Trophy Hunting: The Tuli Safari Circle in Zimbabwe

© Kamla-Raj 2014 J Hum Ecol, 45(3): 257-268 (2014)

Address for correspondence:Dr. Dan DarkeyDepartment of Geography,Geoinformatics and Meteorology,University of Pretoria,Pretoria, 0002, South Africa.Phone: +27 12 420 3710.Mobile: +27 828526782. Fax: +27 420 6385E-mail: [email protected]

Trophy Hunting: The Tuli Safari Circle in ZimbabweDan Darkey and Patrick Alexander

Department of Geography, Geoinformatics and Meteorology,University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 0002, South Africa

KEYWORDS Wildlife Management. Stakeholders. Sustainability. Environmental Perceptions

ABSTRACT Trophy hunting is a controversial activity which takes place in a contested socio-economic andnatural-wildlife environment. The contestations revolve around issues of development, conservation, sustainability,ownership and distribution of resources. An investigation of stakeholders’ perceptions on these issues, within thedevelopmental agenda of Zimbabwe, is the main aim of the study. Through a series of stakeholder interviews it isconcluded that whilst local people prioritize the making of economic gains from their environmental resources,government officials and the National Parks authority are more concerned with environmental protection andsustainability. The game farmer or concession holder’s priorities are mainly sustainability and profit and theclients’ primary objective is to derive satisfaction from hunting down a worthy trophy. In practice, the differencesand similarities in environmental perceptions of stakeholders in the Tuli Safari Circle affect decision makingrealities in light of economic, developmental and sustainability issues. Whilst common perceptions a crossstakeholders could lead to effective policy making and achieve sustainability, balancing the diverse interests of thevarious stakeholders to the satisfaction of all remains a difficult objective.

INTRODUCTION

An investigation into the Tuli Hunting Safa-ri Block (THSB) provides a good example of theenvironmental and developmental paths alongwhich the trophy hunting industry has beenbearing since the 2008 establishment of a unitygovernment in Zimbabwe. The unity governmentmarked a shift in paradigm in the way environ-mental and socio-economic issues are ap-proached (Hanke 2008). It opened a new doorfor finding common ground between stakehold-ers’ perceptions and concerns and seeking un-derstanding and collaboration on these percep-tions - which would become crucial to makingeffective policy for a sustainable hunting indus-try. Hitherto, the harsh socio-economic condi-tions which plagued Zimbabwe, manifesting inthe lack of governmental capacity and hyperin-flation, coupled with a tense political atmo-sphere, prevented finding common grounds onenvironmental issues (Morolo 2004). These diresocio-economic and political conditions beganto change when Morgan Tsvangirai was swornin as a prime minister and Tendai Biti became the

new finance minister under the unity govern-ment between Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the Movementfor Democratic Change (MDC) parties in 2008.

An examination of the perceptions and val-ues of the stakeholders, as they contest socio-economic benefits with environmental sustain-ability motives, is the core aim of this research.The utilitarian (benefits for self) viewpoint andmoral (obligation toward other and the environ-ment) viewpoint are the dominant lenses throughwhich such perceptual tensions are contested(Konchack and Pascual 2006). Differences inperceptions and values will for instance deter-mine the extent to which, and how, the environ-ment by way of stock of trophy animals is con-sidered or utilized. In a country recovering fromyears of socio-political and economic instabilityit is expected that a heavy bias toward economicgrowth would exist thus leaving the environ-ment marginalized. It is thus important to inves-tigate the real-life tensions and compromises thatdetermine the processes, and implications tosociety, economics and environment, of trophyhunting in Zimbabwe.

Objectives

The study thus seeks to establish the corecontestants and the socio-economic, politicaland environment issues that constitute the con-tested agenda in the THSB; find out stakehold-er perceptions on these matters; unravel how

258 DAN DARKEY AND PATRICK ALEXANDER

decisions around trophy hunting are made and;establish the policy measures that affect thedecision making processes. In order to achievethese goals the following research questions arepertinent: What are the effects of Zimbabwe’s politi-

cal changes on the hunting industry? Is there sufficient stakeholder participation

in the hunting industry? What are the socio-economic and environ-

mental perceptions of stakeholders towardsthe Tuli Hunting Safari Block?

How are the tensions between environmen-tal conservation objectives and desires foreconomic gains being managed?

The study area – the Tuli Hunting SafariBlock - occupies a 416km² semi-circular piece ofland that extends into Botswana from Zimba-bwe (Fig. 1). The primary activity in the Tuli Sa-fari Block is trophy hunting, whereby a clientpays an agreed fee to hunt a specific ‘trophy’ –usually a lion. These clients hunt with a paidguide under the management of an ‘operator’who is the concession holder responsible formarketing the hunts and managing his staff

(Lindsey et al. 2007). The concession is grantedby the Zimbabwe National Parks Authority(ZNPA), who plays an oversight role (Baker 1997;Nelson et al. 2013).

There are four main groups of stakeholderswhose vested interests are important to deci-sions relating to trophy hunting in the Tuli Safa-ri Block. First are members of the Zimbabwe Na-tional Parks Wildlife Management (NPWM) whoset the hunting quotas and manage the stock ofanimals. Second is the concession holder whomanages the safari by marketing hunts to cli-ents. The third group of stakeholders is the lo-cal people - mainly communal residents includ-ing local staff who work in the park. Finally arethe clients or hunters, who pay to hunt and cre-ate the demand that keeps the system economi-cally viable. Because all these stakeholders haverelative vested interests in the Tuli Hunting Sa-fari Block, the area becomes a contested domainin terms of the environment, sustainability, andeconomics.

The research report is presented in four parts.Part one is the literature review which discussesthe various social and economic perceptions

Fig. 1. The location of the Tuli Safari Area (adapted from: Google Earth 2008)]

TROPHY HUNTING: THE TULI SAFARI CIRCLE IN ZIMBABWE 259

that have emerged in the environmental dis-course and the general paradigms in which theseperceptions are couched. Such a review providesa basis for understanding the broader social andeconomic context of the research. Part two de-scribes the study site and methodology em-ployed and also identifies the key stakeholdersin Tuli safari hunting business. Part three de-tails the stakeholder perceptions, pointing outthe similarities and differences in their perspec-tives to the hunting environment. Finally, afterthe relative perceptions of all the stakeholdersare considered, conclusions and recommenda-tions are made on promoting the interest of thestakeholders and ensuring environmental sus-tainability of the hunting industry in Zimbabwe.

Literature Review

Tensions between socio-economic prioriti-zation and environmental conservation measureshave always attracted policy debates and re-sulted in explanatory paradigm shifts (Nelson etal. 2013; Lindsey et al. 2013). Rachel Carson’s1962 book ‘Silent Spring’ is arguably the semi-nal work on the environmental effects of humanexploitation of natural resources (Carson 1962).Carson’s contention was that the unregulateduse of pesticides led to extreme negative effectson the environment, ecology and human health(Jegede 2001). Since then environmental issueshave become a dominant part of economic, so-cial and political policy making and implementa-tion. At the heart of most of these environmen-tal debates lie the tension between populationand consumption on the one hand and resourceconservation on the other (Jegede 2001).

Often, sustainable development takes ananthropocentric stance - a viewpoint which con-centrates on the interconnectedness betweennature and humans with humans playing an im-portant role by primarily transforming naturethrough resource usage (Feris 2008). Such aview contrasts with the bio-centric one - where-by the environment has value in itself. Humansmay not exploit these values except to satisfybasic needs (Feris 2008). With the current stateof Zimbabwe, it is expected that economic is-sues would take precedence over the environ-ment leading to a leaning towards an anthropo-centric stance. Within the ambit of market liber-alism, environmental sustainability could beachieved by combining development agenda

with strict environmental protection policy in-terventions (Pepper 1996). The ‘Porter Hypoth-esis’ which suggests that any hindrance to pro-duction that may occur as a result of complianceto environmental regulations can be compen-sated for by the innovations the policies maystimulate (Ambec et al. 2013; Kriechel and Ziese-mer 2009) comes into play. Indeed, technologyitself has proven to be essential in achievingenvironmental quality when combined with thehuman capacity to innovate (Konchack and Pas-cual 2006). Therefore policies themselves canform a catalyst for sustainability through inno-vation. Such a technocratic cum anthropocen-tric stance encourages the implementation ofgreen technologies for the benefit of people(Ambec et al. 2013). This is in contrast to the‘limits to growth’ paradigm which perceives tech-nology as a generator of environmental prob-lems (UNEP 2002).

Perceptions of the hunting industry in Afri-ca vary considerably (Nelson et al. 2013). How-ever, the world conservation union’s view of tro-phy hunting as a sustainable wildlife utilizationprocess (though not entirely hegemonic) appealsto many countries and communities. Within thisframework it is understood that incentives forconservation can be achieved through managedrecreational hunting (Mackay and Campbell2004; Linsey et al. 2012). The rationale behindtrophy hunting is that sustainability can beachieved through a low off-take and high prices(Lindsey et al. 2007).

A different perception is held by animal rightsgroups who consider hunting as unethical, un-sustainable and merely an ego booster (Mcgre-al 2001; Linsey et al. 2012). Evidence of the un-sustainability of hunting is found in Botswanawhere trophy lions have decreased rapidly dueto over utilization (Baker 1997). In many of thecountry’s hunting safaris most of the trophy(usually quality mature male lions) has been shot,however hunting continues due to the high prof-its that accrue to hunting operators. From theanimals’ right perspective is the argument thatrevenues can be generated from a non-consump-tive use of reserves, such as Tuli, by embarkingon photographic ecotourism (Lindsey et al.2007). A counter argument is that in many reallife situations ecotourism is more damaging tothe natural environment than hunting. High den-sities of photographic tourists leave a lastingimpact on the animals and habitats. These im-


pacts such as car tracks, noise and human over-population are not felt in the hunting areas wherelow densities of tourists create more revenuethan photographic ecotourism (Baldus 2009).Furthermore the hunting industry is more resis-tant to political instability and infrastructure in-adequacies. For instance, during the peak of Zim-babwe’s political turmoil and economic woestourism fell by 75% compared to a mere 12.2%drop in the hunting sector (Baker 1997).

Opposed to the non-consumptive use per-ception is the conundrum that without huntingin Africa few animals would survive (Lindsey etal. 2007; Nelson et al. 2013). The large revenuesgenerated by hunting provide the main incen-tive for wildlife conservation. In economic termsthe conservation of a piece of land (without hunt-ing) is outweighed by the opportunity cost ofan alternative usage. Indeed it is argued thatthere is no alternative means to raise enoughrevenue for wildlife conservation except throughhunting (Baldus 2009; Packer et al. 2011). Tanza-nia’s thriving trophy hunting industry bears tes-timony to how trophy hunting could substan-tially contribute to lion conservation, depend-ing on how it is managed (Packer et al. 2011).Hunting covers, on average, 90% of the incomein the Selous National Park in Tanzania (Baldus2009). As a result substantial revenues from hunt-ing accrue to anti-poaching, conservation andcommunity development and community en-gagement involves infrastructure building andskills development whilst surplus meat from thehunts is also distributed throughout adjacentcommunities.

A similar stance is in place in Zimbabwethrough the communal areas management pro-gram for indigenous resources (CAMPFIRE).Established in the 1980s through a success sto-ry involving the Shangaans on the fringes ofthe Gonarezhou national park, local communi-ties are permitted to sell hunting rights to pri-vate companies and derive direct economic ben-efit from conservation. Fifteen percent of theproceeds of hunting go towards rural districtcouncils who decide on how to spend this mon-ey. The proceeds can be allocated to individualhouseholds or community projects such asschools and clinics. The revenue is also direct-ed to local wildlife management (Mackay andCampbell 2004). As a result of these initiativesthe once environmentally hostile communitieshave changed their attitudes to a more preser-

vationist stance because they could derive ben-efit from doing so (Mackay and Campbell 2004).Once again an anthropocentric perspective istaken whereby the sustainable utilization of nat-ural resources is designed to benefit humans.

In the following section we take a brief lookat the study site, the Tuli Safari Circle, and ex-plain the methodology employed in solicitingthe opinions and perceptions of stakeholders.

STUDY SITE, STAKEHOLDERS ANDSTUDY METHODS

Tuli Hunting Safari Block (THSB), the studysite, is in the South Western part of Zimbabwe(see Fig. 1). Its boundary was demarcated whenthe original settlers, known as the ‘pioneers’,fired cannon balls across Zimbabwe into Botswa-na resulting in the 16 kilometer semi-circularboundary of the safari reserve (Capesa 2010).

Key stakeholders who form the populationof the study are the concession holders, nation-al parks managers and rangers, the clients (hunt-ers) and the local community. Representativesof these groups, based on convenience sam-pling, were selected and interviewed. Convenientand feasible, the non-randomness of the sampledoes not preclude generalization of the results(McBurney 2001). The mainly open-ended ques-tions were formulated to solicit the categoriza-tion of stakeholder perceptions on environmen-tal and socio-economic issues relating to hunt-ing in the Tuli Safari Circle. Furthermore detailedunstructured discussions were held with thestakeholder representatives on the related is-sues. In all of these the environmental laws andregulations of the hunting industry in Zimba-bwe were taken into account. For instance Sec-tion (4) of the Zimbabwean Environmental Man-agement Act (Ch 20: 27) No. 13 of 2002, whichoutlines environmental rights stipulates the rightof local communities to participate in the imple-mentation of legislation and policies to ensureequity and environmental quality (ZELA 2003).Such important bottom-up policy intensions weretaken into consideration in analyzing perceptionsand synthesizing the discussions.

Hunting Quotas and Stakeholders’ Perceptions

The central mechanism around which thesestakeholders converge is the hunting quota sys-tem. According to Mr. Capesa (senior ranger),


the quota system is designed by the Zimbabwenational park and wildlife management (NPWM),with the intension of flexibly accommodating thechanging animal populations in order to achievesustainability within the hunting industry (Cape-sa 2010). The rules of the quota system are how-ever set internationally by the convention oninternational trade in endangered species(CITES). As a signatory to CITES and in linewith section 87-96 of the country’s national en-vironmental plans (ZELA 2003), Zimbabwe al-lows the CITES secretariat to approve huntingquotas and to award tags for export purposes(Capesa 2010). The CITES secretariat grantshunting quotas on the basis that the huntingoff-take of a certain species will not be to thedetriment of the long term survival of that spe-cies (Baker 1997). In adopting a system of utili-zation without affecting the natural ecosystem,CITES encourages an eco-centric approach (Lin-denmayer and Burgman 2005). Both Mr Nyam-tora (manager of the quota system) and Mr Stry-dom, (concession holder) concur with CITES -pointing out that the role of the concession hold-er includes the identification of old non-produc-tive males of a species to be hunted by theirclients (Nyamtora 2010; Strydom 2010).

Quotas are set based on a number of param-eters including trophy quality, trophy size, lengthof time it takes to hunt a particular species, lat-est animal population trends and also animalpopulation growth rates (Nyamtora 2010). Re-search into animal population is conducted bythe scientific services unit of the parks and wild-life management board. According to Mr Bope,a manager of the NPWM, sometimes aerial sur-veys conducted by the World Wildlife Fund(WWF) in conjunction with animal sighting re-ports by park rangers assists in establishingpopulation trends (Bope 2010). Finally the utili-zation office issues quotas to the concessionowners only after the quota has been approvedby the chief ecologist of the scientific services(Nyamtora 2010).

The mechanism for setting quotas providesroom for stakeholder engagement. The NPWMholds annual workshops in local areas wherethe safari operator (concession holder), localcommunity and the rural district councils (RDC)provide information (from the perspective of theirrelative vested interests) into the quota system(Bope 2010). Firstly the safari operator willpresent information about the trophy size, tro-

phy quality and the duration of hunts and sug-gest an appropriate quota level. Secondly thelocal community will bring information on prob-lem animals in the area. For example, elephantsthat trample subsistence crops or lions that threat-en human safety in the area will be consideredproblem animals. If these problem animals areon the increase then there is a correspondingincrease in the quota for these animals. Thirdlythe rural district councils which keep record ofanimal population trends and the status of theenvironment will present these at the workshop(Bope 2010).

Clearly, it is important to distinguish anddelineate between the stakeholders and theirrelative environmental perceptions in order toestablish common grounds essential for demo-cratic policy making. Figure 2 illustrates how thevarious stakeholder perceptions lead to a con-tested environmental domain.

In the following section the views, roles andcontestations of the main stakeholders - theparks and wildlife management, the concessionholder, the local community and the clients - aredescribed. Also their positions on environmentand conservation as well as their priorities, whichstem from vested interests, are explored.

National Parks and WildlifeManagement (NPWM)

Interviews with three staff members of theNPWM namely: Mr. Nyamtora, the manger ofthe quota system at the park; Mr Capesa, thesenior ranger and; Mr. Bope, the Manager of theCAMPFIRE program, together with informationfrom the national parks and wildlife managementdocuments represent the views of the NPWMon the trophy hunting system at Tuli.

Fig. 2. Stakeholder perceptions and environmen-tal contestations in the THSB

NPWM- Economic incentives- Conservation and Sustainability

Concession Holder- Sustained benefits- Proper quota setting

Contested DomainCommon ground between vested interestsand perceptions

Local Communities- CAMPFIRE benefits.- Bottom up understanding

Hunter/Client- Utilitarian- Create demand and revenue for hunting


The NPWM documents state the vision ofthe organization as becoming a world leader insustainable conservation by managing efficient-ly and profitably the Zimbabwean wildlife heri-tage for present and future stakeholders throughsustainable utilization and delivery of qualityservices (ZPWM 2005). The mission statementexplicitly incentivizes conservation. Unlike pres-ervation which endeavors to maintain areas ofnature that are untouched by humans as theyare believed to hold intrinsic value independentof human and economic valuation (Hanley andBuchdahl 2002), the main objective of conserva-tion is to ensure that the benefits of biodiversitythat accrue to humans is fair and equitable bothfor present and future people (Lindenmayer andBurgman 2005). This is consistent with theBruntland Commission which conceived sus-tainable development as development that meetsthe needs of the present and future generationsethically (UNEP 2002).

Though the NPWM holds that the benefitsof the environment can persist into the future ifethically managed, the result of the 15th CITESconference of the parties held in Doha, Qatarconcluded that Zimbabwe needed rigorousadoption strategies to ensure sustainable utili-zation and conservation of biodiversity (CITES2009). This urge by the CITES COP15 was inlight of the unrestrained rhino poaching activi-ties across the country. A state of affairs whichhas jeopardized Zimbabwe’s position on CITESlists (Larson 2009). Therefore the NPWM mis-sion statement cannot be assumed to have fullcredibility as it has many challenges. Being thatas it may, the senior NPWM ranger at the Tulisafari circle who oversees the management ofthe area’s conservation believes that the NP-WM’s mission statement can be achievedthrough efficient management (Capesa 2010).

The senior ranger at Tuli hunting safari blockwho represents the national parks and wildlifemanagement board highlights the cultural valueof the area as an added incentive for its conser-vation (Capesa 2010). The Tuli block containsvarious historical sites dating from the earlyEuropean settlers. These include the pioneercemetery, the Fort Tuli, Simala ruins, over twothousand year old baobab trees with pioneersignatures and the ruins of the British SouthAfrican Police camp including a prison (Capesa2010). These cultural remnants are consideredworthy of conserving even though they are not

strictly part of the natural ecosystem. As ob-served by Soliva and Hunziker (2007), heritageconservation acknowledges the historical mi-lieu of the landscape. Therefore within the THSBan incentive for heritage orientated conserva-tion exists due to the presence of these histori-cal sites.

Furthermore, the parks and wildlife manage-ment board advertises these cultural attractionson their website (ZPWM 2005) and hence theincentive to conserve these historic sites maybe owed to the economic benefits they generatevia tourism. Heritage orientated conservationcan therefore have an economic rationale whichinterests the NPWM stakeholders. Being thatas it may, hunting remains the high revenue gen-erator, contributing 65% of the parks revenue.These economic incentives over the natural en-vironment, however, can be distorted if loosecontrol allows for the over-exploitation of wild-life resources by well-resourced hunters (Nyam-tora 2010).

Hunting also benefits the local community -in line with the view of the manager of theCAMPFIRE programme that local communitiesas custodians of natural resources should bethe primary beneficiaries of revenues generatedfrom these resources. In practice, 55% of CAMP-FIRE hunting revenues go to local communities(Bope 2010). However, Nyamtora, the managerof the quota system points to the mismanage-ment of funds allocated to the rural district coun-cils through the CAMPFIRE program as a threatto the sustainability of the area (Nyamtora 2010).He also considers members of the RDC respon-sible for poaching and urges for stricter controlin line with the COP15 position (CITES 2009).Contrarily the Manager of the CAMPFIRE pro-gram is of the opinion that environmental prob-lems were caused by ownership issues stem-ming from strict controls. Prior to the CAMP-FIRE programme in Zimbabwe, all wildlife be-longed to the state leaving local agencies andcommunities with a diminished role as environ-mental actions required authorization from thetop. CAMPFIRE eased conflict and created in-centives for local agencies and people engagedin sustainable utilization and conservation ofthe natural resources (Bope 2010).

Concession Holder

The main role of the concession holder orsafari operator is to market trophy hunting tours


to international clients. Often done at interna-tional hunting conventions, the concessionholder advertises large trophy animals such asold elephant bulls that are set on quota to po-tential clients (Lindsey et al. 2007). The conces-sion holder at the Tuli safari reserve (Mr. Stry-dom), is of the view that ‘in marketing huntingfuture generations must be considered as part-beneficiaries of wildlife’ (Strydom 2010) – a viewconsistent with the ideology of sustainable de-velopment. He however holds that the desire forpossible short term monetary gains is fueled bythe short five-year-lease that concession hold-ers have on safari areas in Zimbabwe. He there-fore suggests that longer leases be introducedso that one could invest more into the sustain-ability of the area by, for example, building damsand boreholes. These together with long termjob security of staff would create greater, longterm incentives for sustainability (Strydom 2010).On the contrary, the manager of the quota sys-tem at the NPWM head office perceives the 5year lease to be long enough to induce incen-tives for sustainability (Nyamdora 2010). Thisillustrates another perceptual difference betweenthese stakeholders.

Even sharper are the differences when itcomes to quota setting. Whilst the concessionholder insists that there are no lions in the Tulisafari block, the parks management had, on quo-ta, two lions to be hunted (in the 2008 huntingseason). At the end of the hunting season theconcession holder must pay a 30% concessionfee based on the quota issued for that seasoneven if the animals are not hunted – implyingthat the concession holder must pay the con-cession fee for the two lions on quota eventhough they may not exist within the safari area(Nyamtora 2010; Strydom 2010).

This illustrates how vested interests andmonetary incentives play a role in conservation.In this particular case the concession holdercontested the presence of the two lions on quo-ta, leading to the Limpopo predator researchgroup conducting a lion survey through the useof call up stations. No lions were detected atany of these points within the THSB (Funstonet al. 2009). The research group concluded thatno lion hunting should occur until populationsrecover to at least 20 in the greater MapungubweConservation area - providing an example of‘source and sink’ whereby animals repopulatebefore they are considered for hunting (Fun-

ston et al. 2009). Lions were thus taken off theTHSB hunting quota for a moratorium period(Capesa 2010) which suited the concession hold-er as the future benefits of lion hunting nowseem more likely (Strydom 2010).

Photographic safaris were suggested as analternative to hunting, however the concessionholder pointed out that photography could notgenerate adequate revenue to meet the needs ofall stakeholders including those of conserva-tion (Strydom 2010). Indeed national parks inAfrica are mostly underfunded, with tourismcontributing about 30% of the required funds(Baldus 2009). The NPWM also indicated thatwith Zimbabwe’s current situation of decliningtourist numbers, the hunting industry is vital forconservation to fund itself (Nyamtora 2010).Moreover, advocates of trophy hunting as ameans to conservation agree that hunting im-poses less damage on the environment and gen-erates higher revenues as fewer hunters, thanphotographic tourists who pay less per entryinto the wild, leave it more natural (Baker 1997).Other advantages that hunting has over photo-graphic tourism are that a hunter is worth 100tourists to the local economy due to the highprices of trophy hunts. Also some areas un-reachable or unsuitable for photographic tour-ism are ideal for trophy hunting which can in-crease revenue, benefit local communities andcontrol population of some species that over-populate and damage the environment (Baker1997).

Local Community

It has become common practice in many coun-tries to involve local people and integrate localconcerns and interest in environmental decisionmaking (Martello and Jasanoff 2004; Nelson etal. 2013). Such a bottom-up approach would, interms of the Tuli Safari Circle, involve the rural,local community adjacent to the THSB who fallunder the CAMPFIRE hunting system, as wellas staff members who live and work on a dailybasis within the case study area. Integrating theinterests of the local community requires an un-derstanding of local perceptions of trophy hunt-ing in the Tuli reserve.

Cloud, a local community member, blamesgovernment for neglecting people in the ruralareas in crafting and implementing environmen-tal management policy. However he also high-


lights overcrowding due to the cultural extend-ed family system as leading to environmentaldegradation (Cloud 2010). For an example hepoints to the situation whereby rural peoplearound Tuli would cut trees indiscriminately anddrag firewood along the ground worsening ero-sion. Some local community members, as stake-holders, also have issues with the CAMPFIREprogram. While some perceive it to be a suc-cess, others hold that governmental mismanage-ment has allowed problem animals such as ele-phants to destroy crop farms and provoke an-tagonism towards environmental conservation.

A local tracker (Ngibe) also fears that someof the game in the THSB (such as large ante-lopes) will soon run short because of over de-mand. Ngibe (2010) points to incorrect market-ing of animals which stems from the incentive ofgenerating revenue as the reason for the reduc-tion in the number of species such as Sable,Eland and Kudu. ‘Even though the numbers arereducing drastically normal quota setting con-tinues because some people are still makingmoney’, claims Ngibe (2010). Clearly, local stake-holders also identify with the problem of mis-management of game hunting. However, aspointed out by the tracker some members of thelocal community are sometimes part of the prob-lem. He pointed to locals who would rather poachwild game, and make a profit even after paying apoaching fine, if caught (Ngibe 2010). The campmanager on the other hand sympathizes withthe local people with the claim that the contextof the Zimbabwean economy causes environ-mental problems especially in areas such asTHSB, where rural people are marginalized bythe economy and are left with no other choicebut to exploit the natural resources availablewhich create unsustainable conditions (VanSchalkwyk 2010).

Hunter / Client

The hunters or clients are the people whocreate the demand for the hunting system. Inline with Baker (1997), they advocate a consump-tive use value for wildlife instead of preservingit in a way unbeneficial to community and coun-try. Two clients, Hay from Missouri and Whitleyfrom Texas, provide insights of how the huntersperceive the industry with its associated oppor-tunities and threats.

Hay comes annually to hunt at THSB which‘offers a quality experience with plenty of hunt-

ing opportunities’ because of the ‘relative abun-dance of wildlife compared to other hunting ar-eas in Zimbabwe’. He thinks that the major threatto the environment comes from local communi-ties who due to poverty and survival needspoach and use the environment unsustainably.‘For many, day to day survival takes precedenceover long term environmental concerns’ (Hay2010). He further suggests that the managementof wildlife should be done in such a way as toachieve an expanding resource base. He likenedthis to an example in his home state of Missouriwhere little or no deer existed due to poor man-agement of hunting in the 1950s and 1960s. Ef-fective, self-financed repopulation strategies andbetter management of hunting changed the sit-uation and today abundant wildlife exists to-gether with a thriving hunting industry (Hay2010). This was achieved through the USA’senvironmental regulations and the willingnessof large corporations to self-impose environmen-tal regulations over and above those that havebeen set out by the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) – what Eisner (2004) describes as‘corporate environmentalism’. Hay furtheropines that expanding the resource base is onlyachievable through a strict application of opera-tional laws. As is the case in the developed worldwhere the local municipalities are empowered toenforce environmental laws through punishmentand reward so should it be in Zimbabwe with therural development councils given authority topunish any lawbreakers on behalf of the state –which owns all wildlife (Hay 2010). Appropriateapplication of these laws could lead to the re-population of hunting areas, increasing huntingquotas and boosting the economy. Moreover, ifgreater numbers of wildlife can be hunted sus-tainably it could increase overall revenue throughelasticity of demand. On the contrary, if onlyone lion is set on quota due to dwindling num-bers, a high price is placed on the hunt. There-fore, if this lion is poached or migrates all stake-holders will lose a relatively large amount of rev-enue and utility value. However, if an expandingresource base is achieved then more lions canbe set on quota annually with less risk per lionhunt.

Whitley, who is a client from Texas, USAcomes to hunt in Africa ‘because it offers theultimate hunting experience with its trill and chal-lenge’. He perceives his hunting efforts as notonly offering personal satisfaction but also con-


tributing to the local economy and to conserva-tion. He sees his hunting payments as contribu-tions to these ends though he admits that hedoes not fully understand how the hunting quotasystem works in Zimbabwe (Whitley 2010). Healso claims that by ‘hunting only older trophymales of the chosen species [he] helps in ensur-ing a role in the ecosystem for stronger andyounger males’. These older trophy animals arepicked by the concession holder based on theirperceived suitability for hunting as they offer aconsumptive use value. The system of huntingonly older game has allowed some species pop-ulations to grow even whilst being hunted in aspecific area (Baker 1997).

Whitley suggests that environmental prob-lems are caused through commercialization andgreed. However, through state and private man-agement together with well-meaning leadership,quality hunting can be achieved. He based hisopinion on the hunting trends he experienced inTexas, throughout his life, where strong legisla-tion and high standards led to sustainability -especially in the case of the popular white-tailed-deer (Whitley 2010).

Finding Common Grounds in StakeholderPerceptions: Theory and Practice

Mismanagement of the hunting quota sys-tem, leading to environmental issues, is high-lighted by all stakeholders. The quota systemaims for sustainability of trophy hunting yet, itprovides incentives for unsustainable social andenvironmental behaviour in the Tuli area (Cape-sa 2010; Strydom 2010; Ngibe 2010). For exam-ple, it is easier and cheaper to poach for survivaland profit even after paying a poaching fine; thefine for rhino poaching is approximatelyUS$120 000, however this is not an effectivepoaching disincentive as the profit from a pairof rhino horns offsets this cost (African Hunter2010). Though international pressure resultedin the re-instatement of a five year obligatory jailterm for poachers, in practice the application ofthis law is influenced by politics - with someclaiming that the length of jail term imposed de-pends on the political party of the poacher (Af-rican Hunter 2010).

Stakeholders commonly hold the conserva-tionist view that sustainability can be achievedthrough the effective management and enforce-ment of the hunting quota system. By giving

economic value to the animals to be hunted, thisanthropocentric point of view, suggests that thelikelihood of humans destroying the environ-ment is reduced by the economic incentive tomaintain the ecosystems (Badenhorst 2004). Thecontrary preservationist school of thought as-sumes that all human actions inevitably harmthe environment; therefore the environmentneeds to be protected from human interference(Marsh 2002). But as pointed out by Badenhorst(2004) the preservationist point of view doesnot offer solid solutions to environmental is-sues within the underdeveloped African social,economic and environmental context. It appearsthat the stakeholders are well aware of the im-practicability of the preservationist perspectiveparticularly in light of the dire socio-economicconditions of rural Zimbabwe.

The common view that wildlife has a usefulfunction is a utilitarian view (Badenhorst 2004).This falls within the economic framework of thehunting quota system as incentives exist for theusage and consumption of this resource. Forexample, the suggestion that the area be utilizedfor photographic safari, preservation viewpoint,did not materialize because the stakeholders allhave a conservationist perception (Strydom2010; Capesa 2010; Nyamtora 2010). A percep-tions fuelled by the rational economic incentivesthat underlie the hunting quota system. For ex-ample, the concession holder of the THSB un-derstands that if the area was a photographicsafari area it would not generate enough reve-nue leading to the loss of social, economic andenvironmental sustainability (Strydom 2010).The NPWM also relies on the hunting industryfor 65% of the revenue needed to achieve itsconservation goals (Nyamtora 2010).

Baldus (2009) asserts that wildlife in Africacan survive without hunting, however, not with-out money. By advocating for a market liberalapproach, the stakeholders are pragmaticallyopting for the most effective approach to achiev-ing social, economic and environmental stabili-ty (Strydom 2010; Capesa 2010; Nyamtora 2010).The market approach to wildlife managementcould establish maximum sustainable yields ofanimal populations by considering the vital sta-tistics of species’ population such as net pro-ductive rates, survivorship rates, fecundity rates,death rates and carrying capacity, which are ac-quired from field observations, to calculate thepopulation growth rates (Gibbs, undated). This


information will indicate how many individualsof a certain species can be harvested withoutreducing the overall population growth rates andtherefore becomes vital in quota setting. Theconsideration of these fundamental ecosystemprocesses within the quota setting system hasbeen identified by the local tracker who identi-fies population dynamics as the most importantelement pertinent to quota setting (Ngibe 2010).Thus liberal market oriented measures and poli-cy processes should take into account popula-tion dynamics and ecosystem processes in or-der to achieve sustainability.

Within this case study it is important to con-sider the economic context in which Zimbabwefinds itself especially when considering the com-mon economic incentives of the stakeholders.The new development regime in Zimbabwe hascreated incentives for industrialization (Time2009). Some market liberal perspectives wouldencourage a ‘grow first, clean up later approach’.This perception understands that environmen-tal quality will initially deteriorate with econom-ic growth and industrialization until per capitaincome reaches a certain level. Thereafter envi-ronmental quality will improve as people havehigher incomes to pay for environmental quality(Galeotti 2007; McPherson and Nieswiadomy2005). Based on the priority given to economicincentives by all the stakeholders in the Tulitrophy hunting case study coupled with the eco-nomic context of redeveloping Zimbabwe, it isexpected that economic growth will precede en-vironmental sustainability. However environ-mental sustainability is only achievable with ef-fective environmental policies and under goodmanagement as advocated by the stakeholders(Strydom 2010; Capesa 2010; Nyamtora 2010).

Indeed the perceptions and perspectives ontrophy hunting by stakeholders need to becouched not only within the economic contextof Zimbabwe but also in light of the environ-mental laws of the country. The EnvironmentalManagement Act (Ch 20:27) No. 13 of 2002 wasproduced by the Zimbabwe environmental lawassociation (ZELA). The principal objective ofthis law is to achieve equitable and just use ofnatural resources and to conserve the environ-ment (ZELA 2003). Furthermore the Act holdsan anthropocentric view which prioritizes meet-ing people’s needs as the primary objective ofenvironmental conservation. It thus advocatesfor the sustainable utilization of species and ec-

osystems (Section 87 – 96) (ZELA 2003). Evi-dently policies do exist in Zimbabwe for the sus-tainable utilization of environmental resources.Yet there are serious mismanagement issues aspointed out by all stakeholders. Suffice to saythat effective enforcement of policies could en-sure sustainability of the nation’s environmentin general and the hunting industry in particular.

CONCLUSION

Political and economic changes such as theformation of unity government and dollarizationof currency offer new opportunities for collabo-ration, stakeholder involvement, and effectivepublic participation in Zimbabwe. Development,as defined by improvement of living standardsthrough increased social, economic and institu-tional processes is vital within the Zimbabweancontext. In line with this, the qualitative assess-ment of the environmental perceptions of stake-holders in the Tuli Safari area reveals a commonconservationist perspective with a strong incli-nation towards economic and utilitarian incen-tives as the propellants of sustainability. How-ever issues of mismanagement are commonlyacknowledged by stakeholders as renderingenvironmental policies ineffective. As a resultshort term monetary incentives tend to encour-age over-utilization of the country’s natural re-sources.

It is encouraging when stakeholders show agood understanding of how the ecosystemworks -with the local tracker for example, affirm-ing that all the animals on and outside the hunt-ing quota system are eco-systemically intercon-nected. Clearly the stakeholders regard the eco-system as the base on which all of the benefitsderived from hunting depend. The quota sys-tem therefore needs to bear in mind all of theseaspects and processes as they contain econom-ic and environmental values that need to persistinto the future. Yet setting quotas to meet thesegoals would require the application of precau-tionary principles which are difficult to apply inlight of current socio-economic realities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Trophy hunting has the potential of ensur-ing conservation of wildlife and sustaining theviability of Zimbabwe’s environmental resourc-es. For this to happen however it is important


that appropriate policies be put in place and ef-fectively implemented. Effective implementationis only possible if corruption is curbed and en-vironmental governance enhanced. Key criteri-on for an effectively governed trophy huntingsystem is one that has a clear, transparent andcompetitive system of quota allocation. Localparticipation is crucial in all these processes.Furthermore, the bulk of revenue arising fromtrophy hunting should go to local owners of theenvironmental resources – without compromis-ing the ability of the system to be self-sustain-ing. Indeed effective stakeholder participationcould translate into a common, bottom-up un-derstanding and guide to social, economic andenvironmental decision making - leading to sus-tainability of the hunting industry.

It is also in the interest of the industry topromote types of hunting that ensure conserva-tion. This could be done by integrating devel-opment of wildlife-based land uses with landreform on the basis that prohibiting hunting doesnot assure effective conservation. Wildlife isperceived by all stakeholders as having an eco-nomic value therefore market orientated mea-sures should be taken to achieve sustainabilitywithin the hunting industry. Finally the role ofCITES and other international regulatory mech-anisms in synergizing trophy hunting and con-servation should be recognized and encouraged.

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Documents

Trophy Hunting: The Tuli Safari Circle in Zimbabwe