PTIL/PSA

Trends in risk level in

the petroleum activity

2012

WIF seminar 04.06.2013

Tore Endresen

Petroleum safety authority

PTIL/PSA

Topics

• Ptil main priorities 2013

• Indicators related to incidents with potential for major

accidents

• Indicators related to well integrity

• Indicators related to barriers

• Challenges

PTIL/PSA

PSA Main priorities 2013

• Preventing Acute Discharges - Goal: The industry must work purposefully to prevent accidents which can

cause acute discharges

• Barriers: technical, operational and organisational barrier elements - Goal: Safety barriers must be maintained in an integrated and consistent

manner in order to minimise risk.

• Groups at particular risk - The companies must reduce the threat of injury and illness for

groups particularly exposed to such risks by continuing to develop operating parameters and to adopt specific measures

• Management and major accident risk - Goal: Management at all levels of the industry must work

to reduce major accident risk, and ensure that these efforts are pursued in a coherent manner.

More details and publications: www.ptil.no

PTIL/PSA

Reported DFUs with potential for

creating a major accident

PTIL/PSA

Major accident indicator, all installations,

normalised against manhours, yearly values

and 3-year rolling averages

Based on observations, does not reflect

risk as excplicit numbers.

PTIL/PSA

Number of hydrocarbon releases

exceeding 0.1 kg/s, 2001-2012

PTIL/PSA

Hydrocarbon releases - risk contribution

in relation to potential loss of life

Normalized according to manhour

PTIL/PSA

Number of incidents

Construction and maritime systems

PTIL/PSA

Floatel Superior

• Designed, built and classed by DNV as for DP and

conventional ancoring

• Damaged due to unsecured anchor in bad weather during DP

operation. Tilted 5,8 deg. 374 people on board.

Foto: Erik Sevaldsen,

2012

Foto: Floatel Int. 2012

PTIL/PSA

Two damaged tanks. Potential for 5 !

PTIL/PSA

Scarabeo 8

• Tilted 8 deg during drilling operation in sept. 12

7°

PTIL/PSA

Wells drilled 1996-2012

12

0

50

100

150

200

250

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

An

tall

Letebrønner Produksjonsbrønner Totalt

0

50

100

150

200

250

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

An

tall

Flyttbare innretninger Produksjonsinnretninger Totalt

PTIL/PSA

Well Control Incidents 1996-2012

13

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

An

tall b

røn

nh

en

de

lse

r

Leteboring

Prod.boring

PTIL/PSA

Well control incidents according to degree of

severity per 100 wells drilled, for exploration

drilling

Exploration drilling

PTIL/PSA

Well control incidents according to degree of

severity per 100 wells drilled, for exploration

and production drilling

Production drilling

PTIL/PSA

Well integrity – NCS 2012

0,44 %

8,71 %

21,03 %

69,81 %

Categories according to OLF

guideline 117, Well Integrity:

Based on 1802 reported wells

Last year 1757

PTIL/PSA

Well integrity – NCS 2008-2012

03/06/2013

17

%

1 1 0,3 0,46 0,44

10 7 7,5 8,2 8,71

13 16

17,8 18,33 21,03

76 76 74,3 73,02

69,81

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Red Wells

Orange Wells

Yellow Wells

Green Wells

8 156

379

1258

PTIL/PSA

Well integrity - per operator in 2012

03/06/2013

18

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

Op1 Op2 Op3 Op4 Op5 Op6 Op9 Op10 Op11

1209 7 58 266 156 20 51 24 11

Pro

se

ntv

is a

nd

el

Rød

Oransje

Gul

Grønn

Andel brønner i

PTIL/PSA

Well integrity – per category in 2012

03/06/2013

19

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

Injecting Producing Suspended Temporary Abandoned

P&A Ukjent

301 1281 115 101 0 4

Pro

se

ntv

is a

nd

el

Rød

Oransje

Gul

Grønn

Andel brønner i

Injection

wells

Production

wells

Temp. abandon

with monitoring

PTIL/PSA

Barriers

Barriereelementer

Number of installations with higher

than average failures than industry

requirement 2002-2012

Average failures 2002-2012 Industry requirement for availability

Fire detection 8 0,0029 0,01

Gas detection 18 0,0071 0,01

Shut-down valves:

· Stigerørs-ESDV 16 0,014 0,01

· Ving og master

(XT) 3 0,008 0,02

· DHSV 20 0,021 0,02

Blow down valve

(BDV) 42 0,023 0,005

Pressure safety valve

(PSV) 14 0,032 0,04

BOP 0,008 *

Fire prevention

· Delugevalves 21 0,009 0,01

· Start test 11 0,003 0,005

PTIL/PSA

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

D 1

07

E 1

4

F 4

0

G 4

2

H 6

L 5

1

M 9

5

Q 6

8

S 2

17

T 151

U 5

3

X 3

1

Y 2

0

Ø 7

5

AA

81

AC

83

AD

76

AE

56

AF

178

AG

20

AH

149

AI 207

AJ 1

09

AK

37

AL 1

27

AM

28

AN

199

AP

162

AQ

256

AR

354

AU

590

AV

604

AW

627

AX

288

AY

174

AZ

812

AÆ

234

AØ

126

AÅ

32

BA

438

BD

320

BE

24

BG

36

BH

126

BJ 1

2

BK

540

BL 2

34

BU

163

BV

58

BW

54

BX

24

BZ

21

BØ

140

CA

56

CB

21

CF

4

An

de

l fe

il

2012 Gjennomsnitt 2002-2012 Bransjekrav

Leak test – DHSV 2012

03/06/2013

21

PTIL/PSA

Last year’s challenge to WIF

• Actions and measures to improve the trend for wells in

operation.

- Define the main causes of degradation and failure

mechanism

- Define the main root causes and possible actions

• Response shows the diversity of the NCS

• Many good points to keep continous focus on

03/06/2013

22

PTIL/PSA

WIF’s response:

Main causes and root causes of barrier

degradation 2012.

• Main Cause - Not constructed according to current NORSOK D-010.

- Sustained casing pressure

- Scale issues

- Leaking Wellhead and X-mas tree seals

- Tubing/Casing and control line leaks

• Root cause - Wells constructed prior to current regulations and NORSOK D-010.

- Shallow HC zones and lack of sufficient isolation.

- Changes in operational conditions (fluid chemistry, converted wells, and

changing pressure etc)

- Aging wells.

- Lack of gas tight threads in some old wells, collapses, corrosion,

inadequate material selections or/and incompatible fluids, etc.

03/06/2013

23

PTIL/PSA

WIF’s response:

What should be the industry focus

going forward ?

• Reduce risk on well - Ensure focus is on reducing risk drivers, e.g. HC quantities.

• Reduce number of red and orange colored wells (goal). - Repair or P&A wells with serious issues (KPI for time in red/orange category?)

• Ensure all new wells/re-worked wells are constructed in

compliance with NORSOK D-010 (Green).

• Use a life cycle approach.

• Improve consistency in categorization.

• Use the new guideline on well integrity incidents to trend

exposure.

• Focus on improved reliability and design of critical well

equipment.

03/06/2013

24

PTIL/PSA

Challenges for 2013/2014

• Re-establish barriers for the orange and red category

well.

• Alter the negative trend for green category wells - Trend for greens wells is negative despite the number of new production

wells completed/reworked for 2012. Red and orange is ‘’constant’’

• Ensure consistency in Well integrity categorization

• Findings from gas lift audits show the need for more

suitable tools/methods for risk management for HC

volumes in annulus

• Improve the management of safety critical barriers - Actions to get better availability for DHSV