DELAWARE ESTUARY SITUATION REPORTSThis series of reports is devoted to discussion of current issues relevant to conservation,

use, and development of Delaware Estuary resources, and of concern to managers, decisionmakers, and the general public.

Wilmington

Camden

Dover

Cape May

Philadelphia

Trenton

Bivalve

D E L A W A R E

Lewes

N E W J E R S E Y

DELAWAREBAY

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Emergency ResponseHow Do Emergency Management Officials Address Disasters in the Delaware Estuary?

Richard T. SylvesProfessor of Political ScienceUniversity of Delaware

Not all disasters happen on land,they also happen on our waterways.The Delaware Estuary has experi-enced a variety of disasters over theyears, from natural threats such ashurricanes and droughts, to �man-made� disasters such as oil and chemi-cal spills. More remote disasters thatcould occur range from radiologicalemergencies at nearby nuclear reac-tors to war.

The toll that disasters take on theDelaware Estuary and those who liveon its shores depends largely upon thedegree of emergency preparedness,speed of response, and effectivenessof recovery operations. What happenswhen a disaster occurs? Who is incharge? How are decisions made?And what actions must be taken toovercome disaster, reducing as muchas possible damage to the environ-ment or human life?

In the Delaware Estuary, as in mostmajor U.S. estuaries, three federalagencies play major roles in emergen-cy preparedness and response: theCoast Guard, the Army Corps of En-gineers, and the Environmental Pro-tection Agency. This report will defineemergency management, examine therole each of these federal agenciesplays in an emergency, and highlighthow each agency operated during anactual disaster� an oil spill in theDelaware Estuary.

Dr. Sylves has been studying emer-gency management for the past 15years, with special emphasis on oilspill preparedness and response in theMid-Atlantic region. He is also co-founder of the American Society forPublic Administration�s EmergencyManagement Section.

The Delaware Estuary, a multi-purposebistate resource.

University of DelawareSea Grant College Program

What Is Emergency Management?

Historically, emergency managementhas been viewed as a local function of lawenforcement or fire departments, aug-mented by public health and civil defenseunits in times of major catastrophe. Theimpetus for national emergency manage-ment stemmed from World War I, WorldWar II, and cold war civil defense. Overthe past 20 years, however, emergencymanagement has been redefined and ex-panded to address a wide variety of natu-ral and man-made disasters besides war.Today, emergency management seeks toreduce human suffering and economic lossdue to the unnecessary exposure of peopleand property to the risks associated witha complex, technological, urban society.Within the context of various laws, emer-gency management can be defined as theprocess of developing and implementingpolicies concerned with mitigation, pre-paredness, response, and recover.

Mitigation, as it applies to emergencymanagement, is deciding what to do toreduce an identified risk to the health,safety, and welfare of society, and thencarrying out that risk-reducing action.Many of the problems of mitigation in-volve differences about how a hazard isperceived and what must be done to alle-viate or reduce the hazard (i.e., inducinghurricane-vulnerable shore communitiesto adopt federal flood insurance for theirhomeowners contingent upon local com-pliance with federal codes of hurricane-resistant housing construction).

Preparedness entails developing a re-sponse plan and training first respondersto save lives and reduce disaster damage.It includes identifying critical resourcesand developing agreements among re-sponding agencies, both within the juris-diction and with other jurisdictions. Alsoinvolved is planning of alert notification,public warnings, and education.

Response means providing emergencyassistance, reducing the probability of sec-ondary damage, and minimizing problemsfor recovery operations. Provisions forsearch-and-rescue, evacuation, and shel-tering are all elements of response.

Recovery is providing immediate sup-port after a disaster to quickly return life-support systems to minimum operatinglevels. This support should continue untilthe community returns to normal (see Pe-tak, 1985). A key component of recoveryis reconstruction and repair. In sound emer-gency management, recovery is linked tomitigation. For example, if a ship collideswith a bridge, causing the bridge to col-lapse, mitigation is served by rebuildingthe bridge to a higher clearance.

Emergency management embodies foursimple assumptions: (1) emergencies ordisasters will occur; (2) it�s better to beprepared for these events than to be unpre-pared; (3) good preparation involvesemergency preparedness and responseplanning; and (4) good emergency man-agement is more than a paperwork ex-ercise�it requires the participation andconsultation of emergency responders; itentails pre-disaster inter-agency and inter-governmental understandings regardingwho is to do what, who is in authority, andwho is to provide labor and resources; andit calls for maintaining a state of readinesseven in non-emergency periods.

Often, emergency management agen-cies operate with stages of mobilizationbased on the immediacy, probability, andmagnitude of the threat. When disaster hasa slow onset, that is, when there is someadvance warning that a disaster is possi-ble, emergency mobilization can moreeasily occur. For example, the locationand path of a hurricane can be tracked sothat probable affected areas can be pre-pared for emergencies. The Coast Guard�sHurricane Emergency Plan includes fourhurricane-threat conditions: ConditionFour is an alert that goes in effect fromJune 1�November 30, corresponding withthe Atlantic hurricane season; ConditionThree goes into effect when hurricane-force winds are possible within 48 hours;Condition Two when these winds are pos-sible within 24 hours; and Condition Onewhen they are possible within 12 hours.

Yet sometimes it may not be the mag-nitude of the threat so much as the infre-quency and singularity of a problem thatmakes it an emergency. Part of the func-tion of emergency management is to trainresponders so that their handling of inci-dents originally labeled emergencies even-tually becomes routine and manageable.

Emergency Management AgenciesAnd Their Disaster Preparedness

While state and local organizations playessential roles in emergency managementin the Delaware Estuary, three federalagencies take the lead in responding todisasters: the Coast Guard, the ArmyCorps of Engineers (the Corps), and theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA)(see Table 1). The following highlightseach agency and its disaster preparedness.

The U.S. Coast Guard

The Coast Guard�s Marine Safety Of-fice (MSO) near Penn�s Landing in Phila-delphia prepares and maintains plans forresponding to virtually every type of disas-ter in the Delaware Estuary. The MSO

employs about 100 people and maintainsa 24-hour watch for incidents affecting theestuary and other local waterways. Com-manding officer of the MSO is also Cap-tain of the Port, a post that empowers himor her to direct law enforcement activitieswithin a specified port area and to protectvessels, harbors, waterfront facilities, an-chorages, bridges, ports, waterways, andthe marine environment. The Coast Guardreduces the risk of disaster through vesseland port safety inspection and regulation.

Because of the Coast Guard�s authorityto respond to emergencies at sea or alongwaterways, it often takes the lead in pre-paredness and response to oil and chemi-cal spills, marine fires, ship collisions, andof late, preparation for commercial avia-tion crashes. It maintains emergency re-sponse vessels and equipment on standbyat the Port of Philadelphia and at CapeMay (the base of its aerial operations forthe estuary). It also maintains emergencycommunications systems and, on short no-tice, can mobilize a large work force of itsown people by drawing on personnel in-side and outside its zone.

The Coast Guard�s most elaborateemergency plan is for oil and hazardoussubstance spills into or along the DelawareRiver and Bay. A Marine Emergency Re-sponse officer handles all spills and triesto insure that each is investigated underthe law. The agency classifies a dischargeof oil under 10,000 gallons a �minorspill,� between 10,000 and 100,000 gal-lons a �medium spill,� and greater than100,000 gallons a �major spill� (see CG,Subregional Area Oil and HazardousSubstance Pollution Contingency Plan).

Major spills require the notification ofthe Multi-Agency Emergency ResponseTeam (MALRT) and officials and agencieson the Major Spill Notification Checklist.MALRT comprises representatives fromEPA Regions II and III, the Army Corpsof Engineers, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-vice, Delaware Department of Natural Re-sources and Environmental Control, Penn-sylvania Department of Environmental Re-Resources, New Jersey Department of En-vironmental Protection, New Jersey StatePolice, and Philadelphia Fire Department.

The U.S. Army Corps of EngineersThe Army Corps of Engineers protects

and regulates navigable waters; constructs,operates, and maintains navigation proj-ects; operates a dredging fleet; has author-ity for emergency military construction;and plays a major role in controlling thewater supply to the region. The agency�sEmergency Operations Center in Philadel-phia is prepared for disasters in the estu-ary. It employs 140 engineers and a staff

2

of 400. During an emergency in the estu-ary, the center has construction responsi-bilities, resources, and technical expertiseto conduct salvage, channel clearance, andcleanup operations. It also has a strongcontracting capability and can get privatecontractor help on an expedited basis.

The Corps plays three major roles inmitigating disaster. It has the authority, incooperation with the Delaware River BasinCommission (DRBC), a four-state feder-al compact agency, to control water flowfrom dams or impoundments in the basin,restricting water release upriver if floodingfrom a major coastal storm is expected, orconversely, releasing more water if lowwater levels threaten to move the salt lineof the Delaware River perilously close toPhiladelphia�s drinking water intakes. TheCorps also keeps the navigable portion ofthe estuary dredged to a depth of 40 feet,reducing the likelihood of vessel ground-

ings, sinkings, or pollution stemming fromhull damage caused by submerged ob-jects. And the Corps operates and main-tains the Chesapeake and Delaware (C&D)Canal, a �lock-less� canal that connectsDelaware and Chesapeake bays, cuttingmarine transit between Philadelphia andBaltimore by 300 miles. Blockage of thecanal would yield serious economic con-sequences for water freight interests andcomplicate transit of naval vessels.

Although the Corps operates with amuch smaller emergency response unitthan does the Coast Guard, the Corps hasdetailed plans for natural disasters and oiland hazardous substance incidents andmaintains a high degree of readiness.

In emergencies, the Corps EmergencyOperations Center is activated and man-ned by six to seven people who maintainradio contact with officials in the field,zone offices, and Washington-Pentagon

offices. Zone coordinators respond toemergencies on federal property in theirareas and are expected to assist their countyemergency managers. However, the Corpsdoes not respond to chemical cleanups �this is the job of the Coast Guard and Envi-ronmental Protection Agency.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

The Environmental Protection AgencyRegion III Emergency Response Section,headquartered in Philadelphia, prepares,maintains, and stores plans for emergen-cies on land and in non-navigable waters.Like the Coast Guard, it is on 24-hourwatch for emergencies. The unit employs30 and has an extramural budget for per-sonnel, equipment, and travel of about$15 million a year. It assists state and localenvironmental agencies or independentlytakes action in the event of a threat to pub-lic health, safety, or welfare, or to naturalresources. A major responsibility is emer-gency management of abandoned toxicand hazardous waste dumps under thefederal Superfund program.

Of the three federal agencies addressedhere, the EPA Emergency Response Officehas the largest collection of oil and chemi-cal emergency plans. To avoid confusionwhen spills occur in or near the estuary,the EPA and Coast Guard have worked outprocedures for determining when each ofthe two agencies has lead responsibility.

Under the 1980 Superfund Law, theCoast Guard has the authority to respondto releases and threats of releases originat-ing from facilities other than hazardouswaste management facilities when suchreleases require �immediate removal� andare in an area of Coast Guard jurisdiction.In other words, if a toxic or hazardous sub-stance is released in an area of CoastGuard territorial jurisdiction (see �A Les-son in Political Geography,� p. 4) and ifthe substance is not emitted from a hazard-ous waste facility, the Coast Guard is incharge. The EPA is responsible for con-ducting a response �when the preliminaryassessment indicates no need for immedi-ate removal action, or when the immediateremoval is completed and the remainingcleanup involves planned removal or re-medial action.� Thus, the EPA directs long-term cleanup of a remedial nature in areasof Coast Guard jurisdiction and assumeslead responsibility from the outset in areasdirectly under its jurisdiction.

The EPA stipulates that it will respondto discharges from industrial facilities,non-marine transportation casualties, andbulk-storage facilities, or at hazardous substance waste sites (EPA Region IIIContingency Plan, III-26) even if these

3

Federal Region III Emergency Response Team

Table 1. Federal Region III Emergency Response Team. These agencies respond to disasters inthe Delaware Estuary. Note that New Jersey is in standard Federal Region II and thus belongs tothat region�s response team. Virginia and West Virginia, both members of Region III, wereomitted because they would have little, if any, role in responding to a disaster in the estuary.

Federal AgenciesU.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous Waste Management

Division, Superfund Branch (Philadelphia, PA)

U.S. Coast Guard, Fifth Coast District (Portsmouth, VA)

U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Environmental Project Review(Philadelphia, PA)

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Newton Corner, MA)

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (New York, NY)

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Public Health Service(Philadelphia, PA)

U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (Philadelphia, PA)

U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health TechnicalSupport (Philadelphia, PA)

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (Broomall, PA)

U.S. Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division, Environmental Enforcement Section (Washington, DC)

U.S. Department of Energy, Brookhaven Lab Area Office (Upton, NY)

State AgenciesDelaware Department of Public Safety, Emergency Planning and

Operations Division (Delaware City, DE)

Maryland Department of the Environment, Hazardous Waste and SolidWaste Management Administration (Baltimore, MD)

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, Office of Environmental Protection (Harrisburg, PA)

incidents have occurred within an area ofCoast Guard lead-response jurisdiction.For example, the EPA assumed the leadrole when a Delaware City chemical com-pany accidentally leaked half a milliongallons of dichlorobenzene into wetlandsbeside the Delaware River.

The EPA emergency response unit iscalled out to an incident, on average,every four or five days. The Philadelphiaoffice�s 14 on-scene coordinators (OSCs)manage about 30 emergency responseprojects most of the time. Consequently,most coordinators are running two to threeprojects simultaneously. (In Coast Guardparlance, an �OSC� is an �On-Scene Com-mander� under search-and-rescue condi-tions and in wartime, but an �On-SceneCoordinator� in environmental response.Sometimes the terms are used interchange-ably. For the EPA, however, an �OSC� isalways an �On-Scene Coordinator.�)

In 1985, the EPA Region III ResponseCenter received 3,000 notices of oil andhazardous substance spills and respondedto over 400 incidents (interview, StephenJarvela, Director, Emergency ResponsePreparedness Section, August 16, 1988).

Disasters and Responding AgenciesThe following details the responsibili-

ties of the Coast Guard, Army Corps ofEngineers, and Environmental ProtectionAgency during specific kinds of emergen-cies in the Delaware Estuary.

Military Mobilization. The U.S. Army,Navy, and Coast Guard share in develop-ing and maintaining an elaborate set ofnaval and port security measures to pro-tect and ensure marine passage to andfrom the Philadelphia Navy Yard. TheArmy Corps of Engineers has lead dutiesin war mitigation because what it buildsserves the national defense�its fortifica-tions are built to deter attackers. The CoastGuard also promotes national defense.From a civilian vantage point, the Corpsand Coast Guard maintain waterways andaids to navigation that help prevent andmitigate maritime and port accidents.

As military organizations, the CoastGuard and Army Corps of Engineers bothmaintain elaborate systems of communi-cations intended to supplement or replacecivilian telecommunications. There aremore than a half-dozen marine band radiofrequencies, some reserved for emergen-cies, such as VHF-FM channel 16, usedfor distress calls and as a hailing frequency.This communications capability is muchgreater than that of the EPA, which, as acivilian agency, lacks elaborate back-upcommunications and is therefore extremelydependent on the telephone.

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Emergency Jurisdictions: A Political Geography Lesson

Why do federal agenciestake the lead in emergencymanagement? One major rea-son is political geography. Thenatural geography of anestuary rarely coincides withgovernmental boundaries. Statelines may abut, span, or dividerivers and bays. County andmunicipal boundaries maycheckerboard the river basins.Even the national government�carves up� estuaries to serveadministrative purposes, andelectoral districts such ascongressional and state legis-lative districts never neatlyconform to an estuary�s naturalcontours. This complexity ofboundaries and districts canmuddle emergency decisionmaking in an estuary.Consequently, lead responsibil-ity for emergency response inmost U.S. estuaries has gravi-tated to national agencies.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Coast Guard officials have setterritorial dividing lines, based on highways, that determine which agency shouldrespond first to emergencies in the Delaware Estuary and which agency has leadauthority. Interstate-95 runs from north of Trenton to the Delaware state line, par-alleling the west bank of the Delaware River. The area west of I-95 is the EPA�slead-response territory except for the area below Schuylkill River Dam in Phila-delphia�s Fairmount Park, which is assigned to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guardhas lead response east of I-95, including the Delaware River. In Delaware, theCoast Guard�s territory lies to the east of I-95 to Wilmington, to the east of US 40to Delaware Route 9, and to the east of US 113 as far as the Maryland border.

On the east bank of the Delaware River in New Jersey, the dividing line be-tween the Coast Guard and EPA is I-295, a route that parallels the river and extendsfrom Trenton to the Delaware Memorial Bridge at Deepwater, New Jersey. TheCoast Guard�s jurisdiction is to the west of I-295 and the EPA�s is to the east.Below the Delaware Memorial Bridge, the Coast Guard�s jurisdiction is east ofUS 30 until it intersects New Jersey State Route 49. It remains east of Route 49until it meets State Route 47 at Millville. It stays east all the way to the GardenState Parkway interchange at Rio Grande, New Jersey, close to the Atlantic Ocean.

Some awkwardness results because New Jersey is in Federal Region II andPennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland are part of Federal Region III. The CoastGuard 5th District Region III jurisdiction crosses the Delaware River and Bay andencompasses much of southern New Jersey. The EPA Region II and III jurisdic-tion is split along the border of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, a border that, inplaces, runs down the middle of the estuary. This has required memoranda ofunderstanding (MOUs) between EPA Region II and III offices.

Note that the environmental incidents or emergencies that the EPA respondsto usually occur inside specific state and local political jurisdictions. Sometimesthese incidents can be handled by the political jurisdictions in which they occur;however, sometimes state and local governments cannot respond effectively to anenvironmental emergency, and the EPA is asked to take over.

The Army Corps of Engineers is not hampered by regional boundaries. ThePhiladelphia District has eight disaster zones in the Delaware River Basin. Zones 4through 8 encompass the estuarine portion. From Zone 1 at the headwaters of theriver to Zones 7 and 8 at the mouth of Delaware Bay, the Corps monitors rainfall,water levels, and water usage, and carries out navigation projects.

MD

DE

PADE

NJ

295

I-95

I-95

295495

4730

40

49

49

47

40

13

9

113

13

• Rio Grande

Philadelphia •

Millville •

Wilimington •

Schuylkill River

Trenton •

Oil & Chemical Spills. All three feder-al agencies have detailed oil and hazard-ous materials emergency response plans.The Coast Guard and EPA share in emer-gency response to oil or chemical spills.In recovery operations, the EPA may, un-der the conditions noted earlier, assumethe lead federal agency role. The EPA hasthe greatest expertise in assessing the en-vironmental effects of oil and chemicalspills and in judging the use of solvents,dispersants, detergents, and other sub-stances that might be employed in clean-up operations.

Marine Fires, Ship Collisions, Ship-Bridge Collisions. Maintenance of safenavigation is a top priority with both theCoast Guard and the Army Corps of En-gineers. Together, the two agencies deviseplans to address marine fires, collisions ofships, ship damage to bridges, and portsecurity. The Coast Guard has a detailedmarine fire fighting plan, and respondingto ship collisions is part of the trainingand education of Coast Guard officers andenlisted personnel. The Coast Guard andCorps also work to protect, regulate, andmaintain waterborne commerce, recrea-tion, and transportation.

Nuclear Emergencies. Both the EPAand Coast Guard have prepared, with theNuclear Regulatory Commission and theFederal Emergency Management Agency,detailed sets of nuclear power plant radio-logical emergency response plans. Theseplans emphasize emergency notificationand alert more than any other aspect ofemergency management. For example, ina nuclear emergency, a vessel from theCoast Guard�s MSO in Philadelphia andanother from Group Cape May would sor-tie to establish a safety zone at its upriverand downriver extremes. Vessel trafficwould be restricted; only those vessels re-ceiving permission from the Captain of thePort, Philadelphia, would be allowed totransit the safety zone. Helicopters fromair stations at Cape May or Brooklynwould conduct a shore-to-shore searchnotifying boaters within the safety zone toevacuate (CG, Radiological EmergencyResponse Plan).

Natural Emergencies. The Army Corpsof Engineers and Coast Guard maintainhurricane preparedness and response. Ofthe three agencies analyzed here, only theCorps formally addresses droughts andfloods in its emergency planning althoughthe EPA�s duties in the aftermath of flood-ing would be substantial. An importantelement of the drought plan is the capacityto build alternate water pipelines, whichthe Corps has done in at least one Dela-ware River drought.

Integrated Emergency ManagementAll-hazard, integrated emergency man-

agement can be viewed systematically asmitigation, preparedness, response, andrecovery (each considered interdependentand interrelated to the others), and can beapplied to the management of all hazards.Experts believe this type of emergencymanagement is superior because it pro-motes a high, coordinated level of emer-gency preparedness while reducing theduplication of effort and resources that in-variably occurs when each threat is plan-ned for separately.

All-hazard, integrated emergency man-agement is not yet in place for the Dela-ware Estuary. However, there is extensiveinteragency and intergovernmental coordi-nation in emergency planning, and there are many memorandums of understanding(MOUs) between the federal agencies andstate, local, and private organizations. Ad-ditionally, mutual aid agreements are em-bodied in almost every emergency plan.

The Coast Guard�s and Corps of Engi-neers� emergency plans are regularly up-dated and tested about twice a year throughjoint exercises or drills. The EPA�s emer-gency response unit is a regular participantin these exercises, but it is burdened by re-gional hazardous materials dump cleanupoperations. In Pennsylvania alone, therewere 121 Superfund removal projects un-der way in June 1988; many were in theDelaware Valley (interview, Stephen Jar-vela, Director, Emergency Response Pre-paredness Section, August 16, 1988).

The Coast Guard and Corps have peace-time duties; each agency also has essentialresponsibilities in readiness for militaryemergencies. Because they are on constantalert for war, each agency holds reserveresources that can be dedicated to peace-time emergencies, including personnel,special equipment, and spending authority.

As a civilian agency, the EPA has nomilitary functions and thus has few re-sources in reserve. Moreover, the agencyhas been vulnerable to substantial federalbudget cuts. Both the Coast Guard and theCorps of Engineers have faced recentbudget cuts, but the EPA�s funding cutshave been deeper and more sustained.

Responding to An Actual Disaster:The Grand Eagle Oil Spill

A good way to learn how emergencymanagement is conducted in the DelawareEstuary is to review an emergency. Thefollowing is a chronology, based on CoastGuard accounts, of emergency response tothe Grand Eagle oil spill in the lowerDelaware River in September 1985. The

comments in italics have been insertedby the author to clarify, or elaborate on,points in the original chronology. See themap on page 6 for all locations referredto in the chronology.

September 28, 1985At 11:30 p.m., the master of the tanker

vessel Grand Eagle informed the Captainof the Port, Philadelphia, via channel 16,that the vessel had lost power, run aground,and was leaking oil near buoy 6, MarcusHook Range, Delaware River. The vesselwas bound for the Sun Oil Refinery, inMarcus Hook, Pennsylvania. The masterreported that an estimated 7,000 barrels ofNinian crude oil, API 36.6, had escapedfrom the No. 1 starboard cargo tank, which contained 56,000 barrels of oil. [Since asingle barrel contains 42 gallons, at least294,000 gallons of oil had leaked into theriver, far exceeding the 100,000 gallon thres-hold used by the Coast Guard to define a�major� oil spill. If the entire contents ofthe hold had flowed into the river, a spill ofmore than 2.3 million gallons of oil wouldhave resulted.]

September 29, 1985About 12:40 a.m., the Grand Eagle was

refloated with the aid of two tugs and pro-ceeded to Sun Oil Refinery. After the ves-sel was docked, a boom was placed aroundit to contain the leaking oil. At 3 a.m., thevessel started pumping off the oil from thedamaged cargo tank. The plan was topump off the entire tank so the source ofthe leak could be secured. About 11Ú2 hoursinto the discharge operation, the vessel�sinert gas system failed and the oxygencontent in the damaged cargo tank climbedto 8.5%, causing an automatic shutdownof the pumping system. About 20 minuteslater, the problem with the inert gas systemwas located and repaired, and transferoperations were restarted. Cargo from thedamaged tank was completely discharged by 11 a.m. [In other words, 111Ú2 hoursafter it was reported to the Coast Guard,the heavy leakage of oil from the hold wasarrested. But the effects of the spill wouldbe attacked for the next 16 days.]

As lead responding agency, the CoastGuard directed its efforts at determiningthe extent, location, and amount of oil thathad been spilled. Base Gloucester Citysmall boat 32348 and Coast Guard cutterCatenary conducted an initial watersideinvestigation and remained close to SunOil to monitor operations and control traf-fic. [This act made it possible to organize aresponse scaled to the magnitude of the spilland its effects.] The On-Scene Coordinatorestablished a safety zone in the DelawareRiver from buoy 2M, Marcus Hook An-chorage, north to the Commodore Barry

5

Bridge. No vessels were allowed in thesafety zone without permission from theCaptain of the Port, Philadelphia. [Thisblocked commercial and recreational transiton the river between Chester, to the north,and Marcus Hook, to the south.]

Shortly after the casualty, the aids tonavigation were checked in the area of thegrounding by the Coast Guard Red OakAids to Navigation team. All aids were re-ported on station and watching properly.The Corps conducted soundings of thearea and found that the vessel grounded ina rocky, shallow spot about 19 feet deep. [These two actions helped prevent another

disaster. The first helped ascertain whethernavigation equipment positioned in the rivermay have contributed to the night-timeincident, and helped insure that the equip-ment was not damaged or displaced by theGrandEagle or other forces. The second ac-tion was precautionary. It attempted to de-termine whether a submerged rock or objecton the river bottom might have speared theGrand Eagle. If such a threat existed, theCoast Guard and Corps could issue vesselwarnings and begin removing it.]

The manager of the Delaware River andBay Cooperative (DRBC), a non-profit co-operative funded by contributions from

major oil companies operating in the estu-ary, was contacted and asked to have itsmembers boom off environmentally sensi-tive Raccoon, Oldmans, and Darby creeks.In addition, the DRBC�s open water oilrecovery skimmer, DELBAY, was asked tobegin operations at the leading edge of the slick and work north along the river. [TheDELBAY operates from Lewes, Delaware, ahalf-day�s sail from the spill site.]

The Multi-Agency Local ResponseTeam (MALRT) was mobilized; a meet-ing at Base Gloucester City was sched-uled for 8 a.m. The Coast Guard AtlanticStrike Team was alerted at 12:20 a.m. and

6

• Pennsville

River

Christin

a

Du Pont Edgemoor

Phoenix Steel

Delaware Memorial Bridge

Oldm

ans Creek

Chester Island

SunOil

MarcusHook •

Buoy 2M, Marcus Hook Anchorage

Cherry IslandFlats

Raccoon C

reek

Commodore Barry Bridge

Coast GuardBase

Gloucester

Delaware City •

Branch Canal

Artificial IslandPSE&G Nuclear Power

Plant Complex

Killcohook N. W. R.

ManningtonMeadows

Marsh

C&D CANAL

Deemers Beach

Salem River

New Castle • Battery Park

Salem Cove

Pea Patch Island

Monsanto Cove

Christina River Park

Grand Eagle Runs Aground and Begins Leaking Oil

Oiled Shore

Heavily Oiled Shore

MD

DE

PA

DE

The Grand Eagle Oil Spill,Delaware River

September 28, 1985

NJ

Chester •

Wilmington •

Darby Creek

was asked to begin assembling equipmentand personnel for the response effort. TheU.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, New Jer-sey Department of Environmental Pro-tection, Delaware Department of NaturalResources and Environmental Control,EPA Regions II and III, plus the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA) Scientific Support Coordinator,were notified by 1:30 a.m. Federal RegionII and III Response Teams were informed by message at 3:20 a.m. [These actionsshow that the Coast Guard assumes majorresponsibilities in the alert notification stageof river spill emergency management.]

At 7:30 a.m., the On-Scene Coordinatorconducted an overflight to determine theextent of the oil slick and its effect. Heavyconcentrations were reported around thevessel at Sun Oil. The oil extended fromthe Commodore Barry Bridge, 2.5 milesnorth of Sun Oil, south to the DelawareMemorial Bridge. [The oil was slicked up-and downriver by tidal action.] About 19miles of shoreline had been affected inPennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.Protective booms that had been deployedat Raccoon Creek, Oldmans Creek, and theChristina River did not hold or were notplaced quickly enough, and oil flowed pastthem and farther into the marsh. [Theseand many other tributaries in the area are atthe same general gradients as the Delawareand are subject to tidal flows.]

An information exchange between theOn-Scene Coordinator and the NOAA Sci-entific Support Coordinator began early.The Scientific Support Coordinator, ThirdCoast Guard District, gathered wind fore-casts, (river) current, and weather informa-tion to develop a computer trajectory forthe slick�s path. Around 3 a.m., on Septem-ber 29, 1985, the first trajectory was de-veloped, predicting that the leading edgeof the slick would reach the DelawareMemorial Bridge by the end of day. [Thefirst trajectory projection was completedonly 31Ú2 hours after the Coast Guard learnedof the spill, in the middle of the night.] Usingexisting and forecast weather and [river]current information, the Scientific SupportCoordinator recommended that measuresbe taken to protect Salem River, Pea PatchIsland, and southern marshes from possibleoiling. Later that day, another trajectoryprojected that the leading edge of the slickwould move 8�10 miles per day.

Members of the Atlantic Strike Teamarrived at the Philadelphia base at about9:45a.m. [Recall that they had been noti-fied at 12:20 a.m. the same day.] After abriefing, they left for Sun Oil Refinery toassist the On-Scene Coordinator. Othermembers of the Atlantic, Gulf, and PacificStrike Teams were to arrive later.

Sun Oil Company initially assumedcontrol of the cleanup until the owner�srepresentatives arrived and could takeover. One contractor, New Jersey Pollu-tion Control, was at the scene and hadstarted cleanup when the vessel docked.Sun Oil hired divers from UnderwaterTechnics to conduct an underwater hullsurvey to determine the extent of the dam-age and the feasibility of placing a tempo-rary patch on the Grand Eagle to preventfurther cargo loss. [Sun Oil�s actions werepurely voluntary because the company didnot own the tanker.] The divers were un-able to find the damaged area because ofpoor underwater visibility and swift cur-rent. The On-Scene Coordinator reportedthat the Atlantic Strike dive team wouldattempt to find the hull damage.

At 4 p.m., the owners accepted financialresponsibility and control of the cleanupand hired Captains Paul Preus and NormanDeWeir of Clean Water, Inc., to coordinateoperations. Sun Oil had hired 13 contrac-tors who were either performing cleanup atthe site or were en route to the area. Theinitial emphasis by the owners was to con-tain and collect the large amount of oil atthe Sun Oil dock. The owner�s representa-tives set up a command post at Sun Oil tocoordinate the cleanup. To satisfy requestsfor information, the On-Scene Coordinatorheld a press conference at Base Gloucesterat 4:30 p.m. The Coast Guard Public Infor-mation Assist Team helped arrange thebriefings. Coverage was reduced becauseof a strike that shut down Philadelphia�stwo major newspapers.

At 6:20 p.m., the On-Scene Coordinatorand the Scientific Support Coordinator metwith James Shirley of Haight, Gardner,Poor & Havens (attorneys representing theGrand Eagle owners), Capt. Paul Preus,and Sun Oil personnel. The On-Scene Co-ordinator raised the issue of boom deploy-ment to protect the Salem Cove area andmarshes farther south. Salem Cove leadsinto Mannington Meadows, a breedingground and habitat for a reported 40,000ducks. They reported that 21 contractorshad been hired to conduct cleanup opera-tions. The owner�s representative assuredthe On-Scene Coordinator that a contrac-tor was en route and would take care ofbooming off the Salem Cove area.

September 30, 1985During a 7:30 a.m. overflight, the On-

Scene Coordinator and Scientific SupportCoordinator observed oil spreading out inribbons from the Commodore Barry Bridgeto about 1Ú4 mile south of the DelawareMemorial Bridge. The Scientific SupportCoordinator projected that by 8 p.m. theoil would travel south to the C&D Canal

and Salem Cove. The On-Scene Coordi-nator again expressed concern to the GrandEagle owner�s representative about boom-ing off Salem Cove and protecting Killco-hook National Wildlife Refuge.

About 9 a.m., the Coast Guard Dive Team arrived and began diving to deter-mine the location and extent of the GrandEagle�s damage. Divers initially were un-able to locate any damage because of lowvisibility and swift currents. However, onlater dives they were able to identify dam-age in the No. 1 starboard cargo tank.

At noon, the On-Scene Coordinatorheld a meeting with the Multi-Agency Lo-cal Response Team and the owner�s repre-sentative to discuss a defensive strategyfor the marshlands. The owner�s represen-tative maintained that a contractor was enroute with 10,000 feet of boom that wouldbe deployed by the end of the day at SalemCove. Up to that point, the emphasis of theowner�s cleanup operations continued to beat Sun Oil. No precautionary measures hadbeen taken in environmentally sensitiveareas south of Delaware Memorial Bridge.At 8 p.m., the On-Scene Coordinator againmet with the owner�s representative to dis-cuss marsh protection. Prior assurancesconcerning booming off Salem Cove stillhad not been met and there was no indica-tion that the booming would be performedsoon. As a result, the On-Scene Coordina-tor declared a limited federally funded spillresponse south of the Delaware MemorialBridge. [Note that this action was a resultof the responsible party�s inability or un-willingness to undertake adequate responseand recover operations downriver. Fromhere forward, the federal government be-gan assigning, and paying for, its owncleanup contractors.]

The On-Scene Coordinator immediatelyasked the Supervisor of Navy Salvage torespond with five Marco V skimmers andsupport personnel. A Navy official saidthey would be able to have the skimmers atthe scene within 12 hours. The On-SceneCoordinator also hired New England Pol-lution Control as the primary cleanupcontractor. [Remember that this contractoris being paid from federal emergency re-serve funding and the responsible party issupposed to reimburse the federal govern-ment for contractor costs the governmenthas incurred in cleanup.]

New England Pollution Control said10,000 feet of containment boom could bedelivered by 8 a.m. on October 1 to bedeployed at Salem Cove. An additional1,000 feet would arrive by noon the sameday. The On-Scene Coordinator�s strategywas to deploy a diversionary boom at Sa-lem Cove and a containment boom acrossthe entrance to the C&D Canal. The five

7

skimmers were to be used for collectingfree-floating oil below Delaware Memori-al Bridge. The On-Scene Coordinator alsoestablished the main command post at theDelaware Emergency Management Cen-ter in Delaware City. All operations werecoordinated from this location. The Scien-tific Support Coordinator and all state rep-resentatives moved to this command postto plan strategies with the On-Scene Co-ordinator. [Establishment of a command postis an essential element of sound emergencymanagement.] A representative was left atSun Oil to monitor the cleanup north ofDelaware Memorial Bridge and maintainliaison with the owner�s representative.

Cleanup continued north of DelawareMemorial Bridge by 21 contractors hiredby the owners. The cleanup remained cen-

tered at Sun Oil, but contractors were dis-patched to heavily affected areas, such asPhoenix Steel, Naamans Creek, Du PontEdgemoor, and the Christina River (Wil-mington Harbor).

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service andTri-State Bird Rescue & Research, Inc.established a wildlife rehabilitation centerfor oiled birds at Tri-State�s facility in Wil-mington. Coast Guard monitors reported atotal of 75 oiled birds.

The On-Scene Coordinator requestedadditional staff from the Third District tobe used for boat crews and pollution moni-tors. District officials announced that avoluntary call-up of reservists would beissued until approval was granted by thecommandant for an involuntary call-up.The On-Scene Coordinator also requested

district approval to raise the 311-K ceilingto $1 million dollars to pay for federal op-erations below the Delaware MemorialBridge. [Paragraph 311-K is in the CleanWater Act of 1972. Under this provision, thefederal government is obligated to maintainbudget authority that can be used to payfederal cleanup costs for oil spills or othertypes of water pollution.]

The governors of New Jersey and Dela-ware contacted the On-Scene Coordinatorand asked about the status of the oil spill.Congressional inquiries also were receivedfrom New Jersey, Pennsylvania, andDelaware. The On-Scene Coordinator ad-dressed concerns about the oil�s threat tosensitive marsh and wildlife areas.October 1, 1985

An 8 a.m. overflight showed that theoil slick had landed along the shore fromNew Castle south to Deemers Beach, up-river from Delaware City, affecting an areaabout 2 miles long. Half-inch-thick oil wasobserved as far south as the Delaware CityBranch Canal, adjacent to the C&D Canal.On the eastern bank, heavy oil concentra-tions were reported from Monsanto Cove,New Jersey, south to Pennsville. A slightsheen was reported in the Salem Covearea. On the western bank, the ChristinaRiver was heavily affected and oil was ob-served as far as 6 miles upriver.

The owner�s representative shifted con-tractors to areas along the New Jerseyshore and Christina River. Cleanup activi-ty was undertaken south of the DelawareMemorial Bridge at Pennsville, and at NewCastle and Deemers Beach. New EnglandPollution Control subcontracted with sixother contractors to gain help in cleanupoperations. Free-floating oil remained inthe Delaware River as thin ribbons, whichcontinued to pose a threat to environmen-tally sensitive Salem Cove. The On-SceneCoordinator directed deployment of aboom across the Salem River and Covearea. A 10-knot current in Salem Rivermade it nearly impossible for contractorsto deploy a containment boom. The boomcontinued to break, so the cleanup con-tractor placed additional securing deviceson it. Once finally secured, the boom waseffectively a permanent boom that couldnot be redeployed if taken down or bro-ken. The contractors also began deployingsome 10,000 feet of diversionary boom toprotect the Salem Cove area.

About 12:30 p.m., the owner�s repre-sentative requested that the Grand Eaglebe allowed to depart Sun Oil to transit afew miles upriver to Pennsylvania Ship-building in Chester so that the damagedcargo tank could be repaired. The On-Scene Coordinator permitted the vessel to

8

Volunteers at Tri-State Bird Rescue & Research, Inc., in Wilmington, prepare to bathe a duckoiled during the Grand Eagle spill in the Delaware River in 1985. (Courtesy of Tri-State BirdRescue & Research, Inc.)

move from to the shipyard, but requiredthat all oil be properly boomed off beforethe vessel set out. The DELBAY skimmerwas positioned to collect any oil that mightescape. At approximately 4 p.m., the ves-sel departed without incident.

October 2, 1985Beach cleanup continued north of Dela-

ware Memorial Bridge, where a heavysheen covered most of the river, inter-spersed with globs of heavy oil. The re-maining floating oil continued to migratesouth although by this time most of it wasbeached on the shore and in marsh fringes.

New England Pollution Control contin-ued to gear up equipment and resourcesfor a large-scale cleanup operation southof Delaware Memorial Bridge. Sorbentboom, a chain of connected, floating oil-absorbent barriers, was deployed at SalemCove; tidal conditions would not allowlong runs of containment boom to be de-ployed. Boom deployment at the C&D Ca-nal was completed. Public Service Electricand Gas Company deployed a boom as aprecautionary measure around water in-takes to its Artificial Island nuclear powerplant, 7 miles farther downriver.

Navy skimmers were recovering about70 gallons of oil from the Christina River.The owner�s representative reported that,to date, approximately 4,309 barrels of oil[181,000 gallons] had been collected, mostby vacuum truck.

The On-Scene Coordinator held a pressbriefing at Tri-State Bird Rescue & Re-search, Inc., in Wilmington. The ScientificSupport Coordinator and U.S. Fish andWildlife representatives were involved. Atotal of 25 birds had been transported tothe facility for treatment.

A representative from the Marine Safe-ty Office in Baltimore arrived at the Dela-ware City command post to monitor theprogress of the slick. Concern was raisedthat the oil might flow into the C&D Ca-nal, which is under the jurisdiction of theCoast Guard, Baltimore District.

October 3, 1985Overflights previously planned were

canceled due to rain and low cloud-cover.Coast Guard boats and a Delaware marinepolice boat, conducting a survey south ofDelaware Memorial Bridge, noted that asheen remained on the river, with isolatedpatches of oil near Pea Patch Island. Mostof the oil beached on the shore north of theDelaware Memorial Bridge.

The DELBAY was called in by the On-Scene Coordinator to conduct skimmingoperations near Pea Patch Island. Whenthe vessel arrived, it reported that there wasno oil in that location.

On recommendation of the On-SceneCoordinator, the owner�s representativeintensified cleanup at the Christina River.The On-Scene Coordinator was concernedthat booms needed to be in place so thatloose oil would not flow out of the river.

The Scientific Support Coordinatorasked the Third Coast Guard Marine Safe-ty Division to arrange, with the EPA, high-resolution aerial photography of the river.

October 4, 1985An afternoon overflight revealed a re-

maining sheen in the river, with patches of oil in isolated areas, such as CherryIsland flats and the Christina River. Clean-up operations were emphasized at NewCastle, Battery Park, and Christina River.

The five Navy skimmers were demobi-lized; two units remained on standby. Lit-tle oil had been collected; the Supervisor ofSalvage representative reported that theskimmers were no longer effective. [TheSupervisor of Salvage representative worksfor Naval Sea Systems Command, an orga-nization that maintains and stores elaboratepollution control equipment.]

Coast Guard Public Information AssistTeam members departed the Delaware Citycommand post, having completed theirduties [Here again, use of this unit, and po-sitioning it in the command post, helped cen-tralize and fulfill essential public relationsfunctions during the incident.]

October 5, 1985The On-Scene Coordinator met with the

owner�s representative and expressed con-cern over goals not being met because ofpoor supervision. [Apparently, the OnScene Coordinator was dissatisfied with theowner�s use and management of cleanupcontractors.] The On-Scene Coordinatorconsidered declaring a federal spill for theremainder of the area. The owner�s repre-sentative appointed two men to overseeand coordinate the cleanup above Dela-ware Memorial Bridge. [Remember, oncethe cleanup is completed, the federal gov-ernment seeks to recover money from thevessel owner to pay for federal contractorcleanup expenses. A threat to widen thearea of federal declaration increases thecleanup costs the vessel owner may later beforced to pay. Note that the government�sown internal costs, such as those for clean-up vessels and personnel, can be added tothe government�s claims under the CleanWater Act, Section 311 (B). However, if theclaims are not fully reimbursed, the U.S.taxpayer must make up the difference.]

A 4:30 p.m. overflight showed that theriver below Delaware Memorial Bridgewas clear except for a small sheen nearPea Patch Island and New Castle. Above

Delaware Memorial Bridge, ribbons of oilwere observed in the Christina River as aresult of water-washing performed on theshore. [Water-washing is a method by whichoil is removed from solid items. It is alsospraying water on grass to cleanse it of oil.]The DELBAY skimmer was on-scene, col-lecting loose oil. The On-Scene Coordina-tor determined that the Salem main chan-nel boom was to remain staged rather thanremoved even though this meant continuedblockage of river traffic.

October 6, 1985A morning overflight showed fewer

areas of sheening. Major cleanup remainedat Sun Oil, Christina River, and New Cas-tle. The 10,500 feet of containment boomdeployed in Salem Cove was removed.Sorbent boom remained at creek entrancesto collect loose oil. The DELBAY was se-cured since there was little oil in the riverthat could be collected.

Heavy concentrations of oil collected inmarsh and beach areas at New Castle�sBattery Park. The Scientific Support Coor-dinator and strike team conducted a surveyto evaluate alternative cleanup methods.[This activity may not seem important, but itenables emergency responder crews to learnfrom experience, thus improving their exper-tise in handling future spills.]

October 7, 1985To improve cleanup operations, the

On-Scene Coordinator permitted limitedmarsh grass cutting (300�400 yards) nearCommodore Barry Bridge.

Using water-washing to clean marshgrass at New Castle�s Battery Park was in-effective. Thus, the On-Scene Coordinatorapproved limited grass cutting to gain ac-cess to pooled oil. The Delaware Depart-ment of Natural Resources and Environ-mental Control concurred with the plan.

October 8, 1985A morning overflight reported little

sheen in the river. Isolated areas were de-tected in the Christina River and at SunOil. Cleanup activities continued at NewCastle�350 feet of marsh grass was cutunder the Scientific Support Coordinator�ssupervision. Pollution monitors observeda cleanup contractor using Aquamix, awater-soluble soap on the bulkhead atChristina Park. The On-Scene Coordina-tor directed the contractor to stop usingthe product until a determination could bemade by the Scientific Support Coordina-tor about its safety to the environment.

The On-Scene Coordinator asked thata contracting officer or representative fromthe Third Coast Guard District be presenton October 10 to review claims by theprime contractor and subcontractors.

9

October 9, 1985Cleanup continued on the Christina

River and along New Castle. The areasouth of Delaware Memorial Bridge wasrapidly approaching completion, but await-ed official judgment by the On-SceneCoordinator and state authorities. The On-Scene Coordinator developed plans to dis-establish the Delaware City command post.

The Scientific Support Coordinator de-termined that Aquamix was not approvedfor use in the marine environment and thusrecommended that it not be used to cleanbulkheads at Christina Park. The On-SceneCoordinator concurred and asked the con-tractor to use an alternative method.

The owners requested permission tosail the Grand Eagle from PennsylvaniaShipbuilding in Chester on October 10.The On-Scene Coordinator required that ithave a tug escort and a manned enginemanual control station during its escortfrom Chester as far as Artificial Island, atthe headwaters of Delaware Bay.

October 10, 1985Cleanup continued at Christina River,

New Castle, and the Sun Oil docks. Theowners of the Grand Eagle changed thevessel�s name to Amersham. [Coast Guardofficials claim this was of no particularadvantage to the owner since parties filingsuit would have no difficulty identifyingand locating the owner of the former GrandEagle.] The On-Scene Coordinator re-quested that Customs clearance be rein-stated so that the vessel could depart. Thevessel�s P&I attorney gave the On-SceneCoordinator verbal assurance that the ves-sel had a valid letter of financial responsi-bility under the new name. [P&I refers tothe protection and indemnity requirementsvessel owners must meet.] The vessel de-parted without incident.

Oily debris from the New Jersey shore-line was stored at a landfill in Chester,Pennsylvania. Oil is considered a haz-ardous waste under New Jersey law. AnEPA manifest number was obtained andapproval was granted for transport of thedebris. It was trucked to a federally ap-proved disposal site in Ohio.

October 11, 1985At 4 p.m., the owner�s representative re-

assumed responsibility for cleanup southof Delaware Memorial Bridge. The re-quest, accompanied by a written plan fororderly transition, was accepted by theOn-Scene Coordinator. The owners as-signed a contractor to the area who was towork under third-party supervision. [Thistransferred cleanup duties from publicauthorities and their contractors to theship�s owners and contractors. It meant that

the On-Scene Coordinator was satisfied thatthe vessel owner�s contractors could finishthe cleanup.]

New England Pollution Control con-tinued to demobilize its equipment andresources. An On-Scene Coordinator rep-resentative remained at the scene to moni-tor close-out of the federally funded por-tion of spill cleanup. The Delaware Citycommand post was temporarily shifted tothe Quality Inn, New Castle.

October 12�November 8, 1985Cleanup continued at New Castle and

Christina River, Delaware, and MonsantoCove, New Jersey. As areas were com-pleted, they were inspected by the contrac-tor and designated state and Coast Guardmonitors who either recommended ap-proval or identified further action needed.

New England Pollution Control com-pleted demobilization on October 15.[This marked the end of federally fundedemergency cleanup activity in the incident.]Federal cleanup expenditures now totaled$1,110,171. Coast Guard Fifth District andNew England Pollution Control personnelcontinued to compile final contractor costs.[Under federal law, the vessel owner wassupposed to reimburse the government forthese expenditures, but parties alleged to beresponsible for environmental damage some-times refuse to pay or they contest theamount they are asked to pay. As a result, adelay in reimbursement occurs, owing tobacklogged court calendars and the timerequired by litigation. Sometimes allegedpolluters win rulings absolving them of re-sponsibility for the government�s cleanupbills. Here, owners of the Grand Eagle con-tested liability for the federal damage claimand the case remains unresolved at this writ-ing, nearly six years since the spill occurred.The federal suit against the Grand Eaglehad escalated to $1,685,323.91, as of Au-gust 1, 1989, largely as the result of infla-tion costs (interview with CG CommanderT. A. Patrick, July 26, 1989).]

An estimated 200 birds, mostly cor-morants, had been affected by oil. Ninety-two birds had been delivered to the Tri-State Bird Rescue facility in Wilmington,Delaware; 38 survived.

On October 18, remaining members ofthe Atlantic Strike Team departed, and thecommand post south of Delaware Memor-ial Bridge was disestablished. All CoastGuard activities were coordinated throughtheir Philadelphia area offices.

An inspection of the shoreline of Mon-santo Cove and New Castle, conducted onNovember 8, showed no need for furthercleanup. These were the last areas to beinspected by the On-Scene Coordinator

and state representatives before the pollu-tion case was closed.

A total of 2,554 cubic yards of debrishad been removed. An estimated 8,060barrels of oil had been received at the SunOil Refinery from a combination of vacu-um trucks, the DELBAY skimmer, and the five Navy skimmers. [About 338,520 gal-lons were collected. Recall that the initialleak was estimated to be 7,000 barrels, butthe punctured cargo hold contained 56,000barrels, of which some escaped from the ves-sel during pump-out of the hold and duringship transit and repair operations.]

Lessons of the Grand Eagle Oil SpillMany principles of emergency manage-

ment are evident in the Grand Eagle oilspill. The Coast Guard, along with privatecorporate and volunteer organizations, re-sponded quickly, helping avert additionalpollution damage. The Coast Guard close-ly monitored the path of the oil flow, theensuing damage and damage threat, andthe work of cleanup contractors, all in ac-cord with its oil spill emergency responseplan. The Coast Guard On-Scene Coordi-nator established a main command postclose to threatened areas, which helpedhim coordinate the actions of federal, state,and local responders. The command postalso served public information functions.The DELBAY oil skimmer, operated by aconsortium of oil companies, took direc-tion from the On-Scene Coordinator andwas a critical resource throughout thecleanup. Volunteers from Tri-State BirdRescue & Research, Inc., did much tohelp oiled waterfowl and typified the bestaspects of volunteer emergency response.

A disturbing, yet illuminating aspect ofthe case was the exchanges between rep-resentatives of the vessel owner and theOn-Scene Coordinator. As oil continued toflow south of Delaware Memorial Bridge,the On-Scene Coordinator became alarmedby delays in the response of the owner�scleanup contractors to threatened areas.Promises were made and not kept. Believ-ing he could wait no longer, the On-SceneCoordinator declared the area south of thebridge a limited federal disaster area andassigned private contractors to the cleanup,who were paid from federal funds. Alsodisturbing is the as yet unresolved lawsuitby the government to reclaim from theGrand Eagle�s owner money spent to payCoast Guard-assigned cleanup contrac-tors. A lesson from this is that parties re-sponsible for the spill cannot always betrusted to do the cleanup they promise andmay use various legal ploys to forestallpayment of federal oil spill cleanup costs.

The Grand Eagle case shows that con-stant monitoring of cleanup operations is

10

necessary. It helps ensure that methods of,or products used in, cleanup do not com-pound environmental damage, as mighthave happened if Aquamix use went un-stopped. Supervision also precluded over-cutting of wetlands vegetation during oilrecovery and water-washing operations.Of more generalizable value was the con-stant evaluation of cleanup methods asthey were being performed. This creates aknowledge base that advances learningand planning for future oil spill cleanupoperations. Superior emergency recoveryoperations are those that improve disastermitigation and emergency preparednessfor future incidents and disasters.

Oil spill emergency preparedness mustbe constantly maintained, practiced, re-vised, by the responders themselves, notby outside consulting firms or administra-tive staff confined to their offices. Oil spillemergency response requires the avail-ability of oil spill cleanup contractors andvolunteer organizations. None of the fed-eral agencies here�Coast Guard, ArmyCorps of Engineers, or Environmental Pro-tection Agency�does an entire major spillcleanup with its own personnel. The EPAhas some capacity to act, at least initiallywith its own resources and technical staff;however, the Corps of Engineers is almostcompletely contractor-dependent. TheCoast Guard is prepared to act temporarilyin the absence of contractors, but it cannotdo without them, particularly in long-termpost-disaster recovery operations.

Private contractors assume the role ofemergency responders in oil and chemicalspill cleanup, in many drought emergen-cies, and in flood threat circumstances. Ineffect, the DELBAY and selected contrac-tors serve as a �rapid deployment force�called in on short notice for boom deploy-ment, diking, and cleanup operations.

Oil spill recovery operations demandclose monitoring by the On-Scene Coordi-nator and other officials. Recovery is al-most always longer than the responsephase and requires care to avoid causingmore damage through inappropriate clean-up activities. It requires coordination ofnumerous public and private organizationsand supervision of volunteers. Both re-sponse and recovery demand competentand regular consultation with the media,even to the point of arranging press toursand news conferences.

Oil spill emergency mitigation is noless difficult than preparedness, response,and recovery. One action that may advancemitigation is raising civil penalties for oilspill violations to levels that get the oiltransport industry�s attention (an actionrecommended by Coast Guard Comman-der T. A. Patrick, Compliance Branch,

phone interview, July 26, 1989). Mitiga-tion is also promoted by dredging riverchannels and deploying and servicing ri-ver navigation aids. Tighter regulation andsupervision of water freight transporterswould also yield mitigation benefits.

Closing ObservationsThere is considerable variation in the

missions, personnel, expertise, and budgetresources of the Coast Guard, Army Corpsof Engineers, and Environmental Protec-tion Agency. The Coast Guard and EPAshoulder day-to-day emergency responseduties and are regularly mobilized. TheCorps maintains a capacity for emergencyresponse, but one Corps official noted thatit had been so long since the agency had toconfront a disaster in the estuary that manyin his unit had serious reservations abouthow younger staff would perform. TheEPA�s emergency response personnel car-ry a heavy burden in managing Superfundcleanup, which impedes their ability to re-spond to new disasters. The Coast Guardalso has considerable obligations in regu-lating maritime operations in the estuary.However, the agency seems to hold morereserve emergency resources, owing inpart to its search-and-rescue responsibility.Neither the EPA nor the Corps is equippedto handle search-and-rescue as quickly orin the same way as the Coast Guard.

In closing, if one considers the generalconcept of �emergency� of the three fed-eral agencies, the Coast Guard maintainsthe highest capacity for initial emergencyresponse. Emergency planning has beenbest integrated into its work routine. TheEPA emergency response unit is a reposi-tory of technical expertise that is stretchedto the limit in workload. The EPA�s emer-gency operations either augment, or work

in place of, state or local emergency opera-tions. The Corps is a secondary emergencyresponse organization called in by theCoast Guard or asked to serve the purposesof the Delaware River Basin Commission.At the same time, the Corps contributes todisaster mitigation much more than theEPA or Coast Guard. Moreover, Corps en-gineers make essential contributions tolong-term post-disaster recovery.

The Coast Guard, Army Corps of Engi-neers, and Environmental Protection Agen-cy all maintain a high state of readinessfor emergencies in the Delaware Estuary.As coordinating organizations, each makespossible a more rational, balanced emer-gency response by state, local, and privateorganizations. From a federal perspective,the Delaware Valley appears, from thisstudy, to be better prepared for waterbornethan land-based disaster, at least with re-spect to oil and hazardous substance spills.

EpilogueOn June 24, 1989, the 749-foot tanker

Presidente Rivera, en route to the same re-finery as the Grand Eagle had been somefour years earlier, ran aground near buoy1M, Marcus Hook Range. The Uruguayan-registered tanker was carrying 430,000barrels of Number 6 oil. The river pilotaboard the vessel notified the Coast Guardthat the ship was grounded and leaking oilinto the river. The incident began at about4:46 a.m., a night-time accident just as theGrand Eagle had been. Initial Coast Guardestimates were that at least 100,000 gal-lons had spilled into the river, but vesselowner representatives thought the amountcould reach 800,000 gallons. The CoastGuard mobilized for a �worst case spill of1.6 million gallons� (Coast Guard News,June 24, 1989, 9:30 p.m.).

11

Workers remove oil from the shore near Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania, in the aftermath of the Presi-dente Rivera spill in the Delaware River, June 1989. (Courtesy of Delaware National Guard)

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The Coast Guard managed this spillmuch as it had the Grand Eagle incident:a safety zone was established in the river;the On-Scene Coordinator supervisedcleanup operations conducted by the ves-sel�s owners and contractors; the RegionalResponse Team was called out to coordi-nate federal, state, and local pollution re-sponse agencies; the Delaware River andBay Cooperative and Tri-state Bird Res-cue & Research, Inc., were alerted, as wereEPA Region II and III and Interior De-partment officials, and experts from theNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration. Creeks, shorelines, and envi-ronmentally sensitive areas were boomedoff. Oil was pumped from the vessel�sholds, and it was refloated. The AtlanticStrike Team arrived quickly. Bottom sur-veys were conducted.

However, there are some notable differ-ences between the Presidente Rivera andGrand Eagle spills. Shortly after thePresidente Rivera accident, the vessel�smaster, river pilot, and crew submitted vol-untarily to drug and alcohol testing. Thereis no evidence that the Grand Eagle crewunderwent drug and alcohol testing. TheGrand Eagle accident was attributed to aloss of propulsion�a mechanical failure.The Presidente Rivera investigation re-vealed that members of the crew mistaken-ly dropped the port anchor at the bow. Theriver pilot had asked the master to readythe anchor. That order was passed from themaster, to the second officer, to the bow.Apparent miscommunication and anchor-mechanism malfunction resulted in thedropping of the anchor while the vesselwas moving at a 6-knot speed, whichforced the ship to turn out of the channel,causing it to ground, penetrating the hull.

Another notable difference between thetwo spills was the volume and heaviness ofthe oil. The Presidente Rivera carried oilso heavy it had to be heated before it couldbe pumped. This oil formed globules in theriver that proved nearly impossible topick up by skimmer but which could bepicked up by pitchfork or shovel. Hun-dreds of workers picked up tar balls from

the river and bank, among them 300 Na-tional Guardsmen mobilized by the gover-nor of Delaware. Officials downgraded thevolume of spilled oil and calculated at theend of the cleanup that 369,844 gallons ofoil and oily debris had been recovered (anamount only slightly larger than that re-covered in the Grand Eagle case). Presi-dente Rivera oil did not spread out asmuch as the more fluid Grand Eagle oil.Also, many more waterfowl died in theGrand Eagle spill than in the PresidenteRivera incident. Tri-State Bird Rescue &Research, Inc., cared for 128 birds duringthe Presidente Rivera incident, but only twodied. There were no reports of significantwaterfowl loss along the river.

Perhaps the greatest difference betweenthe 1989 Presidente Rivera spill and the1985 Grand Eagle spill is that the Presi-dente Rivera cleanup did not trigger anOn-Scene Coordinator declaration of alimited federal emergency, as had theGrand Eagle. The Coast Guard On-SceneCoordinator supervised cleanup by thevessel owner�s contractors and volunteers.Most oil contamination was north of Dela-ware Memorial Bridge; quantities flowingsouth of the bridge did not pose the threatto wildlife areas that the Grand Eagle spillhad. Obviously, owners of the PresidenteRivera will face lawsuits for reimburse-ment of cleanup costs and claims filed bythose who allege damage to their businessor property. It does not appear that thePresidente Rivera litigation will be as pro-tracted as that for the Grand Eagle. Theenvironmental impact of the Grand Eaglespill was more destructive and more wide-spread than the environmental impact ofthe Presidente Rivera spill.

The management of each of these inci-dents did produce political fallout, muchof it critical of oil spill emergency response.It may require new federal laws to reformgovernment oil spill response and compelvessel owners and operators to exercisemore caution, accident prevention, and vi-gilance for the protection of the DelawareEstuary and all our nation�s waterways.

REFERENCESPetak, William J. Jan. 1985. �Emergency Man-

agement: A Challenge for Public Admini-stration.� Public Administration Review.

Philadelphia Port Readiness Committee Repre-sentatives. April 26, 1987. �Memorandumof Understanding.�

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Philadelphia District. June 1987. Emergency Communi-cation Plan. NAP Plan 500-1-2.

��. Dec. 1987. Winter Emergency Plan.NAP Plan 500-1-7.

��. Jan. 1988. Natural Disaster Procedures.NAP Plan 500-1-1.

��. March 1988. Oil and Hazardous Sub-stances Pollution Contingency Plan.

��. April 1988. Drought Emergency Plan.NAP Plan 500-1-6.

��. June 1988. Hurricane Emergency Plan.NAP Plan 500-1-3.

��. N.d. �Philadelphia District Plan forEmergency Survey and Clearance of Navi-gable Waters,� annex to Coast Guard Emer-gency Survey and Clearance Plan.

��. Richard Sylves. Interview with RichardF. Nocella, Chief, Emergency ManagementDivision, August 26, 1988.

U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Safety Office, Phila-delphia. Oct. 1987. �Interdepartmental In-telligence Conference Address List.�

��. Dec. 1987. Radiological EmergencyResponse Plan for Salem, Hope Creek, andOyster Creek Nuclear Generating Stations.

��. Dec. 1987. Domestic Ice Operations.

��. Jan. 1988. Delaware River Basin Ma-rine Fire fighting Plan.

��. April 1988. Subregional Area Oil andHazardous Substance Pollution Contin-gency Plan.

��. May 1988. �Federal Region III StandingRRT Membership.�

��. Richard Sylves. Interview with Lt. PeterJensen, August 15, 1988.

��. June 1988. MSO/Group Philadelphia Hurricane Preparedness Plan.

��. Coast Guard News, June 24, 1989.��. Richard Sylves. Interview with Com-

mander T. A. Patrick, July 26, 1989. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1988.

EPA Region III Superfund Authorized Re-moval Actions, Immediate and Planned.

��. Emergency Response Sec. EPA RegionIII Superfund Removal Program Environ-mental Accomplishments as of 3 June 1988.

��. Region III Contingency Plan. �Annex II1200 Regional Response Team Directory�;�Annex IV 1400 Public Information�; �An-nex V 1500 Notifications, Communications,and Reports�; �Annex VI Legal Authorities�;�Annex VII 1700 Inter-agency Support Ar-rangements/Agreements� ; �Annex VIII1800 Dispersants Use Checklist,� VIII 1-10.

��. Richard Sylves. Interview with StephenJarvela, Director, Emergency Response Pre-paredness Section, August 16, 1988.

12

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Tracey Bryant, editor, andDavid Barczak, graphic artist, University of Delaware Marine Communications Of-fice, for their assistance in manuscript preparation and map development; and the Uni-versity of Delaware Sea Grant College Program for financially supporting this report.

This publication is the result, in part, of research sponsored by NOAA Office of SeaGrant, Department of Commerce, under Grant No. NA86AA-D-SG040. The U.S.Government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental pur-poses notwithstanding any copyright notation appearing hereon.

Published by the University of Delaware Sea Grant College Program DEL-SG-03-91 (6/91.500)