BRIEFING

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Eamonn Noonan with Kjeld van Wieringen

Strategic Foresight and Capabilities Unit PE 690.710 – September 2021 EN

Trends in Chinese reporting on the European Union

Xinhua's coverage of EU affairs, 2012-2021

SUMMARY The main Chinese news service, Xinhua, has steadily expanded its coverage on the European Union over the past decade. The main challenges facing the Union have featured strongly, from the refugee crisis to Brexit to the impact of Covid-19. The tone of the coverage in this period has been neutral, rather than negative, and has not become more critical during the pandemic.

Internal EU policies are often put in a favourable light, although internal divisions also feature in Xinhua's reporting. Xinhua tends to emphasise EU cooperation with China and EU divisions with the United States. It also criticises EU sanctions and human rights complaints, both about China – for example on Xinjiang and Hong Kong – and about countries including Russia and Turkey. These trends are in line with China's long-standing stated preference for the EU to become a pole in a multipolar world order that is able to balance US power, despite its disapproval of the EU's pursuit of human rights issues.

Xinhua's coverage emphasises both the opportunities and the challenges facing European integration. This dual approach tends to support the view that China is ambiguous about the EU's ability to become a more influential and more useful strategic partner on the world stage.

This briefing is based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Chinese-language online articles by the state-affiliated Xinhua News Agency since 2012, as well as a selection of secondary sources.

IN THIS BRIEFING

Introduction Xinhua News Agency Trends in coverage of the EU Coverage during the pandemic Broader context Outlook

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Introduction Decades of strong economic growth have increased China's influence on the global stage. In Europe and elsewhere, debate continues on how to relate to a newly empowered and ambitious China. The European Union takes a nuanced approach, seeing China at the same time as a negotiation partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. But how does China perceive the EU?

In developing a long-term strategy, much depends on understanding and interpreting Chinese views and intentions. One difficulty is the possibility that public statements and media output designed for foreign audiences can be influenced by Sun Tzu's dictum about confusing the enemy, so that they cannot fathom one's real intent. Another is an asymmetric language barrier. China seems to be more familiar with the output of European media than Europe is with that of Chinese media.

This briefing seeks to improve familiarity with Chinese media output. It focuses on Chinese-language reporting on the EU by the Xinhua News Agency from 2012 to 2021.

We have identified and retrieved Chinese-language reports from Xinhua's website with the Chinese term for the EU – '欧盟' – included in the title. This generated 1 158 articles. We have then used text-mining software to extract dominant themes, countries and sentiments, month by month. We have also applied automatic sentiment analysis to the selected articles, to identify whether the tone of the coverage was positive or negative. For the pandemic period, we have furthermore reviewed 441 articles manually, to develop more detailed qualitative findings.

The key take-aways of our analysis of Xinhua articles are as follows:

There has been a significant increase in coverage since 2018. Challenges, crises and opportunities for the EU all feature prominently, as is the case

for European coverage. The tone is relatively neutral, rather than overtly hostile. The tone has not become more negative following the onset of the pandemic. Coverage during the pandemic includes positive observations about possibilities for

cooperation.

Taking secondary literature into account, we also note that:

Huge differences remain between Chinese and EU perspectives on certain matters, notably human rights and democracy. Related criticism, tensions and sanctions feature concisely within but do not dominate Xinhua’s coverage.

Our media analysis tends to support the view that China is eager to stress differences between the EU and the US, and that China favours European integration, in the hope that it will help to balance US power, despite increased Chinese scepticism of the EU's prospects, following its various crises.

Xinhua news coverage over the past decade suggests continued Chinese interest in positive relations with the EU, and a degree of expressed support for European integration. It is reasonable to assume that both economic and strategic pragmatic considerations underlie this editorial line. On the one hand, the EU remains a hugely important market for China, while on the other, China seems to entertain hopes that EU-US bonds will loosen and that US dominance may be undermined if the EU develops as pole in a multipolar global system.

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Xinhua News Agency Xinhua is China's largest news agency. It was founded by Mao Zedong in 1931, and remains affiliated with the party and the state. It has a status comparable to that of a ministry, and is supervised by the State Council and the Communist Party's propaganda and public information departments.

Xinhua has 170 bureaux, over 100 of which are outside China. It employs over 10 000 staff – more than twice as many as the New York Times. Xinhua owns several national and local newspapers and magazines in mainland China. It is a major provider of content to both China's major newspapers and to hundreds of smaller Chinese media outlets. It also has over 200 international clients, and provides news in Chinese, English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, German, Russian, Japanese, Arabic, Tibetan, and Korean. Xinhua has more offices in Europe than any other Chinese media agency. It is represented in every Member State and has 260 employees based in Europe. The European headquarters is in Brussels, and employs around 30 journalists.12 3 4

Xinhua is directly managed by top Communist Party leaders. The President, He Ping, is a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. Its views reflect those held within the Communist Party. Xinhua has often advanced unsubstantiated claims to counter foreign criticism of the Chinese government.5 Xinhua also gathers information and produces reports directly for Chinese policy-makers.6 The news agency has long held a key role in framing politically sensitive issues for other Chinese media, and has been both a leading example and a pioneer of party journalism.7 A former deputy editor-in-chief has stated that Xinhua's foreign news coverage embodies the policies of the party and state, especially regarding diplomacy and propaganda.8 A 2005 report by Reporters without Borders described Xinhua as the world's biggest propaganda agency.9

In late 2012, Xinhua set up a new division to create online-only content. This was a strategy to reach some 730 million Chinese internet users, the vast majority being smartphone users aged under 40. The party aims to attract the attention of younger generations and to win hearts and minds at home and abroad; Xinhua's use of social media and its responsiveness to consumer interests serves this objective. Xinhua's foreign social media distribution network surpasses that of other Chinese news agencies. It reaches 250 million social media users through Twitter and Facebook, including 75 million from Xinhua's own Facebook page. 10 Studies indicate that Xinhua's English-language articles have a greater social media resonance than both foreign and domestic agencies; in a sample period (March 2020), Xinhua's articles were shared on Facebook and Twitter over ten times more than BBC articles.11 Outside China, Xinhua uses content exchange agreements with news services to increase its profile in both democratic and authoritarian countries. Many are tempted by the offer of free content.12 13 Xinhua training programmes for media professionals in developing countries also enhance its influence.14 Xinhua narratives have helped shape reporting on China even by news agencies in Italy and Greece.15

Within China, most people get their information about the EU from state media. Surveys show positive impressions of the EU, as discussed below; this is believed to reflect relatively favourable reporting by Xinhua and other state news agencies.16 The influence of state-affiliated media on domestic perceptions of the EU is itself a good reason to monitor its reporting.

Trends in coverage of the EU Our search identified and retrieved 1 158 Xinhua reports that explicitly mentioned the EU in the title. A large majority are from recent years. Articles on the EU were published regularly from 2015, but not in great number. However, the numbers increased from 2018, often leading to dozens of reports per month. This expanded still further in late 2020 and early 2021. Xinhua's coverage of the EU is substantial and growing; this trend suggests increased Chinese interest in the EU. A Xinhua editor in Brussels confirmed this in 2016, and attributed growing interest not only to the refugee crisis, terrorism and Brexit, but also to President Xi Jinping's many visits to Europe.17

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The themes addressed have tended to follow the major issues on the EU agenda, with an emphasis on challenges and crises. The focus has shifted from the refugee crisis to Brexit and its implications, and then to Covid-19, including its economic impact. An analysis of word frequency using the RapidMiner programme confirms this development.

Figures 1, 2 and 3 portray the results of quantitative analysis using text-mining techniques.

The United Kingdom is the country mentioned most in European coverage, both before and after Brexit. The US ranks second in mentions, which suggests that reporting of the Union is often framed in the broader global context. Germany, Italy and Turkey share third place in mentions.

We then applied automatic sentiment analysis to the selected articles, using the NVivo programme. This technique is not yet seen as entirely reliable. It struggles, for example, to gauge humour or irony. This leads to an important caveat: we should not place too much confidence in its findings, particularly when variations are relatively small.18 19

The results suggest that Xinhua's coverage of the EU is neither overwhelmingly positive or negative. This seems to conform to the findings of surveys of Chinese opinion of the EU. A 2010 survey, for example, found that 47 % of Chinese respondents had a favourable view of the EU, compared with 39 % unfavourable. In 2010, 84 % of elite respondents saw relations in a favourable light, a decrease from 2007.20 Another poll in 2010 found strong support for European democracy, with 66 % of elites and 55 % of ordinary people supporting 'European ideas about democracy.' Only 6 % and 12 % respectively expressed dislike.21

Sentiment analysis finds that the balance did not become more negative in 2020, with what looks like a surprising positive shift in 2021. A potential explanation could be that China prefers to reassure its citizens of positive relations with the EU, following heightened international tensions during the pandemic.

A more qualitative look at reporting outliers shows a keen Chinese interest in EU-US disputes, in internal EU divisions in response to successive challenges, and in leader transitions. The Trump years provided plenty of scope for articles on disagreements between the EU and the US. Coverage in this vein may reflect Chinese strategic considerations; China watchers indicate that Beijing is favourable to the emergence of the EU as a balancing power in relations with the US, whilst it also entertains doubts about the EU's ability to overcome internal divisions and adopt a more independent profile.

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Figure 1 – Xinhua's reporting on the EU, 2018-2021: Frequency and sentiment

Figure 2 – Xinhua's EU coverage, 2018-2021: Main themes and countries

China-EU cooperation – Development IT Climate – Agreement UK Vaccines – Covid US Agreement – Brexit UK Trade – Economy UK Vaccines – Covid UK Refugees – Problem IT Brexit – Refugees UK Vaccines – Covid US Brexit – Problem UK Agreement – Refugees IR 2021 Vaccines – Covid PT Sanctions – Agreement IR Summit – Finance US Agreement – Vaccines UK Trade – Cooperation US President – European Commission US Economy – Agreement UK Migration – Refugees US Defence – Agreement IT Agreement – Trade UK Iran nuclear agreement – Budget US Defence – Agreement US China-EU cooperation – Economy UK Trade – Tariffs US China-EU cooperation – Meeting US Vaccines – Legal US Tariffs – Trade US Brexit – Investment UK Economy – Covid DE European Commission – Rule of law UK Problem – Brexit TR Economy – Covid DE 2018 Brexit – Rule of law UK 2019 Brexit – Agreement UK Corporations – Economy DE Covid – Member states IT Refugees – Covid TR Brexit – Covid UK 2020 Refugees – Agreement UK

Economy Politics Brexit Refugees Covid Environment/health

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

2018

2019

2020

2021

Positive Negative

EU opposition to US Iran sanctions (20.5%) and steeltariffs (9.1%), Brexit causing EU budget shortage andinternal divisions (11.4%), EU data legislation (9.1%)

Refugee crisis discord, negotiations and agreement(26.7%), EU-US tariffs dispute and retaliations (24.4 %),Brexit (6.7%), EU internal cooperation (6.7%)

Von der Leyen nomination and other EU leadershipcandidatures (32.5 %), EU-US tariffs and subsidiesdispute (7.5%), Serbia EU accession (7.5%)

Vaccine development, access and openness to Chinesevaccines (32.7%), EU sanctions Russia (15.4%), China-EU dialogue and trade (13.5%), E U military strategicautonomy (9.6 %)

EU Covid economic recovery fund, strategies andchallenges (43.5%), China criticizes E U interference inHong Kong (6.5%), EU China dialogue and cooperation(6,5%)

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For each month, the tables indicate the most and second most frequently reported theme in that order, followed by the most mentioned country. For months with a particularly small number of reports available, word frequency measurement sometimes provided rather obscure or seemingly unrelated main themes.

The tone of Xinhua's coverage may well change in response to the recent introduction of sanctions by both the EU and China. However, Xinhua's coverage in March 2021 does not make this a central focus; it appeared in just 7 of their 46 news articles. Most of these references come in a largely identical article that was disseminated in multiple outlets. It condemned the EU for using 'the so-called Xinjiang human rights issue as an excuse to adopt one-sided sanctions against China'.

Xinhua coverage also included two reports with criticism of EU sanctions against Russia and North-Korea. This is consistent with the longstanding Chinese position that that internal affairs are strictly its own business. It may also reflect a strategic goal of reinforcing solidarity among those

subject to criticism from the EU. Opposition to Western sanctions is clearly an area where China and Russia have common ground.22

Figure 3 – Xinhua's EU news reports, 2012-2017: Themes, countries, frequency and sentiment

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Coverage during the coronavirus pandemic A closer look at EU coverage since the outbreak of the pandemic supports the view that the tone has become moderately more positive, with a strong thematic focus on the EU's response to the pandemic. Xinhua's news coverage still emphasises positive relations and cooperation between the EU and China, except when reports share Chinese denunciations of EU criticism regarding Hong Kong or reactions to EU sanctions targeting China. Xinhua has featured difficulties in EU relations with other countries, including tariff tensions with the US and disputes with Turkey, Russia, Venezuela, Belarus and North Korea. All the Xinhua articles we reviewed about EU sanctions on other countries included criticism from the countries targeted – but not the EU justifications for sanctions.

Figure 4 shows the result of 441 manually coded Xinhua reports on the EU published during the coronavirus pandemic, from February 2020 to April 2021. The articles were coded for themes and sentiment, with those emphasising problems and challenges being coded as negative (orange) and those emphasising resilience and opportunities as positive (blue). Like the automatic sentiment coding results for this period, the manual coding results are in total moderately positive (60.5 %) rather than negative (39.5 %).

Xinhua coverage has been supportive of EU initiatives and regulations on data, climate and energy, noting potential cooperation with China in these fields in addition to cooperation on trade, investment and economic matters. Some articles are about EU calls for increased military autonomy and defence capacity, and these tend to emphasise opportunities rather than threats.

Figure 4 – Xinhua's EU coverage, February 2020-April 2021: Themes and sentiment

Xinhua coverage in the first week of February 2020, directly following the UK's formal withdrawal from the EU, was surprisingly supportive of the EU. Articles included upbeat comments by experts and by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the effect that Brexit would not halt EU integration, but would rather be an opportunity for deeper integration and

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Other

EU-China meetings and presidential visits

EU regulating large corporations

EU military autonomy and defense

EU-China trade relations

Criticism of EU sanctions against China

China denounces EU interference in Hong Kong

EU data and digitalisation regulation and capacities

Countries denounce EU sanctions and interference

EU-Turkey dispute, sanctions and negotiations

EU refugee and migration crisis

EU-Russia tensions and sanctions

EU-US relations and tariff frictions

EU environmental, climate and energy policy

EU-China Covid-19 cooperation

EU-China economic, data and climate cooperation

Brexit

EU vaccination progress and strategies

EU Covid-19 crisis, response and recovery

Positive Negative

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a stronger EU; Brexit was described as a potential catalyst for EU reform.23 2425 Some articles focused on challenges, such as post-Brexit divisions on migration and budget contributions.26 The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) think tank had earlier argued that Chinese support and hope for European unity and stability is not the whole story; Chinese media has also portrayed Brexit and the refugee crises as indications of Western decline.27

Xinhua coverage emphasised positive EU-China cooperation on Covid-19 from the outset. A notable report in February 2020 followed a meeting between High Representative Borrell and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference. This claimed that Borrell expressed appreciation of China's handling of the epidemic, and agreed that 'some countries' criticism stems from jealousy of China's development achievements'.28 No such statement can be retrieved from the conference website or EU sources mentioning the meeting. The report fits into a previously observed pattern of selective or unverifiable quotation of Europeans supposedly praising Chinese leadership.29

Xinhua has been moderately positive on EU policies in response to Covid-19, including regarding vaccines. In March 2020, Xinhua described the pandemic as a 'critical test for the EU coordination mechanism', saying that 'if the EU does not effectively coordinate each countries' response to the pandemic, this will undermine the European peoples' confidence in the EU and aggravate EU scepticism'.30 Later, Xinhua reported that the EU Member States' initial disunity in responding to the pandemic and insufficient EU coordination gave rise to new concerns for the prospect of further EU integration.31 North-south divides during EU negotiations on funding economic recovery fund were emphasised.32 In contrast, another Xinhua commentary on EU recovery funding noted the historic pattern of European integration making leaps forward during crises. Xinhua speculates that the pandemic could likewise be an opportunity for EU integration.33 In July 2020, Xinhua noted obvious internal conflicts behind the unity achieved at a European summit on the recovery plan. It characterised European integration as 'a heavy responsibility, and a long road ahead'.34 Looking back on 2020, Xinhua listed continuing problems for the EU, including the pandemic, economic recession, discord with the US, and disputes with Turkey.35 A February 2021 article looked at the EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy. This noted the EU leadership's desire not to be too dependent on the US – even after a welcome change of administration; but it concluded that the EU had a long way to go to realise defence integration.36 More recently, Xinhua has again emphasised internal divisions, this time in relation to the distribution of vaccines among Member States.37 This coverage of EU affairs seems more nuanced than what might be expected of Chinese domestic propaganda. It aligns to some extent with mainstream Western media coverage, and is indeed more even-handed than some Western media organisations.

Broader context In the earliest years of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Chinese media and like-minded observers portrayed it as a tool of 'US imperialism'. This changed in the 1960s, when it was attributed a role of protecting against American influence. When Sino-Soviet tensions rose in the 1970s, the EEC was seen as a possible bulwark against Soviet threats. In the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was conceded the status of a possible pole in a multipolar world order.38 The more recent evolution of Chinese media coverage and attitudes reflect a series of landmarks in EU-China relations. A key step was China's designation of the EU as a Comprehensive Strategic Partner in 2003. This is the second highest classification in Chinese foreign policy.39 This was a high point for EU-China relations on both sides, but underlying differences remained. The EU again became more critical of China, and China toned down its expectations of the EU as a partner, in part because of Chinese doubts about its capacity to act decisively on the world stage. In 2006 a senior international editor in Xinhua stated 'because Sino–EU relations are very well developed, we usually report the EU in a positive way'. 40

China's party, foreign affairs and European affairs think tanks have praised European integration, European institutions and the common market.41 White papers and strategic agendas on the EU in

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2013 and 2014 were overtly positive, underplaying potential problem areas and endorsing both European integration and defence cooperation as part of the development of a multipolar world.42 Chinese leaders responded to the 2012 US pivot to Asia with a record number of visits to the EU in the following years. Chinese leadership continued to express support for European integration and to affirm its readiness to deepen cooperation with the EU in the face of US competition, including on issues such as climate change and open international trade.43

A study based on interviews and policy sources in 2016 and 2017 concluded that the Chinese elite's perspective of Europe had remained appreciative. This reflected the leadership's preference for a multipolar world, with Europe as a major pole. In 2018, China failed to persuade the EU to condemn US protectionism in a joint declaration, but the agreed text did include mutual commitments to uphold multilateralism and deepen the EU-China strategic partnership in the areas of climate change and sustainable energy.44

Some observers interpret Chinese support for the development of the EU as a strategic choice, and as an attempt to undermine Western unity by dividing the US and the EU.45 Chinese media in recent decades have reported extensively on cases of opposition or divergence between EU and the US. This tends to support the view that China hopes that the EU could counterbalance the US, even though it has limited expectations about EU capabilities. A Xinhua EU correspondent in Brussels stated in 2007 that 'Strategically, China wants the EU to be more powerful and integrated so that it can become a pole in the world, […] a powerful EU can dismantle the power of the US in the world'.46

China's bilateral relations with EU Member States also raise suspicions of a divide and rule strategy. A strong bilateral focus would appear to undermine the emphasis on EU-China partnership. A more benign interpretation is that China's approach is a matter of pragmatism: bilateral decision-making is less complex than famously complicated EU procedures.47

In 2018, China and the EU cooperated in the United Nations to push for stringent reporting rules to implement the Paris Agreement. Yet China funds coal-fired plants in Bosnia, undermining EU environmental objectives and suggesting a selective adherence to multilateralism.48 The Chinese 16+1 investment cooperation format in Eastern Europe has been seen as a contradiction of claims to support European integration. In response, attendance at these meetings has been broadened to include EU representatives as observers, and its guidelines have stressed complementarity rather than competition with the EU-China strategic partnership.49 Chinese media explicitly challenge what they term 'delusions' about a supposed divide and rule approach in Europe; they express support both for regional integration and for Europe as a strong and cooperative partner in negotiations with the US.50

Over the past decade, China has become less confident about the EU's prospects of becoming a stronger strategic actor, better able to project influence externally. From the Chinese perspective, strategic partnership with the EU has been more rhetorical than practical, held back by continuing disunity on the European side.51 This view has been encouraged by a long sequence of crises, from the 2008 financial crisis, the refugee crisis, terrorism, and the rise of nationalist sentiments, and on to Brexit. The prospect of a European 'superpower' and a balancing force in relations with the US and Russia has lost credibility and strategic relevance in Chinese eyes. This is confirmed by surveys which indicate that the Chinese public Europe ranks far behind the United States and Russia in importance.52

The EU also seems to have lost some of its original economic prestige in China, especially following Brexit. The combination of a rapidly growing and more competitive Chinese economy with serious European economic crises has also had an impact. While the EU was previously cited as an 'economic giant and political dwarf,' it was more recently described as 'just a giant with deficits' by Qiu Yuanlong, a Europe expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 53 He highlighted Europe's mounting debt problems, diplomatic divisions and weak military policy. 54 Chinese economic and financial newspapers and business circles have often expressed severe Euroscepticism, especially during the 2008 financial crisis, as well as serious doubts about EU-China

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relations.55 The EU classification of China is likewise multifaceted, with China simultaneously being designated 'cooperation partner' (on climate change), 'a negotiating partner' (on trade), 'a strategic competitor' (on the economy) and a 'systemic rival' (with differing values and politics).56 China has repeatedly complained about being labelled a systemic rival and much prefers to be called a strategic partner, as noted in an EPRS overview of EU-China relations.

A battle of narratives about crisis management during the pandemic has further strained the relationship. There is an increasing sense that authoritarian governance, such as in China, represents a systemic challenge to democracy around the world. 57 Chinese media have played a role in aggravating tensions. In May 2020, EU ambassadors in Beijing published an opinion piece titled 'EU-China ties vital amid global crisis' in the China Daily, another major state-owned newspaper. After the article was shared on embassy websites, it was found to have been censored. A factual reference to the Covid-19 outbreak originating in China had been removed. This led to criticism by EU and Member State officials.

In contrast, an article posted the previous month by the Chinese embassy in Paris falsely claimed that care workers in Western nursing homes had abandoned work, leaving residents to die. The Chinese ambassador was summoned by the Quai d'Orsay, but refused to withdraw the article or apologise. He instead posted new articles in the following weeks, complaining about 'China bashing', suggesting that 'some Westerners are beginning to distrust liberal democracy' and celebrating the achievements of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics […] in response to the epidemic'. These were seen as examples of the mobilisation of Chinese media in support of 'Wolf Warrior' diplomacy towards the EU during the pandemic. Some suggest that China is now applying practices in the diplomatic arena used to influence public opinion at home, and embracing more aggressive tactics to protect its reputation.58

Outlook Xinhua news coverage over the past decade suggests continued interest in China in good relations with the EU, and continued support for European integration. Economic considerations point to the importance of the EU as a market for China; strategic considerations point to a potential EU future role in a multipolar system, ultimately lessening US dominance. In one scenario, the EU could leverage these abiding Chinese interests to its own advantage, for example in trade negotiations.

However, the EU approach will depend more on perceptions of China in the EU, than on perceptions of the EU in China. This in turn is trending in a negative direction, in response to large-scale human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. The adoption of sanctions against Members of the European Parliament, including the Chair of its Delegation for relations with China, adds further turbulence.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu once again, we should become acquainted with the designs of our neighbours, and always consider the favourable or unfavourable conditions of our counter-party. The perception has been growing for some time that China is moving in an unwelcome direction: internally it is undergoing an authoritarian shift, and externally it is emerging more clearly as a systemic challenge to democratic governance.

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ENDNOTES 1 Breslin S., 'China's Global Cultural Interactions', in Shambaugh D. (Ed.) China and the World, Oxford University Press,

2020, pp. 137-155: 146. 2 Agence France Presse, 'Xinhua News Agency'. 3 Visit Beijing, Xinhua News Agency. 4 Nyíri P., Bei W., Jialu Z. and Van Pinxteren G., 'How do Chinese journalists perceive us? An exploration of Chinese-

language media and their views on Europe and the Netherlands', Leiden Asia Centre, 2017, pp. 6, 7, 11. 5 News Guard, 'French Xinhuanet'. 6 Zhao S., 'China's Foreign Policy Making Process: Players and Institutions', in Shambaugh D. (Ed.), China and the World,

Oxford University Press, pp. 85-110: 98. 7 The following draws on Xin X., 'Popularizing party journalism in China in the age of social media: The case of Xinhua

News Agency', Global Media and China, 3(1), 2018, pp. 3, 5. 8 Zhang L., 'Reflexive expectations' in EU–China relations: a media analysis approach', Journal of Common Market Studies,

54(2), 2016, pp. 463-479: 465. 9 Reporters Without Borders, 'The world's biggest propaganda agency', 2005. 10 Bentzen N, 'The evolving consequences of the coronavirus 'infodemic': How viral false coronavirus-related information

affects people and societies across the world', EPRS, European Parliament, 2020. 11 Gaub F. and Boswinkel B., 'Geopolitical implications of the COVID-19 pandemic', EPRS, European Parliament, 2020. 12 The following draws on Cook S., 'China's Global Media Footprint: Democratic Responses to Authoritarian Influence',

National Endowment for Democracy, International Forum for Democratic Studies, 2021, pp. 3, 8. 13 Lim L., and Bergin J., 'The China Story: Reshaping the World's Media', IFJ Research Report, 2020, pp. 4. 14 Eisenman J., and Heginbotham E., 'China's Relations with Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East', in Shambaugh, D.

(Ed.) China and the World. Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 291-312: 303. 15 Godement F., 'China's Relations with Europe', in Shambaugh, D. (Ed.), China and the World, Oxford University Press, 2020,

pp. 260. 16 Harold S. W., 'Chinese Views of European Defense Integration: Beijing keeps a keen eye on European activities and the

development of trans-Atlantic relations', MERICS China Monitor, 2018, pp. 7. 17 Nyíri P., Bei, W., Jialu Z. and Van Pinxteren G., 'How do Chinese journalists perceive us? An exploration of Chinese-

language media and their views on Europe and the Netherlands', Leiden Asia Centre, 2017, pp. 4. 18 NVivo, 'How auto coding sentiment works'. 19 Barba P., 'Sentiment Accuracy: Explaining the Baseline and How to Test It', Lexalytics, 2019. 20 Zuokui L., 'The Chinese perception of the EU', in Zhou H. (Ed.) China-EU relations. Springer Singapore, 2017 pp. 189-197. 21 Godement F., 2020, pp. 265, 266, 267. 22 Grieger G., 'Russian ties with China in the face of Western sanctions', EPRS, European Parliament, 2017. 23 Xinhua, 'Goodbye EU! Goodbye UK! (author's translation)', 2020. 24 Xinhua, 'Dispatch: The UK leaves the EU at night (author's translation)', 2020. 25 Xinhua, 'Britain's formal departure from the European Union raises multiple questions (author's translation)', 2020. 26 Xinhua, 'French President calls for EU unity in Poland (author's translation)', 2020. 27 Gong J., Lang B., Shi-Kupfer K., ‘Questioning not the EU, but the “Western system” European crises through the lens of

Chinese media’, MERICS China Monitor, 2016, pp. 1. 28 Xinhua, 'Wang Yi met with EU High Representative Borrelli (author's translation)', 2020. 29 Nyíri, Bei, Jialu and Van Pinxteren, ‘How do Chinese journalists perceive us?’, 2017, pp. 16, 17, 18. 30 Xinhua, 'The pandemic tests the EU coordination mechanism (author's translation)', 2020. 31 Xinhua, 'Under the pandemic, the EU faces three big tests (author's translation)', 2020. 32 Xinhua, 'EU to set up trillion-euro pandemic recovery fund (author's translation)', 2020. 33 Xinhua, 'Germany and France propose a 500 billion euro financing plan for the EU (author's translation)', 2020. 34 Xinhua, 'Marathon summit launches EU's strongest ever economic stimulus plan (author's translation)', 2020. 35 Xinhua, 'Portugal, the next EU president country, has a big job to do (author's translation)', 2021. 36 Xinhua, 'Strategic independence for the EU is easier said than done (author's translation)', 2021. 37 Xinhua, 'EU vaccine distribution: Unity remains an issue (author's translation)', 2021. 38 Zhang, EU–China relations: a media analysis approach, 2016, pp. 465-468. 39 Harold, Chinese Views, 2018, pp. 7.

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40 Zhang, EU–China relations: a media analysis approach, 2016, pp. 473-475. 41 Godement, China's Relations with Europe, 2020, pp. 265-267. 42 Harold, Chinese Views, 2018, pp. 7. 43 The following draws on Chang V. K. and Pieke F. N., ‘Europe's engagement with China: shifting Chinese views of the EU

and the EU-China relationship’, Asia Europe Journal, 16(4), 2018, pp. 317-331: 317-223. 44 Grieger G., 'State of play of EU-China relations', EPRS, European Parliament, 2019. 45 Harold, Chinese Views, 2018, pp. 7. 46 Zhang, EU–China relations: a media analysis approach, 2016, pp. 471, 472. 47 Die Welle (DW), 'China's view of Europe'. 48 Grieger G., 'Towards a new EU policy approach to China: 21st EU-China Summit – April 2019', EPRS, European

Parliament, 2019. 49 Grieger G., 'China, the 16+1 format and the EU. European Parliament', EPRS, European Parliament, 2018. 50 Harold, Chinese Views, 2018, pp. 7. 51 Die Welle (DW), 'China's view of Europe'. 52 Godement, China's Relations with Europe, 2020, pp. 265-267. 53 Die Welle (DW), 'China's view of Europe'. 54 Harold, Chinese Views, 2018, pp. 7. 55 Godement, China's Relations with Europe, 2020, pp. 265-267. 56 Anghel S.Z., 'Outcome of EU-China video-summit of 22 June 2020', EPRS, European Parliament, 2020. 57 Grieger G., 'EU-China relations: Taking stock after the 2020 EU-China Summit', EPRS, European Parliament, 2020. 58 Baker L. and Emmott R., 'As China pushes back on virus, Europe wakes to 'Wolf Warrior' diplomacy', Reuters, 2020.

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