Trusteeship in Micronesia

Institute of Pacific Relations

Trusteeship in MicronesiaAuthor(s): Leonard MasonSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 17, No. 9 (May 5, 1948), pp. 105-108Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3022206 .

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from among the communal groups. Moreover, the AFPFL was by then making such headway in organiz- ing rival peasant unions in the districts as to threaten the Communists' hold on the rural areas. These factors combined to make the BCP seek readmission to the AFPFL fold?an eventuality made more likely by the

resignation from the League in May of its strongest adversary, U Ba Pe. Then the assassinations of Aung San and six of his ministers, the following July, insti-

gated by the rightist opposition to the League, brought the left-wing nationalists closer together. (It was even rumored that Thakin Soe's tearstained face had been seen among the mourners paying their respects to the murdered leaders lying in state.) Thakin Nu, upon whom Aung San's mantle had fallen, was known to favor such a rapprochement. Hopes of imminent unity ran high when Than Tun joined AFPFL leaders in a tour of the bandit-ridden districts in an anti-crime cam?

paign during the late summer of 1947. Finally, on No? vember 7, Thakin Nu publicly stated his intention of

working towards such a union when he announced the imminent merger of the Socialist Party with the Peo?

ple's Volunteer Organization. Nevertheless, within three weeks these negotiations broke down. In announcing this failure on November 17, the League spokesman ac- cused the BCP of actively trying to undermine pub? lic confidence in the AFPFL-negotiated Anglo-Bur- mese Treaty of October 1947 and of secretly hoarding weapons at the very time its leaders were verbally sup- porting the anti-crime campaign.

Inevitably basic differences among Burmese national? ists have come to the fore now that the great cohesivc

force supplied by the common objective, Burma's inde?

pendence, has been eliminated. Although the AFPFL

claims, and is widely given credit for, the achievement of independence and although the conservatives are not at present dangerous to its continued tenure of

power, the AFPFL cannot rest on its laurels. Only a

temporary respite has been furnished by the arrest of Thakin Soe and by dissension within the White Flag communist ranks. Removal of Thakin Soe will now

perhaps enable the government to control the separatist movements in Arakan, of which the most aggressive was

apparently supported by the Red Flag Communists. The

eclipse of Thein Pe, who is said to be in ill-health and to have been censured for some unauthorized statements he made to the press on matters of communist policy, has necessitated a shuffle in the high command of the Politburo.

On the other hand the Communists' proved organiz- ing ability and their strong appeal to the peasantry and

youth of the country should not be underestimated. In

approaching the former the government's failure as yet to tackle successfully the serious agrarian problem is vulnerable to attack. And in propagandizing the youth- ful intelligentsia the Communists continue effectively to

flog the dead horse of British imperialism, asserting that Britain has merely substituted an economic and military ?stranglehold for its formal renunciation of political sovereignty. If Thakin Nu carries out his plan to retire from politics this June and if Boh Let Ya, the heir ap- parent and an untried and inexperienced military leader, takes the helm, the moment may be propitious for an all-out communist drive for power.

TRUSTEESHIP IN MICRONESIA

BY LEONARD MASON

At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Com- ** mander Harold E. Stassen of the United States

Delegation cautioned the assembled representatives of

fifty nations that the Trusteeship Committee's Report, which comprised the foundation for an international

trusteeship system, "is tonight only a series of words

mimeographed on a piece of paper; if it is to become a great document the peoples of the world must breathe into it the life that only sincere adherence and support of these principles can give it." Three years have passed, and the trusteeship chapters in the United Nations

Charter have become a great document. The United States has acquired an important stake in that venture

by virtue of its contributions at San Francisco, its sup? port in establishing the Trusteeship Council, and its role as the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific. Sufficient time has elapsed since the United States assumed the administration of the former

Japanese mandated islands that an evaluation may be

attempted of the degree to which the United States has

discharged its trust relative to the welfare of Micro- nesians inhabiting that insular region.

Nations administering trust territories are committed under Article 76 of the United Nations Charter:

to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development toward self-government or indepen? dence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances

Mr. Mason is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the Uni? versity of Hawaii and is one of a group of scientists working on the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology under the auspices of the Pacific Science Board and the U.S. Navy. He is also preparing a book on Micronesia for the Hawaiian IPR.

MAY 5, I 948 105



of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.

This basic objective was spelled out in greater detail in Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement submitted

by the United States to the Security Council on February 26, 1947, to bring the former Japanese mandated islands under United Nations trusteeship. The Trust Territory of the Pacific was formally established on July 18, 1947.

Simultaneously, in an executive order issued by Pres?

ident Truman, military government in the islands was

terminated and their administration was placed under the Navy Department as an interim measure until trans- fer to a civilian agency of the government could be

arranged. Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, then Commander in Chief Pacific and U.S. Pacific Fleet, was appointed the first High Commissioner of the new territory. In a

public address in Honolulu, he stated: "My aim as

High Commissioner is to have everything possible done so as to be able to turn the territory over later to the

permanent government agency with the least possible disruption."1 He summarized the main features of the

territory's administration to be: (1) continuing improve? ment of health and sanitation, (2) physical restoration of war-damaged property and facilities, (3) early estab?

lishment of self-governing communities, (4) institution

of a sound program of economic development, and

(5) establishment of an educational program.2 The task of implementing these pronouncements has

not been easy. Navy civil administrators have come to

realize that the inhabitants of the Trust Territory

(northern Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls) do not

constitute a homogeneous population of some 48,000,

comparable to a medium-sized mid-western community, but actually present a crazy-quilt pattern of many small

groups, each separated from the rest by hundreds of miles of open water, and each possessing a cultural

uniqueness which has to be recognized if a just admin?

istration is to be maintained. Rear Admiral Carleton

H. Wright, U.S.N., administers the Territory from

Guam as Deputy High Commissioner; beneath him in

the administrative hierarchy are four naval officers, who

play a dual role as civil governors and as sub-area mil?

itary commanders in the districts of Northern Marianas, Western Carolines, Eastern Carolines, and Marshalls.

These governors actually depend on their civil admin?

istrators, naval officers who dress in civilian clothes and

who have been trained in civil affairs at the Stanford

University School of Naval Administration. The seven

civil administration units, staffed entirely with naval

personnel except for a few specialist posts recently filled

by civilians, are located at Saipan, Palau, Yap, Truk,

Ponape, Kwajalein, and Majuro. The present system is

characterized by a two-year rotation of all officer personnel which periodically replaces administrators with officers who have completed a tour of duty in another branch of the Navy. In practice, replacements receive a five-months' course in native affairs administration at

Stanford University and in many cases have previously served in civil affairs posts elsewhere. Plans have been discussed in Navy circles to establish a Civil Affairs

Corps within the Navy in which career positions for trained individuals would be established comparable to those in colonial services of other nations, but there has been no recent word of progress in that direction.

Politically, in the Trust Territory, a new program designed to advance self-government has been introduced whereby local communities are encouraged to

manage and support their own government. For exam?

ple, in the southern Marshalls, atoll populations are

governed by magistrate, scribe, council, and court; all officials are Marshallese, chosen by hereditary succession or by popular election, subject to final approval by the Civil Administrator at Majuro. At the lower, village level, officials are headman, policeman, teacher, and health aide (teachers and health aides are selected and trained by the Administration). Nominal salaries are

paid from local treasuries. Since the annual head tax of two dollars, required of all males from eighteen to

sixty, is usually not enough to cover administrative ex-

penses, some communities have levied additional taxes on canoes, livestock, or real property. Where local rev- enues are inadequate because of capital losses sustained

during the war, the Administration provides monetary aid until such time as the local situation has improved. In some other districts, progress in self-government has been slower, as the Micronesians cautiously test their new freedom, not previously enjoyed under the Japanese system of direct rule. On field trips, administrative offi? cers discuss new duties and responsibilities with the

people as well as with the officials. Native leaders and councils are encouraged to make their own decisions, the Administration intervening only when a deadlock occurs.

In this new program, the encouragement of demo? cratic practices has at times conflicted with the traditional prerogatives of autocratic chiefs. Hence, admin? istrators are required to be sensitive to the various

power groups in the community as these reflect chang- ing attitudes about privilege and authority. Similarly, as the administrator exercises final approval of native candidates for office, he has to become well-versed in

local politics and tradition, lest he unwittingly support an outmoded system. Since short-term administrators are handicapped in this respect, considerable reliance is placed on native advisers, providing the latter, if

they be unscrupulous, with opportunity to recommend candidates who lack the confidence of the community

1 Honolulu Star-BuUetin, September 10, 1947. 2 Honolulu Advertiser, July 22, 1947.

106 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



as a whole. Where communities are joined for admin? istrative purposes, recognition needs to be given to pre- existing regional jurisdictions in the native tradition in order to provide for a more cohesive organization and for closer cooperation between historically aligned populations.

Economically, except for the Palaus which have potential wealth in fish and mineral resources, the Trust

Territory is a poor-house. Although most Micronesian communities can probably satisfy subsistence needs by exploiting local resources, the Territory as a whole will continue to be an economic liability to the United States if the native inhabitants are to be advanced in terms of higher standards of living and greater economic and social opportunities. In the agricultural field, native

crops are being ravaged by insect and other pests. The

Administration, working through the Pacific Science

Board, National Research Council, has enlisted the aid of specialists to counteract this menace. An Insect Con? trol Committee for Micronesia was established in Sep? tember, 1947 and already several civilian experts are

working in Micronesia, Malaya, and Africa, seeking further knowledge of the pests and searching for the natural enemies which might be introduced to control them.3 The Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the Department of Agriculture has also been requested by the Administration to advise in the rehabilitation and development of agriculture in the Territory. If

Congress approves the $1,500,000 budget to implement the Farrington Fisheries Act authorizing the Interior

Department's Fish and Wildlife Service to survey pelagic fishing potentialities in the Pacific, Micronesians as well as Americans stand to gain from future commercial fish?

ing operations in that area. The Administration is co-

operating with the Fish and Wildlife Service and with other fisheries research personnel in Hawaii to develop the research program outlined in the Act. At the same

time, negotiations are proceeding with commercial fish?

ing interests which are desirous of operating in Terri- torial waters, especially in the Palaus. Rear Admiral

Wright has declared that "no commercial enterprise [will be] allowed in the Trust Territory in which the inhabitants cannot participate to the fullest extent of their capabilities."4 On the other side, commercial concerns seek long-term leases for cannery sites, permission to import non-natives to train natives in commercial

fishing methods, and removal of duty restrictions on

products exported from the Territory to the United States.

Other economic developments include greater copra production resulting from recent increases in copra values; continuing operation of Angaur phosphate mines

by Japanese contractors and Japanese laborers, the pro- duct being exported to Japan for fertilizer and providing an estimated $200,000 in royalties for native land-

owners; negotiations with American aluminum concerns interested in working extensive bauxite deposits in the

Palaus; an experimental five-year lease on 1,000 acres of farm land on Tinian by three Americans who hope to market their produce on Guam; and investigation of the possibilities for marketing native handicraft in the United States. On January 1, 1948, the U.S. Com- mercial Company, a Reconstruction Finance Corpora- tion subsidiary, closed its operations in the Trust Ter?

ritory and was replaced by the Island Trading Com?

pany (ITC), which is sponsored by the Administration, employs both naval and civilian personnel, and utilizes

Navy sources of supply. ITC buys copra, trochus shell, and handicraft from the Micronesians and distributes trade goods through 114 retail outlets, most of which are owned and operated by Micronesians. A need still exists for a better adjustment of native income levels with store prices, but the problem is not a simple one due to the varying degrees of dependence of native communities on local resources.

The Navy has always placed great emphasis on mat? ters concerning health and sanitation. In the Trust

Territory it inherited a situation in which, for all prac- tical purposes, medical services had ceased to exist dur?

ing the war years. Since 1945, Navy Medical and Hos-

pital Corps personnel have returned the native populations to prewar health standards, or better. A dispensary is located in each of the seven administrative districts; health aides are being selected from the more promising native candidates and are trained to serve in the outly- ing islands to supplement the monthly inspection trips set as a goal by Navy medical officers. The School for Native Medical Practitioners, established at Guam in

January, 1946, is progressing with fair success, and a Nurses Training School has been added. Public health

campaigns in the island communities are maintained

through constant educational and administrative meas? ures. The Micronesians are considered to be intelligent and cooperative, but the language barrier and the diffi-

culties of communication presented by the wide disper- sal of island groups have proved to be formidable ob- stacles in the way of a successful program.

Educationally, six centers have been established in the Trust Territory (Majuro, Ponape, Truk, Yap, Pa?

lau, and Saipan) where Americans are attempting to teach Micronesians to become teachers that they in turn

may manage the one hundred and more village schools scattered throughout the islands. At present, a concerted effort is being made to teach a kind of basic English to teacher trainees, but the results have not been en-

tirely satisfactory despite the eagerness of most natives to learn English. Studies seem to be based largely on

3 National Research Council, First Annual Report, Pacific Science Board, 1947, pp. 17-21.

4 Honolulu Star-BuUetin, March 13, 1948.

MAY 5, I 948 107



the traditional program which is characteristic of Amer? ican elementary schools, although an increasing concern is evident to provide vocational and other training more suited to the environmental needs of the Micronesians. The recent appointment of a former Navy lieutenant, trained in educational work prior to the war, as super- visor of education for the Marshall Islands, marks a first step in recruiting civilian personnel in the Admin- istration's educational program. Another development of potential significance is the appointment by the Ad? ministration of an Advisory Committee on Education,

composed of eighteen civilian educators and specialists from Hawaii. The High Commissioner, at the first meet?

ing of the Committee in Honolulu on December 2, 1947, declared: "It has been my fond desire to have this committee of educators help us in working out the best form of education for these people."6 To date, the Com? mittee has felt sorely the need for more detailed in? formation about the little known territory with which it has to deal and has come to appreciate the difficul? ties of advising on a situation which involves as many cultural backgrounds and levels as exist in Micronesia.

However, several recommendations have already been

presented to the Administration: (1) that every pos? sible effort be made to assure continuity of educational

policy and personnel, (2) that long-range educational

goals be developed at the same time as solutions to im- mediate problems are sought, (3) that a plan be devised to enlist the aid of specialists in the reduction to writing of the many dialects and languages, with a view to standardization and a readier means of communication between the Administration and Micronesians, and (4) that special attention be devoted to adult education as one answer to the particular needs of older young peo? ple who are the leaders in many areas during this period of reconstruction.

In summary, the Navy Department in its administra? tion of the Trust Territory has made a significant start in promoting Micronesian welfare. A tremendous task lies ahead: a complete recovery from the war has not

yet been effected in all areas; agricultural rehabilitation alone will require another decade or two; capital goods owned by natives are being renewed slowly; economic foundations are far from stable; warped political atti? tudes developed under the Japanese are only gradually being discarded; and the cultural breach between the older and younger generations, which Japanese admin? istrators had encouraged, cannot be dissolved overnight. Many basic problems are still not solved. While all agree that the natives* interests are paramount, opinions differ as to what the best interests of the natives may be or how best to achieve the desired goals. The present Administration readily admits that it is not qualified to deal with certain highly technical problems and in

such instances has called upon civilian specialists in

agriculture, entomology, fisheries, education, and other fields. Considerable Navy funds are being expended in an extensive program known as CIMA (Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology), organized by the Pacific Science Board to integrate the field re? search of forty-one anthropologists, geographers, and

linguists from twenty American universities and mu? seums.

Delays in establishing a sound long-range administra? tion have been occasioned by the uncertainty which

persists regarding the eventual disposition of the islands. The Navy Department now manages the Territory as an interim measure, calling its administration "civil"

although the personnel and organization are largely military, until such time as the President of the United States names a civilian agency to take over. In the face of indecision, the formulation of long-range policy is

necessarily tentative, there is a hesitancy about launch-

ing extensive programs, and civilian specialists cannot be easily recruited when commitments must be made on a year-to-year basis. Whatever permanent agency is named to do the job, however, the basic requirements for administering the Trust Territory will remain the same: a transportation and communication system able to service the widely scattered island populations, an

adequate budget to impjement a program designed to

carry out the United States' responsibilities to Micro- nesians and the United Nations, and a well-trained staff of administrators sincerely interested in the advancement of native welfare.

FOOTNOTE ON REPARATIONS

AND REFORM IN JAPAN

In the Far Eastern Survey of December 17, 1947, Mr. ? T. A. Bisson in his article entitled "Reparations and Reform in Japan" advances the thesis that Japan's cur? rent economic crisis is due to a deliberate sabotage plot by Japan's old guard intentionally wrecking Japan's re- vival in order to gain a soft peace. In his view, this plot has succeeded, as indicated by the recent relaxation of the American reparations programs and the suggestion that funds be provided to assist Japan's economic re- vival in disregard of the claims of China and the Soviet Union. Mr. Bisson recommends that no peace treaty be made and no relaxation of reparations demands and economic restrictions be permitted until we are certain that "democratically minded" leaders have taken Japan in charge.

The seriousness of Japan's economic situation has

by now been generally accepted, but a "sabotage plot" is not needed to explain it. Beginning with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and the secret agreements 5 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, December 3, 1947.

108 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



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Trusteeship in Micronesia