Travelling to Brussels via Aarhus: can transnational NGO networks impact on EU policy?

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Travelling to Brussels via Aarhus:can transnational NGO networksimpact on EU policy?Sonja BugdahnPublished online: 02 May 2008.

To cite this article: Sonja Bugdahn (2008) Travelling to Brussels via Aarhus: cantransnational NGO networks impact on EU policy?, Journal of European Public Policy,15:4, 588-606, DOI: 10.1080/13501760801996758

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Travelling to Brussels via Aarhus:can transnational NGO networksimpact on EU policy?Sonja Bugdahn

ABSTRACT This article analyses and evaluates how co-operation between theEuropean Commission and a transnational NGO network has impacted on theimplementation, enforcement and review of an EU policy. Transnational NGO net-works are expected to have a better output based on stronger loyalties to a given EUpolicy than transgovernmental networks linking up national authorities. At the sametime, NGO networks may have to revert to arena-shopping strategies to make animpact on policy development at the EU level. The transnational StichtingNatuur en Milieu (SNM) network supported the implementation of the 1990Access to Environmental Information Directive and is used as a case study. Whilethe SNM network had a good output, networked NGOs could have the strongestimpact on the EU level by participating in the UN–ECE negotiations of theAarhus Convention, the results of which were implemented in 2003 by means ofa strengthened EU directive. The article concludes with a discussion of the futureprospects of transnational NGO networks at the EU level.

KEY WORDS Aarhus Convention; arena shopping; multi-level governance;networks; NGOs; policy review.

INTRODUCTION

Within the last decade, attention at the global level has focused on ‘transnationalnetworks of experts’ (Levi-Faur 2005: 32), which are increasingly cultivated bygovernments and international organizations for the delivery of public goods(see Stone 2004: 559; also Slaughter 2004). At the same time, the EuropeanCommission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) has been repeatedlyadvised to make use of co-operative networks and partnerships (see Metcalfe2001). More concretely, it has been argued that the implementation of EuropeanUnion (EU) regulatory policies requires the establishment of ‘transnational regu-latory networks’ of national and European regulators (Majone 2002: 387).

EU-centred co-operative regulatory networks can be understood as arrange-ments (other than EU committees) consisting of actors based in various memberstates that receive logistical and/or financial support from the EU to pursue

Journal of European Public PolicyISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2008 Taylor & Francis

http:==www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/13501760801996758

Journal of European Public Policy 15:4 June 2008: 588–606

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common goals linked to influencing the creation, the review and/or theimplementation of an EU regulatory policy. A distinction can be madebetween EU-centred transgovernmental and transnational networks (seePollack and Shaffer 2001): EU-centred transgovernmental networks link upauthorities operating at the national or sub-national level of EU memberstates. EU-centred transnational networks, by contrast, are understood in thisarticle as arrangements that link up private actors, with a specific focus placedon non-governmental ‘civil society’ actors. (Hereafter, EU-centred co-operativeregulatory networks are simply referred to as co-operative networks, while ‘regu-latory’ and ‘EU-centred’ are implied. Similarly, EU-centred transgovernmentaland transnational non-governmental organization (NGO) networks are simplyreferred to as transgovernmental and transnational NGO networks.)

The concept of transgovernmental and transnational NGO networks can becontrasted with the concept of a ‘policy network’ which is used to describe infor-mal interaction (see Christiansen et al. 2003) among all those with an interest inan EU policy sector and ‘the capacity to determine success or failure’ (Petersonand Bomberg 1999: 8). Policy ‘issue’ networks at the EU level therefore oftenhave a very heterogeneous composition, while modes of operation tend to becontroversial (Richardson 1994). By contrast, transgovernmental and transna-tional NGO networks can be described as ‘semi-formalized arrangements’ ofactors that are more homogeneous, while the mode of operation is moreco-operative than in policy networks.

Transgovernmental networks have been established in an incremental andexperimental fashion over the last 15 years. Three types of transgovernmentalnetworks may be distinguished: first, there are networks of national authoritiessupporting several of the EU-level agencies with information tasks that wereestablished in the 1990s (Dehousse 1997; Smismans 2004). Second, there arenetworks of national regulatory authorities, an early example of which is theEU Network for Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law(IMPEL) founded in 1992. The White Paper on Governance set out the Com-mission’s intention to make more use of co-operative networks (CEC 2001b,2001c; Jordan and Schout 2006). Recently established networks link up nationalcompetition authorities (the European Competition Network, ECN), nationaltelecommunications authorities (the European Regulators’ Group, ERG) andnational energy regulatory authorities (the European Regulators’ Group for Elec-tricity and Gas, ERGEG). Third, there are networks of national bodies with anombudsman function in dealing with complaints from citizens. Examples are the‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’ (linking up national data protectionsupervisory authorities) and the European Network of Equality Bodies(EQUINET) (which links up national bodies for the promotion of equal treat-ment under the 2000 EU Racial Equality Directive).

The operation of transgovernmental networks can be described as semi-formalized since it tends to have a mandate either in Community legislation,in Commission decisions or in Community programmes (e.g. IMPELis referred to in the Sixth Environment Action Programme; see European

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Parliament and European Council 2002). However, decisions of these networksnormally lack binding force in the member states.

The Commission is often seen as the ‘best candidate’ for becoming a‘network manager’ or ‘network leader’ (Jordan and Schout 2006: 18), but defacto the role of the Commission varies: in the case of the ECN, the Commis-sion chairs the network; in the case of the Data Protection Working Party, theERG and the ERGEG, the Commission provides secretarial support while it isonly a source of funding for EQUINET (in the case of IMPEL, the Commissionused to house and fund the Secretariat).1

Transnational NGO networks funded by the Commission are active in theareas of anti-discrimination and environmental protection. Currently, fourtransnational NGO networks representing and defending the rights of peopleexposed to different types of discrimination receive core funding from Directo-rate-General (DG) Employment to support the implementation of the RacialEquality and Employment Equality Directives (e.g. the European NetworkAgainst Racism (ENAR); see de Burca 2006; CEC 2006: 20). One exampleof a transnational NGO network dealing with environmental protection is pro-vided by the European Habitats Forum (EHF). It links up 14 internationalNGO networks and promotes the implementation of the Birds and HabitatsDirective (see Weber and Christopherson 2002). Table 1 summarizes thecharacteristics of co-operative networks.

This article analyses and evaluates how the co-operation of the Commissionwith a transnational NGO network has impacted on the implementation, enfor-cement and review of an EU policy. First, the most important tasks of co-operative networks are identified based on an understanding of implementation,enforcement and review of EU policy as taking place in fragmented arenas.Second, the article juxtaposes the ability and willingness of transgovernmentaland transnational NGO networks to perform these tasks. It is argued that trans-national NGO networks are more likely to be loyal to the objectives of an EU

Table 1 Characteristics of co-operative networks

Co-operative networks

Transgovernmental Transnational NGO

Formal mandate Legal/Programmatic ProgrammaticComposition Homogeneous: national

authorities with formalmandate inimplementationof EU policies

Rather homogeneous:various national-basedNGOs promotingobjectives in line with EUpolicies

Mode of operation Co-operative Co-operativeRole of Commission Varied (chair, (housing of)

Secretariat, funding)Funding

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policy than transgovernmental networks, and therefore have a stronger output.However, significant ‘output’ of a transnational NGO network does not auto-matically translate into a strong impact on enforcement and the review of an EUpolicy, given that transnational NGO networks face institutional constraints atthe member state and EU levels. Hence, impact on EU policy review is morelikely if precedents in other arenas can be set.

Clearly, in selecting a case it is important that a policy review at the EU levelhas been completed. Since the Employment Equality Directive, the RacialEquality Directive and the Habitats Directive have not yet been reviewed bythe EU, too few conclusions can be drawn regarding the impact of transnationalNGO networks currently supporting these directives. By contrast, the impact ofthe transnational Stichting Natuur en Milieu network (hereafter referred to asthe SNM network) can be fully evaluated because it promoted the implemen-tation of the 1990 Directive on Access to Information on the Environment(hereafter referred to as the 1990 AIE Directive), where the review processwas completed in 2003. The 1990 AIE Directive established a new citizenright, the implementation of which took place in fragmented arenas.Network output is then analysed with regard to the activities undertaken bythe SNM network. The question of impact must be considered separately.Lastly, I discuss strategies for enhancing the impact of transnational NGO net-works at the EU level, and briefly consider some normative issues regarding theoperation of co-operative networks.

FUNCTIONS OF TRANSGOVERNMENTAL ANDTRANSNATIONAL NGO NETWORKS

The increasing use of co-operative networks may be interpreted as an attempt bythe Commission to create what has been termed ‘transnational policy commu-nities’ of experts which form common patterns of understanding regardingpolicy through regular interaction (Bennett 1991: 224f.). However, Colemanand Perl have stressed that transnational policy communities display less agree-ment on basic ideas and values than national policy communities. From a multi-level governance perspective, their purpose is rather to link national policy com-munities to one another and to international institutions (1999: 703). Thisobjective is particularly relevant within the EU, where the development andimplementation of EU policies takes place in differentiated arenas at the EU,national and sub-national levels (Marks et al. 1996; Heinelt et al. 2003).There is broad agreement in multi-level governance literature that effectiveimplementation in various sub-national arenas and effective policy developmentat the EU level require that actors and mechanisms are in place to ensure acertain level of co-ordination (Jessop 2004: 73; Jordan and Schout 2006: 13).

From a multi-level governance perspective, transgovernmental networks thatlink up national agencies and the Commission have been interpreted as astep towards a ‘multilevel community administration’ promoting convergence


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(Egeberg 2006a: 45). Similarly, from a regulatory policy perspective,transgovernmental networks are advocated as a solution to addressing the‘decentralization problem’ of EU regulatory policies created through nationalimplementation variation of broad EU frameworks (Eberlein and Grande2005: 100; also Dehousse 1997; Majone 2002; Nicolaides 2004).

This article argues that both transgovernmental and transnational NGO net-works may become ‘interface actors’ (Knill 2001) that ensure coherence betweenfragmented arenas (see Heinelt et al. 2003: 140) by carrying out specific mobil-ization and co-ordination tasks. More concretely, five different types of networktasks can be distinguished. Co-operative networks may:

. make citizens, administration, economic actors and NGOs in (sub-)nationalarenas more aware of new rights and obligations based on EU policies (themobilization of ‘users’ in (sub-)national arenas; see Metcalfe 2001: 433);

. agree on common standards (see Nicolaides 2004) regarding transpositionand application of EU directives across and within countries (coherencebetween (sub-)national arenas);

. report cases of doubtful compliance to the Commission, which forms a basisfor the opening of infringement procedures and the amendment of transposi-tion and application (coherence between (sub-)national arenas and the EUimplementation arena);

. carry out peer reviews (see Bohne 2006: 570) in member states to acquireinformation on national solutions and to critically evaluate them (coherencebetween (sub-)national arenas and the EU implementation arena and/orreview arena);

. provide input based on (sub-)national experience (see Metcalfe 2001: 433)into the policy review process at the EU level (coherence between(sub-)national arenas and the EU review arena).

THE WEAKNESS OF TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS

Network performance is likely to depend to a large extent on the loyalties of thenetwork participants (Jordan and Schout 2006: 16). However, in practice, auth-orities participating in transgovernmental networks may only show limitedsupport and loyalty to the objectives of EU policies. This is because nationalauthorities are normally hierarchically subordinated to ministries dominatedby political actors, and political concerns other than the effective implemen-tation of EU policy often prevail in a national context.

More recently, some national regulators have gained increased autonomyfrom national ministries. It has been argued by Egeberg that ‘semi-independent’agencies involved in transgovernmental networks can serve ‘two principles sim-ultaneously’, namely the national ministry and the Commission, and can there-fore be characterized as ‘double hatted’ (Egeberg 2006a: 45; on the relatedconcept of ‘dual functions’, see Slaughter 2004). However, empirical resultsconcerning the development of new loyalties in transgovernmental networkslike IMPEL, the ECN and the ERG are mixed (see case studies in Egeberg


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2006b). The Commission has made it clear that it is dissatisfied with theloyalties developed within the ERGEG (see CEC 2007: 8). At the same time,the Commission’s powers of selection and influence in transgovernmental net-works are currently limited. If national authorities participating in transgovern-mental networks show resistance to the implementation of an EU policy, theCommission usually lacks the power to replace them with alternative nationalinstitutions. These may be unavailable in any case since there is often onlyone competent national regulator per member state.

As demonstrated by the case of IMPEL, lack of loyalty affects the perform-ance of transgovernmental networks. While IMPEL performed well regardingthe agreement on common standards and guidelines (Martens 2006), IMPELoutput has been less convincing with regard to the reporting of non-compliance:national officials are understandably reluctant to openly report implementationproblems and failures to the Commission, which may employ that informationto begin infringement procedures against the member state. Hence, IMPELreports based on written surveys of national environment bureaucraciesusually fail to provide negative or critical information about the implementationof EU directives in selected countries; instead they tend to be descriptive andaffirmative (Bohne 2006: 16). More recently, IMPEL was confronted withdemands by the European Parliament and the Commission that it should ‘func-tion more like a police force, discover and report infringements’, yet the parti-cipating experts reject this role as inappropriate for the network (Martens 2006:135). Similarly, peer review processes in transgovernmental networks usuallysuffer from the fact that peers are at the same time both controllers andunder control. As a result, the IMPEL review of national inspection activitiesdoes not contain a single critical observation (Bohne 2006: 570).

With regard to the development of new EU policies, the network would likethe opportunity to have a direct input by examining EU legislative drafts and bycommenting from the point of view of enforceability and practicality (seeIMPEL 2003). At the same time, some IMPEL members fear that informationcontained in IMPEL reports is used by the Commission in the drafting of rec-ommendations or directives and some even threaten to withdraw their partici-pation in the issue of these reports (see de Jong et al. 2005: 77).

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF TRANSNATIONAL NGONETWORKS: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUTPUT ANDIMPACT

The assumption seems plausible that transnational (NGO) networks funded bythe Commission are more loyal to the objectives of an EU policy than trans-governmental networks. This is because NGO networks are typically builtaround a set of shared values, a feature that distinguishes transnational NGOnetworks from transgovernmental networks. And the Commission has thepower to fund only those NGO ‘advocacy’ networks that support the objectivesof EU policies (pro-environment, anti-discrimination, etc.). General support


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does not prohibit transnational NGO networks, which receive funding from theCommission, from advocating more ambitious EU policies based on the convic-tion that the ones in place do not go far enough.

Regarding the promotion of the consistent application of national law imple-menting EU policies, transnational NGO networks are limited in their achieve-ments, since they cannot issue guidance for sub-national authorities orombudsmen. In this regard, transgovernmental networks have an advantage.

If an EU policy creates new rights for citizens and/or groups, transnationalNGOs may be highly motivated to mobilize these citizens and groups to availthemselves of these new rights (in contrast to authorities who may fear costsfor governmental or economic actors). For instance, the Commission hasargued that transnational NGO networks supporting anti-discrimination pol-icies provide a channel for raising awareness about European policies and lawamong their member organizations and potential litigants (CEC 2006: 20).

Transnational NGO networks are also likely to have fewer inhibitions thantransgovernmental networks about acting as critical implementation watchdogsand informing the Commission on non-compliance in the member states – pro-vided that they can obtain enough information (on this role of the EHF, seeWeber and Christopherson 2002: 8). Participation of NGOs in peer review(see Bohne 2006: 570) and policy review processes is also likely to be guidedby a more critical attitude than those of transgovernmental actors. In general,transnational NGO networks are not constrained in the same way as transgovern-mental networks regarding policy development: they can even make proposals forreforms that encounter political opposition in member states. Regarding anti-discrimination policies, the Commission has recognized that the direct experienceof transnational NGO networks ‘helps improve the Commission’s understandingof the diverse forms and effects of discrimination, so that these are taken intoaccount in non-discrimination policy’ (CEC 2006: 20).

However, a high degree of loyalty and policy support by a transnational NGOnetwork does not automatically translate into strong policy impact at the EU level.Correspondents of an NGO network who file complaints with the Commissionface the same institutional constraints at the EU level as ‘normal’ complainantsdo. Infringement procedures have been described as ‘slow, secretive, inflexible,complex and dominated by states and the Commission’ (Jordan 1999: 79).While complainants may be able to mobilize the Commission to open infringe-ment procedures, they are normally excluded from the subsequent negotiationsbetween member states and the Commission (Williams 2002). The Commissionused to have complete discretion over if and when to proceed with a case (Kelemen2000: 156). Although some reforms have been adopted more recently involvingminimum standards for the handling of complaints (CEC 2002a) and priority cri-teria for the processing of the considerable caseload by the Commission (CEC2002b), the basic set-up of infringement procedures has remained unchanged.

Furthermore, transnational NGO networks cannot easily have a strong impacton the development and review of EU policies. The Commission may consult atransnational NGO network when it prepares proposals and the European


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Parliament may also use its input. However, transnational NGO networks areexcluded from negotiations with member states, and interest groups cannotnormally influence the ‘complex process of bargaining and the complicatedtrade-offs behind the closed door of a Council meeting’ (Grande 1996: 331).

Alternatively, transnational NGO networks may target institutions otherthan the EU that offer better participation opportunities. In scholarly literature,this strategy has been referred to as ‘shopping’. Interest groups in general(Richardson 2000) and networked transnational NGOs in particular (on ‘trans-national advocacy networks’, see Keck and Sikkink 1999: 95) have been charac-terized as talented shoppers. The core idea of shopping is that strategicallyminded governmental or non-governmental actors seeking to promote particu-lar policy goals will target the ‘venue’, ‘forum’ or ‘arena’ that offers the mostadvantageous rules of access and participation, procedures governing decision-making, constituencies, etc. (Pralle 2003: 237; for the original concept devel-oped for US domestic policies, see Baumgartner and Jones 1993). An impacton a more restrictive arena is possible, if skilful actors are able to set a precedentwithin one arena and then use that progress to advance the agenda in the morerestrictive arena (Kellow and Zito 2002: 47).

THE ROLE OF THE SNMNETWORK IN THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF THE 1990 AIE DIRECTIVE

The EU adopted the Directive on Access to Information on the Environment in1990, which granted every citizen the right to request environmental infor-mation from authorities with environmental responsibilities, subject to someexemptions. This right was supposed to have an impact on the policy implemen-tation of (EU) environmental policy more generally by strengthening account-ability and control mechanisms (Kimber 2000).

Implementation of the 1990 AIE Directive was badly in need of transnationalNGO network support. It created a new right for citizens and NGOs, but theimplementation required information and mobilization. To add to this, theright of access was defined in vague and ambiguous terms and limited by anumber of broad and ill-defined exemptions (Hallo 1996b; Kimber 2000)that could be subjected to diverging interpretations by different authorities,thereby creating a typical ‘decentralization problem’. Difficulties were com-pounded by the fragmentation of environmental responsibilities among differ-ent intergovernmental levels and specialized organizations (see Demmke 1997).

The environmental group Stichting Natuur en Milieu (SNM) is one of thelarger Dutch environmental organizations, which receives funding from theDutch government. In 1992 the organization decided to build up a networkof experts across Europe to promote the implementation of the AIE Directive.The idea underlying the network was to ensure that there was one person in eachcountry who (a) collected information about the status of legislation, (b) taughtcolleagues from other NGOs about the existence of this directive and how they


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could use it, and (c) could, if necessary, make complaints to the Commission ortake legal action at member state level (Interview SNM network, 2000).

The network covered the then 15 EU member states, the European FreeTrade Association (EFTA) countries Norway and Switzerland, and sixCentral and Eastern European accession states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Participating experts have beendescribed as ‘mostly lawyers and generally working in or closely with environ-mental organizations’ (Stichting Natuur en Milieu 1999). The Commissionfacilitated the work by providing the main source of funding for events and indi-vidual network correspondents (Interview SNM network, 2000).

Output of the SNM network: expertise building on experience

The SNM network undertook a number of activities to make citizens, admin-istration and economic actors more aware of their new rights and obligations, toinform the Commission of non-compliant implementation and to provideinput into the review process. Member states did not provide a level playingfield for the implementation of the 1990 AIE Directive given the diverging tra-ditions and the variation in political support for the new directive (see Hallo1996b; Kimber 2000). Although user guides were published in all EUmember countries represented in the SNM network (Hallo 1996a), thenature and level of other mobilization initiatives taken by SNM national corre-spondents varied greatly. Influential factors were the potential of the AIE Direc-tive to create a new right relative to national tradition and correspondents’institutional affiliations. The Irish and Spanish correspondents were membersof environmental issue groups and campaigned vigorously for the implemen-tation of the AIE Directive at both the policy-making and the administrativelevel (see Wates 1996a; Sanchis Moreno 1996). By contrast, the German corre-spondents, who were members of a scientific institute, tested the application ofthe AIE Directive in a systematic way (see Gebers 1996). Finally, the Frenchcorrespondent, who had a legal-academic background, largely confined hisactivities to analysing French law and jurisdiction (see Pelisson and Prieur1996).

SNM network correspondents filed numerous complaints with the Commis-sion on the deficient transposition and application of the AIE Directive andencouraged others to stage complaints (see country reports by national corre-spondents in Hallo 1996d). By 1996, the implementation of the AIE Directivehad generated the third largest number of complaints to the European Commis-sion relating to a single piece of environmental legislation (see evidence by RalphHallo in House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities1996).

The SNM network also managed to provide valuable information to the EUCommission, thereby contributing a direct input into the review process of the1990 AIE Directive. The co-ordinator of the network published a collection ofdetailed country reports by the national correspondents (Hallo 1996d) and an


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overview report commissioned by the European Environment Agency (1997).SNM organized a series of workshops, which acted as a forum for nationalnetwork correspondents to exchange their experiences with the implementationof the AIE Directive (Interview Stichting Natuur en Milieu 2000). Following aworkshop in 1998, SNM published a set of detailed recommendations for thereview of the 1990 AIE Directive. In addition, the former SNM network co-ordinator provided input into the review process through the EuropeanEnvironmental Bureau (2000) two years later. The Commission officially recog-nized the recommendations by annexing them together with summaries ofmember state implementation reports in its own Commission report precedingthe publication of the proposal for a new AIE Directive (CEC 2000a).

The Convention on ‘Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ (commonly referred to asthe Aarhus Convention) was another influence on the review of the AIE Directive.International environmental agreements have considerable impact on the develop-ment of EU environmental policy (Lenschow 2005, with further references). Byestablishing a regime of access to environmental information that was more gen-erous than the 1990 AIE Directive (together with additional rules on participationand access to justice), the Aarhus Convention was setting a precedent for its review(see Hallo 1996c; Wates 1996b). Since the Aarhus Convention concluded underthe aegis of the United Nations/Economic Commission of Europe (hereafterreferred to as UN/ECE) was signed by the European Community and all itsmember states, it had to be translated into Community law.

In the run-up to the 1995 Ministerial Conference in Sofia which endorsedthe UN/ECE guidelines on access to environmental information and partici-pation, a broad NGO coalition (including NGOs active in the SNMnetwork), supported by the European Parliament, the European GreenParties and national politicians, campaigned for the development of a UN/ECE convention on the same issues. It is estimated that the broad support mobi-lized by NGOs ‘helped to persuade some of the more progressive governments,notably Denmark’ to support the issue in the ECE (Wates 2005: 9).

The agreement reached on the negotiation of a UN/ECE convention can beinterpreted as a result of an arena-shopping process by NGOs involved in theSNM network. While the negotiations of the Aarhus Convention proved tobe a forum for the very same arguments that took place around the reviewand possible revision of the 1990 AIE Directive (see Wates 1996b), institutionalconditions in the UN/ECE arena were expected to be more favourable toNGOs than in the EU review arena. A typical feature of the negotiation of inter-national environmental agreements is that NGOs are able to participate in nego-tiations and provide input (Yamin 2001). NGOs in the SNM network,therefore, expected that the negotiations of a UN/ECE convention would besubject to ‘full public scrutiny’, and this could not be expected from thereview process of the 1990 AIE Directive at the EU level (Wates 1996b: 435).

Since the UN/ECE included countries from West, Central and EasternEurope, together with Russia and the newly independent states, more than 40


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governments negotiated at the convention between June 1996 and March 1998(Jendroska 2005). Environmental NGOs were extensively involved in the draft-ing process of the Aarhus Convention, being allowed to participate in theplenary sessions of working groups and in virtually every drafting committee(Morgera 2005). Jeremy Wates, the former Irish correspondent for the SNMnetwork, co-ordinated NGO input in the UN/ECE negotiations (see Hallo1996d: 450). Another NGO delegate at the negotiations of the Aarhus Conven-tion had worked previously as correspondent for the SNM network. The NGOagenda was ‘primarily driven by challenges that had previously been unsuccess-fully promoted at Brussels’ (Jendroska 2005: 14).

Impact of the SNM network: travelling to Brussels via Aarhus

The question is whether the activities of the SNM network were successful withregard to the mobilization of citizens and NGOs, the promotion of consistenttransposition and application, the opening of infringement procedures and theinfluence on the review process.

It is unsurprising that mobilization at the national level varied. Interest in theimplementation of the AIE Directive increased significantly among environ-mental organizations in Ireland and Spain where campaigns had been organized.In other member states it remained at a modest level, in particular if the statealready had general freedom of information laws in place (see EuropeanEnvironment Agency 1997). As was to be expected, it was impossible fornational NGO correspondents to make implementation more coherent acrossfragmented (sub-)national arenas. The UK correspondent noticed widely differ-ing rates charged by local authorities, and a failure of the government to pre-scribe practical arrangements (Roderick 1996). The Belgian correspondentpointed to ‘countless interpretation problems’ for which no official guidelineshad been issued (de Baere 1996: 56). Though NGOs could expose problemsand differences in interpretation, they had to rely on national governmentalinstitutions such as the ministries to provide clarification and greater coherence.

Between 1992 and 2000, the Commission opened infringement proceduresagainst 11 out of 15 member states, all of which amended their transposinglegislation or adopted new legislation in response (see discussions in theAnnual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, firstCEC 1996: 82f.; last CEC 2001a: 50f.). In particular, infringement proceduresagainst Germany and Spain seem to have been influenced by complaints (Hallo1996b). However, correspondents of the SNM network faced major difficultieswhen they sought to influence the processing of complaints by the Commission.The co-ordinator of the SNM network criticized Commission rules for not pro-viding access to information on the further processing of complaints (see evi-dence by Ralph Hallo in House of Lords Select Committee on the EuropeanCommunities 1996: 148). Moreover, the Commission decided that it wouldlargely abstain from investigating individual application cases unless questionsof principle were involved (Wates 1996a; references in the Annual Reports on


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Monitoring the Application of Community Law, first CEC 1996: 82; last CEC2003: 36). In other words, most complaints concerning deficient applicationwere not processed by the Commission. Other complaints were treated with sig-nificant delays or the Commission arrived at opposite conclusions concerningnon-compliance of national implementation measures (see the account by theBelgian SNM correspondent, de Baere 1996). There is evidence of cases inwhich the Commission after negotiation with member states required feweramendments than before (Bugdahn 2007).

The SNM network was more influential regarding the review process of the1990 AIE Directive through its input during the Aarhus Convention thanthrough its direct input in the review process. While the consensus of NGOswas not required for the convention to be adopted, NGOs were invited to inter-vene ‘on a basis more or less equal to that on which government delegations par-ticipated’. As a result, they had considerable ‘input to and influence upon theresulting text’ (Wates 2005: 10). The Commission also recognized that ‘NGOsconcerned with the environment participated actively and constructively in thenegotiations on an equal footing with national delegations’ (CEC 2000a: 8).

As a representative of the SNM network argued:

We and the people I work with in the network were also very actively involvedin the negotiations of the Aarhus Convention. And many of the battles thatwe would have to fight for the directive were fought in Geneva in terms of thenegotiations. We convinced the governments to include a lot of the thingsthat we felt were necessary to change in the Aarhus text already. And thesewe’re just taking up in the proposal for a new directive, because the Commu-nity and all its member states signed Aarhus.

(Interview SNM network, 2000)

Direct input by the SNM network in the review process of the AIE Directive wasreceived favourably by the Commission which took up several suggestions goingbeyond the Aarhus Convention in its proposal for a new AIE Directive (CEC2000b). However, attempts to create a new AIE Directive which would go sig-nificantly beyond the Aarhus Convention proved to be largely unsuccessful.While the 2003 AIE Directive faithfully implements the information provisionsof the Aarhus Convention, most of the proposals going beyond it met with stiffresistance by member states and were therefore not retained in the final text (Leeand Abbot 2003; Kramer 2005).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This article has analysed and evaluated how co-operation of the Commissionwith a transnational NGO network has impacted on the implementation andreview of an EU policy, using the example of the SNM network, which pro-moted the implementation of the 1990 AIE Directive.

The output of the SNM network has been analysed with regard to the activi-ties undertaken, while network impact on the implementation, enforcement and


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review of the 1990 AIE Directive has been considered separately. Though SNMnetwork correspondents in some member states mobilized users in sub-nationalarenas, others not affiliated to campaigning NGOs remained more passive. Inthis regard, a more homogeneous composition of the NGO network couldhave been helpful (see Table 1). As was to be expected, national NGO corre-spondents could do little to make implementation more coherent across frag-mented (sub-)national arenas since they could not issue binding rules.

Institutional rules at the EU level have limited the impact of transnationalNGO networks on the enforcement and review of EU policy. The participatingNGOs were very active in filing complaints, yet the Commission did not use thefull information. Furthermore, participants of the transnational NGO networkwere excluded from negotiations between member states and the Commissionon the correct mode of implementing a directive. The EU review arena hadsimilar limitations since the SNM network was barred from influencing the sub-stance of the review in the intergovernmental phase of decision-making. Realiz-ing these constraints, SNM network participants were prepared to campaignsuccessfully for an arena change.

Institutional rules in the ‘UN/ECE negotiations arena’ differed significantlyfrom rules in the ‘EU review arena’. Former participants of an NGO networkwere able to negotiate at the UN/ECE on almost equal terms with memberstates. Conditions for the SNM network were less favourable in the EUreview arena, as the adoption process of the 2003 AIE Directive demonstrates.The Aarhus Convention, however, could set a precedent for the reviewprocess.

The question is, what future role will transnational NGO networks play inEU governance? The Commission, in its White Paper on Governance, promisedto develop a more systematic approach to ‘working with key networks, to enablethem to contribute to decision shaping and policy execution’ (CEC 2001c: 18),but this has yet to occur. The case study of the SNM network demonstrates thatthe direct impact of an NGO network on enforcement and policy review at theEU level may be limited despite Commission funding and strong networkloyalty. This raises the question of how transnational NGO networks fundedby the Commission could enhance their impact. A more fundamental questionis whether the strengthening of network impact on EU policies is to be wel-comed from a normative standpoint. The increasing reliance of the Commissionon transgovernmental and transnational NGO networks may be criticized as‘informalization’, a typical feature of which are procedures that are ‘less rule-or law-based and mostly oriented towards outcomes on an ad hoc basis’. Tra-ditional procedures of voting, mandating and representation under the principleof political equality are lacking. Hence, the typical consequences of informaliza-tion are that democratic control by the Parliament and accountability to thepublic are weakened (Greven 2005: 267f.).

However, even if one subscribes to the argumentation advanced by Greven, itis conceivable that the operation and funding of co-operative (semi-)formalizednetworks represent a ‘lesser evil’ compared to the operation of completely


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informal ‘messy’ public–private policy networks (on the lack of democraticaccountability of policy networks, see Borzel 1998: 266). Co-operative networksare at least readily identifiable and hence more transparent (see Peterson andBomberg 1999: 269f.). The transparency of their operation can be furtherenhanced by publicizing details on the composition of the network andminutes of meetings. Moreover, co-operative networks may be made accountableto the European Parliament (for the strengthened role of the Parliament regardingthe control of committees, see Hofmann and Turk 2006: 83). To enhance bothformalization and impact, participants of transnational NGO networks may beassigned formal functions, for instance in the early stages of infringement pro-cedures. NGO representatives might become observers in EU organs dealingwith issues of non-compliance, or they might even be given the right toappoint independent experts who review individual cases (for similar arrange-ments in the compliance mechanism of the Aarhus Convention, see Koester2005; Morgera 2005).

At the same time, the operation of policy ‘issue’ networks can provide more‘safety in numbers’: by providing opportunities for input among a multitude ofactors, the powers of any single actor or type of actors to determine outcomes arelimited (see Rosenau 2004: 46). Hence, the use of co-operative networks insteadof loose policy ‘issue’ networks is likely to render access to EU policy-makingmore exclusive (see Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 269f.).

An in-depth investigation of these normative issues is beyond the scope ofthis article. Suffice it to say that any reforms aiming at an increase in theimpact of transgovernmental or transnational NGO networks should pay dueattention to issues of accountability and transparency.

Considering the large gaps of knowledge about co-operative networks, futureresearch could focus on a variety of topics. The operation of transgovernmentalnetworks of national authorities with ombudsman function (such as theArticle 29 Data Protection Working Party and EQUINET) remains largelyunexplored. An interesting question is whether the existing ombudsman typesof network show more unequivocal loyalty to and support for EU policiesthan transgovernmental networks of economic regulators like ERGEG orIMPEL.

Another question is, to what extent do other transnational NGO networksemploy arena-shopping tactics to enhance their impact at the EU level?Finally, there are areas in which transgovernmental and transnational NGO net-works deal with the same piece of legislation (e.g. the transgovernmentalEQUINET and the non-governmental ENAR both work on the implemen-tation of the 2000 EU Racial Equality Directive). Comparative researchcould be carried out with regard to the specific contribution of each networkto the implementation, enforcement and review of EU policy.

Biographical note: Sonja Bugdahn is a researcher and consultant in the Inter-national Bureau of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research,Bonn.


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Address for correspondence: Sonja Bugdahn, International Bureau of theFederal Ministry of Education and Research, c/o German Aerospace Centre(DLR), Heinrich-Konen-Str. 1, 53227 Bonn, Germany. Tel: þ49 228 3821474. Fax: þ49 228-3821-444. email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article draws on research I conducted in connection with my thesis whilebased at the European University Institute (supervisor: Adrienne Heritier).Funding by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and theEuropean University Institute is gratefully acknowledged. I would also like tothank the participants of the panel ‘Even Rules, Uneven Practice’ at the Univer-sity Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) 36th AnnualConference in Limerick, Ireland, 2006, for their comments and questions.Final thanks go to three anonymous referees who made many valuable sugges-tions for improvement.

NOTE

1 Under the new Financial Framework, funding for IMPEL has become more un-certain and will be supplied under different rules.

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Documents

Travelling to Brussels via Aarhus: can transnational NGO networks impact on EU policy?