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Trust Thy Institutions: Importance of Trust in Political institutions in Mediating Public
Attitudes Towards European Integration and Immigration
Elif Naz Kayran
PhD. Candidate, IHEID - Graduate Institute Geneva
Draft Prepared for Presentation in session 6.1 “The European Project and European Values:
Convergence or Divergence II” at the 3rd ESS Conference, 13-15 July 2016, Lausanne,
Switzerland
ABSTRACT
What are the determinants of the growing Euroscepticism and anti-immigration attitudes in
European societies? The aim of this study is to answer this important societal question by
using European Social Survey data from waves 4, 6 and 7. This is a crucial and timely
question to ask, as the apparent lack of harmonization in key areas of EU governance is
argued to be the cause for some of the biggest crises facing Europe such as the financial and
refugee crises. In the post Eurozone crisis context, policy-proposals from the EU level are
facing strong resistance from the member states in a wide range of issue areas. In addition to
national level opposition, there is an emerging anti-EU voting group within the European
Parliament. There are strong negative positions taken with regards to further integration and
admission of more immigrants and humanitarian refugees. The paper will argue that trust in
European institutions is a crucial determinant factor regarding attitudes towards outwards
integration. This argument will be tested by using two types of out groups in the form of
immigrants and further Europeanization of policy areas. Overall, this study will contribute to
both the literature on public attitude towards Europeanization and immigration, but also to
European governance choices and policy-making in EU level through testing the extent of
importance of institutional trust for the future of European integration and immigration flows.
Key Words: Public Attitude; Euroscepticism; Anti-Immigration; Institutional Trust;
European Parliament.
1
I. Introduction
To what extent trust in European institutions can predict individual attitudes towards
openness to outwards integration in the contexts of economic crisis and recovery? This is a
timely question to ask as the lack of motivation for openness to integration with European
Union (EU) and other countries in key areas of governance is arguably one of the most
important hurdles facing European member states with regards to finding durable solutions to
crises such as financial control, fiscal convergence, lagging growth and labour market
shortages (Drudi et.al.2012). In addition to national level opposition and the increased voting
behaviour for radical right parties or parties that encompass agendas that include Eurosceptic
politics and policies that target out-groups (i.e. immigrants) negatively, there is an emerging
anti-EU voting group within the European Parliament pushing forward right-wing politics
(Treib 2014).
The puzzle of this research paper stems from the observation that there has been a
steep increase in Euroscepticism and anti-immigration attitude in Europe after the Eurozone
crisis (Serricchio et.al. 2013). Interestingly though, studies have shown that there is a
recovery of positive feelings towards EU integration and immigration taking off from 2013
and keeping on an increasing trend through 2015 (de Vries and Hoffman 2016). It has been
shown that much of the blame for the negative externalities of the crisis has been placed to
European institutions and to their inability to contain the crisis and the following austerity
measures that caused serious societal consequences in several EU member countries (Arnold
et.al. 2012; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Torcal 2014). Recently Dotti Sani and Magistro
found that the worst declines in trust in European institutions have been experienced in
countries that experienced the most economic and social problems from the Eurozone crisis
and the subsequent recovery plans (2016). Accordingly, there is more increase in negative
attitudes towards openness (both integration and immigration) in countries where the effects
2
of the crisis have been felt the most (Freedman 2012). Therefore, the context of crisis and
recovery of the Eurozone crisis present a fruitful instance to see how trust in European
institutions could be affecting individual attitudes towards openness to outwards integration.
The main explanatory variable of this study will be trust in European institutions.
Trust in other political institutions will, also, be controlled for using ESS data. Response
variables will be public attitude towards immigration and public attitude towards further
European integration. The paper will begin with a discussion of its conceptual framework,
theory and lay out the hypotheses. Next, a brief analytical review of the literature will be
presented, followed the methodology employed in this paper. Descriptive and statistical
results are presented in two separate sub sections, which will focus on the two outcome
indicators of the outwards integration. Finally, implications of these results and future steps
that are planned for this research will be discussed.
II. Conceptual Framework and Theory
It has been shown, in the literature, that there is a robust and significant relationship between
institutions and trust (Putnam 1993; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). In addition, it has been
found that there are different types of trust in societies that mitigate important societal
outcomes such as the strength of democracy, social capital, equality, and attitudes towards
redistribution (Uslaner 2002). Building on previous research on the topic, Crepaz shows that
the effects of generalized (universal) trust v. particularized trust stem from different
institutional and social capabilities that have important outcomes in the countries and regions
they appear in (2008, 93-133). Taking stock from this literature on trust, institutions, and
attitudes towards the “other” relative to the natives, the theory of this paper posits that trust in
EU institutions have a significant effect on attitudes towards outwards integration in
European countries.
3
An important issue to resolve in openness is how to capture this concept. The most
common two indicators of testing for individual attitudes for openness within member states
can argued to be attitudes towards European integration which will be named here “openness
to Europe” and attitudes towards accepting more foreigners in the form of immigration which
will be named here “openness to non-Europe”. For the purpose of this research it is important
to make two clarifications on the definitions of these concepts. Firstly, “openness to non-
Europe” targets attitudes towards immigration, not immigrants. Anti-immigrant sentiment
raises issues regarding ethnic saliency, discrimination, immigrant integration and access to
rights of immigrants in the country (Quillian 2006; Kunovich 2002). Attitudes towards
immigration more aptly focus on questions regarding openness in the sense that is used in the
paper as admission (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, 313).
Secondly, the attitudes towards European integration have been a contested field as
well within the literature of Euroscepticism. Several authors have argued that attitudes
towards further European integration encompass attitudes towards the European project itself,
individual resentment to European citizens or negative opinions towards the values and
structure of the European Union (Boomgarden et.al. 2010; Kopecky and Mudde 2002). This
definition has been referred to as “hard Euroscepticism” whereas the definition of attitudes
towards European integration as “soft- Euroscepticism” captures opposition or dissatisfaction
with policy directions taken and the Europeanization of policies that should have been kept
nationalized (Leconte 2015; Taggart 1998). It is argued here that a soft Euroscepticism
conceptualization would target how individuals feel about openness towards Europe more
aptly than the alternatives in the literature.
III. Hypotheses
Here, it will be argued that trust in European institutions is a significant determinant of
individual level attitudes towards openness conceptualized as attitudes towards immigration
4
and EU integration. The paper will attempt to evaluate the effect of trust in European
institutions on individual attitudes towards openness in Europe from an approach that aims to
target both of these points to be able to reach robust conclusions. Through this, the research
will be an original conceptualization of the outcome of individual attitudes towards openness
to outwards integration in Europe and highlight some of the common trajectories of individual
attitudes towards EU integration and integration with other countries in the form of accepting
more foreigners.
In this paper, the argument will put forward that trust in European institutions predicts
individual attitudes towards openness, conceptualized in two ways of (1) attitudes towards
further European integration and (2) attitudes towards further immigration. The unit of
analysis of the study is micro level individual attitudes. The institutional trust is argued to
mitigate feelings towards openness and will be able to predict a relationship for the outcome
of attitudes towards further European integration and further immigration. Lower
institutional trust will be a predictor of non-favourable opinion towards openness in both
points.
Hypothesis 1: The more individuals in a country trust European institutions; the more they are
expected to be favourable to further European integration. The less trusting the individuals
are, the less favourable to further European integration they are expected to be.
Hypothesis 2: The more individuals in a country trust European institutions, the more they
will be favourable to immigration into the country. The less trusting the individuals are, the
less favourable to immigration they are expected to be.
IV. Analytical Overview of the Literature
Turning to the literature that could explain what could be the determinants of attitudes
towards openness to outwards integration, the aim is not to present an analytical critique but
to look for alternative explanations to consider for controlling in the research. On the side of
5
openness towards non-EU in the form of immigration, previous theories that aimed to explain
individual level attitudes towards immigration have looked for answers in both macro and
micro levels. In the micro levels it has been argued that socio-demographic factors such as
age, gender, education and income could be predictors of immigration attitude (Quillian 1995;
Raijman et.al. 2003; Mayda 2006).
Some have also argued that contact with immigration and immigrants as well as
different configurations of values and identifications of individuals, namely citizenship,
belonging to a minority, having someone close with an immigration experience or general
values of pro-immigration and placement on the left in the political scale can explain
immigration attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Gorodzeisky and Semyanov 2009). On
the macro levels, cultural threat theories and macroeconomic indicators of a country in the
form of GDP and unemployment have been put forward as predictors (Hjerm 2007; Kunovich
2004). Finally, overall trust in the society and national institutions have been argued to be a
predictor of openness towards non-nationals (Crepaz 2008; Crepaz and Damron 2009;
Espenshade and Hempstead 1996).
Looking at the other side, openness towards EU, for predicting attitudes of soft
Euroscepticism, similar arguments regarding micro factors in terms of socio-demographics,
identities, values and subjective perceptions on individual economic and social wellbeing
have been put forward (Gabel 1998; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). Additionally,
democratic deficit theory, referring to individual perceptions of non-democratic functioning
of European Union, and periphery oriented approaches arguing that nationals from certain
countries are more Eurosceptic, present alternative explanations in the literature (Hansen and
Weaver 2002; Leconte 2010). Another plausible explanation in the field is individual trust in
national institutions in determining individual attitudes towards openness to European
integration (Anderson 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000).
6
V. Methodology
The research question asked in this paper is aiming to explore to what extent trust in
European institutions can predict attitudes towards openness to outwards integration in the
form of (1) attitudes to further European integration and (2) attitudes to further immigration in
the context of economic crisis and recovery. Therefore, the theory tested here has a temporal
aspect that covers parameter years before, during and after a crisis. In this case, for theory
testing I am using the 2010 Eurozone crisis context and taking ESS waves 4, 6 and 7
conducted for 2008, 2012 and 2014 respectively.1 Considering the time lag of conducting the
survey, these years are able to capture the before, during and after crisis contexts. The spatial
parameter of the theory covers all European Union and EFTA countries that are influenced by
EU integration and migration dynamics as much as the EU member states (Lavanex 2011). In
terms of data used in the research, I have dropped individual respondents from countries that
are not surveyed in all three waves as the theory tested requires observations for all three
years, at least from the same country. 2
The unit of analysis of the research is individuals. Both the explanatory and outcome
variables, as well as the control variables introduced in the model will be at the individual
level. The theory of the paper is at the micro level and in this paper country level control
variables will not be introduced. However, based on the theories and the literature review on
the subject of attitudes towards European integration and further immigration, I argue that the
individual responses at the micro level are influenced by the country they are from. In
addition to this, I have argued that the year of the survey matters for the respondent as well,
since the theory was framed in a “crisis context”. The ESS waves allow me to have this multi-
level or nested model specification as each individual level id number also is identified with
1 ESS wave 5 released in 2010 is excluded because it does not include the key variable of interest on
EU integration in the questionnaire. 2 The countries are Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Estonia.
7
which country the respondent is from. I will be using different model specifications for each
of the two main outcome variables.
Measurement & Operationalization of Variables
The dependent variable of the paper is attitudes towards openness to outwards integration,
which is a concept that will be measured by looking at (1) attitudes towards further European
integration and (2) attitudes towards immigration. The individual attitudes towards further
unification will be taken from the European Social Survey (ESS) item that asks, “…some say
European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this
card, what number on the scale best describes your position?” The scale of responses varies
from 0 to 10, 0 being “unification already gone too far” and 10 indicating that unification
should go further.
The individual attitudes towards immigration will also be operationalized through an
ESS question item that asks whether the respondent prefers many or no immigrants let into
the country. The variable item asks the respondents whether or not many or few migrants of
different race/ethnic group from majority should be allowed into the country to live. The
answer scale is from 1 to 4, 1 indicating allowing for many to came and 4 being allowing no
immigration.
The robustness and validity of this operationalization for immigration will be
controlled with two other survey items. First, another question targets the same issue with the
difference in question being “allowing people with the same race/ethnic group” with the
majority to control for framing of the question and to see if that would significantly affect the
results. The choice of different race/ethnic group operationalization is based on the
consideration that the theory overall targets openness towards non-EU, but the control for the
same ethnicity, will allow the research to also see to what extent race and ethnic factor in the
same question may influence the results. Second, an alternative measurement of this variable
8
for another robustness check will be the question item “Allow many/few immigrants from
poorer countries outside Europe” in order to see if the additional factor of economic condition
significantly alters the results. All of these variables are ordinal survey items that are ranked
in a meaningful way.
The independent variable of the paper is trust in European institutions and it will be
operationalized with the ESS item, which scores trust on a 0-10 scale as follows “… please
tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0
means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ...
the European Parliament?” Out of all the other institutions of European Union, it is
appropriate to measure trust through European Parliament (EP) based on several
considerations.
First, it is the only institution with democratic representation of the citizens. Although
some may argue that it is the institution with the least amount of power over decisions, EP is
the biggest governing body in the EU in terms of accountability and representativeness of all
political ideologies and nationalities equally. Additionally, EP is closest to a national level
institution and a governance mechanism such as the national parliament or other democratic
bodies that can mitigate societal attitudes. Arnold et.al have shown that EP is the EU
institution that enjoys the highest level of trust both from both new and old member states
(2012, 20).3 It is neither an extensively contested institution with relatively lowest trust levels
such as the Council of Ministers nor like ECB where its perception is often dependent on
highly volatile economic and financial circumstances that are often outside of EU governance.
Therefore, it is plausible to argue that trust in EP would reflect trust in the general governance
of European institutions.
3 Using data from the Eurobarometer, the study also shows that the trust levels between EP and the
European Commission do not significantly differ from each other (Arnold et.al. 2012).
9
Alternative Explanations and Control Variables
Based on the literature review, as outlined above, several control variables are selected to test
and control for alternative explanations on the outcome tested in this paper. The first control
variable is trust in national institutions. Using ESS standard item on this variable, it will be
operationalized with trust in the national parliament. This variable is on an ordinal scale from
0 to 10. O being no trust at all and 10 being complete trust, identical to the operationalization
of the independent variable. Second control will be trust in general to control for individual
values and beliefs operationalized with the item “most people can be trusted or you can’t be
too careful”, varying from 0 to 10 on an ordinal scale, 10 indicating that most people can be
trusted. These are the most commonly found operationalizations for these concepts in the
literature, therefore the threats to internal validity are considerably low with these two
variables.
The next two variables are also from ESS and will control for satisfaction with
country’s economy and satisfaction with country’s democracy. Operationalized with the
following questions that ask “on the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the
(1) economy/ (2) the way democracy works in [country]?” on two separate questions where
responses vary from 0 to 10, 0 being extremely dissatisfied with the economy/democracy of
the country. To account for political values, placement in the left-right scale will be controlled
for using the ESS item “…where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the
left and 10 means the right.” Citizenship of the country and belonging to a minority group
will be controlled for with two dummy variables with yes/no answers.
Finally, demographic controls will be introduced. The ESS is the data source where
these variables are going to be taken from as well. Age as a numerical variable and total
household income as an ordinal scale of income deciles will be used. Additionally,
satisfaction with the household income will also be controlled for as income and perception of
10
economic standing are argued to be crucial factors for the dependent variable of the study.
This will be operationalized with the question “…how (do) you feel about your household’s
income nowadays” that has answers on an ordinal scale from 1 to 4, 1 being “living
comfortably”. Gender (dummy) will also be controlled for. Education will be controlled as
years in education as a numerical variable. Religiosity will be controlled as “…how religious
would you say you are?” on an ordinal scale of 0 being not at all religious and 10 being very
religious. Main activity in the last seven days (unemployed/paid work/education etc.) will be
controlled for as a categorical variable for labour market status.
It is important here to highlight that the model specifications will not have variables
that are not on the individual level. For instance, typical controls such as unemployment rate
or the percentage of immigrant populations will not be included. This is due to theoretical
approach of the paper that argues an individual level prediction for the outcome of outwards
integration. However, through the use of time as a control variable in the models, as well as
model specifications that can account for the country level (within and between countries), the
paper aims to account for these country level fixed variables.
Model Specifications and Estimation Methods
For the first outcome variable of attitudes towards European integration, I will specify a
mixed effects regression model and a multilevel regression with individuals nested in
countries. An ordered logit estimation model with clustered standard errors for countries with
a categorical variable for time will be used for robustness test. Since this outcome variable has
10 response categories, I am specifying an ordered logit, but this model will also be specified
as a generalized ordered logit estimation for further robustness checks.
For the attitudes towards immigrants, I will specify a multinomial logit estimation
model with clustered standard errors of countries with a categorical variable for time. This
outcome variable only has four response categories and based on both theory and the
11
statistical tests for parallel regression assumption (proportional odds assumption) – Brant test
and Wolfe Gould test - it is argued here that the better model likelihood estimation would be
a multinomial logit model (Long and Freese 2014, 329). Since, the paper predicts a nested
structure for the individuals, a multi-level country panel set model will also be specified. As a
robustness check over the measurement of the immigration attitudes, I will use the two other
question items that frame the issue in different ways; immigrants from the “same ethnic and
religious background as the majority” and immigrants from “poor countries outside of
Europe” as opposed to the original operationalization of immigrants from different ethnic and
religious backgrounds from the natives. For final robustness checks, models for both
outcomes are also ran as non-multi-level models and as regressions with clustered standard
errors for country and time variables.
VI. Descriptive Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest in the paper. Outcome
variables; attitudes towards further immigration and attitudes towards further European
integration are not interval variables, and are specified as categorical for immigration and
ordinal for European integration. Trust in European parliament is also on an ordinal scale with
10 choices, which will be treated as a continuous variable. All variables with a range of 10
choices are treated as continuous. Citizenship of the country, belonging to a discriminated
group and the gender control variables are dummy variables. All variables have adequate
variation for statistical tests.4
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution calculated as percentage of attitudes
towards European integration by each response to trust in European parliament. It can be seen
4 I have changed the directionality of all the variables to match a certain pattern for interpretation
purposes from their original ESS form. For instance, the attitude towards immigration variables have
been recoded to match the trust in European parliament. Higher numbered categories mean the
respondent chooses further immigration, paralleling higher trust in higher number categories in the
trust in European parliament variable.
12
that highest percentage of “unification already gone too far” is from the “No Trust at All”
choice at all as predicted and the “unification should go further” is from the individuals that
responded as having “Complete Trust” in the European Parliament. Figure 2 and Figure 3
present the frequency distributions of the two dependent variables by each ESS wave and
country. It is visible in these two figures that, as expected, there is variation of individual
responses influenced by the year of the ESS wave conducted and the country they are from.
These also show that there is no extreme skewedness in any category of answers for either of
the two outcome variables. Finally, Table 2 presents the power correlations of key variables
of interest. The table shows that there is significant correlation between all of these variables
tested, particularly between the two outcome and one response variables as argued in the
paper.
VII. Statistical Results
DV: Attitudes towards further European integration
The first model specified is an ordered logit model with clustered standard errors. I have
added a control categorical variable for the ESS waves to see the effect of the years. In
addition to the IV, trust in European Parliament (EP), I have done a stepwise addition of
variables into the model based on the alternative explanations put forward in the literature.
Table 3 presents the results of this ordered logit model with clustered standard errors for
countries. In Model 1, trust in EP, satisfaction with country’s democracy and ESS years were
found statistically significant. In Model 2, in addition to the previous three, years of education
completed also has a significant effect for predicting attitudes towards further European
integration. In Model 3, out of the newly included variables household income and
respondent’s main activity have significant effects. The main activity variable is a categorical
13
variable and the baseline used is paid work, so for this baseline the significant predictor
categories were being in education, unemployed and looking for a job and doing housework.
The final Model 4 introduced three new variables. For the two dummy variables,
being female and belonging to a minority group discriminated in the country were statistically
significant. One last observation for Model 4 is that, from Model 3 to Model 4 the statistical
significance of household income variable was lost. This is probably because in model 4 I
have introduced a variable that measures respondent’s perception of their net income.
Looking at the standard errors, none of the models significantly improved any of the
standard errors, as is the case for the residuals of the models specified. The AIC and BIC
statistics show that Model 4 is the better fit. I also ran a likelihood ratio and proportional
reduction in error (PRE) test which showed that Model 4 is the best model specification out of
all four. Therefore, I am choosing Model 4 as the model fit for this ordered logit for
predicting attitudes towards further EU integration.
Table 4 presents the same four models, but with odds ratios instead of log likelihood
in order to see the estimate of the effects of these variables. Based on the model chosen
(Model 4), one-unit increase of trust in European parliament increases the odds of choosing a
response more in favour of further EU integration by 34%. This effect is illustrated in Figure
4 using predicted probabilities. The predicted probability of responding integration has gone
too far is less for choices of complete trust in the EP.
Looking at the variables for alternative explanations, one-unit increase in satisfaction
with the democracy in the country increases the odds of choosing a response more in favour
of further EU integration by 4%. One-year increase in years spent in full time education
increases the odds of choosing a response more in favour of further EU integration by 2%.
Regarding the main activity of the individual, compared to the baseline activity of being in
paid work, being education (by 16%), being retired (by 19%) and being in housework (by
14
18%) increases the odds of choosing a response more in favour of further EU integration.
Being a woman decreases the odds of choosing a response favouring more integration by 14
% and belonging to a group discriminated in that country decreases by 18%. Finally,
compared with the 2008 (ESS 4) the odds of favouring further EU integration is decreased by
18% in 2012 and by 16% in 2014.
For diagnostics of this model, I did a Brant test. Brant test results, presented in Table
5, show that the proportional odds assumption has been violated as a model and for almost all
the variables. In order to make sure that the statistically significant effect I have for my
hypothesized IV, I ran the same model specification as a generalized ordered logit (results
presented in Table 6) and as a multinomial logit with clustered standard errors (results
presented in Table 7). The significance of the trust in EP was robust across all models. More
importantly, as seen in Table 7, trust in EP is the only variable that is statistically significant
in all response categories (when the baseline for estimation is the choice 5). I also ran this
model as a simple multivariate OLS, as an OLS with country and ESS round clustered
standard errors, and as an ordered logit with clustered errors for time; the significance of trust
in EP has been robust across all models I specified.
As a second model specification, which can be argued to fit the data structure better
than the above mentioned method, I used a mixed effects model with three levels: individual
score on attitude towards EU integration, country, and time (ESS round), using the same
individual level predictors in the model as above.5 The model fit used in this mixed effects
model is a linear fit and since the outcome variable was on an ordinal scale of 10 choices,
making it suitable for this specification. The results of the mixed effects models are presented
in Table 8. I have tried stepwise variable addition strategy and conducted the model fit test as
mentioned above. The best model fit was the full model (Model 2). The log likelihood test
5 I have used STATA Reference Manual and Leckie (2013) as main reference points for this
interpretation and model specification.
15
showed that this model is a better fit for the model than a linear single level fit model. Table 9
reports the between and within level variances for each level in the model, which supports this
argument. Based on this, Figure 5 illustrates the magnitude of the country effects on
respondent’s attitude towards EU integration. It is seen from the predicted effects that being
from Poland and Slovenia affects the attitude more than the average, whereas being from
Finland and Norway affects less. Same plot for ESS round showed the effect of time moving
around the average for all three years.
Looking at individual level predictors, trust in European parliament is statistically
significant in this model too. One-unit increase in trust in EP, increases the attitude towards
European integration by 0.326 units towards a favourable opinion. Unit increases in the
education, left right scale placement, and household income all have increasing effect on
favourable opinion towards EU integration (by 0.22, 0.02 and 0.02 respectively).6 For the
main activity categorical variable, compared to being in a paid work, being in education,
being unemployed and looking for a job, being retired, and being in housework all have
increasing effect on the favourable opinion. In terms of diagnostics, outlier observations are
not an issue here based on the descriptive statistics and the large number of observations in
the sample. Figure 7 presents the plotted residuals of this model to test for heteroscedasticity.
There seems to be some clustering especially towards the middle, which is potentially due to
the ordinal scale nature of the variable, but there seems to be some variation on the residuals.
Finally, I have also set the three wave merged panel data and used fixed effects and
random effects model. You can see the results of these model specifications in Table 18 for
the outcome of European integration. The effect of trust in EP is significant in all model
6 Other statistically significant effects are; One-unit increase in general trust, increases the attitude
towards European integration by 0.06 units towards a favourable opinion. One-unit increase in
satisfaction with the economy in the country increases the attitude towards European integration by
0.09 units and satisfaction with the democracy by 0.06 towards a favourable opinion. Being a citizen
(by 0.18), being a woman (by 0.13 units) and belonging to a discriminated group (by 0.08) decreases
the favourable opinion towards further EU integration.
16
specifications, as well as the effect of the surveyed year. As a last robustness check, I have set
each individual survey wave with the same countries nested individual observations as a panel
and did regression estimations using both fixed effects and random effects model
specifications. In all three waves individually, the effect signs and significance of trust in EP
was robust and showed that an increase in trust in EP predicts favourable opinion towards EU
integration.
DV: Attitudes towards further Immigration
Firstly, I have specified a multinomial logit estimation with country clustered standard errors.
The model specification of variables is the same as the previous outcome studied, since the
over-arching aim is to look at these two outcomes as a concept of outwards integration. Table
10 reports the log likelihood coefficients and Table 11 has the odds ratios (relative risk ratios)
of the model estimations. The estimation shows that trust in EP does not have a statistically
significance odds relationship with the outcome for any category when the baseline is set at
“allow many”.
I, then, plotted the predicted probabilities of this estimation as seen in Figure 6. This
figure shows that although the effect of trust in EP is not statistically significant presented as
in Table 11, there is in fact an effect on the predicted probabilities at the lower trust
respondents. In order to understand this, I have changed the baselines to all possible
categories and when the baseline is set to “allow none” as presented in table 12, there was a
statistically significant effect of trust in EP on attitude towards further immigration. The odds
of choosing to allow some immigrants rather than no immigrants at all is 7% higher for those
respondents that are in one-unit higher trust in EP. In addition to this, when baseline was
allowing some, trust in EP was statistically significant for choosing to allow none rather than
some by decreasing the odds by 7%.
17
Next, I tried two alternative measurements for the attitude towards further
immigration. Table 13 and Table 14 presents these results. Trust in EP, does not have a
significant effect on attitudes towards immigration. I have tried both of these results with all
possible baselines, for the both the first and second alternative measurements. None of the
baselines had any significant effects for the trust in EP. For an alternative robustness test on
the results, I did different types of OLS regressions (results are presented in Table 15). Trust
in EP is statistically significant in a multivariate linear regression, but loses significance in the
clustering standard errors.
The next specification I tried was a multinomial logit estimation with clustered errors,
this time by year (results presented in Table 16). This model estimated significant effects for
trust in EP as well as many other control variables specified in the model that were not
statistically significant in those model estimates. I ran this model with different baselines and
the significance of trust in EP remained robust. Clustering by each ESS round year also
showed significance for each country as well, which was expected as the theory predicted that
the individuals are nested in their home countries. However, this way I can also say that there
is significant within country between time variance for this variable.
Lastly based on the results from above, I have set the data as panel with country level
clusters for individual observations and used likelihood estimation. The results from this
model specification can be found in Table 17 in the Appendix. Here, in model specifications
with or without the time variable included, the effect of trust in EP has come out as significant
with a positive coefficient. A similar procedure to the EU integration dimension has been
followed here as well for additional robustness checks and for each survey wave set as
country panels have showed robust significant results for trust in EP.
18
VIII. Implications of Results and Conclusion
Overall the results show that there is significant evidence to support the first hypothesis
regarding the effect of trust in EP on attitudes towards EU integration. All models specified to
test this hypothesis show robust and significant results. The specified mixed effects, random
effects and fixed effects models all predict that increasing trust in EP have a statistically
significant relationship with increasingly favourable attitudes towards EU integration. This is
an important finding and a robust evidence for the institutional trust theories in the literature.
This also may help in understanding increasing Euroscepticism with decreasing levels of trust
in European institutions as seen from the recent trends in European countries.
Aside from the effect of trust in EP, the individual’s satisfaction with the national
democracy has been shown to be a significant predictor as well. Increases in both satisfactions
with the democracy and the years in education spent increases favourable opinion towards EU
integration. Conversely, being female and belonging to a minority group discriminated in the
country decreases the support for EU integration. 7 An interesting finding has been the
differences in country effects in the mixed effects model. Being from certain countries have
been found to be more influential than other in mitigating attitudes towards EU integration.
This result is puzzling in the sense that it potentially requires further questions in order to
understand the reasons underpinning this outcome.8
For the second hypothesis, I can neither confirm nor reject this hypothesized
relationship between attitudes towards further immigration and trust in EP. Although the
effect of trust in EP is statistically significant in multilevel likelihood estimation models, the
multinomial logit model specification showed mixed results for the significance of the trust in
7 There is an odd change in sign between random and fixed effects models for trust in national
parliament, which I have not been able to fully explain. I am looking more into this issue in order to
understand why that happened (See Table 18). 8 I will look for further into this effect using design weights in model estimations to check if these
varieties of country effects are still present.
19
EP. However, I believe this might potentially be due to misspecification of this outcome
variable. As shown in the results and argued in the beginning, a multi-level model
specification that includes both time and country level is required for this. There are issues of
serial autocorrelation, which can be resolved in a hierarchical structure that can account for
the time dimension as well. For the future of this research, I will be working on specifying a
generalized linear latent and mixed model, which is suited for multilevel latent variable
models where the outcome is non-linear such as in this case (Zheng and Rabe-Hesketh 2007).
Connected to the point made above, another important caveat to the results is the issue
with time, measured very broadly with the survey waves. Time is a significant variable in
almost all specifications for EU integration attitudes, so the argument that the crisis context
matters on its effect on attitudes towards outwards integration was supported. For the
immigration attitudes, the categorical time variable has not been robust predictor, and lost
significance in the hierarchical specification. A more substantive evaluation of the effect of
time is required to conclude anything for the matter of crisis context, perhaps using
interaction effects of time with the explanatory variables. Despite its many shortcomings, I
believe this study enlarges the debate on European attitudes towards outwards integration and
perhaps even make a case for strengthening the public’s relationship with European
institutions for a harmonious societal interaction with the proverbial “others” in European
societies.
20
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. with Value Label
Outcome Variables
Attitudes towards further Immigration 69,113 1.70635 .8186974 0 3 Allow Many
Attitudes towards further European Integration 69,113 5.044044 2.480413 0 10 Should go further
Trust in European Parliament 69,113 4.635799 2.264302 0 10 Complete Trust
General trust 69,113 5.571021 2.253791 0 10 Trust All
Trust in National Parliament 69,113 4.989814 2.442867 0 10 Complete Trust
Economic Satisfaction (national) 69,113 5.058889 2.424542 0 10
Democratic Satisfaction (national) 69,113 5.904794 2.318363 0 10
Left Right Scale 69,113 4.84547 2.155952 0 10
Citizenship 69,113 .957461 .2018169 0 1 Yes
Discriminated Group 69,113 .0630706 .2430917 0 1 Yes
Age (years) 69,113 49.30313 31.76638 14 999
Income Feeling 69,113 2.181297 .7825983 0 3 Lives Comfortably
Income (deciles) 69,113 5.703905 2.743898 1 10
Gender 69,113 .4886346 .4998744 0 1 Female
Education (years) 69,113 13.54929 5.332921 0 99
Religion 69,113 4.276229 3.014736 0 10 Very Religious
Main activity 69,113 2.956246 2.537631 1 9 Other
Table 2: Power Correlations of Key Variables (with 4 other control variables)
Attitude
towards
further EU
integration
Attitude
towards further
immigration
Trust in EP General
Trust
Trust in
National
Parliament
Left Right
Scale
Attitude towards
further EU
integration
1
Attitude towards
further immigration
0.237*** 1
Trust in EP
0.352***
0.169***
1
General Trust 0.127*** 0.211*** 0.263*** 1
Trust in Nat.
Parliament
0.214*** 0.217*** 0.559*** 0.400*** 1
Left Right Scale 0.00260* 0.154*** -0.0578*** -0.0275*** -0.0653*** 1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 3: Ordered Logit Maximum Likelihood Estimation with Clustered Standard Errors (by Country) DV: Attitudes towards
European Integration
Variables
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Trust in the EP 0.29***
(0.031)
0.29***
(0.032)
0.29***
(0.031)
0.30***
(0.031)
Trust in country's parliament -0.026 -0.029 -0.032 -0.034
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
General trust 0.018
(0.022)
0.013
(0.022)
0.010
(0.022)
0.0088
(0.022)
Satisfaction with Country’s
Economy
0.035
(0.026)
0.038
(0.026)
0.037
(0.026)
0.032
(0.026)
Satisfaction with Country’s
Democracy
0.043***
(0.011)
0.042***
(0.011)
0.042***
(0.011)
0.039***
(0.010)
ESS round=6 -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.20** -0.19**
(0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063)
ESS round=7 -0.17* -0.18* -0.17** -0.17**
(0.072) (0.069) (0.067) (0.066)
How religious are you 0.0047 0.0070 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age of respondent,
calculated
0.000015 -0.00033 -0.00039
(0.00083) (0.00053) (0.00051)
Years of full-time education
completed
0.022** 0.021** 0.022**
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0073)
In Education 0.15** 0.15***
(0.047) (0.046)
Unemployed, looking 0.099* 0.12**
(0.045) (0.043)
Unemployed, not looking -0.014 0.019
(0.10) (0.091)
Permanently sick or
disabled
-0.063 -0.025
(0.080) (0.083)
Retired 0.18** 0.17**
(0.061) (0.059)
Community or military
service
0.065
(0.31)
0.011
(0.31)
Housework, looking after
children, others
0.11*
(0.091)
0.17**
(0.090)
Household's income 0.033***
(0.0087)
0.024
(0.013)
Left right scale 0.029
(0.022)
0.032
(0.023)
Citizenship -0.048 -0.066
(0.12) (0.12)
Belonging to Discrim.Group -0.19***
(0.055)
Female -0.14***
(0.037)
Feeling about household's
income nowadays
0.064
(0.060)
Observations (individuals) 69113 69113 69113 69113
Num. of Clusters (country) 14 14 14 14
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.035
AIC 300028.12 299741.99 299446.20 299249.52
BIC 300146.98 299860.86 299565.07 299368.38
Log Likelihood -150001.06 -149858.00 -149710.10 -149611.76
Coefficients are log likelihood. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4: Odds Ratios – Ordered Logit MLE with Clustered Standard Errors (by Country) DV: Attitudes towards
European Integration
Variables
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Trust in the EP 1.35***
(0.042)
1.34***
(0.042)
1.34***
(0.042)
1.34***
(0.041)
Trust in country's
parliament
0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
(0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25)
General trust 1.02
(0.022)
1.01
(0.022)
1.01
(0.022)
1.01
(0.022)
Satisfaction with Country’s
Economy
1.04
(0.026)
1.04
(0.026)
1.04
(0.026)
1.032
(0.026)
Satisfaction with Country’s
Democracy
1.04*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.04***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01)
Religion 1.005 1.006 1.01
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 1.000 0.999 0.999
(0.00083) (0.00053) (0.0005)
Years of education 1.023**
(0.0072)
1.022**
(0.0071)
1.022**
(0.0074)
Main Activity Category
In Education 1.16** 1.16***
(0.05) (0.053)
Unemployed, looking 1.10* 1.13**
(0.04) (0.05)
Unemployed, not looking 0.99
(0.10)
1.01
(0.093)
Permanently sick or
disabled
0.94
(0.08)
0.97
(0.081)
Retired 1.20** 1.19**
(0.07) (0.07)
Community or military
service
1.07
(0.33)
1.01
(0.31)
Housework (looking after
children, others)
1.121*
(0.064)
1.18**
(0.067)
Household's total net
income, all sources
1.034***
(0.0089)
1.025
(0.013)
Left right scale 1.029
(0.022)
1.03
(0.023)
Citizenship 0.953 0.94
(0.11) (0.11)
Belonging to a
Discriminated Group
0.82***
(0.044)
Feeling household income
1.06
(0.063)
Female 0.86***
(0.031)
ESS 6 (2012) 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.82** 0.82**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
ESS 7 (2014) 0.85* 0.83* 0.84** 0.84**
(0.06) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations (individuals) 69113 69113 69113 69113
Num. of Clusters (country) 14 14 14 14
Log Likelihood -150001.06 -149858.00 -149710.10 -149611.76 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Brant test of parallel regression assumption (for Model 4 in Table 4)
| chi2 p>chi2 df
All | 2790.21 0.000 216
trustep | 287.79 0.000 9
trustparl.| 25.09 0.003 9
genrealtrust | 40.45 0.000 9
satisfaction eco. | 56.26 0.000 9
stfdem | 19.58 0.021 9
religion | 24.44 0.004 9
age | 104.95 0.000 9
education | 30.40 0.000 9
2.mainactivity | 53.37 0.000 9
3.mainactivity | 4.17 0.900 9
4.mainactivity | 27.41 0.001 9
5.mainactivity | 21.58 0.010 9
6.mainactivity | 54.58 0.000 9
7.mainactivity | 19.20 0.024 9
8.mainactivity | 7.98 0.537 9
9.mainactivity | 16.10 0.065 9
income | 58.63 0.000 9
left right | 79.45 0.000 9
citizenship | 38.69 0.000 9
discriminated | 130.02 0.000 9
gender | 744.15 0.000 9
Income feeling | 18.54 0.029 9
6.essround | 45.13 0.000 9
7.essround | 14.25 0.114 9
Table 6: Generalized Ordered Logit Estimations for (cluster se by country)
DV: Attitudes towards Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Confidence Interval]
further EU Integration
0 Trust EP | .4006803 .0435619 9.20 0.000 .3153005 .48606011
1 Trust EP | .3797452 .0405656 9.36 0.000 .3002382 .4592523
2 Trust EP | .3456419 .0367126 9.41 0.000 .2736864 .4175973
3 Trust EP | .318789 .0303997 10.49 0.000 .2592068 .3783712
4 Trust EP | .2897716 .0292037 9.92 0.000 .2325333 .3470099
5 Trust EP | .2682868 .0283708 9.46 0.000 .212681 .3238925
6 Trust EP | .2546969 .029999 8.49 0.000 .1959 .3134938
7 Trust EP | .2471968 .0293391 8.43 0.000 .1896931 .3047005
8 Trust EP | .2447615 .0310655 7.88 0.000 .1838741 .3056488
9 Trust EP | .2395238 .0329851 7.26 0.000 .1748742 .304173
Table 7: Multinomial Logit Results for European Integration (main activity variable results
omitted) – Clustered standard errors by country –Baseline category 5 omitted.
Variables
0
10 (futher)
trstep 0.650*** 0.728*** 0.794*** 0.859*** 0.940*** 1.090*** 1.131*** 1.174*** 1.226*** 1.231***
(0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0244) (0.0163) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0237) (0.0294) (0.0367) (0.0435)
trstprl 1.033 1.023 1.050** 1.033*** 1.041*** 1.010 1.001 0.999 0.984 0.971
(0.0300) (0.0252) (0.0205) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0150) (0.0198) (0.0300) (0.0348) (0.0424)
ppltrst 0.988 1.003 0.991 1.003 1.004 1.019 1.030 1.023 1.007 0.973
(0.0174) (0.0190) (0.00764) (0.0116) (0.00935) (0.0128) (0.0198) (0.0294) (0.0396) (0.0353)
stfeco 0.909*** 0.942*** 0.955*** 0.974* 0.969*** 0.994 0.996 0.996 1.007 0.985
(0.0197) (0.0193) (0.00980) (0.0136) (0.0112) (0.0241) (0.0355) (0.0455) (0.0505) (0.0555)
stfdem 0.949** 0.964** 0.972* 0.979** 0.981* 1.020 1.018 1.023 1.010 0.989
(0.0214) (0.0144) (0.0167) (0.00954) (0.0110) (0.0159) (0.0139) (0.0153) (0.0190) (0.0340)
religion 0.989 1.000 0.999 0.995 1.000 1.017* 1.015 1.016 1.023 0.993
(0.0146) (0.0112) (0.0105) (0.00865) (0.00672) (0.00940) (0.0122) (0.0179) (0.0205) (0.0220)
agea 1.002 1.002** 1.002 1.001 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.001 1.002* 1.002
(0.00120) (0.000925) (0.00115) (0.00143) (0.000858
)
(0.00124) (0.00201) (0.00165) (0.00112) (0.00146)
education 0.992 0.986 0.978*** 0.989** 0.997 1.002 1.016** 1.021** 1.024*** 1.026***
(0.00867) (0.00964) (0.00530) (0.00485) (0.00551) (0.00525) (0.00720) (0.00950) (0.00950) (0.00945)
income 0.991 1.007 1.014 1.006 0.995 1.016* 1.034*** 1.053*** 1.068** 1.024
(0.0162) (0.0171) (0.0147) (0.00987) (0.0147) (0.00832) (0.0128) (0.0199) (0.0293) (0.0224)
rc_leftright 0.965 0.973* 0.978 0.976*** 0.987 0.977** 0.989 1.025 1.024 1.078**
(0.0269) (0.0154) (0.0158) (0.00937) (0.00967) (0.0110) (0.0156) (0.0209) (0.0361) (0.0378)
1.citizenship_rc
0.943 0.831 0.908 1.175** 1.162* 1.091 1.047 0.936 0.832 0.716**
(0.0827) (0.173) (0.0654) (0.0764) (0.0931) (0.100) (0.124) (0.142) (0.167) (0.117)
1.rc_discri
minated
1.730*** 1.605*** 1.338*** 1.124 1.012 0.823 0.922 1.070 1.275*** 1.484***
(0.130) (0.177) (0.0989) (0.0920) (0.114) (0.0995) (0.0695) (0.128) (0.106) (0.198)
1.gender 0.578*** 0.686*** 0.731*** 0.805*** 0.944 0.902** 0.721*** 0.574*** 0.491*** 0.448***
(0.0394) (0.0446) (0.0281) (0.0414) (0.0419) (0.0416) (0.0314) (0.0408) (0.0561) (0.0406)
rc_incomef
eeling
0.912 0.901 0.929* 0.965 0.982 0.970 1.060 1.033 0.972 1.083
(0.0513) (0.0632) (0.0376) (0.0357) (0.0530) (0.0374) (0.0690) (0.0844) (0.0871) (0.110)
6.essround 1.387** 1.170* 1.141** 1.136*** 1.123*** 0.912** 0.836*** 0.858* 0.901 1.024
(0.182) (0.100) (0.0598) (0.0441) (0.0388) (0.0369) (0.0571) (0.0799) (0.0995) (0.0936)
7.essround 1.217 1.087 1.080 1.064 1.128** 0.952 0.870** 0.821** 0.815 0.913
(0.153) (0.0748) (0.0656) (0.0417) (0.0576) (0.0295) (0.0476) (0.0754) (0.105) (0.0872)
Table 8: Mixed Effects Model Estimations (1) (2) (3)
DV: Attitudes towards further
European Integration
Model
With only Trust in EP
Model 1 (without
categorization)
Model 2 (with
categorical variables)
Trust in the European Parliament 0.401*** 0.328*** 0.326***
(0.00387) (0.00481) (0.00483)
Trust in National Parliament 0.00894 0.00870
(0.00525) (0.00525)
General Trust 0.0574***
(0.00442)
0.0575***
(0.00442)
How satisfied with present state
of economy in country
0.0865***
(0.00507)
0.0866***
(0.00507)
How satisfied with the way
democracy works in country
0.0601***
(0.00513)
0.0598***
(0.00513)
How religious are you -0.00539 -0.00517
(0.00306) (0.00307)
Age of respondent, calculated -0.000274 -0.000238
(0.000282) (0.000297)
Years of full-time education
completed
0.0216***
(0.00167)
0.0221***
(0.00168)
Household's total net income, all
sources
0.0189***
(0.00389)
0.0235***
(0.00397)
Placement on left right scale 0.0253***
(0.00411)
0.0252***
(0.00411)
Citizen of country -0.180***
(0.0434)
Member of a discr. group -0.0775*
(0.0360)
Female -0.139***
(0.0176)
Feeling about household's income 0.0742***
(0.0137)
0.0725***
(0.0139)
Main activity (baseline: paid
work)
0.0225***
(0.00372)
In Education 0.177***
(0.0354)
Unemployed, looking for job 0.185***
(0.0478)
Unemployed, not looking for job 0.0672
(0.0760)
Permanently sick or disabled 0.0553
(0.0550)
Retired 0.178***
(0.0243)
Community or military service 0.433
(0.305)
Housework, looking after
children, others
0.112**
(0.0365)
Citizenship -0.183***
(0.0434)
Discriminated Group member -0.0754*
(0.0360)
Female -0.130***
(0.0178)
Constant 3.246*** 1.981*** 1.956***
(0.0804) (0.120) (0.120)
Observations 69113 69113 69113
AIC 309519.22 307745.08 307717.41
BIC 309564.94 307909.66 307955.14
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 9: Random-effects Parameters for Mixed Effects Model for Model2 in Table8
Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
essround: Identity (Between time level variance)
4.99e-12
countryID: Identity (Within time between country variance)
3958026 .0886143 2552157 .6138327
var(Residual) (Within country between respondent variance)
5.010543 .0269619 4.957977 5.063667
LR test vs. linear model: chi2(2) = 3766.88 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 10: Multinomial Logit Estimations with Clustered Errors by Country
DV: Attitudes towards further Immigration (from different race/religion)
(1)
Allow None
(2)
Allow a Few
(3)
Allow Some
(4)
Allow Many
Trust in the European Parliament -0.07 -0.04 -0.00
(0.040) (0.035) (0.021)
Trust in country's parliament -0.13* -0.05 -0.01
(0.054) (0.052) (0.029)
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too
careful
-0.22*** -0.15*** -0.11***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.022)
How satisfied with present state of economy in
country
-0.09** -0.04 -0.02
(0.034) (0.022) (0.018) BASELINE
How satisfied with the way democracy works in
country
-0.07 -0.02 0.00
(0.039) (0.030) (0.022)
How religious are you -0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.042) (0.030) (0.015)
Age of respondent, calculated 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of full-time education completed -0.10** -0.05* -0.02**
(0.036) (0.021) (0.006)
Main activity In Education -1.02*** -0.55*** -0.35***
(0.147) (0.096) (0.064)
Main activity, Unemployed, looking for job -0.21 -0.23* -0.06
(0.158) (0.090) (0.099)
Main activity, Unemployed, not looking for job 0.23 -0.24 -0.10
(0.294) (0.193) (0.101)
Main activity, Permanently sick or disabled 0.10 -0.17 -0.10
(0.238) (0.147) (0.100)
Main activity, , Retired 0.53*** 0.35*** 0.22**
(0.096) (0.085) (0.084)
Main activity, 7, Community or military service 0.25 -0.42 -0.36
(0.719) (0.493) (0.529)
Main activity, Housework, looking after children,
others
0.18 0.01 0.08
(0.160) (0.106) (0.062)
Household's total net income, all sources -0.08*** -0.05* -0.03**
(0.022) (0.018) (0.010)
lrscale (Placement on left right scale) -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.15***
(0.053) (0.039) (0.021)
ctzn (Citizen of country) = 1, Yes 0.40 0.48* 0.17
(0.263) (0.232) (0.146)
Member of a discriminated group -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.30***
(0.132) (0.110) (0.076)
(Gender) = 1, Female -0.13 -0.06 -0.01
(0.106) (0.088) (0.050)
(Feeling about household's income nowadays) -0.36** -0.27* -0.07
(0.126) (0.110) (0.059)
ESS round = 6 -0.11 -0.13 -0.03
(0.086) (0.082) (0.049)
ESS round = 7 -0.21 -0.26* -0.12*
(0.163) (0.120) (0.058)
Constant 5.77*** 4.70*** 2.98***
(0.821) (0.713) (0.500)
Observations 69,113 69,113 69,113 69,113
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 11: Multinomial Logit Estimations (RRR) with Clustered Errors by Country
DV: Attitudes towards further
Immigration
(from different race/religion)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Allow
None
Allow A
Few
Allow Some Allow Many
Trust in the European Parliament 0.93 0.96 1.00
(0.037) (0.034) (0.021) BASELINE
Trust in country's parliament 0.88* 0.95 0.99
(0.047) (0.049) (0.029)
General Trust 0.80*** 0.86*** 0.90***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.020)
How satisfied with present state of
economy in country
0.91** 0.96 0.98
(0.031) (0.021) (0.017)
How satisfied with the way democracy
works in country
0.93 0.98 1.00
(0.036) (0.030) (0.022)
How religious are you 0.98 1.01 1.02
(0.041) (0.030) (0.016)
Age of respondent, calculated 1.01 1.01 1.00
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of full-time education completed 0.91** 0.95* 0.98**
(0.033) (0.020) (0.006)
Main activity =In Education 0.36***
(0.053)
0.57***
(0.055)
0.70***
(0.045)
Unemployed, looking for job 0.81
(0.127)
0.79*
(0.071)
0.94
(0.093)
Unemployed, not looking for job 1.26 0.78 0.91
(0.372) (0.151) (0.092)
Permanently sick or disabled 1.10 0.84 0.91
(0.262) (0.124) (0.091)
Retired 1.70*** 1.42*** 1.24**
(0.164) (0.121) (0.104)
Community or military service 1.29 0.65 0.70
(0.926) (0.323) (0.371)
Housework, looking after children, others 1.20 1.01 1.08
(0.192) (0.107) (0.067)
Household's total net income, all sources 0.92*** 0.95* 0.97**
(0.020) (0.017) (0.009)
Placement on left right scale
0.74***
(0.039)
0.75***
(0.029)
0.86***
(0.018)
Citizenship (Yes) 1.49 1.61* 1.19
(0.392) (0.373) (0.174)
Member of a group discriminated 0.64***
(0.084)
0.65***
(0.071)
0.74***
(0.056)
Gender = Female 0.88 0.94 0.99
(0.093) (0.082) (0.049)
Feeling about household's income 0.70** 0.76* 0.93
(0.088) (0.084) (0.055)
ESS round = 6 0.90 0.88 0.97
(0.077) (0.072) (0.047)
ESS round = 7 0.81 0.77* 0.89*
(0.132) (0.092) (0.051)
Constant 321.76*** 110.01*** 19.70***
(264.103) (78.430) (9.853)
Observations 69,113 69,113 69,113
AIC
BIC
Number of Clusters
Log likelihood (model)
Log likelihood (null)
154530
154648.9
14
-77252.2
-82967.92
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 12: Multinomial Logit Estimation with Different Baseline
DV: Attitudes towards
further Immigration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(from different
race/religion) Allow None Allow Few Allow Some Allow Many
Trust in EP 0.03 0.07* 0.07
(0.017) (0.028) (0.040)
Trust in Nat.Par. 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.13*
(0.014) (0.028) (0.054)
General Trust 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.22***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.041)
Satisfaction with Economy BASELINE 0.05* 0.08* 0.09**
(0.023) (0.034) (0.034)
Satisfaction with
Democracy
0.05** 0.08** 0.07
(0.018) (0.026) (0.039)
Religion 0.03 0.04 0.02
(0.014) (0.029) (0.042)
Age 0.00 -0.00* -0.01
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
education 0.04** 0.08* 0.10**
(0.016) (0.031) (0.036)
Main activity= 2, Education 0.47*** 0.67*** 1.02***
(0.087) (0.113) (0.147)
= 3, Unemployed, looking
for job
-0.02 0.15 0.21
(0.119) (0.129) (0.158)
= 4, Unemployed, not
looking
-0.48* -0.33 -0.23
(0.219) (0.243) (0.294)
5, Permanently sick or
disabled
-0.27 -0.19 -0.10
(0.156) (0.198) (0.238)
= 6, Retired -0.18** -0.32*** -0.53***
(0.065) (0.089) (0.096)
= 7, Community or military
service
-0.68 -0.61 -0.25
(0.703) (0.641) (0.719)
= 8, Housework -0.17 -0.11 -0.18
(0.114) (0.136) (0.160)
Household's total net
income, all sources
0.04*** 0.06*** 0.08***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.022)
Left Right Scale 0.02 0.15*** 0.30***
(0.022) (0.039) (0.053)
Citizen 0.08 -0.22 -0.40
(0.105) (0.170) (0.263)
Discriminated group
member
0.02 0.16 0.45***
(0.071) (0.097) (0.132)
Female 0.07 0.13 0.13
(0.067) (0.075) (0.106)
Feeling about household's
income
0.09* 0.29*** 0.36**
(0.041) (0.083) (0.126)
ESS round = 6 -0.02 0.08 0.11
(0.050) (0.059) (0.086)
ESS round = 7 -0.05 0.09 0.21
(0.087) (0.128) (0.163)
Constant -1.07*** -2.79*** -5.77***
(0.249) (0.456) (0.821)
Observations 69,113 69,113 69,113
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 13: Alternative DV Measurement (1) - Multinomial Logit Estimations with Clustered Errors by
Country
DV: Attitudes towards further
immigration from same race/religion as
majority
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Allow None Allow Few Allow Some Allow Many
Trust in the European Parliament -0.06 -0.04 -0.01
(0.036) (0.028) (0.015)
Trust in country's parliament -0.13*** -0.07 -0.01
(0.037) (0.041) (0.022)
General Trust -0.20*** -0.12** -0.08***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.019)
Satisfaction with economy -0.15* -0.05 -0.03 BASELINE
(0.060) (0.034) (0.022)
Satisfaction with democracy -0.06 -0.04* -0.01
(0.038) (0.022) (0.014)
Religion -0.03 -0.01 0.01
(0.049) (0.027) (0.012)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of full-time education -0.07 -0.05* -0.02*
(0.041) (0.025) (0.008)
Main activity: In Education -1.10*** -0.63*** -0.33***
(0.162) (0.117) (0.052)
Unemployed, looking for job -0.10 -0.23** -0.03
(0.211) (0.086) (0.078)
Unemployed, not looking for job 0.41 -0.09 0.09
(0.247) (0.195) (0.102)
Permanently sick or disabled 0.16
(0.242)
-0.05
(0.138)
-0.10
(0.097)
Retired 0.21 0.04 0.02
(0.145) (0.118) (0.078)
Community or military service 0.09
(0.662)
-0.26
(0.767)
-0.28
(0.287)
Housework, looking after children, others 0.19
(0.380)
-0.11
(0.290)
-0.04
(0.217)
Household's total net income, all sources -0.12*** -0.06*** -0.04***
(0.027) (0.015) (0.008)
lrscale (Placement on left right scale) -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.13***
(0.046) (0.037) (0.021)
ctzn (Citizen of country) = 1, Yes 0.57* 0.52* 0.23
(0.283) (0.238) (0.136)
Member of a discriminated group -0.44** -0.37* -0.24**
(0.164) (0.164) (0.078)
(Gender) = 1, Female -0.07 -0.05 0.03
(0.084) (0.077) (0.045)
Feeling about household's income -0.35** -0.29** -0.05
(0.133) (0.101) (0.059)
ESS round = 6 0.02 -0.09 0.02
(0.133) (0.111) (0.049)
ESS round = 7 -0.05 -0.16 -0.05
(0.151) (0.133) (0.062)
Constant 3.84*** 3.83*** 2.61***
(0.718) (0.586) (0.469)
Observations 69,113 69,113 69,113
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 14: Alternative DV Measurement (2) Multinomial Logit Estimations w/ Clustered Errors by
Country
DV: Attitudes towards further
immigration from poor
countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Allow None Allow Few Allow Some Allow Many
Trust in Europe. Par. -0.05 -0.03 0.01
(0.043) (0.035) (0.022)
Trust in National Par. -0.09 -0.03 -0.01
(0.056) (0.052) (0.029)
General Trust -0.18*** -0.11*** -0.09***
(0.043) (0.034) (0.021) BASELINE
Satisfaction with Country’s
Economy
-0.09** -0.04 -0.02
(0.028) (0.019) (0.017)
Satisfaction with Country’s
Democracy
-0.08* -0.01 0.01
(0.032) (0.031) (0.021)
Religion -0.04 -0.01 0.01
(0.040) (0.031) (0.015)
Age 0.01* 0.01* 0.01
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of education -0.07** -0.03* -0.01**
(0.021) (0.014) (0.004)
Main activity, Education -0.95*** -0.42*** -0.26***
(0.110) (0.085) (0.063)
Main activity Unemployed,
looking
-0.11 -0.12 -0.11
(0.134) (0.091) (0.086)
Unemployed, not looking 0.17 -0.31 -0.15
(0.191) (0.207) (0.101)
Permanently sick or disabled -0.14 -0.24 -0.19
(0.200) (0.166) (0.139)
Retired 0.57*** 0.35** 0.16
(0.098) (0.108) (0.092)
Community or military service 0.53 -0.06 0.05
(0.576) (0.465) (0.328)
Housework, looking after
children, others
-0.07 -0.08 -0.06
(0.159) (0.147) (0.088)
Household's income -0.06* -0.03 -0.01
(0.027) (0.020) (0.010)
left right scale -0.32*** -0.28*** -0.16***
(0.054) (0.040) (0.024)
Citizen of country 0.33 0.36 0.20
(0.285) (0.202) (0.121)
Member of discriminated group -0.29
(0.153)
-0.34**
(0.127)
-0.23**
(0.075)
(Gender) = 1, Female -0.20 -0.13 -0.08
(0.103) (0.083) (0.045)
(Feeling about household's
income
-0.31* -0.21* -0.03
(0.125) (0.108) (0.052)
ESS round = 6 0.00 -0.06 0.00
(0.088) (0.072) (0.052)
ESS round = 7 0.17 -0.05 -0.08
(0.168) (0.098) (0.063)
Constant 5.20*** 4.04*** 2.55***
(0.723) (0.650) (0.487)
Observations 69,113 69,113 69,113
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 15: Robustness Checks with OLS
DV: Attitudes towards further Immigration (from different race/religion)
Variables Model 1 (no cluster) Model 2 (clustered countries) Model 3 (with clustered years)
Trust EP . 01653021*** .01653021 .01609993
Trust National Parl. .02175507 *** .02175507 .02213643
General Trust .0390611*** .0390611*** .0349342
Satisfaction with
Country’s Economy .01576052*** .01576052 .02006403
Satisfaction with
Country’s Democracy .01446984*** .01446984 .0160643
Religion .00239945 .00239945 .00081343
Age -.00077441*** -.00077441 ** -.00070391
Education (years) .01401777*** . 01401777 ** .0140926
Main activity
In Education .17159217*** .17159217 *** .16310532
Unemployed (looking) .05795801*** .05795801 .04091082
Unemployed (not looking) -.02522065 -.02522065 -.02208662
Permanently disabled -.01486653 -.01486653 -.02193073
Retired -.10987906*** -.10987906 - .10673813
Community service .02188429 .02188429 .02887125
Housework -.01826439 -.01826439 -.00993676
Household income .01497591*** .014975910 ** .01675671
Left right scale .0666775*** .0666775 *** .06983584
Citizenship (Yes) -.11231272*** -.11231272 -.15013011
Discriminated Group Member .1010411*** .1010411 .09021006
Female .02749321*** .02749321 .0279425
Income Perception .08615318*** .08615318 . 06979353
ESS 6 .03031585*** .03031585
ESS 7 .05656428*** .05656428
Country ID . 03377155
cons .45070719*** .45070719** .28088265
Observation 69,113 69,113 69,113
R2 0.1390 0.1390 0.1626
Root MSE 0.75979 0.75979 0.74931
AIC 158187.5 158163.5 156222
BIC 158416.1 1 58282.4 156240.3
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 16: Multinomial Logit Estimations with Clustered Errors by Year (ESS round)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: Attitudes towards further Immigration
(from different race/religion)
Allow None Allow
Few
Allow Some Allow Many
Trust in the European Parliament -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.02*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.008)
Trust in country's parliament -0.12*** -0.06*** -0.02
(0.014) (0.011) (0.008) BASELINE
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful -0.26*** -0.19*** -0.12***
(0.016) (0.005) (0.005)
How satisfied with present state of economy in country -0.07*** -0.03** -0.00
(0.007) (0.012) (0.015)
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country -0.09*** -0.03*** 0.01
(0.020) (0.008) (0.007)
How religious are you 0.01 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Age of respondent, calculated 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Years of full-time education completed -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.02***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
Main activity, 2, Education -0.98*** -0.54*** -0.33***
(0.135) (0.045) (0.053)
3, Unemployed, looking for job -0.07 -0.14*** -0.03
(0.083) (0.029) (0.043)
4, Unemployed, not looking for job 0.26 -0.27*** -0.13
(0.255) (0.066) (0.118)
5, Permanently sick or disabled 0.16 -0.08 -0.08
(0.117) (0.071) (0.064)
6, Retired 0.56*** 0.39*** 0.24***
(0.019) (0.037) (0.042)
7, Community or military service 0.03 -0.78** -0.50
(0.907) (0.298) (0.340)
8, Housework, looking after children, others 0.18*** 0.04 0.05
(0.041) (0.039) (0.077)
Household's total net income, all sources -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.02***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Placement on left right scale -0.32*** -0.28*** -0.16***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
Citizen of country = Yes 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.29***
(0.176) (0.085) (0.052)
Member of Discriminated Group -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.31***
(0.059) (0.029) (0.022)
(Gender) = 1, Female -0.20*** -0.10*** -0.01
(0.058) (0.024) (0.018)
Feeling about household's income -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.08**
(0.027) (0.051) (0.030)
Country = 2, CH -0.56* 0.13 0.02
(0.226) (0.088) (0.091)
Country = 3, CZ 1.37*** 1.27*** 0.43
(0.358) (0.304) (0.256)
Country = 4, DE -1.72*** -1.02*** -0.77***
(0.298) (0.233) (0.167)
Country = 5, DK -0.41* 0.24 -0.23*
(0.162) (0.196) (0.114)
Country = 6, EE -0.33 -0.14 -0.55***
(0.327) (0.282) (0.138)
Country = 7, FI -0.20 0.48*** -0.34*
(0.117) (0.143) (0.150)
Country = 8, FR -0.89*** -0.32 -0.12
(0.260) (0.332) (0.216)
Country = 9, IE -0.95*** -0.66** -0.58**
(0.202) (0.219) (0.189)
Country = 10, NL -0.70*** -0.36 -0.26
(0.165) (0.222) (0.171)
Country = 11, NO -1.52*** -0.51 -0.51*
(0.246) (0.342) (0.239)
Country = 12, PL -2.73*** -1.83*** -1.22***
(0.291) (0.241) (0.188)
Country = 13, SE -3.36*** -2.44*** -1.27***
(0.279) (0.154) (0.137)
Country = 14, SI -1.75*** -0.88* -0.49*
(0.416) (0.367) (0.194)
Constant 6.56*** 5.20*** 3.50***
(0.599) (0.422) (0.257)
Observations 69,113 69,113 69,113
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 17: Multi-level Logistic Regression for Predicting Immigration Attitudes
Model (1) Model (2)
Trust in the EP 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.0100) (0.0100)
Trust in national parl. 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.011) (0.011)
General Trust 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.0088) (0.0088)
Economic Satisfaction 0.053*** 0.052***
(0.010) (0.010)
Democracy Satisfaction 0.081*** 0.082***
(0.010) (0.010)
How religious are you 0.012 0.012
(0.0067) (0.0067)
Age -0.0011* -0.0011*
(0.00044) (0.00044)
Education 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.0058) (0.0058)
Main activity -0.047*** -0.047***
(0.0079) (0.0079)
Household Income 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.0088) (0.0088)
Left Right Scale 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.0089) (0.0089)
Citizenship -0.33** -0.34**
(0.11) (0.11)
Member of discr.group 0.16* 0.16*
(0.076) (0.076)
Female 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.039) (0.039)
Income Feeling 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.027) (0.027)
ESS Round (base=4)
ESS Round 6 -0.0021
(0.052)
ESS Round 7 0.040
(0.057)
Constant -0.73*** -0.74***
(0.21) (0.21)
Observations 45484 45484
AIC 20765.79 20768.98
BIC 20914.11 20934.76
Log Likelihood -10365.89 -10365.49
CHI2 2216.282 2216.515
Pr > CHI2 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 18: Random and Fixed Effects Models for Predicting Attitudes towards EU Integration
Standard errors in parentheses . * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
(1) FE Model (2) RE Model (3) FE Model w/waves (4) RE Model w/waves
Trust in EP 0.332*** 0.360*** 0.328*** 0.356***
(0.00589) (0.00585) (0.00590) (0.00587)
Trust in national parl. 0.0153* -0.0307*** 0.0151* -0.0327***
(0.00643) (0.00636) (0.00643) (0.00636)
General Trust 0.0493*** 0.0165** 0.0518*** 0.0155**
(0.00542) (0.00537) (0.00541) (0.00536)
Economic Satisfaction 0.0455*** 0.0394*** 0.0530*** 0.0456***
(0.00593) (0.00566) (0.00596) (0.00570)
Democracy Satisfaction 0.0628*** 0.0410*** 0.0644*** 0.0450***
(0.00624) (0.00627) (0.00625) (0.00629)
Religiosity -0.00571 0.0130*** -0.00704 0.0125***
(0.00380) (0.00375) (0.00380) (0.00374)
Age -0.000210 -0.000562 -0.0000806 -0.000487
(0.000370) (0.000377) (0.000370) (0.000377)
Education 0.0212*** 0.0242*** 0.0219*** 0.0248***
(0.00205) (0.00207) (0.00204) (0.00207)
Main Activity (paid work baseline)
Education 0.114** 0.183*** 0.127** 0.189***
(0.0437) (0.0445) (0.0436) (0.0445)
Unemployed, looking 0.215***
(0.0606)
0.194**
(0.0617)
0.229***
(0.0604)
0.210***
(0.0616)
Unemployed,not looking 0.128 0.113 0.137 0.123
(0.0953) (0.0970) (0.0951) (0.0969)
Sick or disabled 0.0454 -0.0554 0.0621 -0.0522
(0.0695) (0.0707) (0.0694) (0.0706)
Retired 0.146*** 0.166*** 0.147*** 0.168***
(0.0301) (0.0306) (0.0300) (0.0305)
Comm./military service 0.283 0.172 0.298 0.149
(0.366) (0.373) (0.366) (0.373)
Housework 0.160*** 0.207*** 0.162*** 0.209***
(0.0449) (0.0455) (0.0449) (0.0455)
Household's Income 0.0193*** 0.0332*** 0.0189*** 0.0313***
(0.00481) (0.00476) (0.00480) (0.00476)
Left right scale 0.0405*** 0.0486*** 0.0386*** 0.0483***
(0.00513) (0.00517) (0.00512) (0.00517)
Citizenship -0.157** -0.0769 -0.161** -0.0777
(0.0532) (0.0537) (0.0530) (0.0536)
Discriminated Group Memb. -0.0750 -0.183*** -0.0578 -0.179***
(0.0454) (0.0461) (0.0453) (0.0460)
Female -0.153*** -0.190*** -0.148*** -0.190***
(0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0221) (0.0225)
Income Feeling 0.131*** 0.0928*** 0.127*** 0.0872***
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0168)
ESS Round (Base: wave 4)
ESS 6 -0.389*** -0.268***
(0.0310) (0.0254)
ESS 7 -0.398*** -0.197***
(0.0341) (0.0279)
Constant 1.904*** 2.149*** 2.117*** 2.290***
(0.0843) (0.0842) (0.0856) (0.0851)
Observations 45484 45484 45484
26
Figure 1: Bar Graphs of Trust in European Parliament by Attitudes Towards European
Integration (all waves and countries)
27
Figure 2: Histogram of Attitudes Towards Further European Integration by ESS wave and
country
28
Figure 3: Histogram of Attitudes Towards Further Immigration by ESS wave and country
29
Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities for Attitudes towards Further EU Integration
(based on Model 4 in Table 4)
30
Figure 5: Bar Graph of Country Effects (for Mixed Effect Model 2 in Table 8)
31
Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities for Attitudes Towards Further Immigration (based on Model
in Table 10) by Trust in European Parliament
32
Figure 7: Plotted Residuals against Trust in EP (For the Mixed Effects Model)