BUILDING INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES: A PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH TO

PEACEKEEPING

Faculty Advisor: Elisabeth Lindenmayer

Kelly JosephJulien Delemontex

Laho BangouraSusan Din

Tabatha Pilgrim ThompsonStefania Doebbel

Hyomi CartyChencheng DuIsabela Messias

Cover Image: Peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Repub-lic (MINUSCA) patrol through the streets of Bangui, the capital city of the CAR.

Photo Credit: Susan Din (MPA ’17)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research project would not have been possible without the sup-port of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as the leadership and staff of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Mul-

tidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

The research team is especially indebted to Professor Elisabeth Lindenmayer of the School of International and Public Aff airs at

Columbia University, for creating the opportunity to work on this proj-ect, for her vision and academic guidance since the project’s inception, and her steadfast support throughout the research and report-writing

process.

DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to the people of Liberia and the Central African Republic, who also contributed to this report and whose resil-ience and hope served as inspiration for its completion. This report is for them, and for all confl ict-aff ected societies, in the hopes that it will help drive real progress in how governments prioritize inclusivity on

the path to peace.

TABLE OF CONTENTSAcronyms..........................................................................................................................................................................Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................................Introduction and Background....................................................................................................................................Normative Evolution of a New Paradigm in Peacekeeping.............................................................................Political and Institutional Constraints to Implementation..............................................................................Research Objectives......................................................................................................................................................Methodology...................................................................................................................................................................Case Study: The Central African Republic.............................................................................................................. Context................................................................................................................................................................ Analysis of primary stakeholders................................................................................................................ Consultative Mechanisms............................................................................................................................. Tools for Community Engagement............................................................................................................ Challenges and constraints to eff ective engagement...................................................................... The way forward: Opportunities for meaningful engagement....................................................... Looking ahead..................................................................................................................................................Case Study: Liberia........................................................................................................................................................ Analysis of primary stakeholders................................................................................................................ Existing tools and mechanisms for community engagement........................................................ Challenges and constraints to eff ective engagement....................................................................... Potential areas for growth ........................................................................................................................... Bright Spots....................................................................................................................................................... Looking ahead..................................................................................................................................................Conclusion and recommendations..........................................................................................................................Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................................Appendix A: Key concepts..........................................................................................................................................Appendix B: Tools for Community Engagement.................................................................................................Appendix C: List of meetings conducted by Liberia research team............................................................Appendix D: List of meetings conducted by CAR research team.................................................................

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ACRONYMS AGE Advisory Group of ExpertsCAN Community Alert NetworkCAR Central African Republic CLA Community Liaison AssistantCPP Community Protection PlanCSO Civil society organizationCVR Community Violence Reduction DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and ReintegrationDPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping OperationsGA General AssemblyG8 Group of 8, also known as the International Contact Group on CARIMF International Monetary FundHIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace OperationsJPT Joint Protection TeamLNP Liberian National PoliceMINUSCA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the CongoNGO Non-governmental organizationPCS Peace Consolidation Services (UNMIL)PKO Peacekeeping operationPK5 Point Kilometrique 5, the main Muslim district in Bangui, CARQIP Quick Impact Project RCPC Recovery and Peace Consolidation in the Central African RepublicSAM Strategic Assessment MissionSG Secretary-GeneralTRC Truth and Reconciliation CommissionUN United NationsUNCT UN Country TeamUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNMIL United Nations Mission in LiberiaUNPOL UN PoliceWHO World Health Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYIn October 2014, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon convened a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to conduct a strategic review of United Nations peace operations, resulting in the 2015 report Uniting our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People. Commonly known as the HIPPO report, this assessment provides a detailed account of the evolution of peace operations and makes a signifi cant call for change in the way peace operations carry out their work. Among several recommendations, the report calls for peacekeeping operations to shift towards a more people-centered approach that involves “working in partnership with the local people and, where appropriate, acting as a bridge between local communities and host authorities.”1 This recommendation is the focus of this report.

While it is broadly accepted that peacekeeping missions must work in consultation with host governments to foster national ownership of the peacebuilding process, there is a growing recognition that governments must take ownership by genuinely engaging and consulting all stakeholders of their country. This represents a shift from national ownership to inclusive national ownership, refl ecting a deeper shift in the paradigm of peacekeeping. The new paradigm calls for a departure from the traditional state-centric approach to one that recognizes communities as key agents of peace.

While peacekeeping has already devised a number of tools to strengthen community engagement, this shift will require missions to integrate these tools and incorporate genuine consultation with local communities into their broader political strategy. It will also involve encouraging and supporting governments to prioritize consultation and forge a social contract with their people, in order to build a shared vision for the future of their country. For peace to be sustained, it is essential that peacekeeping missions incorporate these strategies at every stage of the mission cycle, from initial deployment to fi nal drawdown. Thus, a more people-oriented approach to peacekeeping will entail signifi cant changes not only in the way missions carry out their tasks on the

ground, but also in how the UN, and the Security Council in particular, formulates their mandates before and during deployment.

This research argues that the implementation of a more people-centered approach to peacekeeping – one that seeks to foster inclusive national ownership at every stage of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process – is essential to achieve sustainable peace. As the HIPPO report states, a more inclusive, people-oriented approach to peacekeeping will help to improve mandate implementation, ensuring that technical tasks are not implemented in a vacuum, but rather are part of a common political strategy to build more inclusive societies. Although peacekeeping operations are uniquely situated to support host governments in this regard, the Security Council has primarily focused peacekeeping eff orts on stopping violence and stabilizing confl ict-torn countries through a template of technical tasks. It is increasingly recognized, however, that this approach has not eff ectively addressed root causes and confl ict drivers, nor has it created the conditions for sustainable peace after the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces.2 In the absence of a common vision between governments and their people, peace will remain extremely fragile. Thus, the focus for peacekeeping should not only be to help a country build strong institutions and reinforce state authority, but also to support national eff orts to engage local communities and rebuild trust.

The research seeks to provide an analysis of the normative evolution of this new paradigm in peacekeeping, as well as the political and operational constraints that peacekeeping operations face in implementing this shift. The research focuses on two peacekeeping missions operating at very diff erent stages in their mission cycles: the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which deployed in 2014 as the UN’s newest peacekeeping operation, and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which is drawing down after thirteen years of peacekeeping. Using these two case studies, the objective of the research is to show what peacekeeping is already doing in the fi eld to

1 Th e High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. (2015). Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. United Nations, P65. 2 Ibid., P3.

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implement this shift, as well as the practical challenges and impact on the ground. The research consisted of a seven-week course and intensive desk research under the academic leadership of Professor Elisabeth Lindenmayer at the School of International and Public Aff airs at Columbia University, followed by four weeks of fi eld research in Liberia and the Central African Republic by two research teams.

Based on interviews and focus groups with over 200 stakeholders in each country, the research fi ndings show that a lack of community engagement can lead to a misalignment in priorities, high levels of mistrust of peacekeeping personnel and sustained fragility. In cases where community engagement occurred, whether through peacekeeping tools or broad-based consultations, such as the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, this appears to have contributed to a stronger sense of local ownership, better community relations and a more positive outlook on the country’s future. UNMIL illustrates the case of a mission which may have prioritized community engagement too late in its cycle. It has therefore, at best, stabilized the country without suffi ciently addressing the root causes of the confl ict or laying the foundations for sustainable peace. There is still time for MINUSCA to learn the lessons from UNMIL to avoid the same pitfalls.

The lessons learned from the two case studies serve as a basis for a number of policy recommendations aimed at making peacekeeping operations more people-centered. It is fully recognized that such a shift will not be easy and will require political, institutional and operational changes on the part of an organization that remains essentially state-centric. Given the increasingly complex and protracted nature of confl icts today, it is clear that a new approach is needed, and peacekeeping must strike a better balance between the rights of states and the rights of the people, in order to better serve those they are mandated to assist. As noted in the recommendations, this will require fi rst and foremost the full and undivided support of the Security Council. It is hoped that these recommendations can inform current and future peacekeeping operations, and make a contribution to the fi eld of peacekeeping.

Key Recommendations

• Ensure the Security Council prioritizes inclusive national ownership and community engagement in the mandate. This must apply to all peacekeeping tasks throughout all stages of the mission cycle. As stated in Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016), echoed by General Assembly resolution 262 (2016), this will help to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account.

• Institutionalize community engagement as a general practice within peacekeeping. As evidenced by the two case studies, prioritization of community engagement may depend on mission leadership and continues to be carried out in an ad hoc manner. The important work done primarily by Civil Aff airs has yet to be integrated into the broader political and operational strategy, both at headquarters and fi eld level. Thus, it is critical that the Security Council and peacekeeping integrate community engagement as a general practice, in order to have consistent implementation across mission cycles and across peacekeeping deployments. • Encourage and support host governments to foster inclusive national ownership from the beginning. Peacekeeping must act “as a bridge between local communities and host authorities” to help build a common vision on the priorities of the country and regain or strengthen the trust of the people.3 This is crucial for peace to be sustained when peacekeeping operations leave a country.

• Advocate for a quid-pro-quo compact with the host government. This kind of framework can be leveraged to ensure that consultation with the people is a main component of the political strategy for all parties, and that government policies are in line with and refl ective of the priorities of the people.

• Build transparent communication strategies with and for communities. It is critical that peacekeeping operations establish and expand two-way communication channels with local communities, in order to: 1) better manage expectations and ensure that people receive the information they need to organize themselves, 2) leverage local knowledge and

3 Th e High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. (2015). Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. United Nations, P65.

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networks to obtain timely information, and 3) to build a community of trust.

• Provide more training and capacity building for civil society organizations to better advocate and lobby for the people. Civil society and community organizations are often said to have the will, but lack the resources and skills to eff ectively advocate for the needs of the people. This is particularly true in countries where organized civil society is a relatively new development, as in Liberia and CAR.

• Take advantage of traditional community structures. In Liberia, the Ebola response proved that leveraging traditional community structures was highly eff ective, such as using communication networks to disseminate important information in a timely manner. Similarly in CAR, broadcasting messages through religious leaders and networks have been eff ective in reaching the broader population.

• Recruit troops, police and staff appropriate for the local context. Language barriers, perceptions of confl icts of interest on the part of some peacekeepers, and a general lack of understanding of the local context were cited as some of the main constraints to eff ective community engagement. However, it is recognized that this may remain a challenge given the constraints faced by peacekeeping.

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In October 2014, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to conduct a comprehensive assessment on the current state of peacekeeping operations. The report, entitled Uniting our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People, advocates for peace operations to become more “people-centered” as one of four major recommendations to shift the UN’s approach.4 As the report notes, eff orts to sustain peace have often broken down due to “a failure to establish inclusive political arrangements, a fair sharing of resources and

just accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity.”5 It therefore calls for “working in partnership with the local people and, where appropriate, acting as a bridge between local communities and host authorities, … [in order to] help facilitate more inclusive political processes that address social cohesion, inequalities and marginalization, and contribute to a more sustainable peace.” It further recommends that missions achieve this by developing “strategies for community engagement at various stages of the mission cycle – from assessment, analysis, planning, implementation, review and evaluation.”6

4 Th e High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. (2015). Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. United Nations, Pviii. 5 Ibid., P3. 6 Ibid., P66.

A view from inside the headquarters of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in Bangui.

Photo Credit: Susan Din (MPA ’17)

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The HIPPO recommendation was strongly echoed by two other reports on peace and security that came out in 2015, including The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: The 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture by the UN Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) and Preventing Confl ict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The AGE report emphasized the importance of “fostering ‘inclusive national ownership’… whereby the national responsibility to drive and direct eff orts [to sustain peace] is broadly shared by the national government across all key social strata and divides, across a spectrum of political opinions and domestic actors, including minorities.” 7 It also stressed that peace operations should encourage and assist host governments to “broaden ownership to as wide an array of domestic stakeholders as possible, so that the latter can engage with those governments and participate maximally in all stages of peacebuilding.”8 Recognizing that peacebuilding is not merely a post-confl ict activity, the report argued that “sustaining peace” must be the “thread that must run strongly through all of the UN’s work in prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping, as well as through post-confl ict recovery and reconstruction.”9

The Global Study on Resolution 1325 underscored the central role of women in building sustainable peace and echoed the call for more inclusive political processes, particularly with regards to women. The report highlighted that “women’s participation and inclusion makes humanitarian assistance more eff ective, strengthens the protection eff orts of our peacekeepers, contributes to the conclusion of peace talks and the achievement of sustainable peace, accelerates economic recovery, and helps counter violent extremism.”10 As the report notes, the historical and systematic exclusion of women from peace processes has been a major obstacle to the progress and development of countries emerging from confl ict.

These three reports form the impetus behind a growing call to shift the paradigm of peacekeeping 7 Th e Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. (2015). Th e Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, P21.8 Ibid., P21.9 Ibid., P12.10 Th e High-Level Advisory Group for the Global Study. (2015). Preventing Confl ict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Imple-mentation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. UN Women, P5.

operations towards a more strategic approach that fi rmly places people at the center of their work. While it has been broadly accepted that peacekeeping missions must work in consultation with host governments to foster national ownership of the peacebuilding process, this has tended to occur in the absence of broader participation from domestic stakeholders. There is a growing recognition, however, that governments must take ownership by genuinely engaging and consulting all stakeholders of their country – to shift from national ownership to inclusive national ownership. This shift refl ects a departure from the traditional state-centric approach towards one that recognizes communities as key agents of peace.

While peacekeeping has already devised a number of tools to strengthen community engagement (see Appendix B), these tools have yet to be integrated into the broader political and operational strategy of peacekeeping, both at headquarters and fi eld level. To implement a more people-oriented approach, peacekeeping must integrate these tools and incorporate genuine consultation with all segments of society as part of a strategy to actively build and cultivate good relations for the mission’s presence and work. This must also involve encouraging and supporting host governments to forge a social contract with their people as a way to build trust and put forth a common vision of the priorities of the country. For peace to be sustained, it is essential that peacekeeping missions incorporate these strategies at every stage of the mission cycle, from initial deployment to fi nal drawdown. As the HIPPO report states, a more inclusive, people-oriented approach to peacekeeping will help to improve mandate implementation, ensuring that technical tasks are not implemented in a vacuum, but rather are part of a common political strategy to build more inclusive societies.

Peacekeeping operations are uniquely placed to support governments in this process, as they maintain political leverage through their relationships and good offi ces as mediators between confl icting parties. Yet, their primary focus has been on stopping violence and stabilizing confl ict-torn countries

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through a template of technical tasks mandated by the Security Council. It is increasingly recognized, however, that this approach has not eff ectively addressed root causes and confl ict drivers, nor has it created the conditions for sustainable peace after the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces. While peacekeeping operations can intervene to neutralize active confl icts, peace will remain extremely fragile in the absence of a common vision between governments and their people. Thus, the focus for peacekeeping should not only be to help a country build strong institutions and reinforce state authority, but also to support national eff orts to engage local communities and rebuild trust. This is essential for peace to be sustained after a peacekeeping operation leaves a country, and to better serve the people they are mandated to assist.

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The synergy among the three reports provided a strong foundation on which to build momentum for a shift towards a more people-oriented approach to peacekeeping. Prior to their publication, this new paradigm had already taken root at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Eff ectiveness, which took place in Busan in November 2011, convening over 40 countries and organizations to adopt the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The New Deal included commitments to “support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility”, “support inclusive and participatory political dialogue”, and to develop strategic frameworks built on “a broad range of views from multiple stakeholders and the public.”11 However, prior to 2015, the concept of inclusivity had not gained much traction. Since the release of the three reports in 2015, it has made uneven progress but continues to build momentum as more and more Member States, both within the Security Council and

the General Assembly, begin to recognize the need for this shift.

Uneven progress in 2015

In September 2015, the UN Secretary-General (SG) released a report on the implementation of the HIPPO recommendations.12 While the report affi rmed that “strategic communication and community engagement are essential” for peace operations, and that eff ective confl ict response requires “building domestic capacity to protect and strengthen inclusive peace,” the call for a more inclusive, people-centered approach to peace operations was not a priority in this report, let alone recommending strategies to implement this new concept.13

The UN Security Council held its fi rst meeting to discuss the SG’s report in November 2015.14 In advance of the meeting, the United Kingdom,

11 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. (2011). International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, P1-2. 12 United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. (2015). Th e Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of Th e Recommenda-tions of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. United Nations, A/70/357-S/2015/682.13 Ibid., P14&4.14 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Proces Verbal: Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United Nations, S/PV.7564.

NORMATIVE EVOLUTION OF A NEW PARADIGM IN PEACEKEEPING In preparation for the 2016 International Day for UN peacekeepers (May 29), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) uniformed personnel are getting ready for a joint parade with Liberian armed forces and police offi cers.

Photo Credit: Hyomi Carty (MIA ’17)

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as President of the Council, circulated a concept note that focused primarily on two specifi c HIPPO recommendations: sequencing peacekeeping mandates and achieving political settlements. It did not address the recommendation for a more people-centered approach to peace operations, nor did it address the issue of inclusivity. While Council members welcomed the SG’s recommendations, Spain and the United Kingdom were the only Council members to highlight the importance of this shift in their statements: Spain highlighted the importance of “inclusive political institutions and translating the ground-based, people-centered approach into reality,” and the United Kingdom stressed the importance of “engaging with the local community” and “putting people at the centre.”15 No explicit reference was made to inclusivity or people-centered approaches in the presidential statement that came out of this meeting.16 The tepid support of the Secretary-General and the Security Council to explicitly support this new paradigm may be attributable to the traditional, state-centric approach to peacekeeping and the challenge of convincing host governments to build more inclusive societies.

Nevertheless, the new paradigm achieved signifi cant gains in 2015. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by UN Member States in September represented an important milestone, particularly through Sustainable Development Goal 16, which seeks to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build eff ective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”17 In addition, during a high-level meeting on peacebuilding at the end of September, the Secretary-General fi rmly rooted this new paradigm as a condition for sustainable peace, stating: “sustainable, durable peace can only ever be built on genuine, broadly inclusive national ownership.”18 In December 2015, the Security Council also adopted Resolution 2250 which urged Member States to “increase inclusive representation of youth in

decision-making at all levels” as a key to “preventing confl ict and enabling long-term stability and sustainable peace.” 19

Building momentum in 2016

The new paradigm gained more momentum in 2016, particularly within the Security Council and the General Assembly. Between February and March, the SpecialCommittee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) discussed the HIPPO report extensively, recognizing the importance of a people-centered approach at every stage of a peacekeeping mission. In particular, it stressed “a cohesive mission strategy to engage communities, in full acknowledgement of the primary responsibility of the governments of the host countries to provide for their citizens” and listed a number of peacekeeping tools to achieve this end.20

In April, the Security Council and General Assembly adopted a landmark dual resolution (Security Council Resolution 2282 and General Assembly Resolution 262) on a new vision for the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, representing a transformative and groundbreaking milestone in the evolution of this new paradigm of inclusivity. The dual resolution expanded the defi nition of sustaining peace as “a goal and a process to build a common vision of society,” fi rmly putting governments and their people in the lead.21 It further endorsed the conclusions in the Special Committee report and called for a shift from peacebuilding to sustaining peace, stating that peacebuilding is no longer confi ned to post-confl ict situations but rather applies to all stages of confl ict.22 It also emphasized that “the responsibility for sustaining peace is broadly shared by the government and all other national stakeholders” and called for “close strategic and operational partnerships between the United Nations, national governments and other key stakeholders, including…civil society organizations, women’s groups, youth organizations, and the private sector.”23 In addition, the resolution

15 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Proces Verbal: Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United Nations, S/PV.7564, P10&22. 16 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Statement by the President of the Security Council: Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United Nations, S/PRST/2015/22. 17 United Nations General Assembly. (2015). Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. United Nations, A/RES/70/1, P14. 18 Ban, K. (2015). Message to the High-level Meeting on A New Approach to Peacebuilding. United Nations. 19 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Maintenance of International Peace and Security. United Nations, S/RES/2250(2015), P2-3.20 United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations, A/70/19, P31. 21 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Post-confl ict Peacebuilding. United Nations, S/RES/2282, P1. United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, A/RES/70/262, P2.22 Mahmoud, Y., & Súilleabháin, A. Ó. (2016). With New Resolutions, Sustaining Peace Sits at Heart of UN Architecture. International Peace Institute Global Observatory. 23 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Post-confl ict Peacebuilding. United Nations, S/RES/2282, P3&6. United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, A/RES/70/262, P4&3.

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affi rmed that “inclusivity is key to advancing national peacebuilding processes and objectives” and underlined “the importance… of inclusivity in order to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account.”24 The resolution thus reinforced the notion that peacekeeping operations are only one of the many actors involved in helping a country to chart a path to sustainable peace, and must therefore integrate this new paradigm together with the other partners on the ground.

Following the adoption of the dual resolution, the General Assembly held a high-level debate during which Member States expressed strong support for

security at the UN have increasingly taken note of this new paradigm.

Infl uence on peacekeeping operation mandates

This trend has had a positive impact on the mandate of peacekeeping missions, which demonstrates stronger awareness of and support for a more people-oriented approach within the Security Council. Since the release of the HIPPO report, some Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping mandate renewals have included tasks related to inclusivity. This represents a new development and an expansion beyond the

the conceptual shift from peacebuilding to sustaining peace. For peace operations, the debate reinforced the importance of “placing people at the heart of their engagement,” recognizing that local populations are the main stakeholders and that “communities should be front and center in decision-making.”25 Since the adoption of the dual resolution and subsequent General Assembly debate, major documents and meetings on peace and

mandates.

In March 2016, the renewed mandate for the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) called for an “inclusive and transparent political dialogue among all Congolese stakeholders with a view to furthering reconciliation and democratization.”26 In addition, in June 2016, the renewal of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) included a priority task “to support dialogue with and among all stakeholders towards reconciliation and social cohesion… by promoting the participation of civil society, including women’s organisations, as well

as youth organisations.”27 To further support engagement with the local population, MINUSMA radio was highlighted as a key tool to “raise awareness and understanding about [the Mission’s] mandate and activities.”28

The renewed mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), adopted in July 2016, emphasized

the importance of inclusive national ownership by stating that “any sustainable solution to the crisis in the CAR should be CAR-owned…through an inclusive process that involves men and women of all social, economic, political, religious and ethnic backgrounds, including, those displaced by the crisis.”29 In its operative paragraphs, the resolution provided a mandate to support national eff orts “to address marginalization and local grievances, including through dialogue with the armed groups, civil society leaders including women and youth representatives, and by assisting national, prefectoral and local authorities to foster confi dence among

Peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) patrol through the streets of Bangui, the capital city of the CAR.

Photo Credit: Susan Din (MPA ’17)

24 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Post-confl ict Peacebuilding. United Nations, S/RES/2282, P2&3. United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, A/RES/70/262, P2&4. 25 United Nations General Assembly. (2016). Outcome Document of the High-level Th ematic Debate “A World of Risks -- A New Commitment for Peace”. United Nations, P5.26 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on Democratic Republic of the Congo. United Nations, S/RES/2277(2016), P11.27 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on the Situation in Mali. United Nations, S/RES/2295(2016), P8.28 Ibid., P10.29 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on the Situation in the Central African Republic. United Nations, S/RES/2301(2016), P1.

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Several political and institutional constraints exist to implement this recommendation. The fi rst lies with the Security Council given that it is the primary body responsible for formulating and authorizing mandates for peacekeeping operations. Historically, there has been a lack of clear mandate to foster inclusive national ownership and engage communities as part of the broader political strategy of peacekeeping operations. The Council continues to design and authorize mandates with the aim of stabilizing a confl ict-torn country, rather than creating or investing in the conditions for sustainable peace. It has repeatedly emphasized that the process of peacebuilding belongs to the government and has mandated peacekeeping operations to consult with governments as the primary interlocutor accordingly. Thus, peacekeeping mandates have seldom included explicit mandate tasks to engage communities or foster inclusive national ownership, making it diffi cult

for peacekeeping missions to prioritize resources to this end. As will be described in the case study, UNMIL illustrates a prime example of a missed opportunity in this regard. In addition, given short-term mandates and planning horizons, there is often a great deal of uncertainty regarding the availability of resources or whether the mission will be renewed at all, making it challenging to develop a longer-term strategy.

Another constraint derives from the principle of consent of parties. Peacekeeping operations can only deploy with the prior approval of the host government, which can be revoked at any time. Therefore, missions must actively retain consent by sustaining a good working relationship with the host government, so as to maintain presence, legitimacy and infl uence. In the absence of this, they run the risk of becoming ineff ective or even unwelcomed, and may trigger a negative reaction by the government. Thus, there is a delicate balance between engaging controversial actors, such as non-state armed groups or other opposition groups, as part of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process, and maintaining a constructive relationship with the government. Trust is key and serves as the primary tool that missions have to support a government in building institutions and improving governance. Thus, if the host government does not see the value in putting people at the center of the mission’s work or engaging with the broader population - either due to a lack of political will, more pressing priorities or other practical obstacles – the space for the peacekeeping operations to engage local communities and actors can be very limited.

A further obstacle concerns the diffi culty of defi ning who the people are, particularly in countries like CAR where the multiplicity of non-state armed actors poses asymmetric threats. Given the nature of confl icts today, peacekeeping often deploys into contexts where armed groups thrive – some with extremist worldviews, others with links to transnational organized crime. More often than not, these actors are not engaged in a negotiated political solution.

Peacekeeping operations also face the constraint of being deployed for a limited time, during which they must be able to prove results on the tasks of their mandates. Given limited resources, peacekeeping operations are expected to deliver on a number

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS TO IMPLEMENTATION

communities.”30 In addition, it requested the mission to use “relevant and tailored communication tools,” such as radio, as part of “an eff ective political strategy” to engage communities and build trust with the local population.31

The successful implementation of this paradigm shift within the UN system will depend upon the political support of Member States in the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the political will of host governments. Over the past year, there has been a growing awareness and recognition of the need for a more people-oriented approach to peacekeeping. Yet, given the novelty of this new paradigm and the varying priorities among Member States, it will remain challenging to translate this normative shift into institutional changes at UN headquarters and operational changes on the ground.

30 Ibid., P10.31 Ibid., P14.

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of technical tasks, in order to meet predetermined benchmarks as part of their exit strategy. The results of technical tasks are also relatively easy to prove since they can be quantifi ed. It is more diffi cult to measure results for concepts like inclusive national ownership given that they are qualitative in nature. In addition, peacekeeping can only be fully eff ective during its limited deployment if it has a solid partner in the host government. If the government is not willing to take ownership or lacks the capacity, then gains will be lost after the drawdown of a mission.

The lack of accountability mechanisms also serves as a constraint and is often mentioned in debates on community engagement and peacekeeping. Simply put, even if the host government incorporates inclusivity into its strategy and policies, peacekeeping missions do not have the tools to hold the government accountable if such policies are not implemented. To address this issue, the HIPPO report recommends a forming a “compact” between the UN and the host government to serve as a framework of mutual accountability.32 The report notes that if a compact was established from the beginning of the peacekeeping mission, host governments could be more inclined to consult with their people and have their voices refl ected throughout the peacekeeping process.

There are also operational constraints to peacekeeping operations engaging communities on the ground, such as lack of resources, lack of capacity, language barriers and lack of understanding of the local context. These constraints are further elaborated in the two case studies.

32 Th e High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. (2015). Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. United Nations, P39.

The objective of the research is to show what peacekeeping operations are already doing to put this new paradigm into practice, and to shed light on the opportunities and challenges they face in implementing it on the ground. The study focuses on two peacekeeping missions operating at very diff erent stages in their mission cycles: the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) deployed since 2014 as the UN’s newest

peacekeeping operation, and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) deployed since 2004 and currently in its drawdown phase. Drawing upon these case studies, the report seeks to show that a more people-oriented approach – one that seeks to foster inclusive national ownership at every stage of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process – is essential to achieve sustainable peace. The research attempts to address the following questions:

1. How and to what extent are peacekeeping operations engaging civil society and local communities?

2. How are peacekeeping operations supporting host governments to engage their citizens to build inclusive national ownership?

3. What constraints do peacekeeping operations face on the ground to engage communities and shift towards a more people-oriented approach?

4. To what extent can the impact of community engagement, or lack thereof, make the case that inclusivity is one of the conditions for sustainable peace?

The case studies provide a brief analysis of the root causes of confl ict and current context of each country. They also describe the tools and mechanisms each mission is using to engage communities and bridge the space between the government and its people, as well as the constraints missions face on the ground. The lessons learned from the two case studies serve as the basis for several policy recommendations aimed at making peacekeeping more people-oriented. It is hoped that these recommendations can inform current and future peacekeeping operations, and make a contribution to the fi eld of peacekeeping.

The research consisted of a seven-week course and intensive desk research in New York, followed by four weeks of fi eld research in Liberia and the Central African Republic by two research teams. A variety of research methods and tools were employed.

SIPA course and desk research

The fi rst stage of the research consisted of a seven-week course from March to May 2016, under the academic leadership of Professor Elisabeth

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES METHODOLOGY

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Individual names have been excluded to ensure confi dentiality.

Both teams were hosted and supported by the peacekeeping mission in each country, which proved highly useful in facilitating access to key informants both within and outside the mission. Interviewees and participants were largely recruited via a ‘snowball’ or network approach, and both teams sought to ensure maximum variation among interviewees (i.e. across diverse segments of society) to the extent possible, so as to gain a wide variety of perspectives. In Liberia, the team conducted its research in the capital city Monrovia (Montserrado County), and in other counties including Bong, Grand Gedeh, Grand Bassa and Bomi. In CAR, the team mainly conducted its research in the capital city Bangui, and it also had the opportunity to visit Kaga Bandoro, a town in northwestern CAR.

Upon returning from the fi eld, the teams consolidated and analyzed their fi ndings, sharing data to identify common trends and connections between the two case studies. Neither the report, nor its recommendations express the team’s personal opinions or beliefs. The information presented in this report – both country-specifi c and general – refl ect perspectives from the ground, on issues and concerns described by interviewees. Throughout the report there are several references to key concepts, including community engagement, inclusive national ownership and civil society, among others. A summary can be found in Annex A. Limitations of the research

While conducting interviews and focus groups, both teams came across a number of research limitations, including:

• Time constraints: For fi nancial and logistical reasons, the research teams were only able to spend four weeks in each country. Thus, it was challenging to collect substantial data with a large number of stakeholders in such a limited period of time.

• Sample size and accessibility of stakeholders: Teams were unable to speak to certain groups who were initially targeted as key stakeholders, either due to their unavailability or inaccessibility. In Liberia, for example the upcoming elections created a

Lindenmayer at the School of International and Public Aff airs at Columbia University. The course aimed to provide students with a conceptual and critical understanding of some of the key frameworks, tools and approaches used by peacekeeping operations. The purpose was to prepare students to conduct research in New York and in a peacekeeping operation, and build on the body of existing research to make a contribution to the fi eld of peacekeeping. It examined some of the tools used by peacekeeping operations in the implementation of their mandates and the usefulness of these tools in achieving their goals, with particular attention to the complex and diffi cult tasks of peacebuilding and the achievement of sustainable peace. The course also provided an analysis of the background and current context of both case study countries, and students were divided into two research teams assigned to either Liberia or CAR.

The fi ndings and arguments presented in this research are grounded in an intensive and comprehensive review of existing literature on community engagement in peacekeeping and both case study countries. Students also conducted several interviews with UN offi cials and other experts in New York City (see Appendix B and C). In line with ethical and compliance standards, the team completed the Human Subjects Protection Training through Columbia University’s Research and Compliance Administration System, and the research protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Columbia University (see Appendix E).

Field research

Over a four-week period from May to June 2016, the two research teams conducted qualitative research in Liberia and CAR, which consisted of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. In both countries, each team met with over 200 stakeholders at the local, national and international level and across various sectors. Interviewees and participants included representatives from the UN, host government, regional organizations, international NGOs, foreign governments, local authorities as well as a wide range of community and civil society groups, including traditional, religious and community leaders, women, youth, former combatants, refugees and returnees, among others. A list of organizations and social categories that each team met with can be found in Appendix B and C.

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politically sensitive environment in which some government offi cials were unwilling to talk to the team. In CAR, women in general were diffi cult to access, and representatives of women’s groups were repeatedly unavailable.

• Security: The security environment in the Central African Republic remains extremely fragile and volatile. The research team was subject to UN safety protocols required of all UN workers and affi liates, and unaccompanied travel was not permitted. Thus, the team was restricted to MINUSCA transportation, which limited the team’s ability to improvise interviews with the local population. In addition, areas outside of Bangui remain largely under the control of armed groups, which are designated as high-risk zones. This restriction limited the geographic scope of the research in CAR, as well as access to groups of certain social strata.

• Mobility: Infrastructure in Liberia is still largely underdeveloped, and accessing the interior of the country is often diffi cult unless traveling by plane. The team also visited the country during rainy season, which made access and mobility even more diffi cult. Dirt roads made it impossible to travel by land, and fl ights were often cancelled or postponed due to weather conditions.

16

CASE STUDY: THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The CAR research team meets with United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, in his offi ce at MINUSCA headquarters in Bangui.

Photo credit: MINUSCA staff

After years of brutal internal confl ict and a historic transition to democratic rule, the Central African Republic (CAR) fi nds itself at a crossroads. Following the election of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in February 2016, there is a great deal of hope in the new government to set the country on a new path towards sustainable peace. Yet, CAR continues to face enormous challenges: insecurity persists in many parts of the country, economic development remains extremely low and the near total absence of the state outside of the capital, Bangui, prevents any meaningful consolidation of peace. Nevertheless, given its recent deployment, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has an opportunity to foster inclusive national ownership from the outset of a post-confl ict transition.

This case study presents an overview of the opportunities and challenges for inclusivity and community engagement, based on interviews and

discussions with a range of international, national and local stakeholders across various sectors. First, the study provides a historical context of CAR, focusing on the root causes and major events of the most recent confl ict from December 2012 to the present. Next, it analyzes the characteristics and perceptions among the main stakeholders in the country, including the MINUSCA, the CAR government, civil society, armed groups and the International Contact Group on CAR, known as the G8, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics between them. The case study then takes a closer look at the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, a recent consultative forum organized by the CAR transitional government with hundreds of national and local stakeholders, and the subsequent monitoring and implementation mechanisms put in place. Then, the case study identifi es the current tools and mechanisms used by MINUSCA to engage civil society and local communities directly in the work of the Mission or to facilitate post-Bangui Forum engagement with the government. The case study

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also provides an analytical description of the constraints and challenges to eff ective engagement as highlighted by various actors the research team interviewed. Finally, it explores the way forward in CAR by discussing the various priority setting initiatives that are currently ongoing among key stakeholders and the role of civil society.

The country has reached several milestones – most notably the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation as well as presidential and parliamentary elections and a constitutional referendum – and it will be critical for the new CAR government, with the support of MINUSCA and international partners, to build on the momentum of these achievements by acting on the Forum’s recommendations and institutionalizing mechanisms for community engagement. MINUSCA must also continue to engage civil society and local communities through its work to ensure that technical tasks are not implemented in a vacuum and that root causes are addressed. In this regard, the case study focuses on the process of forming a common vision for the future of the country between the new CAR government, international partners, and the people of CAR.

CONTEXTSince it gained independence in 1960, the Central African Republic has witnessed surges of violence and instability throughout its tumultuous history of military coups, rebellions, and foreign interventions. In the context of weak state institutions, gross socioeconomic disparities and deep inter-ethnic cleavages, the situation in CAR remains extremely fragile, and the country ranks 187 out of 188 on the UN’s Human Development Index.33 Several enabling factors - namely, the pervasive climate of impunity, the exploitation of natural resources and the proliferation of arms - have contributed to a reality in which the vast territory outside of Bangui, remains largely under the de facto rule of various armed groups. At the root of the confl ict, the historical marginalization, disenfranchisement and exclusion of Muslims from the country’s political, economic and social development have fomented deep-seated resentment among the Muslim population, driving many to take up arms to gain power. Despite a long

history of peaceful coexistence, decades of “predatory governance,” including the deliberate manipulation of ethnic and religious divisions for political ends, have fueled sectarian clashes between armed groups, which then metamorphosed into widespread inter-communal violence between Muslims and non-Muslims across the country.34 The most recent internal confl ict has eroded the social fabric and cohesiveness of the population, resulting in thousands of casualties, mass displacement and widespread destruction.

In December 2012, the newly-formed Séléka Alliance, a coalition of predominantly Muslim rebel groups from the north, took over the northern and central regions of the country, and eventually marched on Bangui. By March 2013, the Séléka had overthrown President Francois Bozizé, and the leader of the Séléka, Michel Djotodia, declared himself President - the fi rst Muslim President in CAR’s history. In the following months, inter-communal tensions escalated as predominantly Christian self-defense militias formed, calling themselves the Anti-balaka (meaning ‘anti-machete’) to retaliate against Séléka rebels. By the end of 2013, clashes between Séléka rebels and Anti-balaka militias had turned into a full-scale sectarian war, with both sides committing mass killings and grave human rights violations. This prompted the UN Security Council to authorize the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) along with Operation Sangaris, a French peacekeeping mission. Yet, despite regional and French peacekeeping presence, both sides continued to target civilians and commit grave abuses, which spiraled into a vicious cycle of reprisal violence. By January 2014, UN offi cials were warning the international community of the risk of genocide of CAR’s Muslim population.35

Under pressure from regional leaders, Djotodia resigned in January 2014, and Catherine Samba-Panza, the former Mayor of Bangui, was appointed to head the new interim government. In April 2014, the Security Council authorized the deployment of MINUSCA with a priority task to protect civilians. MINUSCA offi cially assumed peacekeeping responsibilities in September 2014, taking over from

33 United Nations Development Programme. (2015). Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development. UNDP, P22734 Cinq-Mars, E. (2015). Too Little, Too Late: Failing to Prevent Atrocities in the Central African Republic. Th e Global Centre for the Responsibility to Pro-tect, Occasional Paper Series No. 7, P6. 35 United Nations Security Council. (2014). Proces Verbal: Central African Republic. United Nations, S/PV.7098.

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ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS

MISCA and operating alongside French Operation Sangaris. The transitional government took signifi cant steps to resolve the confl ict by signing a ceasefi re agreement between armed groups in Brazzaville in July 2014 and facilitating nation-wide consultations leading up to the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation in May 2015.36 The Bangui Forum convened nearly 700 leaders from across CAR society and set forth several actionable recommendations to promote national reconciliation, democratic elections, good governance, security, rule of law and sustainable development.37

In February 2016, the country held its second democratic elections in its history, and following several delays in the electoral process, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, former prime minister under Bozizé, was declared the winner. The electoral process was widely recognized as free and fair and a step towards reconciliation after years of confl ict. In his inaugural speech, Touadéra outlined his administration’s priorities, including disarmament of the country’s rival factions, reform of the national army and boosting economic development. However, the virtual absence of state authority outside of Bangui remains a major challenge, to the extent that peripheral regions of CAR, including the north in particular, maintain a stronger connection to CAR’s neighbors than to the CAR government itself.38 Moreover, the country remains deeply divided given the de facto partition between the predominantly Anti-balaka-controlled West and the former Séléka-controlled East. In addition, according to UN estimates, more than 80 percent of CAR’s Muslim population has been forcibly displaced outside of the country.39

For 20 years, CAR has seen a succession of UN and regional peacekeeping missions, special political missions, peacebuilding initiatives and bilateral military interventions (France and Chad). Yet, it appears that they have only sought to treat the symptoms of the confl ict, rather than the root causes that have fueled longer-running tensions and mistrust. As one scholar on CAR pointed out:

“Immediate concerns of short-term stabilization have trumped long-term investment in addressing underlying causes of violence and confl ict. Interest in CAR has therefore resembled an accordion with ‘an infl ux of peacekeeping, peacebuilding forces and humanitarian agencies during peaks of violence followed by a prompt exit to focus on the next crisis of the day.”40 CAR remains under the strong infl uence of regional and international actors, particularly the G8 – all of whom have their own agendas which have not always been aligned. Following a recent meeting with President Touadéra, the UN Secretary-General welcomed “the resolve of the President and his Government to pursue [a comprehensive] process in a spirit of national reconciliation and inclusiveness, guided by the principles and recommendations of the Bangui Forum.” 41 It will be critical for the new CAR government to follow through on this commitment to ensure that an inclusive and resilient society emerges from the wreckage of civil war.

The following section analyzes the characteristics of and perceptions among the main stakeholders in the country, including MINUSCA, the CAR government, civil society, armed groups and the G8. These descriptions are based on interviews and discussions with a variety of international, national and local stakeholders and provide valuable insight on the dynamics and relations between them. Perceptions play an extremely powerful role in a society such as CAR where low levels of literacy and a strong oral tradition prevail. Understanding these dynamics is crucial to identifying the opportunities and challenges to building a more inclusive society in the country.

MINUSCA

Through many interviews, it became increasingly clear that distorted perceptions of MINUSCA, and its peacekeeping troops in particular, among the local

36 Interim government of CAR. (2015). Immediate Priorities for Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic: Advocacy Document Presented at the High-Level Side Event on CAR at the 70th UN General Assembly. Interim Government of CAR.37 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic. United Nations, S/2015/918.38 Carayannis, T. & Lombard, L. (2015). Making Sense of the Central African Republic. London: Zed Books.39 United Nations Security Council. (2014). Th e International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic: Final Report. United Nations, S/2014/928.40 Akasaki, G., Ballestraz, E. & Sow, M. (2015). What Went Wrong in the Central African Republic?. Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, Paper No. 12. 41 United Nations News Centre. (2016). Ban Welcomes Central African Republic President’s Resolve to Seek All-inclusive Resolution to Crisis. United Na-tions.

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The CAR research team meets with the UN Police Commissioner and UNPOL staff at MINUSCA headquarters in Bangui.

Photo credit: MINUSCA staff

population were a direct consequence of insuffi cient community engagement by the Mission. As a result, many interviewees among the local population, including youth, women and community leaders, expressed a level of distrust with the Mission and a misunderstanding of what MINUSCA is in the country to do. This could be due, in part, to a lack of clear mandate to pursue a more people-oriented approach through consultations and community engagement. MINUSCA’s initial mandate focused on stemming the violence, stabilizing the country and protecting civilians; it did not include a specifi c task to engage a broader range of local stakeholders outside of the CAR government. Other tasks in the initial mandate included support for the transition process, facilitating humanitarian assistance, promotion and protection of human rights, support for justice and the rule of law, and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation processes.42

Many local interviewees perceive MINUSCA as having failed to prevent and respond to threats, risks and alerts of violence in a consistent and timely manner. According to MINUSCA staff , this is partly due to logistical challenges, such as lack of telecommunication service and weak infrastructure in the country, but some interviewees also attribute this to weak presence and poor training of UN troops. This has contributed to a pervasive sense of insecurity, as evidenced by the prevalence of community self-defense groups throughout the country. The perceived lack of responsiveness to threats and acts of violence has engendered a lack of trust of MINUSCA within some communities, according to several

community leaders, and there is a common feeling that MINUSCA has not upheld its mandate to protect civilians. In one example, one local interviewee recalled a situation in which a fi ght broke out in the middle of the street in Kaga Bandoro, and MINUSCA troops simply drove around it, ignoring the need to intervene. Other local interviewees have also recounted massacres and acts of violence that occurred with no reaction from MINUSCA troops. Feelings of mistrust have been further compounded by recent mass allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse as well as some allegations of extrajudicial killings by peacekeepers in CAR.43

Many interviewees among civil society leaders and human rights activists recognized the valuable deterrent eff ect of MINUSCA’s peacekeeping presence around the country. However, the perceived inconsistency of MINUSCA’s response to some acts of violence and not others, as well as the inability of troops to explain why they don’t or can’t intervene, has contributed to a deep misunderstanding of MINUSCA’s mandate, particularly regarding protection of civilians. During a civil society meeting organized by MINUSCA that the research team attended, several community leaders from PK5, the main Muslim community in Bangui, underlined the necessity of MINUSCA having clear explanations and commitments in line with the mandate, demonstrating that confi dence in the Mission remains weak.

Some local interviewees, including civil society leaders, also expressed stronger confi dence in certain troop contingents, notably francophone African troops, while others expressed skepticism and distrust towards other contingents, such as non-French speaking or neighboring country troops. It emerged from interviews with community leaders that language barriers between UN troops and the local population are a major obstacle to community engagement and therefore building trust. Several interviewees noted that the cultural and linguistic affi nity of certain francophone African troops enabled a stronger level of community engagement and confi dence building. At the same time, community leaders in Bangui expressed a strong level of skepticism and distrust of troops from neighboring countries deployed along their respective borders.

42 United Nations Security Council. (2014). Security Council Resolution on Central African Republic. United Nations, S/RES/2149(2014).43 Human Rights Watch. (2016). Central African Republic: Murder by Peacekeepers -- Discovery of Mass Grave Provides New Evidence. Human Rights Watch.

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Given certain dynamics within the region, such as exploitation of natural resources, regional confl icts and geopolitical factors, interviewees were highly skeptical of the motives behind neighboring country peacekeeping presence.

Some interviewees, particularly those in the internally displaced persons camp at M’Poko International Airport in Bangui, perceive that MINUSCA lacks impartiality by focusing its protection eff ort on certain groups. They expressed the belief that the Mission is partial to Muslim communities given the strong presence of MINUSCA troops around Muslim areas. For example, in the Muslim area of PK5 in Bangui, UN troops have helped some Muslims move freely outside of the area by providing protection, which has created some negative perceptions among the non-Muslim community that troops are not impartial. One civil society representative cited an instance where some residents of PK5 went outside of the enclaved area and killed some non-Muslims, and when they returned to PK5, UN troops had secured and blocked the area to non-Muslims who were seeking revenge. According to interviewees, this perception of partiality contributes to the divisiveness between communities, which is perceived as continuing the legacy of colonialism and protecting foreign interests in CAR. Interviewees insisted on the need to keep outside intervention in CAR completely impartial, without favoring either side in the confl ict.

From the viewpoint of the government, offi cials recognized the critical role of MINUSCA during the crisis, but there is a general feeling that MINUSCA’s role needs to be redefi ned to adapt to the post-transition context. According to a former offi cial, MINUSCA’s mandate should be reassessed in light of multiple and complex challenges the country still faces, particularly with regards to security. According to the offi cial, there is a risk that the current mandate does not allow MINUSCA to act forcefully enough to respond to acts of violence or security challenges. As a result, there is a major gap between the interpretation of the mandate and the expectations of the people of CAR in terms of protection and security. At the same time, a government offi cial insisted that “all the partners, including MINUSCA and UN agencies who wish to assist CAR, should do so in close coordination with the government to avoid duplication and unnecessary misunderstandings.”

During an interview, a representative of a regional organization in CAR argued that the UN must learn to limit its missions’ mandates to specifi c timelines. The representative argued: “The UN is not intended to run a country. It should not perpetuate its presence in a country; otherwise it will make the country more dependent on external assistance.” He expressed the opinion that, at its current rate, the MINUSCA is likely to stay for more than a decade in CAR. The representative further argued that “if the UN continues to remain in a country for more than fi ve years, it should conclude that it has failed and withdraw.” In his view, there are diminishing marginal returns with the presence of UN peacekeeping beyond fi ve years, at which stage its presence does more harm than good. Upon the withdrawal of peacekeeping, this should not mean a change of SRSG or Force Commander, but rather the focus should be on capacity building of the national and local governments. He mentioned that MINUSCA has made considerable eff orts in stabilizing the country, but its reputation remains tarnished by the gap between the expectations of the local population and its eff ectiveness on the ground. As long as there is no local ownership over the peace process, the situation will remain extremely fragile with a high risk of return to confl ict. In addition, the country will remain dependent on external actors for both security and development. Government of CAR

Diff erent regimes throughout CAR’s history have had very diff erent relations with civil society and therefore varying levels of community engagement. During President François Bozizé’s rule from 2003 to 2013, the government was generally open to working with civil society organizations (CSOs) and organized two inclusive political dialogues in 2003 and 2008. The purpose of these dialogues was to put forth a shared diagnosis of the underlying sources of tension and confl ict in CAR society and to identify potential solutions among national stakeholders. However, following the overthrow of Bozizé, Michel Djotodia’s regime cut off relations with civil society and human rights activists.44 Subsequently, many CSOs left the country and their national counterparts were put on standby. During the transitional government of interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, civil society actors were re-mobilized in popular consultations through the Bangui Forum process.

44 Michel Djotodia was the President of the Central African Republic from 2013 to 2014.

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During interviews, some government and civil society actors noted that the CAR government has a long history of organizing national-level consultations, including seminars, debates, reconciliation conferences and dialogues. However, the implementation of the outcomes and recommendations of these fora have consistently been lacking. According to civil society interviewees, CSOs are often asked to provide recommendations for these kinds of consultations, but the recommendations are almost always the same, and there is little real change or progress in implementation, despite good intentions and consensus among stakeholders. Civil society interviewees noted that the lack of eff ective implementation is an issue of the government’s political will and has consequently generated a level of “fatigue of consultations.” As two scholars on CAR noted:

“Throughout the decade of la Bozizie the country went through a series of internationally-led peacebuilding and state-building initiatives. The government and rebel parties to these endeavors generally endorsed them in form rather than in spirit, and worked them to their own advantage. The international actors funding the processes were invested in presenting them as successful... What all this meant was that grievances among the population and among the growing ranks of sidelined political elites grew in inverse proportion to the offi cial channels (national dialogues, elections, etc.) to express them.”45

This illustrates a key point within the new paradigm of a more people-centered approach to peacekeeping.

45 Carayannis, T. & Lombard, L. (2015). Making Sense of the Central African Republic. London: Zed Books, P6.

Under this paradigm, it is assumed that people are eager to be engaged and consulted at every stage of the peacekeeping process. However, to maintain this desire for inclusivity, it is necessary to provide proof that their voice has been heard and leads to real change in the implementation of public policies. Consultation should not be perceived as an end in itself.

Among displaced communities, the most fragile category of the population, the lack of access to basic services and provisions has fostered strong feelings of desperation and abandonment by the government. During a visit to the internally displaced persons camp at M’Poko in Bangui, the research team witnessed the extremely diffi cult living conditions of residents at the camp, including the lack of water, insuffi cient food and little access to healthcare and education. Over 20,000 people, predominantly non-Muslims from the central districts in Bangui, have settled in the camp, and many have nowhere to return following the loss or destruction of their homes. Many residents said that the current security situation prevents them from returning to their communities. Given their precarious living situation, one of the women leaders at M’Poko camp stated: “If the government and the international community are not ready to do anything, we are ready to be martyrs.”

At the time of fi eld research, President Touadéra was newly-inaugurated, and while the majority of interviewees praised the legitimacy of the elections process, most refrained from expressing strong perceptions of the new government. They

The CAR research team meets with the Archbishop of Bangui along the Oubangui River. The Archbishop is one of the main leaders of the Inter-Religious Platform for peace and reconciliation in CAR.

Photo credit: CAR local photographer

The CAR research team meets with the Imam of Point Kilometre 5 (PK5), the main Muslim district in Bangui, at the Central Mosque of PK5

Photo credit: CAR local photographer

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emphasized that it needs more time to set its agenda and implementation plan. At the same time, a high-level government offi cial underscored the importance of national ownership – that international and regional partners must recognize “the fact that there are now legally elected authorities in the Central African Republic… [and that] no action should be taken without consulting the government as the main interlocutor.”

Civil Society

There are currently over 230 civil society organizations offi cially registered in CAR, which cover a wide spectrum of local and national issues ranging from environmental preservation to protection of indigenous communities.46 The majority of interviewees – from MINUSCA, the CAR government and civil society – highlighted human rights, faith-based and women’s organizations as the most active and infl uential in CAR society. However, civil society in CAR in general remains extremely weak and constrained by several challenges, according to virtually all interviewees. Many CSOs lack the fi nancial resources and institutional capacity to be eff ectiveindependent entities. Therefore, many lack autonomy and remain tied to (and funded by) international organizations with varying agendas.

CSOs are also predominantly concentrated in Bangui, leaving the vast population outside of the capital without avenues for their voices to be heard. Furthermore, according to several interviewees, powerful individuals (mostly lawyers) create these CSOs with the support of CAR’s small elite circle. The development of larger, national-level CSOs by the country’s elites has reinforced a general lack of representativeness of the46 MINUSCA Civil Aff airs staff peg this number at around 400, based on frequent interaction with CSOs. [Source: “Répertoire des organisations membres de la CIONGCA 2015.” Conseil Inter-ONG en Centrafrique.]

country as a whole, according to a former high-level CAR offi cial. Moreover, the low level of education and development in CAR has also prevented the spread and development of CSOs in other parts of the country. Therefore, civil society in CAR has largely and historically been defi ned by CAR’s elite, reinforcing exclusionary social dynamics and limiting what CSOs can achieve for the wider population.

Based on several interviews with former and current government offi cials – many of whom came from leadership positions in civil society – it emerged that leaders of civil society organizations have a tendency to use their position to enter into politics. This has had a detrimental eff ect on the credibility of CSOs and discredits their role as an independent counter-balance to political power. One high-level government offi cial noted that CAR’s civil society, in its current confi guration, retains neither legitimacy nor credibility, explaining that it must refocus on civic values if it is to regain its infl uence. Several interviewees explained that, in this context, it is diffi cult to institutionalize coordination mechanisms without creating competition among civil society actors, especially in a context where civil society

The CAR team meets with the Committee for Dialogue and Reconciliation at the MINUSCA fi eld offi ce headquarters in Kaga Bandoro. The Committee works to strengthen social cohesion and mutual understanding between local communities.

Photo credit: MINUSCA Staff

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actors see every position as a means of gaining more power and money, and such opportunities are rare.

As a general exception to some of the challenges highlighted above, many interviewees noted that religious leaders maintain a strong moral leadership and play a critical role in social cohesion and confl ict resolution in CAR society. In particular, the Inter-religious Platform for Reconciliation and National Cohesion, consisting of the three main religions in CAR (Catholic, Muslim and Protestant), was instrumental in helping to curb violence during the height of the confl ict. According to leaders of the platform, the platform sought to ease inter-communal tensions by demonstrating that the confl ict was not religious, but rather a political manipulation of ethnic and religious diversity for individual political gain. For example, during the confl ict, religious institutions served as safe havens to protect all civilians fl eeing from inter-communal violence. Faith-based organizations were also instrumental in facilitating inter-faith dialogue among key stakeholders during the country’s transitional government. Several interviewees thus expressed support for the Platform as a highly credible mechanism for the peacebuilding process in CAR.

Armed Groups

Several armed groups still maintain control over large swathes of the territory in CAR and have completely taken over functions that would normally be carried out by the government, including security (e.g. police and gendarmerie), justice, and levying taxes. Armed groups also maintain control of various sources of wealth, including cattle and livestock, coff ee, oil, diamond and other natural resource mining, and manning checkpoints. In practical terms, it is only in the capital city of Bangui that the government fully exercises its authority.

During the research mission, the team conducted a visit to Kaga Bandoro, a town in northern region of CAR, located 245 kilometers north of Bangui, and witnessed the virtual absence of state authority. In Kaga Bandoro, a prefect and sub-prefect were symbolically named by the new CAR government, but they do not exercise genuine authority, nor do they have staff or other resources of support. As a result, armed groups have divided the sovereign functions of the state among themselves, and each group controls a major stream of income. Based on interviews

conducted with representatives of these groups, it was clear that each of these groups has a specifi c agenda and respective claims to power. More importantly, there is a strong level of distrust between armed groups and between armed groups and the new CAR government.

Based on interviews, members of one faction of the ex-Séléka argue that the communities they represent have historically been excluded and marginalized both in terms of the governance of the country, as well as the distribution of wealth and allocation of development projects and resources (i.e. roads, schools, hospitals, water, and electricity). The leaders of ex-Séléka aspire to be offi cially appointed to positions in the government or in the apparatus of the CAR state, including the national army, gendarmes, and police, in order to contribute to the decisions that aff ect them and their people. In addition, they would like to see a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process led in parallel to security sector reform that will allow their qualifi ed soldiers to integrate into the national army. Until their demands are met, they will not concede, and some members explained that the ex-Séléka are in the process of forming a single chain of command in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the new government and to make their voice heard. MINUSCA offi cials have emphasized that the “reunifi cation of the ex-Séléka factions would be a disaster” for the country.

The Anti-balakas, from their perspective, feel their group symbolizes the Central African liberation struggle and as such, they deserve to be honored by the President and his government. This is refl ected in their demand to be recognized and represented in the government. They also believe that the government is currently unable to protect them from the repeated acts of aggression and destruction of their farms. To give up their weapons, they demand that the government meet two demands: formal roles in government and property protection.

International Contact Group on CAR

The International Contact Group on CAR (ICG-CAR), also known as the G8, was formed in 2013 upon the initiative of the African Union to help the country return to constitutional order. The G8 includes the African Union, UN, European Union, France, United States, Republic of Congo, Economic Community of

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As discussed in the previous section, CAR has a long history of staging national dialogues and consultations between the government and civil society. Nonetheless, the Bangui Forum, which took place after the most devastating confl ict the country has ever seen, represented a critical milestone on the path towards defi ning a collective vision for the future of the country. In order to build a more inclusive society in CAR, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of what the Forum achieved and the progress that has been made since. Based on interviews and discussions with civil society, government and international actors, this section takes a closer look at the Bangui Forum and the subsequent monitoring and implementation mechanisms put in place.

The Bangui Forum

Organized by the transitional government under interim President Samba-Panza, the Bangui Forum for National Reconciliation, which took place from May 4 to 11, 2015, convened nearly 700 leaders from all sectors and geographic areas of CAR, including the transitional government, political parties, armed groups, the private sector, civil society, community leaders and religious groups. Leading up to the Forum, the transitional government also organized nation-wide consultations, which were unprecedented in scale and scope. The Forum was hailed by the UN as a “historic and inclusive process that amplifi ed the voices of local representatives, women, youth and civil society.”47 Key recommendations were adopted in the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction regarding the country’s peacebuilding agenda, including: 1) a disarmament agreement between ex-Séléka and Anti-balaka; 2) the release of child soldiers; 3) a timeline for elections; 4) national and local mechanisms for reconciliation and justice; and 5) social and economic development priorities.48

segments of the population, particularly outside of Bangui.

CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS

47 Ban, K. (2015). Secretary-General Commends Central African Republic for Adopting Peace, Reconciliation Pact at Bangui National Forum. United Nations, SG/SM/16739-AFR/3131.48 Copley, A. & Amadou, S. (2015). Five Takeaways from the Bangui Forum for National Reconciliation in the Central African Republic. Brookings Institution.

Central African States (ECCAS) and World Bank. Since its establishment, the G8 has provided support to the peace process, national consultations, and the transition to democratic rule. It should be noted that the initiatives and decisions taken by the G8 are independent from the actions taken by individual members of the Group on the basis of their bilateral relations with CAR.

Members of the CAR government and civil society acknowledged the invaluable contribution of the G8 to the political process, which ultimately led to the return to constitutional order. However, some also noted that unilateral agendas and lack of coordination within the G8, particularly regarding next steps and priorities in the peacebuilding process, has resulted in fragmented eff orts. A senior government offi cial argued that the G8 would be more eff ective if it harmonized its approach, noting that the Group as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, so as to build a more resilient society in CAR. Several local actors expressed a negative perception of international partners in CAR, saying they are only here to exploit natural resources.

It would also seem that the G8 as a whole has not prioritized a more people-centered approach in the peacekeeping process. A prominent local civil society representative and member of the Bangui Forum Follow-Up Committee noted that international partners were not in favor of the popular consultations process leading up to the Bangui Forum due to the fi nancial resources it required. International partners had initially refused to provide funding for it, arguing that it would only prolong the transition. The representative argued that international partners often give the impression of supporting fragile countries, but do not invest in long-term, sustainable solutions to chronic challenges, partly because of their own national interests. He noted that it took the fi rm determination of the former transitional President Samba-Panza to organize consultation process prior to the Bangui Forum. However, it should also be noted that certain individual members of the G8, such as the U.S., provided technical and logistical support during the popular consultations and the Forum, and have also used their political leverage to encourage the new President to consult with various

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Virtually all interviewees acknowledged that the Bangui Forum was a symbolic step in that it had broad participation among national stakeholders across the country, produced concrete and substantive recommendations for a peaceful future for CAR, and took place without violence. In an interview, a CAR government offi cial praised the Bangui Forum as “the most inclusive consultation in the history of the Central African Republic, which enabled all citizens to express their views regarding the future of the country.” Some interviewees noted that previous initiatives to resolve the confl ict (e.g. the peace agreements signed in Nairobi and Brazzaville in 2013 and 2014, respectively) engaged only a limited number of actors and mainly those directly involved in the armed confl ict; thus, the success of the Bangui Forum was due to its broad participation.

However, the general consensus among interviewees in civil society, government and the UN is that progress towards implementing the Forum’s recommendations has been very slow, and the outcomes are not actively being endorsed or carried forward by the new government. Many interviewees explained that this is due to a lack of political will at the national level, which has historically been a major constraint to economic, political and social development in the country. As one G8 government offi cial explained, the new government seems to consider the Bangui Forum as an accomplishment of the previous transitional government under interim President Samba-Panza, noting that the new President will seek to forge his own legacy.

Yet, even if the new government has not explicitly and actively referred to the Bangui Forum, some MINUSCA and G8 offi cials say the recommendations of the Forum are, in fact, being prioritized and implemented progressively. According to them, all of the priorities President Touadéra has announced so far - namely, security (including DDR and SSR), reconciliation and economic development - seem to be in line with the recommendations of the Forum and refl ect the major concerns of Central Africans.49 However, according to a CAR government offi cial, consultations have not been held nor consultative mechanisms put in place since the Bangui Forum because, from the government’s view, this was already achieved during the Forum. In other words, mechanisms for community engagement and consultation post-Bangui Forum have not been institutionalized

because the government does not appear to see an added value. The general view among government offi cials was that ‘the box has been checked’ with regards to consultations with local communities and civil society and that further consultation is not currently necessary.

The Bangui Forum Follow-Up Committee

Following the conclusion of the Forum, the Bangui Forum Follow-Up Committee was created to monitor the implementation progress of the Forum’s recommendations. The Committee, composed of 24 members representing various sectors of CAR society (i.e. government, political parties, civil society, diaspora, youth, women, social minorities, trade unions, employers, media, religious platform, politico-military groups, etc.) and international partners, is a separate entity from the government but depends on the government for funding. The Chair of the Committee, nominated by transitional President Samba-Panza, is Joseph Bindoumi, a former Minister of Defense during the transitional government and former President of the Central African League of Human Rights. During an interview, the Chair clarifi ed that the Committee is not responsible for the implementation of recommendations but rather serves to monitor the implementation of the Forum’s recommendations by key stakeholders, including the new CAR government. To carry this out, the Committee sends reminders through various channels (i.e. mail, courtesy visits, and meetings) to the responsible parties and reports on progress to the public.

Several actors among the G8 expressed the view that the Follow-Up Committee does not appear to have a clear added value. According to interviewees, the Committee has failed to share its monitoring reports with a wide range of stakeholders, including international partners and local actors that took part in the Forum’s consultations, which has contributed to a lack of transparency regarding the implementation process. Moreover, several international actors expressed skepticism regarding the leadership of the Committee under Joseph Bindoumi, given his political ties as a former Defense Minister under the transitional government. According to interviewees, the Committee is working to expand into a larger state institution with antennae offi ces around the country. However, this would require substantial

49 Reuters. (2016). Central African Republic’s President Vows Peace, Reforms at Inauguration. Reuters.

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critical role in the peacebuilding process in CAR, and will serve as a transitional justice mechanism as part of the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Aff airs. Importantly, the Commission will also work to facilitate the return of displaced communities both within and outside of the country.50 According to an interview with the Ministry, the success of the Commission will require an inclusive process with the participation of a broad range of stakeholders through local peace committees, which are in the process of being set up across the country. These committees will be composed of diverse segments of CAR society, including local authorities, religious leaders, elders, youth and women, and will work to promote social cohesion and reconciliation at the local level. According to government offi cials, these committees will be essential to translating the work of the Commission at the local level and will require substantial fi nancial support.

According to interviews with government offi cials, some governmental seminars have already been organized about the functioning of the Commission. However, it seems that the modalities of operationalization have not yet been adopted, particularly with regards to transitional justice. As a recurring constraint, the government continues to face fi nancial diffi culties to fully implement the Commission.

Although community engagement and inclusivity were not included in its initial mandate, MINUSCA has employed a number of tools for community engagement to foster a more consultative and collaborative relationship with civil society and local communities. Based on interviews and discussions with local communities, civil society actors, and MINUSCA offi cials, this section surveys the various tools that the Mission has used to build more inclusive national ownership in CAR.

MINUSCA Civil Aff airs

The Civil Aff airs Section of MINUSCA plays a critical role in engaging civil society and local communities

TOOLS FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

50 More than 900,000 people, representing 20% of the total population, have been displaced by the confl ict. Th e research team met with internally displaced persons in M’Poko camp in Bangui as well as in Kaga Bandoro -- the majority of whom expressed the wish to return home but feared for their security. Simi-lar concerns were echoed by displaced Muslims living in PK5, the main Muslim neighborhood in Bangui, which has been eff ectively enclaved. Th e majority of those displaced have lost their homes, which have either been destroyed or taken over by new residents.

resources in a context where the Committee already has very limited fi nancial means to carry out its work. As one civil society leader and member of the Committee underscored, it will be critical to have a functional committee that can monitor what has been achieved, what hasn’t been achieved and why, and plan strategically for the short- and long-term.

Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission One of the signifi cant outcomes of the Bangui Forum consultation process was the concept of a Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission. During interviews, the majority of stakeholders among civil society, local communities and national and local government stressed that lasting peace and reconciliation will not be possible in CAR without equitable justice. They asserted that the lack of accountability only serves to embolden perpetrators. As the Archbishop of Bangui, one of the main leaders of the Inter-Religious Platform for Reconciliation and National Cohesion, stated: “Justice should be the fi rst priority in the Central African Republic, otherwise the strongest will become ever stronger and the weakest will become weaker. This would plunge the country into disorder and injustice, which are the very source of tension and confl ict… Perpetrators of atrocities must answer for their actions. This is the only way to preserve future generations from war and crime.”

Drawing from a report on the nation-wide consultation process that was held in advance of the Bangui Forum, the purpose of the Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission is to provide a channel to hear the voices of victims, facilitate access to justice and provide a platform for national reconciliation. According to the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction adopted at the conclusion of the Bangui Forum, the Commission will identify and examine crimes and atrocities that have been committed in the country and classify them into two categories: 1) crimes whose perpetrators must be brought to justice, 2) crimes that may be addressed through compensation or general interest work to facilitate inter-communal reconciliation. According to Ministers, members of the President’s cabinet and other government offi cials, the Commission will play a

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in the work of the Mission, with a focus on “supporting local eff orts and bottom up approaches to protection, political dialogue and the promotion of social cohesion, as well as the extension of State authority.”51 In order to carry out this work, the Civil Aff airs section has adapted Protection of Civilians (PoC) pilot tools implemented in other missions, which are based on best practices and seek to increase involvement and ownership of national authorities and civil society organizations. These include the Community Liaison Assistant (CLA) program, Community Alert Networks (CANs), Community Protection Plans (CPPs) and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). According to interviews with MINUSCA offi cials, this work is essential for the achievement of immediate and long-term objectives of the Mission.

Community Liaison Assistants are often described by MINUSCA staff as the “eyes and ears of the Mission.” As of June 2016, there were a total 52 CLAs deployed through Civil Aff airs in various duty stations throughout the country. CLAs are responsible for establishing and building a Community Alert Network (CAN) within their area of responsibility and developing a Community Protection Plan (CPP) for that area based on situational analysis. Through their network, CLAs are in regular contact with local authorities and communities, identify and record threats and attacks against civilians, and provide the

Mission with timely information on security risks, trends and developments through regular reporting mechanisms. According to local interviewees, this type of engagement allows them to communicate their protection needs and also serves as a source of security by facilitating a two-way fl ow of communication between MINUSCA and local actors, building confi dence. In addition to building networks, CLAs also develop CPPs to build local response capacity and resilience, mitigate threats, establish early-warning mechanisms and improve local perceptions of the Mission through dialogue, confi dence building and confl ict management interventions.

Through outreach activities, Civil Aff airs staff also work to sensitize the local population on MINUSCA’s mandate, promote public discussion on key issues and policies related to the mandate and manage expectations about the Mission’s range of possible actions and capacity constraints.52 Several MINUSCA personnel and local stakeholders have praised the work of CLAs, noting that it enables MINUSCA to adapt its work to the local context and analyze trends, which helps to provide early warning about confl ict dynamics and is especially critical in quickly evolving contexts like CAR. It also helps to gauge and respond to local perceptions and expectations in regards to the political and peacebuilding process.

51 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. (2015). MINUSCA Civil Aff airs Annual Work-plan and Budget, July 2015 – June 2016. United Nations. 52 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. (2015). MINUSCA Civil Aff airs Annual Work-plan and Budget, July 2015 – June 2016. United Nations.

The CAR research team meets with residents of a displaced persons camp in Kaga Bandoro, a town in northern CAR located 245 kilometers north of Bangui. The area remains largely under the control of armed groups.

Photo credit: MINUSCA staff

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In one example, the CLA program played a critical role in facilitating dialogue and reducing tensions during a dispute between Muslim and Christian communities in Bangui’s third district, according to an interview with Civil Aff airs staff . The CLA had identifi ed aproblem of Muslims accessing the Muslim cemetery in Boeing, a predominantly Christian area. Christian communities in the area did not want the Muslims to access the cemetery out of fear of confl ict over burial ceremonies. The CLA thus played a mediating role between the two communities, relaying concerns and negotiating reciprocal commitments, which included Christians allowing access to the cemetery and Muslims committing to peaceful processions.

Based on the success of confi dence building between the two communities, the CLA then sought to address a second issue related to Christian communities accessing a market run by the Muslim community. Due to inter-communal tensions, Muslim shops at the market were suff ering from lack of business, while Christian communities lacked access to basic necessities and food items. The space for dialogue and mediation opened by the cemetery issue made it possible to expand market access to the benefi t of both communities. As a result of these two achievements, collaboration between Muslim and Christian youth organizations were launched and have provided another avenue for dialogue and confi dence building.

The Civil Aff airs section has also implemented several QIPs, ranging from the improvement of the delivery of services (e.g. water, electricity, education and health) to infrastructure support to communities (e.g. youth community centers and women’s centers). The research team had the opportunity to visit a QIP that aimed to restore and equip the library at the University of Bangui, the only university in the country which enrolls over 20,000 students. Before the launch of the QIP, perceptions of MINUSCA among university students were relatively tense due to the perceived notion of foreign occupation and the intervention of MINUSCA during student-organized protests. However, since the launch of the QIP at the University library, perceptions and relations have improved, and MINUSCA is openly welcomed at the university. Thus, QIPs not only provide valuable peace dividends and tangible benefi ts to the local population, they have also helped to build public confi dence in the Mission.

Although the budget for QIPs remains limited, QIPs can be extremely eff ective in building trust, particularly in areas where communities may have skeptical views about the presence of the Mission or where tensions persist.

While the Civil Aff airs section has undoubtedly provided valuable contributions to the overall work of the Mission, some limitations have emerged. As acknowledged in the MINUSCA Civil Aff airs Annual Work-Plan and Budget for the period July 2015 to June 2016: “the reality is that the responses to alerts are often reactive rather than preventive.” In addition, the responsiveness of troops to alerts raised by communities through CLAs has not always been suffi cient, according to local interviewees. As one community leader who works with the CLA program stated: “We alert but MINUSCA does not take any measures. So what is the point of working with the CLAs?”

Another major constraint of the Civil Aff airs section is a lack of streamlining of community engagement throughout the Mission and a lack of cross-division communication and information sharing. It was noted during an interview with Civil Aff airs staff that Civil Aff airs is often viewed as the ‘softer side’ of peacekeeping, in contrast to the hard-lined security approach. This has led to a divergence between the civilian and military sides of the Mission, with the military approach generally taking precedence. As one MINUSCA staff member said: “The vision of the HIPPO report has not been widely absorbed throughout the Mission, and therefore, Civil Aff airs still has a limited role within it.”

Pre-DDR and Community Violence Reduction Projects

Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) has yet to offi cially launch in CAR, as it is a national program to be undertaken by the new government. In the meantime, MINUSCA is implementing pre-Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (pre-DDR) and Community Violence Reduction (CVR) Projects, which represent another tool that MINUSCA uses to engage communities.53 CAR is the fi rst country where the UN is implementing a pre-DDR program, which entails paying former combatants to do community work and targets those who are

53 One expert mentioned that the only successful DDR program in Africa was in Liberia because it was UN-led, whereas in CAR, MINUSCA is waiting for the new government to launch DDR.

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to do community work and targets those who are eligible for DDR under the Bangui Forum agreement. Pre-DDR activities aim to increase security in target communities, contribute to building social cohesion, enhance the skills of the ex-combatants and create a foundation for a national DDR program.54 This approach has been piloted in Kaga Bandoro, a town in northwestern CAR, where hundreds of ex-combatants are paid for community work, such as cleaning up the town. To qualify for the program, ex-combatants had to turn in their weapons, which include hand-made guns, assault rifl es and ammunition.55

The CVR program, on the other hand, is designed to be complementary to pre-DDR eff orts and aims to improve security at the communal level. CVR initiatives target armed group elements and associated community members who are not eligible for the national DDR program, but yet whose inclusion into an alternative track is critical.56 According to one MINUSCA offi cial, the main pre-DDR focuses primarily on ex-combatants, whereas diff erence between pre-DDR and CVR programs is that CVR casts a wider net and also targets individuals at risk of being recruited. Several MINUSCA staff explained that CVR is a more eff ective tool as it targets civilians and anyone with weapons, while pre-DDR only targets eligible armed elements and does not take into account individuals who have been forcibly recruited to perform other tasks, such as cooking, cleaning and sexual slavery. UN agency staff explained that a DDR program should be all encompassing of those who have been recruited by armed groups, whether they are soldiers or servants. Given this diff erence in approach, several MINUSCA offi cials explained that CVR programs are more eff ective in reducing the risk of violence at the community level because they provide livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants, as well as for those at risk of being recruited, which reduces incentives that drive people to take up arms.

Despite the benefi ts of the CVR approach, DDR initiatives continue to face major challenges. Based on interviews with MINUSCA offi cials and former combatants, there appears to be a major gap between the expected results of DDR and what can realistically be achieved within the complex context of CAR. This gap is refl ective of the lack of coordination and engagement between stakeholders and represent

54 DDR Section, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. Pre-DDR Brochure. United Nations.55 Long, N. (2016). UN Pilots New Peace Approach in CAR. Voice of America.56 DDR Section, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. Pre-DDR Brochure. United Nations.

missed opportunities for consultation, collaboration and communication. There have been several failed DDR programs in CAR in the past, and several offi cials within MINUSCA expressed concerns over the lack of real incentives for armed elements to give up their weapons, particularly given the control of armed groups over CAR’s vast natural resource wealth, areas of transhumance, and informal economy. In addition, the proliferation of arms throughout the country makes it relatively easy and inexpensive for people to buy weapons, so in a context of extremely low economic development, DDR can have the unintentional eff ect of incentivizing people to take up arms to be eligible for its benefi ts. Under these circumstances, several MINUSCA staff believed that DDR is doomed to fail at the start; however, others believe that many armed groups have grown fatigued with the confl ict and, given a properly structured national DDR program, armed elements could be incentivized to participate.

Armed groups in CAR, however, remain opposed to the DDR (or pre-DDR) process because they have not yet reached a political solution for their disenfranchisement and marginalization. In other words, they insist on apolitical solution as a precondition for disarmament. Since his inauguration, President Touadéra has met directly with armed groups, and the new government is reportedly creating a sub-ministry for their representation. However, it remains to be seen how this will be implemented and if it will satisfy the demands of armed groups. In addition, some armed groups, notably the ex-Séléka, have also expressed a strong desire to be appointed to positions in the national army, which means that any eff ective DDR program would need to go hand-in-hand with a Security Sector Reform program.

UN Radio and Public Information

Given the low level of education and strong oral tradition in CAR, rumors and misinformation are rampant and strongly infl uential in shaping perceptions at the community level. In this context, communication tools are critical to provide accurate and timely information for communities to organize themselves and build public confi dence in the Mission. In order to be eff ective, however, communication tools must be adapted to the local

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CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

The CAR research team visits the internally displaced persons (IDP) camp at M’Poko International Airport in Bangui. The camp hosts around 20,000 IDPs living in precarious conditions. Since the confl ict began in December 2012, nearly one million people-- about 20% of the CAR population-- have been displaced from their homes.

Photo credit: Kelly Joseph (MIA ‘16)

Mistrust and miscommunication

A people-centered approach to peacekeeping, as called for by the HIPPO report, requires a relationship built on trust between MINUSCA and the local population. In the absence of trust and mutual confi dence, the Mission will be unable to engage local communities and actors meaningfully. Several MINUSCA offi cials recognized that the main challenges in engaging productively with communities stem from mistrust, poor communication and distorted perceptions of the Mission and its respective mandate. As a result, the Mission continues to face the challenge of credibility vis-à-vis the people of CAR, according to MINUSCA staff and local actors. This is often due to a lack of clarity and communication of MINUSCA’s mandate, capacity and strategy. Based on several interviews, there appears to be a major disconnect between what the Mission is expected to do for the people of CAR and what it is mandated to do and/or capable of doing.

For example, one civil society leader pointed out that the sheer concentration of armed forces in CAR makes it one the most militarized countries in the world, particularly given the visible and extensive presence of military troops and equipment, but at the same time, the country continues to be plagued by high levels of insecurity. Because MINUSCA troops are not off ensive forces, this is perceived as enabling rebel armed groups to impose their authority over parts of the territory. Civil society actors in general have argued that the people of CAR no longer believe in the ‘will’ of the UN to help bring an end to CAR’s

Despite the gains made through community engagement, several challenges and constraints persist, limiting the eff ectiveness of the tools outlined above. This section describes these challenges, as identifi ed by various stakeholders the research team interviewed. Understanding the nature of these challenges and constraints is crucial in determining how tools for community engagement can be refi ned and adapted to diff erent contexts on the ground, and how they can build on local capacity.

context, such as radio programming and visual graphics for communities with low literacy levels.

The Public Information (PI) Section of MINUSCA maintains four units: radio, publication, media and external relations, and outreach. As one of its main communication channels, the Mission broadcasts information on Radio Guira FM regarding the activities of MINUSCA and its mandate. This work entails collecting information and writing reports, which are consolidated and synthesized at MINUSCA headquarters in Bangui and then broadcasted twice daily. According to PI staff , the use of radio is meant to increase the visibility of the Mission and bridge the gap between expectations and delivery. Other radio programs also exist in CAR, such as Radio Ndeke Luca, which plays an important role in providing a platform to hold elected offi cials accountable to their promises.

PI staff also maintain relationships with a network of local actors and CLAs to collect and disseminate information about events, dynamics and developments in communities. As PI staff in Kaga Bandoro explained, low levels of education and development in CAR prevent traditional methods of communication from being fully eff ective, but word spreads quickly in the community. In this context, PI staff noted that broadcasting messages through the community like a “phone tree” can be extremely eff ective. This involves passing messages to community leaders, especially at churches and mosques where locals often congregate, who then disseminate the information to the local population. Thus, in the context of CAR, religious leaders play an essential role in the dissemination of information and shaping perceptions.

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confl ict. They argue that MINUSCA’s inability to prevent and respond to violence stems from the complexity and lack of clarity over the chains of command, which discredits the organization and raises questions over the need for its presence in CAR. The general view among civil society actors is that there is a considerable gap between the interpretation by MINUSCA of its mandate and the actual protection and security needs of the people of CAR.

In addition, interviewees within the MINUSCA Civil Aff airs team noted that CLAs often face the challenge of having to manage expectations of the local population with regards to development assistance – a kind of quid-pro-quo attitude among some locals (i.e. development assistance in exchange for information through community alert networks). Although peacekeeping missions often suff er from this kind of “crisis of expectations,” it was repeatedly noted in interviews both within MINUSCA and civil society that the gap could be minimized through improved communication that aims to inform, listen, and build trust between the Mission and the local population. In this regard, it is imperative that the local population has access to relevant, accurate and timely information to help mitigate tensions and avoid misinformation. Public confi dence is key to the Mission’s eff ectiveness and ultimately to building sustainable peace within the country.

Controversy over engaging armed groups

According to MINUSCA offi cials, President Touadéra had originally envisioned three phases of dialogue with armed groups, which included: 1) consult representatives of ex-Séléka factions separately, and then meet all factions together; 2) consult representatives of the Anti-balaka groups separately, and then meet all groups together; and 3) convene with ex-Séléka and Anti-balaka representatives together. However, following the conclusion of the fi rst phase, major discrepancies in the approach emerged. The President explained that the Constitution does not allow him to include them in the government and asked that they disarm before the government undertakes support measures. The ex-Séléka explained that this approach does not take into account the concerns of the communities they represent and the causes they each defend. They argued that if the President does not seek to

understand why they took up weapons in the fi rst place, they will not fi nd any reason to give up arms. They argued that in the current fragile context in CAR, the Constitution cannot address their issues without meaningful engagement; therefore, it takes political dialogue and compromise with among key local stakeholders for lasting peace.

Among key stakeholders, opinion remains divided on whether or not it is feasible and a positive step to grant positions in government to representatives of armed groups. Civil society representatives and religious leaders argued against including former combatants in the political process, citing their lack of legitimacy and the risk of sending the wrong message to victims that have been brutalized by armed actors. Some of them have even argued for forced disarmament of armed groups. Leaders of the Inter-Religious Platform for Reconciliation and National Cohesion emphasized that no legitimacy should be given to the armed groups given that elections were held and the legitimate authorities were offi cially and democratically installed. They stressed that “rewarding warlords who have committed atrocity and violence will not be a winning strategy; and will instead weaken public confi dence in new state authority.” They mentioned that MINUSCA should now work to help restore the national army instead of “continuing to roll out the carpet to leaders of armed groups who have terrorized and displaced many Central Africans, the victims of this war.”

This view is shared by many senior offi cials within MINUSCA, who believe the country reached a historic milestone with the elections, and the democratic momentum should be carried forward. For them, the people of CAR have grown fatigued by the vicious cycle of violence. They believe armed groups have no legitimacy to oppose the people’s will and that the legitimacy now fi rmly belongs to the elected president who has the right to refuse to appoint rebel leaders in the government or key positions in the CAR governmental apparatus. However, it is important to note that within the MINUSCA fi eld offi ce in Kaga Bandoro, there is a favorable trend for the integration of armed groups within the military system. Military and civilian staff in this fi eld offi ce, stressed that the government “needs to give a slice of the cake” to these groups as they represent a signifi cant sector of the population and are only asking for equal participation which is seemingly justifi ed in their viewpoints. Thus,

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according to MINUSCA fi eld staff , engaging armed groups is a key component to building sustainable peace in CAR.

“Rich center, poor periphery”

The existence of wide disparities of wealth between Bangui and the rest of the country remains a signifi cant factor contributing to the fragility in CAR. A common theme throughout interviews within MINUSCA and other UN agencies is that inclusion applied only to the “rich center,” whereas marginalization characterized the “poor periphery,” which only contributes to the lack of opportunity for inclusive peacebuilding.

The inequality gap between the rich and the poor in CAR was exemplifi ed throughout the fi eld research through interviews and focus groups with a wide range of people of varying socio-economic status. The vast majority of the resources in CAR are controlled by and concentrated in Bangui (including the government, the UN, and active civil society organizations), all contributing factors to the marginalization of those residing in the regions outside of Bangui. There is a severe lack of presence and extension of state authority in the outlying regions of the country, which limits the ability to eff ectively respond to security risks, monitor dynamics within and between local communities, and deliver basic services such as health and education. This contributes to the perception that the “ownership” of peace and development remains limited to Bangui and therefore risks perpetuating the pattern of marginalization.

Interviewees from UN agencies noted that they face constraints in implementing economic and social projects outside of Bangui due to the lack of infrastructure and presence of armed groups. Because armed groups often prevent access to areas under their control, the local population must rely on international humanitarian organizations for basic provisions and assistance, which should in theory be provided by the government. Thus, the strong divisions between Bangui and the rest of the country continue to impede meaningful engagement and are not conducive to equal and inclusive participation of all citizens.

Weakness of the judicial system

In CAR, mechanisms for justice and accountability are extremely weak – if not nonexistent – and a source of confl ict. A variety of stakeholders interviewed unanimously stressed that impunity has historically been at the center of crisis in the country. Many argued that sustainable peace and social cohesion can only be established if there is redress for crimes that have been committed. Members of the CAR government, including advisors to the President, noted that the lack of mechanisms for justice has contributed to the deterioration of state authority and the loss of trust between the government and its citizens.

Local interviewees argued that establishing mechanisms for justice will help put an end to mass violence, coup d’états and rebellions that have repeatedly destabilized the country. This point of view was echoed by the leaders of the Inter-Religious Platform for Reconciliation and National Cohesion, who stressed that perpetrators should be punished for their crimes and serve as an example for those who are tempted to take up arms and incite violence. One prominent Muslim leader explained that reconciliation initiatives are futile if there is no accountability for crimes. “Muslims have killed Muslims, and Christians have killed Christians, so the real issue is about justice,” he said. He argued that if someone has killed, burned another’s home, or stolen, this is not just a matter of reconciliation, but a matter of justice.

Civil society interviewees, including the Bangui Forum Follow-up Committee, noted that MINUSCA and international partners in CAR should work towards developing and supporting mechanisms for justice as a matter of priority; otherwise, there will continue to be a resurgence of confl ict. In a recent joint civil society appeal to the new President, 21 international and local human rights organizations called on President Touadéra to make justice for international crimes a top priority for his government.57 UNDP and MINUSCA have supported the reconstruction of several buildings for security and justice institutions in CAR. However, lack of resources and capacity continue to be major obstacles for the judicial system to fully exercise its role. The Special Criminal Court, a hybrid court established in June 2015 to investigate,

57 Human Rights Watch. (2016). Central African Republic: Make Justice a Priority -- Joint Civil Society Appeal to the new President. Human Rights Watch.

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prosecute, and try serious violations of human rights committed in CAR since 2003, has yet to take up its functions, due to lack of resources.

Lack of empowerment of women

Women in CAR have historically faced an unending stream of obstacles: lack of governance structures, which make it virtually impossible for women to access justice or understand what their rights are; few opportunities for education and formal livelihoods; and little access to public services. This reality reinforces and perpetuates the marginalization of women and the exclusion of their voices in the country. Moreover, as one rule of law NGO representative explained, there is also “a culture of silence” which undermines the development of women’s rights in the country. While this “culture of silence” as well as the overall exclusion and marginalization of women is not specifi c to CAR, it directly aff ects the peace process, as half the population have not been meaningfully involved, while simultaneously remaining the most severely aff ected by the confl ict. One government offi cial underlined the fact that, as in other African countries, women represent more than half of the population; yet, few conditions are created for their development. They are thus left to deal with the most severe consequences of insecurity, while remaining the least heard.

One of the research team’s major constraints was accessing the women of CAR – demonstrating the pervasiveness of this ‘culture of silence’. At every level, women were diffi cult to reach, and this seemed refl ective of the status of women in CAR society. Previous studies have shown that CAR ranks the lowest on the Human Development Index with regard to women.58 There is a direct link between women’s role in CAR society and their access, or lack thereof, to education.

A dysfunctional education system

The majority of local interviewees noted that the weakness of the education system in CAR has been a major impediment to development and peace in the country. As one local interviewee noted: “The consolidation of peace in the Central African

Republic is inextricably linked to education.” According to UNICEF, one third of school-age children are out of school and around 500 schools – nearly 25% of schools in CAR – are struggling to reopen due to insecurity, displacement and a shortage of qualifi ed teachers.59 As a result, education rates remain extremely low, and many educational facilities are in disrepair throughout the country. This context provides fertile ground for rumors and misinformation to spread, creating and perpetuating distorted perceptions, which can create barriers to eff ective community engagement and consultation.

As several Central African interviewees noted, the root causes of confl ict in CAR will not be addressed if education does not improve, and this remains especially true for the women of CAR. During a focus group with students at the University of Bangui, a group of female students shared their view on the need for “moral education,” so that people “internalize the conditions of peace… [by] building peace at home”. These women argued that this could help to curb sexual harassment and the widespread abuse of women and girls.

Many local interviewees have pointed to ignorance as the main source of confl ict in CAR. Young people in particular were described as being “easily infl uenced and manipulated by negative forces in a society.” Low education levels, they argue, contribute to a general lack of understanding of the current context and ultimately shape a future generation that lacks the knowledge and ability to make decisions independent of outside infl uence from one particular agenda or another. This stresses the importance that the country needs to rebuild its education system for the next generations of CAR to fully realize the county’s potential.

Some interviewees cited the need to improve education on civic duties and values and respect for human rights. Many argued that this is necessary to build the next generation of leaders through education systems that begin at home, building a cadre of leaders who understand both their duties to their fellow citizens and their rights and with a strong moral compass to enforce these tenants of democratic society for many generations to come – including the thoughtful inclusion of women.

58 United Nations Development Programme. (2015), Human Development Report: Work for Human Development. UNDP, Table 5: Gender Inequality Index.59 Gullbert, K. (2016). Th ird of Central African Republic Children out of Class as Schools Struggle to Reopen. Reuters.

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Several multi-stakeholder initiatives are currently underway to establish strategic partnerships between the new CAR government and international partners for the way forward in CAR. These frameworks are intended focus on several key priority areas to guide international engagement in the country, as agreed by stakeholders and, in theory, led by the new CAR government. During interviews conducted by the research team, these initiatives were raised regularly, but key stakeholders, particularly among the G8, did not appear to be on the same page, illustrating that political divisions amoung them continue to block the development of a consolidated strategy. Moreover, where key questions and challenges remain is how they intend to include the voices of the people of CAR, beyond the inclusion of the outcomes of the Bangui Forum. Given the research fi ndings above, and the lessons learned from UNMIL inLiberia, it is imperative that the Central African people be consulted in the process of forming these mutual commitments, and civil society must play a key role in ensuring that their voices are heard.

Working towards a more inclusive Compact

Interviews with MINUSCA offi cials revealed that the Mission is supporting the production of a framework partnership agreement (now known as the Framework of Mutual Accountability, or CEM-RCA) between the government and its international, regional and bilateral partners. This document is intended to serve as a new framework of mutual engagement between the CAR government and the international community, in accordance with the priorities set by the CAR government and based on the Bangui Forum recommendations. The priorities identifi ed in this framework include: peace and security, economic recovery, political and administrative governance, justice, human rights and national reconciliation. The research team noted that the Offi ce of the Prime Minister is leading this process and has formed a technical committee to consult and form a consensus among key stakeholders.

Senior level MINUSCA offi cials explained that the purpose of this framework agreement is to promote a coordinated approach among key stakeholders in CAR and to move away from a siloed approach of several concurrent bilateral initiatives with the CAR government, in a sense avoiding duplication of eff orts and lack of transparency. They noted that this framework acknowledges the importance of partnership with the host government to achieve sustainable peace, but it does not function as a conditionality mechanism for receiving assistance.

In addition, a separate “Compact” has also been formulated under the g7+ New Deal initiative following a fragility assessment process and with the support of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. According to a representative of the g+7 New Deal in CAR, this framework was based on extensive consultations and inclusive approach to refl ect the priorities of the country, as defi ned by a broad range of local stakeholders. Civil society organizations participated in committees that were set up for the Bangui Forum had largely been leveraged to develop this Compact under the New Deal initiative.

Based on the research team’s interviews, other members of the G8 and international community seem to have little to no involvement in the process supported by MINUSCA and currently led by the Offi ce of the Prime Minister. G8 members described a process in which MINUSCA has taken the lead on drafting and is feeding the document directly to the government, reportedly without consultation or collaboration with other stakeholders, including the government and the people of CAR. There is a perception among key stakeholders that MINUSCA is working to dominate the international community in CAR through this process. Several interviewees of the G8 interpreted it as an attempt to gain more control over the government, and expressed a pessimistic outlook regarding the implementation, and ultimately the accountability, of such a framework agreement.

Members of the G8 expressed an overall feeling that, even though the Compact was initially proposed as a tool to encourage the government to consult with its people, it would appear that it is instead being used as a short- to medium-term agreement to determine an exitstrategy for MINUSCA with few inputs from international stakeholders and even fewer from the people of CAR. From this perspective, this document

THE WAY FORWARD: OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEANINGFUL ENGAGEMENT

35

serves more as a shared framework between the UN and the CAR government, rather than an inclusive path forward with input from Central Africans themselves.

One representative of a regional organization in CAR also noted that this kind of agreement is not legally binding, so there is no guarantee that mutual commitments will be upheld. Some interviewees among the UN Country Team expressed the opinion that it would have been better to adapt the “Compact” formulated by the New Deal initiative as a basis to determine mutual commitments between the government and international partners. They argued that the “Compact” under the New Deal initiative was formulated following an extensive fragility assessment and consultations process which refl ects the concerns and priorities of the country expressed by the people of CAR.

Recovery and Peace Consolidation in the Central African Republic

At the request of the new CAR Government, a joint exploratory mission of the UN, the World Bank and the European Union was conducted in Bangui from May 10 to 17, 2016 to establish the terms and scope of a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (now known as the Recovery and Peace Consolidation in the Central African Republic, or RCPC). The objective of this initiative was to assess the needs and defi ne the priorities for the country, in a consultative manner and in close coordination with international, regional and national stakeholders. The RCPC is intended to put forth a strategy for the next fi ve years, outlining the immediate priorities of the country, including budget estimates as well as proposals for implementation and fi nancing of the strategy.

The exploratory mission identifi ed three priority pillars with corresponding objectives: 1) support for peace, security and resilience; 2) restoring the social contract between the state and the population; and 3) economic recovery. These echo a strong resemblance to the priorities and outcomes from the Bangui Forum.

One UN agency offi cial mentioned that the RCPC process is expected to favor an inclusive approach that will incorporate the contributions and views of all stakeholders in CAR’s peacebuilding process, including civil society, the private sector, and local

authorities. The offi cial also noted that a key challenge would continue to be ensuring that the voices and contributions from communities outside of Bangui are taken into account. He noted that the conclusions of the preparatory consultations to the Bangui Forum would be the fi rst source of information in this regard.

A number of focus groups will be organized in each region, prefecture and sub-prefecture, with the support of MINUSCA. Consultation with representatives of local authorities will also be organized, as well as national elected representatives. These meetings would serve as an essential component of the process of initial validation of the RCPC. In addition, a number of radio debates will be organized to allow people to call and send text messages – to directly contribute to the dialogue. An additional part of the consultation process will include a baseline survey conducted to assess the expectations and demands of the people. The survey would gather comments from a wider set of actors, and could be achieved by MINUSCA through its national network.

According to the UN agency offi cial, at the end of the RCPC evaluation process, a fi nal document will be presented under the title: “One country, one vision and one program,” which will be presented to donors and investors. The Minister of Economy, Planning and Cooperation has set up thematic committees that will work on all three pillars with the support of national and international experts. It is expected that the RCPC will be fi nalized in October to allow the government and its partners to carry out the preparatory work before the donor conference in Brussels in November 2016. UNDP, the World Bank and the European Union appear to be actively involved in this process.

During the fi eld mission in CAR, the research team attended a forum of civil society organizations with the support of MINUSCA. The meeting aimed to convene civil society representatives to provide an opportunity and to give guidance on how best to make contributions to the donor conference in Brussels, as well as the ongoing Compact and RCPC processes, in order to amplify their voices and come together for the betterment of the people of CAR. During this forum, representatives of the government, including the Cabinet of the President, promised that civil society will participate and will have a visible and important role during the international donors conference in Brussels.

36

At a ministerial meeting on CAR in September 2016, President Touadéra reiterated his commitment to fi nalizing the Framework of Mutual Accountability ahead of the donor conference in Brussels. The President also emphasized that the Framework of Mutual Accountability and the RCPC will be “a strong signal of an enduring partnership between the Central African Republic and the international community to secure a durable peace.” G8 participants encouraged the government to continue its eff orts “towards an inclusive approach, involving all elements of Central African society” and “to ensurethat this process fi ts within the larger framework of strategies intended to address the root causes of the confl ict, in particular through an inclusive dialogue at the national and local level that promotes the equitable development of all regions of the country, as well as reducing their isolation.”60 Thisrepresents a growing recognition among key stakeholders that building a more inclusive society will be necessary to achieve sustainable peace in CAR.

While the Central African Republic is at a crossroads, there is an opportunity to do peacekeeping diff erently - instead of business as usual – in order to build sustainable peace in partnership with the government and the people of CAR. Inclusivity is not a box to be checked. Rather, it needs to be woven into a mission and a government’s fabric at every stage of the peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development process. The country as a whole is at a pivotal moment in which the new government, with the support of MINUSCA and the G8, must build on the

momentum of previous eff orts to include the voices of the people in order to forge a common vision for the future and build a more inclusive society. The renewed mandate of MINUSCA adopted in July 2016 shows promising signs of a more inclusive approach, with a fi rm statement that sustainable peace must take place through “an inclusive process that involves men and women of all social, economic, political, religious and ethnic backgrounds, including, those displaced by the crisis.”61 The resolution also urges the mission to support national eff orts “to address marginalization and local grievances, including

through dialogue with the armed groups, civil society leaders including women and youth representatives, and by assisting national, prefectoral and local authorities to foster confi dence among communities.”

During the fi eld research, the vast majority of stakeholders

expressed varying levels of scepticism that peace will last in CAR. While the Bangui Forum and democratically-held elections were huge leaps towards providing meaningful channels for the people to voice their concerns, the next step will be to act upon the recommendations in a way that remains accountable to the people through civil society groups and in local communities. Without a process to carry this forward, it will soon become one item on a checklist that was completed with a lack of real accountability to the people of CAR. Moreover, consultative mechanisms need to build on what has already been achieved in order to move forward and not further fatigue a population that has seen many consultations without any follow up. With many tools at its disposal, MINUSCA could hold the key to a brighter future for the country, yet it must move

60 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. (2016). Communiqué on the Ministerial-meeting on the Central African Republic. United Nations. 61 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on Central African Republic. United Nations, S/RES/2301(2016).

LOOKING AHEAD

A tailor poses in his shop in M’Poko IDP camp in Bangui.

Photo credit: Kelly Joseph (MIA ‘16)

37

beyond technical and military approaches. It will take collective commitment to achieve this, with a focus on politics, partnerships, and most importantly people.

While CAR is one specifi c case, this case study shines light on the need for the Security Council to support this new paradigm for inclusivity and a more people-centered approach to peacekeeping. The Security Council needs to truly believe that the voices of the people matter and that a government can and will listen to those voices. As illustrated throughout the case study, there were many examples of mistrust and distorted perceptions among key stakeholders. One example of ways that this trust can be built lies in the responsibility of MINUSCA to share information on the armed groups it engages with and off er solutions on how to move forward in a positive way. Without this transparency and engagement, sustainable peace will be elusive.

A peacekeeping operation should encourage elected governments to institutionalize mechanisms for inclusivity and provide platforms for south-south dialogue of what is working in other countries. These mechanisms cannot simply be add-ons to a mission’s mandate, they need to be included from the outset with clearly defi ned pathways to turn a mandate into an implementation strategy, and this can be done in consultation with the government and its people. The initial mandate of MINUSCA lacked a push for inclusivity and the new mandate has improved upon this, yet this reactive approach has resulted in missed opportunities. In the case of MINUSCA, negative perceptions have created a schism between the people and the Mission, and this lack of public confi dence hinders its eff ectiveness in carrying out its mandate.

As two scholars on CAR have noted, external actors have generally viewed CAR “through the lens of the promotion of regional stability at the expense of standing fi rm for any kind of substantive democracy or inclusiveness in CAR politics”; as a result, the interests of external actors “always end up trumping the interest of Central Africans”.62 MINUSCA, the new CAR government, the international community, and the people of CAR must work together to sustain the peace, ensuring that inclusive national ownership is a priority. Forming a common vision for the future of the country between the new CAR government and

the people of CAR will be essential to seize this window of opportunity for sustainable peace.

62 Carayannis, T. & Lombard, L. (2015). Making Sense of the Central African Republic. London: Zed Books, P14.

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Liberia’s troubled history has been defi ned by a sharp divide between the Americo-Liberian elite and the indigenous population, a dynamic that has continued into the present. After migrating to Liberia in the 1820s, Americo-Liberians settlers established an oligarchy called the True Whig Party in 1884. The elite installed a structure in which local tribes were increasingly and systematically excluded and marginalized, while the former thrived and prospered from easy access to land, rich natural resources and power. Some of their politically and economically oppressive policies included heavy taxation of indigenous people’s crops and arbitrary acquisition of acres of indigenous land. This produced profound social and structural tensions which eventually boiled over into a series of coups and political power struggles. The rise of Charles Taylor in 1989 marked the beginning of a devastating, bloody confl ict, which would drag on for nearly fourteen years and claim over 200,000 lives.

Since the end of Liberia’s civil wars in 2003, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has been

supporting the Liberian government in the arduous task of rebuilding its institutions and laying the groundwork for sustainable peace. However, while signifi cant progress has been made in peacekeeping in Liberia, there remains a widespread sentiment of doubt, among UN staff , the Liberian government and Liberian society, that the country will be able to sustain a fragile peace on its own, pending UNMIL’s drawdown and exit. Many claim that, despite UNMIL’s thirteen-year presence, the issues that fueled the protracted civil wars in Liberia, such as abject poverty, marginalization, corruption and a lack of land rights, have yet to be properly addressed, and continue to contribute to the deep cleavages between the ruling elite and indigenous populations today. Furthermore, the Liberian government and its people have yet to establish a common vision for the country’s future.

Conducted at a critical juncture for Liberia as UNMIL prepares for a signifi cant security transition, this study aims to shed light on the sources of the country’s primary concerns, and make a case for why inclusivity within peacekeeping is of the utmost importance.

CASE STUDY: LIBERIA The Liberia research team meets with Mr. Zarif Farid, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia and Head of UNMIL, and Mr. Murenga Muchiri, Special Assistant to the SRSG (left).

Photo Credit: UNMIL Staff

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The study will begin with a character analysis of the main stakeholders on the ground – UNMIL, the Liberian government, and civil society, including local communities and civil society organizations – so that the nature of the actors’ dynamics and the reasons for their actions can be better understood. The next section will include an outline of the consultative mechanisms and tools that UNMIL has leveraged to foster more inclusive national ownership in the peacekeeping process. The third section describes the constraints and challenges to implementing eff ective community engagement. The fi nal section explores common areas for growth and bright spots shared throughout our interviews to highlight the correlation between the level of community engagement and degree of certainty conveyed about Liberia’s future. That is, when community and civil society leaders felt disconnected from the peacekeeping process, they were less certain about their country’s future and more concerned about confl ict resurfacing in Liberia. Conversely, when people were better engaged and experienced a sense of ownership over the peace process, they expressed more optimism with regard to the country’s future. Through its fi ndings, this study aims to argue that inclusivity is integral to building

In preparation for the 2016 International Day for UN peacekeepers (29 May), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) uniformed personnel are getting ready for a joint parade with Liberian armed forces and police offi cers.

Photo Credit: Hyomi Carty (MIA ’17)

a foundation for sustainable peace in Liberia, and to glean lessons learned from the Mission in order to inform the path forward for current and future peacekeeping operations.

ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS The following section presents an analysis of the characteristics and perceptions that defi ne the primary stakeholders in Liberia, based on information gathered from interviewees representing the UN, the Liberian government, and civil society. Gaining insight into the nature of these actors provides the initial framework through which areas for growth and challenges to establish inclusive national ownership can be determined.

UNMIL

Having resolved to transfer the bulk of peacebuilding responsibilities to the government of Liberia, the UN Security Council, through the adoption of Resolutions 2066,63 2116,64 2215,65 commenced the process of

63 United Nations Security Council. (2012). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2066(2012). 64 United Nations Security Council. (2013). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2116(2013). 65 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2215(2015).

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trust in UNMIL and held it in such high regard that some referred to the Mission as a “psychological security blanket” for Liberians. The mere presence of UNMIL makes the population feel safer, although the people may not fully understand the “division of labor” between UNMIL and the government. This heavy reliance on the Mission, in the absence of trust in the Liberian government, speaks to a culture of dependency on outside forces to maintain order in Liberia. This may be a consequence of the Mission’s failure to implement inclusive, people-oriented approaches from its inception, at a time when more emphasis was placed on stemming violence and stabilizing the country. UNMIL’s initial mandate included “support for the implementation of the Ceasefi re Agreement”, “humanitarian and human rights assistance”, “security reform”, and “implementation of the peace process.”69 The absence of directives in the mandate to pursue more people-oriented peacekeeping was a profound weakness identifi ed by many UNMIL staff . They commented that, in retrospect, peacekeepers and UN staff could have placed more focus on inclusive engagement strategies, which might have led to a stronger relationship between the people and the government, and a potentially faster and smoother drawdown.

To illustrate this point, during the fi rst strategic assessment in May 2003 in preparation for UNMIL’s establishment, consultation with the Liberian people was not considered a priority.70 As one high-level UNMIL offi cial stated: “Strategic assessments that are done in the beginning of the missions are not very inclusive. This is one of the main issues that make it diffi cult to achieve the expectations in country. If you get the assessment wrong, you can never get the mission right.” This led to mismanaged expectations and a loss of leverage when trying to encourage the Liberian government to engage meaningfully with its people later on. Rather than maximizing its capacity to work collaboratively with the government and communities, UNMIL often performed its mandated tasks on its own. This left a critical knowledge and capacity gap, which is still present as UNMIL draws

63 United Nations Security Council. (2012). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2066(2012). 64 United Nations Security Council. (2013). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2116(2013). 65 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2215(2015).66 United Nations Security Council. (2014). Twenty-eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. United Na-tions, S/2014/598, P12.67 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2239(2015).68 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Security Council Resolution on the Situation in Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2308(2016), P2.69 United Nations Security Council. (2003). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/1509(2003), P3-4. 70 United Nations Security Council. (2003). Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia. United Nations, S/2003/875.

reducing UNMIL’s military strength in three phases between 2012 and 2015. In 2012, the United Nations and the Liberian government agreed that the handover of the UNMIL security responsibilities “would be conducted gradually over two to three years”, and should be concluded “no later than 2016”.66 Although this schedule was delayed to some extent by the Ebola outbreak in December 2013, the drawdown resumed in September 2015.67 As scheduled, the security transition was completed on 30 June 2016, with the force being reduced to a residual level of 1,240 personnel. According to the Security Council Resolution 2308 adopted on 14 September 2016, the mandate of UNMIL has been extended until the end of 2016, and “the withdrawal of UNMIL and transition to a future United Nations presence to continue to assist the Government of Liberia to consolidate peace” will be based on the upcoming Security Council’s review by 15 December 2016. 68

In light of this ongoing drawdown, a positive indicator of UNMIL’s work in Liberia is the strong level of trust that Liberians have developed in the Mission. An overwhelming majority of interviewees expressed a very positive view of UNMIL and its role in the country. Many argued that UNMIL, as an integrated mission, has made great contributions to the country’s peace and stabilization eff orts and played a vital role in holding the government accountable for its actions. In particular, UNMIL works with and monitors various security actors, such as the Liberian National Police (LNP), the Bureau of Correction and Rehabilitation (BCR), the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as the justice system, through both high-level meetings and day-to-day operations. For example, many civil society and community leaders noted that the only way they knew that inmates were being held justly and granted their rights to a fair trial was because the UN police regularly visited community jails and conducted inspections.

At the same time, however, people placed so much

41

down. That being said, UNMIL has visibly increased its community engagement eff orts in the past few years. These examples will be presented in the “existing tools and mechanisms” section.

Government of Liberia

The government, by its own admission, is still characterized by the same culture of patronage that contributed to the Liberian confl ict in the fi rst place. Government power remains concentrated in the hands of elites, and many civil society and community leaders refer to government offi cials as ‘colonialists’ or ‘Americo-Liberians’, who have studied abroad and maintain their power through nepotism. This has led to division and tension between the government and its people. As one interviewee explained: “[The Americo-Liberians] still see themselves as Americans. They still want to have a house in America. They have the colonial mentality. They see this country as a farm, so this country will never be developed.”

The overall perception of the government among civil society interviewees, therefore, and perhaps unsurprisingly, has been fairly negative. It was highlighted that the Liberian government has made some progress since the 2003 Peace Agreement despite the recent global recession and outbreak of Ebola, but generally, Liberians seem to have a very low level of trust in the government. Moreover, although much of the day-to-day security tasks had already been transferred over to the LNP by May 2016 in preparation for the security transition, most people were not convinced of the government’s capacity to maintain peace and stability after UNMIL’s drawdown. The government suff ers from a large capacity gap, which is refl ected by the lack of policy implementation, signifi cant discrepancies between Monrovia and all other regions of Liberia, and limited accessibility of remote counties, particularly during the rainy season. Had local people been consulted with and informed of the government’s capacity, resources, priorities, and limitations from the outset, public confi dence levels in the government may have been higher.

There is also a widespread perception that the government engages in more “documenting” than actual “implementing” of policies. “You will never fi nd another country that plans so well, yet accomplishes so little,” admitted one local administrator. Policy

proposals may be collecting dust for months in a parliamentary committee room before any lawmaker even considers them. This has been attributed to a lack of political will on the part of the government.

Finally, the government remains highly centralized, despite pressure from the UN and the people to move toward decentralization. Civil society has been advocating strongly for this cause with some level of eff ectiveness.

Signifi cant eff orts have been made with the help of UNMIL’s Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to equip counties with adequate administrative services and police forces. Nevertheless, this progress still falls short of the country’s needs. For example, all county representatives are still appointed by the central government, rather than being elected by the community, and local administrative budgets continue to be decided upon by the central government in Monrovia. County administrations are consequently left with uncertain and limited resources, and representatives are only held accountable to the central government, rather than to the counties’ residents. Local offi cials expressed interest in changing policies to empower communities to elect their own county offi cials, and enabling local administrations decide on or at least propose their own budgets, but offi cials based in Monrovia seemed less amenable to this idea. Decentralization has been generating so much public discourse ahead of upcoming elections on October 10th, 2017,71 that the government has begun to realize the necessity of making it a higher priority.

Civil Society

Despite fi nancial constraints and lack of cooperation from the government, civil society in Liberia appears to be very active and vocal. Representatives from diverse backgrounds and education levels expressed the desire to contribute meaningfully to their country’s future, often with specifi c ideas and concrete plans. Although Liberian civil society has come a long way since the early stages of its development after the confl ict, it still lacks some ofthe basic capacity and knowledge needed to eff ectively advocate for itself and hold the government accountable for its actions. UNMIL has been investing in capacity building programs for civil society organizations and their leaders on areas

71 National Elections Commission. (2016). Elections Calendar. National Elections Commission, Liberia.

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Youth. Liberian youth are generally enthusiastic about getting involved with youth organizations and fi nding participatory platforms through which to express their views on the work of the government and the future of the country. Young people seem to be the most optimistic about the country’s future, and have off ered numerous plans on how to contribute to the country’s development. For example, college students from Bong County cited the desire to become future politicians, doctors, surgeons, teachers for girls, and community mediators, among other aspirations. At the same time, many community leaders highlighted that youth are often perceived as “trouble-makers,” particularly in the counties. While the government’s Ministry for Youth has a programming presence in some counties, information pertaining to these programs is not always disseminated well, and the opportunities for youth to improve their economic situation are rare due to very low education rates and high levels of youth unemployment.

Traditional leaders. Traditional leaders are organized at the local level in county councils, and overseen by a national council. They represent the traditional justice system and reach out to communities in locations where the LNP has a limited presence or where LNP has yet to establish suffi cient trust. However, the lack of resources available to traditional leaders is a considerable constraint to their work. For example, while traditional leaders appear to have a strong relationship with the government and have been

such as grassroots organizing, advocacy, and negotiation and mediation. However, these are often not considered priority areas by external donors. Despite the strides made in capacity building eff orts, many stakeholders within civil society still require basic access to training and tools. The following descriptions of key segments of civil society showcase the broad spectrum of groups’ interests, needs, and concerns:

Women. Women were once an integral part of the country’s peace process, but all women interviewed voiced their dissatisfaction with their access to services, the level at which they were engaged or consulted in a meaningful way as compared to men, and their human rights conditions. Women expressed diff ering opinions on whether or not the election of a female president had actually advanced the cause for women’s rights in Liberia. Violence against women in the country is still startlingly high. According to the UN Police Commissioner, “rape is considered a misdemeanor…people will kill each other over stealing, but raping a two-year-old girl is an issue families will try to work through.” Women also lamented that they have been aff orded little representation in the traditional justice system, and stressed the fact that it is critical for women to be informed of their rights and avenues through which they can advocate for themselves in the justice system.

Hyomi Carty (MIA ’17) leads the discussion with a group of student leaders from Cuttington University, Bong Community College, Bong Technical College and several high schools.

Photo Credit: Vandalark Patricks

Peace Island is located in the southeastern part of Monrovia. It is home to many former combatants and internally displaced persons.

Photo Credit: Stefanía Doebbel(MIA ’17)

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72 Moft ah, L. (2015). Muslims Protest Liberia Proposal to Institute Christianity as State Religion, Call for Secularism. Ibtimes.73 Th e Governance Commission. (2015). Overview of National Constitution Conference in Gbarnga. Th e Governance Commission, Republic of Liberia.74 See more under “Priorities Misalignment”.

provided offi ce space in the local administrative building, they are not provided fi nancial resources or means of transportation to travel for work. In Grand Gedeh County, traditional leaders often relied on UNMIL transportation to reach the communities they served.

Religious groups. According to the 2008 census, Christians represent 85 percent of Liberia’s population, while Muslims make up 12 percent.72 Muslim leaders expressed feelings of marginalization, particularly when comparing the resources available to Muslim schools, as opposed to those of schools based on Christian values. Despite this, almost all interviewees denied that major tensions existed between Christians and Muslims. While some Christian groups have pushed for the Proposition for Constitutional Reform Aiming at Establishing a Christian State in Liberia,73 otherwise known as Proposition 24, these groups are an extreme minority, and the proposition was discredited by the head of the Liberian Council of Churches and by Muslim representatives alike as being divisive and infl ammatory.

Former combatants. The research team interviewed approximately 30 former war combatants from two distinct groups, to determine whether or not they shared similar priorities and concerns. The fi rst group claimed that they had not benefi ted from any reintegration or transition programs after laying down their arms, aside from receiving a small one-time payment immediately after the confl ict, and thus found themselves in a situation of extreme poverty. During the wartime economy, these men had the means by which to secure livelihoods and earn salaries, but as soon as peace came about, they and their families faced squalor and destitution, with no employment prospects or job training opportunities. By contrast, the second group of ex-combatants, who had participated in the Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) program with UNMIL, were far more economically empowered and in a position to advocate for other issues beyond job security. These ex-combatants, who were members of a motorcycle taxi union and drove motorcycle taxis as a means of livelihood, expressed concerns of facing stigma and discrimination from local police and community members due to their previous roles in the war. Because the second group

of ex-combatants had had their primary needs met, these individuals were able to prioritize reconciliation and reparations, while the fi rst group of ex-combatants fi rmly placed priority on basic needs such as job and food security.74

As pertaining to the three critical task/priority areas identifi ed by UNMIL, including reconciliation, decentralization and land rights reform, there was a wide spectrum of priority areas, depending on which civil society groups were being asked:

• Reconciliation was only cited as a priority when people already had their basic needs met, including some degree of economic empowerment. Moreover, people seemed to have diff erent defi nitions for reconciliation from the perspective of short-term needs, including transitional justice, addressing root causes, and implementing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) recommendations. Reconciliation was given more attention by religious and traditional leaders, who mentioned that continuous marginalization and warlike mentality among many young people remain a threat to sustainable peace in Liberia. All traditional leaders especially in the counties, stressed that tribal tensions were not a concern at all. They said that the mistrust and animosity expressed during the confl ict was primarily directed towards whoever was in power in the government, and that tribal confl ict was more of a “scapegoat” cause, used by manipulative politicians as areason for war. One traditional leader from the Grand Gedeh Zwedru county noted: “The people who banged our heads together and made us fi ght among ourselves during the war are the ones still in power.”

• Land rights seemed to be more of a concern among directly aff ected communities, who complained of being excluded from the negotiation of concession deals.

The wide range of views on priorities and concerns speaks to a highly diverse group of stakeholders within civil society, and although this may render united advocacy eff orts more challenging to organize, it is also evident that civil society and community leaders have a strong desire to participate in society and contribute meaningfully to the dialogue around institutional and social reform.

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Although the importance of promoting inclusive societies has not been emphasized in the Security Council’s mandates to UNMIL, the Mission has employed a variety of peacekeeping and community engagement tools over the course of its mission in order to foster a more consultative and collaborative relationship with the Liberian government and its people.

UNMIL and its Peace and Consolidation Services division (PCS) have facilitated a large number of consultations with people from diff erent community groups, to discuss crucial issues and fi eld citizens’ concerns and needs directly. The SRSG began his term by visiting all 15 counties, starting with the most remote, to meet with residents of those areas through town hall meetings. Further, meetings held with CSOs and community leaders have provided UNMIL with valuable insights and feedback on their work. To illustrate these consultative eff orts, UNMIL has been holding meetings with communities to explain the reasons behind the closing of its local offi ces in light of the drawdown. These meetings are meant to address concerns of local people and explain the security measures which will be installed upon the Mission’s departure, to allay fears of security gaps being left in its wake. Additionally, discussions were organized by the SRSG and PCS offi cers to hear the concerns of religious leaders and attempt to dissuade a certain Christian contingent from supporting Proposition 24, which would inevitably marginalize and alienate the Muslim population in Liberia. Further eff orts made in this regard will be expanded upon in the following section.

With respect to the government, UNMIL has been serving as a facilitator and intermediary between the government and its people through its good offi ces. In an eff ort to boost inclusive national ownership, UNMIL has encouraged the government to take the lead on community engagement in a number of ways, including supporting the government in connecting with communities, both operationally and logistically. For example, the Mission has invited ministers and

other offi cials to visit the counties and consult with communities in town hall meetings, and provided transportation across Liberia via UN fl ights and vehicles. Additionally, UNMIL has utilized UN radio to keep the populations abreast of local and national developments. Furthermore, the Mission is in the process of creating another forum for discussion between communities and the government.

While some of the tools and mechanisms UNMIL has used to engage communities are formally integrated into UNMIL’s mandate, others are less formal and focus on building the government’s credibility and trust within communities. Based on the research team’s fi ndings, highlights of UNMIL’s work to this end can be summarized as follows.

Political leverage and advocacy

In its crucial role as an intermediary between the government and the Liberian people, UNMIL’s leadership has been holding a series of regular consultations with government offi cials to bring the concerns of the people to the government’ attention. For example, the Mission is currently working to enable meetings between President Johnson-Sirleaf and representatives of the Muslim community to discuss matters aff ecting their population, such as the discrimination and arbitrary arrests of Muslims in Lofa county, unequal government support for Muslim schools compared to Christian schools, and the inclusion of Muslim holidays in the offi cial calendar of the Liberian government.

In addition, UNMIL has used its infl uence and the backing of the international community to push for constitutional reform within the Liberian government, with the goal of changing the nature of its relationship with civil society. This includes advocating for a local governance law, which would aim at creating a culture of better engagement and inclusivity with civil society by bringing citizens into core service delivery processes, such asbudgeting, drafting, management, and administration by decentralizing these tasks to local counties. However, this law has been met with signifi cant resistance from lawmakers. UNMIL has also engaged in the promotion of the Land Rights Bill, which is another tool for community inclusion in peace processes. As of now, the bill has not yet been approved, although UNMIL continues to advocate for its prioritization on the national political agenda.

EXISTING TOOLS AND MECHANISMS FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

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Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)

UNMIL has, over the course of its mission, spent over nine million U.S. dollars on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in Liberia. This budget has been fi nancing projects that are designed to “establish and build confi dence in the Mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for eff ective mandate implementation.”75 UNMIL’s projects have addressed the “provision of basic social services; restoration of state authority and the rule of law; as well as support to vulnerable groups through income-generating activities, in close collaboration with national and local authorities, community members, and national NGOs.”76

According to the Liberian government, QIPs have been very helpful for capacity building, particularly at the local level, which has contributed to reducing the country’s dependency on UNMIL. Some QIPs have been aimed at providing soft skills training in local communities on topics such as reconciliation and mediation. In terms of infrastructure, many police stations and community facilities have been constructed in the rural areas through QIPs. The team visited one of these, a highly-utilized youth center, in Grand Bassa county.

QIPs have also supported the work of local public fi gures in promoting peace and reconciliation work. For example, QIPs played a signifi cant role in two major peace and reconciliation initiatives spearheaded by Peace Ambassador William Tolbert III. The fi rst involved consultations with high-level individuals regarding peacebuilding priorities and potential triggers for social unrest leading up to the 2017 elections, while the second entailed the organization of “remembrance ceremonies … to commemorate the victims of the civil confl ict, focusing on youth participation in order to highlight the importance of maintaining social cohesion” with the participation of Christian and Muslim young people.77

In addition, QIPs have been very useful in addressing decentralization, reinforcing the Liberian government’s ability to directly engage with the Liberian people living outside of Monrovia. This process has involved helping the government

build up its county administrations so that services and resources are as accessible to those in rural communities as they are to people living in Monrovia. The process of decentralization largely began in 2015, although it has been limited to certain services, such as the distribution of driver’s licenses and marriage certifi cates. UNMIL used QIP funding to create four County Service Centers to bolster the decentralization process in 2015 and 2016. QIPs also funded equipment for these Centers, including computers, printers, and offi ce furniture. The Mission plans to partner with the government to install 14 important services at the county level, such as car registration and registration renewal services, to increase service access to the Liberian people – something many civil society stakeholders in Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh, and Bong Counties highlighted as a key priority.

UNMIL’s Peace Consolidation Services

Interviewees from across all stakeholder groups highlighted UNMIL’s role as mediator between the Liberian government and CSOs. This work has been carried out in large part by UNMIL’s PCS pillar. For example, PCS offi cers were instrumental in establishing the National Civil Society Council of Liberia (NCSCL) as a key channel of communication between the Liberian government (via its Offi ce of the Minister of Internal Aff airs) and CSOs. PCS works to ensure that the NCSCL meets with the government on a quarterly basis at a minimum. However, launching this eff ort has not been without its challenges: UN staff spoke of an apparent lack of commitment from the government, and consequently, a lack of motivation from the NCSCL, to work together productively.

In addition to its pivotal role in the creation of the NCSCL, PCS offi cers have worked considerably to integrate representatives of various CSOs into governmental working groups to tackle priority issues in Liberia. This includes working groups on security, constitutional reform, electoral law revision, and the Land Act. When the policy and constitutional reform processes fi rst started, PCS offi cers noted that they facilitated monthly meetings to establish the diff erent working groups and to ensure that representatives from CSOs were included. Recently, UNMIL’s role has transitioned to monitoring the relationship, and

75 United Nations Mission in Liberia. Th e Quick Impact Projects (QIP). United Nations.76 Ibid.77 United Nations Security Council. (2016). Th irty-second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. United Na-tions, S/2016/706, P4.

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in the new negotiations. Moreover, UNMIL has facilitated the establishment of local committees at the county level, made up of concession companies’ representatives, county representatives, central government, traditional leaders, and directly aff ected communities, which meet every month.

According to PCS offi cers, the Mission has worked with specifi c communities to help mediate problems involving concessions, as in the case of former Cocopa Rubber Corporation workers in Nimba county who did not receive their promised payments. Some representatives of the Cocopa workers were invited to UNMIL headquarters to formalize and prepare their request, which was then submitted to the Ministry of Finance and the Offi ce of the President. UNMIL worked with both parties until a solution was found and a large percentage of the former workers of the Cocopa received their entitlements.

UNMIL has also partnered with Sime Darby Plantation Liberia (SDPL) to launch the Sustainable Partnership Initiative (SPI) in Grand Cape Mount County. The platform involves institutionalizing a new model of community-based consultation and engagement. The Sustainable Partnership Initiative (SPI) is designed as a multi-stakeholder platform involving the private sector, local communities, civil society organizations, development partners, government, academic and research institutions, and international organizations working together to ensure that the oil palm sector is fair, equitable, sustainable, right and tenured-based. Several other companies have established community consultation mechanisms, including the adoption of a tripartite approach recommended by the UNMIL to address confl ict in their areas. This appears to be working. Several private sector interviewees mentioned that the communities they work in are hyper-vigilant and hold them accountable by reporting any violations of land agreements to the authorities – thus incentivizing these companies to stick to the agreement and build a better rapport with their communities. However, these same interviewees appeared very guarded when asked questions about this topic and cited that they did not want to share specifi c details of how they were building rapport with their communities due to concerns about competing ventures stealing their ideas.

ensuring that cooperation between the CSOs and the government continues within these working groups, each of which have demonstrated varying degrees of success.

Another example of how UNMIL has used its PCS offi cers to promote better community engagement can be found in the creation of President Johnson-Sirleaf’s Poverty Reduction Development Plan in 2006, developed with the support of UNMIL, UNDP, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Aff airs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Internal Aff airs. Interviewees mentioned that UNMIL and UNDP assisted in carrying out community, district, county and national level consultations. The 15 counties were merged into 3 regional plans, which ultimately contributed to a poverty reduction strategy following a conference with county representatives.

UNMIL is also assisting the government in forming a professional standards division for complaints from the population, so that government offi cials can investigate these concerns. Furthermore, in certain instances, UNMIL has also stepped in to support the government in mediating confl icts with other groups. In one case, UNMIL facilitated a series of consultations between the Lutheran Church of Liberia and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development in order to fi nd a solution to the issue of an arrears payment due to medical personnel at the Lutheran Hospital in Zorzor, located in Lofa County.

Via its PCS offi cers, UNMIL has made signifi cant progress in supporting government eff orts to engage its people in land rights reform, whether by educating people on their land rights or developing feedback mechanisms available to voice their concerns and ideas. The Mission, including UN Habitat and UNDP, has also promoted the Land Concession Committee in its bid to become an alternative to courts for dealing with land issues and matters of ownership. This mechanism seems to work better for communities, as it avoids the complicated and lengthy process of arbitration through the national court system.

UNMIL has additionally pushed for the government to include communities in decision-making processes regarding concessions, including ensuring that they have a voice in how revenues from these agreements are spent on public works. The Mission has also been applying pressure on the government to revisit concession contracts to involve community members

47

Community policing (a.k.a. Community alert programs)

UN Police (UNPOL), the LNP, and community leaders have cited community policing as another prominent initiative undertaken by UNMIL and the LNP, with the aim of bolstering the security sector. UNPOL is currently highly engaged in strengthening community policing as part of UNMIL’s aim to support the LNP’s eff orts to build trust and engage the communities they are charged to protect. For example, PCS has been facilitating dialogue between the LNP’s Community Police Section and commercial motorcyclists in Monrovia to diff use tensions and promote cooperation between them. UNPOL and the LNP are also working with the motorcyclists, many of whom are former combatants, to create an early warning and early response network. This early warning and early response mechanism involves identifying and training community “watchdog” members to report suspicious activity to the LNP as soon as an issue arises. UNMIL and UNPOL have been working with communities to receive feedback on how well this system is working and to understand where gaps remain, in order to report back to the central government.

Furthermore, UNPOL has been helping the LNP build capacity through trainings and mentoring, and advising police units on professional conduct and proper policing protocol to improve perceptions of law enforcement and build trust among local

Located on the West coast of the African continent, Monrovia is the capital city of Liberia and the administrative, commercial and fi nancial center of the country. The rainy season of Monrovia runs from May to October, with the peak occurring in June and July --so just in time for the team’s arrival.

Photo Credit: Isabela Messias (MIA ’17)

communities. UNPOL has also advocated for the government to increase the budget for the LNP, since salaries to standard offi cers are very low compared to the cost of living. Such conditions have bred a culture of corruption and accepting bribes, which LNP interviewees also cited, and which UNMIL hopes to reverse. UNMIL has tried to hold the government accountable in this process by “threatening” to let the public know that the government is failing to provide for their police force, but has not been successful thus far.

Finally, it was mentioned that UNMIL frequently provides trainings for civil servants and judicial system offi cers in order to build capacity within these sectors. UNMIL is also working with the government to write a code of conduct for offi cials, to hold them accountable to the people. In addition, UNMIL hopes to establish community watch forums, and district and county-level security councils.

CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT Despite implementing the tools and mechanisms for engagement mentioned above, UNMIL, the Liberian government, CSOs, community leaders and international donors all cited signifi cant challenges in working towards inclusive national ownership. While some of these challenges are temporary in nature and

48

relatively straightforward, others are more structural and deeply-rooted. These challenges, though often interconnected, typically stem from constraints linked to one of the main actors: the UN, the government, or civil society.

UNMIL

To reiterate an earlier point, UNMIL’s most agreed-upon challenge lies with its mandate – a constraint facing most peacekeeping operations. The Security Council has been virtually silent on the issue of consultation with stakeholders and does not include any provision for it in its mandate.78 Further, many UNMIL staff highlighted a disconnect between UN headquarters and the fi eld, stating that the Mission’s mandate was not based on a full understanding of the Liberian context. Since people-oriented peacekeeping and peacebuilding has never been an explicit task within UNMIL’s mandate, inclusivity and meaningful engagement has been left to the initiative and personality of the Mission’s leadership, rather than being institutionalized. UNMIL’s level of people-oriented engagement eff orts have increased under current leadership, but they may have been even more eff ective if a national and comprehensive plan on community engagement had been created from the very beginning of the Mission. The SRSG lamented that UNMIL had “missed the boat” in establishing accountability mechanisms to ensure active partnerships with and collaboration from the government when it came to engaging its people.

Additionally, Liberian UNMIL employees and contractors noted that the large number of UN staff and peacekeepers from neighboring countries sometimes posed challenges when these individuals allowed their own national interests to inform their work or cloud their judgment. For example, one interviewee mentioned a case involving Nigerian UN staff fundraising for a local church that they personally supported. This church happened to support the divisive and controversial Proposition 24. As a result, the staff members’ support of the church was seen by the community as compromising the UN’s code of impartiality, and ran the risk of being perceived as tacit approval or support of Proposition 24.

UN interviewees also cited budget constraints as a serious issue. While the Mission relies on Member

78 United Nations Security Council. (2015). Security Council Resolution on Liberia. United Nations, S/RES/2239(2015).

States and international donors to fund their work, these donors have their own agenda and preferences, which are not necessarily aligned with those of the Liberian government or UNMIL, nor include provisions for consultations with communities. In addition, coordination issues regarding the Mission’s budgets often arise. For example, the UN country team may have money for programs, while the Mission may not, and the internal UN budget timelines do not align: while UNMIL’s budget goes from July to June

(although the mandate is from September to September), the UN Country Team’s budget runs from January to December. This renders long-term, coordinated planning and follow-up to community engagement a much harder task. On a related note, there is a general lack of communication and coordination between the peacekeeping operation and other UN agencies. These entities, although working towards the same goal under the umbrella of the UNCT, often do not coordinate eff orts or eff ectively share information amongst themselves.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, UNMIL faces constraints relating to the lack of political will by the Liberian government. While the UN does have some political leverage based on the backing of the international community (in that fi nancing from Member States can be withheld if it is discovered that the government is not following through with its guarantees), it is ultimately up to the Liberian

The Liberia research team visits Liberia Islamic Unity Foundation High School in the capital city and meets with Imam and Muslim students.

Photo Credit: Mark Fortune, UNMIL

49

government to take ownership over the community engagement process. The Mission is also not in a position to force the government to pursue any particular measure, as it must respect and uphold state sovereignty at all times.

Liberian Government

High turnover in ministries and county administrations, exacerbated by corruption, has led to a lack of capacity, consistency and institutional knowledge in government. This high turnover of government offi cials has led inconsistencies and coherence issues regarding government policies, which generates ineffi cient and ineff ective management of resources and creates incentives for corruption. A consequence of these ineffi ciencies in government is that many solid and detailed plans with elements of community engagement failed to be implemented, as mentioned by many interviewees including a former trade minister.

Nearly every interviewee in government, from low- to high-level offi cials, admitted that corruption runs rampant throughout Liberia’s administrative and judicial systems, despite the current administration’s eff orts to eliminate it. Many government offi cials were characterized as self-interested and insulated by a culture of impunity. Corruption, many people maintained, has become fi rmly embedded in the fabric of society – and it is simply expected for government offi cials to take advantage of their posts in some way or else risk looking “stupid or naïve.” Due to job insecurity, many government offi cials and staff try to maximize the fi nancial “benefi ts” of their post as quickly as possible, in a colloquially-phrased “last rush.” President Johnson-Sirleaf has attempted to strengthen the engagement of governmental authorities in the fi ght against corruption by creating agencies to ensure transparency and integrity, and to push for decentralization. However, she has experienced limited success in her eff orts due to considerable pushback from the political elite. Interviewees from both government and civil society felt that corruption was worsening in the country, with some citing recent incidents such as the murder of a politician and the unjust jailing of a popular human rights activist after both acted as “whistle-blowers” against governmental corruption. The deep mistrust in government expressed by civil society members and community leaders is closely linked to this issue.

In addition to corruption, the government’s lack of political will poses signifi cant challenges to creating a national climate of inclusivity. Many government offi cials acknowledged that they believe it is the responsibility of the CSOs to consult with the people and then communicate suggested policies back to the government, not the government’s responsibility to seek out community’s concerns directly. Lack of fi nancial incentives play into this dynamic, as poorly paid civil servants do not feel particularly committed to their work nor compelled to extend themselves beyond minimum performance requirements. Furthermore, civil society organizations (CSOs) are often viewed as rivals by the government rather than as partners, which impedes eff orts towards eff ective engagement and cooperation.

Another signifi cant challenge is the disconnect between the central government in Monrovia and fi eld offi ces in the counties. County administrators and ministry representatives felt that they have very little voice in the decision making process of how to run their offi ce (or budget), although they understand their needs and their community’s needs the best. One of the government county offi cials expressed his frustrations regarding this, stating, “We do not have any say in the programs, we just get the budget from Monrovia.” This sentiment was best captured in a quote heard time and time again in the team’s interviews: “Monrovia is not Liberia, and Liberia is not Monrovia.”

Inadequate resources also pose a signifi cant challenge for the government. To illustrate some examples of this, county-level administrators lack basic offi ce supplies; county-based LNP offi cers have no way to access hard-to-reach areas in case of emergency, unless they go by foot which can take from a few hours to a few days; and offi ces remain severely understaff ed. While some international donors, including the UN, have sought to provide some of these resources, some government interviewees contended that these provisions are not always helpful if they cannot be sustained. For example, at the LNP headquarters in Grand Bassa county, a defunct UN vehicle sat in front of the building because the LNP did not have the resources to fi x it.

Both the LNP and the IMF cited falls in commodity prices and Ebola as reasons for resource constraints in the country. It was expressed that international

50

donations to Liberia had slowed in recent months due to “donor fatigue,” and the money that does come in is targeted for specifi c areas of donor interest, making it harder for the government to have solid and targeted policies to engage its population. To make matters more complex, the situation of donations is not expected to improve. Numerous interviewees have alluded to the fact that President Sirleaf has excellent international connections, and that the next President will likely have more diffi culty attracting donors.

Regarding elections, the system perpetuates marginalization and exclusion: interviewees mentioned that there is an economic barrier that keeps them from forming parties and entering the political race, since citizens need to have fi nancial conditions to be able to run for political positions.

Civil Society

One of the greatest issues for government offi cials and UN staff in working with CSOs is the fragmented manner in which they operate. This lack of coordination among CSOs, in addition to an overall lack of capacity hinders their ability to eff ectively advocate for their needs and causes. Moreover, an eff ective national action or strategy plan does not exist, despite the presence of the National Civil Society Council of Liberia. One document, titled National Vision, gained little traction, and is scarcely known by CSOs.

Another problem raised is the perception that founding an NGO or CSO is a moneymaking venture in Liberia, instead of a way to truly advocate for a cause or a group of people. In the absence of a national comprehensive plan for NGOs, such a perception often led to a lack of coordination among CSOs, which tend to compete amongst themselves for funds and visibility. This seems to be related to lack of a common vision and lack of coordination between the CSOs working in the same thematic areas. Moreover, civil society leaders also criticized government-owned NGOs or GONGOs (organizations founded and run by government offi cials or their connections), as “front” organizations that allowed government offi cials to push their own agendas under the pretense that they were consulting with civil society. GONGOs are seen as tarnishing the image of CSO community as a whole.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, there appear to be

interests and are not necessarily based on a full understanding of the context and the country’s needs. For example, interviewees from across stakeholder groups cited that hard skill trainings in areas like management, coordination and IT are direly needed, but this type of programming is not currently appealing to donors unless they are focused on issues directly linked to peacebuilding, such as national reconciliation. Also, when working on community-level programs, donors tend to build their own structure from scratch instead of working within the community to leverage existing ones. This renders programs started by donors less likely to stand on their own when funding ceases.

The concentration of CSOs in Monrovia is another weakness, as some groups do not often reach out

diff erent opinions about who carries the main responsibility for community engagement – government or civil society. While government offi cials believe it is civil society’s responsibility, communities and civil society leaders tend to believe that the government should be more active in soliciting their input on needs and interests.

Externally, the motivation, attention and approach of international donors have been an obstacle to proper capacity building in civil society, as mentioned briefl y above. According to some UN staff , in particular local staff , donations are made according to donors’ own

Tabatha Thompson (MIA ’17) leads the discussion with a group of student leaders from Cuttington University, Bong Community College, Bong Technical College and several high schools. Photo Credit: Vandalark Patricks

51

to communities or people in the distant counties whose interests they claim to represent. Also, access to funding is much more limited for CSOs in the counties, thus limiting their ability to implement their projects and activities as planned.

Additionally, the high illiteracy rate in Liberia (from 2009-2014: 57% for all adults, 37% for young male, and 63% for young female) has also been an obvious barrier.79 Even when information is made available online or in publication, it is usually the case that only those well-educated (i.e. the elites) have real access. The Truth and Reconciliation’s Report, for example, was written in a dense, inaccessible language that most communities would not have been able to grasp, even if they had been able to gain a copy of the report. Youth leaders in Grand Bassa county noted that in order for the government policies and programs to reach the widest population possible, there should be more radio broadcasting, especially those in diff erent dialects.

Last but not least, infrastructure is a challenge for all parties concerned. In particular, a lack of suffi cient roads limits access to many remote parts of the country (and even some of the less remote areas), and the roads that do exist become diffi cult and sometimes impossible to navigate during the rainy season. This makes engaging the population outside Monrovia even more challenging. Eff orts made by UNMIL and the Liberian government to improve road access were noted by a few, but they all stated that it remains to be seen whether or not the government has the capacity to maintain the momentum after UNMIL leaves. This may be an area where UNMIL can lend its logistical strength to the government before withdrawing operations.

79 United Nations Children’s Fund. (2016). Th e State of the World’s Children 2016 Statistical Tables. UNICEF.

POTENTIAL AREAS FOR GROWTH

Priority misalignment

In most areas, there seemed to be a strong misalignment of the priorities that Liberia will need to address when UNMIL withdraws. This disconnect in priorities for the country are indicative of a lack of common vision between the people and the government, due to disengagement on the part of civil society. The only area that is prioritized across all parties is security, which is a shared concern in the face of the security transition and UNMIL drawdown. In this regard, several civil society members stated that UNMIL and the government need to prioritize the training and logistical support of Liberian police forces throughout the 15 counties before its departure, demonstrating concerns about the wider security gap at the local level.

Many government, CSO and community leaders assumed that UNMIL’s priorities are to maintain peace and security in the country, but there was little elaboration beyond this. One international donor cited the need for a better strategic communications plan from UNMIL so that the Liberian people are kept abreast of the security transition – a call that was reiterated in interviews with many civil society members and community leaders – from Monrovia to the counties. Also, while recognizing UNMIL’s great work and achievements in the country, especially with QIPs, civil society leaders and government offi cials pointed out that they wished UNMIL would have prioritized capacity building more, rather than taking over the role of the government.

On the part of the Liberian government, most government offi cials identifi ed their top priority as security. However, most UNMIL and civil society interviewees did not have a clear understanding of what the government’s priorities are – either because they thought the government was working on too many things, or the government had never communicated their priorities to the people, or because the government itself does not know what its priorities are. UN staff frequently cited that this lack of understanding made it very diffi cult to work with the government. Some interviewees, including government offi cials, have said this lack of communication when it comes to priorities is partially due to the upcoming presidential and legislative elections. Everything else, aside from security and

The following sections will take stock of some of the unintended consequences that have arisen as a result of limited community engagement and a lack of emphasis on creating a culture of inclusivity, supporting the case that properly implementing people-centered approaches to peacekeeping from the start of a mission is crucial.

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armed robberies. The people’s lack of trust in the LNP, coupled with the culture of dependency on UNMIL, speaks to a signifi cant security gap in which security sector reform was not carried out in a way to be conducive for the establishment of sustainable peace.

Unaddressed root causes

As mentioned earlier, interviewees almost unanimously agreed that the root causes of the initial confl ict remain unaddressed. The same factors that caused the civil war – the wealth gap, economic disenfranchisement and disempowerment, marginalization, corruption, and dissatisfaction with the government – still remain and could very well threaten the country’s fragile peace. While UNMIL may have assisted in stabilizing the country and stopping mass violence, their eff orts have only yielded a “negative peace”.

All civil society and community interviewees expressed a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo, and felt that the government does not represent or listen to them, and consequently, also felt excluded and marginalized from the decision-making processes on issues that directly aff ect their lives. For example, on the issue of land, some warned of possible confrontations and confl icts if the government does not consult with the local population before negotiations with concession companies or provide them with adequate compensation and employment opportunities once land concessions are agreed upon. The absence of a proper land authority to adjudicate issues and uphold legal rights has not helped matters.

Even when the government addresses these issues in some form, such as when country-wide outreach eff orts took place during the TRC’s hearings throughout the country for the TRC Final Report, CSO and community leaders mentioned that the government generally applies a very top-down approach, which is not conducive to the type of engagement that communities desire. The people in Liberia feel that a more grassroots, bottom-up approach with meaningful consultation, is needed for any solution to be sustainable.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of interviewees, across all sectors of society, are tired of war, with many people citing this as the primary reason that the country would not return to fi ghting after UNMIL left, interviews revealed that signifi cant tensions still exist.

election work, “is on the back burner,” stated one UNMIL offi cer. Some UNMIL, donor and civil society interviewees also noted that the government emphasizes infrastructure projects because they are tangible things people can point to in an election year. However, a more frequently cited reason for a lack of clear priorities is corruption, and many interviewees from the civil society said offi cials are only concerned with enriching themselves.

For civil society and community leaders, the resounding priorities were the need for programming and services focused on economic empowerment, including employment, and livelihood programs; community-wide security; aff ordable and accessible education; healthcare; and benefi ts and subsidies – however, these were not often translated into concrete actions on the part of the government.

Lack of trust in government

All interviewees said they expect the upcoming elections to be tumultuous due to the pervasive lack of mistrust towards the government. Moreover, they believed very little change would take place after the elections, regardless of who took offi ce. In addition to the general air of worry and insecurity about how elections would fare without the security presence of UNMIL since the end of the civil war, there are over 30 parties, and campaigners, as well as opposition politicians, who have engaged in infl ammatory discourse on various occasions. The fact that there are so many diff erent parties vying for the presidency perhaps reveals how little faith civil society has in the current administration, or its ability to advocate for these parties’ interests.

Regarding the security transition, most members of civil society voiced skepticism about the LNP’s ability to secure the country after the departure of UNMIL, due to their perceived lack of capacity. The government’s failure to allocate suffi cient resources to and prioritize the development of the LNP has resulted in under-resourced police stations with broken-down vehicles and equipment, which consequently has diminished the people’s trust in LNP’s ability to act if an emergency arose. With such a weak relationship between LNP and the people, some police do not feel held accountable to the communities they serve. For example, civil society interviewees cited instances of corruption where police were bribed to “look the other way” during

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One female interviewee compared these societal issues to a pile of cow manure, saying that “on the surface things looked solid and dry, but once you step in it, the whole pile collapses, revealing fresh, wet manure just below the surface.” This observation was further supported by a small number of primarily former combatants who claimed that they could be convinced to take up arms again if their concerns were not taken seriously by the government. As a former combatant said, “If your children were starving, wouldn’t you do the same?”

Although many challenges and issues remain in the country, there have been cases of eff ective community engagement and eff orts toward inclusivity that have resulted in positive outcomes. One case in particular, the nationwide response to the Ebola epidemic, strongly reinforces the argument made for inclusive engagement as the necessary foundation for sustainable peace.

Engaging communities to fi ght Ebola

During 2014 and 2015, Liberia was severely aff ected by the Ebola epidemic. Altogether, over ten thousand people were infected by the virus and nearly fi ve thousand died from the disease. Nonetheless, Liberia was the fi rst country in West Africa to be declared Ebola free. The role that communities played in the response to the outbreak is key to understanding how the disease was defeated and, more broadly, to learning about successful strategies to achieve meaningful community engagement.80

The UN staff , government offi cials and other international stakeholders identifi ed community engagement as one of the key factors that infl uenced the comparatively fast containment of Ebola in Liberia.81 One high-level offi cial at WHO in Liberia commented that once communities were involved in the design of the health response plans and their concerns were addressed, Ebola Treatment Units – isolated facilities where probable and confi rmed patients are treated – and safe burial procedures gained more acceptance.

The characteristics of Ebola and its transmission mechanisms presented particularly hard challenges

to prevent the rapid rate of contagion. These aff ected deeply-rooted cultural practices, from daily physical contact, like shaking hands or hugging, to traditional religious rituals, like washing a dead person’s body before burial. Due to fear, rumors and miscommunication, many people initially cared for their infected family members at home and touched people who had died from Ebola at traditional funerals, practices that only contributed to spreading the disease.

Banning these practices has a tremendous impact on a communal sense of belonging, and prohibiting such entrenched habits with a top-down approach would have been both insensitive and ineff ective. Thus, the government and the World Health Organization (WHO) cited that they had to engage communities to come up with tailored solutions and culturally appropriate ways of communicating with and training community members to stop the disease.

To correctly detect and prevent the spread of the disease, Ebola cases need to be systematically identifi ed and put into observation. Effi cient tracing is critical, and it requires a list of all contacts the probable or confi rmed infected person had, with their locations. In rural Liberia, where many people don’t have written addresses, this task was impossible without securing the trust of the community and partnering with them. Community engagement was essential for identifying new cases of Ebola and tracing contacts of people who were sick or had died from the disease.

Interviewees, including those from the WHO and the Carter Center, said identifying and empowering community leaders to lead the way in the response was indispensable, and they worked with them to design adequate communication strategies and response plans to trigger behavior changes within their communities. These leaders possessed adequate knowledge of the local context, commanded the respect of the locals and were entrusted to create tailored plans in which community members became active participants and saw themselves as agents of change. They were key to helping identify probable infected people and encouraging them to come forward if they were ill because families needed assurance that their loved ones would be cared for. Furthermore, traditional leaders were integral in

BRIGHT SPOTS

80 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2016). 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa - Case Counts. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.81 World Health Organization. (2015). Th e Ebola Outbreak in Liberia is Over. WHO.

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respecting cultural norms and taking into account the inputs of local communities is the only way to build resilient, sustainable and effi cient responses in crisis scenarios. It also demonstrates the benefi ts of developing a crisis response horizontally (versus vertically) and fostering local ownership.

In sum, the community-led approach used to solve this major health crisis highlights some key lessons that can easily be translated to security and development matters, such as:

• Communities are co-partners: Consulting and collaborating with communities from the design of the response to every phase of the implementation is crucial.

82 Risso-Gill, I. & Finnegan, L. (2015). Children’s Ebola Recovery Assessment: Sierra Leone. Save the Children, UNICEF, Plan International, World Vision.83 Diggins, J & Mills, E. (2015). Th e Pathology of Inequality: Gender and Ebola in West Africa. Institute of Development Studies, Practice Paper in Brief 23.84 Young, T.D. & Quermorllue, S. (2015). A Gender Sensitive Ebola Response and Recovery. Oxfam International.85 Restless Development. (2015). Submission to Africa APPG Inquiry: Call for Written Evidence on Community Led Health Systems & the Ebola Outbreak. Restless Development.86 Th e United States Agency for International Development. (2015). Community Perspectives about Ebola in Bong, Lofa and Montserrado Counties of Liberia: Results of a Qualitative Study. USAID.

The Liberia research team conducts an all-day focus group discussion with student leaders from Cuttington University, Bong Community College, Bong Technical College and several high schools. Gbarnga is the capital city of the Bong County in north-central Liberia.

Photo Credit: Youth Center manager

• Tailor response plans to local culture: Understanding and respecting specifi c cultural norms and leadership structure of each community is key.

• Engage with every group in the community: Building upon the particular strengths and roles of community leaders, religious leaders, women and youth enhances eff ective communication and builds trust.

explaining to communities the risks of ceremonial body washing, and off ering acceptable alternative solutions to the families.

Beyond traditional leaders, women and youth also played a crucial role in responding to the epidemic, by way of their resourcefulness and ability to mobilize their communities.82 Women were disproportionately aff ected by Ebola due to their care-giving role in families, their specifi c roles in traditional burial practices, and their relatively higher rate of employment in sectors most aff ected by the outbreak such as informal services and agriculture.83 Understanding the potential of engaging women was a tremendous asset in the response to Ebola. In many villages, women groups led the plans to raise awareness, assumed the responsibility for orphans, and provided basic resources to families in quarantine. 84

Similarly, the positive contribution to community engagement by Liberian youth in the crisis has been recognized.85 In some villages, they conducted door-to-door awareness campaigns and helped trace possible cases. Some key examples of youth involvement include the Federation of Liberian Youth, which organized community training on how to prevent Ebola spread, and Youth Aid-Liberia (YAL), which implemented an initiative on the awareness of preventative measures on Ebola in local communities.86

Main takeaways

Ebola highlighted the power of and the need for meaningful community engagement. The communities and traditional leaders were critical in disseminating information about the disease to their constituents, as many community members in rural areas were highly mistrustful of government and health workers’ claims about Ebola. Once the communities understood the need for action, they were innovative and very effi cient in developing their own systems to fi ght the epidemic.

The response to Ebola shows that understanding,

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• Build upon existing structures: Utilizing existing programs and communication channels within the communities is more eff ective than applying a top-down approach.

The unaddressed aspirations, uncertainties towards the future and underlying tensions relayed throughout interviews clearly indicate that peace is very fragile in Liberia. Had the government and the peacekeeping mission engaged with and consulted communities from the beginning of the mission, the Liberian people may have exhibited a higher trust in their government and a more positive outlook on the future of their country. On the other hand, when communities were consulted and engaged in a way that leveraged their strengths, and the peacekeeping mission operated within the framework of established traditional mechanisms with respect for local context, eff orts were often positive and benefi cial to the whole of society. The question remains whether UNMIL will be able to draw from these lessons learned to inform their work in preparation for and during the implementation of the drawdown.

So far, it seems that the Mission is taking concrete steps in this direction. It will continue to support the Liberian government with security sector reform and capacity building resources, in an eff ort to place more focus on engaging communities. Also, although some fi eld offi ces are closing down in some counties, UNMIL plans to continue to engage communities in these areas through the establishment of a joint team of UNPOL, PCS staff and military observers. On a bimonthly basis, this team will visit the areas that no longer have fi eld offi ces after the drawdown. Moreover, UNMIL will maintain a monitoring presence to ensure that the government is following through on their promises, such as allocating money in the national budget for the establishment of county and district security councils.

In addition, at the request of the Security Council, the UN dispatched an integrated Strategic Assessment Mission (SAM), comprised of several UN agencies, at the end of August to evaluate what the Mission has achieved thus far and what remains to be done. This mission will also assess which UNMIL functions are being duplicated by other UN agencies to identify where certain tasks may be transferred. PCS interviewees mentioned that the SAM will have a

full agenda of over 50 meetings with internal actors within UNMIL, the UN country team, individual UN agencies and local actors in Monrovia and in the counties – to include members from a broad range of civil society. Given what the research team has heard from high-level UNMIL offi cials regarding the lack of community and civil society consultations with the fi rst assessment, this appears to be a positive development. SAM is expected to release their assessment report in November 2016.

LOOKING AHEAD

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As illustrated throughout these two case studies, the exclusion and marginalization of segments of a population - whether from economic development, political processes or social integration - often serve as one of the main root causes of confl icts. To help address root causes and build a common vision for the future between governments and their citizens, it is imperative that communities and civil society organizations are engaged and feel a sense of ownership throughout the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process. Although the normative evolution of a more people-centered approach within peacekeeping has gained some momentum, both at UN headquarters and in the fi eld, there is still much to be done to bridge the gap between theory and practice. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must focus on encouraging stronger political will

within host governments to put people at the center of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process - and start by doing so within the mission itself.

As seen in CAR, the initial engagement with Central African communities and civil society via the Bangui Forum led to a more positive outlook on the country’s future because people felt more ownership and empowerment. However, the lack of follow-through and implementation following the Forum has been a source of increasing frustration and apathy, and Central Africans’ collective outlook for the future remains bleak. In Liberia, it would appear that a lack of meaningful engagement with communities led to a misalignment in priorities and a failure to address the root causes of the confl ict after thirteen years of peacekeeping. As a result, the government and

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Children play outside the entrance of the IDP camp at M’Poko International Airport in Bangui, CAR.

Photo credit: Kelly Joseph (MIA ‘16)

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the Liberian people still distrust one another and remain discontent with the status quo. Moreover, the Liberian people and the government do not share a vision of sustainable peace for the country. With these considerations, what lessons can be learned about community engagement and peacekeeping eff orts in Liberia as UNMIL prepares to leave the country, and how can these lessons be applied to newer missions, such as MINUSCA in CAR, to ensure that the foundations for sustainable peace are eff ectively laid?

The fi nal section of this report attempts to answer this question based on fi ndings from the research. However, it should be emphasized that these recommendations can only be eff ective if there is sustained support from the international community and strong political will on the part of host governments, peacekeeping operations, and the Security Council to prioritize inclusive national ownership as a primary condition to achieve sustainable peace. These recommendations cannot be conceived as side references or minor technical arrangements, but as normative changes resulting from a shift in mindset regarding how peacekeeping operations are mandated. This will require fi rst and foremost the full and undivided support of the Security Council, which must strike a better balance between the rights of the states and the rights of the people it is meant to assist. It will also require realignment from all stakeholders, from UN headquarters to the fi eld, from international partners to regional organizations, from host governments to civil society, and so on. It is fully recognized that such a shift will not be easy, particularly for an organization that remains essentially state-centric. However, given the increasingly complex and protracted nature of confl icts today, it is clear that a new approach is needed – one that moves beyond stabilization to actively creating the conditions for sustainable peace.

Key recommendations for a more people-centered approach in practice

The following recommendations are based on common themes that emerged from discussions across various stakeholder groups. Interviewees identifi ed these areas as bright spots or lessons learned for ways in which peacekeeping missions can better engage communities and build inclusive national ownership throughout their mission cycles. It is hoped that these recommendations might prove useful to new and future peacekeeping missions, like

MINUSCA, as well as for missions toward the end of their cycle, such as UNMIL.

1. Ensure the Security Council prioritizes inclusive national ownership and community engagement in the mandate. Prioritization of community engagement begins in the Security Council where peacekeeping operation mandates are formulated. Several UN staff mentioned that not having community engagement included in the mission mandate was a challenge because the mandate is how they formed their priorities, allocated funding, and were evaluated. The Security Council should give peacekeeping operations a mandate to foster inclusive national ownership through genuine consultations and engagement with all stakeholders, and by supporting national eff orts to engage in dialogue across all segments of society. This must be integrated into a mission’s political strategy and apply to all peacekeeping tasks throughout all stages of the mission cycle, including the fi rst strategic assessment. This is essential to accurately assess the needs of the people and devise a well-informed strategy for how to work with various stakeholders. As stated in Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016) and echoed by General Assembly resolution 262 (2016), this will help to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account.

2. Institutionalize community engagement as a general practice within peacekeeping missions.As evidenced by the two case studies, prioritization of community engagement may depend on mission leadership and continues to be carried out in an ad hoc manner, primarily by the Civil Aff airs team. It has yet to be integrated into the broader political and operational strategy, both at headquarters and fi eld level. This became particularly apparent in UNMIL’s community engagement eff orts, following a change in the mission’s leadership: if the leadership deems it important, active community engagement and inclusivity initiatives are refl ected in its work. When it is not regarded as a priority, however, engagement activities may be neglected, leading to missed opportunities. Thus, it is critical that peacekeeping, and the Security Council in particular, integrate community engagement as a general practice, in order to have a consistent implementation across mission cycles and across peacekeeping deployments.

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3. Encourage and support host governments to help foster inclusive national ownership from the beginning. Peacekeeping must act “as a bridge between local communities and host authorities” to build a common vision on the priorities of the country. This is crucial for peace to be sustained when peacekeeping operations leave a country. Peacekeeping operations can expand the lines of communication between the government and civil society, and can also use its political leverage to convince governments to regularly engage and consult their people. This can help to ensure that root causes are eff ectively addressed and that trust is regained or strengthened.

4. Advocate for a quid-pro-quo compact with the host government. As the HIPPO report recommends, a “compact” between the UN and the host government can serve as a useful framework of mutual accountability. If a compact was established at the beginning of a peacekeeping mission, host governments could be more inclined to consult with their people and have their voices refl ected throughout the peacekeeping process. UNMIL staff suggested that a quid-pro-quo compact with the new Liberian government – in which the mission would only dispense money for projects after the government had met certain conditions – may work well in ensuring the government is actually engaging its people. Staff mentioned that this type of framework did not exist for community engagement from the beginning of the mission, and some leverage to advocate for community engagement with the government was lost as a result. In CAR, it appears that a mutual accountability framework is in the process of being fi nalized, which will help guide international engagement and hold parties to their commitments. This kind of framework could be leveraged to ensure that consultation with the people is included as a main component for all stakeholders and that government policies are in line with and refl ective of the priorities of the people.

5. Build transparent communication strategies with and for communities.People should be seen as the agents of peace and therefore need information. It is important that peacekeeping operations establish and expand two-way communication channels with local communities, in order to 1) manage expectations and ensure that people receive the information they need

to organize themselves; 2) leverage local knowledge and networks for timely information, and 3) build a community of trust. Failure to properly inform can lead to perceptions of partiality, lack of trust, and loss of legitimacy and credibility of the mission. Moreover, these mechanisms and tools for communication need to be adapted to the local context to guarantee that messages reach all levels of society. Based on the research, it would appear that existing communication strategies to inform communities, particularly those in rural or remote areas, of government programs or the peacekeeping activities are insuffi cient in reaching the broader population. Civil society and community leaders stated that their fears and concerns might be somewhat alleviated if their respective peacekeeping mission had a more active, consistent strategy to inform them of progress being made by the government and the mission itself. In Liberia, people were particularly interested in being updated on when the transition of certain tasks, such as security, would take place, as well as receiving updates on the mission and government’s various activities.

6. Provide more training and capacity building for civil society organizations to better advocate and lobby for the people. Interviewees in both countries, particularly within UNMIL and MINUSCA, highlighted the need to build the capacity of civil society organizations so that they can eff ectively lobby the government on behalf of people they represent. CSOs and communities are often said to possess the will, but not the knowledge or resources, to advocate for their needs, especially in countries in which organized civil society is a relatively new development – as is the case in Liberia and in CAR.

7. Take advantage of traditional community structures. Interviewees from across stakeholder groups in Liberia asserted that the Ebola response proved that working within traditional community structures to tackle key issues is the most eff ective course of action. When international stakeholders and donors became involved in the response without fi rst considering existing community structures, and instead implemented solutions that were not sensitive to traditional practices, including burial rituals, they were often unsuccessful in their eff orts. However, once they began to engage the community, health workers better understood who the key infl uences were and

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and were able to take advantage of existing communication networks to send out vital information about Ebola. In CAR, MINUSCA staff noted that broadcasting messages through religious leaders and networks have been very eff ective in reaching the broader population.

8. Recruit troops, police and staff appropriate for the local context. Language barriers, perceptions of ulterior motives among peacekeepers, and a general lack of understanding of the local context were cited as some of the main constraints to eff ective community engagement. When entire troop battalions lack the language skills and resources to communicate with the local population, opportunities to engage communities or respond effi ciently and eff ectively to security developments are often missed. Language skills are critical for eff ective communication, consultation and collaboration with local stakeholders, which is necessary to build trust. In addition, troops from neighboring countries should not be deployed along their own border as it may present confl icts of interest and fuel the perception that troops have ulterior motives. However, it is recognized that this recommendation will remain a challenge given the limited ability to pick and choose troops and police.

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While conducting the research, the team used the following concept defi nitions:

Community engagement is a two-way process by which the aspirations, concerns, needs and values of citizens and communities are incorporated at all levels and in all sectors in policy development, planning, decision-making, service delivery and assessment; and by which governments and other business and civil society organizations involve citizens, clients, communities and other stakeholders in these processes.87

Inclusive national ownership refers to the process in which “the national responsibility to drive and direct eff orts is broadly shared by the national government across all key social strata and divides, across a spectrum of political opinions and domestic actors, including minorities.” 88

Inclusivity is an intention or policy of ensuring that a diverse range of perspectives are freely and fairly expressed and heard, particularly including people who might otherwise be excluded or marginalized.

Communication is defi ned as community representatives receiving the information they need to organize themselves, and shifting their behavior in supportive directions.

Consultation is defi ned as when community representatives share their perspectives and preferences, and this is treated as key data for decision-making and evaluation.

Collaboration is defi ned as when community representatives are directly involved in decisions with a vote, or even veto rights, at key moments, and/or when they are involved in the implementation of programming after consultation.89

Civil society is the “third sector” of society that comprises civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations.90

Sustainable peace is defi ned as “existing in a state where the probability of using destructive confl ict, oppression and violence to solve problems is so low that it does not enter into any party’s strategy, while the probability of using cooperation, dialogue and collaborative problem-solving to promote social justice and well-being is so high that it governs social organization and life.”91

APPENDIX A: KEY CONCEPTS

87 United Nations and the Queensland State government. (2005). Th e United Nations (Brisbane) Declaration on Community Engagement. United Nations and the Queensland State government, Australia.88 Th e Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. (2015). Th e Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. United Nations, P8.89 Quick, I.D. (2016). Peace Operations & Community Engagement: Background Paper for DPET Workshop on 3-4 February 2016.90 United Nations. Civil Society. United Nations.91 Coleman, P. (2013). Th e Missing Piece in Sustainable Peace. Huffi ngton Post.

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While the importance of inclusivity as a condition for sustainable peace represents a new paradigm shift, community engagement has been the subject of increased attention from Civil Aff airs in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) over the last decade. Civil Aff airs has since developed a number of innovative tools for community engagement, which are critical to understanding local perceptions, adapting interventions to local contexts and building trust with local communities. Table 1 provides an overview of these tools, which, among other activities, help missions to build public confi dence and increase legitimacy. They also help missions to gain a broader situation awareness, while also measuring progress against benchmarks, particularly legitimacy, eff ectiveness and security. 92

Table 1: Community engagement tools 93

APPENDIX B: TOOLS FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

In-depth interviews Interviews help to build relationships and establish trust with local actors. When conducted among a range of stakeholders, as in the network approach described below, interviews can provide a deeper understanding of specifi c issues, unique perspectives and thought patterns.

Town hall meetings Public meetings are used to capture a range of local opinions and views from a community. They can be used for various purposes: to provide information, pro-mote discussion of key issues (e.g., peace agreements and peacebuilding priorities), and/or sensitize communities to the work of the mission. Such meetings are an im-portant tool for consultation and collaboration, but often refl ect the power dynam-ics of local communities and political systems (which could mean the exclusion or underrepresentation of certain groups).

Focus groups Focus groups involve discussing a specifi c set of issues with a pre-determined de-mographic, such as former combatants, women, students, religious and traditional leaders, among others. Focus groups can be useful in targeting perspectives that may be underrepresented in other forums like town hall meetings.

Networks The network approach entails maintaining regular contact with a range of local actors through formal or informal interaction. Actors can include local authorities, community and religious leaders, civil society, academics and individuals such as taxi drivers, restaurant owners, etc. This approach brings the mission closer to local populations, aligning expectations and priorities and improving confi dence in the mission.

Local and social me-dia monitoring and analysis

This approach relies on information regarding current events as portrayed by local media and monitoring social media trends to gauge perceptions among the local community.

Public perception surveys

Public perception surveys are used to establish baselines, gauge progress and identify trends among the population, which can be helpful in designing programs and interventions. They are also used by PKOs to support public information eff orts, monitor peacebuilding dynamics and progress towards mandate implementation, and enhance early warning. Surveys are often conducted by Community Liaison Assistants.

92 United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. (2013). Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimen-sional UN Peacekeeping. United Nations, P32.93 Ibid., P26.

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Joint Protection Teams (JPTs)

JPTs are small, ad-hoc teams composed of UN police, civilian and military staff , and involve various sections of the mission, such as human rights, civil aff airs, protec-tion, etc. International and local NGOs and UN agencies can also participate. JPTs are deployed to high-risk areas to survey protection needs and issue recommenda-tions, with the goal of improving the protection of civilians, including preventing gender-based violence, and enhancing the capacity of civilian experts to reach areas which are hard to access.

Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs)

CLAs are part of the Civil Aff airs team, and are thus responsible for understanding local perceptions and mediating communication between military personnel and local populations. They build broader situational awareness and analysis and send daily reports to the mission’s Civil Aff airs team. They also rely on extended commu-nity networks to monitor community and confl ict dynamics as well as security risks (see Community Alert Networks below).

Community Alert Networks (CANs) and Community Protec-tion Plans (CPPs)

CANs are used to improve the missions’ reach within communities, and are man-aged by Community Liaison Assistants. The tool is, essentially, “a network estab-lished in a community for wider engagement, exchange of information and to alert the community and protection actors in times of emergency.” Often, the mission can provide communication material, such as cellphones, to designated focal points in the community who are part of the network system. CANs can be extremely use-ful to enhance early warning, but must be used carefully to avoid compromising local partners’ safety by exposing them to retaliation.

CPPs involve adapting protection mechanisms to the needs of specifi c local com-munities with the benefi t of a multidisciplinary grasp of gender, policing and other perspectives. CPPs are also put forward by CLAs, given their closer relationship with communities.

UN radio, press and publications

UN communications channels are used to disseminate key messages and inform the community about the work of the mission. Radio programs, for example, off er a useful platform to deliver messages to a broader variety of stakeholders, in various parts of the host countries.

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)

QIPs are small projects that provide benefi ts to the local population and help to build confi dence in the Mission. This can include building water pumps or improv-ing of public infrastructure. QIPs are funded and carried out by the mission in order to produce tangible results for the local community. They are thus a powerful tool for community engagement, as they foster dialogue and local consultation before project implementation, establish communication channels between the mission and communities at the local level, and help UN police and military engage with communities through the implementation of the projects.

Community Violence Reduction (CVR) proj-ects

With the understanding that violence has structural and complex triggers within a society, CVR projects take a more holistic approach to reducing the risks of vio-lence within communities. CVR projects serve as a complementary approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities by providing more inclusive opportunities to those at risk of recruitment by armed groups versus only former combatants. For example, CVR projects entail providing job opportunities, education, professional training and even entrepreneurship training for individuals who are at risk of being recruited by armed groups, or who are more susceptible to involvement in violent activities. Such programs are often implemented in partner-ship with non-governmental organizations and UN Agencies.

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All Liberian Party

Campaigners for Change

Council of Civil Society in Liberia

Episcopal Church

European Union

Former Combatants

Gbowee Peace Foundation

Grand Bassa Community Church

Grand Gedeh Land Commission

Human Rights Lawyers and Activists

Imam Council

Independent National Human Rights Commission

Interim Land Task Force

International Monetary Fund

Islamic Unity Foundation High School

Ivorian Refugees

Liberia Governance Commission

Liberia National Police

Liberia Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC)

Liberian Business Association

Liberian Parliament

Local Administration Grand Gedeh

Market Place Women

Maryland Government

Ministry of Trade

Ministry of Youth and Sports

Motorcyclists Union

Mrs. Garnett

National Council of Traditional Leaders

Peace Island Community

Peacebuilding Offi ce

Restoration Baptist Ministries

Sime Darby Plantation

The Carter Centre

Traditional Leaders Grand Gedeh

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia

UN Women

UNDP

UNFPA

United Nations Police

UNMIL, multiple offi ces

WHO

Woman and Sustainable Development

Women NGOs Secretariat

Young Women’s Christian Association of Liberia

Youth Leaderas Bong County

Youth Leaders Grand Bassa

Youth Leaders Grand Gedeh

APPENDIX C: LIST OF MEETINGS CONDUCTED BY LIBERIA RESEARCH TEAM

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APPENDIX D: LIST OF MEETINGS CONDUCTED BY CAR RESEARCH TEAMAmerican Bar Association – Role of Law Initiative

African Union

Archbishop of Bangui

Bangui Forum Follow-Up Committee

Central mosque of PK5

Civil society forums hosted by MINUSCA

Concern Worldwide

Displaced communities in Bangui and Kaga Bandoro

Don Bosco Rehabilitation Center

European Union Training Mission

EU Electoral Commission

Former combatants

Former Prime Ministers

French Embassy

French Sangaris Force

Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect

International Committee of the Red Cross

International Rescue Committee

Inter-religious Platform for Reconciliation and National Cohesion

JUPADEC

Kaga Bandoro Committee for Dialogue and Reconciliation

Local citizens

MARA Working Group

Members of Parliament

Minister Advisor to the President for Reconciliation

Ministry of Economy and Planning

Ministry of the Interior

Ministry of Social Aff airs and National Reconciliation

MINUSCA, multiple offi ces

M’Poko residents

Norwegian Refugee Council

OCHA

Oxfam

Prefectural and local authorities

Prefectural and local authorities

Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale

Quartier Laquanga religious leaders

Radio Ndeke Luca

Réseau Centrafricain des ONGs de droits de l’homme

UNDP

UNICEF

UNHCR

UN Women

University of Bangui, including the Administration, Student

Association and students

U.S. Institute of Peace

U.S. State Department

U.S. Embassy

World Bank