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Triggers for PCA. Financial Regulation Seminar June 9, 2008. Thorvald Grung Moe Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway). The views presented are mine and should not be associated with Norges Bank. Outline. Background Key features of PCA PCA in Europe? Design of PCA triggers - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Triggers for PCA
Financial Regulation Seminar
June 9, 2008
Thorvald Grung MoeNorges Bank (Central Bank of Norway)
The views presented are mine and should not be associated with Norges Bank
Outline
Background Key features of PCA PCA in Europe? Design of PCA triggers Policy issues Way forward
Background
Definitions
PCA = Prompt Corrective Action Rule-based intervention framework based on
specific levels of bank capital
FDICIA = Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
SEIR = Structured Early Intervention and resolution (Benston and Kaufman, 1988)
Mandatory regulatory responses based on predetermined capital assets ratios that trigger structured actions by supervisors
Trigger event
How can we avoid another run?
Strengthen the financial system
Reducing likelihood of banks failing
Reducing the impact of failing banks
Renewed interest in PCA The Treasury Committee:
… see great merit in the “prompt corrective action” approach adopted in the US and in other countries.
We recommend that the judgment of the relevant authority, supplemented by a set of quantitative triggers, be used to identify whether a bank is either “failing”, at risk or failing, or is just an outlier in the industry.
Tripartite report – more reserved
… the interventions and powers available to the FSA are already wide-ranging
there may be cases in which there are practical problems with implementing (intervention) OIVOP powers (*)
… the authorities judges that the FSA requires a small number of additional powers
(*) Own Initiative Variation Of Permission
IMF support PCA type policy … the regime of remedial measures to be
applied against weak institutions crossing various thresholds established by the FSA could be further elaborated. Although the existing powers of the FSA to take action against weak institutions suffice, increasing clarity on the outcomes sought by regulators will lead to reduced ambiguity and would encourage early voluntary actions by weak financial institutions, for instance by reducing dividends and augmenting capital.
IMF Article IV Concluding Statement; May 23, 2008
Should FSA have spotted the crisis?
… there were a number of indicators emerging that could have prompted the supervisory team to re-assess its view of Northern Rock’s business risk much earlier (p. 42)
A number of signals were apparent that individually (and in aggregate) should have provided a trigger for a review of the structure of the balance sheet and the appropriateness of controls, … (p. 39)
FSA Internal Audit Report (March 2008)
Inadequate FSA resources Lack of management attention Last ARROW in march 2006
Letter to NR board: “Risk to FSA: LOW”
No Risk Mitigation Process (RMP) Supervisory period extended to 3 y Weak Close & Continuous process Liquidity review April 2007:
“No material weakness”
PCA Workshop in Norges BankMarch 2008
Issues for discussion
DO YOU THINK PCA REGULATION COULD BE USEFUL IN EUROPE?
HOW SHOULD PCA TRIGGERS BE DESIGNED AND USED?
WHICH REGULATORY ACTIONS SHOULD BE “TRIGGERED” - AND HOW FIXED SHOULD THE LINK BE BETWEEN TRIGGERS AND MANDATORY ACTIONS?
ANY OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES RELATED TO PCA TRIGGER IMPLEMENTATION IN EUROPE?
ConclusionNorges Bank workshop on PCA triggers, March 2008
PCA legislation is no panacea, but if implemented in a flexible and pragmatic manner, it could be a useful supplement to current EU regulations
PCA in context; related themes
Rules versus authority (Simons 1936)
Why prevention is better than cure (Goodhart 2007)
Banking regulation and PCA (Freixas and Pragi 2007)
Disclosure, volatility and transparency (Baumann 2004)
Formulas or supervision? (Estrella 1998)
The credit crisis and what it means (Soros 2008)
Key features of PCA
FDICIA -“Subtitle D”, Section 38
Mandates that each appropriate Federal banking agency … to take prompt corrective action to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions by prescribing or rescinding, as appropriate, specified capitalization measures established according to statutory guidelines (including capital restoration plan requirements)
FDICIA (1991): Bank classification and related capital levels
Capital levels
Total risk-based capital
Tier 1 risk-based capital
Tier 1 leverage ratio
Well Capitalized
≥ 10 % ≥ 6 % ≥ 5 %
Adequately capitalized
≥ 8 % ≥ 4 % ≥ 4 %
Undercapitalized
< 8 % < 4 % < 4 %
Significantly undercapitalized
<6% <3% <3%
Critically undercapitalized
Tangible equity ≤ 2%
Graduated supervisory response depending on capital category
Key provisions are [Sections 38 (d)–(i)] : No institution can pay dividends that will lead it
to be undercapitalized
Undercapitalized institutions will be monitored and have to provide a capital restoration plan; asset growth can also be restricted
Significantly undercapitalized institutions will (obviously) be subject to further restrictions
Critically undercapitalized institutions will be taken into receivership within 90 days
Mandatory – Discretionaryprovisions for undercapitalized banks
Restrict dividends No management
fees Capital restoration Restrict asset
growth Prior approvals for
branching etc. No brokered
deposits
Require new capital
Restrict affiliate transactions
Restrict rates on new deposits
Restrict activities Replace
management Require divestiture
Arguments in favour of a rule based approach to intervention
Increased credibility of supervisor Reduce scope for regulatory forbearance Reduce danger of undue political
interference Beneficial impact on bank behavior Reduce probability of future insolvency
Llewellyn & Mayes (2004)
Preconditions for PCA in Europe(*)
(*) See Nieto and Wall (2007) for details
Philosophy of SEIR/PCA
1. Minimize deposit insurance loss
2. Forbearance should be limited
3. Banks should be closed at positive capital levels
Institutional preconditions
1. Supervisory independence and accountability
2. Adequate authority
3. Adequate resolution procedures
4. Adequate and timely financial information
Discussion
CRD (and B II) have PCA elements Supervisory architecture different Supervisors prefer “broader” approach Elements of discretion even in FDICIA Discretion due to uncertain information=> Reluctance to embrace rule based
intervention, but emerging support for early resolution features of PCA
CRD/B II have PCA elements
B II/Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored.
CRD/Article 136: Competent authorities shall require any credit institution that does not meet the requirement of this Directive to take the necessary actions or steps at an early stage to address the situation.
Different supervisory architecture
US
Fed OCC FDIC
Europe
NCBincl. supervision
DGSPay box
Systemic concern Safety and soundness Least cost resolution
Supervisors prefer “modified” PCA approach
US Federal Reserve:
Regulators imposed formal action on banks long before their capital became undercapitalized.
PCA legislation may fill a few gaps, but may have been oversold.
Peek and Rosengren (1996)
Canada’s FSA (OSFI):
FDICIA was influential in shaping OSFI’s approach to intervention, but there was no direct importation.
Rather, the framework was rejected in its existing form.
Hard financial indicators were argued to be trailing rather than leading indicators of the financial health of an institution.
Black (2004)
OSFI: “Soft indicators”
The Guides to Intervention therefore incorporate ‘soft’ indicators, such as the strength of internal controls, internal policies on risk management and whether or not these were being followed, as well as figures on business growth in assessing financial health.
Broader supervisory approaches
ARROW = Advanced, Risk-Responsive Operating Frame-Work
FSA: The ARROW risk model
CapitalAsset QualityManagementEarningsLiquiditySensitivity to market risk
FED: CAMELS
Even some discretion in FDICIA
Section 38 (g): If an insured depository institution is
in an unsafe or unsound condition, … the agency may …
Reclassify the institution (“downgrade”) … Require the institution to comply with
(certain) provisions related to that capital category
Uncertain information => discretion
PCA encourage, but is not reliant on market value accounting
Paradox: PCA “rely on” effectiveness of supervisory examinations (Wall and Nieto 2007)
PCA ratings are lagging indicators of bank health (Peek and Rosengren 1996)
Interaction between accounting practices and financial crisis (Goodhart 2006)
Greater volatility => Stronger buffers
Emerging support for early closure
Special Resolution Regime (SRR) … to ensure that a range of tools are available to
take greater control of a failing bank
Special Resolution Regime (SRR) … should be based on regulatory triggers, in line
with principles in EU law governing the reorganization and winding-up of banks (!)
[= based on regulatory judgment by the FSA after consultation with BoE and HMT]
IMF support for SRR We support the aim of early intervention of distressed
institutions in the proposed SRR. It is not possible to identify in advance all
circumstances under which an institution should be put into the SRR process, but a definition of the circumstances likely to give rise to such a judgment would support this aim.
An approach whereby the regime is presumed to be triggered when a bank meets this definition strikes an appropriate balance between regulatory forbearance and unnecessary actions.
As thresholds for liquidity are hard to identify, discretion remains essential in this context.
IMF Article IV Concluding Statement; May 23, 2008
The problem of “signal error”
Banking crisis do not appear out of the blue
A high proportion were anticipated by our best leading indicators
There is a problem, however, of too many “false alarms” ~ one false for every 2-5 true signals
Goldstein (2000): Early warning system for financial crisis
Design of PCA triggers
Design of PCA triggers
10, 8, 3 or 0 %? Alternative triggers? Liquidity triggers? Link to Early Warning Systems Can we predict banking crises?
When to intervene? At 10, 8, 3 or 0 risk weighted capital?
Markets will react negatively if banks even approach regulatory minimum
Which type of crisis? Slow asset burn or
sudden liquidity crunch?
“90 days notice” if critically under-capitalized – realistic?
“… weakness leading to failure are often evident and addressed … well before the PCA capital triggers are met.”
Brunnmeir and Willardson (2006)
Perhaps not such a big issue?Very few banks are actually undercapitalized
CAMEL rating =>
PCA categorySubgroup A(rating 1 or 2)
Subgroup B(rating 3)
Subgroup C(rating 4 or 5)
Well capitalized 9149 485 70
Adequately capitalized
173 25 11
Undercapitalized 4 2 6
Distribution of US banks along PCA and CAMEL categories
Source: FDIC (2001)
Wider set of triggers? RBI will initiate
structured action if banks break any of these triggers: Capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio (CRAR)
Non-performing assets (NPA)
Return on Equity (ROE)
Source: Reserve Bank of India (2000)
PCA TRIGGERS (%)
CRAR < 9 < 6 < 3
NPA > 10, but < 15 > 15
ROE < 0,25
Perhaps also liquidity triggers?
FSA (2007): Liquidity is hard to predict! Liquidity risk can grow very rapidly
One suggested liquidity trigger: Request for emergency support facility
Other suggestions: Funding mismatch Short-duration liquidity shock
Which corrective action to associate? Close link with central bank ELA
Link to Early Warning Systems
New risk index estimated by Norges Bank gives strong and early signals of 1990-93 crisis banks
The risk index includes six indicators:1. The capital adequacy ratio
2. Ratio of residential mortgages to gross lending
3. An expected loss measure
4. A concentration risk measure
5. Return on assets
6. Norges Bank’s liquidity indicator
Early Warning Systems: Fantasy or Reality?
ECOFIN (2008) Considerations should be given to the
further development of early warning systems on individual (financial) institutions.
FSF (2008) Authorities must do all they can to
identify emerging problems so as to be able, if necessary, to take prompt appropriate action to mitigate them.
IMF Financial Soundness Indicators Core set
RWC NPL Sector % of loans ROA ROE Interest margin Cost ratio Liquid assets Net open FX position
Encourage set -additional data on: Deposit takers Other financial
institutions Non-financial
companies Households Market liquidity Real estate markets
Can we predict banking crises?
There are two traditional views of banking panics Crisis is generated by random events
(sunspots)=> bank run not due to any exogenous shock, or
Crisis is generated by fluctuations in fundamentals of the economy
Our theory … makes firm predictions about the conditions under which crisis will occur
Allen & Gale (2002)
But Goodhart’s law would kick in It is highly unlikely that a set of indicators could
be identified that could detect future crises sufficiently early and with a high degree of certainty, while not giving false signals.
Indeed, if such indicators could be identified they would likely lose their usefulness because they would change behavior; markets would take them into account and, by anticipating crises, precipitate them earlier, or policymakers would take actions to prevent crises from occurring. Consequently, the indicators would lose their ability to predict crises. IMF (1998): Economic Outlook
Something simple might do the trick: The leverage ratio
… it is essential that optimal risk-sensitive capital requirements be complemented by a capital floor that does not depend on the riskiness of banks’ activities.
Bichsel & Blum, April 2005
Reducing the leverage ratio would undermine our whole system of prompt corrective action which is the foundation stone of our system of supervision…
Former Comptroller of the Currency John Hawke, April 2004
PCA policy issues
Current PCA policy issues in Norway
Early intervention
1) Write down share capital
2) ELA conditions
Early resolution
3) Closing a bank and depositor payout
4) Bridge bank solution
1996 Act on Guarantee Schemes for Banks and Public Administration etc. Chapter 3: Payment
and capital adequacy difficulties
Chapter 4: Public Administration
Triggers for SEIR in the 1996 Act
WRITE-DOWN OF SHARE CAPITAL IF:
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IF:
one of these criteria is valid
a) The bank is probably illiquid
a) The bank is illiquid
a) Risk weighted capital may fall below 8 %
a) Risk weighted capital has fallen below 8 %
a) A large part of the bank’s equity is probably lost
a) A large part of the banks core capital is lost
1) Write down triggers in the Act
Write down possible according to the Act
However, write down may come too late?
Require new audited statement Could take some
time How to protect
shareholders right when time is short?
Chapter 4 (PA) + going concern may be better option?Based on large bank with Tier 1=8% and Tier 2=11,2%
Write down if …
Equivalent to Tier 2 capital of …
Corrective actions
A substantial part of equity is lost
7,6 % Call general assembly
More than 25 % of share capital is lost
5,8 % As above
Less than 25 % of share capital is left
4,6 % Write down share capital according to estimated losses
A substantial part of total capital is lost
1,6 % Write down subordinated debt
2) ELA policy issues (2004 – 2008)
Systemic
Solvency
Illiquid & solvent
Collateral
Current financial crisis has highlighted: Classic LLR case again
Illiquid, but solvent ELA despite RWC > 10% ELA only for systemic
banks with collateral But, obvious need for
CORRECTIVE ACTION Need to coordinate ELA
conditions with FSA Strengthen capital
position Engage shareholders
ELA policy issues
2004
2005 2006
20072008
3) Closing a bank and depositor payout (highlights from recent report)
A bank closure (public administration) today will be a challenge, even for small banks
If a bank is put into public administration, it is unlikely to reopen again
Public administration is (therefore) not a realistic resolution option for large banks
Depositors should expect partial payment within two weeks; the rest within 3 month
4) Bridge bank solution
How to maintain critical payment services, and write down non-protected creditors?
Policy dilemma Cannot be done under chapter 3 But chapter 4 (PA) will close the bank
Solutions Change law (US bridge bank/UK SRR) or Find “creative” solutions within current law
How to handle “TBTF” banks?
Important PCA elements for EU
Early resolution Provide incentive for market based crisis
resolution Could ease “burden sharing” discussion
Early intervention Fact finding: How do supervisors react to
breaches of regulatory capital today Common definition of solvency Convergence of supervisory reaction to declining
capital levels
Guidance for policy reform
PCA can be a very useful supplement Especially the ability to close early
Better to prevent crisis, but harder Focus should be on resolution policies
Write down, bridge bank, payout, etc.
Resolute handling of liquidity problems Better information systems Tight policy coordination FSA – NCB Enhanced role of owners
Way forward
Banking regulation at a crossroad:New regulations or just new attitudes?
Investors have lost confidence in banks
Bank stocks now trades at a book multiple of 1 – which is lowest level in15 years.
Changes to regulations are politically inevitable.
It appears certain that those changes will dent banks’ profits.
FT June 6, 2008
I don’t think we should lose sight of the fact that so much in regulation is not about structure, but about attitude and management: the “how” of regulation; the way it is done.
Sir Andrew Large (1997)
Way forward No silver bullet Goal: Resolve banking crises without
taxpayers money Prime responsibility for crisis resolution with
firm, owners and creditors Better & higher buffers would help
Plus self- & co-insurance How to resolve + maintain access to critical
payment services Has to deal with “TITF” (too interconnected to fail)
Changes in regulatory design?
Finding the right balance …
… there is a need for a sensible balance to be stuck between an early corrective action framework, and avoiding an excessive intrusive regulatory approach … and the development of excessively complex PCA triggers.
G. Kaufman (2004)
A balance need to be struck between rigid PCA regimes and general, less binding frameworks. One effective combination would include “automatic” rules for pre-agreed acceptable supervisory actions, plus room for flexibility in particular cases. BCBS (2002): Supervisory guidance on dealing with weak banks
Conclusion (repeat)Norges Bank workshop on PCA triggers, March 2008
PCA legislation is no panacea, but if implemented in a flexible and pragmatic manner, it could be a useful supplement to current EU regulations
References: F. Allen and D. Gale (2002). Financial fragility. U. Baumann (2004). Disclosure, volatility and transparency. J. Black. The development of risk based regulation in financial services: Canada, the UK and Australia. J. Blum and U. Birchler. Capital regulation of banks: Where do we stand and where are we going? Brunnmeir and Willardson (2006). Supervisory Enforcement Actions Since FIRREA and FDICIA. BCBS (2002): Supervisory guidance on dealing with weak banks A. Estrella (1998). Formulas or Supervision? Remarks on the future of regulatory capital. X. Freixas and B. Pragi (2007). Banking regulation and prompt corrective action. FSA (2008). The supervision of Northern Rock: a lessons learned review. C. Goodhart (2006): Why prevention is better than cure. M. Goldstein (2000). Implications of early warning models of crisis. HMT (2008). Financial stability and depositor protection: strengthening the framework. House of Commons, Treasury Committee (2008). The run on the Rock. FDIC (2001):Keeping the Promise: Recommendations for Deposit Insurance Reform. IMF (1998). Economic Outlook. IMF (2008). IMF Article IV Concluding Statement; May 23, 2008. G. Kaufman (2004). Musing on financial stability issues. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin. A. Large (1997). Regulation and reform. D. Llewellyn and D. Mayes (2004). The role of market discipline in handling problem banks. Nieto and Wall (2007). Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors' Prompt Corrective Action: Is
there a case for a banking standard in the EU? Peek and Rosengren (1996). Will Legislated Early Intervention Prevent the Next Banking Crisis? Reserve Bank of India (2000). Discussion paper on prompt corrective action. H.C. Simons (1936): Rules versus authority in monetary policy. G. Soros (2008). The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crash of 2008 and What It Means