in the big picture, at the economic development of the region. In the meantime,

though, more Kurdish families are forced to relocate from southeast Anatolia, having

lost their homes and the land they used to cultivate.

Environmentally, large projects that involve major intervention on land and

the water resources of an area will always be considered controversial. The flora and

fauna of a region is developed according to the existing particular characteristics. An

arid or semi-arid area can be transformed to fertile through the effects of a dam, but

the existing bio-environmental balance will be shattered. The fact that a new climate

is developed does not mean that the life forms that were indigenous to the area can

survive the changes. Moreover, there are issues on the reservoir water quality, which

affects directly the people through the food chain, sedimentation of the reservoir, etc,

that need to be addressed, otherwise a dam can become a serious problem. This kind

of human intervention on nature is done in the name of development and in order to

improve living conditions for the local people. Nevertheless, as far as the existing bio-

environment is concerned, the impacts are major.

Negative impacts of the project have occurred also at the cultural level. Due to

the importance of the Mesopotamian plain in history, the impacts cannot be limited to

the ones referring to the Kurds. The Birecik dam reservoir has flooded the site of the

ancient city of Zeugma (gr. ) on the lower parts of the Euphrates basin in the

year 2000. It is believed that Zeugma was built by Greeks around 300BC, in the train


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of the conquest of the region by Alexander the Great.41 There are mixed feelings about

the Zeugma case. On the one hand, an important historical and archaeological site is

lost, on the other, had the dam not been built, no excavations would have taken place

in the area. According to archaeologist L. Scofield, if it werent for the dam, an

important part of the site would have never been discovered.42 British and Turkish

archaeologists raced against time to excavate as much of the area as possible and

managed to retrieve a lot of artefacts, mainly ancient greek and roman, and a number

of well preserved mosaics. All of the above were moved to the museum of Gaziantep.

However, the largest part of the city was submerged before it could be excavated.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence on other potentially important sites of

archaeological and historical interest that might have been submerged by the waters of

the dams.

The lisu dam case

Prior to the analysis of all the above data, in relation to the impact of the Southeastern

Anatolia Project on the Kurdish population, there is one particular case that needs to

be addressed separately.

The lisu dam project has been noted as the most controversial of the GAP

dams. It is a 138-high earth-fill dam and a hydro-electrical power plant, on the Tigris

basin in the province of Mardin, designed for energy production.43 It is regarded as the

centrepiece of the GAP on the Tigris basin and it is planned to be constructed in an

area inhabited by Kurds; the latter defines its controversial character. There were a

number of issues concerning the dam that attracted negative attention from the public

and NGOs and even caused a stir in the British government in 2000, since PM Tony

Blair gave the go-ahead to its Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) to fund


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the project, despite the negative report published by the International Development

Select Committee, on 12 July 2000.

The number of people expected to be forcibly relocated due to the dam

reservoir is between 19000 and 34000 people44 with the 25000 benchmark as the most

probable number. There were serious objections on the Resettlement Action Plan

(RAP) and the Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) prepared for the

lisu dam project, especially after the comments made upon the former by Dr A.

Kudat, a former World Bank expert, acting as a consultant for the Swiss ECA,

Exportsrisikogarantie (ERG). The main issue that raised concerns on the Kudat report,

was the fact that not much had been accomplished in terms of the resettlement of the

affetced people and the environmental impacts of the dam, based on World Bank

standards and international practice.45 As far as the EIAR is concerned, there was

extensive vagueness on what was going to be done as well as on the when and

how it would be done.

The next serious issue was that of the city of Hasankeyf, largely considered as

one of the most important archaeological sites in Turkey.46 The lisu dam reservoir,

highly contested by archaeologists, human rights organisations and the local people,

will flood the ancient town, that contains 22 listed monuments, including among

others, remains of mosques,47 castles, a citadel and a bridge within the city, as well as

500 highly valued caves and countless cave dwellings in the hills surounding it-most

of which have not been analysed by archaeologists.48 The 10000 year-old town and

the surrounding area is vital to kurdish history; flooding it will destroy traditions and

customs the Kurds have been living with for centuries. According to the EIAR

Kurdish settlements can be traced after a migration from Western Persia around

2,500 years ago.


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The consortium appointed to built the dam, collapsed on the 13th of November

2001, when the Swedish firmSkanska, with a 24 percent stake in the consortium,

withdrew under the pressure from swedish, british and international human rights

organisations, quickly followed by the british civil engineering firm, Balfour Beatty.

The end of the consortium saved the Blair government from embarassment, after

initially deciding in favour of funding the project, despite its controversial character,

and receiving a lot of pressure, within Britain.

Since May 2004, a new consortium of German, Austrian and French

companies lead by Austrian VA Tech / Siemens is getting together to build the

discredited dam. It is not clear, yet, where the funding for the project will come from.

So far, two export credit agencies have been approached for supporting the project

ERG (Exportkreditgarantie) in Switzerland and OeKB (Oesterreichische

Kontrollbank) in Austria.49 The worrying thing is that it seems that nothing has

changed in the initial RAP and EIAR and the concerns about the resettlement of the

Kurdish population of the area, as well as the negative environmental impacts have

not been addressed. A new organised round of protests is getting set by several NGOs,

some of which were involved in the 2000-2001 campaigns.

At this point, it is important to clear a serious misunderstanding regarding the

impacts of the lisu dam project. It is understood that there are a lot of inconsistencies

and faults in this project. There are, however, two issues mentioned in the

bibliography, which are not in direct relation to the scope of this paper, that do not

correspond to reality. There are referrences to the impacts the dam will have on the

water flow to Syria and Iraq. The river Tigris, however, does not cross through Syrian

soil. It only forms the border between Turkey and Syria for approximately 40 km,

before it enters Iraqi soil. At the point where it runs along the borderline, none of the


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two countries can exploit the river flow. Therefore there will be no direct impact on

the water flow for Syria, since there is no part of the river basin running through

Syrian territory. The second issue, is about water from the reservoir being used in

agriculture within Turkey. This is false as well, as the lisu dam is not planned for

irrigation. Its purpose is limited to power generation.

In conclusion, the lisu dam is rightfully considered highly controversial, due

to the many weaknesses surfacing on its environmental and cultural impacts as well as

the vagueness of the resettlement plan drawn by the Turkish government. The first

attempt to construct it was cancelled when the international consortium backed down

due to political pressure from NGOs. There is a second consortium brought together

just 3 years later, although the funding hurdle is yet to be sorted out. It seems that the

question today is when rather than whether- the dam will be constructed. If this

second consortium fails to secure the funding or to find a construction company with

the capacity of completing such a project -hence it collapses- the Turkish government

can always rely on the domestic-based formula that supported the construction of the

Atatrk dam. The importance lies on finding ways to address the inconsistencies of

the dam, regarding the Kurdish population, and the serious environmental impacts.

Whether that would mean building the dam wall on a different location, addressing

the problems in an effective way, or scrapping the project altogether, remains to be

seen.

Conclusions

In Turkey there is a feeling that for the last 20 years things have been continuously

changing in the southeast of the country, largely due to the development project

pursued by the state.


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In fact, Turkey has began much earlier searching for areas of potential that it

could exploit, in order to avoid the hardships caused by the 1970s energy crisis, that

brought its economy down to its knees. The waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates

revealed enormous possibilities in the energy and agricultural sector, thus the

Southeastern Anatolia Development Project was conceived. In the process, problems

of the past surfaced, ailing policies revealed their inconsistencies and the need for

solutions became more pressing. It was clear that the development of the southeast

and the change of policy towards the Kurdish population in the area were parts of the

same problem and needed to be addressed as such.

The GAP began as a water-related project, targeting energy production and

agriculture, and soon was transformed into a multidimensional project, aiming at

creating an environment in which the people of the region can fully translate their

potential and preferences into actual life. Thus, besides investments geared towards

the development of water and land resources, social principles that contribute to the

quality of life such as fairness, equity and participation, environmental protection,

improvement of land use and integrated provision of infrastructural services were

integrated in the project.

Consequently, a project of this size and content would essentially alter a lot

more things than the fertility of the soil. Apart from the economics and the foreign

policy issues that have strained Turkeys relations with Syria and Iraq, it actually,

affects, and will continue to do so in the near and distant future, the social structure of

the area. The Turkish governments embarked on an effort to redefine the conditions of

social formation in the southeast provinces.


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However, the question was not whether Turkey is planning to intervene in the

social structure, but to what extent and how positive would it be for the indigenous

Kurdish population.

It is true that the development of much needed infrastructure is a positive step.

One could argue though, that the works on health, transportation, the industrial zones,

the waste water management projects etc, were essential for the region, regardless of

the benefit the Kurds could obtain from them. In other words, all that has been done

and that will be done in the future were going to be done anyway and not specifically

for the benefit of the local population, but to attract businesses and investments. Even

so, the local population would still benefit. However, there are weaknesses in the

governments approach and they are causing serious problems to the Kurdish

population. Masses of rural Kurds have been forced to relocate, losing all they

possessed due to the dams and getting at best a small state compensation. Most of

them have moved to the big cities and holiday resorts of the western coast,

abandoning for good the southeast, in search for a source of income. It seems that the

infrastructure that was planned for the rural population, which is predominantly

Kurdish, will not benefit them much after all. Instead, big landowners and the food

and cotton industry will profit from it, since the government aims at an industrially-

oriented form of agriculture. Furthermore, the potential flooding of the lisu reservoir

that will sink the city of Hasankeyf and the importance of the latter to the kurdish

tradition and history, eliminates the possibility of future generations of Kurds to

return to their birthland, since the very monuments that defined it as birthland will

cease to exist.

Another question that arises is why has the lisu dam been the only project

pursued so actively by international and local NGOs, when several of the criteria that


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render it controversial can be traced in other projects of the GAP? To add to the

confusion, some of the big dams were funded by the World Bank, like the Karakaya,

or partially financed by foreign banks, like the Birecik. The answer rests within the

theoretical framework of reflexive modernity.50 In a more simple way, one could say

that awareness of the consequences of the dams increased rapidly in the mid-1980s

and early 1990s. This would explain why the Birecik dams negative impacts have

partially surfaced, largely due to the fact that it was the last of the big dams to be

constructed, from 1995 to 2000. The Keban dates back in the early 70s while the

Karakaya and the Atatrk were completed in 1988 and 1990 respectively.

Additionally, the construction of the last two dams began in 1976 and 1983, at a time

that large dams were elements of national pride, rather than irrigation and power

production tools. Another reason that explains why the lisu dam was the single dam

to be rendered controversial, is the involvement of Export Credit Agenies (ECA), at a

time when both the Convention on the non-Navigational Uses of International

Watercources and the World Commission on Dams (WCD) guidelines existed in their

final form, providing the opposition with legal grounds to condemn the project.

All of the above is evidence that prove the extent of the effects of the GAP

project on the social structure of the Kurdish population in the southeast. The Turkish

governments probably overlooked the importance of the cohesion of the Kurdish

population in the rural southeast, also due to the lack of rhetoric against the

construction of the first dams. There is still ground for improvement, but the evidence

coming from the second attempt to construct the lisu dam is all but positive. A

number of factors, such as the participation of all the social classes in the decision-

making process, equality before the law and among all the populations, the


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enhancement of the structure of the local population and the utilisation of the local

manpower, should be perceived as principles and be taken into serious consideration.

Applying the GAP project in the arid land of southeast Turkey required

planning and constructing numerous -large and small- projects at an enormous cost

and a time span of a few decades at least; nevertheless, it will always be merely a

technical issue. However, integrating the local population in the new reality brought

in by the project, and doing so with the least possible difficulty proves much harder,

especially under the status of the southeast in the last 30 years. The war between the

PKK and the Turkish army, the despicable acts from either side of the conflict, A.

alans arrest, the unilateral cease-fire from the PKK in 1999 and its reactivation 5

years later, consist of enormous obstacles in the process of an effort that would

already be very difficult in ideal circumstances.

The Turkish government has the obligation to form a social structure, based on

the previously mentioned principles that will easily adapt and progress in an

environment largely developed and supported by the GAP. Constructing dams,

digging irrigation channels, producing Gwh of electric power, even developing the

much needed infrastructure, will not produce long term results in the economic and

political stability of the region, neither will it promote its integration with the rest of

the country, unless there is a society that understands its role and the GAPs role,

accepts the projects importance and it is willing to work towards it.


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1 Despite Turkeys ongoing accession negotiations with the EU and despite the fact that the problems that have risen(Turkey refuses to open its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and airplanes, although Cyprus is an EU full member) aremainly political, the economic stability of the state is not yet certain.2 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Tigris Euphrates, at http://www.MFA.gov.tr/foreignpolicy/tigris-euphrates.html, p.10.3 A.Nachmani, Water Jitters in the Middle East,Mideast Security and Policy Studies, Vol. 32 (1997) BESA Center for Strategic Studies, p.82.4 J.Kolars, Problems of International River Management, in A.Biswas, International Waters of the Middle East (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 66.5 J.A.Allan and C. Mallat (Eds),Water in the Middle East: Legal, Political and Commercial Implications,(London:I.B.Tauris, 1995) p.2046 The PKK, alas Kurdistan Workers Party, was founded by a group of seven people, under the lead of Abd Allah alan, based on a Marxist-Leninist ideological framework and was aiming at a Kurdish nationalist movement. Their initial namewas Apocular , which meant those that follow Apo, aka A. alan.7 The PKK has actually been operating in the southeast of Turkey since 1978, but the official declaration of war was in1984.8 E.J., Zrcher, , (: , 2004) p. 403.9 N.B. Criss, The nature of PKK terrorism in Turkey inStudies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 18 (1995), p. 17-37.10 D., McDowall, A modern history of the Kurds, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000) p.423.11 Ibid., p. 424.12 zal and his successor in the presidency of Turkey, S. Demirel, conceived the idea of the GAP.13 Law 2932 was forbidding the use of the Kurdish language14 H. Poulton, , , (: , 2000) p..276.15 M.A., Birand, Interview with Abdullah calan,Milliyet , 25 March 1991, p. 26-29, in M.M. Gunter,The Kurds of Iraq,(N.York: St Martins Press, 1992) p. 102.16 The fact that the restrictions in the publication of Kurdish newspapers and other printed documents were lifted, whilegovernment funding would be given for the founding of the Kurdish Institute.17 Op. cit., H. Poulton, pp.280-281.18 Ibid, p.27219 The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne provides minority status only to the non-Muslim populations of Turkey. Based on thisTreaty, the Turkish state never recognised the Kurds as a minority group.20 Anon..,Charlemagne: Demirel, Top Turk , The Economist, July 24th-30th 1999, p. 44.21 W. Scheumann, Conflicts on the Euphrates W. Scheumann and M.Schiffler (Eds.)Water in the Middle East: Potentials for conflicts and prospects for co-operation(: Springer Publications 1998) . 118.22

.H.O. nver, Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) inWater resources Development 13: 4 (1997), pp. 459-460.23 Ibid., p.464.24 GAP Regional Development Administration, cited at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Altyapi/etudt2.html, 2007/10/04.25 GAP Regional Development Administration, cited at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Altyapi/etudt1.html, 2007/10/0426 GAP Regional Development Administration, cited at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Altyapi/etudt6.html, 2007/10/04.27 GAP Regional Development Administration, cited at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Altyapi/etudt5.html, 2007/10/0428 I.H.O. nver, Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), p. 465.29 Such as the coordination of the health sector, reorganising the health services, ensuring the consistency of the relevantlegislation, adapting criteria related to the selection of structure, investment and project, financing, etc30 GAP Regional Development Administration, cited at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Saglik/sorunos.html, 2007/10/0431 GAP Regional Development Administration, cited at http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Yatirim/yatirimo_say.htm,2007/10/0432 GAP Status Report , Prime Ministry of Turkey Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, p.14.33 Profiles of Turkish Public Sector Projects for Foreign Funding in 2001, T. R. Prime Ministry State PlanningOrganisation, General Directorate of Economic Sectors and Coordination Department of Project, Investment Evaluation andAnalysis, April 2001, p. 58.34 Latest situation on Southeast Anatolia Project Activities of the GAP administration, GAP, Republic of Turkey, PrimeMinistry, GAP-RDA, June 2006, p.535 It will connect Nizip - Birecik - Sanliurfa - Viransehir - Mardin - Nusaybin - Cizre- Iraq border (Habur). The main reasonfor this new railway line was to bring the existing Cobanbey-Karkamis-Nusaybin-Syria line, which runs parallel to theSyrian border up to north so as to connect it to the leading centers of the region and to ensure higher-standard and moreeconomic transportation of agro based industrial goods and such mines as phosphate and coal.36 GAP Regional Development Administration, cited at http://gap.gov.tr/English/ulas.html, 2007/10/04


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Documents

Turkish Development Policy in the Southeast, Reconstructing or Deconstructing the Kurdish Social Structure[1]