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Bob Boardman

Appendix B of “The Spirits of Babylon”

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“The Red Horseman” - Appendix B

Go Rin No Sho

The Pen and Sword in accord,

to serve one’s Lord.

The Way of the Warrior to which one is sworn and weapons drawn.

The Ground is learned and the Whole is felt. The Winds of tradition are sensed and smelt.

Then like Water to flow and with Fire to strike,

Victory is gained and the liquid runs bright!

Contents Page

The “Nek” – Art or Not?

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Some Key Principles of Warfare

4 A. How to win a fight or battle 4 B. How to win a war 5 C. Ten factors to consider in any conflict 5 D. Principles combined 6

A Brief Overview of the History of Warfare

7 Ancient Chinese Thought 7 The Early Development of Western Warfare 8

Clausewitz “On War” 10

Lead Up to WW1 – Warfare in Width 12

Penetration War & Total War – 1918 to 1945 13

Some comments from Considering Subjects to Date 15 After 1945 – Nuclear & Asymmetric War 15 Naval Warfare 18

The Armour of God

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Conditions for a Raging Fire

26

http://www.thelol.co

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One of my distant relations died at Gallipoli. He was Denis DuVal, corporal in "C" Squadron of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, of the Australian 3rd Light Horse Brigade, Regimental Service No. 394. He died at age 36 in a bayonet charge on the “Nek” on 7th August 1915. He would have gone in the third or fourth wave after the first two waves were annihilated. His grave remains unknown. The Nek was an easily defendable bottleneck about the size of two tennis courts on Walkers Ridge. Circumstances had compromised the original reasons for carrying out the attack so that it had become pointless. Nonetheless, British Major General Sir Alexander Godley, commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division of which the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was then a part, declared that the attack was to proceed. As a result, the tragic and futile attack became known as "Godley's abattoir", with the battle the basis of the Australian movie “Gallipoli” (made in 1981). The following is an account of the battle, drawn from Wikipedia. The 8th and 10th Light Horse regiments of the 3rd Brigade were to advance on a front 80 meters wide in a total of four waves of 150 men each, two waves per regiment. Each wave was to advance two minutes apart. The distance to the Ottoman line was a mere 27 meters. Owing to a failure of timing instructions, the artillery preparation ceased at 4:23 am while the attack was not launched until 4:30 am. The result was to give the Ottoman defenders ample time to return to their trenches and prepare for the assault that they now knew was coming. The first wave of 150 men from the 8th Light Horse Regiment, led by their commander, Lieutenant Colonel A.H. White, "hopped the bags" and went over the top. They were met with a hail of machine gun and rifle fire and within 30 seconds, Colonel White and all of his men were gunned down. A few men reached the Ottoman trenches, and marker flags were reportedly seen flying, but they were quickly overwhelmed and shot or bayoneted by the Ottoman defenders.

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The second wave of 150 followed the first without question two minutes later and met the same fate, with almost all the men cut down by heavy rifle and machine gun fire before they got half way to the Ottoman trench. This was the ultimate tragedy of the Nek, that the attack was not halted after the first wave when it was clear that it was futile. Lieutenant Colonel Noel Brazier, commander of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, attempted to have the third wave cancelled, claiming that "the whole thing was nothing but bloody murder". He was unable to find Colonel Hughes, and unable to persuade the Brigade Major, Colonel John Antill (who believed the reports that marker flags had been sighted). This report of marker flags was subsequently confirmed in a Turkish article published after the war, where it was stated by the author who had been at the Nek that a couple of men with a marker flag made it to the Ottoman trench before being quickly killed. In that time they were able to raise the flag. Colonel Antill had not checked the scene to establish if it was of any purpose to send the next wave, and issued the order for the third wave to proceed. The third wave "hopped the bags" and the assault came to a quick end as before. On this assault, many men launched themselves out of the trenches and tried to dive for cover, having performed their duty to attack, but having no ambition to commit mindless suicide by attacking clearly impenetrable defenses. This explains the lower casualty rate for the 10th Light Horse Regiment. Finally, Hughes called off the attack, but confusion in the right area of the fire trench, due to an officer not being told of the cancellation, led to around 75 to 80 men of the fourth wave going over, and they too were cut down in less than a minute. By 4:45 a.m., the ridge was covered with fresh dead and wounded Australian soldiers, most of whom remained where they fell for the duration of the campaign. Of the 600 Australians who took part in the attack, the casualties numbered 234 out of 300 men from the 8th Light Horse Regiment, of which 154 were killed, and 138 out of the 300 men from the 10th, of which 80 were killed. The Ottoman losses were negligible on this occasion for the Australians charged with unloaded rifles with fixed bayonets and were unable to return fire at all, although there are at least eight known Ottoman dead.

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A. How to win a fight or battle. By applying the required concentration of force at the right place and time, while avoiding having your opponent from doing likewise to you. The required force at the right place and time means to attack at the point of weakness with that which is neither too little nor too excessive – but that which is “cost-effective”. This is as applicable for an individual striking with a fist, wielding a sword or firing a bullet at his opponent, as it is for a war between armies where soldiers are the extension of their commanders will. And if you cannot defeat your enemy with your size and strength (mass) then you must strike from the flank or rear (envelop), or blitz through their defenses or armor (penetration), or apply methods to psychologically and physically weaken him (attrition), or a combination of these.

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B. How to win a war (a series of battles, an extended conflict). 1. By having the physiological will. Depending on the will of the enemy one may need the will to “wage

total war, with all its horrors”. Often, continuing to wage prolonged war requires having the “moral high ground”. If the moral high ground is lost the war must be won quickly or it too will be lost (like the US lost in Vietnam).

2. By having the physical capacity to “continue to wage war and sustain its losses”. This means having

the resources and the technological and logistical systems to counter the enemy’s resources, technology, logistics and tactics (which may include “asymmetric warfare”).

3. By understanding that warfare, above all, is an art form. While war may involve tremendous science

and technological advances, in the words of Clausewitz it is essentially “a great passionate drama”, uncontrollable and unpredictable, that depends at the bottom on the “character/genius” of those involved.

C. Ten factors to consider in any conflict. (Go Rin No Sho identifies the five rings of Void, Wind, Water, Fire and Earth.)

i. Void - The Rational Mind (Clear Objectives) – A strategy may be defense, offence and pursuit to:

destroy the opponent’s physical capacity to fight and/or destroy the opponent’s psychological will to fight. It may be by attrition (maneuver/siege/ scorched earth) or by annihilation (decisive battle). It may be by propaganda and creating terror. The breakdown of strategy must be into clear objectives and goals at strategic, tactical and individual levels.

ii. Void – The Artistic Mind (Operational Art) - The translating of war’s strategic, tactical and individual

objectives into efficient and effective results is understood as “operational art”, and as such it requires “artists”.

iii. Wind - The Senses (Good Intelligence) – The mind requires information to determine strategies and

tactics. “Know thyself and know thy enemy”. Sense what is carried in the wind. Know the location and time of weakness and strength, for yourself and for your opponent. Know the ground and conditions and use them to advantage.

iv. Wind – Good Fortune (Opportunity & Luck) - Sense which way the winds of fortune are blowing. Fortune favors the brave and bold (sometimes). Napoleon often chose commanders because he considered they had “luck”.

v. Water - The Co-ordination of the Body (Command Systems) – These are the modern “C Cube” –

Command, Control & Communications necessary to enable the coordination and communications to fluidly control ones resources – so everyone knows what to do and when to do it, and will obey.

vi. Water - The Speed of the Body (Mobility Systems) – These are the logistical systems to enable ones

resources (soldiers and materials) to be fluidly moved to required places in the required quantity, quality and speed.

vii. Fire - Weapons (Firepower) - Weapons are physical and psychological – “The pen and sword in accord”.

New technology defeats old technology. Spirit without firepower is often not enough (cavalry against machineguns).

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viii. Fire - The Spirit (Character Qualities) – These are the qualities that make up the psychological will to

fight, the will to strike, even in the face of overwhelming odds and heavy losses (eg. leadership, discipline, training, honor, comradeship, etc that give perseverance, confidence, courage, morale, etc). Firepower without spirit is not enough.

ix. Earth – The Way Weapons are Deployed and Used (Tactics) – Tactics are the way weapons are used, often in combination, to provide “shock” and “penetration” to achieve advantage at the weak point. Tactics are a basic factor that win battles (eg. Blitzkrieg, Gate Pa).

x. Earth – Proficiency in the Execution of Operations and Use of Weapons (Training) – The most powerful weapons are useless if they cannot be used effectively as required. Training is a basic factor that hones the deployment and use of force.

D. Principles Combined (Genghis Kahn as an example).

Napoleon, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and others of the greatest military leaders in history were all successful because they understood and employed many of the key principles listed above. To demonstrate, I have chosen one example, Genghis Kahn, who conquered most of the known world of his times: Clear Objectives and Operational Art. Born around 1167, by his mid-twenties Genghis had united the Mongol tribes into a nation with the purpose of conquest. Although often called a “barbarian” with a “horde” who won by creating terror in his path, Kahn gained his victories through brilliant thinking and the practical application of that thinking (in terms of the organization of systems and strategies, and their implementation as operational art). Command and Training. On his path to conquest Kahn organised a military system based on a system of “Tens”. There were ten men to a squad, ten squads to a company, ten companies to a battalion, and ten battalions to a “Tumen” (10,000 men). These Tumens were then led by trusted and proven leaders who enforced rigid training and discipline. Mobility and Firepower. All Mongol soldiers were mounted and led spare horses that carried sufficient supplies for extended campaigns. Both the soldiers and their horses were extremely hardy and could live off the land with limited supplies. Around half were archers who used powerful laminated bows that were capable of penetrating the plate armor of western Knights. The other half were heavily armored cavalry armed with lances. Intelligence and Tactics. To support their operations, the Mongols employed an extensive network of spies and scouts who reported enemy strengths and locations. They also had excellent communications systems. When weakness was detected, several Mongol armies would follow different paths (living off the land) and then converge at their target. Using well rehearsed tactics a combination of shock and surprise often overwhelmed their enemies. The Mongols were also extremely adaptable. When encountering fortified cities they used conscripted or captured engineers to apply siege weapons. Fortune and Character. With proven and successful leaders who had the will to strike and achieve victories, success bred success. To this was added terror as a psychological weapon. Entire defeated armies and cities were butchered leading other potential enemies to become so fearful that they simply fled. In this way the Mongols became an almost irresistible force.

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This brief overview is largely a summary based on the book, “The Art of War – War and Military Thought” by Martin Van Creveld. (Pub. by Cassell & Co, London 2000). In addition, the overview includes a number of my own comments.

Ancient Chinese Thought (p18-35) To the ancient Chinese, war was a necessary evil in an imperfect world, something a state or leader should take no pleasure in, but could not afford to ignore. The best war was that never fought and the Chinese would exhaust diplomacy, use all manner of deceptions, inflict the harshest punishments and use all other means, all to minimise violence. This was not only because war was costly, but because it upset “Tao” (harmony, virtue, goodness). It was virtuous to spare people from death, hardships and misfortunes, and to sustain them in their extremities. Sun Tsu said to appraise war in terms of fundamental principles as follows (note that these are my own headings given to these principles below): 1. WHY Go To War? (Void) - Moral Influence – To ensure people are in harmony with their leaders so they

will follow and obey. This implies that leaders need to be righteous (have moral high ground/just cause) and be able to maintain strict discipline. Presumably it also requires setting a clear objective?

2. WHO Does What? (Earth) – Organisation & Training – To ensure that every soldier clearly knows what

was expected of him – in terms of roles, units, functions and training – broken down into planning, logistics and operations. (Also note that in the ancient Chinese army the strongest was in the first rank – opposite to the Roman army.)

3. HOW Do You Fight? (Fire) - Armaments – To ensure the correct combination of armaments and tactics –

eg. swords (formations), bows (distance), boats & carts – mobility (change), and missile weapons (domination).

4. WHAT Do You Need? (Water) – Logistics – To ensure the best logistics that will provide effective supply,

while maintaining minimum cost. The greater the distance, the greater the cost. It is best to impose the logistic burden on the enemy (by pillaging) or otherwise ensure supply while minimising cost (eg. through insurgency that lives off the people and the land). The Chinese also emphasise extreme flexibility to take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Plans must have different branches and forces therefore must be capable of redeploying.

5. WHERE & WHEN Do You Fight? (Wind) – Intelligence – If violence has to be used, use the minimum to

maximum effect, “throw rocks at eggs” and get it over as quickly as possible. “No state has ever benefited from a long war”. To know the enemy’s weakness and where and when to apply concentration and timing requires intelligence of yourself, your enemy, the weather, the terrain, etc. To know the enemy is to know the qualities of their leaders, and their organisation and supply. At the same time there is the need for extreme secrecy, to deny the enemy of these things and to deceive the enemy – “when you are weak to be seen strong” (and vice versa) – to draw and tempt him into unfavourable terrain and conditions. Sun Tsu says “Know the enemy and know yourself – in a hundred battles you will never be in peril”. He also talks of five kinds of spies:

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Local – travellers and residents reporting on terrain and resources.

Internal – positions inside the enemy.

Turned – spies who have been captured and supply disinformation to the enemy

Dead – send to the enemy to supply disinformation

Living – agents who return from the enemy camp and report.

The Early Development of Western Warfare (p36-112) In antiquity, ancient writers on warfare wrote about “tricks of the trade” - devices and deceptions (the Roman Frontius -1st Century), selection and training or recruits (the Roman Vegetius - 4th Century), and about tactics against particular enemies (the Byzantines). The Byzantine “Strategiton” in the 7th Century particularly emphasised secrecy, flexibility, cunning and guile. Other texts wrote about siege techniques to overcome obstacles, the best by the Frenchman Vauban in the 17th Century, who wrote an extremely methodical approach to attack or defend fortresses. In the 17th Century, the Italian Montecurioli wrote that war was something made by nation states rather than the peoples of the past (such as Greeks & Romans) or by rulers (such as in China, Imperial Rome, the Byzantine Empire and Middle Ages). He also distinguished between external and internal war, with the latter being downgraded to civil war, revolution and revolt (and terrorism?). Thus, instead of being “a walking tour with large scale robbery and occasional battle”, war began to be seen more as something between governments and regular armies, with the peoples playing more passive roles. In the 18th Century, the French Marshal de Sax developed the concept of integrated units (“divisions” made up of infantry regiments, cavalry troops, artillery, engineers and HQ units, etc) to replace detailed orders of battle. This meant that larger armies could be managed (more than 50,000). Fredrick the Great of Prussia (18th Century) chose officers from the nobility because “the one factor which can make men march into the mouth of cannon is honour, and honour is found among nobles alone”. He also believed in ferocious discipline, “soldiers need to fear their officers more than the enemy”. Such an army could march, manoeuvre and fire more rapidly, and most importantly, take casualties and defeat to fight again. The jury is out whether Fredrick preferred “attrition” (manoeuvre to preserve his forces) over “annihilation” (decisive battles to destroy enemy forces). Then in 1772, the Frenchman Comte de Guibert laid out his famous propositions that led to far reaching political reforms to make possible new kinds of armies. These prepositions were:

War was to be waged by the united forces of an entire nation.

To do this, general conscription needed to be introduced.

To enable the supply of the huge resulting armies required reform of logistical/industrial systems.

Armies could no longer move as a single block, but needed to be divided into independent “divisions”.

Up to this point writers wrote as if strategy, tactics and operational art were one. However, around this time another Frenchman, Joly de Maizeroy separated strategy, “the overall conduct of military operations against an enemy” from tactics, “merely mechanical actions like ordering troops, marching, manoeuvring and fighting”. As a progression from this, “operational art” became understood as the translation of the commanders strategy into tactical action at all levels.

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Also at about this time, accurate mapping assumed major importance. In 1799, The Prussian Adam von Buelow defined strategy as, “the art of conducting war not from behind a horse’s ears, but in an office, on the surface of a map”. From this Buelow led the further understanding that:

An army was deployed from a base (or bases) of specific dimensions as determined by a general,

to advance upon an objective,

along lines of operations/communications (single, double, multiple, converging or diverging, internal or external),

along which flowed columns (men and materials). Certain rules applied concerning these lines of operations, eg:

Converging lines are best

The power of the offensive diminishes the further it advances

The relationship between the length of lines and the width of the base needed to be maintained to avoid a flanking attack. Ideally, two lines stretching from a base should meet at right angles at the objective rather than a sharp pointed angle. (Thus, the entire art of strategy was reduced to a simple geometrical formula!)

In his writings between 1804-30, Antoine Jomni, a Swiss who served the greatest military leader of all – the Frenchman Napoleon, took Buelow’s strategic manoeuvre warfare (“chessboard warfare”) to the next level, taking into account complicating factors such as roads, rivers, terrain, forests, fortresses, etc that either facilitated or obstructed manoeuvres. Jomni also introduced other military concepts such as:

Theatres of Operations (assuming a country is engaged against multiple enemies – “theatres”).

Zones of Operations – the area between an army’s base and objective, through which its lines of communications passed.

Earlier commanders such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, etc had been able to survive and operate for years in enemy territory, while maintaining only the most tenuous ties with home. Now however, the whole point of the art of war was to cut one’s enemy’s lines of operations without exposing one’s own, thus either leading to the enemy’s surrender or to battle at the enemy’s disadvantage. In this manoeuvre warfare, Jomni wrote that the two most important manoeuvres were:

1. One part of an army would hold the enemy, while the other would seek some natural obstacle or concealment to march around him and fall on his rear. And where an army had a wide base or two bases enabling convergence at an obtuse angle (rather than acute), they had a real advantage.

2. Where an army found itself between two uncoordinated opposing armies (operating on

internal/diverging lines) it had a real opportunity to dispatch first one then the other army, despite the risks.

Whatever the precise manoeuvre selected, it was always a matter of concentration - concentrating superior force to bear against the decisive point in the enemy’s lines of communication – eg. cities, towns, road junctions, bridges, fortresses, or any point where these could be threatened and forcing retreat or battle to the enemy’s disadvantage. In all this, Jomni emphasised the rational conduct of war through the mind of the strategist. Georg von Berenhorst, a Prussian writing between 1796-99, balanced this “rational approach” by emphasising the unknown, uncontrollable forces of human will and emotions – the state of mind of commanders and troops, and the role played by that great incalculable – pure chance.

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Clausewitz “On War” (p113-119) In 1832, the Prussian Karl von Clausewitz’s classic book “On War” (“Vom Kriege”) was published posthumously by his widow. Clausewitz is the greatest of all Western writers on war. While he was a product of his times, having experienced Napoleonic warfare, his work did not become dated, such as with new technological developments of weaponry, and he balanced both the rationality of war (Jomni) with its irrationality (Berenhorst). Clausewitz was not just a thoughtful soldier but a true philosopher in uniform who sought to get back to first principles by asking:

1. What was war? and, 2. What purpose did it serve?

Quoting from pages 114 to 119: “To answer the first question , Clauswitz in his last book of “On War” constructed an imaginary picture of “absolute war”, that is, war as it would have been if, stripped of all practical considerations concerning time, place and intent, had it been able to stand up naked, so to speak. This device, which he borrowed from contemporary physical science by the way of the philosopher Kant, enabled him to define war as an elemental act of violence in which all ordinary social restraints were cast off. Since force would naturally invite the use of greater force, war also possessed an inherent tendency towards escalation, which made it essentially uncontrollable and unpredictable, “a great passionate drama”. As such it was not primarily a question of acting according to this or that principle or rule; instead it represented the domain of danger, friction and uncertainty. Its successful conduct was above all a question of possessing the qualities needed in order to counter and master these inherent characteristics (where those qualities come from is another question, into which he refuses to enter). Not surprisingly, Clausewitz had much to say about will-power, bravery and endurance, both in the commander – whose “genius” they formed – and in the army which, from top to bottom, had to be imbued with “military virtue”. Though allowing the use of every expedient and requiring the full participation of the intellect, at the bottom war was a question of character. Much like his immediate predecessors, Clausewitz distinguished between tactics – the art of winning battles – and strategy, which he defined as the art of using battles in order to gain the objectives of the campaign. More fundamentally, though war was a duel between two independent minds, its interactive nature sharply differentiated it from other activities; to paraphrase, making swords (which only involved acting upon dead matter) was one thing, using them against another swordsman who is capable of parrying one’s thrusts and replying with others of his own, quite another. In a brief but brilliant discussion on the theory of war, Clausewitz acknowledges that the system proffered by each of his predecessors contained elements of truth. Yet no system ought to be allowed to obscure the elemental fact that war consisted of fighting and that fighting (battle).... determined the outcome of wars; no amount of fancy manoeuvring could do any good unless it was backed up with a big, sharp sword. Furthermore, and given the high degree of uncertainty and friction involved, Clauswitz tended to belittle the effect of manoeuvre surprise and stratagems of every kind. Trying to achieve victory by such means was all very well; but the higher the level at which war was waged, and the greater the masses that took part in it, the less likely they were to achieve decisive results. ‘The best strategy is always to be very strong, first in general and then at the decisive point.’ War was ‘a physical and moral struggle by means of the former’. Since the enemy’s strength was concentrated in his armed forces, the first objective of strategy ought always be to smash them; this achieved, his capital could be captured and his country occupied….

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Still on the subject of strategy…. Consider his discussion on the relationship between attack and defence…. The outstanding quality of the attack, he writes, is the delivery of the blow. The outstanding quality of the defence was the need to wait for that blow and parry it. Since anything which did not happen favoured the defence, other things being equal, to defend was easier than to attack. Moreover, the further away an attacker got from his base, the greater his logistic difficulties and the more forces he would lose owing to the need to leave behind garrisons, safeguard his communications and the like. Conversely, falling back on his base the defender would gather his forces and reinforce them. In the end, and it is here that Clausewitz shows his originality over his predecessors, inevitably there would come a ‘culminating point’. The attack would turn into a defence, and the defence into an attack; that is, unless the enemy had been smashed and a decisive victory had been won first. (eg. The attacks of both Napoleon and Hitler in Russia both became defences.) So far, Clausewitz gives a brief summary of the inherent qualities of war as such. However, war was not simply a phenomenon in its own right. A product of social intercourse, it was, or at any rate ought to be, a deliberate political act, ‘a continuation of policy by other means’, to quote the single most celebrated phrase that Clausewitz ever wrote. It is true that war had a grammar of its own, ie rules which could not be violated with impunity; but it was equally true that it did not have a logic of its own. That logic was to be provided from the outside, so to speak. Unless its higher conduct and general character were governed by policy, war would be ‘a senseless thing, without an object”. Translated into practical terms, this view of war as an instrument meant that ultimately its conduct had to be laid down NOT by the commander in chief but by the political leadership. What is more, it enabled Clausewitz to argue that war is morally neutral – as he says – thus once again allowing his tendency towards brutal realism to come to the fore. There can be no war without bloodshed; in dangerous things such as war, errors committed out of a feeling of benevolence are the worst. Consequently, in the entire massive work the only sentence which is devoted to the law of war is the one which that is so weak and unimportant as to be virtually negligible. (One might thus ask, what does this say about the “civilised” American and Western approach to war in places like Vietnam and Afghanistan?) Towards the end of his life Clausewitz.... underwent a change of mind. He began to recognise that besides aiming at the ‘total overthrow’ of the enemy.... another kind of war might be possible whose objectives were more limited. He had started to revise his work when he died of cholera.... The question was, how to reconcile war’s essentially unlimited nature with its use in the hand of policy; when he died, he still had not found an answer. Among Western writers on war, the position of Clausewitz is unique. To resort to a metaphor, his is not an ordinary cookbook full of recipes concerning the utensils and ingredients which, correctly used, will yield certain foods; instead it contents itself with explaining the nature of cooking and the uses to which it is put, leaving readers to proceed on their own. As a result, when technological progress caused organisation, tactics and much of strategy to change, Clausewitz alone retained his relevance.... the book holds up remarkably well as ‘a treasure of the human spirit’.... he was a philosopher of war; only the Chinese classics rival him...., albeit that their underlying philosophy is radically different. Clausewitz’s way of thought goes back to Aristotle and is based on the distinction between means and ends. By contrast, it is a fundamental characteristic of Chinese thought that such a distinction is absent.... admitting its existence would constitute a departure from ‘Tao’. Accordingly, the Chinese texts regard war not as an instrument for the attainment of this end or that but as a product of stern necessity, something which must be confronted and coped with and managed and brought to an end.... While Clausewitz emphasises that war is brutal and bloody and seeks to achieve a great victory, the Chinese texts are permeated by a humanitarian approach and have as their aim the restoration of Tao.

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These underlying philosophical differences cause Clausewitz to recommend the use of maximum force (‘overemphasising brute strength.... encouraging stupidity and barbarism’).... In turn, the Chinese emphasis on minimum force leads to a greater emphasis on trickery of every sort (‘super-sophisticated warfare.... intellectually attractive but, alas, often unrealistic and sometime dangerous as excessive manoeuvring provides the enemy with opportunities to ‘cut off one’s head’). None of this is to deny that, in practice, Western Warfare often made use of stratagems whereas Chinese warfare could be quite as bloody and brutal as its Western counterpart. In conclusion, in Book Eight of his “On War”, Clausewitz “.... comes very close to saying that since each period made war in a manner corresponding to its social and political (and geographical) characteristics, a single theory of war applicable to all times and places might not be possible at all.

Lead Up to WW1 - Warfare in Width (p120-143) For two thousand years up to the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, when Napoleon was defeated for the final time, the number of men in opposing armies remained much the same (except in the Battle of Leipzig in 1813). Even though firearms had taken over from edged weapons, battle remained much the same – men standing up in relatively tight formations at a certain carefully defined time and space – for a few hours over a few kilometres – and fighting one another in full view of the other. However, from 1830, new quick firing weapons began to make their appearance and by the mid 19th Century, the past parade-like battles were becoming increasingly obsolete. As the amount of firepower per unit and per minute dramatically increased, along with accuracy and range, troops broke formation, sought shelter and adopted camouflage clothing. Previously, the power of military organisation had led to the idea of unit “cohesion”. This was the idea that several men who know and trust each other will confront a lion, but those who do not trust each other will fear to do so. Napoleon had observed that whereas one Mameluk warrior was the equal of three Frenchmen, one hundred French soldiers could confidently take on 500 Mameluks. However, in World War One unit cohesion led to slaughter – units of Frenchmen charging machineguns. Helmut Von Moltke, the German Chief of Staff 1857-1873 did recognise that to attack frontally against modern firepower was suicide, and thought a better approach was to look for the enemy’s flank and envelop him. He also saw a concentrated army as “a calamity – it cannot subsist or move”. For these reasons, deployment in width was turned into a virtue and an offensive strategy of internal/diverging lines from one base (as recommended by Jomini) was discarded. Instead, offensive strategy was to crush an enemy between armies coming in two, possibly three directions from along a wide base (eg. a frontier). To do this required other new technologies besides fire power. Railways allowed the mobilization and deployment of large conscript armies to a country’s border. The telegraph allowed the co-ordination of armies and divisions. But because the telegraph was still relatively slow, especially with encryption to allow security, Von Molke devised a system of directives that only tell subordinate commanders what to do, not how to do it (their objective, not how to achieve it). This required good acquaintance with the system and strong trust, achieved only by general staff training to a high level (which required military staff training colleges). This whole approach was the background to the German “Schlieffen Plan” that sought in 1914, to annihilate the French Army (a la Clauswitz) in a flanking movement (a la Jomini) through Belgium.

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Penetration War & Total War – 1918 to 1945 (p160-183) The Great War (WW1 - 1914-1918) resulted in more dead and injured than most of its predecessors put together (10 million military deaths and 21 million military wounded and a further 7 million civilian deaths). This was a direct result of defence as brought about by modern firepower. Frontal attacks by mass armies against each other came to be seen as folly. Hence the most pressing problem became to try to find a way to bypass, or overcome that firepower and defence. From direct experiences of the Great War a number of military thinkers developed concepts where small modern armed forces would theoretically overpower defences so as to make it possible to wage war quickly and decisively. Giulio Douhet advocated aircraft to fly over defensive lines and attack targets. He pointed out that 1000 aircraft had 10 times the firepower of the British navy’s 30 battleships firing 10 broadsides, yet they only cost the same as one battleship – and this was at a time where aircraft were only in their early stages of development. Douhet advocated:

1. Developing an elite air force 2. At the start of a war making an all out attack on enemy air bases to gain air superiority. 3. Attacking civilian targets (industrial plant, population centres etc) to demoralise the enemy. 4. In theory the war being over almost before it began therefore minimising casualties and being more

humane than a struggle for attrition. (In practice this is not that easy – an all powerful blow from the air is not usually feasible.)

John Fredrick Fuller advocated using tanks. Tanks were developed in WW1 as a moving shield to protect advancing troops from modern firepower. Fuller’s contribution was to identify ways to transform tank formations from a siege engine into cavalry. The aim was not simply to cross trenches and break through an enemy’s fortified system, but to push deeper and bring about the enemy’s collapse from rear to front by attacking his vitals such as command, communications and supply depots. Fuller’s views were similar to Douhet, there would be an elite armoured force, gas would be used and the war would be over quickly minimising casualties. Liddell Hart interpreted Clauswitz as the “Mahdi of Mass” who misled generations of officers into the belief that that the only way to wage war was to form the greatest concentration of force and launch it straight ahead at the enemy. Hart came up with the idea of the “expanding torrent”. This involved diversionary attacks to keep the enemy’s attention localised on its immediate front. The main attack would then use an indirect approach, involving secrecy and surprise from dispersed forces (concealing the “centre of gravity”), who would come from unexpected directions, using highly mobile fast moving troops, in combination with tanks, aircraft and poison gas to overcome defences. The main attack would avoid confrontation with the enemy frontline and target the enemy command and communications, and every plan would have two options. However, like Douhet, Hart saw the main targets (and therefore strategy) as cities. Due to his WW1 revulsion of casualties his focus was on less costly ways to avoid defeat, than on more effective ways to win. He therefore didn’t see the technology as offering the option to implement a strategy of indirect approach against opposing, equally mobile armed forces. In fact, all three – Douhet, Fuller and Hart, in their desire to limit war, suffered from this limitation. Erich Ludendorff, the former chief of German Forces in WW1, had no such limitations. A towering figure, much more than the former two he understood what war was like at the top. And, unlike the last he did not regard it as some kind of field game. As he wrote, having lost two sons, “the war has spared me nothing”, but neither did he shrink from its horrors. His vision of future armed conflict was awesome and, what is more important, more nearly correct than any of the rest. While, rightly or wrongly, Hart, Fuller and to a lesser extent Douhert, may be seen as the fathers of the “Blitzkrieg” in the Second World War, the fact remains

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that it was not their vision of that war but Ludendorff’s which turned out to be only too horribly true (with 25 million military and 50 million civilian dead).

Ludendorff did not believe that a first-class modern state could be brought to its knees rapidly and cheaply by aircraft dropping bombs on its civilian population. Nor could it be achieved by fleets of tanks engaging in mobile operations, however brilliant. Ludendorff’s main thesis was that the developing technologies of production, transportation & communications made modern war into something “total” (the name of his book was Der Totale Krieg), basing itself on all the forces of the nation, and requiring the whole of the latter to be mobilised to the last person. To be sure, the next war would make use of all available modern weapons. Civilians as well as armed forces would be targeted, and the resulting casualties, destruction and suffering would be immense. Therefore, it would be all the more important to mobilise not only all the material resources but also the people’s spirit. The implication of such mobilisation was an end to democracy and the liberties it entailed, including not only the freedom of the press but capitalist enterprise as well. For either industrialists or union leaders (and during the Great War Ludendorff has his troubles with both) to insist on their own privilege was intolerable. They as well as the entire financial apparatus available to the state were to be subjected to a military dictatorship. Ludendorff was also under no illusion that the nation’s spiritual and material mobilisation could be quickly improvised. Hence the dictatorship he demanded was to be set up in peacetime and made permanent. He saw the next war as a life and death struggle to be won by the belligerent with the greatest resources and the strongest will-power, which incidentally disposes of any childish illusions concerning small, professional and highly mobile, let alone chivalrous, armed forces. Anything not serving the war effort would have to be ruthlessly discarded, and this specifically included playing at politics. Politics would in effect be swallowed up by the war, the two would become indistinguishable. “All the theories of Clausewitz should be thrown overboard…. Both war and policy serve the existence of the nation. However, war is the highest expression of the people’s will to live. Therefore politics must be made subordinate to war.” After 1945, Ludendorff’s military thought was often attacked by lightweight critics that mistook their world, in which nuclear weapons had made total warfare as he understood it impossible, as his. After the battle of Moscow in 1942, when the Soviet Union gathered itself up from its initial defeats and began to wage total war like no other country in history, its dictator leader Joseph Stalin promoted the following “five permanently operating factors”, in order of priority. (These bore a strong resemblance to Ludendorff’s concept of total war.):

1. Political stability of the homeland. 2. Morale of the armed forces 3. Quality and quantity of their divisions 4. Armament 5. Commander’s capacity for organising the resources at their disposal.

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Some Comments from Considering Subjects to Date 1. The Tactics of Mass or Envelopment or Penetration or Attrition. It seems that down through the centuries

there has been a merry dance from each of these things to the next, and that to stay fixated on one will sooner or later lead to defeat. The Macedonian phalanx penetrated the Persian mass. The Roman mass enveloped the Greek phalanx. Adolphus used the mobile firepower of his cannons and troops deployed in width to destroy the concentrated mass of the Spanish tecios. In WW1 cannons and machine guns were deployed in width in a mass war of attrition. Yet In WW2 the Germans developed the blitzkrieg to penetrate and envelop their opponents in a matter of weeks. Think about it, the flanking column that envelops, or the row that extends beyond the enemy’s flank, or the concentrated column that penetrates, or the manoeuvres that place the enemy mass at a disadvantage in a war of attrition. Then, add to this attack by air, or by sea, or under the sea or under the ground – all are means to penetrate, or to envelop, or to attack in mass, or to manoeuvre to cause attrition.

2. New Technology and Tactics. It seems many battles and wars have been won by developing new or

alternative technology and the tactics to apply that technology to best effect. Wars and battles have also been lost by the failure to develop the tactics to counter the technology and tactics of the opponent. Alexander the Great used the frontal offensive power of Macedonian long pike phalanx to defeat the Persian Empire. The Roman pilum and short sword and the tactics by which these weapons were used defeated the Phalanx and ruled the ancient world. The French lost at Agincourt because they failed to apply the necessary tactics to counter the English long bow. The casualties of WW1 were the result of wrong tactics – massed frontal attacks by conventional infantry in width - against the machine gun. In response to WW1, the combined use of tanks, aircraft and mobile infantry in the German Blitzkrieg of WW2 led to the defeat of Poland and France in a matter of weeks.

3. Pragmatism and Rapid Adaption. In all this there seems to be messages about pragmatically learning

quickly from observation & failure. If you lose the first battle (or even many like the Romans) but then learn and adapt what works with rapid entrepreneurial perseverance, then you may survive and win the war, or (like the Romans) even many wars.

After 1945 - Nuclear & Asymmetric War (p184-213) The end of the Second World War marked the first time nuclear weapons were used in war (and hopefully it will remain so). The Second World War also marked an end to the development of conventional military theory, although this was not evident at first. When the Gulf war broke out in 1991, 46 years after WW 2, yes there were missiles, cruise missiles, remotely piloted vehicles, helicopters, and computers with links to satellites and global positioning systems. But the campaign was not too much different from the German Blitzkrieg of 1939 and the most important formations were still those old and trusted WW2 products – squadrons of fighter bombers in the air, armoured divisions on land and task-forces centred around aircraft carriers at sea. At the start of the Cold War (1947-89) between the Communist East and Capitalist West, it was still believed that the best way to annihilate the enemy was by means of massive armoured offences, much like the ones mounted by the Red Army against the Germans in 1943-5, only deeper, more powerful and better. This was because the true significance of nuclear weapons was not understood at first. Politicians and the military leaders still believed that the next war would be like the last one, give or take a number of cities turned into radioactive wastes. And so strenuous attempts were made to treat nuclear arms like other weapons, to devise ways of using them and incorporate them into mainstay military doctrine.

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However, as the number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems proliferated, nuclear doctrine evolved from being focussed on using nuclear weapons to fight a war, to that of deterrence. The cumulation of this doctrine was “Mutually Assured Destruction” or “MAD”. While there continued to be attempts to limit nuclear proliferation (eg. SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), and to develop defences against nuclear weapons (eg. Star Wars), and to develop smaller “tactical” nuclear weapons that would enable their use on the battlefield, ultimately MAD proved to be the only acceptable (and sane) nuclear doctrine. In this process, military strategy, in the West at least, became something done by civilian analysts working in universities or think-tanks, rather than by generals. It was as if, in the face of weapons literally capable of destroying the earth, war had become too dangerous to leave to the generals. As more countries gained nuclear weapons (at least eight by the year 2000) or the capability to build them, the logic of deterrence began to work for them too. For a country to wage large-scale conventional war without nuclear weapons against a nuclear enemy was madness, and to do so with nuclear weapons was even greater madness too. Therefore conventional war became something that was fought solely by, or against, third or fourth rate military powers. The implication is that large-scale armed forces, designed and financed for one state to fight against another, are dinosaurs, and are likely to be reduced in future, in quantitative terms at least. This is not to say that nuclear weapons have been capable of deterring all sorts of wars. In particular, the post-1945 era has witnessed many wars fought not between states, but within states involving militias, insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists. These conflicts were waged not by regular forces invading across some border but at extremely close quarters by people who it was difficult to distinguish from the surrounding civilian populations. As shown in Vietnam, Afghanistan and numerous other conflicts, these types of wars could be waged successfully by guerrillas against the conventional regular forces of the most powerful nations of the world, including even the nuclear superpowers America and Russia. Considering that entire continents and hundreds of millions of people came to live under different political regimes as a direct result of such “asymmetric warfare”, there can be no doubt as to its effectiveness. Guerrilla warfare, of course is nothing new. Throughout history, people too weak to meet their opponents in open battle have resorted to attacking them by stealth, sometime winning the struggle but more often losing it as ruthless countermeasures were taken, including turning entire regions into wastelands. (That appears to be the choice of those fighting against guerrillas – assuming there is no external support the task is to either win the local people who support them over, or to destroy the population support base – the former being difficult to do when a regime is corrupt and oppressive – and the latter being unacceptable to Western democracy with a free press. Hence it might be argued that is why the Americans lost the Vietnam War). Perhaps the first coherent theory of guerrilla warfare was put together by the Englishman Lawrence of Arabia in 1926 in his book “The Seven Pillars of Wisdom”. Based on his experience of leading Arab guerrillas in fighting the Turks in WW1, some of his main principles were:

Guerrillas should operate “like a cloud of gas”. Most of the time they should be inactive and invisible hiding in places too inaccessible to be reached by their larger and more cumbersome opponents and relying on dispersion and mobility to escape punitive expeditions sent against them (“when the enemy advances we retreat”).

Such punitive expeditions might however provide opportunities for action, given that regular forces

would inevitably rely on lines of communication which could be subjected to attack.

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In general, guerrillas should avoid head-on clashes with the enemy’s main body, and instead operate on his flanks, his foraging parties, and his garrisons in isolated places - all the while relying on spend and surprise to concentrate their own forces, do the damage and then disappear before reinforcements can be brought up and retaliatory action taken. (As Sun Tsu says, “attack weakness – avoid strength”.)

Logistically guerrillas should be sustained partly from the countryside and partly by taking arms and

equipment from the enemy, thus making it unnecessary to have permanent, and vulnerable, bases. (However it should be noted that Lawrence received significant outside support from the British - which perhaps explains why he did not add the next principle below).

Another important writer on Guerrilla warfare was Mao Tse-tung, the first leader of Communist China. In addition to the above principles, Mao added another principle. He saw the indispensable condition for obtaining success was gaining the support of the people, who were necessary to provide the guerrillas with shelter and supply. This might be done by propaganda, by deliberately provoking the enemy into reprisals, or by force (the barrel of a gun). In the latter method he saw it as essential that the guerrillas did not simply become a gang or marauders (murdering thieves). Whatever the method(s) used the essential point to grasp was that the struggle is primarily political by nature. To Mao, guerrilla warfare was above all a question of drawing “the masses” to one’s side and mobilising them. Because there are limits to the amount of indoctrination and force that can be used to win the masses, this meant the implementation of economic and social reforms to win hearts and minds, thus amounting to revolution (or a “people’s war”). (Thus, while war remained “politics by other means” a la Clausewitz, politics also was a means of war.) Mao, followed by his Vietnamese student Giap in the Vietnam War against the US, identified three phases in any guerrilla war:

1. Isolated hit and run attacks against enemy forces with the aim of demoralising and weakening them. 2. Consolidation of guerrilla power in some remote area to form a base for recruitment, training,

propaganda, harassment and sabotage. 3. Once the enemy had weakened and started to retreat then resort to open warfare. Timing in this

final stage was crucial. If attack was too early the enemy’s regular forces would be too strong, if too late, the guerrilla cause may seem endless and demoralising.

Some Comments on Insurgency Warfare From this discussion one might deduct that there are “11 Principles To Establish & Win An Insurgency War (And To Counter One – That is, If Scorched Earth is Not an Option!)”.

Political Basis 1. Establish the grievances of the people (against oppression, corruption, exploitation, contrary culture,

etc). Clearly identify the enemy – who they are and why they are. 2. Provide a plausible alternative framework (of ideology, politics, beliefs) 3. Destroy the moral high ground of the enemy in all quarters – internal & abroad (expose oppression,

corruption etc) Military Basis 4. Know that the battlefield is “360 degrees” – the attack can be made from any direction, from above

and below. 5. The first goal is to establish and ensure the continued survival and integrity of one’s own forces in

the field. As long as these forces exist there is attrition against the enemy (and hope!)

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6. Establish the security to operate by whatever means that works (from bases, by having mobility etc) 7. Ensure discipline and justice. In particular, avoid all unnecessary actions that lose one’s own moral

high ground – internal & abroad. 8. Ensure free press access to attain the moral high ground and help prevent a scorched earth by the

enemy against the people. 9. Minimise cost to oneself while maximising cost (attrition) to the enemy. 10. Enlist external material support where possible. Seek to deny the enemy external material support. 11. When the time is right resort to open warfare and achieve complete military victory.

Naval Warfare (p144-159) Although navies had figured prominently in wars from ancient times through to the Napoleonic era, it was not until the late nineteenth century that the first comprehensive theory on naval warfare was developed. In 1885 the United States set up a naval war college and in 1890, Captain Alfred Mahan, its first chief instructor, published his lectures in a two volume work, “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783”. This book became a huge success, read in the US, Britain, Germany, Japan and the other major powers. Mahan succeeded in putting together a remarkably coherent case as to why the great powers should have navies, what having such navies entailed, and how they ought to be used. His main concern was strategy. Mahan chose not to elaborate on the details of building ships, arming them and sailing them – being convinced that technological progress must soon render such discussions obsolete. Strategy, on the other hand, was concerned with questions such as: ‘the proper function of the navy in war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of supply depots, the maintenance of communications between those depots and home base; the military value of commerce – destroying as a decisive or secondary operation of war; and the system upon which commerce destroying can be most effectively conducted. Mahan was heavily influenced by his interpretations of history, particularly concerning Britain, the strongest naval power of all, and also the role of sea power during the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage. In the latter, Mahan’s understanding was that not having control of the sea reduced the Carthaginian navy to operating mainly in home waters. Specifically, Carthage had been unable to reinforce Hannibal’s Italian campaign, which, in spite of its commander’s genius, was thereby doomed to fail. Nor had it been able to help its principal ally in Sicily, Syracuse. Rome, on the other hand, was able to use its command of the sea in order to cut Hannibal off from his bases in Africa and Spain, ship its own legions to both Spain and Sicily unhindered, and finally invade Africa itself. Mahan identified that the importance of the sea was that it served as a great highway across which could be transported armies and goods more efficiently and cheaply than could be done on land. Thus, in both war and peace, the side that was able to do this enjoyed a critical advantage over one that could not. According to Mahan, during wartime, ensuring passage for one’s own side while denying it to one’s opponent was the function of the navy. Put in other terms, the navy of a great power (Mahan was only concerned with the navies of the great powers) found itself confronted by a double task, both negative and positive. The negative part consisted of halting and destroying the enemy’s commerce. The positive part consisted of making sure that one’s own ships got through to their destinations. In carrying out this double mission, two strategies presented themselves

1. The first was that of guerre de course and had been often resorted to by past belligerents. This was to protect one’s own shipping by providing it with escorts while simultaneously going after the enemy’s cargo bearing vessels.

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2. The second was to build up as powerful a battle-fleet as possible and use it to seek out and defeat

the other side’s navy. With command of the sea thus achieved, protecting one’s own commerce while sweeping the enemy’s remaining ships off the sea and blockading them in their ports would be relatively easy.

The second strategy meant for Mahan, not a half-hearted approach. Instead, one should seek and achieve command of the sea. Reminiscent of the early Clausewitz, Mahan was basically saying that the best naval strategy was always to be very strong, first in general and then at the decisive point. Once created, the battle fleet should be kept as concentrated as circumstances permitted and when conflict occurred, the fleet should be launched straight at the opposing fleet with the objective of annihilating it. This approach favoured navies made up of the most powerful capital ships which can be built and massive investments in naval infrastructure such as: qualified manpower, ports depots, dry docks, shipyards, plants for manufacturing arms, and communications developments like the Suez, Panama and Kiel Canals. All of this Mahan explained at some length, which in turn contributed to his popularity not only in naval circles but among certain segments of industry and the political world as well. Following on from Mahan was Julian Corbett, a British civilian lawyer, who wrote “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy” in 1911. Corbett offended the British naval establishment partly because he was a civilian but mostly because he questioned Mahan’s strategy of the decisive battle, which more than anyone else was exemplified by British naval hero Nelson’s victory over the French at Trafalgar. Corbett did this by expressing the idea, also from Clausewitz, that war as a whole, including naval warfare, was “merely a continuation of politics by other means”. Corbett then went on to say that “men live upon land and not upon the sea” meaning that warfare upon the latter was less important. He said that history could count many wars that had been decided purely on land without any reference to operations at sea. He also pointed out that in theirs more mature days, both Clausewitz and Jomni had concluded that offensive war was only one form of war and policy might dictate the use of other, more circumscribed measures. Corbett said that the latter (Jomni) had also shown in considerable detail how the manoeuvres of widely dispersed forces could result in victory. He also reminded readers that at sea, as on land, the defensive was the more powerful form of war. Corbett concluded that, other things being equal, a compelling case could be made in favour of a careful, and necessarily prolonged, struggle of attrition – safeguarding one’s own commerce, disrupting that of the enemy, and using the enemy to land forces in the enemy’s rear so as to disrupt his plans and throw him out of gear. He argued that all this was particularly true, if the political entity waging the war was not a country facing a neighbour but a far-flung empire dependent on its lines of communication. Corbett supported his arguments with detailed historical case studies such as the Seven Years War (1756-63), where the British did not achieve complete command of the sea and destroy the French fleet, but achieved by strangulation “the Peace of Paris (The Treaty of Paris) was the most triumphant we (the British) ever made”. Both Mahan and Corbett started from “first principles”. Mahan examined the objectives of naval warfare. Corbett linked naval warfare to policy, which might be limited. At the end of the twentieth century both schools were alive and well, but somewhat academic. Command of the sea was an objective sought only by the US, and even that country had seen its number of aircraft carriers dwindle from nearly 100 to just 12. Whether for economic or geographical reasons, virtually all the rest had given up their capital ships and seen their navies reduced to little more than coastguards that were incapable of independent operations far from home. (Although shortly after this book was written China announced plans to develop missiles to “kill carriers” and acquire carriers of its own. Presumably this is aimed at challenging the US projection of power through its carrier fleet. Where this will lead, who knows?)

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Some Comments from Considering Naval Warfare 1. The relevance of command of the sea in any conflict will surely be determined by the nature of the

conflict. One would presume that a conflict in the middle of the Asian continent may have lesser concern for dominance at sea compared to, say a war across the Pacific Ocean?

2. World War Two showed that a navy without air superiority is highly vulnerable. Command of the Sea

could only be achieved with Command of the Air first. For example, the Germans could not invade Britain across the English Channel because they lost the Battle of Britain and so did not gain Command of the Air. The British also saw their capital ships The Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk from the air before the fall of Singapore because they had no air cover. From the Battle of Midway onwards the Japanese operations across the Pacific were on the back foot because they had lost Command of the Air. Indeed, it is symbolic that the greatest battleship of all, the Japanese Yamato, was sunk from the air at the end of WW2.

3. Land, Sea, Air, Space (and even Time?), ultimately it seems that as technology develops so does the onus

on command of the mediums or dimensions where wars are fought. If war is only to be fought on land there only needs to be the military capability to Command the Land. If there is then the sea, which allows the more cost-effective transport of personnel and materials, there needs to be the military capability to Command the Sea. If then, Command of the Sea and/or Land is dependent of Command of the Air, then there also needs to be that. Now, in our age there is also Space, with satellites, lasers and missiles that give the potential to Command all of Land, Sea and Air. Of course, with each progression of medium there is an associated increase in development costs of technology. Only those who can afford to pay the cost to be in space will have the potential to command all. And who knows, after space there may be other mediums for war, such as in time (like in the Terminator movies), or under the earth or inside computers (like in the Matrix movies).

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Reading: Ephesians 6:10-20 10 Finally, be strong in the Lord and in his mighty power. 11 Put on the full armour of God, so that you can take your stand against the devil’s schemes. 12 For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms. 13 Therefore put on the full armour of God, so that when the day of evil comes, you may be able to stand your ground, and after you have done everything, to stand. 14 Stand firm then, with the belt of truth buckled around your waist, with the breastplate of righteousness in place, 15 and with your feet fitted with the readiness that comes from the gospel of peace. 16 In addition to all this, take up the shield of faith, with which you can extinguish all the flaming arrows of the evil one. 17 Take the helmet of salvation and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God. 18 And pray in the Spirit on all occasions with all kinds of prayers and requests. With this in mind, be alert and always keep on praying for all the Lord’s people. 19 Pray also for me, that whenever I speak, words may be given me so that I will fearlessly make known the mystery of the gospel, 20 for which I am an ambassador in chains. Pray that I may declare it fearlessly, as I should.

Introduction Good morning! The Bible teaches us in many places that there is a devil and that we as a Church and as Christians are in a state of total, vicious war against spiritual forces working behind the scenes, behind flesh and blood. And this is all across society, across the whole world, in every home, street, school, church, work place, and government - down through all the ages. This scripture from Ephesians 6 is just one example of this teaching. (See also 2 Cor 10:3, Rev 12:7, etc) I certainly believe this and could preach a whole message on the subject - but that is not my aim today. I do not want to talk today about whether our enemy is imaginary or not. My message today is aimed at those of you who already believe and accept that we are in a war. And what I want to talk about is how we fight that fight.

A Poor Understanding of Ephesians 6 Now I think most Christians who have been around for a while, especially if they have been part of the Charismatic movement, or around Pentecostal churches, or have been involved in “spiritual warfare” praying, will be very familiar with the passage dealing with the “Armour of God”, as we just heard in Ephesians 6.

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But unfortunately, I think that although these verses are very well known in such circles there is in fact a poor understanding of what they are actually teaching. I think that many Christians come to see these verses about putting on the “armour of God”, as only something that we each individually pray upon ourselves as a protection against evil – a bit like invoking a magic spell, or wearing a crucifix, to keep away bad things. I say - By all means – it is good for each of us put on the armour of God everyday in prayer – I do this myself. But I am going to teach today that doing this is NOT just about doing something as individuals – I am going to teach that this scripture also has great importance in showing us how we are to operate against spiritual forces as a whole Christian community – as a Church!

Roman Armour and Weaponry Now to do this, firstly I want to establish something. If we look at verse 19 we can see that Paul tells us that as he writes the book of Ephesians he is actually “in chains”. And, when we also read the Book of Acts we find (in 28:16) in fact that Paul is a prisoner in Rome and is being guarded by a Roman soldier. We also know Paul was a Roman citizen and his world was ruled by the Roman Empire with their legions, and we can see that the armour and sword he describes in Ephesians 6 closely aligns with that of a Roman soldier. For example, the Greek word for sword used in Ephesians is the word “machaira”, which means large knife or short sword, commonly interchanged with the name “chiphos” that describes a straight sword for thrusting, quite different from “kromphaia”, which means a large sword. Therefore, it is fair to assume that the armour and weaponry being described in Ephesians is in fact the Roman weaponry of those times. In particular the sword can be understood to be a Roman “gladius”, a short double edged, infantry stabbing sword. This is very important in helping to understand what I believe this passage is teaching. You see, the nature of the weapon determines how it is used, and the tactics that must be applied to win in battle. Let me demonstrate.

Two Swords Here are two swords. The first, longer one is a Japanese samurai sword, a katana with a long single edged blade. Before I became a Christian I used to study the writings of Miayamoto Mushashi. He was the most famous of all Japanese samurai and wrote a classic little book called “Go Rin No Sho” – translated in English as “A Book of Five Rings”, the five rings being water, fire, wind, earth and void. Essentially this book defined an Eastern/Buddhist philosophy behind the “way of the warrior”. Then when I became a Christian I took my katana at that time and broke it in two and threw it into the Whanganui River. This was because I rejected the symbolism and religious teachings that came with that sword. I had found a new and better sword.

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This second and shorter sword is a Roman gladius, which metaphorically or symbolically represents the Christian “Sword of the Spirit”. We know this from Hebrews 4: 12, which tells us: “For the Word of God is living and active. Sharper than any double-edged ‘machaira’ (short sword), it penetrates even to the dividing soul and spirit, joints and marrow; it judges the thoughts and attitudes of heart.” The gladius is equally double edged so it can cut both ways but its most important part is the point which is stabbed into the face and body of the enemy. Symbolically we can say that the double edges of the Sword of the Spirit that cut both ways are to love thy neighbour as thyself. And the most important part, to love God above all, is the point – which the Christian drives into the minds and hearts of those who oppose to God – bringing not death but life.

Differences between the Swords To me there are several important differences between the katana and the gladius; Firstly I found that the philosophy in Eastern religion follows the katana – it has only one very sharp edge – to love thyself – that is the way of the warrior – it is about self betterment to achieve “void” – oneness with the universe. The second thing I found is that because the katana is a two handed weapon it is not possible to use a shield. Thus, there can be no shield of faith as with the Christian armour. Thirdly, because the sword is long it requires space. It is not a weapon symbolising very close relationships, either with your fellow soldier or your enemy. This has profound implications when compared with the gladius that represents the Christian Sword of the Spirit.

Demonstration Let me demonstrate. I need two (adult) volunteers of roughly equal size and fighting abilities. Imagine each already has a belt, breastplate, footwear. First – get each to put on a helmet and then give each a sword (one the katana and the other the gladius. Have them face off and ask the congregation who they think has the advantage and is likely to win. (Obviously the katana!) Second - then give the person with the Roman sword a large rectangular shield and ask the congregation now who they think has the advantage. Hmmmm? Thirdly – say to the congregation; “Imagine two lines of these soldiers facing each other then being forced closely together and doing battle. One has a wall of interlinked shields with short swords and the other has samurai swords. Who do you think will have the advantage?” Thank you

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Close Relationships The Roman legions with their short swords and shields conquered the ancient world. Often the Romans soldiers were smaller and weaker than their barbarian enemies who would have larger and longer swords and battleaxes. In one to one combat a Roman soldier might lose but basically Roman tactics were to stay in close formation with shields forming a shield wall until the soldiers could get very close to the enemy where they could use their short stabbing swords to the face and the body. Enemies that had poorer, irregular shields or no shields, and who had longer weapons in close combat that they could not use because of a lack of space were then put at a disadvantage. And this shows us how we are to use our Christian Sword of the Spirit and shield of faith in spiritual warfare. We are to stay in close formation, in close relationships with our fellow soldiers in Christ, forming a shield wall of faith through which the enemy’s flaming darts from hell cannot penetrate. Those darts may be lies, false beliefs, false prophesies, gossip, hurtful & unkind acts, and so on – all things that may grieve our hearts and minds and spirits. To withstand these “missiles” means we must all move together in one common direction with fellow Christians supporting and covering each other. We need to keep in step and stay shoulder to shoulder. If some of us run ahead or hang back, gaps will form in our shield wall of faith through which the enemy darts can penetrate. The darts may not hit us at first but may instead slip through to wound our fellows. In the end though, if we lose our formation - our close relationships, we may all be broken. And again it is all about close relationships when we close with the enemy. Our Sword of the Spirit, like the Roman gladius, is short so we must be in close to use it effectively. And when we get close our shield wall of faith will make it very difficult for our opposition be effective with their longer weapons of self.

Clarifying the Form Our Enemy Takes Now I just want to take a moment to clarify the form our enemy takes. Paul says in our passage from Ephesians 6 that we are to “stand against the devil’s schemes” and that “…our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world, and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms.” Our enemy is spirits of evil working behind flesh and blood, and behind the institutions of the world. I could preach another whole sermon on this but suffice to say these spirits firstly come as agents of lies and corruption that then pave the way for forces of hurt and fear. When we come across someone whose life is being destroyed by lies and corruption, or whose actions are causing damage to others, our task is to listen to our commander Lord Jesus Christ. And when we hear His command to do battle our task is to stand firm together with our shields of faith until we are close enough to use our Sword of the Spirit to good effect - to penetrate through all opposing armour into minds and hearts to drive home the point of our sword – which is to love God first and above all. And by doing this we bring not death to flesh and blood like the Romans did so effectively with their gladius, but life – indeed eternal life, and the spirits, which were drawn like vultures to each carcass, will be defeated and scattered.

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Prayers – Our Spears Now, some of you may have observed that there is one key item of a Roman soldier’s equipment not identified in the Ephesians 6 passage – and that is the Roman spear – the pilum (see image of Roman soldier). The pilum was as a heavy wooden javelin that had a long thin steel head. It was designed to penetrate right through shields and bodies and armour and then the shaft would bend. It would kill, disable any shield it struck, and cause crowded groups of enemy to trip over the shaft. When whole ranks of Roman soldiers threw their pilums in a volley into the front ranks of an advancing enemy it would cause devastation and confusion. The Romans would then rapidly move forward and take advantage with their swords. Paul says at the end of our passage today in Ephesians 6 “And pray in the Spirit on all occasions with all kinds of prayers and requests.” (v18). In a way, the prayers of Christians are like the Roman pilum. And when we collectively cast our prayers ahead of us in a volley it devastates our enemy and gives us the advantage in the close relationships work to come.

A Messy and Exhausting Business So I have given us more to think about when we think of the armour of God. But there is one final thing I want to add. The battles that the Roman soldiers fought were a hard and messy business. Each adult human has about four litres of blood and 10 meters of intestine so when one punched a large hole in the container carrying these contents one tended to get covered with unpleasant things. And when there were lots of people involved it got very messy. We also read that ancient battles were thirsty and exhausting work so units would often withdraw or be rotated to have a breather and slake their thirst if they could. In fact, the various units of a Roman army (centuries and cohorts) maintained gaps between them in battle, partly for this purpose. In a way, there are similarities in the spiritual battles we fight as Christians. If we do battle in close relationships, seeking to penetrate with God’s love against lies and corrupt ways, and dealing with violent and fearful behaviours, then expect to things to get messy and exhausting. We will need to take breathers and drink the waters of the Spirit when we can.

Conclusion So here today I have given an understanding of why putting on the armour of God is not just an individual matter of simply praying some magic invocation for our personal protection. It has far greater significance. I believe this passage from Ephesians also describes how we are to fight the fight as a whole Christian community against the forces of our spiritual enemy – the devil. In this, the most important thing to understand is that the nature of our warfare is dependant on the closeness of our relationships – both to protect ourselves and to defeat what is evil. I pray, may our Lord Jesus Christ guide us further in this. Amen.

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CCCooonnndddiiitttiiiooonnnsss fffooorrr aaa RRRaaagggiiinnnggg FFFiiirrreee

The Fuel - When a society becomes increasingly “vertical” - class based, dependent on wealth and position,

and the larger mass of society is “continuous” – not divided but united in its thirst for change, and there is “openness” – education and circulation of knowledge of ideas that offer that change, then the fuel of revolution or revival will burn. This is particularly so in the centers and locations of high population, for there the fuel is dense.

The Landscape - And where the political and economic landscape is that of oppression and depression,

then any fire is will spread more rapidly, like up a steep slope. And the more severe the abuses and deprivation, the steeper the slope. And the greater the abuses and deprivation, the longer the slope.

The Climate – When the fuel has been dry for a long time, like in a drought with the heat of summer, and

a longstanding political and economic landscape lends itself to a rapid and widespread move of social unrest, then the conditions will be ripe for a conflagration. And when certain daily events occur that increase the thirst for change and make emotions run hot, any blaze will result in extreme behavior. And then, if in this situation the winds of change blow strong, perhaps from a brewing storm, all that is required is an ignition, a spark, a small flame, and an uncontrollable inferno will sweep all before it.

BBBuuuttt wwwiiillllll iiittt bbbeee ttthhheee fffiiirrreeesss ooofff rrreeevvviiivvvaaalll ooorrr ooofff rrreeevvvooollluuutttiiiooonnn???

CONDITIONS INFLUENCE ON FIRE ANALOGY FOR REVIVAL & REVOLUTION

FUEL Fuel Classes (vertical)

Subsurface, surface, ladder & aerial. Fire travels quickly up.

Classes of society indicated by wealth, position and education.

Fuel Arrangement

Aerated or compact. Spaces for oxygen.

Freedom to think – openness to new ideas & to spirit.

Fuel Size & Shape

Proportions of fine, medium, heavy. Fine fuels ignite heavy.

Gender & age groups.

Fuel Type Species, chemical composition, dead or alive

The culture - indicating resistance to change.

Fuel Moisture Main determinant of ignition, intensity, rate of spread and fuel consumption

Thirst – how thirsty/needy are people for change.

Fuel Continuity (horizontal)

Gaps and barriers that break the horizontal continuity of fuel (eg. roads, rivers, changes in fuel type).

Gaps & barriers between groups that will limit spread.

Fuel Availability Determined by all of the above. All the above will determine the proportion of population that will be consumed by revival or revolution.

Fuel Load Amount of available fuel per unit area.

Number of people available per unit area. Heavy numbers in urban centres.

LAND Land - Slope Fire travels faster uphill and slower downhill.

Oppression/depression breeds the potential for rapid spread and high intensity. Comfort breeds the opposite.

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Land - Brokenness

When the land is broken there will not be a consistent rate of spread.

A society where some are oppressed and some are comfortable will not produce a consistent rate of spread.

Land - Elevation Depending on location affects fuel types and weather factors such as wind, moisture and temperature.

The level of development/education in a society may or may not encourage spread.

Land - Aspect Slopes with greater exposure to the sun will burn more readily.

A society with greater exposure to “illumination” (truth) will be more ready for revival or revolution.

CLIMATE Weather - Wind Direction

Fire travels faster downwind than upwind (similar effect to slope).

Which way is the spirit (good or bad) blowing? Revival and revolution will spread more rapidly with greater intensity in the direction of the wind.

Weather - Wind Speed

Greater wind speed causes faster spread and more intense fire behaviour.

How hard is the spirit blowing? If it is blowing with great force, expect rapid spread and extreme behaviour.

Weather - Relative Humidity

With low relative humidity, fine fuels will dry readily making for easy ignition and spread.

Certain influences may in a very short time cause people to thirst for change.

Weather -Temperature

High temperatures increase the ease of fuel combustion by requiring less energy from the fire to sustain itself.

If emotions are already running hot due to external factors, the revival or revolution will be more easily sustained.

Weather -Drought &Rainfall

If there has been little rain expect easy ignition, rapid spread, high intensity and consumption of even less burnable fuels..

If longer term factors have led people to be thirsty for change for a long time it may only take a spark for revival or revolution to begin and spread with rapidity and intensity, consuming even those normally resistant.

Weather - Pressure Systems

These indicate the bigger picture that will determine wind direction & speed, temperatures and rainfall.

What is the bigger picture? Is a storm coming? Will there be winds from a certain direction? Will it be cold and wet?

Weather -Seasons & other cyclic events (El Nino).

Influence of longer term weather patterns – temperatures, rainfall, prevailing winds.

Is this really the season for revival or revolution?

Documents

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