South Africa’sNational PeaceAccord: its structures and functions

Chris Spies

South Africa’s transition to democracy in the 1990swas not as peaceful as is often characterized by theoutside world. For much of the twentieth century,

the anti-apartheid movements relied on non-violentactivism to challenge the state based on whitesupremacy, institutionalized segregation anddiscrimination. This shifted in the 1960s, when someembarked on an armed struggle to force the governmentto abandon its policies, which was in turn met withviolence by the state security structures. In the absence ofresources and mechanisms to manage conflict at alllevels of society, competition and mistrust within andbetween communities often flared into violence. When the official negotiations began in 1990, battles forpower surfaced and political violence escalateddramatically – with a 307 percent rise in fatalities from1985 to 1991.

To respond to this crisis, South African political partiesnegotiated the 1991 National Peace Accord (NPA) aimed atpreventing violence. It created an unprecedentedcountry-wide network of structures to implement theagreement by addressing the behaviour of politicalparties and the security forces, issues related to justice,and conflict management through participatoryprocesses of localized mediation and monitoringcoordinated at the regional and national level. Althoughaimed at ending the violence, its principles andstructures provided an important safety net for nationalnegotiations. Later, politicians knew that even when theywalked out of the constitutional negotiations, theyretained their common commitment as signatories to theNPA, which provided a mechanism for channels ofcommunication to remain open.

Finding an acceptable convenorBy 1990, many South Africans were deeply concerned bythe violence and the risk it posed for derailing theprospect for constitutional negotiations. Despite theurgency, it was unclear who would be acceptable toinitiate a process to address it. Most South Africans hadno faith in President De Klerk’s National Party (NP)government and it was widely suspected that the statesecurity structures were complicit in the violence.

The churches made the first initiative. In November 1990,a national conference involving all but two Christianreligious groups marked a historic moment towardsreconciliation. The Dutch Reformed Church – seen bymany as the ‘National Party in prayer’ – confessed its guiltand acknowledged its role in apartheid. Moved by thisconfession, delegates formulated the RustenburgDeclaration denouncing apartheid, calling for ademocratic constitution and more equitable distributionof wealth. They urged the churches to condemn all formsof violence and decided to convene a peace

Chris Spies is the director of Dynamic

Stability CC, a conflict transformation and

development practice, and a senior

associate of the Centre for Conflict

Resolution. He was the Regional Organizer

of the Western Cape Regional Peace

Committee .

South Africa’s National Peace Accord 21

conference.But the March 1991 offer by the South AfricanCouncil of Churches (SACC) to convene a peaceconference met with a negative response from theInkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which perceived the SACC as supporting the ANC and therefore an unacceptable convenor.

Around the same time as the church initiative, a group ofprogressive business leaders from a number of largecorporations formed the Consultative BusinessMovement (CBM) to develop an informed response tothe deteriorating situation. After a series of discreetmeetings with key leaders, the CBM gained credibility as a potential facilitator in both the NPA andconstitutional negotiations.

Under increasing pressure to respond to the politicalviolence, in April 1991 President De Klerk announced apeace summit for late May involving political, church andcommunity leaders. Although welcomed by the IFP, theANC and others rejected it as a propaganda ploy. Theyargued that the government lacked credibility toconvene such a process unilaterally. Alarmed, CBM andsenior church leaders decided to use their combinedinfluence and credibility to move the process forward.They called an emergency meeting, inviting leaders ofother key business associations and the Congress ofSouth African Trade Unions (COSATU). Through back-channel talks, they developed a formula with the keypolitical leaders that allowed the government summit tobe seen as a component of an ongoing andindependently-convened peace conference involving allparties and organizations.

Designing a processAlthough the SACC, the ANC and a number of othersstayed away from the May summit, the delegates wereable to express their views on the causes of violence andintroduce proposals to end it. The conference appointedLouw Alberts, co-chair of the Rustenburg Conference, toact as facilitator of a second peace conference. He wasmandated to form a ‘facilitating committee’ capable ofconvening a more representative gathering. The ANCwelcomed the summit outcome and proclaimed thepeace process back on track.

Alberts consulted immediately with SACC GeneralSecretary Frank Chikane and others in the ad hocbusiness/church group on the principles and process forestablishing a representative facilitating committee.Chikane agreed to consult with the anti-apartheidmovements, while Alberts consulted the government,businesses and the IFP. Within the week, agreement wasreached on the membership of a 13-person committeedrawn from the church and business community under arotating chairperson.

The facilitation committee judged that the main politicalleaders should not conduct the negotiations directlybecause they would become mired in positionalbargaining and find it difficult to make concessionsneeded for an agreement to address the violence.Instead, Alberts decided to involve junior representativesin a quiet forum designed to encourage consensusbuilding. The facilitators would consult with the mainparties and shuttle between them to determineacceptable proposals that could be the basis for anegotiated solution.

The committee initiated the process with a low-keypreparatory meeting in late June. It attracted almost 120appointed representatives from all the political groupingsexcept three white right-wing parties. It was the first timethat the NP, ANC, and IFP met to discuss the violence andwas the first time that the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)agreed to participate in negotiations involving thegovernment. After a tone-setting speech by ArchbishopDesmond Tutu, the facilitators established ground rules.They then led the delegates through a non-evaluative‘brainstorming’ process on the causes of violence andpossible ways to address them. After grouping thesefactors into themes, the delegates decided to appoint apreparatory committee to consider the issues and toestablish working groups to draft proposals. It was agreedthat nine additional members, three each nominated byANC, IFP and NP, would join the existing members of thenon-partisan facilitating committee to form thepreparatory committee. They would then consult withthe other relevant parties and organizations, report onprogress in August and work toward convening aninclusive forum leading to a binding agreement.

Reaching agreementThe preparatory committee appointed five workinggroups mandated to develop consensus proposals onthe key themes. Every group comprised threerepresentatives each from the government, ANC and IFPgroupings, plus one religious and one businessrepresentative from the committee. The CBM providedadministrative support, with financing from thegovernment. The groups were formed to address fivetopics: (1) code of conduct for political parties; (2) code ofconduct for security forces; (3) socio-economicdevelopment; (4) implementation and monitoring; and(5) process, secretariat and media. After a series ofdeliberations, negotiations, reviewing draft agreementsand receiving feedback, the committee decided to hold ahigh profile National Peace Convention on 14 September 1991. Finally, under considerable pressureand only hours before the Convention, the final draftswere compiled into a single text that would become theNational Peace Accord.

22 Accord 13

The Convention was a tremendous occasion, bringingtogether the senior political leadership for the first timealong with representatives from other political parties,leaders of the ’independent homeland’ territories,traditional leaders, churches, trade unions, businessgroupings, the media and the diplomatic corps. TheAccord was signed by 27 political, trade union andgovernment leaders. It marked a breakthrough revealingthat deep-seated differences would not prevent thevarious parties from working with each other to addresscommon concerns.

Yet a number of significant stakeholders with moreradical views did not agree to sign the NPA. The PAC andthe Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) declined tosign because they were unwilling to be part of anystructure that included the government, yet theyindicated their support for the spirit and objectives of theAccord. On the right, the Conservative Party (CP), theright-wing Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) andHerstigte Nasionale Party did not attend or sign. Three ofthe homeland governments also refused to sign; Ciskeisigned but later withdrew from implementation. But themajority committed themselves – at least on paper – toimplementing the Accord.

NPA’s aims, principles and objectives The NPA created the first institutionalized peacekeepingand peacemaking instrument for South Africa. Mostbelieved that it was the political parties - some of themNPA signatories - that were the key instigators behindmuch of the political violence. The agreement mandatedthe signatories to monitor each other’s compliance withspecified codes of conduct. Political parties andorganizations had to condemn violence publicly, preventmembers from promoting or using any form of violence,cooperate with the authorities to prevent violence atpolitical events and assist the police in investigating andapprehending violators. There were also detailedstandards and operating procedures for the securityforces, particularly the police.

The agreement was rooted in a number of basic values. Itpromoted democratic principles of good governance,mutual responsibility and accountability. It explicitlyrecognized the fundamental rights and freedoms ofconscience and belief, speech and expression,association, movement, peaceful assembly and peacefulpolitical activity. These commitments were especiallysignificant given the history of authoritarianism andpolitical intolerance.

Recognizing poverty as an underlying condition thatcombined with intense political rivalry to be a drivingforce behind some of the most extreme violence, the NPAprovided for social and economic reconstruction anddevelopment intended particularly to benefit and

involve those communities affected by political violence.It also acknowledged the need for urgent rehabilitationand reconstruction in violence-affected areas andstressed the principle of involvement to defuse tensionswithin communities.

NPA implementation structuresThe agreement specified implementation mechanismscreating a structure based on national, regional and localcommittees to facilitate violence prevention andspecialized committees to address key themes. Thesestructures were financed mainly through the nationalbudget, with additional support provided by the privatesector and foreign aid agencies. By 1993, its annualbudget was over USD $12 million – a budget that did notreflect the significantly larger in-kind contributions madeby volunteers and organizations donating their staff andsupport services. The budget was initially administeredby the Department of Justice. In mid-1993, frustrationwith bureaucratic delays and a misperception thatfinancial management indicated government control ledto its transfer to the National Peace Secretariat.

National-level structuresSeveral structures were created at the national level. The60-person National Peace Committee (NPC) wascomposed of representatives from all the signatoryparties and members of the preparatory committee, co-chaired by business leader John Hall and Bishop StanleyMogoba. Its role was to oversee the implementation ofthe agreement as a whole and to resolve any politicalobstacles to its smooth functioning. It was also mandatedto monitor compliance with the codes of conduct forpolitical groups. The NPC was supported by anindependent National Peace Secretariat (NPS), chaired byAdvocate Anthonie Gildenhuys, which implemented itsorders and was responsible for establishing andcoordinating the regional committees. After considerablenegotiations, representatives of five political parties and arepresentative of the legal profession, as well as arepresentative from the Department of Justice wereselected to staff the seven-person NPS. Several positionswere left open in the hope that the non-signatory partieswould decide to join the agreement. The Department ofHome Affairs’ Directorate of Internal Peace Institutionsprovided the NPS’s infrastructural support. Both the NPCand NPS operated by consensus.

Also established at the national level was anindependent, five-person Commission of Inquiry(Goldstone Commission) to investigate the nature andcauses of political violence and intimidation, identifythose responsible and suggest remedies. It comprisedrespected senior members of the judiciary and legalprofession under the leadership of Justice RichardGoldstone. They investigated specific past events as well

South Africa’s National Peace Accord 23

National PeaceCommittee (NPC)Representatives of signatory parties.Oversawimplementation,monitoredcompliance withCode of Conduct forpolitical groups anddispute resolution.

National PeaceSecretariat (NPS)Representatives of4 major politicalparties. 1 person fromthe Peace Directorate& chaired byindependentadvocate. Chargedwith establishing andcoordinating RPCs.

Regional PeaceCommittees (RPCs)1 per province,11 nationally.Representatives ofpolitical and religiousgroups, business,unions, localauthorities, police anddefence forces, LPCsand otherstakeholders.

Local PeaceCommittees (LPCs)Approximately 260nationally.Membership reflectedcomposition ofcommunity.Accountable to RPC. Peace

MonitorsApprox.15,000

National structures Local and regional structures

Commission ofInquiry Regardingthe Prevention ofPublic Violence(GoldstoneCommission)

Police Board Socio-EconomicReconstruction &DevelopmentCommittees. 1 perregion to brokerdevelopmentprojects

Police ReportingOfficers. 1 per region

Special CriminalCourts (created in manylocalities)

as situations likely to trigger violence, such asdemonstrations or the upcoming elections. A PoliceBoard was established to make recommendations formore effective policing, improved police-communityrelations and policy changes.

Regional-level structuresEleven Regional Peace Committees (RPCs) wereestablished around the country, except in the fourindependent homeland territories that were not NPAsignatories. Each RPC comprised representatives ofpolitical and religious organizations, unions, business andindustry groups, local authorities, security forces andother relevant organizations. In some regions, the processof forming the RPC replicated the conflict dynamics of thecountry and called on all the NPS’s mediation skills beforethey could be constituted. They were charged withpreventing violence in their region by using a number ofapproaches, including mediation, monitoring, andfacilitating preventive action. They reported to thenational structures on the causes of violence, coordinatedactivities in the region and established networks of localcommittees. They made decisions by consensus. Inparticular, they established Socio-EconomicReconstruction and Development (SERD) committees tobroker development projects aimed at preventing orreducing violence. Also at the regional level were PoliceReporting Officers nominated by the Bar Association andappointed by the Minister of Law and Order. They wereresponsible for investigating allegations of policemisconduct and supervising the police department’sown Complaints Investigation Unit – which manysuspected was incapable of impartial investigations.

Local-level structuresIn each region, a number of Local Peace Committees(LPCs) were established, eventually totalling more than260 across the country. It was intended that membershipin each LPC would reflect the composition of thatcommunity and involve representatives of keystakeholder groups. Their function was to promote trustand reconciliation at the grassroots, mediate conflicts,facilitate agreements on the operation of local publicpolitical events,promote compliance with theagreements reached and liaise with the local police andjudiciary, and implement national and regional initiatives.They reported to their RPC. In many areas they becameinvolved in coordinating the 15,000 trained peacemonitors drawn from all sectors of society. The volunteerLPC members were trained in dispute resolution,meeting facilitation and negotiation skills and werecompensated for out-of-pocket expenses. In some areas,the LPCs worked closely with the SERD committees toaddress economic development in their community. In afew regions, special Justices of the Peace capable oflaunching their own inquiries into the violencecomplemented the LPCs’ work. Also at the local levelwere Special Criminal Courts established by theDepartment of Justice in cooperation with the local legalprofession. They were intended to process unrest-relatedcases more swiftly and effectively than the existing courtsand operated with special rules guiding evidence and procedures.

South Africa’s National Peace Accord structures

24 Accord 13

Responding to political violenceThe NPA agreement was a major breakthrough thathelped to create the space for parties to engage innegotiations to decide the political future of South Africa.Although the aims of the NPA were probably appropriateto address the violence and many of its goals wereachieved, resource limitations and political turmoil meantthat they were unable to end the violence or resolve thediverse conflicts. Yet the participants deserve credit forworking relentlessly for peace amidst growing cynicismover a continuing dirty war perpetuated by some of thesame parties who were signatories to the NPA. The peacecommittees helped to open channels of communication;legitimize the concept of negotiations; create a safespace to raise issues that could not be addressed in otherforums; strengthen accountability; equalise the powerbalance; and reduce the incidence of violence.1 It is, ofcourse, impossible to know what the consequencesmight have been in the absence of the NPA and itsstructures. Although statistics reflect an increase in thenumber of political fatalities for the period 1991-1993, it iswidely agreed that the levels of violence were reduced inmany areas from what they would have been withoutthese structures.

At national level, NPA structures contributed towardsencouraging and nurturing a culture of tolerance andnon-violence. It created an expectation that the signatorygroups would have to comply with the code of conduct.Although problematic in practice, it gave leverage to NPAstaff and volunteers to encourage political leaders andthe police to live up to their undertakings; manyresponded positively so as not to be seen in oppositionto the accord.

The NPA helped to shift the institutional cultures andbehaviour of both the South African Police (SAP) and theSouth African Defence Force (SADF), both of whomlacked public credibility. The SAP interacted with ordinary

citizens and international observers who cared deeplyabout human rights and the values underlying the NPAand were exposed to constructive problem solvingprocesses. Further, many NPA staff and volunteers usedthe Police Reporting Officers to consistently reportalleged offenders, holding the police accountable fortheir actions for the first time in decades. The processplayed an important role in stimulating the SAP to adopta community policing approach.

At the local and regional levels, the committeessuccessfully managed tensions between major politicalactors by facilitating forums for debate and decision-making. Tensions at the local level were addressed withinthe communities as far as possible. When local peacecommittees were unable to resolve conflicts, the RPCassisted them. They were often asked to help mediatespecific conflicts and helped to broker local peaceagreements on key issues of concern. They were alsoinstrumental in crisis management and violenceprevention. For example, after the revered militant leaderChris Hani was assassinated in April 1993 and massdemonstrations were planned throughout the country,the committees were instrumental in forming ‘jointoperations communications centres’ with the ANC andpolice so as to mitigate the potential for violence. On thisand other occasions, the deployment of peace monitorsto witness public events and position themselvesbetween the hostile forces was often effective inmoderating behaviour and increasing accountability.International observers complemented the efforts oflocal monitors. Although unable to prevent all fatalities, in retrospect it seems likely that they helped to stabilizethe situation at a very vulnerable moment in the peace process.

In addition to this direct work, the NPS sought tostimulate a pro-peace public constituency. They formed asubcommittee responsible for marketing and a media

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department. They cooperated with South Africa’s topadvertising agencies in a peace promotion campaign,developing logos and peace messages and working withmusicians to develop a popular peace song. They helpedthe media to highlight positive stories instead of theusual sensationalist horror stories.

Assessing the shortcomingsDespite the many evident contributions made by theNPA, there were a number of shortcomings. Perhaps thecentral one was that the NPA structures dealt mostly withthe symptoms of violence rather than its underlyingcauses. Its limited capacity to promote socio-economicreconstruction and development was notable. It was alsounable to transform the violent conflict in the transportsector or to implement gun control measures and reducethe number of weapons, which may have enabled thepost-1994 crime wave. Yet the processes it fosteredopened space for South Africans to discuss these largerissues and to seek ways to address them.

The NPA was an agreement between the signatories butbecause it was not enforceable through the courts, theNPC could not use the legal system to sanction thosewho violated its code of conduct. Despite the need tomake amendments to update the NPA, the NationalPeace Convention was never reconvened after theoriginal event – in part because the political parties werebusy positioning themselves for elections. In retrospect,some consider that the NPA was a success despite thepolitical parties rather than because of them; yet withoutthe principled support of these parties, the regional andlocal peace committees could not have operated.

There were also shortcomings in the administration andimplementation of the NPA structures. One of the mostsignificant was the disparity between regions andlocalities, with some RPCs more effective than in others.Throughout the country, there were far more LPCs in ruralareas and an insufficient number in urban areas. Themarketing arm tended to overlook the importantmedium of radio, which has the widest reach in thecountry. Instead they concentrated on expensivetelevision campaigns and the print media, which reacheda disproportionately wealthier and more educatedaudience. Furthermore, although the NPA advocatedinclusiveness, it was clear that men dominated the peacestructures at the management level and only one womanserved on the NPS. When they were formed, almost allthe RPC chairs were white men – despite the transparentelection and appointment procedures. These tendencieswere largely reversed at the level of staff and volunteersand most of the RPCs and LPCs reflected thedemography of the communities they served.

From September 1994, soon after the elections, the newgovernment started closing down the peace structures

without stating its reasons. This decision was possiblytaken in the belief that the new Constitution provideddemocratic mechanisms at all levels that supplanted theneed for the NPA structures. Furthermore, the NPS alwayssaw its role as interim and short-term. Yet in many placesthe LPC's ‘peace office’ had become a valuable resourcefor local communities: they were places to discuss vitalissues and where telephones, a fax machine and a rapidresponse vehicle were available to people who neededthem most. After the closure of the NPA structures, theseresources were no longer available. The KwaZulu NatalProvincial Legislature was the only provincial governmentthat arranged for the continuation of a peace committee.Valuable data including the records of monitors, peacecommittee members, minutes and reports were lostbecause of a lack of coordination and a rigorous researchprogramme. The huge investment in human resourcesthrough training programmes and exposure to uniquepeacekeeping activities was dispersed as retrenched staffdashed to find employment, leaving the closure of NPAoperations in the hands of a few officials of theDepartment of Home Affairs’ Peace Directorate.

In addition to all its more formal achievements andshortcomings, there was also something less tangiblethat occurred through the joint efforts of those involvedin the NPA structures. The exposure of tens of thousandsof people to conflict resolution methodologies made adifference in the way many chose to respond to conflict.The experience of working in a diverse team withcompetent and committed people was a life-changingexperience for many and may have contributed to adeeper shift in South Africa’s divided society. As SusanCollin Marks, a key figure in the Western Cape RPC,observed in Watching the Wind:

“South Africans had never met one another before like this,face-to-face, and over time we learned to turn away fromour habit of fearing one another and instead begin to faceour common problems and jointly find solutions.… Asformer adversaries found one another’s humanitythroughout the country, so the foundation began to be builtfor a place where we could one day all be human beingstogether.” (2000, page 16)

It would be fair to attribute much of the success of SouthAfrica’s peaceful elections to the ordinary women andmen who came forward to make a difference.

1For further information, see . Ball, Nicole and Chris Spies. ManagingConflict: Lessons from the South African Peace Committees.(Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, Centerfor Development and Evaluation: 1998)

F.W. De Klerk and Nelson Mandela at the National Peace Convention.Source: Rodger Bosch/iAfrica Photos

South Africa’s National Peace Accord