The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 6 | Issue 3 | Mar 03, 2008

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'Trophy Capitalism,' Jefrinomics, and Dynastic Travail inBrunei

Geoffrey Gunn

“Trophy Capitalism,” Jefrinomics, andDynastic Travail in Brunei

Geoffrey C. Gunn

The use and potential misuse of sovereignwealth funds in Asia has been newsworthy oflate, especially because of their size and highprofile investments. China and – and possiblyJapan as well – look to parlay their government-owned investment vehicles. With its smallpopulation base, and vast reserves of oil andnatural gas, the small Southeast Asian nation ofBrunei Darussalam, located on the north-eastern side of the island of Borneo, has beenable to lever its economy into providing anenviable standard of living for its populationand mega-billions for its ruling Royal family.

But just as Brunei reaps the rewards of windfallprofits generated by historically high oil prices,so it joins the ranks of holders of sovereignwealth, currently under increasing scrutinyowing to their opaque corporate governancestructure and general secrecy. While, unlike

such foreign exchange surplus countries asSingapore, Brunei has distinguished itselfthrough its portfolio investments, not all ofthem sound. Brunei also shares the externalvulnerabilities of oil producer states. Thisarticle seeks to structurally examine thesevulnerabilities with specific reference to thedynastic crisis of 2001-2002 and sequels. It alsoseeks to explain how the Brunei Sultanaterecovered from this crisis, handsomely addingto the Royal fortunes, without, however,precluding future crisis and even collapsewhether from domestic (dynastic) or externalshocks.

Introduction

Identified by analysts as conforming to,variously, an economic rentier state model, [1]or suffering from "Dutch disease effects," [2]the former British protectorate of BruneiDarussalam, with its small population base(374,000 in 2007), and vast – albeit finite -reserves of oil and natural gas, has been able tolever its economy to provide an enviablestandard of living for its population and mega-billions for its ruling Royal family, led by SultanHassanal Bolkiah, along with a network of closenon-Royal collaborators. Brunei Darussalamalso shares the external vulnerabilities of oilproducer states. This article seeks tostructurally expose these vulnerabilities withspecific reference to the dynastic crisis of2001-2002, still playing out with respect to therecovery of billions of dollars of squanderedassets on the part of a Royal sibling (PrinceJefri). It also seeks to explain how the Sultanaterecovered from this crisis without, however,precluding future crisis and even collapse,

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whether from domestic (dynastic) or externalshocks.

Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah

Understanding the Vulnerability ofResource Rich Economies

The notion that states based upon externalsources of income are substantially differentfrom states based upon domestic taxation wasfirst proposed with reference to a number ofoil-exporting Middle Eastern countries. Beblawi[3] has drawn a distinction between a rentierstate, rentier economy, and rentier mentality.

Rentier economies become problematical, inthis theory, when a rentier mentality prevailsinsofar as the work-reward causation is brokenand reward or wealth is not related to work andrisk taking. Rentier economies are by definitionextroverted, forming high tech enclavesdisconnected from the domestic economy bothin terms of inputs, employment and outputs.

So-called Dutch disease effects, derived fromstudies of the economic impact of hydrocarbonrevenues in the Netherlands in the 1960s, aresaid to derive from a bloated public sector andthe rise of non-productive social expenditure.The “Dutch disease” has been used byeconomists to explain the deindustrialization ofan economy as a result of the discovery of anatural resource. Typically, in this analysis, thediscovery raises the value of the country’scurrency making manufactured goods lesscompetitive and encouraging imports to rise. Inany case, unlike Holland in the 1960s and theUK in the 1970s, Brunei obviously lacks amanufacturing base. Deindustrialization hasnever been the issue. Nor has its currencygreatly risen.

Other economists have discussed a “resourcecurse thesis” or the costs associated with abooming mineral sector based on theobservation that so many countries that havestruck it rich with natural resources haveended up a decade or so later in great trouble.In this view, natural resource rich countries aresubject to a boom-bust cycle with associatedpolitical instability arising from incomedifferentials and unequal access to wealth. Theability to escape the “resource curse” has alsogiven way to a small literature, some espousingneo-liberal/public choice or behaviouralistperspectives, others seeking explanations in“social forces” in favour of capitalistdevelopment in conjunction with a favourableexternal environment such as in Suharto’sIndonesia. [4]

I will expand upon a version of the “rentier

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state” model, especially since, unlike the Dutchdisease description or “curse” metaphor, therentier state analysis seeks to answer thecrucial (and, in Brunei Darussalam, virtuallytaboo question) of who gets what, why, andhow?

However theorized, the problem becomes oneof expanding the skill base of the population,stimulating the private sector, diversifying theeconomy, especially through creation ofdownstream activities, achieving transparencyin national accounting, and reining in unbridledconsumerism by the super rich.

To add a slightly philosophical note, we couldsay that, for Bruneians, to consume is to bemodern. In other words, Bruneians expresstheir modernity through extravagantconsumption patterns. Such behaviour is hardlyconfined to the Bruneian nouveax riche but, inthe context of a steeply hierarchical and status-driven society, it well describes their reality. Asrole models, the Brunei Royal family havepromulgatged a veritable consumer goodsfetishism both at home, through ostentatiousdisplays of wealth, and globally extending tothe collection of a vast array of “trophy” andother assets, such as would merit thedescription of a “trophy capitalist” economy.

Economic History: A Survey

Long a nation of self-sufficient agriculturalistsand peasant fishermen living in a favourableecological niche in the huge tropical island ofBorneo, Brunei has experienced a major shiftaway from agriculture during the last threedecades. A rubber plantation economy withpre-war origins only survived into the 1960s.The overall trend has been towards loss of foodself-sufficiency including even fish. The oneredeeming grace offered by the exploitation ofoil has been to spare the country from theravages of tropical hardwood logging such ashas occurred in neighbouring Malaysian statesof Sabah and Sarawak for the worst. The

potential of this natural asset for ecotourismhas recently dawned upon Brunei.

The Shell group of companies, which, from1913, pioneered the search for oil in Bruneiand, from 1929, commenced the exploitation ofBrunei's hydrocarbon resources, made Brunei,upon its full independence in 1984, one of therichest states in the world. Notably, however,Brunei is not a member of the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and, asa relatively small producer country, is notofficially constrained by OPEC productionquotas.

Shell drilling rig in Brunei, 1926

In any case, material improvements, includingthe development of basic infrastructure, alongwith public housing, educational facilities, andmedical services, only began to take effect withthe implementation of a series of five yearNational Development Plans beginning with theof 1953-58 Plan and, as discussed below,continuing with the Eighth (2001-2005), and

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Ninth National Development Plans (2006-2011)with expanded allocations matching a moresophisticated macro-economic environment.

Needless to say, the modernization of the oilindustry, the discovery of new fields, includingreserves of gas, along with the windfall benefitsreaped from the first oil-price hikes of 1973-74,provided the wherewithal for this expansion.Today, Brunei is the fourth largest oil producerin Southeast Asia [after Indonesia, Malaysiaand Vietnam], producing 200,000 barrels perday in the 2000s but currently in excess of thatamount. Even so, with plunging reserves of oilthroughout Southeast Asia, only Malaysia andBrunei presently produce more oil than theyconsume.

Brunei oil rigAs explained below, the steady dependence ofthe nation upon the oil industry, especiallyexports of crude oil and LNG, to the neglect notonly of traditional agriculture but also theexpansion of downstream industries and thenon-oil and gas sector, has led to its extremevulnerability within the global marketplace. Infact, oil and gas comprise over 96 percent of

Brunei's exports, suggesting an urgency tomatch the rhetoric of diversification withaction. While rentier states typicallyaccumulate reserves sufficient to buffer theireconomies, the prudent management ofreserves, as well as their accountability, asexplained below, has not been the hallmark ofBrunei's short experience as an independentstate.

While independent Brunei has gone as far as tocreate a cabinet system of government, it hasshown no signs of reviving its short-livedparliament or openly tolerating a climate ofopposition. While political parties havesurfaced, they exist in token form only. Ratherthan offering a political opening, as in Kuwait,Brunei has wrapped itself in the cloak ofmonoculturalism defined as Malay Islam Beraja(Royalty), a "monoloyal" ideological system thatprivileges subjects, who comprise some 66percent of the population, but excludes manyother categories of the population. The majorityof Chinese, about 15 percent of the population,are stateless permanent residents of Brunei.Otherwise governance in Brunei conformsclosely to the Middle Eastern pattern ofdynastic monarchy.

Meeting the test of citizenship in Brunei is nosmall matter, as it confers substantial rewardsin what has been dubbed the "Shellfare"system. Setting aside the Royal economy, asdiscussed below, the privileges of citizenshipalso extend to the economic and welfaresectors as the state has expanded its socialservice net to improve the livelihood of largernumbers of citizens through improved housing,healthcare, education and access to privilegedcivil service positions. No personal income taxis levied in Brunei Darussalam. Simply stated,Brunei's affluence, measured by consumptionpatterns and disposable income, is the envy ofits neighbours. In Brunei, as in other SoutheastAsian economies prior to the Asian financialcrisis of 1997, large numbers of people wereprepared to accept authoritarian blandishments

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as long as their rising economic aspirationswere met. The establishment in Brunei does notharp on its economic legitimacy as did someother regimes swept away in the crisis; rather,it is taken for granted.

The Oil Industry

While the global trend has been for producercountries to nationalize the oil industry, such asIndonesia's Pertamina and Malaysia's Petronas,the industry in Brunei retains its privatizedcharacter. Even so, as discussed below, in thewake of the “Prince Jefri crisis,” a new nationalpetroleum company has been formed.

While historically the division of profitsbetween Shell and the Brunei state hadadvantaged the former, by the early post-warperiod the terms had been altered to benefitthe state and the Royal family. Natural gasproduction in Brunei is of more recent origin,with an LNG plant opened in 1973, the largestof its kind in the world at that time. Brunei iscurrently the ninth largest producer of LNG inthe world.

Today the oil industry in Brunei is dominatedby four companies belonging to (Royal) BruneiShell. The state holds a 50 percent share ineach. Dominating is Brunei Shell Petroleum(BSP), responsible for exploration andproduction as well as oil refining. Second inimportance is Brunei LNG, a three-way tie-upbetween Brunei, Shell, and Japan's MitsubishiCorporation. A third company, Brunei Coldgas,buys the liquified gas, and a fourth, BruneiShell Tanker, transports the gas to Japan’sTokyo Electric Power Company, the Tokyo GasCompany and the Osaka Gas Company. (Aroundnine huge tankers continuously circle betweenBrunei and Japan). In 1994 South Koreabecame an additional customer for LNG, animportant step for Brunei in diversifyingmarkets. And, in November 2000, Brunei Shellsigned an agreement to export 10,000 bpd toChina, a first for Brunei. Australia, Indonesia

and Korea are the major customers for Brunei’soil exports, with the US, Japan and Chinataking small percentages.

LPG tanker

State efforts to stimulate the private sector andreverse the state-dependent mentality of localBruneian entrepreneurs and contractors havebeen desultory. Numerous schemes have beenroutinely touted or attempted, such asdeveloping financial services, promotingforeign investment in new start-ups,stimulating fisheries, and promoting nichetourism or ecological tourism. In discussing the"diversification dilemma" in Brunei, Cleary andWong list the constraints to diversification as"labour, capital, resources and managementskills" in a "political and cultural system that isoften highly r igid, conservat ive andtraditionalist." [5]

The first "outside" player on the productionside was Jasra Elf, a tie up between the Royalfamily-controlled Jasra International Petroleumand French major Elf Aquitaine which hasmade important offshore discoveries, not onlyextending Brunei's known reserves butbreaking the Brunei Shell monopoly. [NewZealand’s Fletcher Challenge Energy alsoentered into partnership with Elf, but Shell hasbeen seeking a take-over of Fletcher’s share.]To put this arrangement into perspective, while

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BSP accounted for 90 percent of gasproduction in Brunei, [Jasra] Elf-Fletcherproduced the other 10 percent. But, asexplained below, the oil industry in Brunei issubject to some major new innovations.

Royal Family Economy/Sovereign Wealth

Brunei's "national" wealth is closely bound upwith the privileged and secretive Royal familyeconomy. As one of the richest families in theworld, the Sultan’s fortune is virtuallyindistinguishable from the resources of thestate. Simply stated, as supreme executive andsovereign, the Sultan has the power to disposeof all State assets as he sees fit. Subject ofmuch speculation, the Sultan may at one timehave been worth between US$40 and US$80billion, a figure equal to Brunei's reserves, notto mention the significant assets of his threebrothers. As is well known, the Sultan's assetsrun from luxury hotels in London, Singaporeand Bali, to cattle stations in Australia, tojewellery and art collections. At home, theRoyal family wealth is manifest in sprawlingpalaces and domains. Prince Mohammed has ahigh local profile through owning a controllinginterest in a Singapore-registered companyQAF Holdings, with interests in a range ofventures from supermarkets to newspapers(Borneo Bulletin), to a tie up with thegovernment of Myanmar. Prince Sufri and, asdiscussed below, Prince Jefri, both have privateinvestment companies.

Istana or palace

It is notable that Royal Family economicactivity in Brunei is not reflected in nationalaccounts and falls outside of surveys conductedby the government Economic Planning Unit.The separation of the family economy from theBrunei economy also extends to separateelectricity supplies and telecommunicationsamong other services.

The amassing of sovereign wealth is not uniqueto Brunei, but is a phenomenon shared bystates accumulating natural resource revenuesas with the petroleum-rich Middle Easterncountries, mineral exporting countries such asAustralia, as well as states such as Singapore,China, and Japan that enjoy impressive foreignexchange surpluses. Sovereign wealth fundsamassed by such countries are not of a kind,and run from aggressive international strategicinvestors, such as Singapore’s TemasikHoldings, to domestic investors in former state-owned companies, such as Khazanah ofMalaysia, to passive financial investors ininternational markets of which Brunei is anexample. But one shared feature of manysovereign wealth funds is that they do not havepublic accounts, annual reports, or otherpublished information. Another defining featureof sovereign wealth funds, including Brunei, isthat they are usually established as separateentities from line ministries or governmentagencies. [6]

Brunei and the Asian Economic Crisis(1997-98)

Shielded from the Asian financial crisis thatbegan in 1997 by its small size and irrelevanceas an investment site, the fall in world oil pricesnevertheless brought the economy to its mostcritical state since independence. On 27 June1998 the Sultan issued a series of Emergency(Supplementary) Supply orders for 1999 and2000 or special appropriations out of theConsolidated Fund. Government allocations

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draw from two funds, the Consolidated Fundwhich covers operating costs, and theDevelopment Fund which funds the NationalDevelopment Plans.

Nevertheless, Brunei was not entirely immuneto regional economic trends. The Brunei dollar,which is pegged to the Singapore currency(presently S$ 1.4 to US$ 1), lost about 14percent of its value against the US dollar.Additionally, certain of Brunei's non-oil exports,such as textiles, were affected by the crisis inother ASEAN countries. While that section ofthe population with dollar accounts and otherassets was shielded by the decline in the localcurrency, expatriate workers, many privatesector contractors, and other marginalelements were hurt. Expatriate constructionworkers and other skilled and unskilled labourhave always born the brunt in times of crisis.

What triggered the crisis for Brunei was a 1998decline in prices of crude oil and LNG byrespectively 37 percent and 25 percent overthe previous year. With oil production constantat around 150,000 to 160,000 barrels per day,this meant that the contribution of the oilsector to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)declined sharply.

As a consequence of revenue shortfalls andeconomic malaise, growth of real GDP of fellsharply from 3.75 percent in 1996-97 to lessthan 1.00 percent for 1998-99. The 1998budget registered a deficit estimated at 6percent of GDP, obliging the government tocorporatize some government agencies and toprivatize some government projects. Othergovernment efforts centered on generatingalternative sources of revenue to supplementdeclining oil and gas revenues. [7]

By 2003 GDP growth rose to 3.75 percent butslowed to 1.75 in 2004 repair and upgrading ofoil and gas production facilities reduced output.Non-oil economic activity strengthenedreflecting increased government spending.

Most of the windfall revenue accruing fromhigher oil prices was saved, resulting inimprovements in the fiscal situation. Oilproduction was also expected to grow followingrepairs and upgrades to facilities. [8]

Domestically, rising unemployment wenttogether with a budget deficit since 1988. In1992, for example, expenditure increased by10.8 percent mainly due to increased spendingfor lavish ceremonies commemorating theSultan's Silver Jubilee of accession to thethrone and other expenditures for the royalfamily. Since 1994, the government budgetdeficit has averaged B$1 billion a year. Thisshortfall was funded by drawing upon Brunei'sreserves. Essentially, deficits are financed bydrawing upon foreign investment income, itselfa closely guarded secret.

In September 1998 the Sultan created theBrunei Economic Council in September 1998 totake in hand strategic planning. The Councilwas chaired by Prince Mohamad withmembership from both the public and privatesectors. The Council embarked on a three-pronged Action Plan for economic recovery.This involved a stimulus package to injectliquidity, especially for Small and Medium-sizedEnterprises (SMEs); an implementationstrategy; and a communications initiative.Rhetorically, the package promoted suchconcepts as "fast track" payments, ITinfrastructure, investment in people, think-tank, private sector, bumiputra or BruneiMalay-owned companies and, last but not least,transparency. The recommendations of theCouncil were to be incorporated in a futureeconomic blueprint for Brunei Darussalam. [9]There is little evidence, however, of suchrhetoric translating into a significant break ineconomic praxis. The case of royal favouritismand extravagance is illustrative.

The Brunei Investment Agency, Amedeo,and the Prince Jefri Scandal

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Establ ished in 1983 in the run up toindependence from Britain the following year,the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA), located inthe Ministry of Finance, was positioned tomanage the Sultanate's reserves, a rolehitherto performed by the British CrownAgents. As documented elsewhere, the BIA rolein the external recycling of oil rent took theform of a triple-alliance linking the state, thenew business elite, and international capital.[10]

The nature of this triple alliance has long beenthe subject of speculation by financialjournalists. [11] The modus operandi of the BIAhas been subject to little investigation,although its managing director, Dato AbdulRahman Karim, also Permanent Secretary ofthe Ministry of Finance, stated in 1991 that theagency handled only 40 percent of theSultanate's foreign reserves, which heestimated at US$27 billion. The remainder, heindicated, was divided among eight foreignbanking and investment institutions, with 50 to60 percent of the BIAs money placed in bondsand the balance in stocks and shares.

The picture is incomplete, however, withoutexamining the nexus linking the BIA with thestate, the business elite, and internationalcapital. While BIA assets were estimated tohave risen to $60 billion by the end of thedecade, the modus operandi of the institutioncame under the searing glare of local andinternational media in mid-1998, when theBritish media exposed the fact that theSultanate's largest conglomerate, Amedeo,under the control of the Finance Minister andhead of the BIA, Prince Muda Haji Jefri Bolkiah(b.1956-), youngest brother of the Sultan, hadcollapsed. Amedeo left debts estimated at $16billion, thus depleting BIA assets by the sameamount. In June 1998 investigation into themisuse of BIA funds in the Sultanate wasentrusted to a Finance Task Force, headed bysenior government officials with internationaladvisors. It is probably no coincidence that, in

August 1998, the Sultan named his eldest sonAl-Muktahee Billah as Crown Prince, dispellingrumours and firming up his line of descent.

Stripped of his official positions, Jefri fled thecountry, just as the Sultan assumed theposition of Finance Minister. On 21 September1998 the government stated that 27 companiesled by Amedeo Corporation had been placedunder investigation and taken over by thegovernment on suspicion of misappropriatingfunds. The companies included an amusementpark, an international school, a hotel, and firmsconnected with fisheries, insurance andtelecommunications.

Prince Jefri

While Jefri briefly returned to Brunei inOctober 1998, having sold off some of hisholdings including the Asprey Group, couturierRomasz Starweski, and jeweller Hamilton &Inches, the gesture did not mollify the Sultanand Jefri returned to exile in July 1999. Thatmonth, auditors Anderson Consultingconfirmed that Amedeo would default on debtsestimated at US$3.7 billion, most owed to theBIA. Amedeo subsequently collapsed leavingcreditors unpaid. [12]

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Domestically, the construction industry took ahit. For more than four years Amedeo had beeninvolved in grandiose multi-million dollarprojects in the Sultanate. Such exemplars of"showcase capitalism" [13] to borrow a phrasethat has been used to refer to the economicmodel associated with Indonesian PresidentSuharto (1967-1999), include the Prince'sprivate office, the now abandoned privatemosque in Jefri's office grounds, and theJerudong Hotel. According to a journalist withthe Borneo Bulletin, the lion’s share of theprojects was for the prince and his family. OfB$6.2 billion injected into Amedeo from the BIAand others, only 10 percent could be regardedas having been spent on infrastructureimprovements. These include a Power Station,a communication tower, and an internationalschool. Such projects of "excessive andunnecessary standard" built by foreignworkers, according to the journalist, did notcreate employment for locals or raise their skilllevels. As testified by numerous abandonedJefri-controlled projects in Brunei, the Amedeo-fuelled construction boom only created anillusion of economic progress. In fact, with thebursting of the economic bubble in 1997, thevoid felt by the collapse of Amedeo caste a pallover business confidence in the Sultanate. [14]In 1999, the government injected some US$208million into development projects in a bid toshore up the construction industry left idle byAmedeo's demise. [15]

Sultan versus Jefri Trial

In an unprecedented lawsuit, sensational byany standard, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah accusedJefri of squandering more than B$40 billion (orUS$28.8 billion) in state funds. Besides theabove mentioned investments-turned-sour, Jefrireportedly spent B$2.75 billion over a ten yearperiod buying himself 2,000 cars, 17 airplanes,including a private Airbus A310, several yachts,quantities of jewellery, and more than a dozenhomes and other “trophy” investments. [16]

The Sultan chose a public and legal way to gainrestitution only after private negotiationscollapsed. In fact, as Jefri subsequentlyrevealed, negotiations between lawyers of bothparties had been going on for one year prior tothe settlement of the case in May 2000. [17] Asa regional newsmagazine opined of the civilsuit, the unprecedented legal action stands as"a modest advance for the rule of law and apublic affirmation of the ruler's responsibilityto their subjects," as well as a step forward forthe people of Brunei. But what did the peopleof Brunei obtain? Was this a triumph for rule oflaw and public accountability?

In Civil Suit No. 31 of 21 February 2000 filed inthe High Court of Brunei Darussalam, the firstdefendant (Jefri) was charged by the plaintiffs,the State of Brunei Darussalam and the BIA,with illegally transferring a sum in excess ofUS$14.8 billion. Altogether, Jefri, his sonPrince Hakim, and 71 others, stood charged inthe civil court of misappropriating B$40 billiondeemed to belong to the State under control ofthe BIA." On the same date the court hadimposed a freeze upon the assets of Jefri andthe other defendants worldwide.

Upping the ante, on 6 May council for PrinceJefri produced an affidavit made on behalf ofJefri alleging that Pehin Isa, Home Ministercum special Adviser to the Sultan, receivedhundreds of thousands of dollars from thePrince on a yearly basis. While this was widelyreceived as a scurrilous allegation, it pointedlyra i sed quest ions o f pub l ic prob i ty .Nevertheless, the Sultan always appeared toremain in control of events. Just as theinternational media picked up on the familyfeud, so such offerings as "Washington PostAttacks Prince Jefri," and "Prince Jefri's FallFrom Grace According to Asiaweek," wereposted on web sites linked to the official BruneiDarussalam Home page. [18]

On 10 May 2000, the court ruled againstappeals by Jefri and his son Prince Hakim, to

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resist disclosing the source of their funds, aswell as source of their living expenses. Jefri hadclaimed such disclosure would constitute selfincrimination under section 12 of the BIA Act.They also failed in their bid to evict the chiefjustice. The High Court ordered the Prince toreveal the source of his funds within five days,although still he temporized. Having failed inhis appeal, the case was referred to the PrivyCouncil in London, the highest court of reviewfor Brunei.

In the end, an out-of-court settlement wasreached between the Sultan and his estrangedbrother. Ending the three-month court battle,the Sultan (via Minister of Education PehinAbduul Aziz, (who headed the Task Forceinvestigating the missing BIA funds) publiclyannounced that Jefri had agreed to return allmonies he had taken from the BIA, includinghotels, land, and other assets in Brunei andoverseas. The exact terms of Jefri's settlement,and a separate settlement for Prince Hakimwere not revealed, however.

But what can be concluded of this affair for thepublic interest, rule of law, accountability andfinancial transparency? It is notable that thecontest was framed in two discourses. The firstand private discourse was that betweenestranged brothers, a dynastic fallout, that, atthe end of the day, saw reconciliation in linewith the providence of God and the blessings ofHis Majesty. The second and legalistic andpublic discourse was that played out in the civilcourts between the State and BIA as plaintiffsand Jefri, et al., as defendants. Even so, asexplained below, moral blandishments as muchas legal actions on the part of the Sultan leftJefri stripped of most of his major remainingassets, just as the Sultan retained the power tocontrol the Sultanate’s wealth.

In the Wake of Amadeo

At the end of the day, it was clear that theprivate settlement solution was optimum for

the Sultan, all was in the family, the boundaryof the Royal economy was not publiclybreached as a full public disclosure threatened.Locally, the Court's victory was portrayed asthe Sultan's victory and, ipso facto, that of therakyat or subjects. While Jefri had claimed thatthe forces behind the case were the Islamicconservatives, it is noteworthy that theboundary between Jefri's private life, widelydisclosed in international media, and publiclife, was not breached either in formal courtdocuments or within Brunei. Unity of the royalfamily and indeed their privileges werepreserved intact. There would be no furtherpublic disclosures, the secrecy of the BIA was,after all, unimpeachable.

As the author was quoted in the BangladeshTimes (29 June 2000), “Its a victory for theSultan and the status quo.” [19] The samepaper also reported comments by Hatta BinZainal Abidin (leader of a Brunei “opposition”party) who stated, “His Majesty the Sultan wasvery concerned about the security of thenation. That’s why he agreed to an out-of-courtsettlement.” What the settlement above allreveals is the lack of checks and balances inthe Brunei political system, one dominated bythe Sultan and his acolytes.

Even so, having reneged upon the settlementdeal by refusing to declare his financial assets,Jefri faced down contempt proceedings filed bythe BIA in the London High Court. Eventually,in February 2006, the family feud wasostensibly settled. The Sultan agreed to dropall charges against Jefri. Meantime, in 2007Jefri initiated legal proceedings against hisformer barr is ter charging h im wi thembezzlement of assets. Meanwhile the disputerekindled with both sides accusing the other ofreneging on the terms of settlement.

Liquidation of Assets

As a first step towards overseeing theliquidation of Amadeo assets a Singapore-based

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firm of accounts was commissioned. On 11August some 10,000 items belonging toAmadeo went on auction, but drawing moresnide comment than winning back significantdollars. In short time, perhaps owing to senseof urgency, the Sultan saw to the creation ofGlobal Evergreen, a government-ownedcompany, headed by Education Minister PehinAbdul Aziz, to deal with the legacy of Amadeo.This was a case of top down crisis managementas 200 creditors launched an avalanche of suitsand counter suits becoming, in Aziz’s reportedwords, “a national issue, perhaps a nationaldisaster.” For his part, Jefri promptly returned"his" Airbus A310 to the Sultanate as anindication of more assets to come.

But foreign (Australian/NZ/British) financialinvestigators hired by Evergreen also fell foulof Home Affairs Minister and long-time advisorto the Sultan, Pehin Isa, especially when theirleads or the paper chase led his direction.Pehin Isa also heads immigration, and,according to press accounts ordered a raid onEvergreen offices blocking the foreigners’departure. The Evergreen affair thus became amatter of diplomatic concern with theintercess ion o f the concerned HighCommissions on behalf of their nationals.According to an Australian High Commissionaccount, Global Evergreen acquired suchformer Amadeo assets as the Empire Hotel andCountry Club, the Berakas power station, DSTCorporate Tower, and the Jerudong Marina,[20] suggesting that the state had adroitlymanoeuvred to reassert control of Amadeo innew form outside of the reach of the roguebrother.

Pehin Aziz is reported to have said that some ofAmadeo’s unfinished projects would becompleted. This is important as construction isthe nation’s second largest industry after oiland gas. It is also the lifeblood of manybumiputra (Bruneian) contractors hard hit bythe construction slowdown.

Still, many questions remain over the disposalof “trophy” assets around the world includingPlaza Athenee in Paris, the New York PalaceHotel, the Dorchester in London, and the Bel-Air in Los Angeles. These are the high profileand tangible assets but, beyond that, therecovery of the other billions seems unlikely.

It was not until 2007 that the penny dropped onthe Prince Jefri story. In that year the Sultanwon a key victory when the Privy Council ruledthat the prince—who had stonewalled thecourts for seven years— was required to abideby the agreement of 2000 to return nearly all ofhis remaining holdings. Finally, in March 2008,the Prince lost control of his most valuableremaining asset, the opulent New York PalaceHotel which returned to Brunei governmentcontrol. Even so, to strike a sceptical note, Jefristill remains in control of prime assets to thetune of more than US$1.5 billion, apparently asa bargaining chip in his ongoing negotiationswith the Brunei government. [21]

Economic Rebound? The Outlook

The rebound in oil prices beginning in thelatter half of 1999 from its historic low ofUS$10 a barrel to over US$30 by mid-2000,brought a reprieve to Brunei, en route tohistoric highs by 2007-08 (surpassing US$100 abarrel). While such a windfall, has no doubtmore than replenished the missing billions, thenew wealth will be as easily squandered as theold i f Brunei fai ls to chart a far moremanagerial and technocratic playing field andabove all, a developmental agenda to translateoil wealth into manufacturing, agricultural,tourism or other potentially self-sustainingresources.

If international agencies were in a position tooffer advice to Brunei, then they would urgebetter financial governance. But, just as thecharge of "corruption, collusion and nepotism"brought down the Indonesian New Orderregime of President Suharto of Indonesia and

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became the slogan of reformists throughout thereg ion , in the absence o f a broaderdevelopmental vision and approach, economicrebound in Brunei has its limits, just as its oilreserves are finite. [22] Nevertheless, a firstessential step surely will be overcoming thecurrent dynasty’s signature extravagance on agrand scale, indeed, survival in its present formmay well call for self-effacement and restraint.

Beginning in late 2001/early 2002 thegovernment launched a range of measures tostimulate the local economy. Notable was therelease of the National Development Plan(2001-2005), just as development funds for B$1bi l l ion were released for year 2002,representing an increase of 82 percent over2001. The funds were to stimulate the privatesector, especially SMEs, and to reduce highlocal unemployment.

In November 2001, the government establishedthe Brunei Economic Development Boarddesigned to attract and assist foreign capitalinvestments. One of its major tasks was tooversee the development of a large island(Pulau Muara Besar) as industrial estate. Inresponse to complaints from Prince Mohamedabout government red tape, in October 2001 anInvestment Incentive Order simplifiedapplication procedures for investors. AnIncome Tax Amendment Order did the same ontax incentives for investors. There was also taxrelief for pioneer industries and emphasis onbringing new technologies to Brunei. Pioneerand export industries were exempted fromcustoms duties for import of raw materials.Since 2001 the government has also privatizeda n u m b e r o f g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s(telecommunications and electricity) and theoperation of the Muara container port, and cutback subsidies. A cap was also placed upongovernment hiring.

The push to stimulate SMEs was no doubtgenuine. But, traditionally, the retailing sectorhas been dominated by Chinese. Citizenship

issues and the closure of governmentopportunities to the Chinese community haslong reinforced Chinese business strength inSMEs. In fact, however, it is politically essentialand often a legal requirement for Chinese toenter into “Ali-Baba” partnerships, with theformer guaranteeing all the right connections.But such cosy arrangements for the BruneiMalay partner offer little incentive to go italone.

Unlike Malaysia, for example, where undergovernment patronage, a class of Malayentrepreneurs has emerged, a genuine BruneiMalay business class remains embryonic. Suchlack of commercial traditions in Brunei, wouldeven set it apart from Middle Eastern rentierstates. But the unwillingness of Bruneians toenter into commercial ventures, with thepossible exception of import agencies, fits therentier model where the state sector becomesunduly bloated and career expectations look tothe state as employer.

The Oil Sector/PetroBRUNEI

Another post-crisis development was theestablishment of a national oil company,PetroleumBRUNEI, also known as the BruneiNational Petroleum Company SendirianBerhad. Registered as a “private limitedcompany” in January 2002, PetroleumBRUNEI.is described on the official website, as whollyowned by the government of His Majesty theSul tan through “the Pr ime MinisterCorporation.” [23] It supersedes the formerBrunei Oil and Gas Board and the PetroleumUnit. No less significant, the PetroleumBRUNEImodel, a first in Brunei, is based upon issuingProduction Sharing Contracts (that is, free oftax and royalties).

In creating a national oil company, Brunei wasfollowing the lead of Indonesia, Malaysia, andmost other oil exporting countries. In fact,PetroleumBRUNEI declared that its tradingpattern would explicitly follow Malaysia’s

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Petronas. It might also be seen as a means tolessen dependence upon Shell in explorationand refining. But this development is one towatch, especially if PetroleumBRUNEI movesout of the domestic environment into theSoutheast Asian arena. But managementprospects are daunting, even as the newnational oil company takes its first steps,initially restricted to local activities. As a“private limited company” under the control ofthe government of His Majesty the Sultan, itremains to be seen whether PetroleumBRUNEIupholds “accountability and transparency” suchas it claims, especially as accounts do notappear to enter the public domain.

The Sultanate also released a number of newblocks for oil and gas exploration. Theseincluded a 10,000 square kilometers deepwater concession extending up to 150kilometres offshore. Moreover, the new blockshave been offered under production sharingagreements as opposed to the prevailingconcession and royalty tax system, suggesting amore competitive environment for potentialbidders. Australia’s BHP won one of the bids,Frances’ Total/Final/Elf, another, and Japan’sMitsubishi another, in partnership with Shell.

Current oil prices are far higher than thosecalculated by the 8th and 9th NationalDevelopment Plans. Obviously how Bruneiparlays higher oil revenues earned on the spotmarket into energizing the economy dependsupon many f ac to r s i nc lud ing goodmanagement, transparency, and the ability ofthe economy to absorb inputs.

The rebound in oil prices beginning in thelatter half of 1999 from its historic low ofUS$10 a barrel to over US$30 by mid-2000,(rising to historic highs of more than $100 abarrel in early 2008) also brought a reprieve toBrunei. Combined with the weakening of theBrunei dollar, if these levels are maintained,this could translate into earnings of more thanUS$4 billion in oil and gas exports a year.

Current oil price hikes also play to Brunei’sadvantage. Since 1999, presumably in partbecause of the high prices, Brunei appears tohave backed away from its conservation policyby increasing production by 50,000 bpd.

International Investment Centre?

In 1999 Brunei began to prepare laws to createa tax haven for foreign companies, virtuallystarting from zero in a crowded field of players.For starters, Brunei has no listed companies,no stock exchange, and no central bank. It alsolacks appropriate enabling legislation. Bruneiis, moreover, some ten years behind theinitiative taken by Malaysia on nearby Labuanisland which has apparently had at best mixedresults.

In July 2000 Brunei formally launched theBrunei International Financial Centre whichincludes an electronic bourse, or interactiveweb site to encourage futures trading and anoffshore haven for Islamic banking.

Since January 2002 Brunei has emerged as oneof the largest stakeholders in the Jeddah-basedIslamic Development Bank (IDB) infrastructuredevelopment fund. According to IDB literature,the Fund, established in Bahrain in 1998 with acapital of US1.5 billion, “encourages privateinvestments in infrastructure projects such ase n e r g y , t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n dtransportation.” [24]

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Islamic Development Bank, Jedda

The IDB also advertises its Islamic bankingethos. Essentially Islam forbids riba (interest)but Ju’alal or stipulated price for performingany services” also applies. So the IDB cancharge a fee for a loan, but not in excess ofexpenditure, which would be deemed usurious.Locally, a branch of the IDB in Brunei offersbanking and financial services on Islamicprinciples, alongside two other Islamic bankingentities and some eight foreign banks. Notably,in 2008, the IDB Development Fund returnedsome US$420 million in cash to its subscribers,namely the Saudi Arabia Pension Fund,, a trustfund managed by Bahrain, a Malaysianconsortium, and the Government of HisMajesty, the Sultan of Brunei. [25] Brunei isalso a growing subscriber to Sukuk or “Islamicbonds” issued by the IDB. [26] NotwithstandingBrunei’s attempts to parlay itself as aninternational financial centre, the IDB counterin Brunei operates at low profile.

Brunei’s Bilateral Investments/ RoyalFamily Gifts?

Obviously, many supplicants appear in theCourt of Brunei Darussalam, some moresuccessful than others. Actually the Sultanatesupports a special Foundation, whichdistributes the Sultan’s gifts to his subjects,such as dates imported from the Middle East

and civil service salary hikes. Notoriously, in amuddled deal involving Oliver North, RonaldReagan once turned to the Sultan to securefinancial support for US-backed contras inNicaragua, only to have the money returned. Amore recent example of the Sultan’s largessewas his personal gift of US$2 million to formerIndonesian President Abdulraman Wahid, to beused for charity in Aceh. “Bruneigate” was justone of the scandals surrounding PresidentWahid - contrived or not - leading to his ouster.None of this rubbed off on Brunei, but doessuggest that misplaced gifts can have untowardresults. Since 9/11 Washington is obviouslyconcerned at the prospect of Brunei’sresources being channelled into unregulatedfunds such as certain Islamic charities. In anycase, a more benign example from the recentpast might be the Sultanate’s gift of US$20,000to the 20 May 2002 East Timor independenceceremonies.

It is unlikely that any data base on BIAinvestments will surface in the public domain,but investment pacts include an agreement toset up a joint $200 million fund (with an optionto expand to $500 million) that will make long-term joint investments with Thai companies.This is a deal between the Brunei InvestmentAgency and the government of ThailandPension Fund signed on 16 January 2003. [27]

Diversification evaluated

The need to diversify away from the oil and gassector and attract foreign investment has longbeen recognized in Brunei, at least on paper.For example, in 1994 the governmentestablished a wholly owned private companySemaun Holdings “to spearhead industrial andcommercial development through directinvestment in key industrial markets.” Yet Stateattempts to stimulate the private sector andreverse the dependence mentality of the middleclasses upon the state have been desultory.Numerous schemes have been touted orattempted, such as developing financial

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services, promoting foreign investment in newstart-ups, stimulating fisheries, and promotingniche tourism or ecological tourism. To littleeffect.

The Brunei Investment Agency has preferred toinvest abroad rather than in the domesticeconomy. The government-owned SemaunHoldings is disallowed by its charter tocompete with the private sector so it too mustlook abroad. Oil still accounts for 40 percent ofGDP and provides 90 percent of export value.Manufacturing accounts for less than 4 percentof GDP and manufactured goods are cheaper toimport than produce locally. That applies, too,to rice and even fish.

Even the recent launch of such export platformindustries as the garment industry isproblematical. First, it is a typical enclave-typeindustry with little connection with thedomestic economy, importing all machineryand the raw materials. Even the labour isimported (Bangladesh/Philippines) and that isanother problem: sweatshop conditions, lack ofenforceable labour laws, and social discontent.But labour can be repatriated too, such asoccurred at the height of the crisis. One brightlight is that the oil sector has attracted a rangeof local service providers but as part of theenclave economy, their impact on the domesticeconomy is limited.

Downstream activities related to the oilindustry, financial services, tourism, and therecovery of agriculture are among venturesmost discussed. But is diversification more thanjust a slogan? What promise does resource-based industrialization hold? Expanding intodownstream activities such as oil refining andaluminium smelting offers promise, but canB r u n e i s u p p o r t t h e s o p h i s t i c a t e dtechnostructure to operate such ventures? Therecord is mixed, as with the example of thelocal Seria oil refinery, especially since its lowoutput suggests that it is more a political thaneconomic venture. The same applies to the LPG

plant located at Lumut.

With the advent of Visit Brunei Year in 2000,the Sultanate crossed a bridge in the sense ofpotentially permitting scrutiny by largenumbers of foreign tourists, an idea that wasprobably not endorsed by re l ig iousconservatives. Along with this, the Service Hubfor Trade and Tourism (SHuTT) was created.Royal Brunei Airlines might be touted as arelatively well-managed , albeit cosseted, stateenterprise but Brunei also faces stiffcompetition in the tourism industry. Even inecotourism Brunei competes with theneighbouring Malaysia states of Sabah andSarawak whose facilities are better developed.Moreover, Brunei still remains heavilydependent upon imports of consumer goodsand luxuries (making the country susceptible toimported inflation). And sti l l , a largepercentage of the Brunei population (about 75percent) works for the government, the desireand expectation of every graduate.

Weaknesses/Disincentives to ForeignInvestment

In summary, the Sultanate supports a highlycentralized political system, leading to acutebottlenecks, while Brunei’s market is small.Despite calls by some local economists, Bruneilacks a central bank. It also lacks publishedeconomic data such as would even meet IMFrequirements. Even the One Stop Shop concepthas to be viewed as a farce, especially whenpaperwork for a would-be entrepreneur seekingspace in an industrial park can take up to twoyears. Given the culture of secrecy/lack ofinformation outside of government channels, itis not surprising that the WTO has complainedof lack of transparency in the system,specifically mentioning the BIA and SemaunHoldings. The WTO is not alone. As the IMFconcluded of its “Article IV” evaluation ofBrunei’s economy in 2005, “Directors sawscope to enhance fiscal transparency, notingthat the limited availability of information

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continued to hamper fiscal policy analysis.”[28]

Conclusion

I have argued that vulnerabilities in externalrents have obliged the authorities in Brunei, atleast the technocratically inclined, to re-examine certain of the givens of the past and todiversify the economy away from the oil andgas sector to reduce exposure to externalities.Stated another way, the challenges to economiclegitimacy and dynastic rule thrown up by theregional and family crisis combined, demandedcreative even radical solutions. Being blessedwith hydrocarbon reserves at a time of soaringprices, Brunei has recently managed to escapethe resource curse thesis. It did not go bust in1999, its resources and reserves werestretched, but ample, its institutions - thecourts - the local banks, the currency peg didnot implode, there was no major domesticdiscontent in a society where social cohesionappears to be high.

As the Sultan sought to rein in a waywarddynastic member through a sensational civilaction suit, the limits to transparency weredrawn and the private space of the royal familyand the royal economy secured. There is nodoubt that a state that allows its nationalreserves to be frittered away withoutaccountability is deeply troubled. Still, nofundamental breech of the rentier economymodel in Brunei appears in sight while thedynastic system of privilege - here termed“trophy capitalism” - remains embedded, andno productionist revolution is on the horizon.

The sense remains that in Brunei not all arecomfortable with the encroachments of marketforces and neoliberalism. Globalization writlarge, and especially recent globalizing impactshave cha l lenged many ver i t ies thattraditionalists hold dear. Even “goodgovernance” is a loaded term in Brunei,especially if it is associated with Western

doctrines of liberalism and democracy. Thismessage comes through s trongly inconservative quarters reaching right to theIstana (palace).

Nevertheless, as Brunei continues to reapwindfall profits, amply replenishing the missingbillions squandered by a wayward Prince, thefocus shifts to the management of theSultanate’s sovereign wealth, such as vested inSemuan Holdings and the BIA. This is all themore important as Brunei begins to parlay itsinvestments in regional pension funds alongwith Islamic funds and bonds, besidestraditional portfolio investments. Largerquest ions remain as to jus t how farinternational regulation of “sovereign” fundscan go but, as with the IMF evaluation ofBrunei, one can detect a shift on the part ofinternational financial organizations towards aconcern for international standards. As inferredin the discussion on the Royal family fortunesin Brunei Darussalam, the notion of commonwealth remains abstract in the extreme withoutsome form of international scrutiny andaccountability.

Geoffrey Gunn is Professor of InternationalRelations, Nagasaki University, a specialist onIndonesia, East Timor and the Malay world,and a Japan Focus Coordinator. He is theauthor of First Globalization. The EurasianE x c h a n g e , 1 5 0 0 - 1 8 0 0(http://www.amazon.com/First-Globalization-Eur a s i a n -Exchange-1500-1800/dp/0742526623/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1205327423&sr=8-1).

He wrote this article for Japan Focus. PostedMarch 12, 2008.

Notes

[1] Christopher Colclough, "Brunei :

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Development Problems of a Resource RichState, " Euro-Asia Business Review, Vol. 4, No.4, 1985, pp. 29-32. Also, see the author’s,"Rentier Capitalism in Negara BruneiDarussalam," in Kevin Hewison, RichardRobison and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asiain the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy &Capitalism, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993, pp.109-132; and “Brunei,” in Patrick Heenan andMonique Lamontagne (eds.), The SoutheastAsian Handbook, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers,London/Chicago, 2001, pp.78-86.

[2] Mark Cleary, and Shuang Yann Wong, Oil,Economic Development and Diversification inBrunei Darussalam, Macmillan, London,1994/St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994.

[3] Beblawi Hazem and Luciani Giacomo (eds.),The Rentier State, Croom Helm, London, 1987,p.52.

[4] Andrew Rosser, “Escaping the ResourceCurse: The Case of Indonesia,” Journal ofContemporary Asia, Vol.37, no.1, February2007, pp.38-58.

[5] Cleary and Wong, pp. 123.

[6] “Concern” literature relating to rapid rise ofsovereign wealth funds continues to swell. Forexample, see Steven Weisman, “Concern about‘sovereign wealth funds’ spread to Washington(http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/0820/business/wealth.php),” International Herald Tribune,20 August 2007

For a useful summation of the issue, see JamesSeward, “Should there be common standardsfor Sovere ign Weal th Funds in As ia(http://http/eap.blog.worldbank.org/content)?”

[7] Brunei Darussalam: Overall EconomicPerformance, Asia-Pacif ic EconomicCooperation

[8] "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005

Article IV Consultation with BruneiD a r u s s a l a m(http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pn05137.htm),” InternationalMonetary Fund, Public InformationNotice No. 05/137 September 30, 2005.

[9] Report of the Brunei DarussalamE c o n o m i c C o u n c i l(http://www.brudirect.com/BruneiInfo/info/BDECR_PressReleas.htm%20%202000/04/26)

[10] Gunn, Rentier Capitalism. Themodel, in turn, can be traced to Abdul-Fadil, Mahmoud, "The Macro-behaviourof Oil-rentier States in the Arab Region,"in Hazem Beblawi & Luciani Giacomo(eds.), The Rentier State, Croom Helm,London, 1987, p.86.

[11] eg. James Bartholomew, The RichestMan in the World: The Sultan of Brunei,Viking, London, 1989.

[12] Far Eastern Economic Review Asia2000 Yearbook, p.96.

[13] Rex Mortimer (ed.), Showcase State:The Illusion of Indonesia's AcceleratedModernisation, Angus & Robertson,Sydney, 1973.

[14] Stephen, Ignatius, "Jefri-controlledprojects lie abandoned," The SundayTimes (Singapore), 2 April 2000.

[15] Far Eastern Economic Review Asia2000 Yearbook, p.87.

[16] Maggie Ford, "Brunei: Profligate

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Prince Jefri," Newsweek, 10 April 2000.

[17] Ignatius Stephen, "Prince Jefri,Brune i Se t t l e $40 B i l l i on Case(http://www.brudirect.com/DailyInfo/News/Archive/May2000/130500/nite01.htm%2000/05/13)."

[18] Of f ic ia l Brune i Homepage(http://www.brunei.gov.bn/)

[19] “$16 billion vanishes into thin air,”Bangladesh Times, 29 June 2000.

[20] "Country Economic Brief: BruneiD a r u s s a l a m , A u s t r a l i a n H i g hCommission, Brunei Darussalam,February 1994."

[21] Mark Maremont, “Will the Princeturn Pauper?: Billions later Jefri’s in aR o y a l M e s s(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120433378645304553.html?mod=home_we_banner_left),” The Wall Street Journal, 1March 2008.

[22] FEER Yearbook 2000.

[23] See PetroleumBRUNEI homepage(http://www.pb.com.bn/index.asp)

[24] See website of Islamic DevelopmentBank (http://www.isdb.org/)

[25] Ame Info, “Islamic DevelopmentB a n k u n v e i l s u c c e s s o f i n i t i a linfrastructure development fund(http://ame.info.com.100912.html/),” 3March 2008[26] C.T. Hj Mahmud, “Brunei stampsmark in g lobal Is lamic Banking(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/2696/http/www.brudirect.com/DailyInfo/News/Archive/June05/120605/nite02.htm),” BruneiDirect.com, 12 June 2005

[27] “Signing Ceremony for Setting Up oft h e T h a i l a n d P r o s p e r i t y F u n d(http://www2.mof.go.th/Picture%20News/160146.htm)”

[28] “IMF Executive Board Concludes2005 Article IV Consultation with BruneiD a r u s s a l a m(http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pn05137.htm),” InternationalMonetary Fund, Public InformationNotice No. 05/137 September 30, 2005