Transport in Africa - ecgnet.org · The report received significant contributions from Joseph Mouanda (Senior Evaluation Officer), Girma Earo Kumbi (Senior Evaluation Officer), Clement

From experience to knowledge... From knowledge to action... From action to impact

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December 2014

Transport in Africa: The African Development

Bank’s Intervention and Results for the Last Decade

Summary Evaluation Report

IDEV conducts different types of evaluations — to achieve its

strategic objectives

Thematic Evaluation Project Cluster Evaluation

Regional Integration Stra

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Project Perfo

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(Public Secto

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Project Performance Evaluation

(Private Sector)

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Evaluation Synthesis

Corporate Evaluation

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From experience to knowledge... From knowledge to action... From action to impact

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December 2014

Transport in Africa: The African Development

Bank’s Intervention and Results for the Last Decade

Summary Evaluation Report

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was prepared by Hajime Onishi, Principal Evaluation Officer, Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV), and Max Hennion, Consultant. It was peer reviewed by John Eriksson, Consultant. Rakesh Nangia, Evaluator General, IDEV, and Mohamed Manai, Division Manager, supervised the preparation of the report.

The report received significant contributions from Joseph Mouanda (Senior Evaluation Officer), Girma Earo Kumbi (Senior Evaluation Officer), Clement Banse (Evaluation Officer), Samson Houetohossou (Senior Research Assistant), Sylvia Baguma (Consultant) and Erika Ismay Maclaughlin (Consultant). Ruby Adzobu-Agyare, Myrtha Diop, and Imen Trabelsi provided effective administrative and secretariat support. Publication of the report was coordinated by Felicia Avwontom (Principal Knowledge Management Officer).

IDEV is grateful to those who participated in interviews and data collection at the Bank’s Tunis office and for comments received from the Transport and ICT Department (OITC) and others on the draft final report.

All questions and comments should be referred to Hajime Onishi ([email protected]) or Mohamed Manai.

© 2014 African Development Bank Group All rights reserved – Published December 2014

Transport in Africa: The African Development Bank’s Intervention and Results for the Last Decade – Summary Evaluation Report IDEV Sector Evaluation, December 2014

Disclaimer

Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the various authors of the publication and are not necessarily those of the Management of the African Development Bank (the “Bank”) and the African Development Fund (the “Fund”), Boards of Directors, Boards of Governors or the countries they represent.

Use of this publication is at the reader’s sole risk. The content of this publication is provided without warranty of any kind, either express or implied, including without limitation warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non- infringement of third-party rights. The Bank specifically does not make any warranties or representations as to the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any information contained in the publication. Under no circumstances including, but not limited to, negligence, shall the Bank be liable for any loss, damage, liability or expense incurred or suffered which is claimed to result directly or indirectly from use of this publication or reliance on its content.

This publication may contain advice, opinions, and statements of various information and content providers. The Bank does not represent or endorse the accuracy, completeness, reliability or current validity of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided by any information or content provider or other person or entity. Reliance upon any such opinion, advice, statement, or other information shall also be at the reader’s own risk.

About the AfDB

The overarching objective of the African Development Bank Group is to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction. The Bank Group achieves this objective by mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in RMCs and providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

About Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)

The mission of Independent Development Evaluation at the AfDB is to enhance the development effectiveness of the institution in its regional member countries through independent and instrumental evaluations and partnerships for sharing knowledge.

Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV) African Development Bank Group

Statutory Headquarters: Immeuble du Centre de commerce International d’Abidjan (CCIA) Avenue Jean-Paul II 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01 Côte d’Ivoire

Phone: +225 20 26 20 41

Fax: +225 20 21 31 00

E-mail: [email protected]

idev.afdb.org

Design & layout: CRÉON – www.creondesign.net IDEV Layout and Design Task Manager: Felicia Avwontom Original language: English – Translation: AfDB Language Services Department

Rakesh Nangia Evaluator General

[email protected]

Rafika Amira Division manager

[email protected]

Samer Hachem Division manager

[email protected]

Karen Rot-Munstermann Division manager

[email protected]

ContentsAcknowledgements iiAbbreviations and Acronyms vExecutive Summary 1Management Response 13

Introduction 25Background and Objective 25Methodology 26Report Structure 27

The Bank’s Strategic Response to Transport Challenges in Africa 29

Transport Challenges in Africa Are Constantly on the Move 29AfDB Transport Policy 29AfDB Transport Portfolio 32

Performance in Preparing Bank Assistance 39Applying a Global and Continental Vision 39Addressing Country Needs 41Aligning with Country Sector Strategies 44Enhancing Quality at Entry 45Tracking Results 47

Performance in Delivering Bank Assistance 51Addressing Implementation Challenges 53Implementing Non-lending Activities 55Supervising Results Delivery 58Collaborating with Donors 60

Achieving Results 61Contributing to Mobility and Accessibility 61Contributing to Regional Integration 63Promoting Public-Private Partnerships 64

Sustaining Results 65Maintaining Assets Built with Bank Assistance 65Supporting RMC Maintenance Systems 65Protecting Infrastructure Assets 67

Conclusions and Recommendations 69Conclusions 69Recommendations 75

Annexes 81

Contents

List of figuresFigure 1 IDEV transport evaluation: inputs to the evaluation 26Figure 2 Sources of the AfDB transport sector policy framework 31Figure 3 Trends in the transport sector share in total Bank group commitments (2000–11) 33Figure 4 Share of public and private sector support by transport subsector (2000–11) 34Figure 5 Portfolio distribution by region (2000–11) 35Figure 6 Share of transport by subsector (Net commitments, 2000–11) 36Figure 7 Toward a renewed theory of change for AfDB transport policy 41Figure 8 Theme of AfDB transport projects’ general objectives 42Figure 9 Specific objectives of AfDB transport projects 43Figure 10 Percentage of projects delayed by stage 51Figure 11 Staff and consultants involved in PAR preparation (Excluding PPP projects, N=117) 54Figure 12 Projects with capacity building component as percentage of transport

projects approved and the total amount apportioned to capacity building per year 56Figure 13 Percentage share by AfDB financing instrument in the transport sector

(2000–11, Net commitments) 57Figure 14 Number of field supervision missions in transport sector for ongoing projects 58Figure 15 Bank’s supervision quality rating in terms of skills mix and practicability of solution 59

List of tablesTable 1 Achievements in transport sector policy development 30Table 2 Comparison of Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 45Table 3 Routine road maintenance coverage ratio in selected countries in Africa 65

List of boxesBox Djibouti’s CSPs 44

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AADT Annual average daily traffic

AfDB African Development Bank (or the Bank)

BOT Build-operate-transfer

BOAT Bamako-Ouagadougou-Tema Corridor

CSP Country Strategy Paper

DCT Doraleh Container Terminal

EAC East African Community

EQ Evaluation question

ESW Economic and sector work

EU European Union (the Commission of)

EIRR Economic internal rate of return

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

HDM Highway Development and Management Model

IDEV Independent Development Evaluation

IPR Implementation Progress and Results Reporting

IRI International roughness index

LCC Lekki Concession Company

MDB Multilateral development bank

M&E Monitoring and evaluation

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MTEF Mid-Term Expenditure Framework

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development

OITC Transport and ICT Department

OPSM Operational Private Sector Management Department

PAR Project Appraisal Report

PCR Project Completion Report

PCREN Project Completion Report Evaluation

PFM Public finance management

PIDA Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa

PPP Public-private partnership

RAMP Rural Access and Mobility Project

REC Regional Economic Community

RISP Regional Integration Strategy Paper

RMC Regional member country

SDTV Société Djiboutienne de Gestion du Terminal Vraquier

SME Small and medium enterprise

SSATP Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program

SWAP Sectorwide Approach

UA Unit of account

VOC Vehicle operating cost

Executive Summary

Background, Objectives, and Methodology

The goal of this evaluation is to inform future policy, strategic, and operational directions for the Bank’s assistance in the transport sector by: (i) identifying emerging trends in the sector; (ii) assessing how the Bank has responded to these trends; (iii) taking stock of the results of the Bank’s assistance; and (iv) drawing lessons for future work. It combines the two objectives of evaluation: (i) accountability, through determining the extent to which the Bank’s activities have contributed to the development of the transport sector in Regional Member Countries (RMCs); and (ii) learning, though the identification of best practices and lessons learned to be carried forward to future projects.

In informing the renewal of the Transport Sector Policy, this evaluation sought to answer four main evaluation questions:

❙ How relevant are the Bank’s policies and activities in the transport sector to the needs of recipient countries and other clients?;1

❙ To what extent has the Banks assistance been delivered efficiently?;

❙ To what extent has the Bank contributed to the development of the transport sector in RMCs?; and

❙ To what extent are these results sustainable?

The evaluation followed a phased approach. The first phase consisted of desk reviews, including a literature/policy review (OPEV 2013d) and a portfolio review (OPEV 2013e). The second involved the conduct of country and regional case studies as well as special thematic studies; which provide an in-depth assessment of the Bank’s assistance at both the country and regional levels. The second phase of the evaluation covered 14 countries2 and 6 regional/development corridors,3 for a total of 25 projects. Coverage of the various modes of transport corresponded to the content of Bank’s transport sector portfolio, which is dominated by road projects rather than railway or port/airport projects. Three of the projects examined (two ports and one airport) are Public-private partnerships (PPPs). The third phase of the evaluation involved the preparation of a synthesis/summary report of key findings and analyses from the first and second phases.

Bank Assistance to the Transport Sector

Transport infrastructure development continues to be the main priority underpinning the African Development Bank’s assistance. Between 2000 and 2011, AfDB commitments to the transport sector increased more than six-fold, from UA 150 million to approximately UA 1 billion. This level of financial commitment is greater than that for any other sector, representing nearly a quarter of the Bank’s total portfolio.

The AfDB Transport Policy was issued in 1993. The policy covers all transport subsectors and provides a comprehensive set of principles that govern the eligibility of country proposals to receive Bank support. However, the policy has not been used to guide the selection and approval of transport projects. The Bank’s transport policy has not been updated to

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reflect new developments and emerging needs in Africa’s transport sector since it was first developed 20 years ago and is now becoming outdated.

The OITC (Transport and ICT) Department is developing a new transport policy and strategy (including an urban transport strategy) with a

related action plan. This new transport policy needs to address the emerging issues for transport sector policy development in Africa, including: regional transport facilitation; development of logistic chains, regulation of the road haulage market; railway competitiveness; and governance in building and managing transport infrastructures and services.

Finding 1: Bank assistance contributed to mobility and accessibility, but rarely to the expected level.

Achievement of project outputs is the strong point of AfDB assistance. All evaluated projects achieved this first level of expected results, whether through work as planned or at the cost of increased project cost or duration. The Bank’s contribution to developing mobility was verified by ex post economic internal rates of return (EIRR) almost systematically (81 percent) above the opportunity cost of capital. AfDB assistance to improving transport infrastructure freed market forces and individuals from insurmountable transport constraints. Together, these gains represent an invaluable contribution to Africa’s development. However, the short-term outcome indicators stated in project logframes often (25 percent) do not meet initial expectations. Measures of the achievement of short-term outcomes have remained elusive due to excessive emphasis placed on project management as opposed to the achievement of outcomes.

Regional corridor projects have faced several challenges due to a lack of coordination among beneficiary RMCs and there is little evidence that results have been achieved at the outcome level. The results of regional initiatives have been proportionate to RMCs’ commitment to the project and to regional integration in general: promising for Central and East Africa, and less so for West Africa. However, it is evident that the Bank has

successfully applied lessons learned during the implementation of the Bamako-Ouagadougou-Tema Corridor (BOAT) and the Central Corridor project, as demonstrated by the inclusion of ESW to guide project implementation and help ensure an appropriate level of coordination.

The capacity limitations of RMCs have not received sufficient analysis or attention at the outset of projects and have often been only partly addressed, particularly for road projects. Despite the fact that institutional weaknesses in the transport sector exist across the continent, only 36 percent of the 129 transport sector projects implemented between 2001 and 2011 included a capacity-building component.

The Bank-financed PPP projects reviewed4 were often reactive to contextual and market constraints. The projects faced several external shocks (change in client’s logistical chains, institutional challenges with governments, and financial drawbacks linked to social unrest), but proceeded without major addenda to their initial contracts. The limiting factor of these Bank projects was the lack of a strategic plan to help maximize their contribution to the local economy and to upper-level outcomes, such as regional integration, tourism development, or urban mobility.

2 Transport in Africa: The African Development Bank’s Interventions and Results for the Last Decade – Summary Evaluation Report

Finding 2: Dysfunctional infrastructure asset protection and maintenance systems limit the sustainability of the results achieved through Bank-assisted projects.

Except for the PPP projects, for which maintenance is assured over 20 to 40 years via a contractual arrangement, sustainability is a major concern for the Bank’s transport sector projects, particularly for road projects. Only a handful of RMCs and PPP projects involving links that were constructed or rehabilitated with Bank support were subject to regular preventive maintenance.

PARs provide only brief and optimistic analyses of the effectiveness of the maintenance systems in RMCs. Any discussion of sustainability is often narrow in scope. Any discussion of maintenance is

limited to the recurrent cost induced by individual projects and their impact on the maintenance budget of RMCs. The Bank’s knowledge base for infrastructure asset protection and maintenance capacity is limited at the level of individual countries.

Improvement of road maintenance systems has focused mainly on resource mobilization (setting up road funds) and has not given sufficient consideration to improving the absorption capacity of both the administration and the private sector or to quality control expected from road agencies.

Recommendation 1: Adopt a holistic and coherent approach for implementing the other nine recommendations of the evaluation

❙ Non-lending activities such as ESW, policy dialogue, institutional restructuring, and capacity development should be incorporated into Bank support for transport infrastructure provision.

❙ Emphasis should be placed on multi-country assistance, which combines infrastructure development, transport facilitation, institutional development, harmonization of the haulage market regulations, and integration of the logistics chain with rail and port operations.

❙ Additional emphasis should also be placed on the development of regionally harmonized transport policies and regulatory frameworks, by supporting RMCs and RECs.

❙ The Bank should also increase its focus on PPPs via a “bottom-up” approach, which relies on private partners to identify viable business opportunities.

Recommendation 2: Enhance sustainability

❙ Infrastructure asset protection and maintenance should be prioritized at all stages of the project cycle and via non-lending activities such as policy dialogue and capacity building. This support should adopt a sector-wide perspective and ensure that public sector reform and weaknesses in public finance management are addressed in a systematic manner.

❙ The Bank should place increased emphasis on both resource mobilization and absorption capacity for road maintenance, including: (i) the clearing of maintenance backlogs; (ii) the development of strategies for improving contract management capacity within both central and decentralized public administration; and (iii) support for the establishment of a competitive and robust construction sector.

❙ The sustainability of the results achieved should be monitored following the completion of an AfDB-supported project. This long-term monitoring should be incorporated into RMCs’ monitoring system at the sector-program level in a manner to ensure that the achievement of results at the outcome level is properly assessed.

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In the few cases where projects involved a small increase in resources for road maintenance, the effects on road condition were limited by poor absorption capacity owing to weak road administration and nascent local construction industries, which have sometimes been crippled by market failure. Projects often did not include non-lending activities that address administrative and construction industry absorption capacity. Lessons learned regarding the importance of such non-lending activities have already been applied by the AfDB in the implementation of new regional projects such as the Central Corridor, which integrated maintenance capacity into the policy dialogue.

Axle load control has been noted as a key issue in most road projects, but generally did not drive the full development of new policies or regulations by RMCs, with the acquisition of suitable weighting equipment. RMCs found it difficult in most cases to overcome the resistance of importers, wholesalers, and haulage truckers. The Bank’s project approach has placed insufficient emphasis on policy decisions that have significant social or political consequences. This situation has recently begun to evolve in a more positive direction, through the combined efforts of development partners.

Finding 3: The 1993 transport policy did not channel Bank assistance toward a forward-looking vision of Africa’s transport.

Projects do not refer to a specific transport sector policy, or even a shared understanding of guiding principles such as a unified theory of change or policy framework. Each individual project creates its own reference framework, generally based on the appraisal mission’s views on what the effects (outputs and outcomes) of a new or improved road or railway track should be. In general, PARs did not reflect the 1993 transport policy.

The 1993 transport sector policy preceded major developments in the transport sector policy framework

and lessons learned over the last 20 years. Most of its underlying principles are still sound, but the increasing complexity of tackling transport challenges in Africa called for regular updates.

A transport sector policy and regularly updated action plans covering all modes of transport are now lacking, and there is thus no reinforcement of operational synergies between Regional Integration Strategy Papers (RISPs) and CSPs, or enhancement of the Bank’s leadership in the transport sector. Some areas where the AfDB could focus more

Recommendation 3: Update the Bank’s transport sector policy, with a new strategic action plan (1/2)

❙ The Bank should update its transport sector policy and strategy and adopt a more focused, strategic and integrative approach to transport sector support that places additional emphasis on tackling RMC’s administrative and market failures.

❙ As part of this process, the Bank should identify an underlying theory of change for the transport sector, which can then serve as the common framework for Bank staff.

❙ Operationalize the new vision and the underlying theory of change for the transport sector in Africa in the Bank’s transport policy and strategy in a medium-term action plan.

Recommendation 3: Update the Bank’s transport sector policy, with a new strategic action plan (2/2)

❙ Annexes to the Bank’s transport sector action plan in the upcoming new transport strategy should be used to elaborate regional strategies (regional transport action plans), using the same country groupings as those used for RISPs in order to operationalize the strategy and identify synergies between infrastructure development and regional integration.


attention are the introduction of performance-based contracting, road and aviation safety, competition in the road freight industry, streamlining procurement procedures, ensuring there is sufficient competition

when tendering, translating sound strategies into action plans and implementing them, and advocating with member states to encourage greater private sector opportunities.

Finding 4: Alignment on RMC investment plans prevented strategizing and prioritizing Bank assistance at the country level.

Appraisal and supervision of transport sector projects has been conducted without a guiding policy framework at the country level. The CSPs do not refer to the 1993 Bank transport sector policy. Nor do they present a country or regional transport strategy, or introduce reforms or advisable “institutional stretches5” for the transport sector.

The five RISPs that were recently issued provided managers with a priority list of regional links rather than a comprehensive approach to regional transport facilitation and harmonization of infrastructure asset policy.

Efforts to address the needs of the population in RMCs have been limited to ensuring alignment with a national development or poverty reduction plan. Most country projects in the transport sector were identified by RMCs with no input by the Bank. Economic analysis was used afterwards to justify the choice and not to inform the strategic selection of projects, which could have resulted in better use of the scarce public resources that would be mobilized

over time to repay the Bank loan. Mere alignment with RMCs’ transport sector investment plans did not ensure the best added value for the Bank’s assistance, because project selection was not guided by a prioritized action plan based on reliable data and transport models.

Alignment with RMCs transport sector investment policies has not ensured the best added value for Bank assistance. A country-specific transport action plan should be provided as an annex to the CSPs. Such a document would look at the country needs and macro-level economic potential and use these forecasts to identify possible funding gaps.

Bank assistance to the transport sector has been limited to a very large extent to lending activities. The new generation of projects, and in particular regional (that is, multicountry) corridors, made far more consistent use of economic and sector work (ESW) and the logical framework to guide project implementation. Recent changes in OITC are beginning to pay dividends in this regard.

Recommendation 4: Improve sector approach at RMC level

❙ The Bank should elaborate and periodically update a country transport action plan or roadmap that is aligned with CSPs. Such an approach could add value to the country sector portfolio and strategy.

❙ ESW could be used more extensively to elaborate inclusive sector approaches at the RMC level in close coordination with other donors. Updated country-level transport sector strategies and action plans, informed by ESW, should be provided as an annex to CSPs.

❙ The process of prioritizing lending and non-lending activities could be done in a manner that is aligned with the transport policies and investment plans of RMCs. The Bank should bring about more value added in identifying such activities, not simply by using EIRR but by exploring alternatives more rigorously.

❙ RMCs should be involved more systematically in developing sector-wide approaches. The Bank should consider mainstreaming support for certain essential reforms, such as the strengthening of maintenance systems as well as market, technical and economic regulation.

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Finding 5: Market failures in the transport services and the construction industry are absorbing a substantive share of the economic benefits of Bank assistance.

Market failures and governance issues in transport operations are working against efforts to reduce high transport prices, which is imperative for Africa’s development. Almost everywhere on the continent, experience has demonstrated repeatedly that various forms of market failure, such as cartelization and governance issues (customs corruption, roadblocks) are creating market distortions and diverting the benefits of transport sector projects (such as reduced vehicle operating costs (VOC)) away from the intended beneficiaries.

Market failures in the construction industry are similarly hampering transport infrastructure development. The ability of the executing agencies to implement Bank projects within the agreed duration and cost is limited, not only by the increase of the cost of construction products but also by cartelization among the few existing construction firms and misuse of public funds, including corruption. These essential factors have not been addressed by Bank projects nor considered through policy dialogue or country-centered ESW.

Finding 6: Neither policy dialogue nor other non-lending activities were mobilized to the extent needed to contribute significantly to sustainably achieving Bank assistance objectives.

The projects in the transport sector have generally not been used to promote policy dialogue on transport issues. Even though it often represents a sizable share of country-level investment plans, the Bank’s assistance has not been perceived by RMCs as an opportunity or an obligation to engage in dialogue about existing or emerging policy issues. Bank projects could have been leveraged as opportunities to discuss serious issues in the transport sector such as maintenance, value for money of works, institutional weaknesses and accountability.

In general, the Bank’s contribution to transport sector development through non-lending activities

has been marginal. The Bank has only engaged in ESW and policy dialogue as part of its most recent regional corridor project. Decentralization has contributed to greater emphasis being placed on non-lending activities in this regard.

There is an apparent skills gap among staff within the Bank with respect to transport sector policy and dialogu e as well as institutional development. Hiring consultants has not become a common practice. Experience and skills are concentrated on the roads subsector, largely leaving the other modes of transport and policy dialogue aside.

Recommendation 5: Secure level playing fields

❙ Activities that seek to ensure a level playing field among private sector actors and appropriate regulation throughout the logistics chain should be mainstreamed into all projects in order to allow for price adjustments when operating costs are reduced by the Bank’s interventions.

❙ The Bank should also ensure that a fair and competitive market exists for the construction industry by providing technical support to small and medium-sized enterprises as well as their intermediary organizations and ensuring access to suitable fundraising, procurement and supervision mechanisms.


Finding 7: Although recently there has been an encouraging trend, improved quality at entry will be key for enhancing the performance of Bank assistance, notably for achieving ambitious results.

Quality at entry (QAE) concerns are impacting delays and cost overruns. Specifically, the quality of the engineering design has often proved to be a major issue during project implementation, resulting in cost overruns. The main causes for cost overruns were constant and steady price hikes of oil products and their sub-products, constitutive of the major share in infrastructure construction. Increase in delays implies a price increase. Market failure in the public works industry in Africa has exacerbated these problems.

Quality at entry controls largely continue to be formal requirements that emphasize technical issues and the achievement of outputs. In particular, there is a need for greater emphasis to be placed on ensuring the existence of an enabling environment for Bank projects.

The time and budget provided for appraisal missions are well-acknowledged obstacles that limit more fulsome assessments of QAE. The skills mix of staff assigned to appraisal missions does not adequately reflect the need for an integrated approach which involves combination of both lending and non-lending activities. Engineers and economists are over-represented among appraisal team members, making it difficult to design and pursue policy reforms as well as institutional and capacity development. The quality assessment of a project’s engineering design was sometimes unable to ensure safe implementation of AfDB transport projects, and road projects in particular.

Combining infrastructure and institutional development in Bank projects has not been the rule. While lack of institutional capacity is generally acknowledged, accompanying measures have not been implemented systematically into transport projects. At best, minimal resources are left to tackle huge and persistent challenges that affect sustainability and effectiveness.

There is scope for further improvement in identifying and facilitating drivers of change throughout the appraisal process. There is also further room for improvement in the analysis of project assumptions and risks, which makes up a routine part of the project appraisal process.

Donors increasingly value support provided to reform champions, governance reform initiatives, and inclusively elaborated institutional capacity building initiatives. Institutional shortcomings of the executing agencies are typically underestimated in PARs. Analysis of assumptions and risks has been conducted routinely, but has not contributed to the strategic selection and management of transport sector reform initiatives as expected and has failed to identify means of maximizing the potential benefits of projects.

The ultimate value of transport projects is often assessed based on the economic internal rate of return (EIRR), which is calculated and tested for one individual project and engineering design. However, such analyses could be used more strategically

Recommendation 6: Mainstream policy dialogue

❙ The Bank should strengthen its contribution to constructive policy dialogue in RMCs by undertaking targeted and strategic ESW in the transport sector, linking it to SSATP, PIDA, and other initiatives that support transport policy development and planning.

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to guide decision making for a road network management strategy, prioritize proposed projects at the country level or chose between alternative designs, provided that sufficient forecasting ability could be developed. Unfortunately, the Bank’s staff have had to rely on poor contextual data provided by RMCs to set the context for the Bank’s assistance context and foresee potential transport challenges. However, the presence of field offices is facilitating access to more in-depth and updated background information.

Deficits in quality at entry are resulting in delays and cost overruns. Cost overruns were almost inevitable given project design and management

and were then exacerbated by delays. Strategic adjustments made during project implementation in response to these delays and cost overruns have not been insufficiently backed by ESW to ensure that changes will provide the best value for money for Bank assistance.

In contrast, the PPP projects reviewed incurred minimal delays and cost overruns, due in part to the needs of private operators to ensure the profitability of concessions.

This optimism must be balanced, however, by the limited opportunities for PPP in the transport sector in Africa, particularly for roads.

Finding 8: Project supervision has exclusively focused on implementing activities rather than on contributing to the achievement of higher-level objectives.

The Bank’s supervision has supported executing agencies in the management of projects. Bank staff have been flexible and responsive in addressing engineering implementation issues, often to the extent that reaching reasonable proxy of outputs with limited delays and cost overruns becomes the main – if not the only – driving factor of Bank

project management, without any further reference to the outcomes.

Overall, however, supervision remains unsatisfactory. Despite increases in frequency, the quality of supervision during project implementation remains an area of concern.

Recommendation 7: Improve quality at entry

❙ An assessment of the extent to which an enabling environment and sector governance are considered sub-components of transport sector projects and/for sector-wide approach should be integrated into the appraisal process in order to enhance quality at entry and promote the achievement of short-term outcomes (level playing fields, logistics chain, maintenance systems, and cross-cutting issues).

❙ The Bank should ensure that RMCs follow best practices to prioritize transport infrastructure development projects. The Bank should also engage, where required, with RMCs to improve their capacity for data collection and management to operationalize transport models.

❙ The Bank should improve quality at entry by providing technical support to executing agencies to enhance the quality and reliability of critical design inputs (e.g. databases, engineering, environmental and social impact assessment, etc.).

❙ Environment/social and organizational audits should be used more consistently to enhance efficiency in delivering assistance at two critical stages: (i) during project preparation (quality assessment of environment/social mitigation plans, safety audits, and resettlement plans); and (ii) after completion of the infrastructure component (ex post engineering, environment and social specifications audits).


The serious weakness of the causal chain (story line) in most projects and the frequent confusion between outputs and outcomes has made it difficult to implement results-based monitoring and management. Deficits in skill set among supervision teams has posed further difficulties for the Bank in responding to institutional challenges that emerge during the implementation of projects owing to superficial risks and assumptions analysis at the start, and then limited support by mid-term reviews.

Project supervision has tended to place undue emphasis on project management and activity-based monitoring as opposed to results-based monitoring. The additional factor that affects supervision performance is a persistent approval culture where the incentives are stacked at project approvals, while the overall accountability for results remains low. It is expected that the recent introduction of the Implementation Progress and Results Reporting (IPR) system will lead to a significant improvement in this respect.

Finding 9: AfDB positioning into donors’ division of labor led it to keep a low profile in RMC reform agendas.

Although the Bank is involved in donor coordination, its involvement in platforms for transport sector policy dialogue has been limited for a long time.

Most coordination with other donors had focused on shared investment in the improvement of infrastructure according to investment plans endorsed by RMCs. However, the Bank has often been seen as the last-resort donor.

Decentralization is enabling a wider scope for the Bank’s involvement. Recently the Bank has been involved more heavily, in some cases (Rwanda, Burundi) taking the lead in coordination of sector donors. The effects of the decentralization process were clearly identified in the new generation of (regional) projects: more presence, more authority, better understanding of the context and background, and better personal connections.

Recommendation 8: Improve supervision

❙ Supervision should center upon monitoring performance and the achievements of short-term outcomes instead of activity management.

❙ The Bank should ensure that the skills set among supervision teams is appropriate to support the implementation of policy dialogue, capacity building and cross-cutting initiatives.

Recommendation 9: Ramp up the Bank’s role in policy dialogue and donor coordination

❙ Reinforce the Bank’s involvement in donor coordination and transport sector thematic groups by leveraging the long-term partnership established with RMCs, providing support from specialists and placing additional emphasis on ESW.

❙ Accordingly, the Bank should ensure that staff have the appropriate skills set to support policy dialogue with RMCs, particularly staff posted in field offices.

❙ The Bank should guide and facilitate both the strategic direction of its own activities and donor coordination in the transport sector by investing in human resources and transport sector expertise within the Bank.

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Finding 10: Results-based and evaluation practices implemented to date have not been sufficient to improve the performance of Bank-supported projects.

The Bank has struggled to demonstrate the achievement of short-term outcomes. These difficulties are rooted in shortcomings in the identification and appraisal stages, and then reinforced by project implementation practices. The quality of the logical frameworks among the sample of approved projects has been uneven. These frameworks rarely identify quantitative and time-bound short-term outcome indicators; more often, vague statements about impacts on agriculture, regional integration, public investments are presented with little credible supporting evidence.

This issue has been recently addressed for project design through initiatives such as the Internal Working Group, through which a culture of consistency is being developed. Core Sector Indicators are being integrated, and the quality of logframes is improving.

Any assessment of the extent to which outcomes have been achieved has typically been postponed

to project completion. Monitoring of the results achieved has often been left to the executing agencies, who have also generally been unable to provide sufficient baseline data. Furthermore, assessments of the extent to which results have been achieved at the outcome level have tended to cease after the Bank’s administrative involvement in a project has come to an end. In recently approved projects, collection and monitoring of baseline data are incorporated into the project as part of an independent contract or are integrated into the construction supervision services, with the objective of assisting the executing agency in those areas and to build their capacity.

Bank staff continue to require support in implementing results-based monitoring, particularly with regard to the guiding principles of results-based monitoring (understanding of the chain of effects) and its practice (designing indicators and monitoring and evaluation systems).

Recommendation 10: Improve monitoring and evaluation systems, both inside and outside the Bank

❙ The performance of projects should be assessed against objectively verifiable indicators. Particular emphasis should be placed on the achievement of short-term outcomes in overall performance ratings.

❙ The Bank should also improve the quality of short-term outcome indicators at the project level by ensuring that they are relevant, specific, targeted and time-bound and that they support the enhancement of subsector national monitoring systems.

❙ The same set of core indicators should be used for all Bank activities in the transport sector to facilitate consistency and coherence in policy dialogue, supervision missions, and mid-term reviews.


11Executive Summary

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Management welcomes OPEV’s Evaluation of the African Development Bank’s assistance in the Transport sector over the last decade. The report provides timely evaluation as the Bank prepares to formulate both its Transport Policy and Transport Strategy. The report provides good recommendations and assessments that will represent useful addition to the on-going efforts to adapt Bank’s operations in the sector towards addressing new emerging development challenges ushered by rapid urbanization, climate change, and globalization. Management agrees that the Bank will need to adopt a more holistic approach in the sector with increased focus on sustainability and policy dialogue. As the report rightly points out, the Bank can leverage its financing in the sector to help not only increase connectivity and mobility on the continent, but also implement an agenda of policy reforms, and build knowledge and capacity.

The provision of adequate transport infrastructure is pivotal to achieving sustainable development and socio-economic growth in Africa, as it facilitates the movement of goods and services, stimulates economic activities, improves the continent’s competitiveness, and provides access to social services. The level of transport infrastructure provision in Africa is inadequate, both in terms of quantity and quality (with variation from one country to another). This has negatively impacted the continent’s efforts to achieve the desired levels of socio-economic growth, and has adversely affected efforts to foster regional integration and ensure social inclusiveness.

Nonetheless, the continent has witnessed progress in several areas of transport infrastructure development over the last decade including increased stock of paved road networks, stronger political will to foster regional integration, and growing investments in the air transport and railways sub-sectors. However, as progress is achieved, new development challenges also emerge in the sector. These include for example rapid urbanization, regional integration, social inclusiveness, fiscal space for sustainable funding, and resilience to climate change.

The Bank has committed sizable shares of its resources in financing transport infrastructure, which

has contributed considerably to achieving various national and regional development objectives. Nonetheless, there is need to build on the Bank’s experience to improve the approach to delivering transport infrastructure projects, and respond to emerging challenges including urbanization, climate change, and inclusiveness.

The Bank has engaged in various initiatives in this connection. These include, for example, the global commitment (with 7 other MDBs) to deliver more sustainable and more inclusive transport, and the initiation of a process to operationalize the Bank’s newly adopted green growth concepts.

The OPEV report couldn’t be timelier as the Bank prepares to revise its Transport Policy and develop a Transport Strategy. The findings of this evaluation will provide key inputs for the preparation of these two important documents.

Holistic approach

Management agrees with OPEV that there is a need for a more holistic approach in planning and delivering transport infrastructure. This would definitely yield more impacts at both sectoral and developmental levels. Management

Management Response

13Management Response

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agrees that Bank assistance can be formulated better to achieve greater mobility and improved sustainability. The progress to date has been in line with the level of financial resources available and institutional capacities of both the countries and the Bank. With growing resources, capacity, and experience in the delivery and packaging of infrastructure projects, the coming decade will witness increased involvement of the Bank in upstream policy and institutional development, planning and programming of national and regional infrastructure and development of PPPs and other innovative delivery mechanisms to ensure sustainability.

The Bank has begun early steps towards these objectives. For example, under its decentralization strategy, the Bank has increased its field presence with the number of field offices growing from 5 in 2005 to 33 in 2013. The Bank Transport Department in particular has more than 60% of its professional staff based in the field. This is beginning to yield higher impacts in term of steering effective sector dialogue with Governments.

The Bank has also embarked on a process to expand the internal capacity and skill base of the Transport Department (OITC) by hiring experts in trade facilitation, transport policy, urban transport and by intensifying both in-house and external training in areas such as transport sector reforms and Public, Private Partnerships. More and more emphasis has also been accorded to analytical and sector work to underpin policy dialogue.

To this extend several Country Transport Sector Reviews as well as other cross-cutting thematic transport diagnostic studies have been or are being conducted. Example of these include studies on promotion of domestic construction industries, developing a strategy for Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP), assessment of railways concessions in Africa, improving OITC internal processes, assessment of quality of Bank-financed road projects, and road

safety. Management welcomes the findings of the evaluation which comes to support these ongoing initiatives.

While acknowledging the overall quality of the review, Management disagrees with the statement that the Bank relied on poor contextual data provided by RMC’s to set Bank’s assistance context and foresee transport challenges. Bank assistance in the sector has been generally formulated within a broad framework set and agreed to with other donors and based on continuous sector dialogue and programmatic engagements with RMCs. Furthermore, the Bank and other donors active in the sector have been relying on data collected and disseminated under the multi-donor Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) initiative, which is currently hosted and managed by the Bank.

Management believes that the report could have acknowledged more strongly the Bank’s unique role in fostering regional integration through cross-border transport projects. The Bank played a leading role in advocating, supporting, and financing key regional transport corridors throughout the continent. This is in addition to some of the transformational national projects such as the Nairobi-Thika Highway in Kenya and the Dakar Diamniado Toll road in Senegal. These projects, and others, contributed significantly in increasing social and spatial inclusiveness and in stimulating economic activities in their zones of influence and at the national and regional levels.

Transport policy

The Bank’s current Transport Policy is 20 years old, dating back to 1993. While most of its provisions are still relevant, there is an urgent need for updating the policy to address emerging development challenges in the sector, and to assist in the continent’s economic transformation. It is against this background that


the Bank has engaged in the preparation of a new Transport Policy, which will be further complimented with a Transport Strategy, both anchored to the Bank’s 10-year Strategy (TYS).

While the Bank’s 1993 Transport Policy was broad and comprehensive enough, the overriding bank development policy based on the 1999 Bank Vision, was Agriculture and rural development, which had a dampening effect on the ability to fully deploy the provisions of the transport policy. With this caveat, Management concurs with OPEV findings that the Policy did not channel Bank assistance towards a forward looking vision of Africa’s transport. Management also supports some of the recommendations put forward by the report, such as the need to harmonise regional strategy papers with the Bank transport strategy, as well as the need to develop staff skills.

As highlighted earlier, the report will form an important input into both the new Policy and the new Strategy. The preparations of these two key documents have been withheld until the completion of the subject OPEV evaluation, in order to benefit from its findings.

Infrastructure sustainability

The OPEV report highlights the challenges facing the sustainability of the Bank’s assistance, and summarises these as “dysfunctional infrastructure asset management and maintenance systems”, recommending more engagement in the maintenance stages of projects whether through Sector-Wide Approach, or improving absorption capacity.

While noting that the process of building asset management capacities at national levels is a gradual and lengthy process, and that Bank operations have addressed challenges of sustainability at different fronts, Management concurs with these findings and the recommendations. As a matter of fact ensuring sustainability of infrastructure is one of the key objectives for the Bank’s assistance in

the transport sector. There are currently on-going internal discussions on the adoption of whole-of-life structured approach to infrastructure project appraisal. This approach will make use of innovative mechanisms such as output-based aid (OBA) and performance-based road maintenance contracts to shift operating risks to contractors and improve long term sustainability. This new approach is expected to feature within the upcoming Transport Strategy.

These new improvements will be supported with capacity and country institutional development for a more comprehensive and long term monitoring at country level, based on continuous dialogue. Such an approach will raise awareness on sustainability issues thereby reinforcing country’s sustained commitment towards infrastructure assets preservation and maintenance.

Sector approach at RMC level

Management agrees with OPEV recommendations on the use of Economic and Sector Work (ESW) to support sector approach in RMCs; it also agrees on the need for screening and prioritization tools to ensure alignment to both RMCs’ policies and investment plans and Bank’s own policies and strategies. The vast majority of Bank supported transport projects are part of program-based approaches and most countries have come to understand the importance of sector wide approaches. Therefore prioritization beyond individual project EIRR is an implicit part of a program-based approach. Management agrees on the need to assist RMCs to systematically adopt SWAPs.

The Bank transport department has engaged in the preparation of transport sector reviews, and diagnostic studies, with the recent completion of similar reviews/ studies in Angola, Gambia, and Tanzania. The department will continue to rapidly increase the number of reviews/ studies conducted, and improve the quality of analysis within these documents.


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These documents are expected to be instrumental tools in helping to understand the key transportation challenges facing our RMCs and frame the Bank intervention strategy in the sector. They will form key inputs into the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), and assist RMC’s better direct sector development strategies. The Bank’s decentralisation efforts will play a major role in the delivery of these products.

During preparation of the Bank transport strategy, dialogue/consultations will be undertaken with countries/regions to ensure ownership of the approach, to identify and agree on prioritization approaches as part of the transport strategy. This work will also build on existing RISPs and CSPs.

Quality at Entry

Management supports the findings of the report that the potential for result-based monitoring and evaluations needs to be utilised better to improve performance of Bank assistance. Sector departments, such as OITC will continue to work closely with ORQR and other concerned departments to continuously improve the utilisation of such approaches. Management supports the recommendation on the need to expand intervention to the enabling environment of the transport sector projects for achieving short-term outcomes (policy framework, institutional organization, logistic chain, maintenance systems, etc). This represents a key element under the “economic effectiveness” pillar adopted by the Bank and other MDBs under the concept of sustainable transport.

Improving supervision

Management agrees with the finding that there is need to increase supervision missions’ skill-mix. This issue was raised in several Bank documents, including OPEV’s own evaluations of “mainstreaming the environment into Transport” and “project supervision at AfDB 2001–2008”.

However, it is to be noted that limited staffing hinders Bank efforts to increase such mix. Nonetheless, notable progress has been achieved in a good number of Bank supervision missions. Management intends to increase the use of consultants to bridge the gap and ensure that the majority of Bank supervision missions benefit from a diverse and well balanced skills mix. Decentralization efforts and the establishment of Regional Resource Centres have added great benefits in this regard.

Improving Bank’s role in policy dialogue

Management partly agrees with the finding that AfDB positioning into donors’ division of labour led the Bank to keeping a low profile in RMCs reform agenda. Understandably, the Bank’s limited field presence during the earlier part of the past decade did not position it well to assume leadership roles in policy dialogue. Nonetheless the Bank had always maintained an engagement in policy dialogue through its involvement in thematic donor groups, within which leadership is entrusted to the partners with local presence. And while the Bank’s leadership role was limited, a good share of Bank transport operations were used as vehicles for policy reforms through conditionality and cross conditionality with other development partners.

Considerable positive change is now taking place as the Bank field presence is aggressively improved and the size of its financing in several RMCs has indeed offered the opportunity to play a greater role, including shaping the reform agenda. In this connection, the Bank is now assuming sector leadership role in several countries including Rwanda, Kenya, and Zambia amongst others.

The Bank role has also extended further to include continental dialogue through its engagement with the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSTAP), an Africa-wide initiative hosted by the World Bank and dedicated to support transport policy and institutional development on the continent. In addition, the establishment of the Africa50 Fund will provide the opportunity to further extend the dialogue platform to include private sector players.


Management Action Record

Recommendation Management response

Recommendation 1: Adopt a holistic approach while applying the other nine recommendations.

Combine more narrowly policy dialogue, institutional restructuring and capacity development with infrastructure provision.

Agreed – Management agrees that the Bank’s role in policy dialogue and sector reforms needs to be up-scaled. The following actions have been taken/ planned to take place:

❙ The Bank will increase its capacities in the area of Transport Policy. OITC has recruited a transport policy specialist, conducted training on transport policy for 8 staff, and targets to train additional 5 staff by Q2-2015.

❙ Under the Decentralization Strategy, more than 60% of Transport Sector Specialists have been posted to field offices to be closer to clients and for continuous policy dialogue. Additional 4 staff will be decentralised by Q3, 2015.

❙ Conduct detailed country sector diagnostics that will serve as basis for starting quality dialogue on reforms and policy issues. OITC will conduct two studies are planned by Q4 2014, and another 3 by Q4 2015.

❙ OITC will incorporate more detailed review of policy challenges in future projects, together with components on policy-related measures, where required, in cooperation with other donors.

Increase the focus on multi-country assistance combining infrastructure development, transport facilitation, corridor institutional development, and harmonization of the haulage market regulations and integration of the logistic chain with rail and port operations.

Agreed – Management agrees with the need to adopt a more comprehensive approach in addressing transport corridors and systems and the need to also elevates to a regional level. Actions taken/ to be taken, include:

❙ The Bank will continue to diversify its skills mix; OITC has recruited a Logistics and Trade Facilitation expert to help mainstream the integration of logistics chains in project and program design. OITC has also recruited a ports expert to, amongst other tasks, help introduce a more comprehensive approach to regional corridors development by integrating roads, railways and ports. This trend will continue in 2016, and will be further detailed in the Transport Strategy (Q2 2015).

❙ ONRI and OITC have been involved in developing regional institutional development programs. The two departments will increase cooperation to introduce more of regional-targeted programs. Increased cross-department cooperation will take place also amongst OITC, ONRI, OPSM, and OSAN to help develop more integrated transport systems.

The Fund aims at introducing innovative means for financing regional infrastructure projects in Africa, key to which are transport projects.

Notwithstanding the above comments, Management agrees that the Bank’s role in policy dialogue needs to be intensified. To this extent, Management also acknowledges the need for scaling up Bank’s human resources and expertise, in the transport sector particularly in areas such as policy reforms, PPP advisory, and Sector Wide Approach.

Conclusion

The evaluation made a number of insightful observations and useful recommendations for improving the Bank’s operations in the transport sector. Management will undertake several actions to implement the recommendations as set out in the management action record. Additional policy or strategy adjustments will be considered under the on-going Bank Transport Policy update and the subsequent Transport Strategy.


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Additional emphasis should be placed on the development of regionally harmonized transport policies and regulatory frameworks, by supporting RMCs and RECs.

Agreed – Management agrees with the need to put emphasis on the development of regionally harmonised transport policies and regulatory frameworks. Management will take the following actions:

❙ Continue to support RECs and other regional bodies in formulating regional transport policies, strategies and regulatory frameworks in the context of regional transport projects financed by the Bank.

❙ Support RMCs and RECs in the formulation, design and financing of programs and projects targeting non-physical barriers to trade and transport at a regional level.

Increase the focus on public-private partnerships in the transport sector on a bottom-up approach.

Agreed – Management agrees that the Bank needs to play a larger role in developing PPP capacities and a bottom-up approach. The following measures have been taken/ will take place:

❙ The Bank will establish in 2014 a PPP Advisory unit within the recently established Business Development Department, as well as a PPP Hub in the South Africa Regional Resource Centre (SARC).

❙ Targeted training courses have taken place for staff in OITC, and OPSM on different topics of PPP. This will continue in the years 2014 and 2015.

❙ OITC will increase dialogue with Governments on developing capacities in the field of PPP and building enabling environments, in cooperation with OPSM. This is anticipated to be anchored to actual projects.

❙ Increase the delivery of PPP projects and the use of risk mitigation instruments (PRG, PCG), through OITC and OPSM, particularly those benefitting from both Bank’s private and public arms to ensure more leverage and higher impact.

❙ Introduce programs /projects/ components targeting development of PPP enabling environment, utilising in the process cooperation with entities such as ALSF, and bilateral trust funds.

❙ The review of the Procurement Policy of the Bank is also addressing the need for more fit-for-purpose instruments that target, for example, concessions under PPP arrangements.

Recommendation 2: Enhance sustainability

The sustainability of the results achieved should be monitored following the completion of an AfDB-supported project. This long-term monitoring should be incorporated into RMCs’ monitoring system at the sector-program level in a manner to ensure that the achievement of results at the outcome level is properly assessed.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation. As projects supported by the Bank are more and more part of program-based approaches. The Bank will ensure that results sustainability monitoring systems are implemented within the overall sector-program frameworks, with the periodic monitoring conducted by the sector working group and governments.

Prioritize infrastructure asset protection and maintenance at all stages of the project cycle and beyond with non-lending activities; involve systematically in a sector-wide approach in this respect, considering public finance management and public sector reform on a systematic manner.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation, Management will take the following actions:

❙ Support the development of program-based approaches and sector reforms and capacity development of transport agencies in modern infrastructure assets management, including development of sound governance. OITC will introduce 1 pilot project in 2015.

❙ Support holistic and structured approach to infrastructure development to include both capital and operating expenditures and performance-based contracts.



Support a more combined approach of resource mobilization and improved absorption capacity for road maintenance, including clearing the backlog; strategies for improving contractual management capacity, and for the private sector to develop a technical and managerial need to be closely articulated; they must be synchronized, taking into account the long timeline for an efficient, probe and organized construction industry to emerge.

Agreed – Management agrees with the spirit of the recommendations. OITC plans to incorporate more aggressively the concepts of Output-and-Results-Based contracts and whole project life cycle into its future projects to ensure more sustainable projects. Management will take the following actions:

❙ Piloting the concept in transport projects, where project life-cycle will be conceptualised and presented to include maintenance stages. OITC will present at least one project in 2014 under this concept.

❙ The Bank shall undertake studies at country and sub-regional level to assess the challenges for the development of domestic construction industry and provide in-project assistance to assist RMCs develop strategies to tackle this problem.

Recommendation 3: Update the Bank’s transport sector policy, with a new strategic Action Plan

Update the Bank’s transport sector policy and strategy; in that, time has come for a focused, selective and integrated approach, paving the way ahead, out of RMCs’ combined administrative and market failures that hampered achieving short-term outcomes and sustainability in Bank projects.

Identify the underlying theory of change for the transport sector as the common framework of Bank’s staff

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation, Management will take the following actions:

❙ The transport policy terms of reference were discussed in 2013, and the actual document is anticipated to be submitted for approval in Q4 2014/ Q1 2015. The policy will capture the issues highlighted in the recommendation.

❙ A Transport Strategy will also be prepared concurrently in order to operationalize the policy for the period 2015-2018, including identification of required type of analytical tools, for example impact analysis, sector diagnostics, etc.

Operationalize the new vision and the underlying theory of change for the transport sector in Africa of Bank’s transport policy and strategy in a medium term Action Plan (4-8 coming years); related new advocacy background and skills should be developed for the operational staff.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendations. Management will take the following actions:

❙ Concurrently with the planned Transport Policy, OITC will lead the work on developing the Transport Strategy, which will capture all the aspects highlighted in the recommendation. The Strategy is anticipated to be submitted for approval in Q2 2015.

❙ Increasing structured training for Task Mangers to develop the required knowledge and transaction skills to see-through the change. Annual departmental training programs will be prioritised accordingly.

Annexes to the Bank’s transport sector action plan in the upcoming new transport strategy should be used to elaborate regional strategies (regional transport action plans), using the same country groupings as those used for RISPs in order to operationalize the strategy and identify synergies between infrastructure development and regional integration.

Agreed – Management agrees with the concept of reflecting the regional divergences with transport strategies, and the need to harmonise infrastructure development and regional integration. Management will take the following actions:

❙ Developing the Transport Strategy, which will take into consideration, amongst other inputs, all the recommendation put forward within the OPEV report.

Recommendation 4: Improve sector approach at RMC level

The Bank should elaborate and periodically update a country transport action plans or roadmap that is aligned with CSPs. Such an approach could add value to the country sector portfolio and strategy.

Agreed – Management agrees to the objective of achieving higher impact, and the need for elaborating and updating action plans within the sector. Management will take the following actions:

❙ Increase more aggressively the development and use of ESW, particularly national and regional sector diagnostics to initiate dialogue at early stages and enable the incorporation of sector discussion more systematically into national development plans, and eventually CSP. In doing so the Bank will ensure collaboration between sector departments and other entities such as ESTA and EDRE, and will deploy resources from various channels such as Trust Funds.


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Utilize extensively ESW to inclusively elaborate a sector approach at RMC level, in close coordination with donors; an update of a Bank's comprehensive country level transport sector strategy and action plan should come as an annex of CSPs.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation. Actions to be taken are the same as highlighted in the recommendation above.

Introduce prioritization within alignment with RMCs' transport policy and investment plans; the Bank's should bring about more added value in identifying projects by comforting prioritization beyond individual economic internal rates of return and more rigorously exploring alternatives; sub-sector data management systems should be accordingly supported to ensure the continuous availability of the essential data for prioritization and monitoring.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendations. This type of analysis and assessment will be one of the key objectives of the sector review/ diagnostics studies. It is anticipated that such studies will present list of recommendations that will include, amongst others, measures required to improve data management systems and various other aspects. The following actions are planned;

❙ Conduct detailed country sector review/ diagnostic; four studies are planned for 2014.

❙ Increase the number of studies delivered per year from 2015 onwards, following completion of internal capacity development activities with OITC, with support of other departments.

Involve systematically individual RMCs in sub-sector wide approaches and consider mainstreaming essential reforms (maintenance systems and market technical and economic regulation) under sector-wide programs based on an agreed agenda of reforms.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation. Concerted actions in collaboration with other donors has led to wide acceptance and implementation of sector wide approaches in transport by many RMCs. The Bank will continue to provide technical assistance to develop or update SWAPs.

Recommendation 5: Secure levelled-playing fields

Mainstream in all projects activities for ensuring the required leveled playing field and regulated access to the profession for each key element of the logistic chain in order to allow price adjustment when operating costs are reduced by Bank’s interventions;

Agreed – Management agrees with the objective of the recommendation. However, regulatory reforms to address market failures should form part of SWAPs and implemented holistically. Management will take the following actions:

❙ Undertake periodic analytical work to gain greater understanding of transportation and third party logistic markets in RMCs in order to assist in designing proper reforms to address market failures and regulatory impediments.

Ensure competitive markets for the construction industry by providing an enabling environment to SMEs, supporting them and their intermediary organizations technically as well as with suitable procurement and supervision mechanisms; setting fund-raising mechanisms for equipping SMEs.

Agreed – Management agrees with the need for the Bank to play a greater role in the development of construction industries. Management will take the following action:

❙ Develop appropriate incentive mechanisms and suitable measures in the context of the revision of the Bank procurement policy to foster the development of SMEs, including those in the construction industry.

❙ Increase utilisation of bilateral funds and coordination with other donors to develop structured programs, developing in the process special partnerships of specialised institutions.

Recommendation 6: Mainstream policy dialogue

Strengthen the contribution to a constructive policy dialogue by producing well targeted and well managed ESWs in the transport sector, linking them to SSATP and other initiatives for transport policy development.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation and will undertake the actions highlighted against the earlier recommendations (increased policy dialogue and ESWs). In addition:

❙ OITC has appointed a dedicated focal point (policy specialist) to work closer with SSATP, and help mainstream it works into Bank operations, and will increase the focus on dissemination of knowledge products to ensure these achieve a wide outreach both within the RMCs and within the Bank.



Recommendation 7: Improve Quality at Entry

An assessment of the extent to which an enabling policy, institutional environment and sector governance are addressed as sub-components of transport sector projects and/or sector-wide approach should be better integrated into the appraisal process in order to enhance quality at entry and promote the achievement of short-term outcomes (level playing fields, logistic chain, maintenance systems, and cross-cutting issues).

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation that project development objectives should be designed within the wider context of an enabling policy and institutional framework. Management will take the following actions:

❙ OITC will continue sector policy dialogue with other donors and RMCs to foster sector wide approaches including the development of policy and institutional aspects. In addition, project formulation and design will in as much as possible incorporate TA components to facilitate the implementation of an enabling policy and institutional framework, where deemed necessary.

The Bank should ensure that RMCs follow best practices to prioritize transport infrastructure development projects. The Bank should also engage, where required, with RMCs to improve their capacity of data collection and management to operationalize transport models.

Agreed – Most transport projects supported by the Bank are already part of a program-based approach, where prioritization has already taken place at the program design level. Nonetheless, the need to build capacity and disseminate best practices is well acknowledged.

Enhance reliability of critical design inputs expected from executing agencies (databases, transport demand modelling, engineering, environment and social impact assessment and mitigation plans, resettlement plans, baseline for outcome monitoring) and thus strengthen AfDB support (technical assistance) and quality assessments; ESWs should support appraisal and continue to inform projects’ adjustments during their life cycle.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendations. It is to be noted that these measures are already incorporated in Bank transport operations, through the QaE dimensions related to results and risks and environmental and social safeguards, where applicable. Management will take the following actions:

❙ The Bank will continue to review comprehensively the capacities in the sector as part of each operation prepared and incorporate components and programs that target to address these challenges.

❙ OITC and OPSM will increase cooperation to complement private sector operations in the transport sector with measures targeting improving the sector capacities, as required.

Develop incentives for utilizing the environment/social and organizational audits of AfDB toolbox for enhancing efficiency in delivering assistance at two critical stages: in project preparation (quality assessment of environment/social mitigation plans, safety audits and resettlement plans) and after completion of the infrastructure component (ex-post Engineering, environment and social specifications audits).

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation, recalling that a review of resettlement action plans and environmental and social management plans is already conducted and integrated in the Bank’s QaE standards. Management will take the following actions:

❙ Continue to incorporate the assessment of these elements in all future operations.

❙ All public transport projects will include components on Road Safety audits, while these represent key concession obligations for PPP-financed projects.

❙ The Bank’s new Integrate Safeguard System (ISS) is also anticipated to improve the monitoring of various E&S aspects particularly at preparation stages.

Recommendation 8: Improve supervision

Anchor supervision to performance monitoring for achieving project short-term outcomes and goals, thus contributing to restore the priority of achieving short-term outcomes over activities’ management issues.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation. The following actions have taken place/ will take place;

❙ The Bank has introduced in January 2013 the Implementation Progress and Results Report (IPR) as the new evidence-based and results-focused supervision tool; in particular, the IPR rating methodology includes the systematic tracking and rating of outcomes and outputs as identified in the logical framework of the operation.


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Diversify the supervision missions’ skills mix to reinforce capacity in policy dialogue, accompanying measures and cross-cutting issues; provide an easy access to ESWs during projects’ implementation.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendations. However, it is to be noted that limitation of staffing will hamper all efforts in this regard. Management has taken/ will take the following actions:

❙ Trade facilitation, E&S, and policy specialists are currently accompanying supervision missions, wherever possible and the trend will continue in the future. However due to staffing/resources limitations an action plan with specific targets will be developed as part of the transport strategy.

❙ Continue efforts to increase staffing, or use of consultants, to maximise the supervision mission mix, to ensure that most supervision missions include the required skill-mix in the short term pending the development of a comprehensive action plan within the transport strategy.

Recommendation 9: Upscale Bank’s role in policy dialogue and donors’ coordination

Reinforce the Bank’s involvement in donors’ coordination and transport sector thematic group by providing a distinctive added-value based on more ESWs and the long-term partnership built with RMCs.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation. Key to the implementation of such proposal is the development of human resources capacities and increased presence of the Bank in in field offices and global forums. In addition to measures mentioned above, Management has taken/ will take the following actions:

❙ Management will provide additional and dedicated resources to support a robust program of analytical and sector work in the transport sector.

❙ OITC has already decentralized more than 60% of transport specialists to field offices. Management will provide in as much as possible additional human resources to allow the department to deploy clusters of specialists at the regional resource centers.

❙ Management will avail adequate resources for training and skills development of Task Managers, on issues of policy dialogue, sector reforms, and institutional development.

Develop policy dialogue skills among Banks staff, in particular those posted in Field Offices; provide extensive specialists’ backing when entering thematic groups.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendations. Leading donor thematic groups puts additional burden on already overloaded task managers and will require additional resources for consultants and additional back-office support. Management will provide additional support to assist in this effort.

Facilitate and eventually ensure the policy and strategic directions of sector donor coordination for the transport sector by up-scaling the Bank’s human resources and expertise.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendations will take the following actions:

❙ In the context of the upcoming Transport Sector Strategy, a comprehensive assessment of the required resources and capabilities will be conducted and appropriate time-bound action plan for up-scaling the Bank’s human resources and expertise in the transport sector will be developed and implemented.

Recommendation 10: Improve M&E system both inside and outside the Bank

Improve the quality of short-term outcome indicators (relevant, specific, targeted, time-bound) at project level and support the sub-sector national monitoring system;

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendation. The following actions have taken place/ will take place;

❙ The Bank has developed the new IRR system for supervision and rating of projects, which support the referenced objectives.

❙ Development of sub-sector national monitoring systems will be gradually developed as the Bank increases its engagement at the said level.

Use the same set of indicators for all AfDB actions, including policy dialogue, supervision missions and mid-term reviews.

Disagreed – Measurement of outcomes and policy dialogue will differ considerably, both in terms of nature and quantification, from those of projects, and hence those of supervision missions and mid-term reviews.

Articulate more rigorously the rating to objectively verifiable indicators; overweight short-term outcomes’ achievement in the overall rating.

Agreed – Management agrees with the recommendations, and will take the following actions:

❙ All projects approved in 2013 onwards will be subject to the recently ORQR-developed IRR system, which will help monitor indicators more rigorously and accurately.



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Introduction

Background and Objective

The transport sector is a core priority for the African Development Bank (AfDB). Deficiencies in transport infrastructure and high transport costs have a substantial impact on development, posing challenges for economic competitiveness, provision of social and economic services and intra-regional trade.

The Bank’s existing transport sector policy (AfDB 1993) was prepared in 1993 and is in need of renewal. In 2000, the Independent Development Evaluation Department (IDEV) conducted an independent evaluation of the road subsector based on a desk review of 30 completed projects approved between 1981 and 2000 (AfDB 2000). In light of the Bank’s intention to formally review the Transport Sector Policy (ongoing since 2013), a more comprehensive evaluation was undertaken in order to guide and inform the Bank’s future strategic and operational approach to transport sector assistance.

In informing the renewal of the Transport Sector Policy, this evaluation sought to answer four main evaluation questions:

❙ How relevant are the Bank’s policies and activities in the transport sector to the needs of recipient countries and other clients?;6

❙ To what extent has the Banks assistance been delivered efficiently?;

❙ To what extent has the Bank contributed to the development of the transport sector in RMCs?; and

❙ To what extent are these results sustainable?

These questions were selected with reference to the established intervention logic (theory of change) for the Bank’s transport sector intervention in Africa, which also serves as the foundation for the overall analytical framework of the evaluation (Please see annex A).

These lines of inquiry further reflect the two main objectives of the evaluation function: (1) Accountability, through determining the extent to which the Bank’s activities have contributed to the development of the transport sector in regional member countries (RMCs); and (2) Learning, through the identification of best practices and lessons learned to be carried forward to future projects.

An Approach Paper for the evaluation was produced in June 2012 (OPEV 2012). In this paper, the transport sector was defined as any means of moving people or goods from one location to another. The following five sub-sectors were identified:

❙ roads and highways;

❙ railways;

❙ ports and inland waterways;

❙ aviation; and

❙ urban transport.7

This universe, as defined above, includes 134 Bank-financed transport projects or studies approved between 2000 to 2011. Rural road projects under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture and Agro-industry Department were also evaluated.

25Introduction

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Methodology

The evaluation followed a phased approach, as shown in Figure 1. The first phase consisted of desk reviews, including a literature/policy review (OPEV 2013d) and a portfolio review (OPEV 2013e). The literature review identified the emerging trends and developments that have influenced the transport sector in Africa. The policy review (OPEV 2013d) subsequently compared the Bank’s transport policy with those of other development agencies and assessed the Bank’s organizational effectiveness as well as the extent to which the Bank’s policy framework8 has evolved to respond to these emerging trends. Finally, the portfolio review examined the nature of the Bank’s support

to the transport sector since 2000, including its composition by subsectors, objectives and expected results and development effectiveness.

The second phase of the evaluation involved the conduct of country and regional case studies as well as special thematic studies, which provide an in-depth assessment of the Bank’s assistance at both the country and regional levels. These country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b) assessed the Bank’s overall assistance to RMCs in the transport sector by looking at the achievement of outcomes, coherence with the goals and objectives of the Bank’s related policies, and the comprehensiveness of the Bank’s approach in addressing transport sector issues in RMCs. The studies included six

Country and regional case studies

Country case studies

Multi-country case studies

Phase 1: DESK REVIEW Phase 2: FIELD VISITS Phase 3: SUMMARY REPORT

SUMMARY REPORT

Portfolio review

Policy/literature review

Special thematic studies

BACKGROUND PAPERS

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Cluster evaluation on sustainability


Cluster evaluation of multinational road projects


Approach paper

Evaluation questions

INPUT

Figure 1: IDEV transport evaluation: inputs to the evaluation


in-depth field case studies, two of which focus on cross-border development corridor projects implemented in multiple countries, while the four other case studies examine the results achieved at the country level.

These case studies were further supported by two thematic cluster evaluations. The cluster evaluation on sustainability (OPEV 2013c) was designed to provide insight into the sustainability of Bank-financed road projects and the development benefits they have generated. In particular, this evaluation sought to identify means of maximizing or strengthening post-completion sustainability through mechanisms such as explicit post-completion strategies. Furthermore, the evaluation examined the extent to which sustainability management had been integrated into project design and implementation processes. The cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a) was comprised of four in-depth case studies which examined the effectiveness of multinational and international road projects in achieving socioeconomic impacts, including increased cross-border trade and movement of individuals.

The second phase of the evaluation covered 14 countries9 and 6 regional/development corridors,10 for a total of 25 projects. Coverage of the various modes of transport corresponded to the content of Bank’s transport sector portfolio, which is dominated by road projects rather than railway or port/airport projects. Three of the projects examined (two ports and one airport)

are Public-private partnerships (PPPs). Findings from case studies and cluster evaluations were identified through interviews and focus groups with key stakeholders as well as site visits to all 25 projects. These data were then triangulated with information from available documentation and interviews with Bank staff, executing agencies, direct beneficiaries, ministries, and other local stakeholders.

The third phase of the evaluation involved the preparation of a synthesis/summary report of key findings and analyses from the first and second phases. Lines of evidence considered in this phase of the evaluation included the literature review, policy review (OPEV 2013d), portfolio review (OPEV 2013e), country and regional cause studies (OPEV 2013b,), and cluster evaluations (OPEV 2013a, c).

Report Structure

This summary report follows the structure provided by the evaluation questions. The next chapter presents an overview of transport challenges in Africa and the strategic response by the Bank. Chapter 3 examines the relevance and performance of processes for selecting and identifying Bank projects. Performance (efficiency) in delivering Bank assistance, is discussed in chapter 4. The achievement of results is in chapter 5. Finally, chapter 6 examines the Bank’s contribution to achieving and sustaining the results of its assistance.

27Introduction

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The Bank’s Strategic Response to Transport Challenges in Africa

Transport Challenges in Africa Are Constantly on the Move

There have been several notable developments in the transport sector since the previous evaluation was conducted in 2000. Although the transport policy frameworks of development finance institutions (DFIs) have been adjusted to reflect these developments, severe shortcomings in transport activities and services – particularly international haulage transport – continue to hamper the realization of Africa’s potential.

The main challenges for the transport sector in Africa are the following:11

❙ Accumulation of road maintenance backlogs;

❙ Lack of stable and established construction industries and rising construction costs;

❙ Lack of regulation (economic and technical) and coordination of private operators;

❙ Lack of an overall strategy to guide the implementation of rural transport initiatives;

❙ Insufficient attention paid to the issue of urban transport (up until the last five years);

❙ Need for improved connections to international arkets;

❙ Poor enabling environments for private sector concessions (roads, railways, ports, and airlines); and

❙ Insufficient emphasis placed on important cross-cutting issues such as road safety.

Table 1 summarizes the extent to which transport sector policy developments have been achieved throughout the continent.

The table suggests that there is a need to adjust transport sector policy development in Africa to better reflect emerging issues such as regional transport facilitation, strengthening of logistic chains, road haulage market regulation, railway competitiveness, and governance of transport infrastructure and services. There also continues to be much to accomplish in terms of: (i) strengthening maintenance systems; (ii) promoting build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes for ports; and (iii) ensuring value-for-money in the public sector procurement and supervision of infrastructure works implemented by private sector actors, particularly small contractors. Other emerging sub-sectoral issues that merit further attention include urban transport, rural transport, and road safety.

AfDB Transport Policy

The AfDB Transport Policy was issued in 1993. The policy covers all transport subsectors and provides a comprehensive set of principles that govern the eligibility of country proposals to receive Bank support. The main objectives and principles of the policy are first elaborated at the sector level12 and then further operationalized for each subsector.13 Instead of primarily targeting public sector interventions, this policy adopts a private sector lense in promoting liberalization, commercialization, and user charges. These principles reflect a common trend in DFI interventions up to the 2008 global financial crisis.

29The Bank’s Strategic Response to Transport Challenges in Africa

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The 1993 AfDB transport sector policy was based on two strategic pillars. The first sought to promote intra-Africa and international trade and economic integration through the development of reliable national, regional, and international transport systems. The second sought to promote the development of areas or “zones” demonstrated economic potential. These objectives were to be achieved through improved maintenance of transport infrastructure, strengthening of institutional and administrative capacity and liberalization of the transport market.

The Bank’s transport policy has not been fully implemented as a tool for guiding the identification and approval of transport projects. This gap has partly been caused by the fact that: (i) The policy was never operationalized into an authoritative directive or plan of action to guide the activities of Bank staff; and (ii) The policy limited RMCs’ ability to adjust proposals to better reflect their national priorities and capacities, thereby limiting the extent to which the Bank could be proactive in selecting and approving proposals.

Having such an action plan as well as a clear vision for transport sector development in Africa would have provided additional incentives for task managers to contribute to proactive policy dialogue.

The Infrastructure Department’s Three-Year Business Plan, 2008–2010,14 was another missed opportunity for creating a strong vision and policy framework supporting the development of Africa’s transport sector. The Business Plan did not build on the existing transport sector policy and, instead, provided only a set guiding principles and strategic priorities for infrastructure investment. Furthermore, this plan was not prepared as part of the Bank’s infrastructure policy, but instead was meant to guide operations relating to infrastructure investments by identifying priorities, opportunities and threats in the realization of infrastructure goals. Priorities identified for the Bank’s activities in the transport sector included: (i) regional transport corridors; (ii) rural roads; (iii) road rehabilitation and maintenance programs;

Table 1: Achievements in transport sector policy development

Mostly achieved Partly achieved Negligibly achieved• Improved sector analysis • Better lending instruments • Rural road conditions

• New trust funds • Aid-for-Trade • Lower unit construction costs

• Effective road agencies • HIV/AIDS strategies • Traffic management

• Better project prioritization • Effective road funds • Law enforcement

• Robust project preparation • Better safeguards supervision • Better road safety

• Main roads in good and fair condition • Strengthening institutions and capacity building

• Effective subsidy policies

• Innovative pilot projects • Effective port concessions • Effective rail concessions

• Transparency in donor-funded procurement

• Performance-based contracting • Anti-corruption measures

• Reduced conditionality • Donor coordination and harmonization • Lower road freight tariffs

• Sound advice on public-private partnerships

• Effective regional projects and cross-border projects

• Non-motorized rural transport

• Better strategic planning • Improved regulation • Durable roads financed under agricultural projects

• More effective regional partnerships • Improved spending of allocated budgets • Reduced vehicle air pollution

• More attention to involuntary relocation • Greater urban focus • Small contractor financial support

Source: OPEV 2013d


Figure 2 : Sources of the AfDB transport sector policy framework


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AfDB Transport-Related Policies/Strategies/Guidelines AfDB-Related Policies/Strategies/Initiatives

Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP)

NEPAD·CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme)

NEPAD Short-term Action Plan

Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF)

NEPAD-IPPF (Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility)

NEPAD Medium to Long-term Strategic Framework (MLTSF)

Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA)

Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)

Africa50Fund

Revised Private Sector Operations Policies

Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Policy

Bank Group’s Policy on the Environment

Strategy Update for the Bank’s Private Sector Operations

Strategic and Operational Framework for Regional Operations

Agriculture Sector Strategy 2010–2014

Regional Integration Strategy Papers (for West, Central, East and Southern Africa)

Bank Group’s Capacity Building Strategy 2010–2014

Bank Group’s Urban Development Strategy

Decentralization Roadmap 2011–2015

1993 Transport Policy

Strategic Plan 2003–2007

Medium-Term Group Strategy 2008–2012

Ten-Year Strategy 2013–2022

Infrastructure Three Year Business Plan 2008–2010

1987

1993

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

(iv) sector-wide approaches (SWAPs); (v) urban transport; (vi) strengthening of institutional and maintenance capacities at the national level; and (vii) promotion of public-private partnerships and multi-sectoral projects.

The three-year business plan was directly linked to the African Development Bank Group Medium-Term Strategy, 2008–2012, which provided an overall framework for the Bank’s activities and emphasized infrastructure, including transport, as one of its core pillars. It also included commitments to: (i) mainstream gender, climate change, and knowledge management more fully and effectively into ongoing operations; (ii) establish new and innovative development partnerships, particularly with the private sector; and (iii) increase engagement in and support for regional integration and fragile states (AfDB 2008a).

The emphasis placed on infrastructure in both the Bank Group Medium-Term Strategy (2008– 2012) and Long-Term Strategy (2013– 2022) is in sharp contrast to that of the Strategic Plan for 2003–2007, in which the Bank Group prioritized agriculture projects and sustainable rural development.

Soon after the development of the Medium-Term Strategy, the Bank announced its Regional Integration Strategy (2009–2012) (AfDB 2009), which prioritized regional infrastructure development as its first pillar and institutional capacity development as its second pillar. Similarly, the Regional Integration Strategy did not provide specific guidelines or directives regarding the selection, development or approval of projects, which could have contributed greatly to the achievement of sustainable development results. Instead, the main focus of the Strategy was on mobilizing resources for regional integration. Five Regional Integration Strategy Papers (RISPs), for North, West, Central, East, and Southern Africa were approved between 2009 and 2012 to further strengthen this policy framework.

In framing these policies, business plans, and strategy papers as a fundamental platform for transport assistance, the Bank has further expanded its transport operations through participation in collective initiatives with other development partners. These partners include:

❙ The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) infrastructure project preparation facility and the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA);15

❙ The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa;

❙ The Road Management Initiative of the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP); and

❙ The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program.

AfDB Transport Portfolio

Transport infrastructure development continues to be the main priority underpinning the African Development Bank’s assistance. Since 2000, the Bank has continually increased its financial commitment to transport sector projects (Figure 3). The Bank has committed approximately UA 7 billion over the last twelve years, representing the largest share of any sector among the Bank’s overall portfolio. The total funds allocated to the transport portfolio increased by more than sixfold between 2000 to 2011, from UA 150 million to approximately UA 1 billion. This level of financial commitment is greater than that for any other sector, representing nearly a quarter of the Bank’s total portfolio. This increase reflects efforts to align the Bank’s activities with its medium-term strategies, which emphasize infrastructure development in Africa as a key priority.

The Bank has also progressively increased its focus on multinational (regional) operations. Over the


twelve years between 2000 and 2011, resources committed to multinational operations accounted for 27.2 percent (UA 1.8 billion) of Bank support to the transport sector. Moreover, the share of multinational operations among transport sector support nearly tripled between the periods of 2000–2005 and 2006–2011, and now represents the largest share of projects within the transport portfolio.

Trends in the transport sector portfolio

Analysis of Bank support by subsector (Figure 4) shows that the transport portfolio has largely been dominated by the road subsector, which accounts for approximately 78 percent of the Bank’s net commitments. This emphasis on the road sub-sector is appropriate given that the bulk of freight

and passenger movement in most African countries occurs by road. Considerable amounts were also committed to railway and air transport, which – account for approximately 17 percent of the transport portfolio – while investment in water transport/ports has been comparatively small. While support to all of the three transport subsectors – road, railway, and air – increased considerably in terms of their respective shares of the Bank’s overall transport portfolio between 2000 and 2011, the greatest increase was demonstrated by the road subsector. In contrast, the already limited share of multi-subsector commitments (to more than one subsector) sharply decreased in during 2006–11 because of limited demand from RMCs and the absence of sector budget support.16 Finally, urban transport projects accounted for only about 3 percent of the transport portfolio during the review period.

Figure 3: Trends in the transport sector share in total Bank group commitments (2000–11)

0

300

600

900

1200

1500

201120102009200820072006200520042003200220012000

12

19

8

17

29

20

29

20

17

34

24

15

Transport commitments (UA million) Transport shares (%)Source: OPEV 2013e, p.4


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There has also been considerable Bank support to the private sector for their involvement in the transport sector. The Bank has encouraged private sector participation primarily through public-private partnership (PPP) schemes, which represent 9.4 percent of total Bank commitments to the transport sector. For example, almost all water/port projects that sought to improve the quality and efficiency of port services were implemented through private sector lending. Railway and air transport also attracted some attention from the private sector. The Bank has assisted private sector investment in road transport through the development of toll roads, but collaboration with the private sector occurred less frequently for road transport than for other subsectors.

In addition to the support provided to transport sector, the Bank also committed over a quarter of billion UA to the development of rural feeder/community access

roads through its support to the agricultural sector. These activities represented only 3 percent of the total support granted to the agricultural sector as a whole. The review found that, during the period covered, approximately 76 agricultural projects supporting feeder/community access road construction were implemented, with the objective of promoting agricultural and rural development. However, the proportion of funds utilized for feeder/community access roads represented less than 25 percent of total commitments for these projects. Only a few of these projects focused primarily on roads.

Portfolio distribution by region and country

In terms of regional shares of transport sector support (Figure 5), North Africa has received the most funding (26 percent, equivalent to UA 1.7 billion), followed by East Africa (15 percent). West Africa is in the middle of this distribution,

Figure 4: Share of public and private sector support by transport subsector (2000–11)

0

20

40

60

80

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120

TotalMore than one subsectorPortAirRailwayRoad

99%

1%

57%

43%

71%

29%

0%

100% 100%

0%

91%

9%

Public PrivateSource: OPEV 2013e, p.12


having received a total of 13 percent of regional funding. Central and Southern Africa have received the smallest amount of funding, accounting for approximately 11 and 8 percent of the transport portfolio respectively. A handful of middle-income countries received the largest share of transport support overall: For example, Morocco and Tunisia each accounted for over 12 percent of the Bank’s net commitment to the transport sector.

Between 2000 and 2006, the share of overall support to the transport sector accounted for by multinational operations and the East and Central regions of Africa increased, while the share of support accounted for by the North, the West, and the South of Africa declined. However, between 2006 and 2011, the Bank began to concentrate on the less-developed areas of the continent as the Northern and Southern regions become better able to access other lending sources. Consequently, the share of multinational

operations almost tripled during this period, with most these operations being implemented in the central part of the continent.

Bank Support to transport by subsector

As noted above, Bank investments in the transport sector have historically been dominated by projects in the road transport subsector. Over the last 12 years, the road subsector constituted 78 percent of total net commitments and 79 percent of the overall number of projects in the transport sector. On average, the Bank has committed UA 48 million per project. However, for Morocco and Tunisia, which represent the two largest shares of transport sector support by country, the average project size amounted to between UA 100 and 250 million.

During 2000–11, a total of UA 1.7 billion in net commitments was provided for multinational road

Figure 5: Portfolio distribution by region (2000–11)

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20

40

60

80

100

SouthCentreWestEastNorthMultinational

2000–2005 2006–2011Source: OPEV 2013e, p. 6


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projects, accounting for almost 95 percent of all multinational funding (Figure 6). The majority of these projects sought to promote regional integration and stimulate greater trade and economic growth. For example, a recent review demonstrated that 54% of the Bank’s projects in the transport sector identified increased regional integration as a key objective.

Fewer efforts have been made to support sector-wide (sector interlinked) operations, including transport sector studies and policy reform projects. In total, these projects accounted for just 3 percent of the total net commitments.

Financing instruments

Project lending was the main financing instrument for the Bank’s activities in the transport sector, accounting for 73 percent of the total number of projects and 86.5 percent of total net commitments. Another major instrument was the project cycle grant,17 which accounted for 6.8 percent of net commitments.

Disbursement of commitments

The average disbursement ratio18 for transport sector assistance over the past five years (2007 – 11) is 18 percent, which is less than the Bank-wide level (21 percent). Compared with other infrastructure sectors, the pace of disbursement in the transport sector (18 percent) is lower, on average, than that of the power/energy sector (28 percent), although the transport sector ratio is higher than that of the water and sanitation sector (16 percent). Annual Portfolio Performance Reviews conducted over this period showed that the main factors that constrain disbursement are: (i) difficulties in fulfilling conditions of effectiveness or disbursement at the start of projects and delays in implementation due to slow procurement processes; (ii) lengthy disbursement processes; and (iii) inadequate supervision. The transport sector clearly faces more complex challenges than the energy sector in terms of fulfilling terms and conditions at the outset of projects and managing contracts for road/rail construction works. These

Figure 6: Share of transport by subsector (Net commitments, 2000–11)

Port

Road / Highways

Railways

More than onesubsector

Air2%

78%

9%

3%

8%

Source: OPEV 2013e, p.7


challenges, which are inherent to the transport sector itself, call for greater care in ensuring appropriate quality at entry and supervision, as well as an enlarged scope of support activities that better address enabling factors for transport sector development and drivers for change.

Cofinancing with other development partners

The AfDB has partnered with many multilateral and bilateral donors in supporting transport sector development in Africa. Of the estimated total cost of transport projects, the Bank contributed a total of 37 percent, while nearly a quarter (24 percent) was leveraged from other development donors in the form of cofinancing. The multiplier coefficient19 for the twelve years between 2000 and 2011 was found to be 2.1, which suggests that the Bank has attracted significant resources from external partners. RMC governments and beneficiaries were also found to have contributed significantly to the total cost of transport sector projects, with these contribution accounting for an estimated 23% of the total cost.

In sum, the Bank’s assistance to the transport sector has been successful in delivering transport infrastructure as required by RMCs, but it could do much more if it maintained a more balanced and proactive portfolio. Filling gaps in the existing transport policy and producing a new policy is only part of the equation. Although the quantity of policy and strategy documents linked to transport is impressive, there is often a lack of detailed action plans to facilitate their implementation within individual subsectors. Going forward, the Bank would benefit from more concrete strategies that address the transport sector more broadly and clearly indicate what targets will be met, who will meet them, and when. Business as usual will mean a continued focus on rehabilitation, which will not fully utilize existing skills and expertise among sector staff and will continue to place undue emphasis on processes rather than results and sustainability.

The following sections present the main findings of this sector evaluation before summing-up (conclusions) and proposing recommendations for the way forward.


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This section analyzes the relevance of the Bank’s assistance in the transport sector as well as its coherence with the Bank’s Transport Sector Policy and Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). Relevance is assessed through determining the extent to which Bank support has been aligned with sector policy frameworks in RMCs as well as the needs of the population. Ensuring that assumptions and expectations are realistic in the development of each project is another critical aspect of project design and selection that can impact the achievement of expected results.

Applying a Global and Continental Vision

The 1993 Transport Sector Policy does not reflect the Bank’s organizational shift toward a more integrated development approach in two important respects: (i) Adoption of a more integrated approach to development incorporates policy reform, capacity development and promotion of good governance; and (ii) Increased emphasis on the role of the private sector.

In the early 1990s, there had been a growing expectation that the private sector would play a large role in funding both transport infrastructure and transport services worldwide. However, after some early successes, there was a dramatic decline in private investment in transport in the late 1990s when the Asian financial crisis led many investors to shy away from transport projects, which they considered to be inherently risky.

The policies of the World Bank Group, the European Union (EU) and its subsidiaries, as well as the other multilateral development banks (MDBs) are remarkably similar for transport sector-related issues (see annex C of the policy review report, OPEV 2013d). These MDBs have all begun to embrace a more balanced approach to transport sector programming which incorporates

public policy considerations as well as economic regulation. Important gaps in AfDB transport policy, in contrast, include: (i) the lack of a clear policy statement regarding deregulation of market entry in the road haulage industry; and, (ii) the lack of rail regulator and modern administrative systems for rail transport, including wagon-tracking systems.

More multimodal and regional projects and programs began to emerge in Africa, as it became increasingly clear that some transport sector issues could not be resolved through the efforts of a single country. Regional integration has emerged as a major priority for international development over the past decade (notably with PIDA in 2010). In addition, the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Busan Plan of Action (2011) have shed new light on improving aid effectiveness and sustainability through a regional approach to development. Finally, regional approaches are also gaining increasing attention due to the double-digit economic growth forecasts of several countries on the continent: Rapid economic growth must be taken into account alongside the pace of transport development in planning and implementing transport sector initiatives.

A similar consensus is emerging among MDBs with regard to cross-cutting issues.

Performance in Preparing Bank Assistance

20

39Performance in Preparing Bank Assistance

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Relatively new cross-cutting themes include donor coordination activities, political economy issues, and regional integration. Older cross-cutting themes, in contrast, include environmental, gender, social, and monitoring issues.

More emerging issues that may be integrated into a renewed AfDB transport sector policy are identified in Annex C, along with possible policy/strategy options. These issues primarily reflect the need to: (i) adopt international standards for transport infrastructure and services which promote international competition; (ii) address acknowledged market failures driven by governance issues in the public sector; (iii) renew the role of the public sector as enabler for private sector initiatives and as a leader for cross-cutting issues; and (iv) reform resource mobilization and absorption for maintenance, in particular for the road network.

The Bank has not been proactive in implementing its transport sector policy and adapting its policy priorities to emerging trends. Although new types of projects were introduced during the reference period, including regional initiatives and PPPs, these changes reflected agreements made with other DFIs rather than a change in the Bank’s overarching sector strategy. A comprehensive, forward-looking transport strategy and action plan is needed, supported by detailed operational guides, economic and sector work (ESW) and policy training for Bank staff, might have encouraged a more proactive approach on the part of the Bank.

Whereas transport infrastructure development is increasingly emerging as a major focus of the Bank’s transport strategy and portfolio, Bank staff have been left without an operationalized and updated framework for guiding their activities. Staff are increasingly expected to act proactively (for example, supporting ESW, engaging in policy dialogue, and taking a more active part in donor coordination) but lack a strategic framework for

ensuring alignment with the Bank’s objectives in the transport sector. Each staff member has relied mainly on his/her own experience for setting directions at the project, subsector, and sector levels. Although transport sector staff are aware of the newer developments in the road subsector – such as new perspectives on increasing the effectiveness of road funds and agencies, holistic approaches to road safety, and emerging best practices for road maintenance – there is limited evidence that these new developments are being integrated into day-to-day operations.

A theory of change conveys the strategic vision and common principles for assistance provided to a given sector. The logical links and drivers for change identified in the theory of change set out a strategic path for staff to follow, while leaving room to adjust for contextual factors. The underlying theory of change of the Bank for the transport sector was not clearly identified and was never adopted by staff as a common framework to guide operations. Having a clear theory of change would have helped guide and prioritize policy dialogue as well as project design, and supervision, thereby harmonizing activities and promoting the achievement of short-term outcomes. A proposed theory of change for the Bank’s transport sector strategy is illustrated by the intervention logic chart (Figure 7).

However, this proposed logical chain continues to be oversimplified at the short-term outcome level, which is the most critical level for enhancing effectiveness and sustainability of the Bank’s assistance. The output column needs further disaggregation as well.

A comprehensive and integrated approach to strengthening the transport sector in Africa would call for the creation of synergies and strategic linkages among:

❙ Sector planning and programming; ❙ Infrastructure development;


❙ Transport facilitation measures; ❙ Institutional development; ❙ Transport and construction industries’ market

development and regulation; ❙ Sector public finance management (including

programming); ❙ Fiscal and user-charges policies; ❙ Accountability and anti-corruption measures;

and ❙ Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues.

Addressing Country Needs

The AfDB country-level development strategies are aligned with the sector investment plans of RMCs, thereby reflecting the needs of the population. The portfolio review indicated that the objectives of individual transport sector projects (with Project Completion Reports, PCRs) are relevant, with all reviewed projects rated as satisfactory or highly satisfactory (75%) in this regard.

Context Input Output Short-term outcomes

Long-term outcomes Goals (impact)

The lack of transport infrastructure is one of the serious bottlenecks in Africa

Physical input (incl. civil works for transport infrastructure)

Physical infrastructure:

• Roads• Railways• Seaports• Inland

waterways• Airports• Urban transport

system• Inland container

depots• Etc.

Assistance (through ESW, policy dialogue) for competitiveness improvement of transport sector

Regulatory framework on transport industry

Connecting missing transport links

Congestion reduction in urban area

Poverty reduction

Improved transport network performance

Transport time savings Enhanced

personal mobility/accessibility to/from main transport hubs and to/from rural/urban areas

Single stop border posts and related border crossing system

Establishment of road maintenance fundCapacity building on

transport sectoral resources

Donor coordination

Increased production and related costs makes African countries among the least competitive in the world

Improved operation and maintenance skills of transport infrastructure

Transportation cost savings (VOC savings)

Improved operations in railway/seaport/air port

Efficient transshipment of cargo from one transport mode to the other

Freight cost reduction

Freight price reduction

Border crossing time reduction

Effective asset management of physical infrastructure

Longer life of physical infrastructure

Optimal split between modes of transport

Inclusive growth

Economic development

Improved logistics system

Consumer price reduction

Reduced cost of input goods and services

Competitive environment for private sector

Favorable environment for public service delivery

Positive environmental impact (e.g. CO

2 reduction)

Intra- and interregional trade facilitation

Green growth

Regional integration

Figure 7: Toward a renewed theory of change for AfDB transport policy


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The case studies demonstrated a similar degree of alignment with the RMCs’ development and poverty reduction policy frameworks. However, these projects have often only referred to RMC frameworks in very general terms. For example, the overarching goal of developing transport infrastructure and road networks, common to all countries, has often been cited as the main rationale for Bank involvement.

Project objectives are stated at two levels: general and specific. The most prevalent sector/general objectives identified for projects were: (i) promoting regional integration and trade; (ii) fostering economic growth; and (iii) poverty reduction (Figure 8). Between 2000 and 2011, transport projects receiving Bank support have increasingly identified promotion of regional integration and trade as their overarching objective, whereas projects that seek to promote economic growth and poverty reduction and transport efficiency have become less common.

Improving the quality and service standards for transport services was found to be the most common specific objective identified for projects. A review of Project Appraisal Reports (PARs) found that about 72 percent of projects under review identified improvement of transport quality and service standards as a specific objective (Figure 9). Facilitating mobility and access of the population to markets and basic services through building transport infrastructure was the second most frequent specific objective identified among the projects under review. Interestingly, some transport projects sought to improve basic service provision alongside transport sector development by constructing health centers, schools, and boreholes for water supply, although such projects were relatively few in number.

Institutional capacity building was identified as a specific objective for only 12 percent of the projects under review. Ensuring the sustainability of existing transport infrastructure, a similar objective, was identified as specific project objective by approximately 4% of projects.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Ef�ciency of transport sector

Economic growth and poverty reduction

Regional integration and trade

2000–05 2006–11

Figure 8: Theme of AfDB transport projects’ general objectives

Source: OPEV 2013e, pp.14-15


Similar to the overarching project objectives, the nature of the specific project objectives identified for transport sector projects evolved between 2000 and 2011. Over these 12 years, the proportion of projects that sought to enhance transport service standards rose from 71% in 2000–2005 to 73% in 2006-2011. Similarly, the proportion of projects that sought to facilitate mobility of the population, increase their access to markets and basic services, or improve living conditions also increased between 2000 and 2011. On the other hand, the proportion of projects that sought to build institutional capacity decreased over this period.

The other issue commonly faced by the AfDB is insufficient or unavailable baseline data on infrastructure conditions, traffic, and productive potential. Although there is a clear need for intervention in the transport sector – infrastructure shortages and maintenance backlogs are almost universal throughout the continent – it is difficult to conduct a meaningful project selection or prioritization exercise given this information gap. Only a few countries can

provide the Bank with a road management database, including updated data on the road network, its condition, and the traffic. Most of the country projects evaluated were identified by RMCs. Economic analysis was used afterwards to justify the choice of project after it had already been selected; not the other way around. Using this data to guide project selection could help ensure the optimal use of the scarce public resources, while preserving opportunities for supporting inclusive growth through RMC-supported projects. The Bank, however, is not currently in a position to use transport models and other data to inform a comprehensive action plan, including the identification of funding gaps and establishment of a multi-year prioritized investment and maintenance program. The lack of a systemic means of prioritizing and reviewing projects was common to all country projects in Namibia, Tunisia, and Nigeria with the public sector. Regional corridor initiatives were an exception in that a common rationale and itinerary is adopted by the AfDB and other MDBs involved in the implementation of a project.

2000–05 2006–11

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Ensure sustainability of existing road network

Indentify best option/solution for investment

Facilitate mobility of (rural) population/access...

Improve living condition of bene�ciary in...

Improve basic services (education, health, water)

Promoting agricultural/economic activities

Institutional capacity building

Improve quality/service standard tranport

Figure 9: Specific objectives of AfDB transport projects



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Aligning with Country Sector Strategies

The Bank’s CSPs are well-aligned with major country-level development plans or poverty reduction strategies. The CSPs, however, do not refer to any policy corresponding to the Bank’s transport sector strategy. Nor do they present a country or regional transport strategy or introduce reforms or advisable ‘institutional stretches21’ for the transport sector. The reform agenda in CSPs is restricted to drivers of macroeconomic stability; sound public finance management (Nigeria and Tunisia are good examples); and, more rarely, good governance (Djibouti being a case in point).

Transport specialists within the Bank noted that their sector analyses and recommendations for the CSP missions are often relegated to annexes because of the formatting constraints (standard layout, number of pages) and inherent prioritization of the document. The main issue is that sectoral annexes are not being archived in the system. Projects appraisal and supervision are not being conducted in the context of this policy framework, which could have ensured better synergy with cross-cutting dimensions such as public finance management and governance. As a result, reports on coherence and consistency with policy frameworks are often left vague and unsubstantiated.

The regional corridor initiatives are often left without a framework equivalent to the CSP

which could be then shared with the other countries involved to facilitate coordination. The five RISPs that were recently issued have provided managers with a very general framework (for example, a list of operations in the case of the Central Africa RISP), while CSPs are restricted purely to the local agenda. Although PIDA identifies priority corridors, a corridor strategy is missing. Each corridor initiative has been left to set its own strategy: the Bamako-Ougadougou-Accra-Tema (BOAT) corridor has promoted institutional reforms (notably for ensuring regular road maintenance), while such an approach was not conceived for the Central Corridor. Given that competition among regional corridors is on the rise, the development of corridor strategies could be helpful in guiding future initiatives.

PPPs do not fit well into the CSPs. Although PPPs are part of the Bank’s efforts to renew public service delivery models, they are often discussed very broadly in CSPs under “private sector participation” instead of being identified as a means of public sector reform. PPPs are specific opportunities rather than initiatives jointly planned by the governments, the Bank, and other potential partners. Although CSPs take PPPs into account, they do not integrate them into the overall strategy. In Djibouti, for example, containers and bulk terminals are the main economic activity, but they are barely noted

In Djibouti, the CSP 2007–2010 identified the challenges for promotion of good governance. They were centered mainly on: (i) the adoption of political reforms that will enable the institutions to reflect the diversity of the national political landscape; (ii) the revival of administrative reforms that foster the accountability and productivity of state employees; (iii) better allocation of public finances to priority programs, notably poverty reduction strategy implementation results; and (iv) the strengthening of the legal and judicial systems.

These challenges were addressed by the fourth thrust of the AfDB program, which seeks to promote political, local, judicial, and economic good governance. Besides consolidating democratic gains, this pillar of the strategy focuses on the implementation of decentralization and justice that guarantees fair trials in order to reassure investors and protect ownership. The government objective was to increase foreign direct investments flows, notably in the transport sector (ports).

Box 1: Djibouti’s CSPs


beyond the Bank’s portfolio presentation. The same is the case for the Enfidha Airport in Tunisia, which has demonstrated high potential for tourism development.

Enhancing Quality at Entry

The project design stage is of critical importance for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of a project as well as the sustainability of the results achieved. There is currently a narrow range of existing assessments and items, defined by standard templates, which are required for Board approval of a project. The time and budget available for appraisal missions are well-acknowledged factor that limits the depth of potential pre-approval assessment. Bank staff have often had to rely on information and data available locally – that is, made available by the candidate beneficiary. Although Field Offices are increasingly

able to provide support in this regard, most of the projects surveyed continue to lack baseline data, which in turn raises questions about the validity of the reported results achieved.

The ultimate value added of a transport project, road projects in particular, is often assessed through the Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR), which can be systematically estimated and then tested. The EIRR can be used to demonstrate that public resources have been invested responsibly when it is compared against the opportunity cost of capital or the cost and benefits of alternative options for achieving the same objective. Based on the evidence from the 17 PCRs, EIRRs were found to be higher than the opportunity cost of capital22 for 81.3 percent of the projects. Detailed analysis indicates that 56.3 percent of these projects recorded an EIRR above its ex ante level, while 25 percent registered less than the ex ante level, but more than the opportunity cost. The sustainability

Table 2: Comparison of Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR)

Project name Country Ex ante EIRR (%)

Ex post EIRR (%)

Variation

Roads Maintenance and Upgrading Project Uganda 15-23 26-45 ++Projet De Pistes Rurales (PPR) Burkina Faso 14 27 ++Tetteh Quarshie Circle Mamfe Road Rehabilitation Project Ghana 21 40 ++Djougou-N’dali Road Improvement Project Benin 14 22 +Projet De Construction De La Route Rosso-Boghe Mauritania 13 18 +Projet D’amenagement Routier Dans Les Provinces De L’ouest Cameroon 14 16 +Road Infrastructure Project Rwanda 20 22 +Likalaneng-Thaba Tseka Road Project Lesotho 16 17 +Kicukiro-Kirundi Road Project Multinational 16 16 =Gitarama-Ngororero-Mukamira Road Project Rwanda 15 15 =Projet D’amenagement De La Route Ambam-Eking Cameroon 15 13 -Rehabilitation De La Route RN1 Bis Madagascar 17 13 -Mbabane Bypass Road (Two International Roads Phase-II) Swaziland 20 15 -Second Road Program Burkina Faso 13 8 --Mpharane-Bela Bela Road Upgrading Project Lesotho 16 7 --South Eastern Highway Project Mauritius 15 6 --



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cluster evaluation (OPEV 2013c) based on the same information (PCRs) came to a similar conclusion, but there is still a worrying number of projects with below-projected EIRR.

The legitimacy of EIRR assessments is sometimes questionable, considering the extent to which hidden parameters can influence the final result when using a standard tool like HDM4.23 Other issues that can influence the validity of this analysis include: (i) the unreliability of data on traffic and network conditions, and vehicle operating costs (even in Tunisia); (ii) the inability to foresee how traffic conditions will evolve with developing contexts over the long-term (e.g. 20 years; as demonstrated in the Namibia Northern Railway Extension Project, Lekki Toll Road in Nigeria, and Enfidha Airport in Tunisia); and (iii) the lack of established methodological parameters for integrating external benefits into the analysis (such as increase in agricultural production for the Rural Access and Mobility Project (RAMP) in Nigeria).

For most of the projects reviewed, the PARs were largely focused on engineering, and only superficial consideration was given to the presence of enabling environment for implementation of the project. Challenges encountered during the implementation phase strikingly similar from one project to the next.24 In emphasizing alignment with RMC investment plans over structural and institutional reforms, the project appraisals do not provide a strong incentive for the conduct of in-depth needs assessments or critical assessments of the enabling environment (governance, institutional capacity, and technical skills of the executing agencies and the private sector), drivers for change, or transport sector reform. Placing emphases on engineering and EIRRs has not been sufficient to ensure that the appropriate conditions are in place to allow for the efficient implementation of transport projects. The impact of contextual factors such as institutional weaknesses (for example, the lack of a road maintenance programming system in the

Tunisia Public Work Ministry), delays in procurement, market failures (in road and port activities – in Ghana, for example), agency “capture” (with the Lagos State department in charge of PPPs), and inability to maintain the network (in all case studies) could be minimized through a more comprehensive project design process.

In many cases, the general weakness of RMCs in road asset protection and maintenance had not been identified until the engineering design phase, significantly increasing the unit cost of road construction. The failure of RMCs to finance and implement a proper maintenance cycle for newly built infrastructure and take necessary measures to protect existing infrastructure (axle load control, rain barriers, safety campaigns, and the like) is being increasingly integrated into the structural design of roads, resulting in substantial an unanticipated costs. Given the limited resources available for concessional Bank assistance, this trend may be detrimental to infrastructure development overall.

For road projects, consideration of road safety issues has not been commensurate with the risk of fatalities and accidents in RMCs. This omission was evident for all evaluated road projects, particularly for the Lekki Expressway25 in Lagos State (Nigeria). Safety assessments have rarely26 considered taken non-motorized modes of, which are of considerable significance in rural areas, into account.

Project selection and design mechanisms are wholly different for PPPs compared to other Bank-financed public transport sector projects. The Bank has typically not been involved in the development of these initiatives in the beginning stages (and has sometimes opposed an initiative, as in Djibouti) and have often been insufficiently engaged in assessing the legal and regulatory enabling environment for PPPs. Project design has typically been undertaken either by international consultants hired by the government


(Enfidha Airport) or the candidate concession holder itself (Nigeria, Djibouti). These projects are typically scrutinized first by commercial banks, and again by international consultants. The DFIs have been called upon mainly to finalize the financial package, with, at best, limited leverage on the core business. The Bank’s added value in the case of Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT) in Djibouti was the introduction of an Environment and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and the follow-up of the implementation of its recommendations.

Tracking Results

There is insufficient evidence to assess the achievement of short-term outcomes for most transport projects due to weaknesses in project monitoring practices. All three major lines of evidence considered for this evaluation (the country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b), cluster evaluation on sustainability (OPEV 2013c), and cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a); see chapter 1 for details) revealed that the Bank does not have a sufficient results-oriented monitoring system to allow it to assess, and follow up on the achievement of short-term outcomes at the project, country and regional levels.

The Bank’s culture is exclusively focused on activity-based monitoring (efficiency, in evaluation terms). Despite widespread support for results-based monitoring and evaluation, Bank staff have had difficulty operationalizing these concepts at the project level. The assessing of results at the outcome level, in particular, has remained challenging due to the lack of a detailed transport sector strategy to inform the identification of reliable indicators and the lack of resources available to support the identification of appropriate baseline data (ESW). The latter issue is also evident at the output level, as monitoring is often scaled back to reflect only the

result of construction works and other planned activities. In particular, project monitoring suffers from: (i) the absence of a shared understanding regarding outcome indicators; (ii) the poor quality of the indicators themselves, which are often not sufficiently specific or based on reliable and objective data sources; (iii) the absence of appropriate baseline data; and (iv) the lack of time-bound targets.

These deficiencies are the result of weaknesses in the project identification and appraisal stages and are reinforced during project implementation. The quality of the logical frameworks among the sample of projects reviewed for this evaluation was found to be widely uneven. These projects rarely possess quantitative and time-bound outcome indicators (Aus-Rosh Pinah Road Rehabilitation). Instead, they often rely on vague reports, self-substantiated results achieved at the outcome level, including effects on agriculture (RAMP Project in Nigeria), regional integration and public investment (Classified Roads Rehabilitation IV in Tunisia).27 During the early stages of the reference period, results-based monitoring and the related logical frameworks were relatively new to most Bank staff28 and were treated more as a formatting or project approval requirement rather than a genuine change in development practice. There has been little evidence of an actual cultural change in the way projects have been monitored until recently, following the establishment of the OITC internal working group.

Assessments of the extent to which results have been achieved at the outcome level has typically been postponed until the project completion phase. Based on the 17 PCRs available,29 76.5 percent of projects were rated satisfactory or higher with regard to the outcomes. This result should be interpreted cautiously, since there is often a disconnect between self-evaluation rating and independent evaluation rating (OPEV 2013e, p. 19). The country and regional case studies, cluster


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evaluation on sustainability, and cluster evaluation of multinational road projects came to a more balanced picture of AfDB achievement, which is also consistent with the conclusion reached in the 2010 IDEV supervision evaluation (OPEV 2010) that the project performance ratings system is highly deficient (OPEV 2010, p. 28).

The supervision process, one of the major strengths of the Bank’s organization for activity management, has de-emphasized the monitoring of project outcomes. Implementation of the monitoring system has typically been left to the executing agencies, which have generally not been able to provide the necessary baseline data. Without support, these agencies are unlikely to report on established indicators once the project is approved. Activity-based reporting by executing agencies is already rare and erratic even where raw data are at hand, and thus it was not realistic to expect them to provide the sector statistics or

household surveys that are necessary for results-based monitoring. The PCRs compiled by the three evaluation threads demonstrate a paucity of data on short-term outcomes (let alone long-term outcomes). Although progress achieved against outcomes is often assessed as being positive, supporting evidence is rarely provided.

Other limitations of PCRs (notably for Tunisia’s projects) include confusion between output and outcome indicators and the omission of objectives that were either not achieved or abandoned during implementation. The field missions were, therefore, more instrumental in realistically assessing the achievement of the Bank’s short-term outcomes. Going back to the PAR logframe, identifying subsequent changes in outputs and short-term outcomes, and interviewing stakeholders helped to obtain a more balanced picture of achievement against expected results.



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Performance in Delivering Bank Assistance

30

The transport sector (which falls under the Infrastructure, Private Sector, and Regional Integration Vice Presidency, OIVP) is divided into three divisions and has a complement of 35 professional posts, of which 34 are currently filled. Overall, staffing has not been commensurate with the size of the transport portfolio. This deficit has had some effect on the Bank’s performance in delivering infrastructure projects in RMCs. Assuming that the sector is able to retain these professional staff, the question is, how many more will be needed in the short to medium term?

The main operational departments that interact with the transport sector staff are the Private Sector Department; the Energy, Environment, and Climate

Change Department; and the NEPAD Regional Integration and Trade Department.

The strategy documents that guide, directly or otherwise, the Bank’s transport sector policy do provide sufficiently specific guidance to support transport sector operations. The real challenge for the transport sector has been to translate these strategies into concrete activities. There is currently no detailed action plan to: (i) ensure that different strategies pertaining to the transport sector are rolled out in a coherent and consistent manner; (ii) identify priority policy dialogue themes for both regional and non-regional activities; and (iii) prioritize projects and non-lending activities, funding gaps, and multi-annual investment programs.31

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Effectiveness to �rst disbursement

Signature to effectiveness

Approval to signature

2000–05 2006–11

Figure 10: Percentage of projects delayed by stage

Source: IDEV 2013e, p.24

51Performance in Delivering Bank Assistance

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With regard to timeliness of project delivery, the performance of transport sector projects has been mixed. In particular, efficiency has been compromised by long implementation delays. Of the 17 projects analyzed as part of the portfolio review, 11 were completed with a time overrun of 2–4 years. Only 6 of the 17 were completed with a time overrun of less than 2 years. Not one project was completed with less than a time overrun of one year (Figure 10).

In keeping with the above, almost all projects evaluated as part of the country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b) and cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a) faced some delays during implementation, from months (Northern Railway in Namibia; Kicukiro-Kirundo between Burundi and Rwanda) to years (Classified Road Rehabilitation IV and Railway Modernization II in Tunisia, Dori–Tera Road between Burkina and Niger). Excessive delays have generally not been a direct result of implementation so much as delays in the initial negotiations between the governments and the Bank. Such delays postponed projects by more than one year in Tunisia, Nigeria, and Namibia. For some international projects, coordination between RMCs has been delayed as a result of technical issues (Burundi/Rwanda) or a lack of harmonization: for example, the start of Bank support to the BOAT Corridor was postponed by 18 months while awaiting the fulfillment of conditionality on axle load control.

The capacity limitations of RMCs have not received sufficient analysis or attention at the outset of projects and have often been only partly addressed, particularly for road projects. Both task managers and operations staff acknowledged that institutional shortcomings have been vastly underestimated in PARs. However, a realistic capacity assessment would have compromised the approval of projects in the task managers’ portfolios and prompted protracted arguments with RMCs. Despite the fact that institutional weakness exist in transport

sector throughout the continent, only some transport projects have included a capacity-building element. Of 17 completed road projects assessed in the portfolio review, 11 (65 percent) included a capacity building element (OPEV 2013e, p. 15). Use of background papers to guide activities has been less effective in this regard. In most cases, even where capacity was clearly identified as an issue, support for capacity development either did not materialize or did not fully reflect the identified needs. This shortcoming raises concerns for efficiency as well as effectiveness: building the capacity of RMCs during the course of project implementation is essential to achieving sustainable development results.32

For several projects, the quality of the engineering design proved to be a major issue during project implementation. This challenge was evident in the Dori–Tera Road Project (OPEV 2013a, p. 12), as well as in Chad, Cameroon, and Lesotho (OPEV 2013c, p. 9). Executing agencies are in charge of procuring and managing the related service contracts and controlling the quality of the deliverables. Many of the issues that arose for road projects during the implementation stage were rooted in design weaknesses such as geotechnical mistakes, underestimated traffic characteristics, shortcuts in assessing social impact (resettlements, in particular), and prioritization of budget constraints over technical standards. The subsequent implementation delays and cost overruns cannot be rectified by procurement supervision or project counseling and can have serious implications for the achievement of short-term outcomes.

Procurement processes are a similarly critical source of project delays. Procurement-related delays are often caused by market imperfections (procurement and subsequent difficulties in managing contracts) and governance issues (insufficient safeguards, leading to corrupt practices or excessive, time-consuming safeguards). Delays caused by a no-objection procedure from the Bank’s side were rarely a source of delays for the


evaluated projects. Task managers were perceived by most executing agencies as facilitators, who contribute to resolving internal blockages resulting from government processes. But with only 1 to 1.5 supervision missions being conducted each year, it is unlikely that task manager support will be provided in a timely manner. Desk reviews were helpful in providing more timely support. Furthermore, the Bank’s procurement system assists transport sector task managers in ensuring that the bidding process is transparent, with minimal scope for corruption (OPEV 2013e, p. 46).

Project design and management processes often resulted in cost overruns. Major contributors to these cost overruns included steady price increases for oil products and their sub-products, which constitute major inputs for infrastructure construction. The extent of unit price increases over the entire reference period has been without precedent. Market failure in the public works industry in Africa has multiplied these cost increases and likely means that costs will continue to climb. Adding to the impact of these cost increases are the considerable implementation delays for Bank projects.

Some projects were adjusted for increasing costs through a change in their scope. This practice explains why only two projects in the sample of case studies faced a significant cost overrun: the RAMP rural road project in Nigeria and the BOAT Corridor (in Burkina Faso). For RAMP, the total length of road of 474 kilometers was designed from gravel finish to asphaltic surface, following a change in project design (from earth road to asphalt surfacing) in response to an increase of up to 120 percent in the unit price of oil-related inputs in road construction. During the same period, the cost overruns linked to a similar price escalation in Tunisia were taken over by the government, as the Bank’s project was a share of a wider national program. Cost overruns are sometimes difficult to analyze because of adjustments made to planned activities. In contrast the projects reviewed under the cluster evaluation on

sustainability (OPEV 2013c) and the cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a) were more systematically affected by cost overruns: being more focused on one road segment, the ability to change the scope of the project was limited.33

Better cost estimation at the design stage and utilization of realistic inflation rates34 for fuel and construction products will help avoid cost overruns and reduce the need to adjust project scope, potentially impacting the achievement of short-term outcomes. Minimizing negotiation and approval delays would have a similarly positive impact on project implementation.

The PPP projects reviewed incurred minimal delays and cost overruns, which, in any case, would be automatically taken over by the concession holders, even if they had been caused by external factors (strikes of Monastir Airport staff, for example). The firms in all four of the PPP projects reviewed were often able to ensure the profitability of these projects despite the challenges of operating in developing countries. This findings can be generalized only to a limited extent, however, as many such projects are facing major issues throughout the continent. This optimism must also be balanced against the limited number of opportunities for PPP in Africa’s transport sector, particularly for roads: PPPs require high levels of traffic and a proper enabling environment, both of which do not exist in most countries across the continent and are unlikely to develop over the medium-term.

Addressing Implementation Challenges

Despite the considered skill and experience of staff responsible for project appraisals, analyses of projects are often too brief and superficial to allow for meaningful quality control and assessment beyond specified topics.35 The process is still heavily formal and restrictive in scope: While Bank staff provide core expertise


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in engineering and transport economics, there is limited scope for assessing other factors pertaining to quality at entry. A review of the 129 PARs of the transport portfolio36 found that appraisal teams include an average of 4.08 members, excluding PPP appraisals, which are undertaken by larger teams (9.75 members per project). Of these 4.08 members, 2.26 are transport engineers or economists and 1.81 cover other aspects of transport projects, including socio-economic and environmental issues. Hiring consultants has not been a common practice, with consultants representing an average of 0.41 members per project, although the average number of consultants per team has recently been increasing. Between 2006–11, more resources were devoted to project appraisal and the average number of staff on each appraisal team increased from 3.30

to 5.64. Furthermore, appraisal teams became increasingly diversified over this period with the average number of non-transport specialists rising from 1.32 to 3.47. However, the size of the project appraisal team has not been reflective of the scale of the project, as shown in Figure 11. For example, the appraisal team for Tunisia’s Classified Road Network Rehabilitation IV Project was relatively modest, with limited assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the national road construction and maintenance system. There are several opportunities for further improvement in identifying drivers for change and assessing both assumptions and risk throughout the programming and appraisal processes.

Challenges faced by executing agencies in terms of their implementation capacity (inadequate

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The number of staff and consultants involved in PAR preparation per project

Figure 11: Staff and consultants involved in PAR preparation (Excluding PPP projects, N=117)

Source: Prepared by the evaluation team.


skills, high turnover, aging staff in ministries, lack of maintenance funding and growing maintenance backlogs) do not appear to have influenced the Bank’s strategic response to transport challenges in Africa or the selection of projects. For example, the appraisal of Lagos State capacity to handle a PPP was particularly inadequate and laid the foundation for most of the issues faced during implementation. Similarly, the assumptions and risks analysis for the BOAT Corridor, covering Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali, did not adequately capture the scale of competition between corridors and ports in West Africa, as well as the lack of coordination among the three countries involved.

Regional corridors and their potential implementation challenges tend to be more rigorously assessed prior to their implementation by the Regional Economic Community (REC) institutions or other coordinating agencies. Regional corridors, however, are relatively recent initiatives and are not as common as other transport sector projects. This was not the case, however, for the PPP initiatives, for which most of the initial assessments (financial, technical, and economic) were undertaken prior to the entry of the Bank into the project. In Djibouti, for example, the main contribution of the Bank was the ESIA.

Even if generally underestimated in the PARs, the scope and depth of institutional shortcomings in the context of transport sector projects are widely known by the task managers and by the Bank as a whole. Institutional contexts are systematically and periodically analyzed by one DFI or another, often the World Bank or the EU, and are therefore available to all Bank staff. These reports have identified major institutional issues in road management and rail maintenance for all RMCs, including middle-income countries such as Tunisia. However, between 2000 and 2011 (Figure 12), only 36 percent of the 129 transport sector projects included a capacity building component. Allocation for capacity building activities has varied widely from one year to the next, showing no clear

trend. The 47 projects analyzed by IDEV that included a capacity building element focused primarily on training. Furthermore, 21 of these projects included the provision of technical assistance and 15 projects included the purchase of equipment. Combining of infrastructure and institutional development is therefore not yet commonplace among the Bank’s activities.

This limited engagement in addressing an important and longstanding shortcoming of the African transport sector has been a product of the division of labor among donors, with capacity development left to the lead agency, usually the World Bank or the EU. The persistence of weak capacity over the last decade, however, demonstrates that there is a gap between the assistance that has been provided and the development needs of RMCs, calling for both a renewed approach to the governance of Bank support in the transport sector. The issue of country capacity has only been addressed consistently in the context of Bank support to regional corridors.

The legal support made available by the Bank to the governments of RMCs to help them negotiate more equitable partnerships in the context of PPPs, is a good example of how the indirect provision of infrastructure can be combined with institutional development and knowledge transfer. Among the PPPs reviewed, these funds were not utilized to support the government, apart from DCT in Djibouti, which did not materialize.

Implementing Non-lending Activities

The Bank’s transport sector projects have rarely been leveraged to advance policy dialogue or ESW. Country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b) revealed that non-lending activities have similarly not been used to open discussion about other subsector challenges beyond project management issues. This was confirmed by the portfolio review (OPEV 2013e) as well as the other evaluations


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conducted. The Railway Modernization Project in Tunisia is one of the rare examples where the appraisal phase was used as an opportunity to open dialogue on key subsector issues and solutions. This opportunity came about as a partnership with the World Bank was winding down, which created space for more discussion on non-lending issues.37

Most of the country-level projects involved limited support for policy dialogue, as per a division of labor agreed with the World Bank and the EU. Most of the Bank’s transport operations are from an older generation of projects appraised in the early 2000s. They did not benefit from the ESW that was later encouraged by the Bank. Furthermore, the limited formal authority given to task managers hampered their ability to reach RMC decision-makers when it came to sector

policy or reform agendas; Instead, they were bound to management routines and technical problem solving. The lack of an updated and operationalized Bank transport sector strategy further prevented the task managers from proposing policy reforms. Their incentives were modest, partly because policy dialogue is an activity without added value in their personal evaluation ratings, and is too often time consuming and tainted with local political dimensions and sensitivities. This political dimension was strong for many projects, further complicating efforts at initiating policy dialogue – for example, in the case of the Lekki Toll Road Project in Nigeria and the Djibouti PPPs. In the case of Tunisia’s Classified Road Network Rehabilitation, the Public Works Ministry opened itself to policy dialogue very late in the project, after completion and the Arab Spring.

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Figure 12: Projects with capacity building component as percentage of transport projects approved and the total amount apportioned to capacity building per year

Source: Prepared by the evaluation team.


Only with the relatively recent regional corridor projects has the Bank been strongly engaged in ESW and policy dialogue. The BOAT Corridor Project initiated this trend, engaging in policy dialogue on road maintenance reform. Although, these efforts had minimal success apart from the establishment of the Burkina Faso Road Fund. For the Central Corridor, the Bank supported coordination at the corridor level, mobilized ESW for transport monitoring activities of critical importance to the improvement of international transit, and engaged in high-level policy dialogue. Similar examples of good practices can be found with the Rwanda-Burundi connecting link. The BOAT Corridor stands as a counterexample, with limited ESW, reflecting a reactive, as opposed to proactive approach to project implementation.

The delegation of authority to country and regional offices in October 2012 seems to have reduced management issues and created space for policy dialogue. This change was

particularly clear and effective with the Central Corridor, now more strongly backed by the two field offices (Tanzania and Rwanda). Delegation to a country office or a regional office is regarded by representatives in governments and the East African Community (EAC) as an important measure in ensuring effective decision making by the Bank. Corporate decentralization had added value to the involvement of the Bank in policy dialogue, even if the size of the sample considered for the background papers does not allow an assessment of whether decision-making authority was adequately decentralized.

For PPP projects, the Bank does not engage in non-lending activities. PPPs have excluded policy dialogue because they are exclusively focused on the concession holders and have not offered recourse to ESW for the concession core business or for leveraging the local economy (critical in Djibouti). Only in one case (DCT Project in Djibouti)) did the Bank finance a missing ESIA

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Figure 13: Percentage share by AfDB financing instrument in the transport sector (2000–11, Net commitments)



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to comply with its internal rules. PPPs are often not regarded as an opportunity to feed into transport sector policy dialogue, although they may represent, as in Djibouti, a sizable share of the local economy. The Enfidha Airport is another example of a missed opportunity to engage in policy dialogue, especially considering the role played by the concession holder (TAV group) in promoting Tunisian tourism in new markets (Eastern Europe, Russia).

Supervising Results Delivery

The Bank monitors the implementation of its operations through different types of supervision: launching missions, desk reviews, mid-term reviews, and field missions. The number of filed supervision missions in the transport sector has consistently increased since 2007 (Figure 14). The quality of supervision during implementation, however, remains an area of concern. Lack of an appropriate skills mix among supervision teams was identified in the portfolio review as a major issue that might impact project performance

for approximately 70% of the PCRs reviewed (Figure 15). Poor alignment between performance ratings provided by field supervisors for active projects and the problems commonly encountered during project implementation casts further doubt on the credibility of these reports.

Overall, supervision remains unsatisfactory. Case studies revealed that the findings of IDEV’s previous evaluation of the Bank’s supervision performance (OPEV 2010) are still relevant, with an average of 1.5 supervision missions occurring each year. The main challenges identified in that report included: (i) lack of clarity surrounding roles and responsibilities with regard to supervision within the multidisciplinary team approach; (ii) results and risks were (and are) not sufficiently examined by supervisory teams; (iii) insufficient consideration of the gradual shift from a centralized system to field-based supervisory arrangements; (iv) infrequent use of supervision instruments other than periodic supervision missions; (v) quality standards are currently not well defined, monitored, and enforced; and (vi) supervision is clearly under-resourced.

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Figure 14: Number of field supervision missions in transport sector for ongoing projects



The fundamental factors that negatively impact supervision performance at the Bank identified in the 201038 evaluation are largely still relevant. These include (i) an operational culture that incentivizes project approvals, while the overall accountability for results remains low; (ii) portfolio fragmentation and a large number of aging projects; (iii) shortage of dedicated administrative funds for project operations and a high ratio of projects to task managers, with task managers receiving little team support; and (iv) a weak support system in terms of electronic database management and supervision guidance.

The Bank’s supervision has been supportive to executing agencies in managing transport sector projects, which are generally achieving the expected outputs. However, in some cases, the achievement of concrete outputs may overshadow the achievement of more intangible results linked to policy or institutional reforms. The best example of this trade-off is the Railway Modernization Project in Tunisia (OPEV 2013b, p. 19), in which the institutional capacity component of the project was replaced with technical studies for the purposes of expediting project implementation

without establishing any link to the long-term reform agenda supported by DFIs. Similarly, in several instances, the amounts dedicated to environmental and social impact mitigation measures were reallocated to the construction budget, in order to handle unforeseen developments and implementation challenges (OPEV 2013c, p. 18).

Reaching a reasonable proxy of outputs with limited delays and cost overruns has become the main, if not the only, driving factor of Bank project management, without appropriate reference to the achievement of outcomes. The RAMP in Nigeria is a good case in point, as is the Classified Road Network Rehabilitation IV in Tunisia. In both cases, the achievement of results at the outcome level was not considered essential by either the Bank’s supervision teams or for the executing agency. Identifying project outcomes was considered to be more of an administrative requirement, typically completed in a pro forma manner at the completion phase, rather than a guiding principle for the project or a framework that can serve as the basis for the sector or subsector policy dialogue on reform and institutional restructuring.

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Figure 15: Bank’s supervision quality rating in terms of skills mix and practicability of solution



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In the case of some problematic projects, the initial project outputs were changed over the course of implementation, affecting the achievement of some of the initially agreed short-term outcomes, as well as their sustainability. These changes usually affected the policy reform component of projects. Two examples are the BOAT Corridor, which initially envisioned harmonization of road protection measures, and the Railway Modernization Project in Tunisia (OPEV 2013b, p. 19), for which the initial list of railway lines that had been identified for their economic potential was changed in favor of more short-term priorities (suburban lines). The dismissal of social and environmental measures, as another aspect revealed by the cluster evaluation on sustainability (OPEV 2013c), impacted the extent to which projects resulted in immediate benefits for the population.

For PPPs, the supervision of transport concession projects is done by the Operational Private Sector Management Department (OPSM) without standard practices for coordination with the Bank’s Transport Department. The PPP supervision thus focused on the viability of debt servicing and contractual obligations agreed with the firm based on the ESIA, irrespective of the transport sector policy framework (Tunisia) or the opportunities created for the local players in the logistic chain (Djibouti). Besides this limitation, the standard of supervision was high and was appreciated by the concession holders.

The cross-cutting issues were insufficiently mainstreamed throughout the project cycle, in particular those for mitigation of environmental and social impacts, including resettlements. Most of the evaluated projects involved rehabilitation of transport infrastructure, and therefore dealt with limited environmental impacts. Although, projects are to abide by the minimum environmental requirements for quarries, no follow-up has been conducted against these standards – for example, with Kicukiro-Kirundo Road. The same issue was

found for Dori-Téra Road, along with insufficient measures to mitigate social impacts.

Collaborating with Donors

The AfDB has been involved in donor coordination overall, but its involvement has not been proportional to the scale of Bank’s activities in the transport sector. In terms of how well the Bank is coordinating with other development partners, the picture is uneven. The country & regional case studies (OPEV 2013b) suggested minimal involvement except for some regional initiatives, particularly regional initiatives managed from field offices (Central Corridor). By definition, the Bank must work effectively with all stakeholders in the case of regional integration initiatives. At the same time, the cluster evaluation on sustainability (OEPV 2013c) identified a number of instances where AfDB has worked well with other partners, especially in transport program arrangements such as those in Liberia, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, “working well” with partners does not necessarily entail in-depth coordination to create policy reforms or contributing to other donors’ thematic working groups. The Bank’s limited engagement in non-lending activities does not allow it to fully enter into policy dialogue because it lacks some background information and skills possessed by other donors. The close relations with RMCs also contribute to a diffuse reluctance regarding potentially conflict-prone reforms.

During most of the reference period, the internal organization of the Bank hampered the participation of task managers in country-level coordination in the same way it limited policy dialogue. However, the positive effects of the decentralization process were clearly identified for the new generation of (regional) projects: more presence, more authority, better understanding of the background, and better personal connections, as in the Central Corridor Project in Tanzania/Rwanda.


The expected outputs of the Bank’s transport projects included mainly physical infrastructure, institutional development, studies, and advocacy on safeguards and cross-cutting issues. For road projects, outputs included construction of paved roads, rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads, other road infrastructure such as bridges and interchanges, institutional capacity building, and accompanying social infrastructure such as schools, water boreholes, and health centers. Delivering expected outputs is a necessary condition for achieving development objectives at the outcome level.

The most common outcome indictors for the Bank’s transport projects included: (i) increase in traffic flows; (ii) reduction in vehicle operating costs (VOC) and travel time; (iii) increase in regional and national trade; (iv) improvement in the condition of road networks; (v) increased economic activity; (vi) improved access to social services (increases in education enrollment and health care, reduction in water-borne diseases); and (vii) improved national capacity to maintain transport infrastructure. These outcome indicators represent a mix of short-term, intermediate and longer-term development outcomes. This inconsistency demonstrates the lack of a consistent approach to implementing results-based management in the transport sector, which limits the ability to compare the progress achieved via different projects against a comprehensive and shared theory of change.

A summary of the findings at the project level can be found in Annex D (matrix of effectiveness) and F (feedback from the field). The matrix of effectiveness demonstrates the rich diversity of objectives of Bank assistance in the transport sector. Among the expected results, more positive contributions than problematic situations were noted. The strong points

are obviously reducing VOC and travel time, which are the most direct effects of a new or rehabilitated road. Records are less clearly positive for higher-level results, which often require some level of involvement by the country administration. This deficit demonstrates the importance of transport sector governance as well as the need for an enabling environment among both the private and public sector.

Contributing to Mobility and Accessibility

AfDB contributions to improving transport infrastructure removed market distortions and freed individual initiatives from insurmountable transport constraints. The gains can be extraordinary when existing conditions have been very poor (average speed of 10 kilometers/hour or less). These gains are more diffuse for more developed networks, but individual benefits are multiplied by far greater traffic volumes. These gains represent an invaluable contribution to Africa’s development. The increase in traffic volumes was demonstrated systematically in evaluated projects. The Ndjamena-Douala Corridor might be an extreme case, but daily traffic increased from 197 vehicles per day in 2009 to 658 per day in 2012.39 The same kind of results can be obtained from a well-conceived feeder road network rehabilitation program, such as the RAMP in Nigeria.

For all completed projects reviewed or evaluated, the expected outputs were achieved, but at the cost of significant delays, time-consuming supervision back-up, and cost overruns. This finding was further confirmed through the portfolio review (OPEV 2013e, p. 19), the country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b),

Achieving Results

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cluster evaluation on sustainability (OPEV 2013c), and cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a). The portfolio review (OPEV 2013e, p. 39), however, found mixed performance in terms of the achievement of outputs for rural feeder road components implemented by the Agriculture and Agro-Industry Department (OSAN). The available evidence in the PCRs shows that out of 17 agricultural projects, 9 were rated unsatisfactory with respect to the achievement of feeder road outputs. At the same time, eight projects were rated satisfactory in this regard.

In achieving their outputs, AfDB projects had a positive impact on both mobility and accessibility. A new or rehabilitated road or railway line cuts travel times and reduces VOC, at least for as long as the condition of the link is maintained. Gains in accessibility (from field yields to the weekly market; from the village to the nearest health care outlet for a pregnant woman) have definitely been achieved. Between Kicukiro (Rwanda) and Kirundo (Burundi) (OPEV 2013a, p. 4), the average travel time was typically decreased by two-thirds, which may be due to reduced congestion of urban networks (Lekki Road in Lagos; OPEV 2013b, p. 21) or the linking of regional capitals in emerging economies in Tunisia, for example. The Bank’s contribution to developing mobility was demonstrated by an ex post EIRR above the opportunity cost of capital. EIRRs increase in accordance with induced and generated traffic flows circulating on higher-level service roads, indicating that these road projects were in high demand.

Market failures allow parties other than the intended beneficiaries to capture a significant share of the financial benefits of Bank assistance. The link between reduced VOC and lower transport price is considered as mechanical. However, actual gains in mobility for the population and consumption savings are conditioned by: (i) the existence of competition between transport operators; and (ii) limited roadblocks and other

“invisible” barriers. From the case studies, and in particular the regional initiatives, it was rarely the case that the benefits of road projects flowed directly to the general population (OPEV 2013b, p. 20). Benefits of reduced VOC for road haulers have too often been captured by cartels and roadblocks (or police checks). Passenger transport prices were found to be far more flexible (OPEV 2013a, p. 5), but were still subjected to increasing racketeering through roadblocks. In some cases, corporatism and tour de role are capturing a share of the benefits of Bank’s transport projects from passengers too. This is particularly the case for urban transport. Because of the lack of tight monitoring of costs and prices in road projects, none of the evaluations came to a definitive figure, but all qualitative evidence points to a relatively large capture of reduced VOC by transporters, traders, and police forces, with a minimal share passed on to users.

However, regarding short-term outcome indicators included in project logframes, in most cases the results are far from initial expectations. They are often overoptimistic and/or dependent on RMC commitments that have proven unrealistic. Of the projects examined through the case studies, achievement of results at the outcome level was more likely when the project was extremely focused and limited in scope, such as for the Aus–Rosh Pinah Road (OPEV 2013b, p. 16) in Namibia, which is self-contained and almost exclusively serves a mining activity. As soon as the results are linked to other public initiatives (such as Angola’s commitment to connect to the Namibia Northern Railways extension) or to institutional reforms (as for the Railways Modernization II Project in Tunisia), the projects become less manageable, owing to a changing government agendas (Namibia) or unforeseen weaknesses in public sector capacity (Tunisia, Swaziland40). In the subsequent endeavors, project management tends to sacrifice intended outcomes in favor of short-term solutions for operational issues.41


Contributing to Regional Integration

Regional corridor projects are facing such diverse and unexpected challenges that the achievement of relatively ambitious outcomes often appears to be out of reach. For regional integration, the outcomes are expected to materialize based on the interaction among a range of factors: (i) trade facilitation (customs regulations); (ii) port efficiency (dwelling time and freight exit procedures); (iii) governance (roadblocks); (iv) fair and open market practices (transporters, freight forwarders, importers); and (v) producers who are proactive or not to transport incentives. Regional projects appear to assume that all of these factors will naturally align toward the same developmental goal, but this is often not the case.

The evolution in practices between Bank assistance to BOAT and to the Central Corridor is a good illustration of a learning-by-doing process. BOAT was among the first regional projects identified for Bank support, in early 2000. The initial expectations regarding harmonization of asset maintenance and protection delayed the implementation of the project for months, with only infrastructure improvements being supported to date. It became apparent that the critical factor for a successful logistic chain was the port. The Bank’s support to Tema Port was limited to procuring a mobile scanner and a weight bridge, which did not have a marked effect on the overall efficiency bottlenecks.42 Other West African corridors with more efficient port facilities (Abidjan, Lomé, Cotonou) increasingly attracted freight flows.43 These issues were not anticipated in the Bank’s project due to a lack of ESW and limited involvement in policy dialogue platforms. These factors have now largely mainstreamed into the Bank’s support to the Central Corridor, which has included a range of non-lending activities.

Poor coordination between RMCs that benefit from a common infrastructure was found also with the Kicukiro-Kirundo Road between Burundi and

Rwanda (OPEV 2013a, p. 22). The Joint Technical Committee failed to ensure adequate coordination and political tensions between the two countries became crippling. The case of Cameroon is specific in the sense that Chad (and the Central African Republic as well) does not have any worthwhile alternative; one-sided harmonization is easier to achieve.

The cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a) identified similar, and sometimes stronger, capacity shortcomings with RECs than with RMCs. This was particularly clear with the transport facilitation component of the Douala–Ndjaména Corridor, which was barely engaged by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) three years after the initial deadline due to capacity shortcomings and the lengthy procedures of the regional organization (OPEV 2013a, p. 23).

The Bank has learned from its previous experiences and has engaged proactively in ESW, policy dialogue, and coordination with other donors in its support to the Central Corridor, yielding some positive results. This project is ongoing, but first assessments are rather positive, even if being involved in ESW proved to be a learning-by-doing process. The field offices provide value added by implementing relatively new assistance modalities (OPEV 2013b, p. 20). Corporate decentralization and establishment of the resident representative position in Tanzania and Rwanda have been in place for several years. The delegation of authority has been implemented as per October 2012 and regulated in accordance with the Delegation of Authority Matrix. Delegation to a country or regional office is regarded by representatives in governments and the EAC as an important measure to ensure effective decision making by the Bank. The project components (CC-TTFA and Support to the EAC Secretariat) were subject to between one and two supervision missions annually, which was sufficient. The

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missions were undertaken efficiently and focused on implementation issues; for example, progress, financing, procurement/disbursement, reporting, and institutional arrangements. These missions also took note of requests for additional support from the Bank.

Promoting Public-Private Partnerships

The Bank-financed PPP projects reviewed44 were often reactive to contextual and market constraints. The projects faced several external shocks (change in client’s logistical chains, institutional challenges with governments, and financial drawbacks linked to social unrest), but proceeded without major addenda to their initial contracts. In Tunisia, payments of concession fees were delayed, but the TAV Tunisia operator relied on TAV International to meet its basic financial obligations (salaries and other running costs), while developing an aggressive marketing program targeting new markets for tourism. In Djibouti, the congestion of the container terminal caused by the dysfunctional Ethiopian para-public shipper was addressed by DCT, a subsidiary of Dubai World Port, by extending the storage platform with own resources. These investment strategies rely on sound market development prospects for the duration of the concession contract (approximately of 20 to 30 years). A state-owned firm would never have overcome such issues, or, at best, would not have overcome them without considerable additional budgetary transfers from the government.

Because the profitability of the concession holders is strongly linked to the expected outputs, their achievement is often a reflection of the soundness of the initial business plan and the financial viability of the concession holder. The outputs include dwelling time, annual passenger traffic, journey time, and the like, which are critical

enabling factors for freeing initiatives and reducing the share of transport costs in import and export prices. Providing some form of economic regulation ensures that markets stay competitive or become so. Concession holders’ revenues are directly linked to the delivery of outputs.

The contractual agreement frees the concession from routine administrative constraints and petty corruption. This somewhat artificial business environment facilitates the achievement of outcomes so long as the contractual obligations are respected by both parties. This was the case in Djibouti and Tunisia, but not for the Lekki Toll Road Project in Lagos State. The limiting factor of these Bank projects is the lack of a strategic plan to promote more positive effects for the local economy (for example, the Djibouti terminals).

Achievement of outcomes such as regional integration, tourism development and urban mobility is, in turn, largely left to market forces. Support to PPPs continues to align with the Bank’s overarching development mandate. Concession holders are necessarily committed to improving performance and complying with contractual obligations, but not with optimizing the multiplier effects on the local or regional economy. Leaving economic and social benefits solely to market forces in a context that has strong tendencies toward cartelization among a few firms with connections to political figures or those that operate within the informal sector is risky and might affect sustainability. In the case of the Djibouti port terminals, for instance, almost all benefits go to Ethiopian operators, from freight forwarders, transporters, producers, and consumers. Job creation in Djibouti has been limited to less than 1,000 employees and 4,000 part-time docker workers. Similarly, TAV, the concession holder for Enfidha-Monastir Airports, was left on its own to find solutions after the 2011 crash in tourism flows to Tunisia.


Sustaining Results

Sustainability of project results is highly important for achieving high-level development impacts such as economic growth and poverty reduction. Fundamentally, the AfDB contributes financially to build or improve a transport infrastructure, while the host government commits to protect and maintain it.

Maintaining Assets Built with Bank Assistance

Roads constructed or improved with the Bank’s assistance were rarely subject to preventive maintenance. Out of the 6 projects reviewed in the sustainability cluster evaluation (OPEV 2013c), adequate routine maintenance was implemented only in Mozambique as part as the national maintenance programming. Among the projects examined in the case studies and sustainability evaluation of the Bank’s assistance to the transport sector, only Namibia stands out as maintaining its road asset built with the support of the Bank.

Bank-supported transport assets are not being maintained due to dysfunctional infrastructure maintenance systems in host countries and significant maintenance backlogs. When a country faces a maintenance backlog, routine maintenance of newly rehabilitated roads is postponed in order to address more urgent demands. The sustainability of Bank-supported transport projects is tied to improvement of the overall transport maintenance system in RMCs, including the capacity of executing agencies to secure financial resources and improve effectiveness of contractual management for maintenance operations.

Supporting RMC Maintenance Systems

There has been no clear relationship between the Bank’s transport sector assistance and the improvement of the nationwide resources for maintenance. The cluster evaluation on sustainability (OPEV 2013c) and coverage ratios for maintenance needs in the 10 countries with a Bank

Table 3: Routine road maintenance coverage ratio in selected countries in Africa

Country Annual Increase in road funds resources Coverage ratio of routine maintenance needs (%)Chad 8% (2001–12) 65

Uganda 10% (2008–11) 34

Mauritius 13% (2009–10) Not known

Ghana 2% (2006–11) 38

Madagascar 35% (2005–08) 42

Mozambique 3% (2004–11) 100

Benin 9% (2003–08) 100

Lesotho 16% (2008–12) 52

Cameroon 28%(1999–11) 68

Mauritania 5% (2007–12) 80

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road project demonstrate that there is still scope for improvement in most countries. This finding was confirmed for almost all countries covered by the two other evaluations. In contrast, in the portfolio review (OPEV 2013e, p. 25), out of 17 PCRs/Project Completion Report Evaluations (PCRENs) in the road subsector, only 8 rated the extent to which project achievements are expected to last. Based on this limited sample, 7 projects (87 percent) were rated as satisfactory in terms of sustainability, and the remaining project was rated as unsatisfactory.

Most of projects evaluated did not seek to improve nationwide maintenance systems, thus not addressing the issue of sustainability.

Typically, sustainability is addressed in an extremely narrow fashion in PARs and any assessment is often limited to the impact of project costs on the national maintenance requirements. However the amount added to overall maintenance costs from one individual project is often minimal (a few hundred kilometers at most out of at least 20,000–40,000 for the network). These projects can even subtract from costs for sealing earth roads that are expensive to maintain, if they are maintained in accordance with standards, which is all too often not the case. Therefore, this assessment does not adequately reflect the ability of the country to maintain bank-supported transport assets over the long-term.

Analyses of the effectiveness of maintenance systems provided in PARs are often brief and optimistic. For all projects reviewed, infrastructure maintenance, and specifically road maintenance, is nevertheless clearly identified as the prime condition for sustainability of the AfDB contribution to development. Tunisia, for example, committed to a budget increase over three-to-four years as a guarantee for Bank support in improving the network conditions. PARs have rarely reported on the ratio of maintenance needs coverage45 or the growing maintenance backlog (OPEV b, Tunisia

Country Report). The discussion has generally been limited to the growth of resources available over the years. These reports fail to account for the complexity of restoring operational systems, most notably that increasing resources for road maintenance is limited by low absorption capacity, weak road administration and nascent local construction industries, which are sometimes already crippled by market failure.

The lack of prospects for the improvement of maintenance and protection systems has led to a tendency to over-design road projects. Road structure and sealing are adjusted for ambitious traffic projections as well as the constraints of the natural environment. In an increasing number of cases, engineering design has anticipated the lack of maintenance (sealing thickness, drainage) and traffic regulation (axle load control). Work supervision in most of the cases reviewed ensured proper enforcement of the technical specifications, as far as a quick visual inspection can determine this. Issues were identified for the Chad (Djermaya-Massaguet) and the Cameroon projects directly after the completion of work. In Madagascar, in contrast, the National Road n°2 is still in good condition after six years, but it still requires periodic maintenance. During project implementation, the Bank’s supervision was flexible in adjusting for structural or engineering issues that were inadequately examined by technical feasibility studies, which has enhanced the sustainability of the road.

There is evidence that lessons learned pertaining to road maintenance are already being applied by the Bank in new regional projects such as the Central Corridor, which has integrated maintenance into policy dialogue, with a particular concern for bringing in earmarked resources to cover the maintenance needs of a significant share of the network. This was already the case for the BOAT Corridor, designed in the early 2000s, which had the objective of creating genuine second-generation road funds46 in Burkina Faso


and Mali, and increasing the fuel levy in Ghana. The Ghana levy is still well below the African benchmark for cost recovery of US$0.1/L,47 and currently at US$0.03/L, having not been revised since 2005. As a result, this project has come to completion without having improved the likelihood that it will be adequately maintained.

The BOT schemes face fewer concerns regarding sustainability, since they ensure that maintenance will be undertaken in the coming years. The concession holders are contractually obligated to return the facilities in good order after 20 (Djibouti port terminals) to 40 years (Enfidha-Monastir Airports), without involving further public funding. The PPP sites visited during the field missions have been kept well maintained, even if some minor repairs have been postponed in response to the firm’s financial situation in specific cases (e.g. DCT in Djibouti, Enfidha in Tunisia).

Protecting Infrastructure Assets

Axle load control is a key issue in most road projects, but has often not been addressed during project implementation; RMCs find it difficult to overcome the resistance of importers, wholesalers, and haulage truckers. Weighting equipment was acquired as part of a project in just

two cases: Kicukiro-Kirundo and the BOAT Corridor. For the Rwanda-Burundi connection, the axle load control system was not operational due to a lack of spare parts. In Tema Port, this system is still under construction. In West Africa, only Niger is strict about axle load control, which applies to the Dori–Téra Road up to the border. Even harmonization of national regulations along a regional corridor looks insurmountable; for instance, in the case of the BOAT Corridor, the axle load issue delayed the project for months. Ghana currently applies stricter rules in axle load control than the surrounding countries, which seems to affect the traffic flow on competitor corridors. The Cameroon Corridor toward Chad stands as an exception, thanks to the combined efforts of the AfDB and the EU in harmonizing asset protection regulations which have convinced Cameroon to take strong action by multiplying weighting bridges, tightening controls over weighting station management, and adopting new technologies. Mozambique is unique in strictly enforcing axle load control on its trunk road network.

Sustainability concerns are real, but are often not reflected at the project level. The results of Bank assistance, even a simple rehabilitated road, become more apparent over the course of several years and are dependent upon ongoing maintenance. Regardless, Bank follow-up often ceased after the administrative closure of a project.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

The following conclusions are organized according to the main findings from a review of background papers (including those of the policy/literature review (OPEV 2013d), the portfolio review (OPEV 2013e), country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b), cluster evaluation on sustainability (OPEV 2013c), and cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a) which formed the basis for this synthesis. The same headings are used to structure the recommendations.

Conclusions

Finding 1: The Bank’s assistance contributed to mobility and accessibility, but rarely to the expected level.

All AfDB transport projects contributed to increased mobility and accessibility. In addition, multi-country projects contributed to regional integration, and port/airport projects helped connect beneficiary countries to international markets and flows. Bank transport projects thus made a distinctive contribution to Africa’s development. All three sets of evaluations testify to reduced travel times and VOC, increased traffic, enhanced mobility owing to increased transport supply, increased freight flows, and local development dynamics overall through agriculture and trade.

Achievement of project outputs is the strong point of AfDB assistance. All evaluated projects achieved this first level of expected results, whether through work as planned or at the cost of increased project cost or duration. For all of the projects,

achievement of outputs was documented through supervision and completion reports.

AfDB assistance to improving transport infrastructure freed market forces and individuals from insurmountable transport constraints. The gains can be extraordinary when existing conditions are very poor. These gains are more diffuse for more developed networks, but individual benefits are multiplied by far greater traffic volumes. These gains represent an invaluable contribution to Africa’s development.

However the results for short-term (intermediate) outcome indicators stated in project logframes are too often far from initial expectations, because these indicators are often overly optimistic and/or dependent on delivery of commitments from RMCs. Detailed analysis of the 17 PCRs indicates that 56.3 percent of the projects recorded an EIRR above its ex ante level, while 25 percent registered less than the ex-ante level but higher than the opportunity cost. For less quantifiable indicators, achievements were even more elusive.

The results of regional initiatives are proportionate to RMCs’ commitment to the project and to regional integration in general: promising for Central and East Africa, and less so for West Africa. The projects developed a comprehensive strategy, balancing infrastructure with institutional development, as well as with transport facilitation. The project approach was expanded to include policy dialogue based on ESW (for the Central Corridor) which supported the Bank’s credibility with RMCs and the donor community involved in regional integration. These multi-country projects benefited from the

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Bank’s decentralization policy, and field officers demonstrated their capacity to utilize their knowledge of and connection with the local enabling environment.

The new generation of projects, particularly those projects targeting regional (that is, multi-country) corridors, made far more consistent use of ESW and the logical framework. The Central Corridor project is the best example of a project with a sound logical framework with clearly stated short-term outcomes, specific and measurable indicators, and a convincing storyline underlying the strategy, based on several pieces of ESW. The same can be said, although to a lesser extent, of the BOAT Corridor.

Regional/multinational projects have, however, demonstrated that implementation of a policy and regulatory framework to promote infrastructure protection (for example, axle load limits) by an individual RMC generates market distortions, and generally benefits operators in neighboring countries that are lagging behind in this respect. This also applies to safety and cross-cutting issues such as environmental regulations and the fight against HIV.

Of the four PPP projects reviewed, three achieved their intended outputs – namely profitability of the private undertaking, provision of higher-quality services, and investment. Little consideration was given, however, to the achievement of outcomes, including government revenue and the trickle-down effects for the local economy (in Djibouti in particular). Although profitability is the primary goal of PPPs, it would be beneficial to give more consideration to local development.

Finding 2: Dysfunctional infrastructure asset protection and maintenance systems limit the sustainability of the results achieved through Bank-assisted projects.

With the except for the PPP projects, for which sustainability is a contractual obligation over the course of 20 to 40 years, sustainability is a

major concern for the Bank’s transport sector projects. Fundamentally, the Bank provide financial contributions to help build or improve transport infrastructure whereas the host government commits to exploit and maintain this infrastructure. Roads constructed or improved with Bank assistance have rarely been subject to preventive maintenance.

PARs provide only brief and optimistic analyses of the effectiveness of the maintenance systems in RMCs. Any discussion of sustainability is often narrow in scope. For example, the impact of the recurrent costs related to the project on the nationwide maintenance budget. Any discussion of maintenance is limited to the recurrent cost induced by individual projects.

The Bank’s knowledge base on infrastructure asset protection and maintenance is not adequately documented. The lack of non-lending activities resulted in limited opportunities to enlarge project supervision to include items such as policy dialogue, information systems, strategic principles, diagnostics, planning and results-based monitoring. Instead project supervision has primarily involved the management of individual projects, an approach which places emphasis on short-term problem solving.

Improvement of road maintenance systems has focused mainly on resource mobilization (setting up road funds) and has not given sufficient consideration to improving absorption capacity of both the administration and the private sector or to quality control expected from road agencies.

Axle load control has been noted as a key issue in most road projects, but generally did not drive the development of new policies or regulations by RMCs or the acquisition of suitable weighting equipment. RMCs found it difficult in most cases to overcome the resistance of importers, wholesalers, and haulage truckers. The Bank’s project approach has placed insufficient emphasis on policy decisions that have significant social or political consequences. In some rare cases, axle load control did not even


materialize during project implementation. The situation has recently begun to change through the joint efforts of development partners, as in Cameroon.

Finding 3: The 1993 transport policy did not channel Bank assistance toward a forward-looking vision for Africa’s transport sector.

Projects do not refer to a specific transport sector policy, or even a shared understanding of guiding principles such as a unified theory of change or policy framework. Each individual project creates its own reference framework, generally based on the appraisal mission’s views on what the effects (outputs and outcomes) of a new or improved road or railway track should be. These reference frameworks may even be based on the expectations communicated by the Bank’s Board.

The Bank’s transport sector projects have placed excessive emphasis on road upgrading, at least within a forward-looking vision of Africa’s transport systems. Africa will increasingly see diversified demand for mobility and accessibility across all means and modes of transport, from rural transport to improved connections with the world’s economic centers.

The underlying principles of the 1993 transport sector policy are still sound to some extent, but there is an urgent need to integrate some recent and major developments into the sector policy framework, as well as the lessons learned over the past 20 years. Furthermore, this policy framework has not been translated into a comprehensive action plan to govern transport sector activities. Africa’s transport challenges are constantly evolving and require regular policy updates to ensure the ongoing relevance of the Bank’s assistance. Finally, the current transport policy does not convey a clear-cut and comprehensive theory of change that could unite the Bank’s initiatives in the transport sector under a common vision for transportation in Africa.

There is an ongoing need for a transport sector policy and regularly- updated action plan that cover all modes of transport, reinforce operational synergies between RISPs and CSPs and enhance the Bank’s leadership in the transport sector. Some issues on which the AfDB could place additional emphasis are: (i) performance-based contracting; (ii) road and aviation safety; (iii) competition in the road freight industry; (iv) streamlining procurement procedures; (v) ensuring there is sufficient competition when tendering; (vi) translating transport strategies into action plans; and (vii) advocating with member states to encourage greater private sector opportunities.

Finding 4: Excessive emphasis placed on ensuring alignment with RMC investment plans has worked against the strategic selection and prioritization of transport sector assistance at the country level.

The transport projects are appraised and managed in isolation, without a well-defined framework for building on synergies between transport subsector, as well as with other sectors. CSPs do not necessarily reflect the Bank’s transport sector strategy. The resulting strategy papers are superficial, not action-oriented, with only limited linkages to the Bank’s overall policies.

Actions taken to address the needs of the population are often limited to contributing to a national development or poverty reduction plan. Accordingly, the rationale of transport projects is not assessed through ESW or justified by comparison with alternative options and discussed inclusively with RMCs in a country transport action plan. Such an approach would help articulate priorities, funding gaps, investment plans, and the like. The mere fact that projects contribute to a national plan and are requested as such by the governments has been considered sufficient to justify the implementation of a given project.

Alignment with RMCs transport sector investment policies has not ensured the best added value for


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Bank assistance. A country-specific transport action plan should be provided as an annex to the CSPs. Such a document would look at the country needs and macro-level economic potential and use these forecasts to identify possible funding gaps.

Finding 5: Market failures in the transport services and the construction industry are absorbing a substantive share of the economic benefits of Bank assistance.

Market failures and governance issues in transport operations are working against efforts to reduce high transport prices, which is imperative for Africa’s development. Almost everywhere on the continent, experience has demonstrated repeatedly that various forms of market failure such as cartelization and governance issues (customs corruption, roadblocks) are creating market distortions. This phenomenon can be seen, for example, with the BOAT Corridor (inefficiencies and corruption in Tema Port, tour de role among truckers and corruption in dry ports, roadblocks, non-harmonized axle load regulations).

Market failures in the construction industry are similarly hampering transport infrastructure development. The ability of the executing agencies to implement Bank projects within the agreed duration and cost is limited, not only by the increase of the cost of construction products but also by cartelization among the few existing construction firms and misuse of public funds, including corruption. These essential factors have not been addressed by Bank projects nor considered through policy dialogue or country-centered ESW.

Finding 6: Policy dialogue as well as other non-lending activities were not mobilized sufficiently contribute significantly to sustainably achieving Bank assistance objectives.

The projects in the transport sector have generally not been used to promote policy dialogue on

transport issues. Even though it often represents a sizable share of country-level investment plans, the Bank’s assistance has not been perceived by RMCs as an opportunity or an obligation to engage in dialogue about existing or emerging policy issues. Bank projects could have been leveraged as opportunities to discuss serious issues in the transport sector such as maintenance, value for money of works, institutional weaknesses and accountability.

The Bank’s contribution to transport sector development through non-lending activities was marginal. The Bank has only engaged in ESW and policy dialogue as part of its most recent regional corridor project.

There is an apparent skills gap among staff within the Bank with respect to transport sector policy and dialogue as well as institutional development. Hiring consultants has not become a common practice. Experience and skills are concentrated on the roads subsector, largely leaving the other modes of transport aside, even though these other forms of transport are the future of Africa’s infrastructure development (aviation, railways, maritime transport and ports).

Decentralization has contributed to greater emphasis being placed on non-lending activities.

Finding 7: Although recent trends have been encouraging, further improvements in quality at entry will be critical for enhancing the performance of Bank assistance, most notably for achieving ambitious results at the outcome level.

Quality at entry controls largely continue to be formal requirements that emphasize technical issues and the achievement of outputs. In particular, there is a need for greater emphasis to be placed on ensuring the existence of an enabling environment for Bank projects.

The skills mix of staff assigned to appraisal missions does not adequately reflect the need


for an integrated approach which involves a combination of both lending and non-lending activities. Engineers and economists are over-represented among appraisal team members, making it difficult to design and pursue policy reforms as well as institutional and capacity development. Bank staff have become more conversant in policy dialogue, but key issues subject to policy dialogues are becoming so diverse and specialized that specialists are increasingly required. Hiring consultants has not become a common practice; they represent an average of only 0.06 mission members, though the number of consultants hired has recently been increasing.

Combining of infrastructure and institutional development in Bank projects has not been the rule. While lack of institutional capacity is generally acknowledged, accompanying measures have not been implemented systematically into transport projects.

There is scope for further improvement in identifying and facilitating drivers of change throughout the appraisal process. There is further room for improvement in the analysis of project assumptions and risks, which makes up a routine part of the project appraisal process.

EIRR is calculated and tested for one individual project and engineering design. Instead, this information would be useful to guide decision-making regarding road network management strategy, prioritize proposed projects at the country-level or choose between alternative designs, provided that sufficient forecasting capacity could be developed.

The Bank’s staff have had to rely on poor contextual data provided by RMCs to set the context for the Bank’s assistance context and foresee potential transport challenges. The presence of field offices is facilitating access to more in-depth and updated background information.

Although great emphasis has been placed in ensuring the quality of engineering design for transport projects, these efforts have often been insufficient to ensure safe implementation of Bank transport projects, road projects in particular.

Deficits in quality at entry are resulting in delays and cost overruns. Cost overruns were almost inevitable given project design and management and were then exacerbated by delays. The main causes of cost overruns were constant and steady price hikes of oil products and their sub-products, which are essential to infrastructure construction. The extent of increases in unit prices seen over the reference period were unprecedented. Market failure in the public works industry in Africa further compounded cost overruns and prevents any stabilization or decrease in unit prices over the foreseeable future.

In contrast, the PPP projects reviewed incurred minimal delays and cost overruns, due in part to the needs of private operators to ensure the profitability of concessions.

Finding 8: Project supervision has exclusively focused on implementing activities rather than contributing to the achievement of higher-level objectives.

The Bank’s supervision has supported executing agencies in the management of projects. Bank staff have been flexible and responsive in addressing implementation issues, often to the extent that reaching reasonable proxy of outputs with limited delays and cost overruns becomes the main – if not the only – driving factor of Bank project management, without any further reference to the outcomes.

Overall, however, supervision remains unsatisfactory. Despite increases in frequency, the quality of supervision during project implementation remains an area of concern. In the portfolio review, the lack of an appropriate skills mix within the supervision


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teams was frequently mentioned as an issue of concern. Deficits in skills set among supervision teams has made it difficult for the Bank to respond to institutional challenges that emerge during the implementation of projects.

Assessments of the extent to which completed construction work complies with initial technical specifications has largely been left to the executing agencies. Hiring an independent consultant to do a technical audit during implementation is now becoming standard practice.

Environmental mitigation plans and accompanying social measures have not been followed adequately – and, therefore, have not been implemented as planned – throughout the Bank’s projects.

Project supervision has placed undue emphasis on project management and activity-based monitoring as opposed to results-based monitoring. Results-based supervision was only introduced in 2012 via the Implementation Progress and Results Reporting (IPR) system.

Finding 9: AfDB positioning in the division of labor among other donors has led it to keep a low profile in RMC reform agendas.

Although the Bank has been involved in donor coordination, its involvement in platforms for transport sector policy dialogue had been limited for a long time. Most coordination with other donors had focused on shared investment in the improvement of infrastructure according to, investment plans endorsed by RMCs. However, the Bank has often been seen as the last-resort donor. More recently, however, the Bank has taken the lead in donor coordination for some transport sector projects, including those Rwanda and Burundi.

The introduction of field offices as part of the decentralization process has had a clear impact on

the management and implementation of the new generation of regional projects: more presence, more authority, better understanding of the local context, and better personal connections.

Finding 10: Results-based monitoring and evaluation practices implemented to date have not been sufficient to improve the performance of Bank-supported projects.

The Bank has struggled to demonstrate the achievement of short-term outcomes. These difficulties are rooted in shortcomings in the identification and appraisal stages, and then reinforced by project implementation practices. The quality of the logical frameworks among the sample of approved projects has been uneven. These frameworks rarely identify quantitative and time-bound short-term outcome indicators; more often, vague statements about impacts on, agriculture, regional integration, and public investments are presented with little credible supporting evidence.

Any assessment of the extent to which outcomes have been achieved has typically been postponed to project completion. Monitoring of the results achieved has often been left to the executing agencies, who have also generally been unable to provide sufficient baseline data. Furthermore, assessments of the extent to which results have been achieved at the outcome level have tended to cease after the Bank’s administrative involvement in a project has come to an end. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that results monitoring continues beyond the project implementation period in order to fully capture the extent to which outcomes have been achieved.

For more recently approved projects, however, baseline data collection and monitoring have been better incorporated into the implementation of the project, either as part of an independent contract or the construction supervision services. In addition, these activities have typically sought to assist the


executing agency in identifying and measuring the results achieved and build their capacity for results-based monitoring and management.

Bank staff continue to require support in implementing results-based monitoring. However, the recent introduction of the IPR system has demonstrated potential for improving results-based monitoring across the Bank’s operations.

Recommendations

The following ten key recommendations are based on evidence from the policy/literature review (OPEV 2013d), portfolio review (OPEV 2013e), country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b), and cluster evaluations (OPEV 2013a, c). These recommendations correspond to findings 1 through 10 presented in the previous section. In addition, the recommendations provide a proposed approach for addressing some of the issues identified. It should be noted that, in many cases, OITC has at least partly anticipated and addressed concerns raised in this evaluation.

1 Adopt a holistic approach.

2 Enhance sustainability.

3 Update the Bank’s transport sector policy and strategy with a new action plan.

4 Improve the sector approach at the RMC level.

5 Tackle market failures and secure a level playing field.

6 Mainstream policy dialogue.

7 Improve quality at entry.

8 Improve supervision.

9 Scale up the Bank’s role in policy dialogue and donor coordination.

10 Improve the monitoring and evaluation system, both inside and outside the Bank.

Recommendation 1: Adopt a holistic and coherent approach for implementing the other nine recommendations of the evaluation.

The Bank should incorporate non-lending activities such as policy dialogue, institutional restructuring, and capacity development into its support for transportation infrastructure. The required skills set for project managers and teams involved in these activities should be adjusted accordingly to cover new fields and instruments, including policy dialogue and ESW.

Increased emphasis should be placed on multi-country assistance, which combines infrastructure development, transport facilitation, corridor institutional development, harmonization of the haulage market regulations, and integration of the logistic chain with rail and port operations. The adoption of international or regional standards should be identified as a prior condition for these projects.

Additional emphasis should also be placed on the development of regionally harmonized transport policies and regulatory frameworks, by supporting RMCs and RECs.

The Bank should also increase its focus on PPPs via a “bottom-up” approach, which relies on private partners to identify viable business opportunities. In doing so, the Bank should also ensure that RMCs have access to legal facility and counseling to strengthen their negotiating position and enable them to reach a fair agreement with private concession holders. Finally, the Bank could analyze means for maximizing the development potential for the local economy in the context of PPPs, support the development of PPP-enabling policy and legal frameworks and investment plans.

Recommendation 2: Enhance sustainability.

Infrastructure asset protection and maintenance should be prioritized at all stages of the project


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cycle and via non-lending activities such as policy dialogue and capacity building. This support should adopt a sector-wide perspective in this regard, ensuring that public sector reform and weaknesses in public finance management are addressed in a systematic manner.

The Bank should drive this much-needed change in approach by deepening its knowledge base on asset protection and maintenance and placing increased emphasis on ESW and non-lending activities, such as policy dialogue and provision of technical assistance. Policy reform and institutional capacity building could be explicitly incorporated into contractual agreements.

The Bank should place increased emphasis on both resource mobilization and absorption capacity for road maintenance, including: (i) the clearing of maintenance backlogs; (ii) the development of strategies for improving contract management capacity within both central and decentralized public administration; and (iii) support for the establishment of a competitive and robust construction sector. It may take some time to build the capacity of private construction industries; these industries may even need to be built from scratch in the case of post-conflict situations or in countries with long-standing governance issues.

The sustainability of the results achieved should be monitored following the completion of an AfDB-supported project. This long-term monitoring should be incorporated into RMCs’ monitoring system at the sector-program level in a manner to ensure that the achievement of results at the outcome level is properly assessed.

Recommendation 3: Update the Bank’s transport sector policy and strategy and develop a concrete transport sector action plan.

The Bank should update its transport sector policy and strategy. In doing so, the Bank should

adopt a more focused, strategic and integrative approach to transport sector support that places additional emphasis on tackling RMC’s administrative and market failures that will not contribute to the achievement of short-term outcomes and sustainable development results. Numerous policy developments have taken place in Africa’s transport sector since 1993, and the Bank must take the lead for Africa in incorporating these lessons learned and new developments into a new transport policy and strategy. The depth of the Bank’s expertise in the African transport sector that has been developed over the years will add value to the process of elaborating a comprehensive yet realistic transport policy framework.

As part of this process, the Bank should identify an underlying theory of change for the transport sector, which can then serve as the common framework for Bank staff to operationalize this vision into the new policy, strategy and action plans. Efforts should be undertaken to develop the necessary skills set among operational staff to help implement this vision.

Annexes to the Bank’s transport sector action plan in the upcoming new transport strategy should be used to elaborate regional strategies (regional transport action plans), using the same country groupings as those used for RISPs in order to help operationalize the strategy and identify synergies between infrastructure development and regional integration.

Recommendation 4: Improve the sector approach at the RMC level.

The Bank should elaborate and periodically update a country transport action plans or roadmap that is aligned with CSPs. Such an approach could add value to the country sector portfolio and strategy.

ESW could be used more extensively to elaborate inclusive sector approaches at the RMC level


in close coordination with other donors. Updated country-level transport sector strategies and action plans, informed by ESW, should be provided as an annex to CSPs.

The process of prioritizing lending and non-lending activities in the transport sector could be done in a manner that is aligned with the transport policies and investment plans of RMCs. The Bank should bring about more added values in identifying such activities, not simply by using EIRR but by more rigorously exploring alternatives. In doing so, the Bank should help promote the availability of sub-sector data management systems and continuous availability of data that are essential to project selection and monitoring.

RMCs should be involved more systematically in developing sector-wide approaches. The Bank should consider mainstreaming support for certain essential reforms, such as the strengthening of maintenance systems as well as market, technical and economic regulation. These essential reforms could be based on an agreed agenda that has been developed inclusively with RMCs.

Recommendation 5: Tackle market failures and secure a level playing field for all aspects of the logistics chain.

Activities that seek to ensure a level playing field among private sector actors and appropriate regulation throughout the logistic chain should be mainstreamed into all projects in order to allow for price adjustments when operating costs are reduced by the Bank’s interventions.

The Bank should also ensure that a fair and competitive market exists for the construction industry by providing technical support to small and medium-sized enterprises as well as their intermediary organizations and ensuring access to suitable fundraising, procurement and supervision mechanisms.

Recommendation 6: Mainstream policy dialogue.

The Bank should strengthen its contribution to constructive policy dialogue in RMCs by undertaking targeted and strategic ESW in the transport sector, linking it to SSATP, PIDA, and other initiatives that support transport policy development and planning.

Recommendation 7: Improve quality at entry.

The Bank should ensure that RMCs follow best practices to prioritize transport infrastructure development projects. The Bank should also engage, where required, with RMCs to improve their capacity of data collection and management to operationalize transport models. EIRRs and related tools such as the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM) could be used to ensure the RMC’s prioritization and selection of transport infrastructure development projects, by referring to the Bank’s country transport action plan that is aligned with CSPs.

An assessment of the extent to which an enabling environment and sector governance is considered as sub-components of transport sector projects and/or sector-wide approach should be better integrated into the appraisal process in order to enhance quality at entry and promote the achievement of short-term outcomes. Devoting additional time and funding to ESW would be useful in this regard.

The Bank should improve quality at entry by providing technical support to executing agencies to enhance the quality and reliability of critical design inputs (e.g. databases, engineering, environmental and social impact assessment, etc.). Quality at entry appraisals should move beyond engineering and assessments of institutional implementation capacity toward an assessment of the extent to which a sufficient enabling environment


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exists to support project implementation. In particular, such an assessment would address issues such as governance, public finance management at sector level, procurement regulations and capacity of the existing construction industry. The Bank should consider more ESWs to support such assessments and continue to inform project’s adjustments during their life cycle.

Environment/social and organizational audits should be used more consistently to enhance efficiency in delivering assistance at two critical stages: (i) during project preparation (quality assessment of environment/social mitigation plans, safety audits, and resettlement plans); and (ii) after completion of the infrastructure component (ex post engineering, environment and social specifications audits).

Recommendation 8: Improve supervision.

Supervision should center upon monitoring performance and the achievements of short-term outcomes instead of activity management. Furthermore, the Bank should ensure that the skills set among supervision teams is appropriate to support the implementation of policy dialogue, capacity building and cross-cutting initiatives. Increased access to ESW during project implementation would be helpful in this regard.

Recommendation 9: Expand the Bank’s role in policy dialogue and donor coordination.

Reinforce the Bank’s involvement in donor coordination and transport sector thematic groups through leveraging the long-term partnership established with RMCs, providing extensive support

from specialists and placing additional emphasis on ESW. Accordingly, the Bank should ensure that staff have the appropriate skills set to support policy dialogue with RMCs, particularly staff posted in field offices

The Bank should guide and facilitate both the strategic direction of its own activities and donor coordination in the transport sector through investing in human resources and transport sector expertise within the Bank. A help desk should be made available to task managers and staff at field offices to support project identification and appraisal. This strategic guidance would be particularly beneficial as the Bank increases its engagement in policy advocacy and dialogue with RMCs.

Recommendation 10: Improve monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems both inside and outside the Bank.

The performance of projects should be assessed against objectively verifiable indicators. Particular emphasis should be placed on the achievement short-term outcomes in overall performance ratings.

The Bank should also improve the quality of short-term outcome indicators at the project level by ensuring that they are relevant, specific, targeted and time-bound and that they support the enhancement of subsector national monitoring systems in line with the new IPR system. The same set of core indicators should be used for all Bank activities in the transport sector to facilitate consistency and coherence in policy dialogue, supervision missions, and mid-term reviews.



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Annexes


The intervention logic (or theory of change) for the transport sector in Africa, illustrated below (Figure A1), is the basis for the analytical framework of this evaluation. The figure explains the multidimensional causal links that go beyond provision of physical infrastructure to encompass the broader outcomes occasioned by the Bank’s assistance. The evaluation questions were then selected with regard to the issues of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the Bank’s operations in the transport sector, with reference to the intervention logic. The questions were further narrowed down and specified following the portfolio review (OPEV 2013e) and the literature/policy review (OPEV 2013d), and they provided a framework for the country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b).

Annex A — Evaluation Framework

Input

Civil Works

Capacity Building

Financial Resource

ESW

Policy Dialogue

Output

Physical infrastructure

❙ Roads ❙ Railways ❙ Sea Ports ❙ Inland Waterways ❙ Airports ❙ Urban Transport System ❙ Inland Container

Terminal

Policies, Management and Capacity

❙ Regulatory Framework on Transport Industry

❙ One-Stop Border Posts ❙ Road Maintenance

Fund ❙ Operation and

Maintenance Skills of Transport Infrastructure

Transportation Time Savings

Transportation Cost Savings

Freight Cost Reduction

Freight Price (or Rate) Reduction

Connecting Missing Transportation Links

Improved Railway/Port/Airport Operation

Efficient Transshipment of Cargo from One Transport Mode to the Other

Border Crossing Time Reduction

Effective Asset Management of Physical Infrastructure

Longer Life of Physical Infrastructure

Enhanced Personal Mobility/Accessibility to/from Main Transport Hubs and to/from Rural Areas

Improved Transport Network Performance

Improved Logistics System

Reduced Cost of Input Goods and Services

Consumer Price Reduction

Congestion Reduction in Urban Area

Optimal Split between Modes of Transport

Competitive Environment for Private Sector

Favorable Environment for Pubic Service Delivery

Short-term outcomes

Long-term outcomes

Assitance Intervention

Logic

Evaluation Questions

EQ-1 Whether the Bank’s assistance is efficiently delivered or not

EQ-3 How relevant the Bank’s transport-related policies are to the Bank’s ability to respond consistently to the needs of recipient countries and other clients

EQ-4 To what extent the Bank’s assistance in transport has contributed to sustainable results

EQ-2 What the contribution of the Bank is to the transport sector of RMCs

Figure A1: Evaluation framework

83Annexes

The evaluation of the Bank’s effectiveness is limited by the availability of Project Completion Reports (PCRs). Seventeen PCRs are available from the group of 43 completed transport projects during the period from 2000 to 2011. This limitation was partially overcome with case studies and additional information provided by special thematic studies.

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Annex B — Africa’s Transport Challenges

Road networks are accumulating maintenance backlogs. On the whole, widespread adoption of road agencies and road funds has been effective and has led to improved operations and more finance for road maintenance. In a several cases these measures have not sufficed, owing to lack of government commitment. Maintenance needs of classified road networks (and all the more so for the extensive nonclassified networks) are still far from being covered either by budgetary resources or by users’ charges. Suitable levels of fuel levies are seen by governments as threatening political stability and the competitiveness of their economy. Roughly half of the African countries had shortfalls of 40 percent or more in annual road maintenance. In Chad, Uganda, and Niger, such expenditure shortfalls exceeded 60 percent. The focus is now on trying to make these institutional arrangements more effective.

Local construction industries are often nascent and construction costs keep rocketing upward. Little progress has been made in the development of local road construction industries, since initiatives have been somewhat ad hoc and have lacked follow-through. However, there is evidence of success in reducing the cost of road maintenance through the use of performance-based contracting. The costs of road construction in Africa have escalated alarmingly throughout the decade. Rising input prices and tight construction markets (which are largely beyond the control of the client countries) are major factors. However, the absence of sound tender competition and market failure are factors subject to regional member country (RMC) control.

Roads and road transport users are victims of the lack of regulation (economic and technical) and coordination of private operators. Little progress has been made, except in southern Africa, on the liberalizing of the road freight market. This has left haulage prices subject to cartelization and urban transport hostage to expensive substandard levels of service allowed by tour de role. Measures to prevent or reduce vehicle overloading (which severely damages the roads) have had some success in isolated instances such as Tanzania and Cameroon, but, overall, limited progress has been made because too few resources have been directed at such initiatives. Similarly, although much has been said about improving road safety, and road safety councils have been created in several countries, progress has been slower than hoped for, even if integrated interdepartmental strategies have been introduced, including laws and awareness campaigns. Enforcement by police forces remained the weak link in making a road safety breakthrough.

Rural transport needs to be an overall strategy rather than a series of unconnected projects. The focus in the last decade has been on how to prioritize rural road projects to maximize agricultural potential and how to provide better accessibility for rural communities. The know-how exists, but successful implementation requires good supervision and arrangements for sustaining the investment through appropriate maintenance. This has been achieved in individual projects, but not on a large scale. Rural passenger transport remains comparatively neglected and is often left to the private sector. Only isolated pilot projects have also been aimed at nonmotorized transport improvements, while this option has a demonstrated potential for a major breakthrough for many neglected rural areas.

Urban transport has not been perceived as a major issue until the last five years or so. Consequently, urban transport projects are still comparatively few, although successful initiatives in Lagos and Accra have encouraged additional projects in several other cities. There is much learning available from other continents

85Annexes

regarding the creation of metropolitan authorities, bus rapid transit (BRT), integrating fares on public transport, and the introduction of traffic management measures that can be absorbed in Africa. The role of the private sector is also an area that can be expanded.

Connections to international markets are improving. For ports, the trend has been to concentrate on international best practice in crafting suitable enabling legislation and ensuring appropriate safety standards are introduced, including improved navigational aids. For aviation, recent developments have been to encourage the establishment of regional and low-cost airlines, as well as improved safety and security standards in line with international practice.

Private sector concessions (roads, railways, ports, and airlines) are lagging behind compared with other parts of the world as a result of the poor enabling environment. There are very few toll road concessions, save for South Africa. Railways are often unattractive to the private sector because of the cost of rehabilitating old infrastructure in relation to likely volumes and unrealistic public service obligations. Ports offer the best opportunities through the landlord port model, and most of the larger ports have adopted this approach. Little progress, except in South Africa, has been made in establishing independent regulators.

The mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in transport projects, including safety, was kept marginal, owing to the shared engineering/economics background of development finance institutions (DFIs). The quality and reach of design and appraisal, to include environmental, social, and monitoring aspects, have improved since the mid-1990s, but supervision of safeguards in Africa continues to be a problem, with only 40 percent having satisfactory compliance. Indeed, a common theme was the need to improve the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) generally in order to better measure performance. Supervision and monitoring deficiencies48 constrain the ability to evaluate safeguards results. To date, only limited involvement can be seen in relatively new cross-cutting issues in Bank projects, such as work on HIV/AIDS (particularly in transport corridors), gender mainstreaming (though gender-specific practices in transport have also been introduced), and climate change. The same applies to the emerging theme of sector governance.

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Annex C — Strategies of the Bank’s 1993 Transport Sector Policy and New Developments Since 2000(new developments in italics)

Subsector Thematic issues

Detailed issues Strategy

Roads Construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation

❙ Continuing backlog of road maintenance

❙ Shortage of funding for road maintenance and construction

❙ Lack of maintenance monitoring ❙ Costs of maintenance too high ❙ Price escalations; lack of tender competition

❙ Emphasize maintenance, reconstruction over new construction ❙ Improve collection and disbursement of funds; establish second-generation road funds; identify candidates for toll roads and bridges

❙ Improve road fund organization and efficiency; introduce performance-based contracting

❙ Establish or improve road maintenance management systems ❙ Consider establishing smaller contracts; ensure sound transparency and publicity

Operations ❙ Inefficiency of force account operations

❙ Inadequate enforcement of axle load limits and insufficient weighbridges

❙ Inappropriate use of labor resources

❙ Weak institutional organization and management

❙ Reduce force account operations and increase use of private contractors

❙ Reform approach to enforcement by decriminalizing offenses and empowering weighbridge operators to levy on-the-spot fines; and investing in more weighbridges (the 1993 call to “Strengthen enforcement capacity at national level” has been dropped.)

❙ Increase use of labor-based road construction and maintenance, where appropriate

❙ Implement policy reforms in planning, financing, budgeting, and management; encourage establishment of autonomous road agencies

International traffic

❙ Inadequate access to land-locked and transit countries

❙ Physical and nonphysical barriers to regional transport and trade

❙ Lack of road freight competition leads to cartels

❙ Support development of international transport conventions ❙ Enact compatible road laws and regulations ❙ Develop policy to facilitate cross-border transport and coordination

❙ Improve selected road links ❙ Deregulate market entry for road haulage

Rural transport services

❙ Poor prioritization of rural roads ❙ Poor condition of rural roads ❙ Poor operational efficiency and financial performance

❙ Lack of access to intermediate transport vehicles

❙ Improve priority rural roads; use Road Economic Decision Model; examine agricultural potential versus distance to market; ensure transport expert on agriculture teams when transport content significant

❙ Encourage competition by reducing economic regulation ❙ Reduce government involvement in road transport service operations

❙ Encourage use of intermediate forms of transport technology, where appropriate (the 1993 call to “strengthen industries for rural transport vehicles” has been dropped.)

Appropriate technology

❙ Lack of appropriate design standards

❙ Overdesign of roads ❙ Inadequate local materials for low-volume roads

❙ Inappropriate use of local resources in road construction and maintenance

❙ Lack of road network planning

❙ Update and harmonize road design and engineering standards ❙ Better economic analysis of surfacing and design options ❙ Experiment in trial sections with other easily available materials ❙ Provide technical and management assistance to develop local road construction industry

❙ Establish national construction councils and appropriate training schemes

❙ Establish national strategic transport models to capture demand, test options, and advise elected officials and policy advisers

87Annexes



Road safety ❙ High rate of road accidents ❙ Establish national road safety councils to coordinate interdepartmental approach

❙ Revise road safety legislation ❙ Strengthen road accident data systems; provide police with enforcement equipment

❙ Improve road design, traffic management, and engineering standards

❙ Promote mandatory road safety audit at the stage of basic/detailed design and before completion certificate

Railways Institution ❙ Lack of management freedom and autonomy

❙ Inflexible management organization and procedures

❙ Inadequate management information systems

❙ Reform operating practices to reflect market-oriented approach; consider concessions, especially for non-core business activities

❙ Review railway organizational structure and better utilize middle management

❙ Modernize laws and regulations pertaining to railways ❙ Develop information procedures and data bases

Human resource development

❙ Shortage of skilled staff ❙ High degree of labor redundancy; workforce needs downsizing

❙ Inadequate human resource management

❙ Lack of labor incentives

❙ Establish and strengthen regional training facilities ❙ Gradually adjust labor force to match operating requirements; use multilateral development bank loan funds to pay for redundancy costs

❙ Reform and modernize management practices; utilize private sector

❙ Establish programs to provide labor incentives; utilize private sector

Technical ❙ Inadequate availability of rolling stock

❙ Insufficient traffic-costing data

❙ Difficult to find location of wagons

❙ Improve management of spare parts procurement, including access to foreign exchange

❙ Establish and strengthen traffic-costing units within railway marketing departments

❙ Introduce wagon-tracking system

Transport policy

❙ Railways aging and in need of investment

❙ Provision of uneconomic services for social or other reasons

❙ Shift of traffic from railways to road transport

❙ Failed railway concession

❙ Undertake market analysis and base investment on likely future traffic

❙ Establish performance agreements; contract to include coverage of public service obligations; establish concession policy and need for a regulator

❙ Review railway and road cost-recovery policies in line with international practice; long-distance bulk traffic is best carried by rail, and short-distance or urgent loads by road

Investment priorities

❙ Inadequate response to transport market conditions

❙ Poor conditions of infrastructure and rolling stock

❙ Adapt size and design of rolling stock fleet to traffic needs ❙ Improve maintenance management techniques ❙ Coordinate equipment acquisition and development at regional level

Safety ❙ Hazardous operating conditions due to poor condition of track and equipment

❙ Strengthen safety inspection capacity; improve maintenance practices

Maritime Institutions ❙ Inappropriate institutional framework for maritime administration

❙ Inadequate institutional support for multimodal transport

❙ Bottlenecks in customs and administration

❙ Establish and strengthen national organizations for maritime administration and revise legislation as appropriate to partner with the private sector

❙ Form a national trade and transport promotion group to address multimodal issues and maritime administration

❙ Follow international practice and create a “one-stop shop” for faster turnaround

An ID

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Management ❙ Inefficient management of ports and reluctance to introduce private sector concessions

❙ Lack of port security ❙ Hazardous coast for shipping ❙ Lack of organization and application of modern management practices by African shippers

❙ Reform management practices to encourage decision-making freedom, accountability, and use of the private sector, especially the “landlord” port model

❙ Strengthen the organization and staffing of port security; use private sector

❙ Improve navigational aids and procedures ❙ Improve organizational structure and management procedures following international best practice


❙ Inadequate training and human resource management

❙ Hazardous land and sea working conditions

❙ Establish and strengthen regional training programs; partner with the private sector where possible

❙ Review and improve work rules and regulations

Shipper coordination

❙ Lack of shipper representation in port administration and management decision-making

❙ Strengthen the role of shipper’s councils and other coordination bodies

Maintenance ❙ Inadequate shore-side and sea-side maintenance practices

❙ Shortage of skilled maintenance personnel

❙ Establish and strengthen maintenance management procedures; partner with private sector where possible

❙ Provide technical training programs for maintenance personnel; partner with private sector

Regional cooperation

❙ Lack of shipping policy coordination and cooperation

❙ Improve the organization and management of port associations

Inland waterway investment

❙ Lack of inland waterway facilities

❙ Prepare integrated investment plans and maintenance arrangements for inland waterways development

Multimodal regulation

❙ Inappropriate regulation of multimodal transport

❙ Rationalize regulation pertaining to multimodal transport

Aviation Aviation policy ❙ Policy unclear in respect of Yamoussoukro Decision permitting better packaging/sharing of intraregional services

❙ Lack of coordination of aeronautical policy

❙ Inadequate aeronautical legislation

❙ Clarify regional aviation policy in light of previous international and African Union agreements; negotiate appropriate regional airline arrangements; allow low-cost carriers to enter the market

❙ Strengthen organizations responsible for regional coordination of policy

❙ Modernize aeronautical laws and regulations


❙ Shortage or underutilization of training facilities and management

❙ Lack of skilled management and technical manpower

❙ Develop regional training programs and facilities; involve the private sector in appropriate partnership arrangements (pilot, technicians, logistics professionals, and the like)

❙ Strengthen technical and management training programs within existing regional institutions

Regional integration

❙ Lack of regional air transport services cooperation

❙ Promote pooling of aircraft and ground maintenance resources ❙ Encourage consolidation of air services through regional airports

Air service operations

❙ Lack of administrative organizations and management

❙ Role of government in airline operation

❙ Encourage the formation of airport management authorities ❙ Encourage appropriate regulation of operations emphasizing safety and standardization

❙ Promote commercialization and privatization of parastatal airline operations

❙ Encourage low-cost carriers to emergeAeronautical infrastructure

❙ Inadequate infrastructure maintenance management

❙ Poor condition of infrastructure ❙ Poor security; out-of-date-navigational aids

❙ Lack of financing for maintenance and rehabilitation

❙ Strengthen aircraft and ground maintenance management systems according to ICAO standards

❙ Rehabilitate runways, navigational aids, and other infrastructure ❙ Seek loan finance from MDBs to improve security and navigational aids

❙ Strengthen financial information systems and increase sources of financing; make use of private sector concessions where feasible

89Annexes



Urban transport

Institutions ❙ Lack of urban transport institutions and policies

❙ Lack of land use and transport planning coordination

❙ Lack of implementation capacity

❙ Lack of funds for urban transport

❙ Establish national or metropolitan transport coordination agencies; encourage the development of policies at the national level

❙ Establish metropolitan-, municipal-, or local-level implementing agency

❙ Reform municipal finances to secure revenue sources ❙ Establish detailed urban transport models, linked with the strategic models to carry forecast, testing of projects and selection based on best economic returns/usage

Public transport

❙ Shortage of public transport services

❙ No integration between urban transport modes

❙ No priority for buses ❙ No harmonization between bus and taxi modes

❙ Public transport is unaffordable

❙ Public transport is unsafe for women

❙ Create a regulatory environment encouraging private bus public transport services

❙ Create integrated ticketing/fare system ❙ Increase bus vehicle operating speeds through bus priority and bus rapid transit schemes

❙ Establish and enforce a public transport policy ❙ Welfare subsidies are preferable to transport subsidies ❙ Introduce gender-specific measures

Road network ❙ Inefficiency of existing urban road networks, leading to severe traffic congestion; cities are polluted by noxious vehicle emissions; vehicle technology is old, and many vehicles are unsafe

❙ Through traffic congesting city streets

❙ Motorcycles worsening traffic congestion

❙ Improve urban road maintenance and rehabilitation management and operations

❙ Implement traffic management schemes in major travel corridors; create and enforce parking policies; synchronize traffic signals

❙ Introduce and enforce emission standards, introduce annual vehicle road-worthiness testing

❙ Develop bypass roads and complete crucial sections of existing networks

❙ Develop urban traffic control systems, utilize urban transport models and advance telematics to render existing urban networks more efficient

❙ Establish the process for traffic impact assessments Establish the process for development cost contribution

Intermediate transport

❙ Lack of pedestrian facilities ❙ Shortage of intermediate transport facilities

❙ Develop pedestrian pathways, bridges, underpasses, and road crossings; develop restrictions for walkways and pedestrian areas; provide facilities for bicycles

Road safety ❙ High incidence of traffic accidents along major urban roads

❙ Lack of awareness of road safety issues

❙ Lack of road safety legislation ❙ High accident rate involving motorcycles

❙ Implement remedial measures at high-accident locations ❙ Implement appropriate urban traffic controls and focus enforcement along major corridors

❙ Introduce awareness campaigns and teach road safety in schools

❙ Introduce revised or new laws for seatbelts, speeding, and drinking under the influence

❙ Enforce wearing of helmets and provide better trainingHuman resource development

❙ Shortage of specialized knowledge and practical experience

❙ Shortage of specialized skills ❙ Project implementation units isolate and duplicate training

❙ Training initiatives uncoordinated

❙ Establish or strengthen training for transport management and maintenance skills; increase opportunities for on-the-job training and through Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program

❙ Policy to increase the number of public sector traffic engineers and transport planners

❙ Build capacity in departments/agencies, not project implementation units

❙ Have coordinated training strategy linked to civil service training initiatives

An ID

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Cross-cutting issues

Operations – client ownership

❙ Lack of progress on softer issues such as institutional strengthening

❙ Lack of client ownership ❙ Insufficient donor coordination, puts heavy burden on clients

❙ More emphasis on capacity building and policy frameworks ❙ Adopt more flexible lending instruments ❙ Move to less conditionality, client customization and more use of country systems

❙ Adopt Sectorwide Approaches and other programmatic approaches where feasible and hold regular donor/client coordination meetings

❙ Increase economic and sector work for transport funded through trust funds

Vehicle and driver licensing

❙ Outdated vehicle road licensing and customs duty systems

❙ Outdated driver licensing and driver’s safety training

❙ Review vehicle licensing and customs duty systems ❙ Review driver licensing and safety training ❙ Encourage more South-South cooperation in driver licensing.

Operations – speeding up processes

❙ Long time for no objection decisions

❙ Review procurement procedures (including transport) ❙ Decentralize more staff and make more decisions locally (including transport)

Operations – data gap

❙ Lack of data on which to base sound decisions

❙ African Infrastructure Country Diagnostic and Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program initiatives to help close knowledge gap

Operations – policy for fragile states and post-conflict countries

❙ Extremely weak institutional environment

❙ Develop guidelines for intervention in fragile states based on own and partners’ experiences; note that transport sector assistance is normally a high priority

Operations – policy for dealing with poor governance and corruption

❙ Reduced effectiveness of public administration

❙ Distorts allocation of public expenditures

❙ Erodes rule of law and trust in the state

❙ Prepare guidelines for staff to assist in reducing transport sector opportunities for corruption and fraud, especially in procurement

❙ Encourage greater transparency in procurement activities and bidding processes

❙ Ensure staff are aware of their responsibilities should they come across corrupt practices

Operations – policy for emergency disaster response

❙ Need to ensure that emergency disaster procedures follow best practice

❙ Review current procedures for best practice in transport procurement, rapid appraisal techniques, and inculcating mitigation measures in respect of future emergencies a “one-stop shop” for faster turnaround

Environmental and social policy – gender

❙ Gender issues not considered in transport projects

❙ Mainstream gender in transport projects; identify opportunities where women can play a role in the planning and implementation of road transport operations.

Environmental and social policy – climate change

❙ Climate change issues not considered in transport projects

❙ Identify transport projects where climate change can be expected to have an impact; develop a policy in respect of such projects

Environmental and social policy – HIV/AIDS

❙ HIV/AIDS impact in transport projects not mitigated

❙ Integrate HIV/AIDS prevention activities in transport corridor and specific transport projects including contract documentation

Environmental and social policy - safeguards

❙ Need to update environmental and social safeguard policies for transport projects

❙ Ensure best international practice is followed for safeguard categorization, procedures, involuntary resettlement and supervision (public and private sector projects)

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) – best practice

❙ Need to ensure best practice is followed in M&E in transport projects

❙ Ensure existing practices are reviewed and latest developments are adopted

91Annexes



M&E – development indicators

❙ Need to ensure best practice followed with transport development indicators

❙ Ensure existing practices are reviewed and latest developments are adopted

Donor coordination and harmonization

❙ Client countries are overwhelmed by multiple aid initiatives and entities

❙ Identify areas where progress can be achieved in transport projects in line with the Gleneagles Agreement

New lending instruments and trust funds

❙ Need to reform lending practices for transport in line with international best practice

❙ Identify which instruments are suitable and funds are available for transport projects and in what circumstances each should be used

Aid-for-Trade and regional cooperation

❙ Need to review effectiveness of Aid-for-Trade and regional cooperation projects

❙ Evaluate effectiveness of Aid-for-Trade and regional cooperation projects and establish which give the best returns

Note: There were no cross-cutting issues addressed in the 1993 policy, and that is why the balance of this portion of the annex is in italics.

An ID

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ion


Proj

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ex D

1 —

Mat

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ind

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s o

n E

ffec

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93Annexes

Ann

ex D

2 —

Mat

rix

of F

ind

ing

s o

n E

ffec

tiven

ess

Proj

ect N

ame

Gene

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ratin

g as

effi

cient

ly as

orig

inal

ly ex

pect

ed.

Brib

ery

and

chec

kpoi

nt c

osts

still

rife

alth

ough

redu

ctio

n.

Inst

itutio

nal S

uppo

rt fo

r Eas

t Afr

ica

Trad

e an

d Tr

ansp

ort F

acili

tatio

n Pr

ojec

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N/A

- Not

yet

infra

stru

ctur

e w

ork

Dwel

l tim

e in

the

Port

of D

ar e

s Sa

laam

, tra

nsit

time

and

trans

port

cost

s ha

ve

been

redu

ced

on th

e Ce

ntra

l Cor

ridor

.

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r Gra

nt c

losu

re, a

levy

of 0

.3 U

SD c

ent p

er to

nne

dry

carg

o (o

n tra

nsit

carg

o as

wel

l as

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l as

on

loca

l car

go in

Tanz

ania

) has

bee

n di

scus

sed,

but

whe

reas

the

levy

on

trans

it ca

rgo

has

been

agr

eed

by th

e tra

nsit

coun

tries

, the

loca

l levy

in Ta

nzan

ia is

still

un-r

esol

ved.

Aus-

Rosh

/ Pi

nah

road

Reh

abili

tatio

n (N

amib

ia)

Cons

truct

ion o

f 169

km

of

bitum

en ro

adA

1 ho

ur s

avin

g fo

r a h

eavy

veh

icle

on a

sin

gle

trip.

Nort

hern

Rai

lway

Ext

ensi

on (N

amib

ia)

Cons

truct

ion o

f 248

km

of

railw

ay tr

ack

Unce

rtain

- de

viate

d

traffi

c an

d ro

ad c

ondi

tion

not m

onito

red.

RAM

P -

Rura

l Acc

ess

and

Mob

ility

Pr

ojec

t (Ni

geria

)UA

39

,40

mCo

nstru

ction

of 4

74 k

m o

f ru

ral r

oads

Like

ly bu

t the

dat

a av

aila

ble

is un

able

to a

sses

s th

e ex

tent

of a

chie

ving

the

prop

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out

com

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Impr

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Roa

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aint

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ce P

lann

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Littl

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fort

has

been

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far i

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gard

s to

stre

ngth

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stitu

tiona

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acity

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ross

Rive

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aint

enan

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ing.

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i Tol

l Roa

d (N

iger

ia)

PPP

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of 4

9 km

of u

rban

road

Impr

oved

Roa

d Sa

fety

:

An in

crea

se in

the

accid

ent r

ates

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drivi

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abits

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new

ly bu

ilt ro

ads.

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reha

bilit

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(Tun

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)UA

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ds

Railw

ay In

fras

truc

ture

Mod

erni

zatio

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(Tun

isia

)UA

61

mCo

nstru

ction

/reha

bilita

tion

of

railw

ay a

sset

sTh

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rget

s fo

r tra

ins’

del

ays

wer

e

achi

eved

(% o

f tra

ins

late

by

less

than

15 m

s re

duce

d fro

m 7

0 to

85%

–

expe

cted

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; Pho

spha

te tr

ains

late

by

less

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ours

redu

ced

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, whi

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itial t

arge

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).

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intro

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the

phys

ical c

ompo

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s di

d no

t com

prom

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e

redu

ctio

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; Tun

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Impr

oved

Fin

anci

al S

ituat

ion:

Rela

ted

activ

ities

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mpl

emen

ted.

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unis

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€ 70

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evel

of S

ervi

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Cont

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of a

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days

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ieve

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M

inim

ally

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eved

N

ot a

chie

ved

Uab

le to

eva

luat

e

Regi

onal

and

Cou

ntry

Cas

e St

udie

s: U

EMOA

/Gha

na R

oad

Prog

ram

me-

1, In

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port

for E

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frica

Tra

de a

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rans

port

Faci

litat

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Proj

ect,

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oad

Proj

ect,

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kki T

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ect,

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roje

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t, No

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ilway

Ext

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roje

ct, a

nd R

ailw

ay In

frast

ruct

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Mod

erni

zatio

n Pr

ojec

t-II.

Clus

ter E

valu

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n of

Mul

tinat

iona

l Roa

d Pr

ojec

ts:

Rwan

da-B

urun

di C

onne

ctin

g Ro

ad P

roje

ct, B

urki

na-N

iger

(Dor

i-Ter

a) C

onne

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ad P

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rans

port

Faci

litat

ion

betw

een

Doua

la a

nd N

djam

ena

Proj

ect.

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Annex E – Salient Data from the Portfolio Review

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Algeria

Mauritius

Guinea

Mauritania

Lesotho

Mali

Niger

Malawi

Sierra Leone

Chad

Swaziland

Rwanda

Madagascar

Benin

Djibouti

Namibia

Burundi

Togo

Nigeria

Mozambique

Cameroon

Burkina Faso

Dem Rep Congo

Kenya

Senegal

Ethiopia

Uganda

South Africa

Tanzania

Ghana

Gabon

Tunisia

Morocco

Multinational 27.15

12.86

12.50

6.68

4.25

3.48

3.44

3.27

2.98

2.65

2.63

2.15

1.82

1.61

1.46

1.35

1.18

1.01

0.89

0.88

0.84

0.75

0.70

0.67

0.48

0.44

0.37

0.35

0.29

0.25

0.24

0.20

0.11

0.07

Figure E1: Percentage Share of Bank’s Net Commitment in Transport Sector by Beneficiary Country

95Annexes

Table E1: Net commitment by subsector and beneficiary country (2000–11)

Road commitment (UA) Share (%)Multinational 5,101,013,214 33.8

Tunisia 708,838,327 13.9

Gabon 438,817,615 8.6

Ghana 278,993,423 5.5

Tanzania 228,472,722 4.5

Uganda 214,849,790 4.2

Kenya 172,826,912 3.4

Ethiopia 171,070,000 3.4

Morocco 129,136,691 2.5

Burkina Faso 119,817,696 2.3

Senegal 97,453,168 1.9

Mozambique 95,807,637 1.9

Nigeria 88,452,504 1.7

Cameroon 76,548,836 1.5

Burundi 66,100,000 1.3

Benin 54,920,385 1.1

Dem Rep Congo 52,450,000 1.0

Madagascar 47,384,036 0.9

Rwanda 46,200,000 0.9

Swaziland 44,194,227 0.9

Namibia 41,268,710 0.8

Chad 31,610,000 0.6

Sierra Leone 29,020,073 0.6

Malawi 24,104,000 0.5

Togo 23,310,000 0.5

Niger 22,811,309 0.4

Mali 19,000,000 0.4

Lesotho 16,632,073 0.3

Mauritania 15,550,764 0.3

Guinea 13,420,000 0.3

Mauritius 7,058,162 0.1

Total 5,101,013,214 100.0

Railways commitment (UA) Share (%)Morocco 255,608,476 43.1

South Africa 226,148,942 38.1

Tunisia 54,904,701 9.3

Multinational 34,720,874 5.9

Namibia 16,935,713 2.9

Algeria 4,478,307 0.8

Total 592,797,012 100.0

Air commitment (UA) Share (%)Morocco 254,680,842 51.3

Dem Rep Congo 88,600,000 17.8

Senegal 59,641,978 12.0

Tunisia 57,708,181 11.6

Ethiopia 25,038,858 5.0


Namibia 594,000 0.1

Total 496,613,859 100.0

Ports commitment (UA) Share (%)Djibouti 58,079,758 36.5

Togo 54,183,411 34.0

Cameroon 29,395,958 18.5

Senegal 17,040,565 10.7

Morocco 600,000 0.4

Total 159,299,692 100.0

More than subsector commitment (UA)

Share (%)

Morocco 204,704,798 92.8


Madagascar 1,743,099 0.8

Total 220,647,897 100.0

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Figure E2: Percentage share of donors in total cost of cofinanced projects in transport sector (2000–11)

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

AfDBGovernment & Bene�ciaries

EU, EC, EIBWorld Bank (IDA, IFC)

IsDBWADBOPEC

ABEDARegiona EC (CEMAC, WAEMU, ECOWAS)

Japan (JICA, JBIC)US Ex-IM Bank

AFDAFESD

SDFOthers bilateral (KFW, SIDA, DANIDA, KDF)

Private sectorOther contributer

36.8%22.6%

4.6%3.7%

1.3%0.7%0.6%0.6%

0.2%3.1%

2.0%1.4%

1.1%0.6%0.5%

16.3%3.9%

Table E2: Short-term outcome achievement by completed road projects

No. Project name Country Reduction in transport cost

Reduction in travel time

Reduction in VOC Increase in traffic flow

Roughness

Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act

1 Djougou-N’dali Road Improvement Project

Benin NA NA 50% NA 25% 29.8% 15% 329% NA

2 Second Road Program

Burkina Faso 5% 5% NA NA NA NA 5% 8% 6.0

3 Projet De Pistes Rurales(PPR)

Burkina Faso NA NA NA NA NA NA 3% NA NA

4 Projet D’aménagement De La Route Ambam-Eking

Cameroon NA NA NA NA 35-45% 35% 10% NA NA

5 Projet D’aménagement Routier Dans Les Provinces De L’ouest, Du Littoral Et Du Sud

Cameroon 20% NA NA 67%

35-45% 70% NA NA NA

6 Tetteh Quarshie Circle Mamfe Road Rehabilitation

Ghana NA 3% 20% 30% 20% 19% 25% 4-7% 80%

7 Mpharane-Bela Bela Road Upgrading Project

Lesotho NA NA 30% 48% 30-40% 41.3% 4% 4.8% From 20 to 3.0

8 Likalaneng-Thaba Tseka Road Project

Lesotho NA NA 30% 63% 30-40% 49% 4% 15.5% From 19 to 2

9 Rehabilitation De La Route Rn1 Bis

Madagascar NA NA NA NA 25% 25% 15% 15% NA

10 Projet De Construction De La Route Rosso-Boghé

Mauritania NA NA NA NA 63% NA 5-8% 36% NA

97Annexes

No. Project name Country Reduction in transport cost

Reduction in travel time

Reduction in VOC Increase in traffic flow

Roughness

Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act

11 South Eastern Highway Project

Mauritius NA NA 30mn NA 60% NA NA NA NA

12 Projet De Route Kicukiro - Kirundo

Multinational NA 70% 10% NA NA NA 10-15% 67% NA

13 Route Kankan-Kouremale-Bamako

Multinational NA NA NA 72% 25% 30% 15% 200% NA

14 Road Infrastructure Project

Rwanda NA NA 35% NA 45% NA 15% NA NA

15 Gitarama-Ngororero-Mukamira Road Project

Rwanda 40% 33% 50% NA NA 33% 10-15% 169% NA

16 Mbabane Bypass Road (2 Int. Rds Phase II)

Swaziland NA NA 40% 24.2% 30% 64.2% 4% NA 8 to 3 paved, 20 to 8 gravel

road

17 Roads Maintenance and Upgrading Project

Uganda NA NA 30% 66% 14% 40% NA NA NA

Note: Exp = Expected/planned; Act = Actual; NA = Not available.

Table E3: Implementation time overrun in road projects

No. Project name Country Approval date Planned completion

date

Actual completion

date

Implemen-tation delay

(months)

1 Djougou-N'dali Road Upgrade Project Benin 7/22/2003 31-Dec-07 30-Apr-10 28.4

2 Second Road Program Burkina Faso 11/14/2001 1-May-04 1-Jun-08 49.7

3 Projet De Pistes Rurales(PPR) Burkina Faso 9/29/2004 31-Dec-09 31-Dec-10 12.2

4 Projet D'amenagement De La Route Ambam-Eking Cameroon 12/14/2000 31-Dec-03 1-Feb-05 13.3

5 Projet D’amenagement Routier Dans Les Provinces De L’ouest, Du Littoral Et Du Sud

Cameroon 3/29/2001 1-Nov-04 1-Jul-07 32.4

6 Tetteh Quarshie Circle Mamfe Road Rehabilitation Ghana 12/11/2000 30-Aug-05 31-Dec-07 28.4

7 Mpharane-Bela Bela Road Upgrading Project Lesotho 1/16/2002 1-Sep-03 12-May-05 20.6

8 Likalaneng-Thaba Tseka Road Project Lesotho 10/29/2003 31-Dec-08 29-Jun-10 18.2

9 Rehabilitation De La Route Rn1 Bis Madagascar 1/9/2002 31-Oct-04 30-Nov-07 37.5

10 Projet De Construction De La Route Rosso-Boghé Mauritania 5/2/2003 31-Dec-07 31-Dec-09 24.4

11 South Eastern Highway Project Mauritius 6/13/2001 31-Dec-06 30-Jun-08 18.2

12 Projet De Route Kicukiro - Kirundo Multinational 9/20/2006 31-Dec-09 30-Nov-11 23.3

13 Route Kankan-Kouremale-Bamako Multinational 5/17/2000 31-Dec-05 31-Dec-08 36.5

14 Road Infrastructure Project Rwanda 10/8/2003 31-Dec-07 31-Dec-09 24.4

15 Gitarama-Ngororero-Mukamira Road Project Rwanda 12/20/2004 31-Dec-09 31-May-12 29.4

16 Mbabane Bypass Road (2 Int. Rds Phase II) Swaziland 12/17/2003 2-Mar-07 30-Sep-09 31.4

17 Roads Maintenance and Upgrading Project Uganda 9/13/2000 31-Dec-04 30-Jun-06 18.2

Average 26.3

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Table E4: Capacity building component in completed road projects (resources committed, actual and expected output)

No Project name Country Total Bank

approval

Capacity building (UA mil.)

Expected output Actual output PCR rating

At appraisal

At completion

1 Djougou-N'dali Road Benin 15.11 0.04 0 Staff training was planned but not indicated the number of beneficiary

Not reported. NA

2 Second Road Program

Burkina Faso

22 0.45 0.415 Equipment of the BDR with measuring equipment and processing of road data

BDR equipped NA

3 Projet De Pistes Rurales(PPR)

Burkina Faso

15.71 0.6 0.54 Forty-five provincial units are equipped with 11,250 light site equipment for feeder road maintenance

Provincial units are being equipped with considerable delay in the supply of light site equipment for feeder road maintenance.

1

4 Projet D'amenagement De La Route Ambam-Eking

Cameroon 8.9 0.2 0.25 Ten personnel trained in environmental audit and 70 management staff of MINTP sensitized to the environmental impact of road projects, and 20 forestry personnel of Ambam and Abang-Minko’o trained in 2003

Training ensured in 2006 of:

(i) 66 MINTP management staff (environmental audit, 2; road project environmental monitoring, 18; tarred road maintenance and OA, 46;

(ii) 18 MINFOF and MINEP management staff trained in environmental management

NA

5 Tetteh Quarshie Circle Mamfe Road Rehabilitation

Ghana 25 5.17 1.62 i) Management information system (MIS).

ii) Contract administration and financial management system.

iii) Requisite logistics for local traffic studies and highway planning.

iv) 200 Senior and 600 junior staff of GHA benefit from training locally or overseas.

i) Hardware for MIS procured but procurement of software and WAN for regional offices failed;

ii) Support services for traffic studies and highway planning delivered;

iii) Training delivered as planned Institutional support was fair.

2

6 Rehabilitation De La Route Rn1 Bis

Madagascar 10.1 0.14 0.04 Two resource persons for MTP Not reported. NA

7 Projet De Construction De La Route Rosso-Boghé

Mauritania 14.62 0.06 NA Database on available socio-economic indicators

Database on socioeconomic indicators compiled within the framework of services of the nongovernmental organization in charge of socioeconomic monitoring and sensitization

3

8 Projet De Route Kicukiro - Kirundo

Multi-national

30.2 0.96 0.76 Technical capabilities and operational service road of Burundi and border services are enhanced

Vehicles, computer equipment, office automation, and software were supplied by the Office of Technical Assistance to strengthen the technical and operational capabilities of the ODR

3

9 Route Kankan-Kouremale-Bamako (Z)

Multi-national

24 NA NA Capacities of the National Directorate of Public Works (DMTP) in Mali are reinforced

Capabilities of DMTP were reinforced through its computer equipment, however, officers were not trained in computers and general road

1

99Annexes

No Project name Country Total Bank

approval

Capacity building (UA mil.)

Expected output Actual output PCR rating

At appraisal

At completion

10 Road Infrastructure Project

Rwanda 15 0.25 0.17 Ten engineers and 20 senior technicians trained in highway structure technology and bridge infrastructure

Training provided for 64 road staff (12 engineer in project organization, planning, management, and execution; 10 engineers in contracting, 12 engineers in road security, 15 engineers in bridge infrastructure, and 15 in highway structure technology

3

11 Gitarama-Ngororero-Mukamira Road Project

Rwanda 15.2 0.82 0 Fifteen employees trained in data processing and languages, five engineers trained in road management. Road database set up; and a series of in situ laboratory equipment

For optimal use of outstanding resources from the rural infrastructure project, the administration preferred to allocate these funds for training, instead of the training budget for this Gitarama-Ngororero Project

4

Table E5: Commitment to feeder/community roads by country in agriculture sector project (2000–11)

Country Amount (UA 000)

Share (%)

Uganda 47,924.3 23.9

Tanzania 40,543.4 20.2

Multinational 19,630.0 9.8

Ghana 18,224.1 9.1

Dem Rep Congo 12,050.0 6.0

Senegal 11,788.1 5.9

Cameroon 11,746.1 5.9

Nigeria 8,250.6 4.1

Guinea 5,730.0 2.9

Burkina Faso 4,639.6 2.3

Benin 2,810.0 1.4

Mali 2,117.0 1.1

Botswana 1,780.0 0.9

Liberia 1,565.0 0.8

Tunisia 1,513.0 0.8

Country Amount (UA 000)

Share (%)

Chad 1,446.0 0.7

Sierra Leone 1,362.0 0.7

Kenya 1,277.4 0.6

Mozambique 1,187.3 0.6

Niger 1,018.0 0.5

Angola 750.0 0.4

Malawi 710.0 0.4

Guinea-Bissau 620.0 0.3

Madagascar 601.0 0.3

Central Africa 390.0 0.2

Rwanda 310.0 0.2

Swaziland 300.0 0.1

Lesotho 80.0 0.0

Sao Tome 24.0 0.0

Total 200,386.9 100

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Table E6: Feeder/community roads achievement levels in agricultural sector, based on PCRs

Projects Country Approval Date

Planned output Actual output Rating

Artisanal fisheries development project

Angola 10/30/2002 25 km feeder road 11 km feeder road 2

Mono and couffo rural development support project

Benin 4/18/2001 A. The lengths of rural roads constructed, rehabilitated, and improved are 40 km, 13 km, and 60 km, respectively. Construction of a bridge over the Couffo.

B. Setting up of 15 RRMCs for 40 km of new rural roads. Mobilization of RRMCs for 13 km of rural roads to be rehabilitated. Involvement of RRMCs in the 60 km of rural roads to be improved.

A. 40 km of rural roads were completed. The first section constructed in 2007 has deteriorated. Studies were begun, but no output. Mobilization for 60 km began but no output.

B. Fifteen RRMCs were set up for the 40 km of rural roads, but did not carry out work on the damaged section. RRMCs for the 13 km of rural roads to be rehabilitated were not mobilized. Technical assistance provided to beneficiaries by the nongovernmental organization for the improvement of 60 km of rural roads started at the end of the project but there was no output.

1

Decentralized and participatory rural development project in the bazega and kadiogo provinces

Burkina Faso

4/18/2001 200 km of grazing land (cattle tracks) constructed

Due to insufficient funds, only 59 km of earth roads are being rehabilitated

1

Agoua, monts kouffe and wari-maro forestry management project

Benin 1/20/2000 1.000 km of category 1 feeder roads, 171 km of category 2 feeder roads are built

BD launched for 162.7 km of feeder roads. Reduction of this objective given the insignificant forest surveillance works. As a result of the delays in the bidding document process, the construction of the feeder roads postponed to a second phase.

1

Rural family income improvement program in the northern provinces

Cameroon 6/28/2001 239 km of rehabilitated rural roads

41 km (17.08 percent) of rural roads rehabilitated

1

Cashew development project

Ghana 9/21/2000 Spot improvement to 200 km of feeder roads in all project districts undertaken.

192 km of feeder roads improved. Contracts are ongoing for an additional 10 km of feeder roads and to be completed end of April 2010.

3

Participatory integrated watershed management project

Gambia 6/9/2004 200 km of inter-village roads 191 km of inter-village roads 3

Upper guinea rural development support project

Guinea 6/15/2000 The difficult sections and all crossing works renovated on 110 km of feeder roads

The 55 km of Siguiri feeder roads that were provisionally accepted in June 2007 have deteriorated. As for the 55 km in Kouroussa, they were provisionally accepted in 2010.

2

101Annexes

Projects Country Approval Date

Planned output Actual output Rating

Support project for the national rural infrastructure program – phase ii

Guinea 10/2/2002 The length of feeder roads rehabilitated is 120 km in Télimélé, 104 km in Pita, 133 km in Dabola, 79 km in Dinguirayé, 75 km in Lélouma, 101 km in Koubia, 102 km in Mali, 150 km in Mandiana, and 155 km in Siguiri, completed in December 2008 (duration: 15 months)

Feeder roads rehabilitated in four prefectures: Télimélé (93 km); Pita (72 km); Dabola (109 km), and Dinguiraye (4.3 km) making a total of 278 km (27 percent). More than 2 bridges in Mandiana and 16 culverts in Siguiri. Most of the works carried out at end of project (2010).

Unsatisfactory quality.

1

Rural development support project of the daye, hamadja and korioume

Mali 11/3/2000 Road resurfacing on 19.5 km Works not executed 1

Lake malawi artisanal fisheries development project (lmafdp)

Malawi 1/29/2003 75 km access roads rehabilitated revised to revised to 52 km at MTR

52 km of access roads rehabilitated (but some have no link with anticipated FLS)

3

Zinder region agricultural development support project (padaz)

Niger 10/18/2001 Rehabilitation 45 km of tracks in 2004. Construction of 23 km of new tracks roads.

42 km of roads partially rehabilitated in 2005 by patching rather than identical rehabilitation, owing to budget constraints. 25.3 km of new tracks constructed in 2005

4

Rwanda forestry management support project

Rwanda 11/14/2001 Rehabilitation of 360 km of access roads to Gishwati and Nyungwe plantations. Maintenance of 280 km of access roads to Gishwati and Nyungwe forest plantations

Rehabilitation of 310 km of access roads to Gishwati and Nyungwe plantations. Maintenance of 113 km of access roads to Gishwati and Nyungwe forest plantations

2

Community feeder roads project to support the national rural infrastructure program (ppc/pnir)

Senegal 4/3/2002 90 RCs have a better community road network of 1,800 km which contributes to opening them up

84 RCs have a network of new feeder roads (instead of repaired community roads as initially planned) totaling 1,206 km, which has enabled numerous areas to open up.

3

Senegal anambe basin rural development support project

Senegal 4/25/2001 100 km of rural roads are provided according to required technical standards

82 km of rural roads have been provided (final acceptance in 2008) according to satisfactory technical standards; the budget allocated did not enable achievement of the quantitative targets.

3

Agricultural marketing systems development program

Tanzania 9/18/2002 1050 km of feeder rural roads rehabilitated, 1,750 culverts, 115 bridges constructed in 35 districts

957.3 km of rural roads constructed in 30 based districts; 71 km of Rujewa-Madibira road rehabilitated; 1,549 culverts and 575 bridges constructed

4

Area-based agricultural modernization program

Uganda 9/13/2000 A. 6 District Engineers, 104 road Inspectors and 480 petty contractors trained.

B. 54 No. and 701 km of feeder roads and 200 No. and 2000 km of access roads rehabilitated.

A. 6 district engineers, 104 road inspectors and 430 petty contractors trained.

B. 75 No. and 1121 km of feeder roads and113 No. and 1011 km of access roads rehabilitated .

4

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Table E7: List of beneficiary countries from multinational (regional) transport sector projects approved between 2000 and 2011

No. Project Name Project code Beneficiaries countries1 Route Kankan-Kouremale-Bamako P-Z1-DB0-010 Guinea, Mali

2 Programme D'amenagement Routier Et De Facilitation Du Transport Par Le Sud Bamako-Dakar

P-Z1-DB0-013 Senegal, Mali

3 Projet De Route Kicukiro - Kirundo P-Z1-DB0-037 Rwanda, Burundi

4 Projet De Route Dori-Téra P-Z1-DB0-035 Burkina-Faso, Niger

5 Projet Route Labé - Sériba - Tambacounda Et Programme De Facilitation Du Corridor Conakry-Dakar

P-Z1-DB0-029 Guinea, Senegal

6 Arusha-Namanga-Athi River Road Development Project P-Z1-DB0-040 Kenya, Tanzania

7 Transport Facilitation Program On The Douala – Bangui And Douala – N’djamena Corridors

P-Z1-DB0-045 Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic

8 Route Nyamitanga-Ruhwa-Ntendezi-Mwityazo P-Z1-DB0-047 Burundi, Rwanda

9 Route Bamenda-Mamfe-Ekok-Mfum-Abakaliki- P-Z1-DB0-023 Cameroon, Nigeria

10 Multi-Nacala Road Corridor P-Z1-DB0-039 Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia

11 Mombasa-Nairobi-Addis Rd P-Z1-DB0-018 Kenya, Ethiopia

12 Mombasa-Nairobi-Addis Corridor Ii P-Z1-DB0-027 Kenya, Ethiopia

13 Cameroun/Gongo: Route Ketta-Djoum P-Z1-DB0-048 Cameroon, Congo

14 Programme COSCAP en AOC P-Z1-DA0-002 Centre and West Africa countries

15 Uemoa/Ghana-Programme Routier 1 P-Z1-DB0-014 Burkina-Faso, Mali, Ghana

16 Etude De La Route Boke - Quebo P-Z1-DB0-011 Guinea, Guinea-Bissau

17 Tanzania/Kenya:Arusha-Namanga-Athiriver Road Study P-Z1-DB0-007 Kenya, Tanzania

18 Etude De La Route Dori-Tera P-Z1-DB0-012 Burkina, Niger

19 Botswana/Zambia - SADC North-South Corridor Study P-Z1-DB0-028 Botswana, Zambia

20 SADC Technical Assistance - Transport P-Z1-DB0-041 Botswana, Zambia, DR Congo

21 Arusha-Namanga-Athi River Road Development Project P-Z1-DB0-038/040 Kenya, Tanzania

22 ECOWAS Interconnecting Railways Study P-Z1-D00-012 ECOWAS member countries

23 Etude De La Route Boke - Quebo P-Z1-DB0-011 Burkina-Faso, Niger

24 Etude Faisabil.Chemin Fer Isaka-Kigali P-Z1-DB0-020 Rwanda, Tanzania

25 Transport Facilitation Program On The Douala – Bangui And Douala – N’djamena Corridors

P-Z1-DB0-042/43/44/45

Cameroon, Chad, Central African Rep.

26 Etude De Base Pont Rosso P-Z1-D00-015 Mauritania, Senegal

27 Etude Du Pont Kinshasa Brazzaville P-Z1-D00-016 DR Congo and Congo Brazzaville

28 COMESA Aviation - Regional Cns/Atm P-Z1-DA0-003 COMESA member countries

29 Nacala Corridor Project Phase Ii(Zambia) P-Z1-DB0-063 Zambia

30 Etude Route Ouesso-Bangu-N'djamena Et Na P-Z1-DB0-066 Congo, RD Congo, Chad and Central African Rep.

31 Trans-Gambia River Crossing Project P-Z1-DB0-046 The Gambia and Senegal

32 Kenya-Uganda Railways Concession P-Z1-DC0-011 Kenya and Uganda

33 Phase 2 Chemin Fer Dsm-Isaka-Kiga/Keza-M P-Z1-DB0-060 Rwanda and Tanzania

34 Multinational Road Doussala-Dolisie P-Z1-DB0-071 Congo and Gabon

35 Botswana/Zambia-Kazungula Bridge Project_North South Coridor

P-Z1-DB0-031 Botswana and Zambia

103Annexes

Annex F — Feedback from the Field

Mobility and Accessibility

Aus-Rosh Pinah Road Rehabilitation Project (Namibia)

The objective of the Aus-Rosh Pinah Road Rehabilitation Project was to facilitate economic development in the southern parts of Namibia by reducing the costs and increasing the efficiency of the road network. The 169-kilometer gravel road between Aus and Rosh Pinah was upgraded to bitumen standard. Foreseen short-term outcomes were (i) transport costs were reduced by 30 percent in 2006 when the road was fully opened to traffic, and (ii) average annual daily traffic (AADT) of 200-250 vehicles for the project road by 2006. The purpose of the project—as expressed by the government—was to solve the problems of dust, drainage, and traffic safety caused by the existing gravel road. These problems would increase alarmingly in view of the large expected increase in heavy vehicle traffic attributable to the planned development of the zinc-lead mines (RPZC) at Rosh Pinah and the development of another mine at Skorpion (20 kilometers northwest of Rosh Pinah).

The bituminized road has had considerable benefits in terms of lowering vehicle operating costs (VOC), the number of accidents, and travel time. According to the two mines’ transport operator, the benefits of the bitumen road have been a 70 percent reduction in VOC, a one-hour saving for a heavy vehicle on a single trip, and a reduction in accidents (particularly rear-end collisions between passenger cars and heavy vehicles in the dusty conditions on the previous gravel road). The lifetime of heavy vehicles has been lengthened substantially as a result. Travel times quoted by the Skorpion Mine were 2.5 – 3 hours to Aus on the gravel road and 1.5 hours on the bitumen road. This would work out at an average speed of between 56 and 68 kilometers/hour on gravel and 113 kilometers/hour on tar. RPZC put the time for a trip from Rosh Pinah to Aus by truck at about four hours on gravel and a maximum of two hours on bitumen. Productivity had been increased, both for the company and for its clients, which means a quicker turnaround time and higher profits.

Rural Access and Mobility Project (Nigeria)

The overall objective of the Rural Access and Mobility Project (RAMP) is to develop an efficient rural road and integrated transport network, which is a prerequisite for the promotion of socioeconomic growth and poverty alleviation in the state within the context of the state’s Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS). The project is ongoing. The specific objective is to create all-year access to transport services for the rural population in Cross River State. The medium-term outcomes are: (i) reduction of transport costs and travel time between markets and areas of production through rehabilitation of feeder roads to an all-weather standard; (ii) reduction in travel time between communities, major markets, and social centers; and (iii) improvement of the management of the Cross River State road network through training of Ministry of Works staff at the state and local government levels.

The project is still ongoing and the monitoring activities by the executing agency (SPIU) have not yet commenced, although the monitoring plan was robustly prepared by the monitoring specialist of SPIU. The lack of information did not allow the evaluation team to conclude its work. The World Bank implemented a similar project in another state, which achieved its short-term outcomes. It can only be hypothesized that the AfDB project followed the same trend.

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Lekki Toll Road (Nigeria)

Two short-term outcomes of this ongoing project were expected by the Project Appraisal Report (PAR). These were: (i) reduction in average annual VOC from US$0.35 per vehicle/kilometer in 2008 to US$0.20 per vehicle/kilometer in 2011 for light vehicles; and (ii) a reduction in the average monthly accident rate of 10 percent between 2008 and 2011.

For the VOC indicator, the only source of information is from the Lekki Concession Company (LCC) Project Research Report (LCC 2011 and 2012). The data showed significant savings on otherwise hidden costs that road users incurred prior to completion of kilometers 0-6, which were related to savings on spare parts, tires, and the like. These savings, mainly on travel time on the 6-kilometer constructed road, have enabled more daily trips by commercial and private vehicles. The VOC itself is not monitored; if its reduction is automatic for the 6 kilometers improved, the extent to which the quantitative target was met is unknown.

For the road safety indicator, the baseline was not available and data collection has not been adjusted to suit the purpose of outcome monitoring. From data available (over a stretch of 20 kilometers of the Lekki Road), the accident rate tends to increase rather than decrease: the 851 accidents recorded and attended to in 2012 correspond to a 4.7 percent increase compared with 2011.

Classified Road Network Rehabilitation IV (Tunisia)

Two short-term outcomes were expected by the PAR: a decrease of VOC by 45 percent and an increase of the interregional trade, with no quantitative target. For the VOC indicator, two sources of information were foreseen: a report on road network condition at the end of the project and an assessment of road IRI (international roughness index) for each segment of road at the end of the work. The DGPC (General Directorate of Civil Engineering) did not prepare a road network condition report. The indicators are interlinked, as the latter provides an indication, in regards to technical specifications during road works (combining the skills of the construction firms and the rigor of the supervisory control). The network condition is a proxy of the performance of the maintenance system, and ensures the sustainability of the Bank’s financial contribution. It is also an underlying assumption for the IRRs.

Road conditions are not reported centrally. The data are available in regional directorates but are not centralized. The reliability of the road condition data is questionable, because it did not result from a formalized process, but rather from visual inspection by the “chef de zone.” The DGPC has not developed a road management database, which is a basic tool for network management and the basis for rational maintenance works programming. As far as the DGPC is concerned, the classified network49 is in good condition and well maintained, which was demonstrated to some degree by use of the network during the field mission; this observation would gain from being confirmed by more objective and systematic data.

The PCR mission estimated the decrease in VOC at 24 percent, rather than the expected 45 percent. The IRI value is uneven from one road segment to the next (with incidence on VOC from -9.5 percent to -47.5 percent, indicating significant issues with technical specifications). From the field visit in the center-south of the country, significant differences in the quality of the work were seen when passing from one region to the other. It is not possible for a retrospective evaluation to conclude if differences are related to the technical ability of the firm, issues with work supervision (managed at the regional directorate level), or a combination of the two.

105Annexes

The other short-term outcome was interregional trade or traffic flows. The related indicators were not developed in the project matrix and were not elaborated afterwards. The information was not available at the end of the project. The traffic counts are done nationally every five years. The last count was organized in 2012, but the results are not available. Notable increases in traffic were recorded by comparing the 2007 survey with 2002 data used for CRR IV identification.

In summary, the main short-term outcome of the CRR IV project, reduction of the VOC by 45 percent, was significantly reduced (24 percent). The increase in interregional trade was not monitored at all. Using the increase in traffic would be a hazardous proxy, as most of it relates to personal mobility and the tremendous increase in the private vehicle fleet during the reference period. The degree of achievement of the short-term outcomes of the project was given a 3 by the PCR (dated 2012), without any specific, objectively verifiable indicator.

Railway Modernization II (Tunisia)

The project’s objective is to improve efficiency and quality of railway services by rationalizing management costs and modernizing infrastructure. The indicators identified in the project’s matrix are: (i) reduced travel time for the improved links, (ii) number of late trains for passengers and freight (phosphates) lines, (iii) revenue increase from freight transport, and (iv) improved financial situation of the SNCFT (The Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Tunisiens). The only source for informing outcomes’ indicators is the SNCFT’s activity reports.

The significant changes made during the course of the project’s implementation for the institutional as well as the physical components make it challenging to assess the achievement of the short-term outcomes:

❙ The institutional component was initially far-reaching and, to some extent, the main focus of the project, intending to reform or at least restructure the SNCFT in coordination with the World Bank project. This component’s reform content was watered down, as the underlying studies being undertaken were related to other issues, postponed, or replaced by more technical inputs. The SNCFT has a long record of resistance to reform, even when supported by the World Bank. It would be hazardous, therefore, to allocate changes in the SNCFT financial situation to the Bank’s project. At the same time, the reform sought by the Bank’s involvement was not introduced until now, and will not be so in the coming years, as the government’s tendency is to step back on the reform path. The increase of revenues from freight transport was expected, notably from establishing a railway link with Tunisia’s major ports. The transport link was abandoned and the funds reallocated to passenger transport, a higher priority for the SNCFT, even if this activity is known to be structurally less profitable. The priority given to passenger traffic was imposed on SNCFT by the government in the framework of its social policy. The outcomes related to the SNCFT financial situation were therefore not achieved.

❙ The changes introduced in the physical components did not compromise the reduction of travel times for the modernized passenger’ rail links (Tunis-Sousse-Sfax-Gabès, 4.55/6.20; Tunis-Jendouba, 2.13/2.47; Tunis-Borj-Cedria, 0.25/0.35; Tunis-Gaafour, 1.30/2.20). The targets for train delays were achieved ((percent of trains late by less than 15 minutes reduced from 85 percent to 70 percent – expected, 80 percent; phosphate trains late by less than 2 hours reduced from 91 percent to 25 percent, while the initial target was 20 percent).

In summary, the RM II project achieved its short-term outcomes to a limited extent. The Bank’s contribution was progressively scaled down from a relatively far-reaching reform process to contributing financially to modernizing railway links. The degree of achievement of the short-term outcomes of the project was rated as 4 by the PCR (dated 2011).

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Northern Railway Extension (Namibia)

The aim of this project was to stimulate economic growth in the northern parts of Namibia by extending linkages between the rural and urban areas, as well as between Namibia and Angola. The project extended the railway between Tsumeb and Ondangwa (248248 kilometers) at a cost of roughly ZAR500 million, funded by the AfDB, the Kuwait Fund, BADEA (The Arab Bank for Economic Development for Africa), and the Government of Namibia. Once built, the new railway line did not attract the anticipated traffic volumes. The feasibility study in 1999 made two forecasts (lower and higher) of initial traffic, the range being 135,500-253,500 tons per year, with a forecast annual growth rate of 3 percent. For its first year of operation (2007), the expected traffic would have been in the range 171,650-321,125 tons. According to the 2008 Annual Report of TransNamib Rail, the line carried 131,290 tons. In 2012 the line carried 159,620 tons, which is consistent with the low estimate of the feasibility study.

The Northern Railway Extension is, however, as stated by TransNamib Rail, not carrying the traffic volumes required to be economically or financially viable, nor does it allow short-term outcomes relating to increased mobility of the northern population. Traffic levels (goods and passenger) on the Northern Railway Extension are adversely affected by poor track conditions south of Otjiwarongo and the failure of the Angolan government to construct a link to the border to connect the two national railway systems.

Namibia’s sole cement producer, Ohorongo Cement, opened its plant at Sargberg near Otavi in 2010. The plant has a capacity of 1 million tons per year, and in 2012 produced 700,000 tons. It exports some of its

Figure A2: Northern railway extension traffic

100000

120000

140000

160000

180000

200000

220000

240000

260000

280000

300000

20122011201020092008

Low High Actual

Source: Prepared from the project feasibility study and Annual Reports of TransNamib Holdings.

107Annexes

production to Angola and Botswana. Ohorongo Cement is trying, together with copper smelters, to use rail, and would indeed use rail entirely if possible, as it is a cheaper mode than road. Comparative rates are N$87/ton by rail and N$176/ton by road to Ondangwa. At present, it ships by rail only 6,000 tons per year to Ondangwa, as against 36,000 tons by road. The volume could be doubled if the rail operator, TransNamib Holdings Ltd. (TNH), had the capacity. However, TNH is short of locomotives.

Regional Integration

Rwanda-Burundi Connecting Road (Kicukiro-Kirundo)

The average travel time between Kicukiro and Kirundo was reduced from six hours in 2006 to two hours after completion of the road. Similarly, the travel time between Nyamata and Kigali in Rwanda was cut by three hours; the price of bus transport between Kigali and Nyamata was reduced from 800 FRW in 2006 to 600 FRW; the VOC savings for Mombasa-Bujumbura international traffic alone transiting on this road amounted to US$50 million per year; the AADT on the Kigali-Nyamata-Nemba route increased by 6.4 percent per year, more than foreseen by the economic feasibility study (5 percent per year); 6 new transporters, operating a fleet of 85 minibuses, offer a service to Kigali starting every half-hour from 6 am, while before the project, only the ONATRACOM, a public undertaking, operating a fleet of 13 minibuses, provided 2 services each week. A number of projects for agricultural and rural development have emerged in the district of Bugesera, as well as new industrial production units (Fanta soft drinks, toilet paper, and other products, some of which were relocated to the District of Kigali)) and three new hotels; a high school, three colleges, and five primary schools have been constructed in concert with the improvement of the road. Almost all women now give birth in a maternity center, which none could do before, and other patients can now be evacuated by ambulance.

Burkina-Niger Connecting Road (Dori–Tera)

The travel time was cut from 3 hours to 1.5 hours for passenger services and from 6 hours to 2.5 hours for freight transport; passenger fares were cut by half, while the freight price decreased from 25,000 FCFA per ton in 2010 to 14,000 FCFA in 2013; In Burkina Faso, the AADT increased from 9 vehicles in 2008 to 64 vehicles in 2012; a hotel in Tera and a fuel station in Pételkolé were constructed; the benefit mentioned most frequently is the accessibility of health facilities, especially after the construction of two health centers, one in Katchirga in Burkina and the other in Chatoumane in Niger.

Douala-Ndjamena Corridor

The average travel time decreased from 14 days in 2005 to 7 days; similarly, the travel time between Yaounde and Meiganga was reduced from 2–3 days to 10 hours; the passenger fare on the same route was cut from 15,000 FCFA in 2010 to 9,000 FCFA in 2013; the price of a semi-trailer of 32 tons between Ndjamena and Douala decreased from 5,000,000 FCAF in 2010 to 3,000,000 in 2013; Nandéké–Mbéré AADT reached 658 vehicles in 2012 (including 303 trucks), compared with 197 in 2009 (84 trucks); passenger transport was previously provided to the Meiganga population irregularly by taxis brousse or dilapidated minibuses; now, passenger services are assured by regular operating coaches or new, comfortable minibuses. These lines offer at least 3 departures a day to Yaounde and Douala, and 10 departures a day for Ngaoundere (toward Chad).

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Bamako-Ouagadougou-Accra-Tema Corridor

The project stated eight exemplary SMART outcome indicators for regional integration:

1. 10 percent increase in local trade in the UEMOA zone in 20082. From 2008, a 15 percent increase in overseas trade of landlocked UEMOA countries transiting through

posts of UEMOA countries and Ghana3. More than 15 percent increase in traffic on the Ghanaian corridor4. BOAT Corridor condition improving from “fair” to “good” from 20085. 50 percent reduction in journey times from 20086. 15 to 20 percent reduction in invisible costs from 20087. 30 percent reduction in vehicle operating costs from 20088. Greater than 40 percent reduction in the rate of overloaded trucks from 2006.

It proved impossible, however, to assess with certainty if the short-term outcomes among the above (numbers 3 to 6) have been achieved, as the baseline situation and a systematic monitoring of the above indicators are not available. Only piecemeal information is available from studies carried out recently by other donors (USAID/UEMOA, p. 2; JICA 2013, chapter 8) on the BOAT logistic chain, including the Tema Port.

Figure A3: Transaction volume at ports (millions of tons)

Pt. LoméPt. Tema

Pt. Dakar

Pt. Abidjan

Pt. Cotonou

Pt. Lagos

Pt. Banjul

Pt. Conakry

Pt. Freetown

Pt. Monrovia

Pt. TakoradiPt. San Pedro

Togo

Mali

Ghana

BeninGuinea

Gambia

Senegal

Mauritania

Nigeria

Liberia

Burkina Faso

Côte d'Ivoire

Guinea-Bissau

Sierra Leone

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Port Cotonou

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Port Lomé

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Port Tema

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Port Abidjan

2007 2008 2009 2010

Port Dakar

Transship Transit Export Import

25

20

15

10

5

0

25

20

15

10

5

0

25

20

15

10

5

0

25

20

15

10

5

0

25

20

15

10

5

0

PortRail networkRoad network(million ton)

(million ton)

(million ton) (million ton) (million ton)

Source: JICA (2012) Data Collection Survey on Traffic for International Port and Corridor in Western Africa, Chapter 5, pp. 5–1

109Annexes

This corridor lags behind others in terms of evolution of the freight traffic. This has been cited because of inefficiencies at Tema Port, which is illustrated in the diagrams below (Figure A3), which shows that transaction volume at the Port of Tema is static at around 10 million tons per annum, while it is increasing in Port Abidjan and currently stands at 25 million tons per annum.

The growth in transit traffic in Tema has also been modest, particularly when compared to nearby Cotonou and Lome Port. A reduction of invisible costs started materializing, even if slowly.

From this piecemeal information and the information gathered during the field visit on overload control, it appears unlikely that the project will achieve its short-term outcomes in the few years left before completion. However, if the BOAT Corridor road works had not been carried out, it is likely that the sections of road would have broken up by now, thus increasing travel times and costs, making the corridor less attractive.

Central Corridor

The East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP) consists of components financed by the AfDB and the World Bank. The components are complementary, but separate, subprojects that share the same outcome indicator (at the project-objective level): “Total transit time through the northern and central corridors is reduced. Standard deviation of average transit time is reduced” The physical aspects of the project supported by the Bank were completed. Capacity building was integrated into to the project, but it was not sustained or carried through to implementation. Systematic collection of reliable transport data will be available once an observatory is established and fully operational. In the meantime, data is made available through selected surveys and the general experience of transport operators, and on that basis a picture can be assembled of significant improvement since the start of the project.

For the Dar es Salaam-Kigali route, dwell time in the Port of Dar es Salaam has been reduced from 15–17 days in 2009 to 7–9 days in 2013. Transit time from the DRC (border towns in northeastern DRC – Goma/ Kavinvira/ Bukavu) to the port has been reduced from 20–24 days to 11–13 days; and from Kigali to the port from 14 to 5 days. The number of round trips that can be made with a container truck from Rwanda over a two-month period has increased from three to five trips. The cost of transport of a 40-foot container for import to Rwanda was reduced from US$7,000 to US$5,000 (assuming it travels empty to the port), and for export from US$5,000 to US$3,500 (assuming it carries a load both ways). This trend of improvements is supported by reports from many respondents interviewed by the evaluation mission and corresponds with the results of a Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) baseline study undertaken for the Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency in 2011. It is not possible to objectively define the agency’s share of these achievements, because many other actors have also contributed, but it can safely be said that the short-term outcomes of the project are about to be achieved.

Connecting to International Markets and Flows

Enfidha-Monastir Airports (Tunisia)

The project is ongoing, leaving limited room for assessing short-term outcomes retrospectively; moreover, the Bank’s financial contribution was not related to particular specific objectives beyond achieving operational status for the two airports of Monastir and Enfidha. From interviews with the concession holder and review

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of supervision reports, the traffic at Monastir Airport was already at 4.2 million passengers in 2012, with a 6 percent annual increase, while the target for financial profitability was set at 5 million passengers. For Enfidha Airport itself, traffic reached 3.2 million passengers in 2012, with an annual increase as high as 13.9 percent.

The supervision reports also provide several implementation and financial performance indicators, but did not report the outcomes of the project. The improved performance has mainly contributed to tourism development, and thus increased revenues for the economy and the state. The concession holder and the project encountered the incidents of the 2010–11 political crises, which affected the inflows of tourists, disrupting the potential of the project to achieve its intended short-term outcomes. It is therefore too early – and logically impossible – to go into further detail other than stating that TAV Tunisia has so far shown a strong capacity and involvement in getting the project running.

Container and Bulk Terminals (Djibouti)

Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT) medium-term outcomes (PAR, annex 1) are the following: (i) Handling capacity increased to 1.55 million TEUs50 in 2015, (ii) decrease of turnaround time (in percentage, expected to be determined later but was not), (iii) 40 percent of TEUs to and from Ethiopia, and (iv) 50 percent of TEUs in transshipment cargo. The short-term outcomes of the Société Djiboutienne de Gestion du Terminal Vraquier (SDTV) project were not identified, as a logical framework assessment was not included in the PAR. They are straightforward, as the bulk terminal is 100 percent dedicated to Ethiopia’s market: increased productivity of the terminal’s bagging lines to suit the fertilizer and grain orders of the Ethiopian shippers.

The identification and formulation phases were managed by the candidate firms that coordinated directly with the Djibouti Presidency. Most of the design stages were dedicated to elaborating the concession contract, engineering feasibility studies, and the business plan. It is therefore not easy to define the projects’ short-term outcomes.

In actuality, the bulk and container terminals were subject to a range of expectations. From the Bank’s point of view, outcomes are a mix of development prospects and loan repayment. From the concession holder’s’ point of view, the focus is only on profitability and equity dividends. In terms of physical outcomes (transport of imports and exports), the main stakeholder and beneficiary is the neighboring country, Ethiopia. The Djibouti local economy only benefits from side effects, direct (DCT and SDTV local employees, dockers) or indirect (freight forwarders, transporters). Another expectation of the government was to demonstrate its openness to foreign investors, with the view of developing free zones for attracting more diversified activities, and, if possible, activities that are less capital-intensive than port handling.

The first outcomes that can be safely assessed are the lenders’ debt servicing and the profitability for the concession holders. Considering the tenure of the Bank’s loan to SDTV and DCT (9 and 10 years, respectively), the prospects for debt servicing are sound. The Bank’s short-term outcomes can be considered achieved.

For DCT, the quantitative medium-term targets are about to be met: handling capacity increased to 1.2 million TEUs (1.55 million expected), and the turnaround time was significantly reduced (no precise target), in particular when the congestion issue imposed by the inability of the Ethiopian shipping line to take containers out from ports’ premises was resolved (late 2011); the turnaround time is now aligned with international standards. The targets related to the respective share of transshipment and import-export were

111Annexes

also achieved; transshipment cargo represented 55 percent of the containers handled by DCT in 2011. The projections for 2013 and 2014 suggest a further increase, while the transshipment market is highly volatile, as all ports in proximity to the Suez Canal are competing in this market.

Regarding the concession holders, the monopoly granted to SDTV on grain and fertilizers for Ethiopia, the productivity achieved by investing in bagging lines, and the comparative advantage of the Djibouti land corridor ensure long-term profitability of the undertaking. The extension foreseen to another quay, included in the contractual agreement with the government, will increase the handling capacity, and thus cash flow.

The prospects for DCT are also sound, supported by the extension of the quay from the initial 1000 meters to 2000 meters. The highly capital-intensive business model and the attention to training make the activity profitable. The demand is sustained by Ethiopia’s economic growth, and will stay so at least in the medium-term (three-five years), owing to the implementation of the government’s “Transformation Plan”. The main risk for DCT business prospects is the new container port promoted by PAID (Port Autonome International de Djibouti) and the government with the financial, engineering, and managerial support from Chinese firms.51

For the local economy, the main contribution of the two projects is job creation, as foreseen for DCT: 815 employees (218 for SDTV and 597 for DCT) and dockers hired on a daily basis (163,000 docker-days in 2012). Subcontractors of SDTV and DCT are hired for site cleaning and minor repairs. The number of employees for DCT is in alignment with the Bank’s expectations. Freight handled by SDTV is 100 percent for the Ethiopian market, as are some 90 percent of containers handled by DCT. The effects of the productivity

Figure A4: DCT - Operation performance

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gains on prices paid by local consumers for imported goods do not benefit the Djibouti population; they only benefit the Ethiopian population.

The indirect benefits for the local economy and the Djibouti population at large could be expected from the logistics chain: freight transport, freight forwarding, and other maritime transport auxiliaries. This expectation did not materialize because the government of Ethiopia negotiated with the government of Djibouti a control over the logistic chain, under a para-public undertaking (Ethiopian Shipping Lines, ESL). Almost all (90 percent) trucks are Ethiopian, as are the freight forwarders, at least initially owing to restrictive certification standards defined by the Ethiopian government. The situation is changing slowly, due to an unexpected shortage of transport capacity on the Ethiopian side: the domestic market allows for more remunerative conditions than the ones imposed on the international transit by the Ethiopian government and its parastatal multimodal operator. In the coming years, the Djiboutian private sector might seize the opportunity. For the time being, potential local investors keep requiring financial support from the government to increase the transport fleet capacity. The limited benefits of the two port projects are resented by the population and are increasingly being questioned during election campaigns. The main concern of the population is the monopoly organized by Ethiopia on the logistic chain (freight forwarding and transport) for tasks that could be (or should be) regulated by a bilateral agreement aligned with COMESA rules.

The amount of revenues generated (in terms of taxes and fees) was one of the Bank’s two impact indicators (the other being job creation). For DCT, the related long-term targets were the following: (i) annual royalty payment of US$44 million; and (ii) income taxes of US$14 million.52 The tax exemption granted to both projects during initial negotiations exceeded income tax revenues. Revenues received from the concession holders since the start of activity are estimated at US$11 million annually (since 2009 for DCT concession fees), which is far from the annual US$44 million foreseen for DCT only.

Figure A5: Djibouti - Evolution of foreign direct investments

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113Annexes

Some less concrete advantages expected by the government of Djibouti from the promotion of the concessions to international operators are mainly in terms of encouraging foreign direct investment. This materialized, notably through high occupancy rates of the existing free zones and reservations for future extensions.

For the time being, the diversification toward employment-intensive activities has been limited: most of the activities are from the tertiary sector (banking in particular) and storage and logistics.

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References

AfDB (African Development Bank Group):

2013. At the Center of Africa’s Transformation: Strategy for 2013–2022. Tunis: African Development Bank.

2011. “Decentralization Roadmap.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2010a. “African Development Bank Group Agriculture Sector Strategy, 2010–2014.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2010b. “African Development Bank Group Capacity Development Strategy.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2010c. “The Bank Group’s Urban Development Strategy: Transforming Africa’s Cities and Towns into Engines of Economic Growth and Social Development.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2009. “African Development Bank Group Regional Integration Strategy, 2009–2012.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2008a. “African Development Bank Group Medium-Term Strategy, 2008-2012.” ADB/BD/WP/2008/23/Rev.5, African Development Bank, Tunis.

2008b. “Infrastructure Department Three-Year Business Plan 2008-2010.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2008c. “Medium-Term Strategy 2008-2010.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2008d. “Strategic and Operational Framework for Regional Operations.” Management Operations, African Development Bank, Tunis.

2008e. “Strategy Update for the Bank’s Private Sector Operations.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2002. “African Development Bank Group Strategic Plan, 2003–2007.” African Development Bank, Tunis.

2000. “A Study of Bank Experience and Lessons from Road Sub-sector Projects and Programs.” ADB/BD/WP/2000/136. African Development Bank, Tunis

115Annexes

1993. “Transport Sector Policy.” ADB/BD/WP/93/98, and ADF/BD/WP/93/121, African Development Bank, Tunis.

JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency):

2013. “Data Collection Survey for Economic and Industrial Development along Economic Corridors in Southern Africa.” JICA, Tokyo.

LCC (Lekki Concession Company):

2011 and 2012. Project Research Reports. www.lcc.com.ng/default.asphttp://www.lcc.com.ng/default.asp

OPEV (Operations Evaluation Department, African Development Bank Group):

2013a. Evaluation of the African Development Bank’s Assistance to the Transport Sector — Cluster Evaluation of Multinational Road Projects.” OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

2013b. “Evaluation of the African Development Bank’s Assistance to the Transport Sector — Country and Regional Case Studies: Synthesis Report.” OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

2013c. “Evaluation of the African Development Bank’s Assistance in the Transport Sector — Sustainability Cluster Evaluation Report.” OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

2013d. “Evolution of AfDB Transport Policy Framework — Policy Review: Transport Sector in Africa.” OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

2013e. “The Growing Role of AfDB in Infrastructure Development – Evidence from Transport Sector Portfolio 2000-2011.” OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

2013f. “Transport in Africa — AfDB’s Intervention and Results for the Last Decade: Summary Report.” OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

2012. “Evaluation of the Bank’s Assistance in the Transport Sector: Approach Paper.” High-level Evaluations Division (OPEV.2), OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

2010. “Project Supervision at the African Development Bank 2001–2008: An Independent Evaluation.” OPEV, AfDB, Tunis.

TransNamib Rail:

2008. “2008 Annual Report of TransNamib Rail.” Windhoek, Namibia. www.transnamib.com.na/files/transnamib-annual-report-final-smallest-file-size.pdf

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USAID/UEMOA:

15th IRTG Report, UEMOA. Borderless Alliance. www.borderlesswa.com/resources/15th-usaiduemoa-report-1st-quarter-2011

World Bank:

2010. Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation. Washington, DC: World Bank.

117Annexes

Endnotes

1. Coherence was assessed within the relevance scope.

2. Benin, Djibouti, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tunisia, Uganda.

3. Rwanda-Burundi, Mali-Burkina Faso- Ghana (BOAT Corridor), Tanzania-Rwanda (Central Corridor), Burkina-Niger, Cameroon-Chad, Swaziland-South Arica.

4. Only the country & regional case studies (OPEV 2013b) covered PPP projects; related developments can be found on pages 21-25.

5. Institutional stretches is a new concept emerging among FDIs to depart from best practices, deriving from several political economy works that assessed the shortcomings of the “institutional mimetism” of the 1990s and the “best fit” of the 2000s.

6. Coherence was assessed within the relevance scope.

7. Pipelines were excluded, regarded as part of the industry sector.

8. Figure 1-1 at Section 2.2 explains the details.

9. Benin, Djibouti, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tunisia, Uganda.

10. Rwanda-Burundi, Mali-Burkina Faso- Ghana (BOAT Corridor), Tanzania-Rwanda (Central Corridor), Burkina-Niger, Cameroon-Chad, Swaziland-South Arica.

11. They are further developed in annex B.

12. (i) Investment and rehabilitation; (ii) Conveyances for each mode of transport; (iii) Regional trade and transport; (iv) Role of the government and the private sector; (v) Cost recovery and financial considerations; (vi) Institutional and human resources development; (vii) Appropriate technologies; (viii) Environmental considerations; (ix) Safety.

13. Roads (transport services, maintenance, rehabilitation, new construction, financing, safety); Railways (institutional development, human resources development, investment & maintenance development); Regional trade & transport; Water transport; Maritime services; Air transport (coordination, aviation services & management, financing); Urban transport (coordination & planning, public transport, road network, intermediate transport, safety, human resources development).

14. Elaborated on the basis of the Medium-Term Strategy 2008–2010.

15. The overall goal of PIDA is to promote socioeconomic development and poverty reduction in Africa through improved access to integrated regional and continental infrastructure networks and services. The overall capital cost of delivering the Priority Action Plan from 2012 through 2020 is expected to be nearly $68 billion, or about $7.5 billion annually. Transport projects and programs represent around 37 percent ($25.4 billion) of the total cost, demonstrating the critical need for transformative investments in the sector to support African trade, promote growth, and create jobs.

16. Only one such initiative with Morocco.

17. An instrument used to fund project design and preparation activities such as technical and feasibility studies.

18. Defined as the ratio of disbursed amounts in a particular fiscal year to the undisbursed balance from the previous year.

19. Amount attracted from external partners for US$1 contributed by the Bank.

20. Findings of this section are chiefly those of the country & regional case studies (OPEV 2013b); the two other background papers focuses respectively on effectiveness (cluster evaluation of multinational road projects [OPEV 2013a]) and sustainability (cluster evaluation on sustainability [OPEV 2013c]).

21. Institutional stretches is a new concept emerging among DFIs to depart from best practices, deriving from several political economy works that assessed the shortcomings of the “institutional mimetism” of the 1990s and the “best fit” of the 2000s.

22. Opportunity cost is generally 12 percent.

23. HDM is a software application that manages the road deterioration and road user effects models to evaluate strategies and improvements for the road network. In project design, HDM is used by DFIs, notably for estimating the EIRR, reflecting the opportunity of an infrastructure. HDM4 is the last version of the software, introduced in 2003.

24. The last quality at entry independent assessment conducted by IDEV in May 2013 confirms the findings of the country & regional case studies (OPEV 2013b) as well as the positive trend for the new generation of projects, following the implementation of three types of reforms during the last three years: (i) changes to format and preparation procedures for PCN/PARs; (ii) review processes for the PCN/PARs, including OPSCOM and other upstream review steps (peer review, country team, and sector department review); and (iii) broad changes to policies and procedures, including new cross-cutting issues.

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25. See annex F.

26. The only case (cycle track) is in Benin; see; see cluster evaluation of multinational road projects report (OPEV 2013a), p. 21.

27. See annex B.

28. From staff interviews.

29. For the completed projects that have no PCR, the portfolio review (OPEV 2013e) generated informative evidence using analysis of the last supervision mission report and interviews with Task Managers.

30. This section addresses efficiency, in evaluation criteria terms. Similar to for the previous section, this criterion was only systematically evaluated by the country and regional case studies (OPEV 2013b). Related findings are detailed in case studies’ individual reports.

31. OITC (Transport and ICT Department) is in the process of developing a new transport policy and strategy (including urban transport strategy) with an action plan.

32. Commonalities for all development agencies include weak capacity of member countries; the special requirements of fragile states and disaster relief; political disruptions, revolutions, and even wars affecting safety and general progress; the arrival of new lenders in Africa that do not conform to the Paris Declaration principles; improved governance and anti-corruption measures; concern that maintenance of existing infrastructure be given priority over new construction; and improving aid effectiveness through better interagency cooperation and better internal processes and procedures. (Source: OPEV 2013e, p. 50).

33. Eighty percent of the sample of projects under the cluster evaluation of multinational road projects (OPEV 2013a, p. 16); notably Madagascar, Benin, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Lesotho. OITC indicated that a reflection is also need for the provisions made for variation of price/price adjustment in contract agreements.

34. Several such works are undertaken by DFIs.

35. Setting up the OITC Internal Working Group is said to have made a significant contribution in improving quality of PARs in recent years.

36. Over a total of 134 projects, 129 PARs, including 12 PARs for PPP projects, were available.

37. A similar situation can be observed in some other countries in recent years. The Bank has been asked by the EU to take over leading transport sector dialogues in Burundi and Rwanda, for example.

38. OITC indicated that decentralization should help to improve the quality of Bank’s portfolio.

39. Cluster evaluation of multinational road projects report (OPEV 2013a), p. 6. Several examples can be found in the sustainability cluster evaluation report (OPEV 2013c) as well.

40. Issues in managing resettlement for the Swaziland International Road Project ––– Phase II, for instance (sustainability cluster evaluation; OPEV 2013c)

41. For example, by reallocating funds initially planned for designing a throughout reform strategy of Tunisia’s national railway company (Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Tunisiens, SNCFT, for a study on mitigation of environment impacts of SNCFT workshops. (Source: OPEV 2013b, pp. 19).

42. Rather linked to port/customs management and their users’ (traders, freight forwarders, truckers) practices.

43. Transaction volume at the Port of Tema was static at around 10 million tons per annum between 2007 and 2010, while increasing in Port Abidjan, and currently stands at 25 million tons per annum. (OPEV 2013 b, p.20)

44. Only the country & regional case studies (OPEV 2013b) covered PPP projects; related developments can be found on pages 21-25

45. Percentage of the amount required for addressing the maintenance needs of a given network that are covered by resources availed.

46. The second-generation road funds are agencies managing earmarked resources collected from road users. Resources are earmarked for road maintenance only. The road fund revenues are collected using primarily the fuel levy, vehicle license fees, a supplementary heavy vehicle fee, international transit fees, and fines for overloading. Road users should be involved not only in the financing of the road fund, but also in its management.

47. Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic 2009 (World Bank 2010).

48. Completion reports for one-fifth of category A projects (potential high impact) and half of category B projects (potential moderate impact) lacked information on safeguards performance.

49. The classified network is made up of the sections of the network where the responsibility of the central government for maintenance and management is recognized by law.

50. Twenty-foot equivalent unit.

51. Doraleh multipurpose port ($300 million).

52. The two other long-term targets (PAID’s share of dividends of US$255 million, Residual value of project assets at the end of concession of US$3 million) cannot be assessed for now.

Independent Development EvaluationAfrican Development Bank

Country and regional case studies



Phase 1: DESK REVIEW Phase 2: FIELD VISITS Phase 3: SUMMARY REPORT

SUMMARY REPORT

Portfolio review

Policy/literature review

Special thematic studies

BACKGROUND PAPERS

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Cluster evaluation on sustainability


Cluster evaluation of multinational road projects


Approach paper

Evaluation questions

INPUT

Overview of IDEV Evaluation ofAfDB Support to the TransportSector in Africa (2000 – 2011)

About this Evaluation

Deficiencies in transport infrastructure and high transport costs have a substantial impact on development, posing challenges for economic competitiveness, provision of social and economic services and intra-regional trade. Not surprisingly, the transport sector is a core priority for the African Development Bank (AfDB) in Africa – whose transport infrastructure lags behind that of other developing regions. Between 2000 and 2011, the Bank’s commitments to the sector rose from UA 150 million to approximately UA 1 billion — a more than six-fold increase. This level of financial commitment represents close to a quarter of the Bank’s total portfolio and is higher than for any other sector.

Independent Development Evaluation conducted an assessment of the Bank’s support to the sector during the period under question. The evaluation aimed to inform future strategic and operational directions for Bank assistance in the sector. It covers all investment projects, studies, technical assistance and institutional support projects implemented by the Bank over the 12-year period.

This publication presents the summary evaluation report submitted to the AfDB Committee on Operations and Development Effectiveness along with the AfDB management response to the evaluation. It draws on several studies: a portfolio review, policy and literature review, country case studies, and cluster project performance evaluations.

An IDEV Sector Evaluation

idev.afdb.org

Statutory Headquarters:Immeuble du Centre de commerce International d’Abidjan (CCIA) Avenue Jean-Paul II 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01 Côte d’Ivoire Phone: +225 20 26 20 41 • Fax: +225 20 21 31 00Email: [email protected] D

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Documents

Transport in Africa - ecgnet.org · The report received significant contributions from Joseph Mouanda (Senior Evaluation Officer), Girma Earo Kumbi (Senior Evaluation Officer), Clement