Turkey Terrorism

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Royal United Services Instute

OCCASIONAL PAPER

Edited by James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron

COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Turkeys Added Value


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About the Study

Support for this study was provided by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Aairs, who in

partnership with RUSI, held a conference in March 2009 entled Combang Internaonal

Terrorism: Turkeys Added Value. The event provided an opportunity for a bilateral

exchange on counter-terrorism best pracce between the UK and Turkey, as well as a

relevant forum to discuss the various dimensions of the terrorist threat in Turkey and thecountrys response to it.

This RUSI European Security Programme study is intended to look back on some of these

themes and the evoluon of the debate.

About RUSI

The Royal United Services Instute (RUSI) is an independent think tank engaged in cung

edge defence and security research. A unique instuon, founded in 1831 by the Duke of

Wellington, RUSI embodies nearly two centuries of forward thinking, free discussion andcareful reecon on defence and security maers.

For more informaon, please visit: www.rusi.org

About the European Security Programme

The European Security Programme is concerned with leading research projects, private

discussion meengs and public conferences on all aspects of European Security and Defence.

The Programmes main research interests relate to the development of European military

capabilies, the EUs European Security and Defence Policy, NATO transformaon and

NATO-EU relaons, as well as internaonal defence partnerships and military operaons.

RUSI is commied as part of the European Security Programme to a comprehensive

analysis of polical and military issues in the eastern Mediterranean. To this end, the

Instute launched the Eastern Mediterranean Forum in 2008.

Eastern Mediterranean Forum

Since its incepon the Forum has taken on research projects, oered analysis and facilitated

a dialogue on a wide range of topics that are relevant to this important region. The Forum

aims to engage decision-makers and other stakeholders in round table discussions,seminars and conferences in London and the region, and establish a regular dialogue

covering key issues to enhance relaons between neighbours.

www.rusi.org/europe/

Printed by Stephen Ausn & Sons Ltd


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Combang Internaonal TerrorismTurkeys Added Value

Edited by James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron

Occasional Paper, October 2009

www.rusi.org


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The views expressed in this paper are the authors own, and do not necessarily reect those of RUSI or anyother instuons to which the authors are associated.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Alastair Cameron , Head, EuropeanSecurity Programme, Royal United Services Instute, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, United Kingdom, or viaemail to [email protected]


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Contents

Foreword v

Turkeys Vision of Combang Terrorism 1

Inan Ozyildiz

Some Perspecves on Turkeys Counter-Terrorism Strategy 4

Yonah Alexander

The Dimensions of the Terrorist Threat in Turkey 6

Jim McKee

PKK Terrorism in Turkey 9

Nihat Ali zcan

Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and Syria 13

hsan Bal

Protecng the Key Naonal Ulies and Energy Infrastructure 16

Mitat elikpala

Protecon of Energy Infrastructure 19

Gareth M Winrow

Counter-Terrorism, Polical Reform and EU Condionality 22

Glnur Aybet

Turkeys Strategic Posion and the Need for Dialogue 26

James Ker-Lindsay


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vv

Arguably, there is no other country with quitethe range of experience of terrorism and policalviolence as Turkey. Over the course of the past fourdecades, the country has grappled with extreme leand right-wing groups. Indeed, it was the growingprevalence of these organisaons that led to themilitary intervenon in 1980. However, Turkey hasalso experienced other forms of terrorist acvies.Some of these have been a part and parcel of theemergence of militant Islamic-inspired terrorism,

both indigenous and exogenous. The massivebomb in Istanbul, in 2003, which injured over 700people, was the most prominent example of this.But Turkey has also been the vicm of other aacks.In the 1980s, a number of Turkish diplomats weremurdered by the Armenian Secret Army for theLiberaon of Armenia (ASALA). More recently,the country has found itself drawn into regionalconicts. For example, Chechen terrorist groupshave staged operaons in Turkey.

However, perhaps the most notable bale Turkeyhas fought against terrorism has been againstthe separast guerrillas of the Kurdistan WorkersParty, the PKK. Listed as a terrorist organisaonin the UK, US and the EU, it rst emerged as asignicant insurgent organisaon in 1984, waging amulfaceted terrorist campaign against the Turkishstate and society. The bier and bloody ghngseen in the south eastern provinces forced manythousands of people from their village homes into

the major cies of Turkey, which in turn has seenthe emergence of more tradional terrorist taccs,such as bombings and shoongs. This has not onlysought to insl fear into the hearts of ordinaryTurkish cizens, the bombing of tourist resortshas been a deliberate aack on the economy. Andalthough a ceasere was called in the campaign in1999, when Abdullah calan, the terrorist leaderwas captured, since 2004 the group has once againcome to the fore.

Up unl recently, Turkeys trials and tribulaons incombang these terrorist groups was given lileaenon by its partners in the West. In large part,these issues were seen as domesc in nature.

To be sure, they were a sign of a troubled polity,but were never seen as anything that the Turkishauthories could not handle by themselves withminimal external involvement. In this sense, thereis more than an element of truth in the tle used byAndrew Mango in his book on Turkey and terrorism,Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years WeFought Alone.

This collecon of papers is an aempt to draw

together some of the latest thinking about waysin which Turkey can and should cooperate with itsinternaonal partners in tackling terrorism. Drawnfrom a conference held at the Royal United ServicesInstute in March 2009, it explores a wide rangeof topics, ranging from the ways in which Turkey isseeking to secure its energy infrastructure, throughto the ways in which it has built a co-operaverelaonship with neighbours who once supportedterrorist acvies in Turkey. The conferencediscussions were based at the me on the UKslong-term CONTEST strategy and its four mainpillars: PREPARE, PURSUE, PREVENT and PROTECTas they applied to Turkey, bringing experts togetherto explore the issues and ways of tackling them.

About the Papers

In the opening paper, Minister Inan Ozyildiz explainsthe profound nature of the threat posed to Turkeyby all manner of terrorist organisaons, and builds astrong argument for the internaonal communitys

connued assistance in helping Turkey to eradicateterrorism through the variety of security and co-operave frameworks available.

Yonah Alexander then oers some introductorythoughts on the queson of terrorism in generalbefore opening up the examinaon of the waysin which Turkey, in parcular has been aected byinternaonal terrorism.

The sheer variety of terrorist organisaons in Turkey

is a point stressed by Jim McKee in his contribuon.However, as he also notes, the Turkish Governmentneeds to concentrate on tackling the real threats,rather than perhaps become sidetracked with

Foreword


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other issues. At the same me, he notes that the

Turkish Government is also making great strides inlearning from its past mistakes and recognising thattackling the threat of terrorism requires aenonto be paid to wider economic and social factors.

From the start of the 1970s, Turkey has encountereda wide number of terrorist organisaons. Thelongest lasng, most well-known and best organisedof these has been the Kurdistan Workers Party, thePKK. In his arcle, Nihat Ali zcan examines andanalyses the development and evoluon of the

PKK, exploring its polical objecves and strategiesin order to explain the current situaon and thefuture of the PKK issue in Turkey.

One of the most remarkable diplomactransformaons to have taken place in the pastdecade has been Turkeys relaonship withSyria and Iran. For many years these countrieswere acve supporters of terrorist movementsin Turkey. However, today, Turkey maintains aclose relaonship with both countries. IhsanBal examines how this transformaon occurred,showing the degree to which it relied on the fullrange of polical techniques from the threat of theuse of force, through to economic co-operaon andcultural interacon.

In his contribuon, Mitat Celikpala examines thegrowing importance of energy as a security factorand explores the very real dangers posed by terroristorganisaons to oil and gas pipelines, most notably

the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline that runs thoughTurkey. As he notes, while steps have been takento improve the security of crical infrastructuresin Turkey, policy makers need to give the issue farmore thought and invesgate the possibilies forgreater public-private co-operaon in this sphere.

Following on from this, Gareth Winrow explains

how aenon has increasingly been paid to theprotecon of energy infrastructure in Turkey frompossible terrorist aack. In addion to oil and gaspipelines and their associated facilies, he stressesthat aenon must also be paid to the substanaloil tanker trac navigang the Bosporus. Hisarcle also refers to NATOs increasing interest inenergy security, and the possible signicance ofthis for Turkey.

In her contribuon, Gulnur Aybet explores the

ways in which the process of Turkeys accessionto the European Union can shape counter-terrorism eorts in Turkey. There is lile doubtthat the reforms required for EU integraon canhelp to migate some of the underlying causes ofdiscontent in the country. However, the eventualsuccess of these eorts is not just predicated onpolical will inside Turkey, but also on support forTurkish membership from outside. In this sense,the longer term bale against terrorism requiresTurkey and the EU to work closely with one another.

The concluding contribuon by James Ker-Lindsaylooks at the wider queson of Turkeys place in theworld, and how this will shape the debate overcounter-terrorism. It argues that Turkey is, in threedisnct senses, a vital transit country. First of all,it is an increasingly important route for energycoming to Europe and beyond. Secondly, it is alsoseen as an important transit point for terroristgroups. Thirdly, it is also a vital link in terms of

ideas, acng as a bridge between the West andthe Islamic world. In a very real sense therefore,Turkey is a key country in the global ght againstterrorism. However, in order to pursue an eecvecounterterrorism strategy, there quite clearlyneeds to be greater dialogue between Turkey andits internaonal partners.


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Turkeys Vision of Combang Terrorism

Inan Ozyildiz

Over the last thirty years, the ght against terrorismhas been one of the priories of the successivegovernments in Turkey. During this period Turkeyhas had to face many aspects of terrorism, rangingfrom extremist le to extreme right movements,including many of its internaonal dimensions. Mostparcularly, Turkey has been ghng against theterrorist campaign of the Parya Karkeren Kurdistan

(PKK, Kurdistan Workers Party), a ruthless separastterror movement which has claimed the lives of morethan 35,000 cizens since 1984. Due to the countlessterrorist aacks perpetrated by this organisaon,public sensivity to this parcular problem is indeedvery high in Turkey.

For Turkey, the transnaonal nature of terrorismbecame obvious a long me ago. Likewise, theconnecon between organised crime and terroristgroups has been detected, widely invesgated andproven by Turkish agencies. Through this experience,Turkey has repeatedly underlined the importanceof internaonal co-operaon as a prerequisite forachieving success in this area, and highlighted theconnecons between organised crime and terroristorganisaons.

Turkey does not make any disncon betweenterrorist groups and expects the same from its friendsand allies amongst the internaonal community.

Turkey believes that in order to ensure broaderco-operaon, all terrorist organisaons should becombated with equal determinaon and regardless oftheir movaon. No state, today, can on its own fullyensure the security of its cizens against this complexand asymmetrical threat. Thus, the ght against globalterrorism can only be successful through co-operaonon a global scale.

A striking example of this form of global terrorism isAl-Qaida and its aliate groups, which represent a

real threat to Turkey. The Istanbul bombings in 2003were the deadliest and most destrucve in Turkeyshistory. Turkey, with its democrac, secular andopen society, as well as a predominantly Muslim

populaon, is at odds with the ideology and aimsof Al-Qaida. Since the Istanbul bombings, Turkishagencies have therefore intensied their eorts toprevent terrorist groups linked to, or inspired by, Al-Qaida from conducng their acvies in Turkey. Asa result of operaons carried out aer these aacks,many people linked with Al-Qaida were captured andtheir plans foiled. Yet, the Turkish authories remain

vigilant regarding the acvies of all religiouslymovated radical groups.

Turkey acvely takes part in mullateral eorts toght terrorism by making best use of its experiencein this domain and believes that the United Naonshas the primary role in formulang the internaonalcommunitys response to terrorism. Having assumeda non-permanent seat in the UN Security Councilfor the period of 2009-2010, one of Turkeys mainpriories as a UN Security Council Member is to lendits added value towards the various counter terrorismeorts conducted within the UN framework. Duringits term, Turkey has thus connued to support andcontribute to the work of the UN Counter TerrorismCommiee, as well as called for strict implementaonof relevant Security Council Resoluons on counterterrorism.

Turkey has signed and raed all twelve UNconvenons on combang terrorism, as well as

recently signed the convenon for the Suppression ofActs of Nuclear Terrorism. Turkey is also contribungto the budget of the Terrorism Prevenon Branch ofthe UN Oce for Drug Control (UNODC) and CrimePrevenon in Vienna, as well as conducng eortswithin NATO, whether acng as Chair of the WorkingGroups on the Financial Aspects of Terrorism orhosng the NATO Centre of Excellence on Defenceagainst Terrorism in Ankara.

Priority areas for counter-terrorism co-operaon

today include: The comprehensive sharing of intelligence Ensuring the applicaon of deterrent penal-

es to terrorist crimes


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and one ag, rejecng eorts to divide the country.

Yet, regardless of the outcome of this debate, thefact remains that the Turkish government will notnegoate with the PKK.

What remains of a parcular concern are theoperaons of the PKK in Europe. Using an elaboratenetwork that was set-up in the 1990s to smuggleterrorists from Turkey into European safe havens, thePKK has established a signicant record within criminalacvies, such as smuggling drugs, tracking illegalimmigrants into the European Union, and running

prostuon rings to raise funds. These acviesprovide a major source of income for the PKK. It hasbeen esmated, for instance, by the United NaonsOce for Drugs and Crime that narco-tracking fromCentral Asia into Europe generates a $5 billion peryear revenue, with about one-half of this reportedlyused by the PKK. In light of this, it would seem thatTurkeys terrorism problem is expected to mutate intoa transnaonal narco-criminal one in the future, whichwill be much harder to ght than its previous formdue to its economic dimensions. Nevertheless, thedeterminaon of the civilian and military authoriesto overcome this new form of terrorism is promisingbeer days for Turkey.

A noteworthy aspect of Turkeys role in combangterrorism relates to other relevant regional and globalsecurity concerns. For example, representavesfrom EU member states and twelve Mediterranean

partners, including Turkey, met in Barcelona, Spain,

in November 1995 to begin the Euro-MediterraneanPartnership. Though the ulmate goal of the dialoguewas to secure improved polical, economic andcultural relaons in the Mediterranean region, it didfocus on marime security cooperaon. This iniavecomplemented NATOs Mediterranean Dialogueiniated by the North Atlanc Council the previousyear. Also, on June 29, 2004, at the Istanbul Summit,NATO members decided to elevate the MediterraneanDialogue to a full partnership with associate countriesunder the Istanbul Cooperaon Iniave. The ICI

aims at promong military-to-military cooperaon,ghng terrorism through informaon sharing andmarime cooperaon and ghng illegal trackingon a bilateral level with Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Israel,Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

Moreover, from 1 January 2009 through 2010, Turkeyis serving as a non-permanent member of the UNSecurity Council, whose primary responsibility isto maintain internaonal peace and security. Theselecon of Turkey for this important Council seat is atesmony of the world bodys condence in Ankarasability to carry out this task.

Yonah Alexander is Professor Emeritus of

Internaonal Studies at State University of NewYork and director of the Inter-University Center forTerrorism Studies (Washington, DC).


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Iraq-Iran border. The Turkish border incursion last

year was a psychological blow to the organisaon;the Turkish military proving themselves able topenetrate well into PKK territory in the depthsof winter and PKK leaders forced to ee furthersouth. Just as serious is the fact that the groupcan no longer be sure of ethnic solidarity fromthe Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) on whoseterritory it is based.

The threat from Islamist terrorism was dramacallydemonstrated in November 2003 when Turkish

extremists linked to Al Qaida drove suicide truckbombs into two synagogues, the Brish Consulateand the headquarters of HSBC in Istanbul. However,religious extremism in Turkey was not a newphenomenon. For over a decade, Turkish Hezbollahand several obscure o-shoots had been variouslyghng the indel PKK and the secular state (witha number of its most outspoken proponents inthe media and academia being killed in a seriesof car bombings), before engaging in a frenzy ofblood-leng within their own ranks. Over 5,000Hezbollah members were arrested in a series ofpolice operaons in 2000-2003 before the groupabandoned its armed acvies. Whilst essenallyparochial in their aims, the nihilisc violence ofHezbollah was ahead of its me. The group retainsa signicant following and the potenal for it toalign with the global Jihad remains a very realthreat. Meanwhile, Al Qaida has since returnedto Turkey to carry out a water-borne aack on anIsraeli cruise ship. Whilst this failed when their

bomb-factory blew up hours before the operaon,statements made by Ayman Al Zawahiri clearlyconnue to place Turkey in Al Qaidas sights.

The threat from Islamist extremism does notjust come from established organisaons. Theindividuals who carried out an armed assaulton the US Consulate in the summer of 2008demonstrated the risk of amateur low-capabilityaacks. Similarly, the high-prole murders of anItalian priest, Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and

three Chrisan missionaries were all carried outby teenagers, movated by the uniquely Turkishfusion of religious extremism and ultra-naonalism.The risk with such individuals not associated with

established groups is that they are more likely to

appear under the intelligence radar.

Other tekr networks opt for an introvertedexistence, placing their children in unocialmadrassas, and refusing to undergo military serviceor to carry the identy cards of the secular state.Whilst their aspiraons usually fall short of aackplanning, these groups clearly provide ferle groundfor the extremist message to take root. Turkey is alsomade vulnerable by its geographical locaon, whichserves as an aracve overland route for extremists

travelling to Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, some ofwhom have returned, beer trained or brutalised byconict, to carry out extremist acvies in Turkey.

The radical le are an anachronism but one whosethreat is occasionally deadly. Whilst once some 70such organisaons fought for various interpretaonsof Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, there now existonly ve groups that retain an armed, albeit limited,capability. Two of these consist of a few dozen ghtersroaming the province of Tunceli, which has a longhistory of rebellion against Ankara. The other threeare urban-based and seek to target both the fascistTurkish state and the imperialism represented byforeign diplomac and commercial interests. Thedeath of Dursun Karatas, for many years the doyenof leist terrorism, in exile last year led some tospeculate on the nal demise of this variant of armedstruggle. However, the aempted suicide bombingin April 2009 demonstrated that it is not over yet.The DHKP/C is the only group in Turkey to have

consistently aempted to carry out assassinaonsof high prole polical leaders and the only leistorganisaon in the world to deploy suicide bombers.Their internal security and planning are meculousand, whilst recent aempts have been characterisedby incompetence, one successful aack could clearlyhave a major impact.

Most public and polical aenon remains focusedon the Ergenekon invesgaon. Whilst the secularopposion cries foul and alleges a polical witch-

hunt, many are prepared to believe wild conspiracytheories that would have the deep state holdingthe strings of all the countrys terrorist organisaons.Even informed observers remain confused. Whilst a


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recent history of elements of the state acng outside

the law is beyond doubt, Ergenekon may serve as aconvenient scapegoat for past wrongs. It remains tobe seen whether it is either terrorist or indeed anorganisaon at all.

Focusing on the Key Threats

More important is that aenon is not divertedfrom the very real terrorist threats. Factors ofgeography, internaonal geo-polics, history,ethnic makeup and the secular system all play arole in shaping this into a disnctly Turkish terrorist

threat. Whilst the radical le are in their dyingthroes, the threat of a one-o spectacular hit hasnot totally disappeared. The PKK may also be interminal decline but the end of this low-intensitywar is not yet in sight. The tradional rural Kurdishconstuency of the PKK has moved on; eithermaking do with what amounts to a normal life inthis poor (but improving) region or using extendedfamily links to move to western Turkey and Europe.The PKK is le as a result ghng for its physicaland polical survival. The rank and le, bullied(and worse) into staying in the organisaon, aresurrendering in increasing numbers to the securityforces, and are being treated with lenience. Whilstthe PKK will be able to adapt (as it always has done)to the increased threat of Turkish air-strikes, themore progressive approach of the government isclearly a far bigger challenge to its existence. It wasperhaps no coincidence that the April landmineaack occurred at a me when there wereindicaons that the government was considering

expanding the scope of the Repentance Law toencourage ghters down from the mountains. Thetruth is that the PKK wants war not peace becauseit is violent struggle that denes the organisaonand keeps it together. Incapable of strategic victorythe group has resorted to aacking civilians; theiraim being to incite sectarian conict and polarisethe Kurdish queson between Turks supporng anover-enthusiasc crackdown on terrorism and Kurdsseeking the protecon of the PKK. Whilst there areoccasional outbreaks of ethnic violence, which

have more to do with compeon for jobs rather

than polics, this scenario is unlikely to occur. The

government, and increasingly the army, know thatpursuing the military soluon without economicpackages and a hearts and minds oensive onlyserves the interests of the PKK and are unlikely tofall into this trap.

Turkey of course faces the same threat frominternaonal terrorism as other countries in Europe.However, it does not suer the inherent instabilityof its eastern neighbours. With no tradion of theradical Sala or Wahabbi interpretaons of Islam

and a language that separates it from the ArabMiddle East, Turkey has some protecon against theappeal of religious extremism. Whilst extremistsmay condemn the way the state runs ocial Islam,there is lile doubt that the overall eect of thesecular system has been to reduce the potenal forradicalisaon.

Crucial in its war against terrorism is the lawenforcement and intelligence apparatus, which islarge, procient and is learning from the mistakesof the past, with a vastly improved record onhuman rights. Less eecve has been the lack ofco-ordinaon and instuonal rivalry (police versusGendarmerie) and relavely new counter-terrorismlegislaon that seems to serve more to pleaseBrussels than provide the security forces withthe tools they need to ght terrorism outside themilitary theatre. Polical will in ghng terrorism isnot in doubt. But polical party point-scoring andthe no-go areas relang to the Kurdish issue curb

healthy debate, as well as limit the opons availableto address these threats with a more progressiveand imaginave approach. The 1980 military coupcame against a back-drop of polical violence thatapproached civil war. Turkey has moved far sincethat me and informed commentators believe thatthe army, whilst ever anxious about creeping Islam,will remain in its barracks. Turkey needs to connuethis progress in its campaign against terrorism, andrightly should be supported in this endeavour.

Jim McKee is a Brish terrorism expert.


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As a typical ethno-naonalist structure, thePKK has consistently argued that it representsall Kurds, regardless of ideological, religious orsectarian and dialeccal dierences. However,the reality is that the Kurdish groups in the regionare extremely heterogeneous. Although it aspiresto represent trans-Kurdish naonalism in Turkey,Iraq, Iran and Syria, most Kurdish groups in these

countries have not accepted the PKK as a legimateorganisaon. In truth, the PKKs hopes of buildinga homogeneous Kurdish naon-state have cometoo late. It missed the favourable course of historyin the early 20th Century when this might havebeen possible.

Even within Turkey, the scope of the PKKs appealis limited. For a start, one must consider theheterogeneity of Turkeys Kurds in terms of class,religious beliefs, dialects, polical atudes andsub-ethnic aliaon. Broadly speaking, TurkeysKurds can be divided into three groups; namelyintegrated Kurds who accept the Turkish Republic,ethno-religious Kurds and ethno-naonaliscKurds. The rst group is fully integrated into thepolical system and does not have any identy-based polical demands from state. The secondgroup, the ethno-religious Kurds, are also divided.Some adopt the extremist ideological line ofKurdish Hezbollah. However, most support the

right wing pares that have tradionally hadreligious undertones, such as the ruling Jusceand Development Party. It is only the third group,Kurdish ethno-naonalists, who support the PKKand its legal front organisaon, the DemocracSociety Party, in the polical arena.

Meanwhile, the PKKs inuence is limited by twoother factors. First of all, the Turkish policalsystem and the countrys liberal economic systemhave curtailed the PKKs inuence. The ability to

parcipate in the democrac process, to enterinto public service and to establish businesseshave all led to the integraon of Kurds into society,as has the prevalence of inter-ethnic marriages. At

the same me, the process of globalisaon, alongwith regional developments, has served to feerthe secessionist aspiraons of the PKK.

Kurdish Ethno-Naonalism and PKK Terrorism

The PKK was established as a Marxist-Leninistorganisation in 1973 under the leadership ofAbdullah calan. However, it did not start its

terrorist activities until 1978. Soon after thedeclaration of martial law in Turkey, calanescaped to Syria. In 1979, he passed to Lebanon,where he gained support from various pro-Sovietterrorist organisations, such as George Habash,Cibril and Havetme and from Syrian intelligence.Meanwhile, the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and1988 and the first Gulf War, in 1991, created apower vacuum in Northern Iraq, which became asafe haven for the PKK as it began its attacks onTurkey.

From its earliest stages, the PKK envisageddefeating the Turkish Armed Forces in SouthEastern Turkey, which would then lead to theformation of a separate Kurdish state. In orderto do this, it adopted the Maoist ProtractedPeoples War Strategy. According to this strategy,there would be three phases: strategic defence,strategic balance and strategic attack. Thestrategic defence phase would include guerrilla

activities and armed propaganda. At the sametime as it sought to strengthen its armed militiagroups, the PKK would also attempt to separatethe Kurdish people living in the region from thestate. Thus the hope was to establish a mutuallysupporting political front and a strong militiaorganisation.

Following on from this, during the strategicbalance phase, the PKK planned to continueterror and guerrilla activity as well as deploy

regular forces in order to establish control over aspecific area. In order to do this, it was necessaryto have gained widespread support from theKurdish people, who would become partners

PKK Terrorism in Turkey

Nihat Ali zcan


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in the enterprise. Finally, in the strategic attack

phase, the PKK would defeat the Turkish armyand establish a socialist Kurdish state.

Between 1984 and 2008, the PKK conducted 43,455terrorist acvies in Turkey.1 During this period,4,967 personnel of the Turkish armed forces, 1,335voluntary village guards and 217 police ocersdied. Meanwhile, 44,553 PKK members were killedor captured. At rst, the PKK sought to ensure thehighest possible impact on the wider populaon bytargeng civil servants and others who were seen to

be colluding with the Turkish state. These includedteachers, religious gures, village headmen andother prominent gures in the region. As a result,5,669 civilians also died during this period. Thistacc was parcularly eecve as it diminishedthe power of the Turkish state amongst Kurds andincreased support towards the PKK among them.

Although the PKK adopted hybrid terrorist tacticsranging from street demonstrations to advancedguerrilla, it could not pass from strategic defenceto the second phase of strategic balance. Despitethe fact that it gathered a force of 16-17,000militia, and established vital safe heavens inNorthern Iraq, the PKK never succeeded inestablishing permanent militia installations inTurkey. Moreover, the PKK sustained heavy losseswhenever it was caught in open battles with theTurkish army. But even though a central plankof its Maoist strategy failed, the organisationnevertheless managed to achieve some goals

during this period. For instance, it managedto establish a legal political organisation andstrengthen its support in Turkey and amongst theDiaspora. However, it was not enough. At its fifthCongress, held in late 1994, the PKK was forcedto alter its strategy.

This change can be attributed to three mainfactors: Turkeys counterterrorism strategies,dynamics within the PKK organisation itself,as well as global and regional developments.

Most prominently, Turkey adopted a State ofEmergency a constitutional regulation tocombat PKK terrorism. Although the State ofEmergency did not give direct responsibility

for all aspects of state security to the Turkish

Armed Forces directly, the Turkish army de factoassumed these responsibilities. At the same time,the Turkish Armed Forces which were organisedand equipped to meet the conventional threatsof the Cold War era restructured, re-equippedand adopted asymmetric counter-terrorismstrategies. In particular, the Army pursued aclear and hold doctrine, whereby an area wouldbe cleared of PKK militia before measures weretaken to ensure that they could not operate in theregion again. Needless to say, this necessitated

a large-scale mobilisation of security personnel.Approximately 350,000 soldiers and gendarmes,70,000 village guards and 35,000 police officerswere mobilised.2 This put considerable pressureon the PKK and reduced its operational capacity.

At the same time, the PKK faced structuralproblems. As it grew, the quality of the militiastarted to decrease and the poor quality of itsleadership became obvious. Meanwhile, thefact that increasing attacks were not generatinggreater support for the PKK, forced calan toreconsider the military strategy of the PKK.Terrorism and violence began to be seen as apotential hindrance to the PKKs political aims.Similarly, global and regional developmentsforced the PKK to reconsider its strategies. As thePKK increased its strength, Iran and Syria becamemore nervous about supporting the organisation,eventually limiting their support. Furthermore,as competition between Turkey, Iran and the

Russian Federation over the Caucasus and CentralAsia started to ease, so Moscow and Tehranssupport for the PKK decreased.

However, in other ways, the PKK continuedto achieve partial success in establishing aKurdish national identity and achieving politicalinfluence. This process was also assisted by thegrowth in ethno-nationalist conflicts followingthe end of the Cold War. It was also facilitated bythe democratisation and the EU reform process,

which enabled the PKK to establish legitimateand legal political organisations. This allowed thePKK to become an umbrella-type organisationand an active front organisation, both in Turkey


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As Paul R Pillar eloquently states in Terrorism andU.S. Foreign Policy: Diplomacy touches at leastas many aspects of counter terrorism as does anyother instrument. In the case of Turkey, diplomaceorts were made parcularly dicult by the factthat some neighbours supported those terroristmovements Ankara sought to ght.

Throughout the Cold War, Iran and Syria bothsupported terrorism against Turkey, with Tehransupporng extremist groups and Damascuspromong the PKK. In contrast, today there is acompletely dierent picture: these countries donot support terrorism against Turkey, but cooperatewith Turkey against terrorism, and even ghtagainst the terrorist groups in their own territory.The key queson, therefore, is why have thesecountries changed their atudes and begun to actin a completely opposite way?

In part this change is due to external and internalfactors aecng both Iran and Syria. A change inthe regions power balances and the existence ofnew threats pushed these countries to review theirrelaons and policies regarding terrorism. Theexternal threat was the US presence in the regionand its increasing inuence. This represented amajor threat to Iran and Syria, both of which werenamed in the axis of evil rhetoric and were thus

potenal targets. Meanwhile, both countries werefacing growing internal challenges to their regimes.

At the same me, changes were also taking place inTurkey. For many decades, Ankara had a tendencyto avoid the Middle East with all its troubles.However, starng with the zal era, in the late1980s, this escape the region policy, as it wasknown, started to change. The primary reason forthis was the recognion of the countrys geopolicalimportance and the need to develop regional

policies in accordance with Turkeys geographicalposion. Thus the Ecevit government made anaempt to develop a relaonship with Greece and

furthered its relaonship with the Middle East,especially with Syria. It also reached agreementswith Iran. This all provided the kernel for theJusce and Development Party (JDP) governmentszero problem approach with neighbours a termcoined by Ahmet Davutolu, current Minister ofForeign Aairs of Turkey. Today, Turkey aempts tohave good relaons with its neighbours including

Armenia and facilitated cooperaon with Iranand Syria in order to alienate the PKK and extremistterrorist organisaons.

This shi in perspecve therefore allowed Turkeyto develop the groundwork for further cooperaonthrough dierent means. Turkeys diplomacmanoeuvres, using various tools from coercivediplomacy to deepening economic relaons andpublic diplomacy, have played a crucial role inthis process. Turkey used coercive language whennecessary, and aer bringing these countries tothe same page on counter terrorism, increased theintensity of the relaons. This took place in spiteof negave public percepons in each countrytowards the other. Thus, the animosity betweenthe countries was eliminated to a certain extent.

The Case of Syria

Syria began acvely supporng terrorism in the1960s. During the Cold War, state sponsored

terrorism was a vital tool for the compeng blocs,and Syria, along with the Soviet Union, promotedvarious terrorist organisaons. As a member ofNATO, Turkey was a natural target, while at the sameme, Syria laid claim to Hatay a city borderingSyria and to water resources in Turkey. In pursuingits bale against Turkey, Syria used terrorist groupsto exert pressure on Ankara. For instance, itassisted and trained extremist leist groups in theBekaa Valley. Likewise, it also supported ASALA,an Armenian terrorist organisaon. Later on, and

most notably, it worked closely with the PKK. Thiswas done in a variety of ways, such as by shelteringthe leadership of the movement, providing training

Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and Syria

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camps, turning a blind eye to the bureaus of the

terrorist organisaon and even providing trainingassistance through its intelligence services andmilitary. Damascus also facilitated the terroristsinltraon of the Turkish border in order to carryout their aacks and return to their hideouts inSyria. All the while, Syria also prevented Turkeyfrom pursuing the terrorists and from conducngcross border operaons.

Syria began to change its posion regarding theterrorist organisaons in the late 1990s. Aer the

collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its majorally and supporter in the region. Moreover, thecountrys economic problems, coupled with thehealth problems of Hafez al-Assad, weakened theruling regime. Seizing on this, Turkey adopted atougher stance in order to convince Syria that it wasincreasingly unwilling to accept Syrian support tothe PKK. For example, soon aer his appointment asthe Commander of Land Forces, General Alla Atesvisited the Syrian border in September 1998 wherehe issued a severe warning to Damascus. Followingon from this, the then Chief of the General Sta,General Huseyin Kvrkoglu, and former PresidentSuleyman Demirel repeated the warnings at theinauguraon of the 1998 Turkish Parliament,stang that Turkeys paence was running out.These messages were further reinforced throughother channels, with for example, the Egypanpresident, Hosni Mubarak warning Syria aboutTurkeys serious intent to use force.

In response, Syria declared its compliance andreadiness to cooperate and, on 20 October 1998,the pares signed the Adana Accord. Syria nowaccepng that the PKK was a terrorist organisaonthe country expelled its leader, Abdullah calan,who was captured a few months later. In the periodthat followed, Turkey strengthened its relaonshipwith Syria by expanding security cooperaon and byreaching a series of endorsements on other issues,such as trade, tourism and cultural cooperaon.These agreements not only served the economic

interests of both pares but also increased theirinterdependence. In me, so power techniquesreplaced the previous hard power taccs. BasharAsads decision not to menon the city of Hatay

in his inauguraon contributed to this growing

climate of trust, as did his emphasis on economicliberalisaon and cooperaon with neighbouringcountries.

Although much counter-terrorism diplomacytakes place through specialised service-to-serviceor department channels, public support for thebilateral co-operaon has also been vital. In recentyears, Syrians have started to follow Turkish TVseries and an increasing number of Syrian touristshave come to Turkey. According to stascs

produced by the Turkish Ministry of Culture andTourism, the number of Syrian cizens enteringTurkey in 1996 was 92,278. In 2007, this hadincreased to 332,840. Likewise, there has been agrowth in economic co-operaon. From 2000 unl2006, foreign direct investment from Turkey toSyria totalled just 300 million dollars. In contrast, in2007 alone, the volume of investment reached 200million dollars. Similarly, the trade volume betweenTurkey and Syria, which was 800 million dollars in2006, reached $1.1 billion in 2007. According to theTurkish Foreign Trade Department, it is expected toreach $2.5 billion in 2009. All this has contributedto a new climate of trust between Turkey and Syria.

The Case of Iran

The case of Iran proved to be slightly dierent. Inpart, this was because Tehran had dierent reasonsfor supporng terrorism against Turkey. At rst,and in line with its revoluonary ideology, Iransupported religious-based terrorist organisaons.

However, following its failure to export its ideas,and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it began tosupport the PKK against Turkey in an aempt tocompete against Ankara for regional leadership.This support was believed to be provided mainlyby the informal radical wing of the state apparatusand was not as substanal, or as evident, as Syriassupport for terrorism.

The primary reason for the rapprochement was theend of compeon between the pares in the late

1990s. Despite the importance of Central Asia aerthe collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran and Turkeyaccepted their limitaons in the region, whichin turn removed a key element of compeon


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On 5 August 2008, an explosion occurred on theTurkish secon of the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oilpipeline. Pumping one million barrels per day (bpd)of Caspian crude to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on theMediterranean Sea for export to Western markets,the pipeline is widely regarded as one of the mostimportant alternave paths carrying Central Asian andCaspian oil to the internaonal market. Although the

pipeline is dug underground along its enre route, theblast occurred on a pipe gate valve near the easternAnatolian town of Refahiye in Erzincan province, andcaused a 1 per cent drop in daily internaonal oiltransportaon, as well as closed the pipeline for 15days. Ocially it was claimed that the explosion wasa technical failure caused by a systemic malfunconwhich had been detected prior to the blast. However,the separast Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) claimedresponsibility for the explosion and it is widelybelieved that it was PKK sabotage.

Assuming it was a terrorist aack, the asymmetricnature of the incident rapidly becomes apparent.An educated guess would suggest that the enreoperaon may have cost the PKK as lile as $500.In contrast, the cost to the owners of the pipeline isarresng with the loss esmated to be around $1.68billion (taking 1 million barrels a day at $120 perbarrel, and spread over 14 days = $1.68 billion). Whenone adds in the other outlays as a result of burned

oil in the pipelines, re ghng and personnel costs,suspension of oil ow, repairs etc, the overall bill issomewhere closer to $2 billion.1

Energy Transit and the Security Queson

Turkey is now emerging as one of the key links betweenthe main oil and gas producing countries and the keyconsumer markets. Already, Turkey has emerged asthe main alternave route for energy transportaontowards the EU. Indeed, EU sources menon that thebiggest 10 gas suppliers, holding 35 per cent of global

gas reserves, either are, or might potenally be,interested in using Turkey as a transit country. Thusthe internaonal energy market is readily redeningTurkeys regional and global posion. Responding to

this, Turkish policy makers have made it a key policypriority to raise Turkeys prole as a transit country,2

recognising that the development of new pipelineswill increase Turkeys wealth and regional signicance.

In order to accomplish this, Turkey however needs toaddress some underlying security quesons. Theseare in part related to polical developments in the

neighbourhood. The BTC explosion took place justdays before the start of the Russo-Georgian War inAugust 2008. This in turn raised awareness of theneed to take into account regional issues, such as thestrategic balance in the Caucasus, the construcon ofalternave pipelines, and polical dierences in thearea. At the same me, and as the August blast on theBTC highlighted, there is a real possibility that terroristorganisaons, such as the PKK, have started to revisetheir policies. The BTC pipeline, along with others, is anideal target for militants wishing to destabilise Turkey.Thus, when planning new pipelines, aenon mustalso be given to the threats posed by terrorists groups

and not just the PKK. Even though many terrorismexperts argue that state-sponsored terrorism is notas common as it was during the Cold War period, inTurkeys neighbourhood, where local conicts sllhave strategic signicance, one cannot exclude thepossibility that this remains a factor.

The explosion therefore requires us to re-dene the

public and private crical infrastructure and developcommon security policies to protect them.3 The basicquesons are squarely on the agenda: In which waydoes Turkey protect those already exisng pipelinesand what kind of infrastructure is needed to protectnew ones? Is the exisng security structure sucientfor the protecon of new pipelines? And how canTurkey establish an ecient security system to protectthose pipelines in coordinaon with its partners?

The Current Security Regime

Dening and securing Turkeys crical infrastructure,including energy-related networks, is now seen as acore part of the naonwide legal, administrave andsecurity system. This makes both central authories

Protecng the Key Naonal Ulies and Energy Infrastructure

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BOTA. Meanwhile, at Ceyhan, ships of the Turkish

Coast Guard Command protect BTC shipment faciliesand tankers.

It should be noted that, apart from the 2008 Erzincan-Refahiye blast, there has not been any seriousincidents against the pipeline. Unl then, almost30 cases of vandalism or aempts to steal oil hadbeen reported, but the pipeline had essenally beensuccessfully protected by the security forces. However,the intenon to increase the number of pipelinesrunning through Turkey makes the protecon of

pipelines and other related crical infrastructure asensive issue. Problems of cooperaon, the lack ofecient communicaon between the responsiblebodies and a lack of investment in the securitystructure for protecng the pipelines are the mainconcerns confronng Turkish decision makers. Inorder to address these issues, there is now beerco-ordinaon between the GCG and Ministries ofForeign Aairs, Energy and Interior Aairs. SecurityCoordinaon Meengs organised by these bodies,with the parcipaon of representaves from theTurkish Armed Forces, Turkish Intelligence Serviceand BOTA, have been held. By and large, this systemworks well; however, some problems connue toarise due to lack of coordinaon and ming.

It is also worth menoning that, although theGendarme forces have been appointed to protect thepipelines and other related facilies, these forces arealso responsible for providing public order. The heavyburden on the Gendarmerie thus necessitates a fresh

outlook on crical infrastructure protecon that willinclude the parcipaon of the private sector. This isparcularly important in western Turkey where there

are no Gendarmerie staons exclusively responsible

for the protecon of the pipelines and other facilies.In western provinces all crical infrastructure securityis incorporated into the general security frameworkand structures.

Taking Adequate Measures

Turkeys policy of becoming an energy transit country,or even a hub, is sll on the table. However, if it is toemerge as a hub or as an alternave route for bothproducers and consumers, potenal risks, includingterrorist aacks, need to be considered. Security will

be a central issue when making new investmentsin pipeline routes running across Turkey. As thestatements by various terrorist organisaons haveshown, they clearly realise this. Thus, in order tobecome a central energy transit route, Turkey willneed to take steps to tackle terrorism and minimisethe perceived threat that it poses. Sucient amountsof money and human capital should be allocated andsecurity must be professionalised and coordinatedwith the relevant partners. Turkey will need tocooperate with its allies most notably the EUand the US and will have to develop its nancial,administrave, instuonal and technical capacity toprotect its crical infrastructure eciently. Within thiscontext, Turkey has to become a part of a commonEuropean energy policy outlook and the EU shouldallocate resources to ght terrorism together withTurkey. The PKK is not Turkeys problem alone; itseliminaon should be a common essenal.

Mitat Celikpala is Associate Professor of

Internaonal Relaons, TOBB University ofEconomics and Technology, Department of

Internaonal Relaons, Ankara, Turkey.

1 We can compare this amount with the 2008 budget ofsecurity organisaons that are responsible of protecng thepipelines in Turkey. For instance, the General Command ofthe Gendarmeries 2008 budget was $2.5 billion and GeneralPolice Forces 2008 budget was $4.5 billion.

2

The main pipelines running through Turkey are BTC, Kerkuk-Yumurtalk, Samsun-Ceyhan or Blue Stream and Iraniannatural gas pipelines. In addion to those main pipelinesthere is a 12,000 km internal pipeline network carrying oiland natural gas for Turkeys domesc consumpon. Currently

4 per cent of the worlds oil passes through the Bosphorusand 1 per cent via BTC. This means that 1 in every 16 barrelsof oil consumed in the world passes through Turkey.

3 It has been reported that there have been more than 170aacks, aempted aacks or suspected aacks on energy

infrastructures in Turkey since 1989. Although there areno ocially recorded aacks on the BTC, there have beenapproximately 30 the and vandalism incidents, with 8 ofthem having happened during the project phase.

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In recent years there appears to have been amarked shift in the way in which the internationalcommunity has started to view Turkey andits experience of terrorism. Far from being aperipheral player in the debates on how to fightterrorism, Turkey has come to assume a frontand centre role in international discussions. Inlarge part, this is because of the vital strategic

position that Turkey occupies as a transit state in an all encompassing geographical, physicaland ideological sense.

Turkey as a Transit State

For a start, Turkeys geo-strategic position hashad a major impact on the way in which thequestion of Turkeys relationship with terrorismis viewed. In recent years, Turkey has emergedas a major player in discussions over Europeanand international energy diversification. Fears ofrising over-reliance on Russian energy sourceshas led to a growing interest in alternative gasand oil supplies in Central Asia and the Caspian.Often, Turkey plays the key role as the transitpoint for new pipelines. Most notably, we haveseen the importance attached to the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which providesAzeri energy supplies with an outlet on theMediterranean Sea. Other pipelines are now indevelopment. However, as has been seen already

in other countries, the importance of suchprojects makes them a high-profile target forterrorist organisations. Indeed, in 2008, a majorexplosion on the BTC pipeline was blamed on thePKK. In this case, while there were no injuries,the economic consequences of the attack weremassive. Thus, in the first instance, if Europe is toensure that Turkey is able to provide a conduit fornew energy supplies, it must also help to ensurethat the pipelines that are being built are secure.

The second sense in which Turkey can beconsidered to be a transit country is in thecontext as a transit for terrorists and as abase for those planning terrorist operations

elsewhere. It has been noted that Turkey isoften viewed by many terrorist organisations asa relatively safe haven for holding meetings andarranging money transfers. More to the point, itis also seen as providing a route for extremiststo enter Europe. This is the result of a number offactors. For instance, over in the east, its bordersare relatively permeable and in the west it

neighbours the Greek islands, which are seen asproviding a range of opportunities for entry intothe European Union. Indeed, these factors makeTurkey not only a key transit route for illegalimmigrants trying to enter the European Union,but also a potentially vital route for terrorists togain access to European member states. To thisextent, tackling Turkeys role as a transit pointfor terrorists and terrorist related activity is asecond vital reason why Turkey has assumed amore significant role in recent years.

Thirdly, Turkey has come to be seen as a vitaltransit point in the battle of ideas. In recentyears, considerable emphasis has been placedon Turkeys value as a link between the Westand the Islamic world. This process has in partbeen shaped by geopolitical factors, but is alsoa reflection of Turkeys willingness to reengagewith Muslim states, especially in the MiddleEast. Add to this its growing strategic and

regional role, as evidenced by its election to theUN Security Council, and one can see just howpotent a position Turkey holds. It is this role as acultural bridge a term that, while rather clichdis nevertheless true is likely to prove vital inthe years and decades ahead. It is often said thatTurkey provides a model for Islamic countriesto emulate. True, but the existence of a strongand independent minded Turkey also showshow Europe and the United States can workwith Muslim states without those states simply

becoming beholden to the West. Co-operationin pursuit of common goals need not be atthe expense of religious identity or territorialintegrity although fears about the Wests

Turkeys Strategic Posion and the Need for Dialogue

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intentions towards Turkey, as will be explored

a little later on, persist and need to be tackledmore effectively.

The Need for Dialogue and Understanding

The obvious quesons that emerge from this are thefollowing: given the signicance of Turkey, what canthe internaonal community do to support Turkeyin its eorts to tackle terrorism? And, secondly,what added value can Turkey oer in the ghtagainst internaonal terrorism? The answers mightappear to be relavely simple. However, the reality

is far more complex and complicated than mightrst appear. One of the key problems that emergesin any discussion over terrorism is the idencaonof terrorist groups. This is driven by context andspecics. While Turkey and its Western partners willmake great claims to regard all terrorist groups asthreats and pledge to ght them, the reality provesto be rather dierent. This is where there appearsto be a real need for dialogue.

For instance, and to use a recent example, whereasthe United States and the European Union regardHamas as a terrorist group, the Turkish attitudeappears to take a more nuanced view. While theorganisation certainly carries out acts of violence,many in Turkey view this as an act of legitimateresistance to Israeli occupation and the blockadesand excessive use of force used by Israel againstPalestinians. Meanwhile, others will point to itsdemocratic mandate. Ankara appears to be ableto view the situation in shades of grey, rather

than the black and white applied in Washington.And yet, at the same time, Turkey is angered andinfuriated when European countries prove tobe unwilling to take an uncompromising stancetowards Kurdish separatist groups operating inEurope. To this extent, one of the key problemsaffecting co-operation between Turkey and itspartners in Europe and the United States is thedegree to which they approach terrorism intheoretical and practical terms. As a concept,terrorists are accorded equal opprobrium.

In reality, differences can be, and are, drawnbetween groups. This, in itself is a majorcomplicating factor.

Another area in which mutual dialogue might

yield results is with regards to the way inwhich Turkey conceptualises the fight againstterrorism. One of the dangers that can emergein any society is the level at which one setsthe bar of extremism. If set too low, if can leadpeople to be classed as terrorists and treatedaccordingly, which in turn fosters resentmentand can lead to their radicalisation. Thus, intackling terrorism, there is a need to be awarenot to cross the boundaries and instigate a fifthP: Provocation.1 This is a very real danger that

exists in many societies confronting terrorismwhich requires a careful assessment of thebounds of tolerance, and what is and is notconsidered to be a legitimate realm of debate. InBritain, where this whole subject has been at theforefront of public debate in recent years, theemphasis has been on values. To be British is torespect the rule of law, including the laws in placerelating to racial and religious discrimination.This ensures that people who wish to advocategreater minority rights, or even the dissolutionof the United Kingdom into its constituent partsor the unification of Northern Ireland with theRepublic of Ireland are free to do so as longas they remain wholly and unambiguouslycommitted to democratic methods. In the viewof many outsiders, the bar in Turkey, especiallyas relates to the question of Kurdish separatism,has been far too low for far too long. Moves thatwould be seen as legitimate calls for freedomof cultural expression have been interpreted as

radical demands for independence. This explainswhy Europe has often taken such a strong line onminority rights, and perhaps has not been willingto accept all of Turkeys concerns over the PKK.Just as Turkey is willing to see that Hamas mayhave some legitimate grievances, again there aremany in Europe who have an innate sympathy forcertain Kurdish aspirations.

However, it is a two-way street. Few outsidersreally comprehend the deep fears that most Turks

connue to harbour about the possibility that theircountry may fracture along ethnic or sectarianlines. While the Treaty of Svres, which proposedthe paron of the Anatolian Peninsula at the end


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1 The United Kingdoms long-term counter terrorism CONTESTstrategy is based around four main pillars known as the FourPs: PREPARE, PURSUE, PREVENT and PROTECT

Notes

of the First World War, is lile know in the West,

where it is seen a minor historical item of interest,in Turkey it connues to shape public atudes.There is sll an overriding belief that in one wayof another, Europe would like to see Turkeydismembered. In this regard, pressing the case forgreater Kurdish rights, and being seen to harbourgroups that seek an independent Kurdistan, isseen by many in Turkey as proof posive that theEuropean Union is sll intent of bringing about arealisaon of the Treaty of Svres. In Europe, suchthoughts appear unrealisc. In Turkey, they are all

too real. Managing the balance between Europes

demand for separate minority and cultural rightswith Turkeys fears that the EU is seeking to hastenthe dismemberment of the Turkish Republic issomething that will need to be handled delicately.However, it will also mean that both sides will haveto be more willing to open up to the views of theother side.

James Ker-Lindsay is Senior Research Fellow at theEuropean Instute, London School of Economicsand Polics Science.

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Turkey Terrorism