TrappingThePrince:MachiavelliandthePolitics ofDeception MaryG · tion of Machiavelli is another vision of politics, arepublicanonerootedinloveof liberty and respect for self-governance,

Trapping The Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception

Mary G.Dietz

The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), 777-799.

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Thu Nov 10 10:59:56 2005

TRAPPINGTHE PRINCE:

MACHIAVELLI ANDTHE POLITICSOF DECEPTIONMARYG. DIETZ

University of Minnesota

Miachiavetti’ most famous political work, The Prince,was a masterful act of political deception. I argue that Machiavelli's intention was arepublican one: to undo Lorenzo de Medici by giving him advice that would jeopardizehis power, hasten his overthrow, and allow for the resurgence of the Florentine republic.This interpretation returns The Prince to its specific historical context. It considersMachiavelli's advice to Lorenzo on where to reside, how to behave, and whom to arm inlight of the political reality of sixteenth-century Florence. Evidence external to ThePrince, including Machiavelli's other writings and his ownpolitical biography, confirmshis anti-Medicean sentiments, his republican convictions, and his proclivity for decep-tion. Understanding ThePrince as an act of political deception continues a tradition ofreading Machiavelli as a radical republican. Moreover, it overcomes the difficulties ofprevious republican interpretations, and provides new insightinto the strategic perspec-tive and Renaissance artistry Machiavelli employed as a theoretician.

now it has become commonplace for po-litical scientists in fields as diverse as in-ternational relations, comparative poli-tics, organization theory, and politicalpsychology to construct explanationsabout political life and political conductthat rely in part on the “axioms” that

[Flor some time I have never said whatI believedand never believed what I said, and if I dosometimes happen to say whatI think, I alwayshide it among so manylies that it is hard torecover.

—Machiavelli

Reatism is

generally considered a necessary firstmove in the effort to make the study ofpolitics scientific, and when politicalscientists turn to the history of ideas, theytend to acknowledge Machiavelli as thechampion of realism, and The Prince, inparticular, as the first treatise in politicalthought to infuse the contemplation ofpolitical affairs with a spirit of em-piricism, realpolitik, and raison d'état. By

evolved from Machiavelli's little treatise.These include the necessities of “nakedself-interest,” the maintenance of ruler-ship at all costs, the utility of unethicaland manipulative behavior, and the cen-trality of power as an endin andofitself.?Accordingly, in many areas of politicalinquiry Machiavelli has come to beregarded as the theorist of “Machiavelli-anism,” and Machiavellianism itself en-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWVOL. 80 NO. 3 SEPTEMBER, 1986

American Political Science Review Vol. 80

tails understanding politics primarily interms of who dominates whom and howsuccessfully.

Asfar as it goes, this understanding ofpolitics as power is true to Machiavelli'spurposes in The Prince, but, in the end, Ithink it does not go far enough. Whatismissing from the political scientists’ rendi-tion of Machiavelli is another vision ofpolitics, a republican one rooted in love ofliberty and respect for self-governance,which political theorists have long con-sidered as vital to Machiavelli's thoughtas power and realpolitik.2 This second vi-sion of politics as participation is onetheorists tend to associate with Machia-velli’s later works, particularly TheDiscourses and The History of Florence.Thus, like political scientists, they toooften read The Prince in terms of thepolitics of power and domination.

I suggest that neither political scientistsnor political theorists have realized thefull force of the Florentine’s intentions inThe Prince. By offering a differentperspective on the treatise I hope to showthat both groups have underestimatedMachiavelli, and in ironic ways—thetheorists by not seeing the republicangoals that guide the treatise, the politicalscientists by not recognizing the full forceof the “Machiavellian” intentions that in-form it. My purpose, then, is not only topresent a new interpretation of this mostfamous of Machiavelli’s works, but alsoto encourage a reconsideration of the ad-jective that bears his nameand thevisionof politics it represents.

Republicans and The Prince

Nopolitical thinker was more aware ofhow crafty assault by deceit could serveas a substitute for brute assault byviolence than Niccol6 Machiavelli. Thetheme of deception weaves throughall ofhis work—his drama, his militarywritings, his history, his political theory.Mandragola is a tale of crafty assault

practiced by the wily Ligurio, who helps ayoung rake bed the beautiful wife of apompous old doctor. The Art of Warargues that a commander who vanquishesan enemybystratagem is as praiseworthyas one whogains victory by force. TheHistory of Florencetells the story of a citywhere deceit and guile secure power,while honesty and blind trust ruin it.Nowhere, of course, is Machiavelli's lovefor the art of deception more vividly un-maskedthan in The Prince. There the sub-ject of crafty assault takes its notoriousform in his advice to a ruler on how toplay the fox, “confuse men’s brains,” andemploy cunningin the political world. Inshort, whetherthe subject is love, war, orpolitics, Machiavelli recognizes the ad-vantagesof crafty assault in any form, beit trickery, stratagem, orartifice.For those whobelieve that Machiavelli

wasa republican and a Florentine patriot,this view of him as the mastertheorist ofdeceit poses difficulties. As Hanna Pitkin(1984) reminds us, foxes make poorciti-zens—their deceit undermines civicvirtu—and The Prince abounds withfoxes and advice on deception. Further-more, in Machiavelli's infamous tract toLorenzo de Medici wefind no defense ofthe Florentine republic, no call forpopularliberty, no praises of republicanRome. Far from denouncing tyranny, aswould any bold republican, Machiavelliappears to content himself with forgingthe absolute and ruthless power of anautocrat. How,then,is it possible to hailhim as a defender of liberty, self-government, and civic virtu, when theseappearto be the very valueshe teacheshisMedici protégé to subvert?

Proponents of the thesis that Machia-velli was a republican, despite his author-ship of The Prince, fall into two camps.

According to the “weak republican”thesis, The Prince is an aberration.Despairing of the future of Florence,much less its republican government,Machiavelli saw the Medici as the only

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1986 Machiavelli and Politics of Deception

alternative to total chaos, and so wrotehis advice book in reaction to an impend-ing crisis (Baron, 1961; Hale, 1961;Pocock, 1975). This thesis maintains thatafter 1513 Machiavelli simply abandonedthe idea of the prince as a “political in-novator”; he renewed his commitment torepublicanism, developed an admirationfor antiquity, and refueled his antipathyfor the Medici. The result of this renewalwas The Discourses, complete with itsdedication to republican sympathizersand its repudiation of the entire genre ofprincely advice books. Thus, thesescholars view The Prince as a tract thatreflects both Machiavelli's acceptance(reluctant though it might have been atthe time) of Medicean domination and hisclear-sighted, if opportunistic, attempt toingratiate himself with the new rulers ofFlorence.Amongother things, the weak repub-

lican thesis strains credulity. To read ThePrince as a sudden capitulation to Medicirule, or as a tool to curry favoris, argu-ably, to underestimate Machiavelli as acitizen and a theorist. Though I find Gar-rett Mattingly’s (1958) ultimate assess-ment of The Prince unconvincing (forreasonsI will explain shortly), I think heposes in dramatic termsthe correct riposte

to the weak republican thesis:

I supposeit is possible to imagine that a man whohas seen his country enslaved, his life’s workwrecked andhis owncareer with it, and has, forgood measure, been tortured within an inch ofhis life, should thereupon go homeandwrite abook intended to teach his enemies the properway to maintain themselves.. . . Butit is a littledifficult for the ordinary mind to encompass.(1958, p. 485)

The other camp advances a “strongrepublican” thesis, arguing that even asMachiavelli writes The Prince, he remainsa defender of republican liberty and anopponent of the Medici (Gentili, 1924;Mattingly, 1958; Rousseau, 1978;Spinoza, 1945; Wolin, 1960). However,ifthis is indeed the case, and if republican

sympathies abound in The Prince, thensomething else must be moving beneaththe surface of the text; some drama thatthe protagonist-prince does not see mustbe taking shape. This is precisely what thestrong republican camp wants to argue,but as is so often the case with Machia-velli, there are differences of opinion on

the matter of the subtext of The Prince.Three main views emerge.The first is Rousseau’s (1978, p. 88)

claim that The Prince is a book forrepublicans. Rousseau arguesthat the ad-vice book was notintended for the Mediciat all, but rather to expose to the peoplethe brutal ruthlessness of princes and laybare their methods and madness. Thereisa paradoxical quality to this interpreta-tion of the sort we have come to expectfrom Rousseau, namely, that even asMachiavelli is fashioning masks for aprince, he is unmasking him. By exposingthe prince's stock-in-trade, Machiavelli isarming republicans with all the knowl-edge they need to avoid being deceived. Asimple andtelling criticism can, however,be lodged against this Rousseauian opin-ion: Machiavelli could not be writing abookfor republicans, because he neverin-tended that they readit. Interpretative ac-curacy often hangs on mattersof practicalpolitical action, not to mention the inten-tion of where to publish and for whom,and in this case we find no evidence thatMachiavelli did or attempted to doanything with his treatise but send it toFrancesco Vettori, his contact in theMedici Palace.A second version of Machiavelli as a

strong republican hardly takes The Princeseriously, for it assumes that the treatisewas notintendedseriously. Garrett Mat-tingly (1958) holds that Machiavelli's ad-vice book is nothing more than a joke, a“diabolical burlesque” of the mirror-of-princes literature prevalent in the Renais-sance. Nominally agreeing with Rous-seau, Mattingly argues that Machiavelliwrote The Prince as an alarm, a “tocsin”

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to the people of Florence. However, thisagreement is surely more literary thanpolitical, for, unlike Rousseau, Mattinglydoes notread thetreatise as revealing cer-tain truths about princely power thatrepublicans should know. He sees ThePrince primarily as a fine example ofMachiavelli's dramatic temperament, areflection of his ability simultaneously toshock and amuse his audience. Machia-velli surely intended to shock and perhapsto amuse, and Mandragola fully displayshis dramatic skills, but this does not suf-fice to make The Prince a burlesque, evenif a diabolical one. The most obviousproblem with Mattingly’s readingis thatitfails to take seriously Machiavelli's desireto reconstitute the political world. In ThePrince, Machiavelli (P, p. 56) declares hisintention “to write something of use tothose who understand.”? He wishes toreveal reality, not ridicule it, and hisrepeated instruction concerning princelyvirtu soundsless like a satire on the cor-ruption of power than an attempt todetermine how those in power might useguile and deceit to mitigate the corruptionof the state.

Thethird strong republican perspectivereads The Prince literally, as an advicebook for a founder. Machiavelli's princeis to be the restorer of order, the man ofvirtu who will lay the foundations fromwhich the republic will emerge. Thus, ThePrince is “phase one” of a series of eventsthat will lead to liberty and republicangovernmentin “phase two.” Onthis ac-count, The Discourses takes its point ofdeparture from the (hoped-for)realizationof the prince’s plans. Put another way,The Prince has to do with “heroic”politics, The Discourses with masspoliticsof a republican sort, madepossible by theheroism of the virtuoso leader. ThusSheldon Wolin (1960, p. 231) contendsthat the prince will “render himselfsuperfluous” and therefore “give way” tothe rise of mass politics and the republic.Exactly how the founder renders himself

superfluous or how hegives way to therepublic, Wolin does not say; the implica-tion, roughly, is that he creates institu-tions that will subsume and outlive him.Hence the majorissue, for Wolin (1960, p.231), is whether or not the state will becapable of “generating its own momen-tum” after the founderis dead.‘Twoproblemsbeset Wolin’s attempt to

solve the puzzle of the transition from ThePrince to The Discourses, and so to shoreup the third version of the strongrepublican thesis. The first problem is tex-tual: in The Prince, Machiavelli gives nospecific advice concerning the foundationof republican institutions. Indeed, he doesnot deal with republics at all. On thisscore, we should compare The Princewith a later work, Machiavelli's advice toPope Leo X, “On Reforming the State ofFlorence” (Pansini, 1969, pp. 633-34).There he does offer lengthy and detaileddirectives on the organization of arepublic, and advises, among otherthings, the reopening of the hall of theCouncil of the Thousand, the redistribu-tion of offices to the general public, andthe return of a gonfalonier. Nothing evenremotely similar to this appears in ThePrince, where Machiavelli seems contentto develop Lorenzo’s knowledge ofhistorical examples and his appreciationof deceit and violence, rather than hisfamiliarity with republican ordini.The second problem with Wolin’s thesis

is more political in nature: Would atheorist as cognizant of the vicissitudes offortuna as Machiavelli content himselfwith the notion that “heroic politics” willsomehow “give way” to masspolitics,that the death of the prince will lead to therise of the republic? Moreover, would a.Florentine who knew well the _per-sonalities of the Medici princes—Giuliano(a man of little ambition, with a lack ofaptitude for dealing with Florentine af-fairs) and Lorenzo (an unapproachableautocrat with Spanish pretensions)(Gilbert, 1984, p. 135; Hale, 1977, p.

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99)—truly imagine them fit subjects forheroic politics, much less men great-hearted enough to relinquish their powerafter creating the conditions for a newrepublic?

Surely these rhetorical questionsanswer themselves. The history of thegovernment of Florence, with its unpre-dictable oscillations between various

-forms of princely and republican rule,taught Machiavelli at least one lesson:that to wait (as was the Florentine habit)and expect to benefit from circumstancesbrings disaster. Whatis necessary is to actand to act boldly to change circum-stances. This, in fact, is the very lessonMachiavelli teaches his prince, so it seemsodd, to say the least, to assume thatMachiavelli himselfis willing to wait forthe prince’s retirement or death and ex-pect that circumstances will, in duecourse, eventuate in a republic.These last observations give us the

needed purchase, I believe, to understandMachiavelli's strong republican intentionsand to solve the puzzle of The Prince.Given the Florentine’s commitment toboldness and his conviction that success-ful political action requires the mastery ofcircumstances, does it not seem plausiblethat The Prince could be read as apolitical act in itself, a bold attempt tochange existing conditions? Despite itsmain fault, the Rousseauian interpreta-tion is compelling precisely because ofthis—it approaches The Prince as praxisand renders Machiavelli a political actoras well as a political theorist. Again,however, it must be remembered thatMachiavelli sent his tract to the princeand not to Piero Soderini, the deposedgonfalonier, or to his republican friendsinthe castle at Volterra. So the puzzle re-mains. If we are to be committed to areading of Machiavelli as a strong repub-lican and of The Prince as praxis—as Ipropose we should—then in whatsenseisthis little book a bold attempttoalter cir-cumstances? How is the author of The

Prince to be reconciled with the authorofThe Discourses?These questions can be answeredonlyif

we remember Machiavelli's awareness ofthe advantages of crafty assault, and con-sider another, arguably more plausible,interpretative possibility: that The Princeis not simply about deception, butis itselfan act of deception, and that this theoristof deceit is at the same time a practitionerof that very art. In other words, ThePrinceis a tract that in fact aims to restorea republic, though in appearance itdedicates itself to maintaining a prince-dom. Machiavelli indeed intends thisbook for the Medici. Thus, his deceptionresides not in exposing princely tricks torepublicans, but in something far morecrafty: he intends for a gullible and vain-glorious prince to heed the duplicitous ad-vice of The Prince, and thereby take ac-tions that will jeopardize his power andbring about his demise. Thus, even asMachiavelli (P, p. 65) tells Lorenzo that“one who deceives will always find thosewhoallow themselves to be deceived,” heis deceiving Lorenzo. Even as he pressesupon the prince the need to establish arelationship to others that is unknown tothem, Machiavelli places Lorenzo in ex-actly this relation to himself. Even as heoffers his Medici a “humble testimony ofdevotion,” Machiavelli devises a plot, aseries of movesthat, if followed, will leadLorenzo to disaster.

This reasoning presumes, of course,that Machiavelli was a decided enemyofthe Medici, and that he intended his ad-vice to be followed to its damningletter.Wewill turn to that shortly. First we needto consider how, in the course of ThePrince, this master of political deceptionsets his trap, disguises his own true aims,and makes Lorenzo his mannerino.

Trapping the Prince

Machiavelli’s conception of politics inThe Prince is quite clearly drawn from his

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understanding of and éxperiencein the artof war. Politics, like warfare, is a viciousstruggle to gain control, to dominate andconquer opposing forces, to battle one’sway to victory over the enemy. Machia-velli (P, p. 53) thus advises his prince to“have no other aim or thought... butwar andits organization and discipline.”That art alone is necessary for glory inpolitics. The organizer of the Florentinecivilian militia also knows that thoughthere is “no comparison” between thearmed and the disarmed man, success inwar depends upon more than bruteassault by sheer force of arms(P, p. 54).Machiavelli (1965) recommends anothersort of assault in The Art of War:

Wherethe nature of the terrain is such that youcannot draw the enemy into an ambusheasily,you may, however,dig ditches andpitfalls in theplains, cover them overlightly with brushwoodand clods and leave areas of solid groundthrough which you mayretire in the heat of bat-tle; ‘ the enemy pursues, he is undone. (1965, p.118

Thus, for the general and the prince,the art of war and theart of politics re-quire a knowledge of crafty assault as wellas of armed combat. The political actormust beas skilled at setting traps as he isat bold, ferocious attack, for when oneisfoiled by “terrain” and unable to ambusheasily, it may be necessary to deceive.

Thepolitical terrain of Florence in 1512was not advantageous for Machiavelli.No “easy ambush” of the Medici lordswas possible, and therefore we mightremember Machiavelli’s advice togenerals in such situations: employstrategy and deception and your enemywill be undone. The Prince isMachiavelli's stratagem, an act of assaultin the form of deception. As has beenrecognized for centuries, the text itself

provides areas of “solid ground,” or firmadvice a newprince in a newterritory canrely upon to gain and maintain his power.What has been missed, however, isMachiavelli’s deceit. Amidst this solid ad-vice he prepares “ditches and pitfalls” in

the form of subversive directives for hisMedici lord, which he then covers overwith promises of power, glory, andpopular support. This deceptive advice toLorenzo concerns three decisive matters

for a prince: where to live, how tobehave, and whom to arm. If we readMachiavelli’s counsel to the prince withhistorical information at hand, its subver-

sive character begins to appear.If we readit with a complete understanding ofLorenzo de Medici’s circumstances inFlorence, the conclusion seems obvious:Machiavelli is out to undo this enemy ofthe republic. Let us consider whathe says.

Where to Live

Machiavelli begins The Prince bystating that his subject matter concernsmonarchies, not republics (P, p. 5). Thisis surely disingenuous, for although hisdiscussion of kinds of principalities andhow they are acquired and kept(P, pp.5-41) focuses primarily on princely powerand not popular governance, one of hismain categories of principality is theformer republic. Machiavelli says that ofall the new princes, the one who becomesruler of a once-free city faces the mostoverwhelming difficulties, and he devotesa short chapter (P, pp. 18-19) to explain-ing princely options in such a situation.We, like Machiavelli, might expect thatLorenzo, a new prince in a former repub-lic, would be particularly interested in thischapter, so we should note what Machia-velli prescribes when he addresses “theway to govern cities or dominions that,previous to being occupied, lived undertheir own laws”(P, p. 18). Machiavelli of-fers the prince in a formerly free statethree choices: he mayeither despoil, livewithin, or restore the freedomsof the oc-cupied city. He then discounts the thirdalternative by appealing to history: TheRomans unsuccessfully tried to holdGreece and, at the same time, allow herfreedom; hence, their only recourse was

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to lay waste and despoil the country asthey had done in Capua, Carthage, andNumantia. The paradox is not lost onMachiavelli—in order to maintain powerin a former republic, one mustdestroyit.What renders such extreme measuresnecessary is the character of the citizenryof a subjugated republic: “They do notand cannotcast aside the memory oftheirancient liberty,” Machiavelli warns, butthen he concludes his chapter by offeringthe second option as anotherresort.If theprince can neither “lay waste” to the citynor restore its freedoms, then he mustreside in it (P, p. 19).

Uponfirst reading, Machiavelli’s advicein chapter 5 seemssolid. Indeed, he doesnot even botherto defendit. In chapter3,on “mixed monarchies,” he argues that aprince’s residence within his conqueredterritory renders possession “more secureand durable” (P, p. 8) and allows for theimmediate remedy of disorder, and inchapter 6, he reiterates that the main-tenance of poweris facilitated by a prince“being obliged to reside personally in hisownterritory” (P, p. 21). Yet there issomething curious, even contradictory,about his advice in chapter 5. Before hecounsels residence, Machiavelli unequivo-cally states that “whoever becomes theruler of a free city and does notdestroyit,can be expected to be destroyed byit.” Amotive for rebellion against the prince, heargues, can always be foundin “the nameof liberty,” which republican citizens can-not cast aside (P, p. 18).

If this is the case, then what should wemakeof his advice? It seems that a princewho lives within a conquered republicwould stand to lose rather than benefit,particularly if the people have not forgot-ten “the nameofliberty.” A prince withina city is easier to find and destroy thanone wholives in a country villa, as hadbeen the habit of the Medici family; theymaintained a palace within Florence butspent muchoftheir time in their villas—Careggi, Cafaggiolo, Castello, Fiesole,

Poggio a Caiano—outsidethe city (Burk-hardt, 1958, p. 399; Wackernagel, 1981).Machiavelli’s advice seems designed tochangethe residential practice of the fam-ily by strategically placing the prince in-side the city’s walls. Yet at the same timeit seems to run counter to his warning

about the vengeful nature of formerrepublicans—why should a princelive intheir midst?

Perhaps ourperspective is not yet com-plete. Machiavelli may be determined toassure Lorenzo’s power by offering fur-ther advice on how to neutralize the“desire for vengeance” and the love ofliberty that inflame republican hearts, sothat even thoughthe prince resides withinthe city, he will be secure. Machiavellidoes give advice on this score, but what

he says is curious indeed.

How to Behave

If any one piece of advice occursrepeatedly in The Prince, it isMachiavelli’s dictum that the ruler shouldalwaysstrive to gain the favor of the peo-ple. In chapter 9, “Of the civic principal-ity,” Machiavelli tells Lorenzo to rejectthe “trite proverb” that, “He who buildson the people builds on mud,” for theprince who animates the masseswill find“he has laid his foundations well” (P, p.38). Machiavelli reiterates this point invarious ways throughoutthetreatise (P,pp. 60, 61, 63, 67, 71, 75, 76, 80). Becausethe friendship of the people is the prince’s“main resource” in times of adversity, hemust avoid incurring their hatred in orderto insure against conspiracy or ruin; thisis “one of the most important matters aprince has to confront” (P, p. 67). Machi-avelli acknowledges that princes cannotalways avoid being hated by someone,but it is best if those who hate him not bethe people (P, p. 67). In a new age, then,all princes (except the Turk and theSultan) ought to aim at satisfying thepopolani. Implicit is a corollary Machia-

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velli makes explicit in his chapter on civicprincipalities: be wary of the nobility.The nobles are portrayed as untrust-worthy, dishonest, greedy, and danger-ous. Machiavelli writes:

[Flrom hostile nobles [the prince] has to fear notonly desertion but their active opposition, and asthey are always more far-seeing and more cun-ning, they are alwaysin time to save themselvesand take sides with one whothey expect to con-quer. (P, pp. 36-37)

Hence the wise prince will, when possible,esteem his nobles, but moreoften he willbe suspicious of them. The people providea far firmer foundation for power.

Before we accept the astuteness ofMachiavelli's advice to Lorenzo, weshould recall this Medici’s situation. Aswe shall see, the Florentine people werenot well inclined toward the new Medici.The moodof the city had changed mark-edly since the days of il Magnifico. TheFlorentines had become accustomed to arepublic; what opposition there wastoitcame primarily from the aristocracy. Itseems, then, that an astute advisor wouldhave told Lorenzo to turn for support tothe very class Machiavelli tells him tosuspect—the oftimati. All the morecurious is Machiavelli’s own acknowl-edgementof this elsewhere (though not toLorenzo in The Prince). In his documentto Pope Leo X, “On Reforming the Stateof Florence,” Machiavelli tells the Popewhat would have to be doneif a princewished to turn the city into a monarchy:

[I]n Florence wherethereis a great sense of equal-ity, one would first have to introduce inequalityand create nobles with castles and villas, whowould join the prince in suppressing the city andthe whole province with their armies and fac-tions. A prince alone, without the nobles, cannotbear the weight of a monarchy. (Pansini, 1969,p. 20)

Despite the fact that The Prince is(ostensibly) dedicated to a prince whowishes to maintain his power, nowhereinthe treatise does Machiavelli offerLorenzo the advice he gives Pope Leo.In

fact, he says exactly the opposite andissues warnings abouttrusting nobles andalienating the people. Of course, it maybe that between 1512 and 1521 Machia-velli simply changed his mind on the sub-ject of whose favor the prince shouldseek, but before we draw this conclusionwe mightlook at anotheraspectof his ad-vice on how to behave.

Machiavelli takes up the subject “Ofliberality and niggardliness” in chapter16. In advising the prince on how tobehave, he again reminds him of the im-portance of not being hated bythe people,observing that

one who wishes to obtain the reputation ofliberality among men, must not omit every kindof sumptuous display, and to such an extent thata prince of this character will consume by suchmeansall his resources and will be at last com-pelled, if he wishes to maintain his name forliberality, to impose heavy taxes on his people,becomeextortionate, and do everything possibleto obtain money. This will make his subjectsbegin to hate him.(P, p. 58)

To underscore his warning againstliberality (liberalita), Machiavelli con-cludes the chapterbysaying, “of all thingsthat a prince must guard against, the mostimportant are being despicable or hated,andliberality will lead you to one or otherof these conditions” (P, p. 60). Thus, theprince (who hasalready noted the dangerof alienating the people) will agree topractice “niggardliness’ (parsimonia)—itis one of the vices that secures his power.However, we have evidence to suggestthat Machiavelli’s warning against liberal-ity in The Prince is more a matter ofrepublican sympathies than helpful ad-vice, for in The History of Florence hereveals how the Medici benefitted fromliberality.

Book8 of Machiavelli’s History relates,amongotherthings, the famoustale of thePazzi conspiracy against il Magnifico,Lorenzo de Medici, in 1478. The details of

the attempted but unsuccessful plotagainst Lorenzo’s life need not concern us,

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but what Machiavelli says about the out-come of the conspiracyis instructive. Oneof the elements of the plan called forFrancesco Pazzi to ride to the gates of thecity in the aftermath of Lorenzo’s assas-sination, calling the people to liberty andto arms. However, events took a differentturn. Francesco was woundedin the at-tempt to kill the prince, andit fell to hisuncle, Iacopo, to sound the alarm. Machi-avelli explains and analyzes the failure ofthis final effort by the Pazzi in the follow-ing way:

Iacopo rode out with perhaps a hundred menwhohad been prepared for this job, to makethislast trial of their fortune, and he went to thePalace square calling the people andliberty to hisaid. But the first had been deafened by fortuneand the liberality of the Medici and the secondwas unknown in Florence, so there was noresponse. (1970, p. 273, emphasis added)

It is impossible to miss Machiavelli's con-clusion—the liberality of the Medici hadgarnered the people's support. Indeed, thefamily’s practiced munificence and heavypublic spending had deafened the Floren-tines to the cri de coeur of the republic—that is, to liberty.Armed with Machiavelli's analysis of

this event, we can nowreadhis advice inchapter 16 of The Prince in a differentlight. His injunction against liberality isintended to deprive Lorenzo of a tacticthat had worked exceedingly well for theMedici in the past. As Machiavelli seesit,a liberal prince can spend, then depend onthe people’s goodwill, a miserly one can-not. It seems, then, that even as he assuresLorenzo that miserliness will win himpublic support and keep him from beinghated, Machiavelli takes steps toguarantee that the nameofliberty is notforgotten in Florence—andit is in libertythat citizens of a former republic “canalways find a motive for rebellion”(P, p.19). Yet, as Machiavelli knows, rebellionmay cometo naughtunless there are goodarms to strengthen it. We must now con-sider his advice on arms.

Whom to Arm

In chapter 20 of The Prince, Machia-velli takes up the matter of “whetherfort-resses and other things which princesoften contrive are useful or injurious.”Allan Gilbert (1938, p. 162) has notedthischapter’s “un-Machiavellian” advice tothe ruler about how to gain the support ofthe people, but let us take another look.The chapter begins with a review of whatprinces who want “to hold their posses-sions securely” have done, and Machia-velli notes that no “definitive judgment”ispossible on these matters (P, p. 77). Con-ditions and circumstances vary and re-quire different responses. But, then heissues a most definitive statement:

A new prince has never been known to disarmhis subjects, on the contrary, when he has foundthem disarmed he has always armed them,for byarming them these arms become your own, those

that you suspected become faithful and thosethat were faithful remain so, and from beingmerely subjects become your partisans. (P, p.77)§

As if to leave no further doubt on thematter, Machiavelli goes on to argue thatthe new prince who disarms his subjectsoffends them andgenerates hatred toward’himself. As we have seen, he has takencare to prepare the solid groundforthisadvice bytelling the prince that the hatredof the people is precisely what he mustavoid; one of his most potent remediesagainst conspiracy is not being hated bythe masses. Therefore, Machiavelli con-cludes, “a new prince in a new dominionalwayshas his subjects armed. History isfull of such examples” (P, p. 78). His ad-vice on this score follows from chapter 14,where the prince has been warnedof theevils of being disarmed, and from chapter12, where the prince has been told of thedisastrous consequences of hiringmercenary and auxiliary troops.On the surface, perhaps, Machiavelli’s

advice on arms seems sound, even “un-Machiavellian,” but that impressionbegins to blur if we consider a seemingly

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obvious point. Machiavelli's suggestionthat the granting of armsinspires loyaltyand makes partisans out of subjects, iftaken to be sincere, fails to accountfor thepossibility, indeed the probability, thatarms mayalso facilitate plots, incite in-surrection, and inspire rebels. The newprince who armshis subjects may just aseasily make himself a mark for overthrowby creating the very instrument of hisown destruction, namely, a_ civilianmilitia. Moreover, earlier in the treatise,when Machiavelli discusses such virtuousnew princes as Francesco Sforza in Milanor Cesare Borgia in the Romagna, hemakes no mention of their having armedtheir subjects, doubtless because they didnot. His bold claim that “history is full ofsuch examples” is followed by no exam-ples at all, an odd omission for a thinkerwho is otherwise so willing to presentspecific historical examples for the princeto emulate.

Mostcurious of all, however, is Machi-avelli’s omission of a historical examplethat would have meant much to Lorenzo.In a letter written to Piero Soderini at thesame time he was composing The Prince,Machiavelli (1961) makes mention ofsome causal histories that have ledvarious princes to greatness, and notesthat

Lorenzo de Medici disarmed the people to holdFlorence; Messer Giovanni Bentivogli in order to

hold Bologna armed them;the Vitelli in Castelloand the present Duke of Urbinoin his territorydestroyed the fortresses in order to retain theirstates; Count Francesco and many others builtthem in their territories to make themselves sureof them. (1961, p. 98)

Machiavelli cites the Bentivogli, the Vi-telli, and Francesco Sforza in his discus-sion of the things princes contrive inchapter 20, but he never acknowledgesthe example of Lorenzo de Medici, a newprince whodisarmedhis subjects in orderto hold them. Surely this is odd, for of allthe historical examples for the younger

Lorenzo to emulate, his grandfatherwould have been the best. Not only wasilMagnifico the most artful principe of theMedicean line, he was also the mostbrilliant secular figure of the age, bothloved and feared by the Florentines.But quite clearly, the example of Lorenzothe Magnificent directly contradictsMachiavelli’s advice on arming subjects,and Machiavelli appears content to omitthis piece of information in his “defini-tive” advice to the new prince.The issue here, however, is not simply

whether new princes have in the pastroutinely armed their subjects and, inessence, created civilian militias. At issueis another, more immediately historicalmatter: is Machiavelli’s advice wisecounsel for a Medici in Florence? Fromwhat we knowofthe history of thecity,the answer to this question can only beno.

In Florence, the idea of liberty wasdeeply rooted in political tradition. Thecity’s sense of freedom persisted throughperiods of oligarchical rule, rigged elec-tions, and partisan foreign policies. Aproclamation of July 1329, passed by the.pratica (a citizen assembly), declared thatthe city would never submit to the auto-cratic rule of one man, “since liberty is acelestial good which surpasses all thewealth of this world” (Rubinstein, 1968,p. 450). That “celestial good” was whatthe Florentines believed contributed totheir greatness. Coupled with this tradi-tion of republican liberty, the Florentineshad a history of strong opposition to theMedici, which grew particularly virulentin the mid-fifteenth century. In an oathsworn in May of 1466, 400 citizens overthe age of 14 declared a political programof opposition to Medici rule that de-manded,in part, that citizens “be free todebate and judge public and populargovernment” (Rubinstein, 1968, p. 458).Nor were the Florentines without in-dividual voices raised in defiance of theMedici usurpation of liberty. In his

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Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, LeonardoBruni declared, “nothing can be achievedby the covetousness of single citizensagainst the will of so many men,” andsuggested safeguards against autocraticpower (Rubinstein, 1968, p. 446).Alamanno Rinuccini published De liber-tate, a powerful attack on Medici tyranny(Rubinstein, 1968, pp. 461-62), andGirolamo Machiavelli, Niccolo’s great-granduncle, was tortured and executedfor his part in leading the opposition toMedicean measures instituted under therule of Cosimo (Machiavelli, 1970, p. 218;Ridolfi, 1963, p. 2).There is no reason to suspect that this

opposition to the Medici or the spirit ofFlorentine republicanism itself hadsoftened or disappeared by 1512, or thatMachiavelli was unaware of it. Withoutquestion, the republic was anything butstable and secure; internal struggles be-tween the middle class and the aristocracywere unending, making institutionalreform immensely difficult and externalaffairs precarious. By 1510, Piero

Soderini, the gonfalonier, was out offavor; the aristocracy waspressing forhisremoval from office and for a return togovernostretto, though not for an end tothe republic. There is, in fact, littleevidence to suggest that there was anypopular sentiment favoring the return ofthe Medici, nor is there any indicationthat the Medici’s assumption of powerwasgenerated in any major waybyforceswithin the city.© No doubt the family hadallies among a small number of wealthyfamilies and some younger aristocratswho stood to gain commercially andpolitically from the decline of the republic(Brucker, 1969), but in the end, theMedici resumed their power with the aidof Spanish bayonets, not the Florentinecitizenry (Gilbert, 1984; Hale, 1977;Schevill, 1936). The fact that, once in-stalled in power, the princes kept foreigntroopsin the city and guardsat the palaceindicates that they felt some uncertainty

about their popularity. Perhaps this iswhy the younger Lorenzo, unlike hisgrandfather, il Magnifico, rarely venturedinto public places to mingle and meet withthe citizens. When hedid, he was accom-panied by armedguards (Gilbert, 1984,p.

108).With respect to the matter of arms and

Florence, let us further consider Machia-velli’s advice to Lorenzo onfortresses, forit is as curious as his advice on arming thecitizenry. In fact, his injunction against afortress, when read in light of Florentinerepublicanism, also seems far more inkeeping with the interests of the republicthan with those of the Medici.

In chapter 20, Machiavelli tells Lorenzothat “a prince who fears his own peoplemore than foreigners ought to build for-tresses, but he who has greater fear offoreigners than of his people ought to dowithout them” (P, pp. 80-81). This isclever strategy, considering that Machia-velli has previously condemnedtheprincewho fears his own people, and hasstressed the danger of placing too muchtrust in foreign powers. Hence, the princewho can read at all cannot help butdecide, as Machiavelli would haveit, not .to build a fortress. More metaphorically,the best fortress is to be foundin the “loveof the people” (P, p. 81).

Militarily, Machiavelli's counsel on for-tresses runs counter to the prevailingviews in Tuscany in the early Renais-sance. Fortresses were considered usefulin defending a dominion from outsideenemies. In opposition to this, Machia-velli argues that a fortezza is useless andcites the example of the Castello Sfor-zesco, which gave “more trouble to thehouse of Francesco Sforza than any otherdisorder in the state” (P, p. 81).” At best,

Machiavelli's military analysis of thismatter is exceedingly thin. He seems moreinterested in the internal, political im-plications of this strategy, rather than theexternal military ones. Again, we mustexamine what such an internal strategy

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would mean in the context of Florenceunder a Medici lord.

If the tradition of liberty distinguishedFlorentine republicanism in a_ politicalsense, then the walls of the city markedher republicanism in a strategic one (Hale,1968, p. 502). The Florentines were notor-iously wary of the subject of fortresseswithin the city. A fortezza symbolized theantithesis of republicanism, signaling thedemise of popular governance and theemergence of an inner powerelite by pro-viding an autocrat with an impregnablestronghold. Observing the circumstancesof neighboring city states, the Florentinessaw that princes often constructed for-tresses in the name of military security,but in fact used them for purposes ofdomestic oppression. Not surprisingly,then, the Florentines, with their strongrepublican traditions, viewed the buildingof a fortress as both a symbolic and aliteral danger.

Machiavelli shares this suspicion. In aletter to Guicciardini, written in 1526, heequates the building of a fortress with theenslavementof the Florentines and warnsthat “the most harmful thing a republiccan undertake is to enact somethingstrong or that easily can be madestrongwithin its body” (Machiavelli, 1961, p.235). He goes on to observethat, if a for-tress existed in Florence, “any powerfulman” who conquered the city would,upon entering, find it a convenientstronghold, and the Florentines “wouldbecome slaves without any protection”(Machiavelli, 1961, p. 235). These obser-vationsraise yet another puzzle. If Machi-avelli is so convinced of the danger a for-tress poses to a free Florence and of theadvantages it holds for a prince, thenwhy, when devising a strategy for theMedici, does he not recommend thebuilding of a fortezza? Indeed, whatwould a Medici prince whois backed bySpanish troopsin a city under siege standto gain by not fortifying himself? Yet inthe face of such facts, and knowing the

problems a fortress would present forrepublican activity, Machiavelli does notrecommend that Lorenzo build one; nordoes he recommend anystrategies of“containment” other than the “love of thepeople.” How can we accountforthispuzzling advice on armsand fortresses?The mystery or oddity of Machiavelli’s

treatment of arms and fortresses can beexplained in only one way. HeoffersLorenzo advice on security, with the in-tention of delivering him into republicanhands. Machiavelli has not lost sight ofthe reality of Florentine politics; he knowsfull well what the consequences will be ifLorenzo resides in the city, foregoesliberality, arms the people, distrusts thenobles, refuses a fortress, and mingles“from time to time” with the Florentines.In a city where “the desire for vengeance”runs deep and “the memory of ancientliberty” shines bright, an “unarmed pro-phet” is never fully secure; an unwantedprince who armshis subjects and does notprotect himself is even less likely to sur-vive. As his “advice book” proceeds,Machiavelli's warning in chapter 5, “who-ever becomesthe ruler of a free city anddoes not destroyit, can be expected to bedestroyed byit,” (P, p. 18) takes on thecharacter of prophecy. Lorenzo will notdestroy Florence; that muchis clear. Hisonly alternative (if he takes Machiavelli'scounsel) is to reside in the city. Oncetherein, Machiavelli will have him adoptpolicies that are, in fact, republican snaresdesigned to entrap him. He will bedestroyed. These are the “ditches andpit-falls” that lie beneath the seemingly solidground of Machiavelli’s advice to hisMedici lords.

Machiavelli and“The New Sons of Brutus”

If I read it aright, The Prince is itself anact of political deception. In addition tothe deceitful “advice” in the text itself,

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signs of crafty assault are also to be foundoutside Machiavelli's text, and all point inonly one direction: not only was Machia-velli no friend of the Medici; he was a de-cided enemy. Hebelieved that the Floren-tine republic had torid itself of their con-trol if it was to revive and flourish. Otherdocumentary sources and Machiavelli'sownpolitical biography help shore up mycase.Among Machiavelli scholars, it is

generally agreed that in 1513 he was con-cerned with getting into the Medici’s goodgraces, finding employment, and return-ing to active political life. According toQuentin Skinner (1981, p. 21), “As soonas he came out of prison, Machiavellibegan scheming to recommendhimself tothe city’s new authorities.” To insure thesuccess of his scheming, Machiavelliwrote numerousletters to his friend, theerstwhile republican Francesco Vettori,now the Medici’s ambassador to Pope.Julius II and Machiavelli's only access tothe corridors of power. At every turn, thepolitical exile appears eager to ingratiatehimself to the Medici and, through Vet-tori, to assure the family of his trust-worthiness, his honesty, and his support.In the famous letter of December 10,1513, Machiavelli (1961, p. 142) tells Vet-tori of his “little work” On Princedomsand of his intention to offer it to the newprince, Giuliano, in the hope that theprince will welcomeit and makeuse of thetalents of the author. The dedicatorypages of The Prince seem to provide fur-ther evidence that Machiavelli was con-cerned with promoting the greatness ofthe Medici and with assuring their successthrough the benefit of his knowledge ofthe “art of the state.”That Machiavelli was a schemer is

beyond doubt. Nor does there seem to beany question that he was eager to haveThe Prince gain the eye and approval ofGiuliano and, later, Lorenzo. However,those whoare tempted to read The Princeas so much Machiavellian opportunism

would do well to consider what Machia-velli has to say in The Discourses about“the sagacity and severity of JuniusBrutus,” the “father of Romanliberty”(D,p. 402). We will return to the severity ofBrutus shortly. Let us first consider hissagacity.

In book 3, chapter 2 of The Discourses,Machiavelli notes that more than anyoneelse, Junius Brutus deserves to be es-

teemed forhis “simulation of folly” (D, p.403). Having neither the arms nor theforces to mount an open waragainst thekings of Rome, Brutus instead ingratiatedhimself with those in power. On this mat-ter, Machiavelli takes issue with Livy’s in-terpretation of Brutus’s motives and sug-gests a reading of his own:

Titus Livius gives but one reason that inducedBrutus to this simulation, namely, that he mightlive in greater security and preserve hispatrimony, yet if we well consider his conductweare led to believe that he had another reason,which was that by thus avoiding observation hewould have a better chance of destroying thekings and ofliberating his country, whenever anopportunity should offer. (D, p. 403)

Clearly, Machiavelli not only holdsBrutus in great esteem for his simulationof folly, but also for his commitment toliberating his country, and he offersBrutus as a modelfor others whoare “dis-satisfied with their ruler.” In Machiavel-lian terms, if one cannotplay the lion andthreaten the prince directly by force ofarms, then one must be a fox and under-mine the enemy from within. “It is ad-visable... at times to feign folly, asBrutus did,” Machiavelli writes, “and thisis sufficiently done by praising, speaking,seeing and doing things contrary to yourway of thinking and merely to please theprince” (D, p. 404).

Interpreters of Machiavelli should bewary of repeating Livy’s mistake aboutBrutus, and so avoid being tricked by ap-pearances. If Machiavelli had designs onthe Medici, as I think he did, then it seemsreasonable to expect that he would seek to

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prove himself a trustworthy advisor, and

so get the Medici to follow his advice. Ifwe keep Machiavelli's praise of Brutus’ssagacity in mind, then his ownflattery ofLorenzo and his appeals to Vettori seemevenless likely to be matters of simple op-portunism, and rather more. deeplypolitical. Like Brutus, Machiavelli tradeson the appearance of friendship and ad-miration forhis ruler; he “feigns folly” fora political purpose—to ingratiate himselfto Lorenzo, thereby earning his trust sothat the prince might be destroyed—muchas Junius Brutus destroyed the kings andrestored the liberty of Rome.There are other reasons to question

whether Machiavelli was so monomani-acally consumed with getting his old jobback that he simply shed his republicansympathies and dedicated himself to serv-ing Florence’s Medici lords. First, there isthe political history of the Machiavellifamily itself. Though family legacy neednot determine one’s loyalties, it generallyserves as a source of personal identity aswell as of reflection, particularly in an agewhere a family’s identification with thepolitical order is of great and lasting im-portance. Machiavelli himself points outin a chapter in The Discourses—straight-forwardly entitled “Reasons why the samefamily in a city always preserves the samecharacter”’—that what a youth hearspraised or censured within his family“becomesafterwardsthe rule ofhis life forall time” (D, p. 535). As Machiavelli'sbiographertells us, the Machiavelli werean old Florentine family, noted for theiractive participation in Florentine publiclife and, most significantly, for theirdevotion to the republic. They gave thecity some 12 gonfalonieri and 54 priors(Ridolfi, 1963, p. 2). As I have noted,Girolamo Machiavelli died in prisonbecause he dared to speak out against theoligarchy of Cosimo de Medici, andanother Machiavelli, Francesco, wasremembered for a public speech in 1424that condemned tyranny and praised

liberty: “The enjoyment of freedommakescities and citizens great: this is wellknown.But places under tyranny becomedeserted by their citizens and engage intheir extermination” (Pitkin, 1984, p.204). Whether Machiavelli knew ofFrancesco’s speech is uncertain, but itssentiments were in all likelihood passedon, for they are clearly evocative of someof the central tenets of The Discourses.

In short, there seemslittle question thatthe Machiavelli family viewed Piero deMedici’s ouster in 1494 (when Niccolowas 25) and the revival of republicanismmore favorably than did the aristocraticTournabuoni, Guicciardini, Strozzi, orNeroni families, who feared for their in-terests under a radically republicanregime. Also, the sentiments of Florence

itself were generally more “Machia-vellian” than aristocratic. Piero’s three at-tempts to return forcibly were met witharmedresistance from thecitizenry. Effec-tively defeated in 1498—the year Niccoldwas appointed Second Chancellor—theMedici finally ceased plotting against therepublic, retired to their country villas,and left fortuna to do what they couldnot.

In compiling evidence of Machiavelli'sanimus toward the Medici, we must, sec-ondly, consider somecrucial events in hisown life, as well as the wary view theMedici took of him. Although the familywasa suspiciouslot, they were not whollyundiscriminating in their purge of repub-licans. Thus, when the chancery wasreor-ganized in 1512, the First Chancellor,Marcello Virgilio, was allowed to remainin office (Hale, 1961, p. 134). In fact,Machiavelli was the only chancery officialdismissed by the Medici (Gilbert, 1984, p.173).° Without doubt, the Medici re-garded Machiavelli with considerablesuspicion. As we know,nearly a decadelater they granted him a modeststipend towrite his Florentine history, but eventhough his literary skills were gainingfame, his political trustworthiness was

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still very much in doubt. Indeed, the fam-ily never allowed him back into any posi-tion of political power.We must also remember the Boscoli-

Capponi affair. A few months after hisremoval from office, Machiavelli was im-plicated in a conspiracy against Giulianowhen his name was found ona list in thepossession of one of the two young con-spirators. The Medici imprisonedandtor-tured him on the rack but found out no-thing (Mattingly, 1958, p. 485). Machia-velli may have been ignorantof the plot,butit is a significant political fact that theanti-Mediceans surely perceived him to bea potential ally, one who might becounted onfor support had the assassina-tion succeeded.Nine years later, in 1522, Machiavelli

again fell under suspicion following theabortive plot to assassinate CardinalGiulio de Medici. The plot was organizedby two of his closest friends, ZanobiBuondelmonti (to whom he had dedicatedThe Discourses a few years earlier) andLuigi Alamanni, a poet and fellowmember of the Oricellari circle. In 1524,one of the accomplices revealed thatBuondelmonti had mentioned Machia-velli’s name as oneof severalcitizens whoshould be invited to join the plot (Ridolfi,1963, p. 203), but by then the dust hadsettled. Buondelmonti and Alamanni hadfled the country, two others had been ex-ecuted, and Machiavelli was in refuge inSan Casciano, writing his Florentinehistory.

For all we know, Machiavelli may haveor may not have been involved in eitheror both of these conspiracies. Assuming,conservatively, that he was not, we canread this noninvolvementeither as a signthat he was loath to conspire against andmore willing to work with the Medici inorder to stabilize Florence, or as a sign ofhis wariness about the success of conspir-acies in general, even if he wanted to seethe Medici removed from power. WhatMachiavelli writes appears to substantiate

the latter view, at least in part. Hisfamous chapter on conspiracies in TheDiscourses (which Buondelmonti musthave read), though filled with advice onhow to conspire, is replete with warningsabout the slim chances conspirators havefor success (D, pp. 410-36). Andin hishistory, Machiavelli writes, in referenceto attempted assassinations of the Medici,that “because conspiracies rarely succeed,they most often bring about the ruin ofthose who plan them and they bringgreatness to those against whom they aredirected” (D, p. 263). We might expect,then, that Machiavelli’s reluctance (ifreluctance it was) to participate in con-spiracies owed more to caution than toallegiance. Indeed, his republican friendsmust have taken his noninvolvement intheir conspiracies (if again, noninvolve-ment it was) in this latter light, for in1527, when the Medici were once againforced from Florence, Buondelmonti andAlamanni, now returned, supported theirfriend’s appeal for employment in therestored republic, at a time when the“enemies of the republic,” Guicciardiniand Vettori among them, were beingcalled into court (Gilbert, 1984; Ridolfi,

1963).Apart from The Prince, Machiavelli's

writings provide us with somefinal cluesabout his attitude toward the Medici.Whathewrites in reference to the familyandtheir supportersis decidedly negative,although his true opinion is not alwaysimmediately apparent—nor could it be.These were treacherous times and onerisked imprisonment, or worse, if onespoke toocritically of the Medici lords ortheir policies. Political tracts and cor-respondence hadto becrafted slyly; anenemy of the regime had to know how toappear to be loyal, even though heactu-ally was not.?°

Machiavelli practices this politicalstrategy in the History of Florence. Thework was not simply an_ intellectualendeavor; there were political implica-

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tions as well, since it had been commis-sioned by Cardinal Guilio, a member ofthe Medici family. Machiavelli was notunaware of the delicacy of his task. Hewrote to Guicciardini asking for advice onwhatto say about the family and how tosay it. Then he concluded, “I... shalltry to act in such a waythat, since tellthe truth, nobody will be able to com-plain” (Machiavelli, 1961, p. 206). Whatwefind in the history, particularly in thesections devoted to the Medici, is truthtelling of a particularly “Machiavellian”kind. There are numerous flatteringreferences to the Medici, to be sure.Machiavelli calls Cosimo, “the mostfamous and respected citizen... whoever lived,” describes Piero de Medici as aman of “virtu and goodness” and a greatcitizen, and extolls Lorenzo the Magnifi-cent’s beneficience, his contribution to thecity, his dignity, and his property,“worthy of a King” (Machiavelli, 1970,pp. 220, 246, 315-17). In short, Machia-velli’s truth telling seems designed to castthe Medici in the best possible light, andto play to the cardinal’s family pride.A closer reading, however, reveals a

different sort of truth telling. If we putMachiavelli’s assessment of the Mediciprinces in the context of someof his moregeneral comments on the corruption ofFlorence, the family does not fare so well.At the start of book 7, where heshiftsfrom a consideration of foreign affairs to“troubles at home,” Machiavelli notesthat the unity of a city is threatened mostby the presence of factions and partisans.Citizens, he says, can make a reputationeither publicly or privately. The lattercourse is reprehensible, for “this sort ofbehavior gives rise to factions and par-tisans, and a reputation wonin this wayisas offensive as the other kind is valuable”(Machiavelli, 1970, pp. 214-15). The tac-tics employed by private citizens includedoing good to various othercitizens, help-ing someone with money, getting himundeserved honors, and beguiling the

lowerclasses with public benefactions andamusements. In short, the private citizencreates a coterie of “hangers-on,” asMachiavelli puts it, in order to advancehis own personalgoals. Machiavelli’s toneindicates his contempt for such activityand for citizens such as these, who con-tribute to the corruption of cities likeFlorence.We need only match Machiavelli’s

description of the offensive behavior ofprivate citizens with his ostensible praiseof the Medici to see that in extolling theprinces he is actually condemning them.By his account, the Medici are privatecitizens; they corrupt the republic byplaying to factions. Liberality wasCosimo’s forte. We have already seen thatMachiavelli thinks liberality deafens apeople to the cry of liberty and lulls theminto forgetting their freedom. Lorenzodispensed pensionsandaid to the nobilityand put on tournaments and pageants forthe populace, tactics used by the privatecitizen in order to foster partisan support.It is Machiavelli’s lengthy account ofPiero’s short-lived regime, however, thatbest captures his aversion for Medicimaneuvers, for he gives there a detailedpicture of the ravages of factional andparty circumstancesthat plagued Florenceduring the Medici years (1970, pp.228-41). In various ways, then, Machia-velli shows us how circumstancesat oncenecessary for this family’s perseverancewere profoundly destructive of Florenceherself.

Guilio’s (now Pope Clement) enthusias-tic acceptance of this historical master-work suggests that Machiavelli achievedhis goal—writing a truthful account insuch a way that nobody complained. Hehad also, however, registered a distinc-tively “Machiavellian” conviction, onethat took the form of subtle historicalanalysis: in order to survive, the Floren-tine republic must rid itself of theMedici.”We might turn to one final piece of

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written evidence. Machiavelli's convic-tion that the Medici were a threat toFlorentine liberty surfaces in TheDiscourses as well, and returns us to hisdiscussion of Junius Brutus. If Brutus’ssagacity enabled him to restore therepublic of Rome, his severity helped himto maintain it. The father of the Romanrepublic condemned his own sons todeath because they were the enemies ofliberty, even as he wasliberty’s defender.The lesson Machiavelli (D, p. 405) drawsfrom Brutus’s example is a characteristicone; whoever makes himself a tyrant andfails to kill Brutus, or restores liberty to aformerrepublic andfailsto kill the sons ofBrutus, will not maintain himself for long.This seemingly nonpartisan adviceis fol-lowed by an example, that of PieroSoderini, the deposed gonfalonier ofFlorence. Soderini realized that the “newsons of Brutus” had to be destroyed, but,as Machiavelli (D, p. 405) writes, he didnot have the courage to do it. However,Machiavelli's story of Soderini is morethan just a counterexample of the severityof Brutus; what makesit interesting is themoralgloss he addsaftertelling the tale ofthe fallen gonfalonier:

{O]ne should neverallow an evil to run on out ofrespect for the law, especially whenthelawitselfmight easily be destroyed by the evil and{Soderini] should have born in mindthat as hisacts and motives would haveto be judged by theresult .. . everybody would have attested thatwhathe had done wasfor the good of his coun-try and not for the advancement of any am-bitious purposes of his own. . . . But Soderiniwas the dupe of his opinions, not knowing thatmalignity is neither effaced by time, nor placatedby gifts. So that by failing to imitate Brutus helost at the same timehis country,his state and hisreputation. (D, p. 406)

Machiavelli’s harsh judgment ofSoderini can be read cynically, of course;

the gonfalonier’s decline was Machia-velli’s as well, and he had reason to resentit. However, the nature of Machiavelli'scriticism—his reference to the “evil” thatthreatened the country and the “malig-nity” that would not disappear over

time—suggests there is more at stake forhim here than the meresalvaging of hisreputation. When evil threatens liberty,hopes hangonthe sagacity andseverity ofthose whorevere the republic. Brutus metthis test; Soderini failed it, and soFlorence lost her freedom. In Machia-velli’s eyes, Soderini’s great weakness wasthat he did not love the republic enoughto act boldly and eliminate her enemiesbefore they could conquer Florence andobliterate liberty.2 Machiavelli’s disdainfor Soderini is outweighed only by hishatred for those whom Soderini could notdestroy—those who threatened liberty—the “new sons of Brutus,” the Medici andtheir allies.

The Prince in Perspective

I began by suggesting that Machiavelli'sgenius resides in his appreciation of craftyassault in all its guises—the lover'strickery, the general’s stratagem, theprince’s artifice—but in truth, Machiavellidirects his most penetrating attention tothe actor/advisor behind the assault, theone who, observing the scene from adistance, controls the lover, the general,the prince. That is, what Machiavelli ad-mires is a kind of Renaissance artistry—astrategic perspective—that allows for aunique conception of spaceorterrain, andconsequently makespossible the manipu-lation of persons and events. Ligurioemploys just such a perspective in Man-dragola; Fabrizio exhibits it in histopographical advice to generals in TheArt of War. But Mandragola and The Artof War are simply later versions—one:dramatic, the other military—of the stra-tegic perspective Machiavelli himselfpractices as advisorto the prince.

We might measure Machiavelli's suc-cess as a political advisor whosees thingsstrategically by the labels he has earned—“political realist” and “master of real-politik’’—and by the statesmen andpoliti-cians, from Metternich to Kissinger, who

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have adapted his strategic perspective totheir own times and circumstances. Yet to

stop here, as do so manyofthepoliticalscientists and political actors who citehim, is to overlook a matter of deepestimportance to Machiavelli, namely, thepolitical values—republicanism andliberty—that inform his perspective as ad-visor to Lorenzo de Medici. When,in theintroduction to The Discourses, Machia-velli (D, p. 101) tells his friends to “[look]rather to the intention of him who givesthan to the thing offered,” he implicitlyunderscores the distinction between theapparent meaning of any given work,political counsel, or strategic perspectiveand its deeper purpose. To put this morebroadly, political advising involves morethan the capacity to analyze events or tosee things as they “really are,” for the“reality” that informs the analysis isneither a neutral observation nora scien-tific truth, but a perspective colored bythe values, purposes, and political com-mitments of the advisor who offers them.Whenthese are at odds with the interestsof those in power, the advisor may chooseto retire, to capitulate, to oppose openly,or (as Ligurio puts it) “to pursue deceit toits envisioned dearest goal” (Machiavelli,

1957, p. 38) by painting a particular vi-sion of reality for the ruler whom he orshe counsels, with a precise purpose inmind. The latter is Machiavelli's strategyas advisor in The Prince; his purpose isthe restoration of republican liberty.

I want to argue, then, that there is moreinvolved in Machiavelli’s advice in hislit-tle treatise than a presentation ofrealpolitik, but at the same time suggestthat his deeper purpose—to deceive—isnot at odds with reading The Prince eitherin terms of a newscience or as a work ofRenaissanceartistry. By wayof clarifica-tion, let us consider how Machiavellihimself depicts his perspective in ThePrince and thereby gain onefinal inter-pretative clue to his aims andintentions.

In his dedication to Lorenzo, Machia-

velli consciously invokes Renaissancear-tistry in its most literal sense, and drawsan analogy between himself, the advisorto princes, and the landscape painter:

[Flor in the same waythatlandscapepainters sta-tion themselves in the valleys in order to drawmountains or high ground and ascend aneminence in order to get a good view of theplains, so it is necessary to be a prince to knowthoroughly the nature of a people and oneof thepopulace to know thenatureofprinces. (P, p. 4)

By inviting us to recall the great in-novation of Florentine painting—its at-tention to accurate representation of pic-torial space—Machiavelli also discloses anecessary quality of the political advisor.The intellectual disposition, or, to returnto Machiavelli’s visual metaphor, the“vantage point” of the advisor, must befully dimensional and complete. It encom-passes the actors and influences thatpopulate and permeate the vast politicallandscape, and thus avoids therestrictedperspectives of the prince or the populace,whosevisions are governed solely by theirrespective relationships to one another.Unlike the actors he observes, the advisorstands “outside” the political canvas andintegrates particulars into a sweeping con-textual vision of reality. He sees actorsnot as isolated figures and events not asdisconnected instances, but as parts of arichly constituted tapestry, a variegatedfield of competing interests and ambi-tions. The advisor’s special dispositionand imagination are, then, the very op-posite of the short-sightedness Machia-velli deplores as the mark ofpolitically in-effectual men, those who cannot controlevents or see beyondtheir immediate cir-cumstances.?*

But, as I have argued, there is more in-

volved in Machiavelli's advice than adetached depiction of political reality, justas there was moreinvolved in the Renais-sance art of perspective than the achieve-ment of pictorial veracity. In a literalsense, the discovery of perspectivealso in-troduced the art of deception to Renais-

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sance painting. Though the depiction ofreality was a central concern for thepainter, it did not involve a simple mir-roring of the physical universe. Rather,the painter selected particular elements ofthe visible world, then arranged and con-veyed them so as to give the illusion ofreality (Brucker, 1969). This act ofartisticdeception involved more than a dazzlingdisplay of technical virtuosity; also vitalto it was the relationship the painterforged between the illusion he presentedand the person whoobservedit. Thinkingof his canvas as a window through whichhe viewed the world, the artist sought toconvey the illusion as reality, and tostimulate the observer’s emotions andsense of possibility (Ackerman, 1969;Brucker, 1958). From “inside” the paint-ing, the artist tantalized his observerswith a seductive vista and pulled themtoward a point or prospect that seemedattainable. At its most powerful, perspec-tival art induced the viewersinto actuallyfeeling a part of the painting, as thoughthey could step into it and secure the pro-spect that beckoned them. Theartist per-formed a feat of aesthetic manipulationeven as he accomplished an act of pic-torial veracity. He used his science to pro-duce a material work of deception, an art.

In much the same wayas theart ofdeceptionis a distinguishing characteristicof Renaissance perspectival painting, so itis a part of Machiavelli's strategic perspec-tive in The Prince. Just as we can only ap-preciate theartist’s act of aesthetic mani-pulation if we consider how the paintingplays upon the observer's sensory impres-sions and “tactile values’ (Berenson,1909, p. 11), so we can confirm Machia-velli’s act of political manipulation only ifwe consider how The Prince as text playsupon his reader’s—Lorenzo de Medici’s—values, desires, and sense of politicalpossibility. Machiavelli will enticeLorenzo with a vision that will over-whelm his every other thought anddistorthis senses. With this in mind, we might

recall the moment in Mandragola whereMachiavelli (1957, p. 25) offers a poeticcomment on Ligurio’s power and on theoutrageousgullibility of old Nicia:

Our doctor here, would not suspecta lieIf he were told that jackasses canfly;He has a heart so set on fatherhood,That he’s forgotten every other good.

Ligurio can deceive Nicia because of hisstrategic perspective. He knows how toplay upon the old man’s desires and toorganize his field of choices by advancingsome alternatives and concealing others.He makesthe prospect of Nicia’s fatheringa child so palpable that this promise ofliving on comesto control Nicia’s world,his sensibilities, and his every perception.Thusthe old doctor is trapped; duped notonly by Ligurio’s wiles but by his ownvanity, his grandiose expectations set thestage for his becoming the cuckold.

If we bring our ownstrategic perspec-tive to The Prince and look to therela-tionship Machiavelli establishes betweenhis text and its intended reader, we mightsee a political version of Ligurian decep-tion at work. Machiavelli offers Lorenzothe promise of a different sort offatherhood—the fathering of the stateof Italy. Machiavelli’s strategy is Ligurian—to promise greatness to the Medicilord and thus render him susceptibleto the further flatteries that will, infact, undo him. Nowherein ThePrinceisthe Ligurian strategy as evident as in thefamous chapter 26. There Machiavellipaints the prospect of the prince assaviour of Italy, leader of his people,unifier of the fractious city-states, foreverimmortalized by his power and glory. Thepassion and spirit of these Machiavelliandeclamations have long troubled manyofhis interpreters, who puzzle over themarked contrast between this finalchapter and the cold calculation of therest of The Prince. However, thetroublesomeness of chapter 26 begins torecede if we remember that technical

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precision and vivid imagination were nostrangers to the Renaissance painter nor,for that matter to Ligurio as he set out totrap his prey. Accordingly, we might readMachiavelli's final call to action as the“bait,” or, to return once moreto perspec-tival art, as the “vista” he offers Lorenzo.If the chapter does its work, Lorenzo,likeNicia, will “forget every other good” andso become not only Machiavelli’s puppet,but the dupe of his own grandiose expec-tations of earthly power and political im-mortality.

Thus, Machiavelli sets out to manipu-late the dimensions of Lorenzo's world.After presenting a particular scope ofpossibilities in The Prince, he artfully nar-rowsthefield of choices so that, in theend, the prince will live, act, and armhimself in the manner that his advisorrecommends. Thus Machiavelli performsa feat of crafty assault, even as he accom-plishes an act of political veracity.Lorenzo will be lured into following hisadvisor’s dangerous counsel even as hereads this indeed unprecedented work ofrealpolitik. The beauty of the deception,were it to work, lies in Lorenzo's beliefthat his acts follow from his own virtaand seem perfectly in keeping with his aimto maintain power in life and achieveglory after death, while in reality theywork to restore the republic.

Postscript

As a text, The Prince succeeded insecuring Machiavelli's future fame and insealing his notoriety. As a trap, it securednothing. From all we know, Lorenzonever even read it. The republic Machia-velli wanted so passionately to see revivedin Florence did indeed comelater, but bydifferent means than he envisioned andfor but three short years, after which theMedici were installed in the city again.How could Machiavelli’s stratagem havecometo naught? Howcould his trap havefailed to spring as he had hoped?

The deceiver himself would have a wryand ready answer: Fortuna, that mysteri-ous goddess who governs half our ac-tions, thwarted his plans and fouled hischancesfor success. As the chroniclertellsit, on the day Machiavelli presented ThePrince at the palace, Lorenzo was alsogiven a gift of greyhounds, an unfortu-nate circumstance indeed, for the Medicilord was moreintrigued with his houndsthan with princely governance (Barincou,1961, pp. 76-78). Yet there is more to theturn of fortune’s wheel than this. Despitethe greyhounds,it is hard to imagine whyLorenzo, a suspicious prince, would havetaken this former republican, this man-nerino of Soderini, into his confidence inthe first place. Machiavelli's every at-tempt to appearto be other than he wasin the end was no matchfor his unblem-ished reputation as a Florentine republi-can, and so The Prince remained unreadand Machiavelli unsummoned, forced toreturn to the countryside, where hedivided his days between the “ancientcourts” andhis favorite and altogether ap-propriate pastime—snaring thrushes withhis bare hands(Ridolfi, 1963, p. 140).

His misfortune takes yet one moreturn,however, and the story is well known.When the republic was restored in 1527,Machiavelli eagerly reapplied for his oldjob at the Second Chancery. The newrepublicans, however, were suspicious—at the least they viewed him as an untrust-worthy opportunist, at the most as a pro-Medicean. They had, it seems, been moresuccessfully duped by The Prince thanLorenzo himself, and they too refused toallow Machiavelli’s return to politicallife.The irony is hard to miss: Machiavellihad, quite simply, outfoxed himself.Whatever misfortune was dealt this

master of deception, however, his designsin The Prince now seem clear. We needonly to remember circumstances andrecall what the chronicler reports on theoccasion when the advice book waseclipsed by the hounds. Uponleaving the

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Medici palace, Machiavelli was said tohave muttered that “though he wasnot amanto plot against princes, his little bookwould avenge him” (Barincou, 1961, p.78). Far from avenging him, The Princehas for five centuries accused this Floren-tine patriot. His vindication is long over-

due.

Notes

The research for this article was supported by aSummerResearch Fellowship from the University ofMinnesota. I thank Terence Ball, J. Peter Euben,James Farr, and Joan Trontofor their careful readingand helpfulcriticisms of my argument, and NormanJacobson for the inspiration behindit.

1. In international relations, see Waltz (1954) andGulick (1955); in comparative politics, see Bluhm‘(1965); in organization theory, see Pfeffer (1981); inpolitical psychology, see Nardulli, Flemming, andEisenstein (1984).

2. See, among others, Wolin (1960), Pocock(1975), Shumer (1979), Skinner (1981), Hulliung(1983), and Pitkin (1984).

3. Quotations from Machiavelli's worksarecitedin the text using the following abbreviations: P: ThePrince (1950, pp. 3-98); D: The Discourses (1950,pp. 101-540).

4. In a related fashion. J.R. Hale (1961, p. 175)suggests that Machiavelli thought “regeneration canbe best organized by a prince, but whenhe feels thatcivic virtue has been restored, he shouldretire.” Yetsurely Machiavelli would not think that a princewould simply “retire” after restoring civic virtue or,for that matter, be interestedin restoring the onlyvirtue Machiavelli considers “civic”—republican-ism. He knows too muchofpolitical rulership andRenaissance Florence to expect that.

5. Machiavelli (P, p. 78) offers one exception tothis armamentrule: the prince who acquires a newstate in addition to the old one wherehis troops arestationed should disarm the former. However, thisexception does not apply to the Medici, who were inexile as private citizens before their return toFlorence and in control of no “old”state.

6. Furthermore, circumstances did not changedramatically. A report on Lorenzo, made in 1515 bythe Venetian ambassador, notes: “This Lorenzo hasbeen madecaptain of the Florentines against theirown laws. He has become ruler of Florence: heorders and is obeyed. . . . They used to castlots; nolonger . . . the majority of the Florentines have notaste for the power of the house of Medici” (Hale,1977, p. 99).

7. Overall, Machiavelli's advice on fortresses isambiguous and could be a short essay initself. InThe Art of War, Fabrizio never advises against for-

tresses; in fact, his discussion centers not upontheirusefulness but upon their size, their relation to sur-rounding ditches, the design of portculisses, and thelike. Machiavelli (1965, pp. 183-94) seems to be sug-gesting that fortresses are both important andnecessary. In The Discourses, however, he appearsresolutely opposed to fortresses, deeming them both“unnecessary” and “injurious” to prince and republicalike. “Good armies,” he writes, will suffice insteadof citadels (D, p. 365). The fact remains, however,that Machiavelli argues against a fortezza in ThePrince, and the advice, whateverelseitis, is fully inkeeping with Florentine republican sensibilities.

8. Machiavelli’s thesis was tested dramatically in1534, when Alessandro de Medici not only disarmedthe Florentines, but also constructed a fortress. TheFortezza da Basso secured Alessandro from his sub-jects, but not from his cousin Lorenzino, who assas-sinated him in bed in 1537. More importantly,however, it seems Machiavelli’s prediction was ac-curate—Florentine republicanism was neverrestored. Hale (1968, p. 502) notes that the Fortezzada Basso was “the visible evidence that freedom wasin fetters.”

9. Machiavelli’s dismissal seems to have beenmotivated by at least three factors: (1) his specialfriendship with Gonfalonier Soderini (he was con-temptuously known as Soderini’s mannerino);(2) the hostility of the pro-Medicean aristocracy,who never ceased viewing Machievelli as an enemyof their class and a supporter of the republicancause; and (3) his reputation as the organizer of theFlorentine civilian militia that had fought the Mediciand their Spanish allies at Prato (see Gilbert, 1984,pp. 172-74; Hale, 1961, pp. 134-35; and Ridolfi,1963, pp. 130-32).

10. Although my argumentbears somesimilarityto that of Leo Strauss, especially as expressed in hisPersecution and the Art of Writing (1952), the dif-ferences seem to me much more important. Strauss(1952, p. 33) excepts Machiavelli’s name in his list ofpersecuted writers, but surely Machiavelli was po-litically persecuted; we have the biographicalevidence, and Machiavelli himself (circumspectly)expresses as much on a number of occasions(Machiavelli, P, p. 4; 1961, pp. 10, 104, 143-44). Isuspect that Strauss did not include the Florentine inhis list because of his commitment to readingMachiavelli as a teacher of evil and his writings as“immoral andirreligious” (Strauss, 1958, p. 12), aview that often blinds him to the historical contextandthe political and biographical circumstances wemust bring to bear upon our understanding ofMachiavelli's aims and intentions.

11. Anumberof scholars have drawn this conclu-sion on the basis of their reading of The History ofFlorence as so much Machiavellian dissembling (seeGilbert, 1977, pp. 82-92; Najemy, 1982, pp. 575-76;and Skinner, 1981, pp. 84-86).12. Ridolfi (1963, p. 203) cites an epitaph Machia-

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velli wrote for Soderini that gives graphic evidenceof his opinion of the man who might havesaved therepublic but had not the virtd to do so:

The night Pier Soderini diedHis soul went to the mouth of Hell;AndPlutocried: Silly soul,Whycometo Hell?Go to Limbo with the Infants.

13. Wolin (1960, pp. 21-22, 203-9) quite rightlycharacterizes similar attributes as part of thepolitical theorist’s vocation, Machiavelli’s included.However, the tension between therole of “advisor”and the vocation of “theorist” is equally important,and though beyondthe scopeof this essay, deservesmore concentrated attention.

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Mary G.Dietz is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota,Minneapolis, MN 55455.

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Documents

TrappingThePrince:MachiavelliandthePolitics ofDeception MaryG · tion of Machiavelli is another vision of politics, arepublicanonerootedinloveof liberty and respect for self-governance,