Issue: WON MMMMC should be liable for P52k when it exercised its option of Abandonment?

Held: No. Private respondents belatedly informed petitioner of the arrival of its goods in Manila and that if it wished to take delivery of the cargo it would have to pay P52k, but with the last paragraph thereof stating as follows:

Please can you advise within 15 days of receipt of this letter whether you intend to take delivery of this shipment, as alternatively we will have to take legal proceedings in order to have the cargo auctioned to recover the costs involved, as well as free the container which are (sic) urgently required for export cargoes.

Clearly, therefore, private respondents offered petitioner the options:1. paying the shipping and demurrage charges in order to take delivery of the goods;2. abandoning the same so that private respondents could sell them at public auction and thereafter apply the proceeds in payment of the shipping and other charges.

It will be remembered that in overland transportation, an unreasonable delay in the delivery of transported goods is sufficient ground for the abandonment of goods. By analogy, this can also apply to maritime transportation. Further, with much more reason can petitioner in the instant case properly abandon the goods, not only because of the unreasonable delay in its delivery but because of the option which was categoricallygranted to and exercised by it as a means of settling its liability for the cost and expenses of reshipment. And, said choice having been duly communicated, the same is binding upon the parties on legal and equitable considerations of estoppel.

IV. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS

A. Safety of Passengers

1. Duty to observe utmost diligenceArt. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

2. Duration of Liability CASES:1.) Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. CAThe Supreme Court held that the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers makes Aboitiz liable. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. A reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioners vessel. In the case at bar, such justifiable cause exists because he had to come back for his cargo. Aboitiz has failed to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence in requiring or seeing to it that precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into a forbidden area.

2.) La Mallorca vs. CAOn the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rule that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carriers premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under the Rules of Court, although incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.

3.) Dangwa Transportation vs. CAThe testimonies of the witnesses show that that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code

4.) Vda de Nueva vs. Manila Railroad CompanyA passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of acontract, express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is accepted as an equivalent.The relation of passenger andcarrier commences when one puts himself in the care of the carrier, or directly under its control, with the bona fideintention ofbecoming a passenger, and is accepted as such by the carrier as where he makes acontract for transportation and presents himself at the proper place and ina proper manner to betransported.

Even disregarding the matter oftickets, and assuming Nueca intended to be a passenger, he was never accepted as such by MRC as hedid not present himselfat the proper place and in a proper manner to be transported.

Theliability ofrailroad companies topersons upon the premises is determined by the genera lrulesof negligence relating to duties ofowners/occupiers ofproperty.While railroad companies are not bound tothe same degree of care in regard tostrangers who are unlawfully upon the premises of its passengers, it maystill be liable to such strangers fornegligent ortortuous acts. Here, Nueca was not on the track,but either unlawfully inside the baggage car or beside the track It is normal for people to walk on the trackor roadbed when there is no oncoming train and to walk beside the track when a train passes. Thispractice is tolerated by MRC. Generally, MRCs stations are not enclosed, and is easily accessible to thepublic.

MRC isnegligent;doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.The train was under the complete control of the railroad company at the time ofthe accident. The baggage car would not have been derailed if the trainhad been properly operated. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that primafacie negligence maybe established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof ofnegligence

3. Presumption of NegligenceArticle 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

4. Defenses of Common Carriersa. Doctrine of Last ChanceWhen both parties involved in the accident were both negligent , the negligence of the party will not b considered the proximate cause if the other party has the last clear chance of avoiding the injury. Thus, if the plaintiff has the last clear chance of avoiding the injury , the defendant my no longer be held liable .

In such case, the negligence of the plaintiff which is not just contributory negligence will be considered an efficient intervening cause.

However, the doctrine will not be applicable if the case is between the passenger and a carrier and the concurrent negligence of the carrier and a third party are the proximate causes of the injury . Ex. A truck was parked askew in violation of the traffic rules and a truck was hit by overspeeding passenger bus , the operator cannot invoke the doctrine of last chance in a case filed by the passenger of the bus who was injured as a result of the same incident.

b. Mechanical DefectsDamage or injury that can be traced to mechanical defects is not a damage or injury that is caused by fortuitous event. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that carrier is liable to its passengers for damages caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance. CASES:1.) Japan Airlines vs. CAThe Supreme Court held that JAL cannot be held liable. In the case at bar, there was absence of bad faith and negligence on the part of Japan Airlines. Such occurrence of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo amounts to a force majeure. When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Common carriers are not insurer of all risks. Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. However, JAL is not completely absolved from liability. It has the obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first available flight to Manila

2.) Philippine Airlines vs. CAThe contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with publicinterest, the law requires common carriers to carry thepassengers safely as far as human care andforesight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for allthe circumstances.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travellingpublic. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty . . . . ( emphasis supplied) The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp theexacting standard required by law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due toinclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence didnot terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage andthe sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said inone case once again must be stressed, i.e.,the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at theport of destination and has left the carrier's premises.

Hence, PAL necessarily would still have toexercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battlebetween government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that theprivaterespondent was a stranger to the place.

3.) Tiu vs. ArriesgadoThe Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Is Inapplicable Contrary to the petitioners contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles.It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent Arriesgados wife due to the negligence of petitioner Laspias, his employee, on this score.

4.) Necesito vs. ParasWhile the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passenger, it should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of its equipment it such defects were discoverable. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the utmost diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide and therefore the knuckles failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility. Judgment REVERSED, PRBL to pay indemnity.

5.) Juntilla vs. FontanarTire blowout of a jeep is not a fortuitous event where there exists a specific act of negligence by the carrier consisting of the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the inciden.

In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all timest

5. Liability for acts of employees Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees

CASES:1.) Maranan vs. PerezUnder Art. 1739 of the Civil Code, a common carrier are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have ached beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carrier.

It is the carriers strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to technical competence but also to this total personality, their behavior and thus moral fiber.

The dismissal of the claim against the driver is correct. Plaintiffs action was predicated in breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a part thereto. His civil liability is covered on the criminal case.

2.) De Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad CompanyWhile a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. In the present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused thereby.

3.) LRT vs. NatividadThe law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.

The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.

4.) Marchan vs. MendozaThe Supreme Court held that the proximate cause of the accident was the gross negligence of Marchan who when driving is expected to have employed the highest degree of care. He should have been assiduously prudent in handling his vehicle to insure the safety of his passengers. There is no reason why he shouldnt stop the vehicle upon noticing a parked truck in front of him. He must have taken precautionary measures in securing the safety of his passengers. Philippine Rabbit is also liable because common carriers cannot escape liability for the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence and willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders. The awarding of compensatory damages is reasonable because Arsenio Mendoza had suffered paralysis on the lower extremities, which will incapacitate him to engage in his customary occupation throughout the remaining years of his life. The awarding of exemplary damages likewise is found just although the plaintiffs did not specify such claim. The court is called upon the exercise and can use its discretion in the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint.

6. Liability for acts of strangersArticle 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

CASES:1. Bachelor Express vs. CAThe sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still proves that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Considering the factual findings in this case, it is clear that petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. The argument that the petitioners are not insurers of their passengers deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destination as warranted by law.

2. Fortune Express vs. CAThe Supreme Court held that the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos cannot be assailed as a fortuitous event. The requisite of unforseeability to be considered forced majeure is lacking. Fortune Express knew that Maranaos were planning to burn some of its passenger buses and yet petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Petitioners employees failed to prevent the attack on one of its passengers because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong. Art. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that the common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of willful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through proper diligence. Because of Fortune Expresss negligence, the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos was made possible.

3. Gacal vs. PALThe source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.

The failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), without any connection with private respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a military take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international flights.4. Pilapil vs. CAA tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

Although the suggested precaution of using mesh grills could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type,

in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this respect.

7. Effect of stipulation on liabilityArticle 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.

Article 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier's liability for negligence is valid, but not for wilful acts or gross negligence.The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier's liability.

Article 1760. The common carrier's responsibility prescribed in the preceding article cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.

B. Passengers BaggagesArt. 1754. The provisions of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passenger's baggage which is not in his personal custody or in that of his employee. As to other baggage, the rules in Articles 1998 and 2000 to 2003 concerning the responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be applicable.

Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by the travellers in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the effects brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects. (1783)

Art. 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two preceding articles shall Include the loss of, or injury to the personal property of the guests caused by the servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as strangers; but not that which may proceed from any force majeure. The fact that travellers are constrained to rely on the vigilance of the keeper of the hotels or inns shall be considered in determining the degree of care required of him. (1784a)

Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void. (n)

C. Relevant provisions of the Warsaw Convention 1. Binding effect of the Warsaw Convention2. Categories of International Air TransportationCASES:1.) Mapa vs. CAIssue: whether the contracts of transportation between Purita and Carmina Mapa, on the one hand, and TWA, on the other, were contracts of international transportation under the Warsaw Convention.Held: If they were, then we should sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in light of our ruling inSantos v. Northwest Orient Airlines.It appears clear to us that TWA itself, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals impliedly admit that if the sole basis were the two TWA tickets forLos Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago, the contracts cannot be brought within the term international transportation, as defined in Article I(2) of the Warsaw Convention.As provided therein, a contract is one ofinternational transportationonly if according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.There are then two categories ofinternational transportation,viz., (1) that where the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties regardless of whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment; and (2) that where the place of departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power, even though the power is not a party to the Convention.It must be underscored that the first category ofinternational transportationunder the Warsaw Convention is based on the contract made by the parties.TWA does not claim that the Manila-Los Angeles contracts of transportation which brought Purita and Carmina to Los Angeles were also its contracts.It does not deny the assertion of the petitioners that those contracts were independentof the TWA tickets issued in Bangkok, Thailand. No evidence was offered that TWA and PAL had an agreement concerning transportation of passengers from points of departures not served with aircrafts of one or the other.There could have been no difficulty for such agreement, since TWA admitted without qualification in paragraph 1 of its Answer to the second Amended Complaint the allegation in paragraph 1.1 of the latter that TWA is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines with office address at Ground Floor, Saville Building, Sen. Gil. J. Puyat Avenue, corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila.TWA relies on Article I(3) of the Convention, which provides as follows: A carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party.It also points to Article 15 of the IATA Recommend Practice 1724, which provides:Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers under one ticket, or under a ticket and any conjunction ticket issued in connection therewith, is regarded as a single operation. The flaw of respondents position is the presumption that the parties have regarded as an undivided carriage or as a single operation the carriage from Manila to Los Angeles through PAL then to New York Boston- St. Louis-Chicago through TWA.The dismissal then of the second Amended Complaint by the trial court and the Court of Appeals affirmance of the dismissal were not based on indubitable facts or grounds, but on inferences without established factual basis.

2.) China Airlines vs. Daniel ChiokIt is significant to note that the contract of air transportation was between petitioner and respondent, with the former endorsing to PAL theHong Kong-to-Manila segment of the journey.Such contract of carriage has always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single operation. This jurisprudential rule is supported by the Warsaw Convention, to which the Philippines is a party, and by the existing practices of the International Air Transport Association(IATA).

Article 1, Section 3 of theWarsaw Convention states:

Transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, orauthority of the same High Contracting Party.

Article 15 of IATA-Recommended Practice similarly provides:Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers under one ticket, or under a ticket and any conjunction ticket issued therewith, is regarded as a single operation.

3.) American Airlines vs. CAWarsaw Convention to which the Republic of the Philippines is a party and which has the force and effect of law in this country applies to all international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by an aircraft gratuitously or for hire. As enumerated in the Preamble of the Convention, one of the objectives is "to regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air".The contract of carriage entered into by the private respondent with Singapore Airlines, and subsequently with the petitioner, to transport him to nine cities in different countries with New York as the final destination is a contract of international transportation and the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passengers.This includes section 28 (1) which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought.Scs daadThe threshold issue of jurisdiction of Philippine courts under Art 28 (1) must first be resolved before any pronouncements may be made on the liability of the carrier thereunder. The objections raised by the private respondent that this case is released from the terms of the Convention because the incident on which this action is predicated did not occur in the process of embarking and disembarking from the carrier under Art 17and that the employees of the petitioner airline acted with malice and bad faith under Art 25 (1)pertain to the merits of the case which may be examined only if the action has first been properly commenced under the rules on jurisdiction set forth in Art. 28 (1).Art (28) (1) of the Warsaw Convention states:Sup remaArt 28 (1) An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.There is no dispute that petitioner issued the ticket in Geneva which was neither the domicile nor the principal place of business of petitioner nor the respondents place of destination.The question is whether the contract of transportation between the petitioner and the private respondent would be considered as a single operation and part of the contract of transportation entered into by the latter with Singapore Airlines in Manila.Petitioner disputes the ruling of the lower court that it is. Petitioners main argument is that the issuance of a new ticket in Geneva created a contract of carriage separate and distinct from that entered by the private respondent in Manila.This is without merit. Art 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention which states:"Transportation to be performed by several successive carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely because one contract or series of contracts is to be performed entirely within the territory subject of the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High contracting Party."