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Trulia motion to dismiss Zillow suit
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENTCase No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
The Honorable James L. Robart
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTWESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
ZILLOW, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRULIA, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
TRULIA, INC.’S MOTION TODISMISS COMPLAINT FORPATENT INFRINGEMENT
NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:January 11, 2013
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 1 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page iCase No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
TABLE OF CONTENTSPage
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND............................................................................................. 2
III. ZILLOW’S COMPLAINT FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BEDISMISSED. ...................................................................................................................... 5
A. Legal Standards....................................................................................................... 5
B. Because the ’674 Patent Claims Do Not Satisfy the EligibilityRequirements of Section 101, Zillow’s Complaint Should be Dismissed.............. 6
1. The ’674 Patent Claims Unpatentable Abstract Ideas. ............................... 8
2. The Claimed Routine and Conventional Steps Do Not Render theAbstract Ideas and Mental Processes Patentable. ....................................... 9
3. The ’674 Patent Claims Fail the Machine-or-Transformation Test.......... 10
a. The ’674 Patent Claims Fail the Machine Prong. ......................... 10
b. The ’674 Patent Claims Fail the Transformation Prong. .............. 12
C. Alternatively, Trulia Requests a Stay Pending the Federal Circuit’sEn Banc Ruling in CLS Bank................................................................................ 12
D. The Indirect Infringement Claims Must Be Dismissed for Failure to Meetthe Pleading Requirements of Rule 8.................................................................... 13
IV. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 16
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 2 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page iiCase No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................. 15
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................................................. 5, 14
Bancorp Servs. L.L.C., v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.),687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................... 5, 8, 10, 11
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 554 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 5
Bilski v. Kappos,130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) ...................................................................................................... 6, 7, 10
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................... 14
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.,685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012)........................................................................................... 12, 13
Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................. 15
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).......................................................................................... passim
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber,674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................... 5, 8, 9, 12
Diamond v. Diehr,450 U.S. 175 (1981) .................................................................................................................... 7
Emblaze Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,No. C 11-01079 SBA, slip op., 2012 WL 5940782 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) ................. 14, 15
Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC,671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................... 8
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) .............................................................................................................. 14
Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.,No. 09-4252 (FSH), 2011 WL 1870591 (D.N.J. May 16, 2011) ................................................ 6
Gottschalk v. Benson,409 U.S. 63 (1972) .............................................................................................................. 6, 7, 8
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 3 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page iiiCase No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
Halton Co. v. Streivor, Inc.,No. C 10-00655 WHA, 2010 WL 2077203 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) .................................... 15
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.,687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................... 8
In re Bilski (Bilski I),545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................... 10, 11, 12
In re Grams,888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989)..................................................................................................... 9
Le Roy v. Tatham,55 U.S. 156 (1852) ...................................................................................................................... 1
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................. 14
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) ........................................................................................................ 6, 7, 9
Medtrica Solutions, Ltd. v. Cygnus Med., LLC,No. C12-538RSL, slip op., 2012 WL 5726799 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2012) ......................... 15
Nazomi Commc’n, Inc. v. Nokia Corp.,No. 10-CV-4686, 2011 WL 2837401 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) .............................................. 14
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,No. C-12-1233 EMC, 2012 WL 3985118 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012).................................. 5, 11
Pac. Biosci. Labs., Inc. v. Nutra Luxe MD, LLC,No. C10-0230 JLR (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2011 Order) .............................................................. 13
Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington,51 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1995)....................................................................................................... 5
Vacation Exh., LLC v. Wyndham Exch. & Rentals, Inc.,No. 12-04229 RGK (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012)............................................................. 6
Wistron Corp. v. Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC,No. C-10-4458 EMC, 2011 WL 4079231 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2011)...................................... 14
STATUTES
35 U.S.C. § 101........................................................................................................................... 1, 6
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P.Rule 12(b)(6)........................................................................................................................5Rule 8 ...................................................................................................................................2
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 4 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 1Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Zillow, Inc. (“Zillow”) and defendant Trulia, Inc. (“Trulia”) both run real estate
information websites. Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3. Days after Trulia commenced the “roadshow” for its
initial public offering to begin marketing its stock to investors, Zillow filed the subject complaint
against Trulia. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Zillow seeks damages and an injunction—based on a feature
that had been on Trulia’s website for over a year—that allows homeowners to enter information
about their homes to better value their homes. Dkt. No. 1 at 3, 5, 7. Zillow claims to own this
business method and has claimed it in the asserted U.S. Patent No. 7,970,674 B2 (“the ’674
patent”). Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Because the business method claimed in the ’674 patent is
unpatentable, Zillow’s complaint should be dismissed.
Abstract ideas and principles are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). The Supreme Court has reiterated this time and time again, in
the seminal cases of Benson, Flook, Bilski, and most recently, in Mayo. An abstract idea is
exactly, and exclusively, what is claimed in the ’674 patent. The ’674 patent claims the abstract
idea of allowing a homeowner to adjust information about a home, such as correcting the number
of bedrooms or bathrooms, and the calculation and display of a refined valuation based on the
adjusted information. The claims at issue do not limit the manner in which the information is
obtained or even the method used for calculating the refined valuation.
Asking a homeowner for information about the home and using it to refine a valuation
consists entirely of mental processes, which the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have
maintained do not meet the eligibility requirements of Section 101. The claims’ incidental use of
a computer or recitation of “a computer readable medium” does not convert them into patentable
material. This is especially true where, as here, the steps of the claim—displaying, obtaining,
and generating information—are routine and conventional and do not represent “an inventive
concept.” For the reasons set forth below, the ’674 patent is not eligible under Section 101.
Accordingly, Trulia respectfully moves the Court to dismiss Zillow’s complaint for infringement
with prejudice.
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 5 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 2Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
Trulia further moves the Court to dismiss the complaint’s allegations of indirect
infringement as to the ’674 patent for falling far short of the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon which the Supreme Court elaborated in the seminal
cases of Iqbal and Twombly. Zillow’s complaint fails to make even insufficient “threadbare
recitations” of any of the elements necessary to state a claim for contributory or induced
infringement.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2012, Trulia commenced the process to become a public company. Dkt.
No. 1 at 5. On September 7, 2012, Trulia commenced the “roadshow” for its initial public
offering to begin marketing its stock to investors, and, on September 12, Zillow filed the subject
complaint against Trulia. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Zillow’s complaint against Trulia alleges
infringement of the ’674 patent, entitled “Automatically Determining a Current Value for a Real
Estate Property, Such as a Home, that is Tailored to Input from a Human User, Such as its
Owner.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 (the ’674 patent). The ’674 patent was filed on February
3, 2006, and issued over five years later on June 28, 2011. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1. It purports to claim
a “new approach to valuing homes that [is] responsive to owner input, as well as having a high
level of accuracy, and being inexpensive and convenient.” ’674 patent at 1:53-56. The accused
Trulia Estimates feature launched over a year prior to Zillow’s complaint. Dkt. No. 1 at 3.
The ’674 patent recites 40 claims. Claims 1, 2, and 15 are the only independent claims.
This motion concerns each independent claim and their respective dependent claims.
Claim 15 recites:
15. A method in a computing system for refining an automatic valuation of adistinguished home based upon input from a user knowledgeable about thedistinguished home, comprising:(a) obtaining user input adjusting at least one aspect of information about the
distinguished home used in the automatic valuation of the distinguished home;(b) automatically determining a refined valuation of the distinguished home that
is based on the adjustment of the obtained user input; and(c) presenting the refined valuation of the distinguished home.
’674 patent at 21:49-59.
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 6 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 3Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
Although including a “computer readable medium,” claim 2 essentially recites the same
underlying method as claim 15:
2. A computer readable medium for storing contents that causes a computingsystem to perform a method for procuring information about a distinguishedproperty from its owner that is usable to refine an automatic valuation of thedistinguished property, the method comprising:(a) displaying at least a portion of information about the distinguished property
used in the automatic valuation of the distinguished property;(b) obtaining user input from the owner adjusting at least one aspect of
information about the distinguished property used in the automatic valuationof the distinguished property; and
(c) displaying to the owner a refined valuation of the distinguished property thatis based on the adjustment of the obtained user input.
’674 patent at 20:18-32.
Finally, although claim 1 is much longer than claims 2 and 15, it adds no patentable
subject matter. Indeed, it merely repeats slight variations of the unpatentable steps of claim 15
over and over again.
1. A method in a computing system for automatically determining a valuation fora subject home in response to input from an owner of the home, comprising:(a) presenting a display that includes an indication of a first valuation determined
for the subject home and indications of attributes of the subject home used inthe determination, the indicated valuation being determined by applying tothe indicated attributes a geographically-specific home valuation model isbased upon a plurality of homes near the subject home recently sold;
(b) presenting a display that solicits input from the owner that updates one ormore of the indicated attributes;
(c) receiving first input from the owner that updates one or more of the indicatedattributes;
(d) applying the geographically-specific home valuation model to attributes ofthe subject home as updated by the first input to determine and display asecond valuation for the subject home;
(e) presenting a display that solicits input from the owner that identifies the type,cost, and timing of one or more home improvements performed on thesubject home;
(f) receiving second input from the owner that identifies the type, cost, andtiming of one or more home improvements performed on the subject home;
(g) using the second input to determine and display (a) a present value of theidentified home improvements and (b) a third valuation that takes intoaccount the present value of the identified home improvements;
(h) presenting a display that solicits input from the owner that identifies otherassets or liabilities of the subject home and the value attributed to them by theowner;
(i) receiving third input from the owner that identifies other aspects of thesubject home affecting its value and the value attributed to them by theowner;
(j) determining a valuation adjustment corresponding to the identified aspects;
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 7 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 4Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
(k) displaying a fourth valuation that takes into account the determined valuationadjustment corresponding to the identified aspects;
(l) presenting a display that solicits input from the owner that identifies homesnear the subject home that the owner regards as similar to the subject home;
(m) receiving fourth input from the owner that identifies homes near the subjecthome recently sold that the owner regards as similar to the subject home;
(n) using the fourth input to generate a tailored geographically-specific homevaluation model that (1) is based upon a plurality of homes near the subjecthome recently sold that is a superset of the homes identified by the fourth
input, but (2) places special emphasis on the homes identified by the fourthinput;
(o) applying by a computer the tailored valuation model to the updated attributesof the subject home to obtain a fifth valuation of the subject home; and
(p) displaying the fifth valuation based on the application of the tailoredvaluation model.
’674 patent at 19:29-67.
In the specification, the ’674 patent acknowledges that “[a] variety of conventional
approaches exist for valuing homes,” such as relying upon recent selling prices and professional
appraisals. ’674 patent at 1:24-51. It also recognizes that it is possible to design systems that
automatically value houses, but notes that such automatic valuations “would generally be
performed based upon the contents of a public database, and without input from each home’s
owner or other information not in the public database.” Id. at 1:45-49. Such systems, according
to the ’674 patent, fail to consider owner input and as a result, may be inaccurate. Thus, the
invention claimed in the ’674 patent is the idea of allowing a homeowner to input information
about a house that is considered in the valuation of the property. Id. at 1:45-56. This owner-
provided information is then considered in a refined valuation of the home. Id. at 3:18-22.
Zillow’s complaint purports to allege both direct and indirect infringement by Trulia.
However, the allegations of indirect infringement fail to include the necessary factual elements.
Indeed, the entirety of Zillow’s indirect infringement claims allege:
Trulia has infringed and continues to infringe the ’674 patent by its use of, forexample, the Trulia Estimate feature, and by Trulia’s contributing to the use of,and inducement of others to use, infringing features and services. Under 35U.S.C. § 271, Trulia is liable for its infringement of the ’674 patent.
Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 19.
Based on the legal insufficiencies of the complaint, Trulia now moves for dismissal.
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 8 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 5Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
III. ZILLOW’S COMPLAINT FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BEDISMISSED.
A. Legal Standards
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss based on
the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged. See
Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court has held that a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter “to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citations
omitted). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 557). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Whether a claim recites patent-eligible subject matter is a question of law. See
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, district courts have
dismissed complaints for patent infringement upon a finding that the asserted patents do not meet
the patent eligibility requirements of Section 101.1 See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., No. C-12-1233 EMC, 2012 WL 3985118, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) (granting
1 As recently confirmed by the Federal Circuit, claim construction is not a prerequisite to adetermination of subject matter eligibility under § 101. See Bancorp Servs. L.L.C., v. Sun LifeAssurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (recognizing that theCourt “has never set forth a bright line rule requiring district courts to construe claims beforedetermining subject matter”).
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 9 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 6Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
motion to dismiss under § 101 where patent claimed “an automatic pricing method and apparatus
for use in electronic commerce environments”); Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., No.
09-4252 (FSH), 2011 WL 1870591, at *4-5 (D.N.J. May 16, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss
under § 101 where patent claimed a system for processing information from a template file to an
application program); Vacation Exh., LLC v. Wyndham Exch. & Rentals, Inc., No. 12-04229
RGK (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012, Order) (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) (granting motion
to dismiss under § 101 for a patent that discloses a method and system for allowing a user to
automatically and electronically trade timeshare properties by communicating with a central
computer system that has access to a database).
B. Because the ’674 Patent Claims Do Not Satisfy the Eligibility Requirementsof Section 101, Zillow’s Complaint Should be Dismissed.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has long held that there are three specific
exceptions to this provision: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
In Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218, the Supreme Court considered a petitioner’s attempt to patent a
procedure for instructing buyers and sellers how to protect against the risk of price fluctuations
in a discrete section of the economy. Id. at 3230-31. Noting that the patent essentially claimed a
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk, which is a “fundamental economic practice,”
the Court held that allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would “effectively grant a
monopoly over an abstract idea” and found the application unpatentable. Id. at 3231.
/ / /
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 7Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
Tel: (206) 883-2500 / Fax: (206) 883-2699
Recently in Mayo, the Supreme Court explained that “to transform an unpatentable
[abstract idea] into a patent-eligible application of such [idea], one must do more than simply
state the [idea] while adding the words ‘apply it.’” Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at
1294 (finding a method for the use of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune disease
not patent-eligible where the steps “involve well-understood routine, conventional activity
previously engaged in by researchers in the field”) (emphasis added). To be eligible, the patent
must “contain other elements or combinations of elements, sometimes referred to as an
‘inventive concept.” Id. at 1294. Simply adding “steps in the claimed process” that “involve
well-understood, routine, conventional activity” is insufficient. Id. Nor can “the prohibition
against patenting abstract ideas ‘[] be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” Bilski,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-2 (1981)).
Further, “methods which can be performed mentally, or which are the equivalent of
human mental work, are unpatentable abstract ideas—the ‘basic tools of scientific and
technological work’ that are open to all.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371 (quoting Benson, 409
U.S. at 67). An invention that “simply provided a new and presumably better method for
calculating alarm limit values,” but could still be made with a pencil and paper is not patent
eligible under Section 101. Flook, 437 U.S. at 584. Even a method of programming a general-
purpose computer to convert binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary through the use of a
mathematical algorithm was deemed unpatentable because such conversion, while complicated,
“can be done mentally” and without the use of a computer. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
The Federal Circuit has also held an invention to be unpatentable if the “method steps can
be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d
at 1372. “Such a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract
idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101. Methods which can be performed entirely in the
human mind are unpatentable not because there is anything wrong with claiming mental steps as
part of a process containing non-mental steps but rather because computational methods which
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701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
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can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the ‘basic
tools of scientific and technological work’ that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.” Id. at 1373 (emphasis added).
1. The ’674 Patent Claims Unpatentable Abstract Ideas.
The ’674 patent involves the “fundamental practice” of assessing the value of real
property, and claims the abstract idea of allowing a homeowner to adjust information regarding a
house that is subsequently factored into a refined valuation of the home.2 Simply reciting the use
of a general computer to perform the routine and conventional step of allowing a homeowner to
input information regarding a home, the ’674 patent contains no “inventive concept” that would
render the claims patent-eligible. Indeed, the patent claims are indistinguishable from abstract
ideas previously rejected by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. See Benson, 409 U.S. at
67 (method of programming a general purpose computer to convert binary-coded decimal
numbers into pure binary through the use of a mathematical algorithm was not patent eligible);
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370 (method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction
over the Internet was not patent eligible); Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1317 (a computer-aided
method and system for processing credit applications over electronic networks was unpatentable
abstract idea); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1277-78 (system for administering and tracking the
value of separate-account life insurance policies not patent eligible); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am.
Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (patent describing an investment tool
designed to enable property owners to buy and sell properties without incurring tax liabilities not
eligible under § 101); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting-in-part) (noting that if Bilski had been decided prior to the trial,
the district court have resolved the case under § 101 and finding system in which a user enters
2 Although reciting a “computer readable medium,” independent claim 2 (and its dependentclaims) should be subject to the same scrutiny for purposes of determining eligibility under§ 101. “[A] claim directed to a ‘computer readable medium,’ despite its format, should betreated no differently from the comparable process claims held to be patent ineligible under§ 101.” Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1276.
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701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
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data regarding a patient’s symptoms and a computer generates a list of possible diseases or
conditions was not patent eligible).
2. The Claimed Routine and Conventional Steps Do Not Render theAbstract Ideas and Mental Processes Patentable.
In the context of this precedent, there can be no doubt that the steps of presenting and
inputting information, and even the more “complicated” step of calculating a valuation of a
home, can be performed mentally and “with a pencil and paper.” Indeed, it is beyond dispute
that the valuations of a home can and have in the past been performed entirely by the human
mind. That the steps claimed in the ’674 patent can be performed mentally further demonstrates
that the claims are unpatentable abstract ideas. Further, simply adding “steps in the claimed
process” that “involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity” is insufficient to render
an abstract idea patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294. Each of the steps of
the ’674 patent claims comprise such routine and conventional activity: (a) presenting or
displaying information about the property; (b) obtaining adjusted information from the owner
about the property; (c) automatically determining a refined valuation based upon the input from
the owner; and (d) presenting or displaying the refined valuation to the owner. The ’674 patent’s
steps are precisely the type that the Federal Circuit has found to be ineligible.
The steps of displaying or presenting information used in a valuation do not render the
’674 patent-eligible. Similarly routine steps such as receiving and forwarding data have
previously been found to “not ‘impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.’” Dealertrack,
674 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Bilski I, 545 F.3d at 961-62). Likewise, the claimed step of obtaining
information about a home from the owner is not a meaningful limitation. In CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1370, the Federal Circuit considered “a method for verifying the validity of a credit card
transaction over the Internet,” which required one to “obtain and compare intangible data
pertinent to business risks.” The Court found that the “mere collection and organization of data
regarding credit card numbers” cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 13 of 21
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In Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1279-80, the claimed steps included determining values
and then storing, removing, and/or accumulating those values in managing a stable value
protected life insurance policy. The Court determined that performing calculations and
manipulating the results of the values—similar to what is claimed in the ’674 patent—were
ineligible subject matter. Id. That the method claimed in the ’674 patent is limited to the real
estate market makes no difference. The Federal Circuit rejected the idea that the limited use to
the life insurance market saves the claim, noting that “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use
or adding token post-solution components did not make the concept patentable.” Id. at 1280
(citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231). The steps of the claimed method do not impose a meaningful
limitation that would render the ’674 claims patentable.
3. The ’674 Patent Claims Fail the Machine-or-Transformation Test.
Though not dispositive, the machine-or-transformation test is nevertheless “a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are
processes under § 101.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. In Bilski, the Federal Circuit held that a
claimed process would only be patent-eligible under Section 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus; or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. In re
Bilski (Bilski I), 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Application of the machine-or-
transformation test to the ’674 claims further demonstrates that they are not patent-eligible.
a. The ’674 Patent Claims Fail the Machine Prong.
The methods claimed in the ’674 patent fail to identify a specific machine. In fact, the
’674 specification confirms that no specific machine is required. Rather, the specification
describes the invention as “[a] software facility for automatically determining a current value for
a home or other property is tailored to input from its owner or another user (‘the facility’) is
described.” ’674 patent at 2:57-59. Figure 1 illustrates that any general computer can be used to
practice the claimed method, and the specification lists typical components including: a central
processing unit, a computer memory, a storage device such as a hard drive, a computer-readable
media drive such as a CD-ROM, and a network connection such as the internet. ’674 patent at
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4:25-46 (“computer systems configured as described above are typically used to support the
operation of the facility”); Figure 1. This list of general components found on any computer
does not tie the ’674 patent to a particular machine. “[M]erely identifying general ‘machine
elements’ does not satisfy the [machine-or-transformation test]; were that so virtually any use of
devices beyond the human body for a claimed method would satisfy the test.” OIP Techs., 2012
WL 3985118, at *13.
Nor do the ’674 patent claims “impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.” See
Bilski I, 545 F.3d at 961; CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1369. Although claim 2 recites “a computer
readable medium for storing contents that causes a computing system to perform a method for
procuring information about a distinguished property from its owner,” and claims 1 and 15
require “a method in a computing system,” the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held such
incidental use of a computer to be insufficient to satisfy the machine prong. “[T]he use of a
computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its basic function—making
calculations or computations—fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas
and mental processes.” Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278.
“To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the
claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or
computations could not.” Id. (“the performance of repetitive calculations” does not impose
meaningful limits on the claims). The machine must play a significant part in permitting the
claimed method to be performed. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (finding the computer
readable medium limitation unpatentable under § 101). Merely reciting a “computer readable
medium” for performing the claimed method does not render the claim patentable. “[T]he basic
character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea is not changed by claiming only its
performance by computers, or by claiming the process embodied in program instructions on a
computer readable medium. Thus, merely claiming a software implementation of a purely
mental process that could otherwise be performed without the use of a computer does not satisfy
the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test.” Id.
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 12Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
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Where, as here, the claims do not “specify how the computer hardware and database are
specially programmed to perform the steps claimed in the patent,” the patent is ineligible under
Section 101. See Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333. Like the patent at issue in Dealertrack, the
’674 patent’s “claims are silent as to how a computer aids the method, the extent to which a
computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method.”
Id. Moreover, “[b]ecause the computer here ‘can be programmed to perform very different tasks
in very different ways,’ it does not ‘play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be
performed.’” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the ’674 patent fails the machine prong of the test.
b. The ’674 Patent Claims Fail the Transformation Prong.
Nor do the ’674 claims transform a physical object or substance, or something
representing a physical object or substance, into a different state or thing. See Bilski I, 545 F.3d
at 963. “Purported transformation or manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations
or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because they are
not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or
substances.” Id. “The mere manipulation or reorganization of data, however, does not satisfy
the transformation prong.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375. Manipulation of information is
precisely what the ’674 patent claims and, as in Bilski, does not effect a transformation.
The ’674 patent does not meet the eligibility requirements of Section 101; therefore, the
complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
C. Alternatively, Trulia Requests a Stay Pending the Federal Circuit’sEn Banc Ruling in CLS Bank.
Trulia believes the Court should rule in its favor on the instant motion to dismiss
irrespective of the outcome of the Federal Circuit’s upcoming rehearing en banc in CLS Bank
Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated, scheduled for February 8,
2013. Specifically, CLS Bank should not affect the outcome here because, in CLS Bank, the
computer limitations played a far more significant role in the performance of a far more specific
application of an inventive concept than that at issue here. CLS Bank Int’l, 685 F.3d at 1355
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 16 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 13Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
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(claims cover computer-implemented steps of exchanging obligations maintained at an exchange
institution by creating electronically maintained shadow credit and shadow debit records).
Nonetheless, the questions presented in CLS Bank are:
a. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implementedinvention is a patent ineligible “abstract idea”; and when, if ever, does thepresence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?
b. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as amethod, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times beconsidered equivalent for § 101 purposes?
Trulia recognizes that the Court may believe that the rehearing en banc will impact its
determination of the present motion or provide guidance useful to the present motion. Should
the Court so believe, Trulia requests that the Court defer resolution of the present motion and
stay the case pending the Federal Circuit’s ruling. See e.g., Pac. Biosci. Labs., Inc. v. Nutra Luxe
MD, LLC, No. C10-0230 JLR (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2011, Order) (analogous situation granting
motion to stay pending reexamination due, in part, to potentially significant impact of
reexamination on case).
D. The Indirect Infringement Claims Must Be Dismissed for Failure to Meet thePleading Requirements of Rule 8.
The sum total of Zillow’s pleading related to indirect infringement constitutes a
conclusory mention in paragraph 19 of the complaint that “Trulia has infringed and continues to
infringe the ’674 Patent by its use of, for example, the Trulia Estimatefeature, [sic] and by
Trulia’s contributing to the use of, and inducement of others to use, infringing features and
services” and a similar conclusory mention of indirect infringement in its Prayer for Relief. Dkt.
No. 1 at 6-7. Zillow’s allegations of indirect infringement should, therefore, also be dismissed
for their failure to make even threadbare recitations of the elements required to support
contributory and induced infringement.
To state a claim for inducement, a plaintiff must establish “first that there has been direct
infringement, and second that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 14Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
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possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.” Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm
Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 697-98 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (“Accordingly, we now hold that induced
infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement.”). “In order to succeed on a claim of contributory infringement, in addition to
proving an act of direct infringement, plaintiff must show that defendant ‘knew that the
combination for which its components were especially made was both patented and infringing’
and that defendant’s components have ‘no substantial non-infringing uses.’” Lucent Techs., Inc.
v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Zillow failed to plead any of the elements required to state a claim for contributory or
induced infringement. The absence of even a single element warrants dismissal. See Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949. Zillow’s multiple omissions require dismissal.
1. Zillow Pled No Factual Allegations Regarding Knowledge and Intent.
For both inducement and contributory infringement, the complaint must allege
knowledge of the patent and specific intent. See Global-Tech Appliances, 131 S. Ct. at 2068;
Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1320. Zillow’s complaint is completely silent, and fails to allege even
conclusory allegations of knowledge, for which Courts in this Circuit have routinely dismissed
indirect infringement claims. See, e.g., Emblaze Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. C 11-01079 SBA, slip
op., 2012 WL 5940782, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) (dismissing indirect infringement claims
where complaint was “devoid of any allegations alleging how [defendant] actively induced
infringement with knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement”); Wistron
Corp. v. Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC, No. C-10-4458 EMC, 2011 WL 4079231, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (dismissing indirect infringement claims and noting that “[p]ost-Twombly
and Iqbal, courts have typically rejected conclusory allegations of knowledge”); Nazomi
Commc’n, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. 10-CV-4686, 2011 WL 2837401, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14,
2011) (dismissing claim for inducement where plaintiff failed to “allege specific facts” to
support the conclusory allegations that defendant “actively and knowingly induced”).
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 15Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
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2. Zillow Pled No Factual Allegations Regarding Direct Infringement bya Third Party.
Claims for induced infringement and contributory infringement cannot exist in the
absence of direct infringement by third parties. See Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
342 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Zillow’s failure to allege direct infringement by any third
party therefore provides a separate, independent ground for dismissal. See Emblaze Ltd., 2012
WL 5940782, at *7 (dismissing indirect infringement claims where complaint “failed to allege
facts plausibly showing direct infringement by any third party”); Halton Co. v. Streivor, Inc., No.
C 10-00655 WHA, 2010 WL 2077203, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (dismissing indirect
infringement claims where “no entity other than defendant has been accused of directly
infringing” the asserted patent) (emphasis added).
3. Zillow Pled No Factual Allegations That Trulia’s Products WereEspecially Designed for Infringing Use.
Finally, Zillow’s contributory infringement claim should be dismissed “in the complete
absence of allegations [] that [the accused product] is a component of a patented invention, or
that the component has no substantial noninfringing use.” Medtrica Solutions, Ltd. v. Cygnus
Med., LLC, No. C12-538RSL, slip op., 2012 WL 5726799, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2012);
see also Emblaze Ltd., 2012 WL 5940782, at *7 (granting dismissal where plaintiff failed to
allege that no substantial non-infringing uses); Halton Co., 2010 WL 2077203, at *2 (complaint
failed to state a claim for contributory infringement where there was “no allegation by plaintiff
that the accused . . . product was a ‘component of a patented machine . . . constituting a material
part of the [patented] invention’ or that the accused product was not capable of ‘substantial
noninfringing use’”).
In sum, Zillow’s complaint makes no attempt to plead any of the elements necessary to
state a claim for contributory and induced infringement—it pleads nothing relating to knowledge
of the patent and intent to infringe, nothing relating to direct infringement by a third party, and
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 19 of 21
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 16Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
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701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036
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nothing related to a lack of noninfringing use. Lacking each and every required element,
Zillow’s indirect infringement claims should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Trulia respectfully requests that the Court grant its
motion to dismiss.
Dated: December 19, 2012
Stefani E. Shanberg, Pro Hac ViceJennifer J. Schmidt, Pro Hac ViceWILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATIProfessional CorporationOne Market PlazaSpear Street Tower, Suite 3300San Francisco, California 94105Telephone: (415) 947-2000Facsimile: (415) 947-2099Email: [email protected]
Barry M. Kaplan, WSBA #8661WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATIProfessional Corporation701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100Seattle, Washington 98104-7036Telephone: (206) 883-2500Facsimile: (206) 883-2699Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for DefendantTRULIA, INC.
/s/ Stefani E. Shanberg
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTFOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT – Page 17Case No. 2:12-cv-01549-JLR
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 19, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to counsel of record.
Stefani E. Shanberg/s/ Stefani E. Shanberg
Case 2:12-cv-01549-JLR Document 19 Filed 12/19/12 Page 21 of 21