Truthtelling and the “Liar’s Paradox”

• Epimenides the Cretan once stated: “All Cretans are liars!” (Was he telling the truth?)

• Mark Twain: “None of us could live with an habitual truth teller; but, thank goodness, none of us has to.”

The “true” liar’s paradox seems to be this:

• we believe, as a default position, that lying is always wrong

• BUT we tend to believe that lying is sometimes excusable, occasionally permissible, and rarely, even obligatory (to prevent some great harm or injury)

Utilitarianism and Truthtelling

• an act of truthtelling is RIGHT if (and only if) the good consequences outweigh the bad

• an act of lying is WRONG only when the bad consequences outweigh the good

• This seems to be the wrong explanation of why lying is wrong

• but perhaps a correct clue about when there might be exceptions or excuses to the rule against lying

Absolutism from St. Augustine to Kant

• Lying is ALWAYS wrong. No excuses, no exceptions.

CI3 -- Kingdom of Ends: legislative inconsistency and incoherence

CI1 -- Universal Law: “free rider status”

CI2 -- Respect for Persons: deception as betrayal, use of deceived as a means merely to achieve the liar’s own self-serving ends

“Principle of Veracity”

lying always requires a reason, a justification; truth-telling does not.

• Generally true. But . . . is this always true? • Need to define: EXCUSES;

BLAMEWORTHINESS Presumably it might at least be

EXCUSABLE, to tell a lie when one or more of the following conditions is met:

• prevent great HARM (a murderer in search of their intended victim)

• bring about some great BENEFIT (LtCOL North’s appeal; physician concealing or misrepresenting medical diagnosis to a patient)