Transpo Doctrines

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Chapter I

Classes of Carriers

First Philippine Industrial Corp v. CA:

A "common carrier" may be defined, broadly, as one who holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business of transporting persons or propertyfrom place to place, for compensation, offering his services to the public generally

Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm or ass ociation engaged in the business of carrying or transportingpassengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public."

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

o He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in thetransportation of goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation

o He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confinedo He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his established roads; ando The transportation must be for hire.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, the definition of "common carriers" in the Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means oftransporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle

Bascos v. CA:

The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to thegeneral public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted."

o In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move.Judicial admissions are conclusive

Hijacking, not being included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier ispresumed to have been at fault or negligent. Thus, to exculpate the carrier from liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the

hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. Affidavits were not enough to overcome the presumption

De Guzman v. CA:

It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for othermerchants fromManila to Pangasinan, although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and

even though private respondent'sprincipaloccupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his

customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here

Planters Products Inc v. CA:

A charter-party is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified timeor use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a merchant or other person for the

conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight

Charter parties are of two types: (a) contract of affreightment which involves the use of shipping space on vessels leased by the owner in part or as awhole, to carry goods for others; and, (b) charter by demise or bareboat charter, by the terms of which the whole vessel is let to the charterer with a

transfer to him of its entire command and possession and consequent control over its navigation, including the master and the crew, who are his servants

Contract of affreightment may either be time charter, wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, whereinthe ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for

a single or consecutive voyage, the shipowner to supply the ships stores, pay for the wages of the master and the crew, and defray the expenses for the

maintenance of the ship

The distinction between a common or public carrier and a private or special carrier lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking isa single transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation, although involving the carr iage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation offering

such service is a private carrier

It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as theparticular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned

The period during which the carrier was to observe the degree of diligence required of it as a public carrier began from the time the cargo wasunconditionally placed in its charge after the vessels holds were duly inspected and passed scrutiny by the shipper, up to and until the vessel reached its

destination and its hull was re-examined by the consignee, but prior to unloading. This is clear from the limitation clause agreed upon by the parties in the

Addendum to the standard GENCON time charter-party which provided for an F.I.O.S., meaning, that the loading, stowing, trimming and discharge of the

cargo was to be done by the charterer, free from all risk and expense to the carrier. Moreover, a shipowner is liable for damage t o the cargo resulting from

improper stowage only when the stowing is done by stevedores employed by him, and therefore under his control and supervision, not when the same is

done by the consignee or stevedores under the employ of the latter

Article 1734 of the New Civil Code provides that c ommon carriers are not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods if caused bythe character of the goods or defects in the packaging or in the containers. The Code of Commerce also provides that all losses and deteriorations which

the goods may suffer during the transportation by reason of fortuitous event, force majeure, or the inherent defect of the goods, shall be for the account

and risk of the shipper, and that proof of these accidents is incumbent upon the carrier.


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Fabre v. CA:

Petitioner need not be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions on common carriers to apply.PHILAMGEN v. PKS:

If the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry the goods for thegeneral public or to a limited clientele, although involving the carr iage of goods for a fee, a person or corporation providing such service could be a private

carrierThe regularity of ones activities in an area can indicate more than just a casual activity on its part and thus may characterize it as a common

carrier

Caltex v. Sulpicio Lines:

The respective rights of a shipper and carrier depends on the contract of carriage (i.e. bill of lading or charter party) and not on whether it is a private orcommon carrier. Furthermore, the charterer of a vessel has no obligation before transporting its cargo to ensure that the vessel it chartered complied with

all the legal requirements. The duty rests upon the common carrier and accordingly, the charterer has the right to presume the seaworthiness of the

vessel. A charter party may convert a common carrier into a private carrier, provided that it is a demise or bareboat c harter.

Loadstar Shipping Co v. Pioneer Asia Insurance Corp:

Petitioner remains a common carrier notwithstanding the existence of the charter agreement since the said charter, voyage charter, is limited to the shiponly and does not involve both the vessel and its crew

Governing Laws

Samar Mining Company v. Nordeutcherlloyd and C.F. Sharp & Company:

When a carrier had delivered the goods at the port of destination, at that point, he merely becomes an agent of the consignee and ceases to be liable forany loss or damage of goods transported

Eastern Shipping Lines v. IAC:

The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier such that if the goods are to be transported tothe Philippines, it is the Civil Code that will govern. Furthermore, in all matters no regulated by the said Code, the rights and obligations of common

carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws (i.e. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, etc)

National Development Co v. CA:

It is immaterial that the collision and subsequent l oss of the goods occurred in foreign wat ers. Thus, for as long as the goods were intended to betransported to the Philippines, it is the Civil Code that which will govern. Since a collision is not specifically covered by the Civil Code, so Book3 of t he Code

of Commerce, which deals with the collision of vessels is applicable.

And according to the said laws, where the collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel, the owner of the vessel at fault shall indemnify the losses.However, if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the damages

suffered by their cargoes. Also, the shipowner or carrier is not exempt from liability for damages due to the fault or negligence of the captain

Chapter II

Common Carriage ofGoods

Mirasol v. Dollar:

Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in goodorder and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and

prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any

redress, no matter what may have caused the damage

Ynchausti Steamship v. Dexter:

The mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier, and of their arrival at the place of destination in bad order, makes out a prima facie caseagainst the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury occurred, the carrier must be held responsible

Eastern Shipping Lines v. IAC:

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extra-ordinary diligence in the vigilance overgoods, accdg. to all the circumstances of each case. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless the

same is due to any of the ff. causes mentioned in Article 1734. Moreover, it is required under Art. 1739 of the sa me Code that the natural disaster must


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have been the proximate and only cause of the loss, and that the carrier has exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after

the occurrence of the disaster. This petitioner carrier has also failed to establish satisfactorily

Ganzon v. CA:

By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier and upon their receipt by thecarrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carriers extraordinay responsibility for the loss,

destruction, or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1738, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual

or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.

The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained inthe custody and control of the carrier, albeit unloaded

Citadel Lines Inc v. CA:

Basic is the rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or ownerdeclares a greater value, is binding. Furthermore, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction or

deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.

Since the value of the goods does not appear in the bill of lading, the stipulation limiting the carriers liability appliesSaludo Jr v. CA:

The two-fold character of a bill of lading are: it is a receipt as to the quantity and description of the goods shipped and a contract to transport the goods tothe consignee or other person therein designated, on the terms specified in such instrument. There is likewise no law which requires that the delivery of

the goods for carriage should precede the issuance of the bill of lading.

An airway bill estops the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality described in the bill," a further reading and a more faithfulquotation of the authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than

a contract between the shipper and the carrier. . . . (However), as between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have been delivered for shipment

no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from showing the true facts . . . Between the consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as

to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment. As between the consignor and a receiving carrier,

the fact must outweigh the recital."

Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods aredelivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the s hipper

or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu,and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the

consignee or such other person entitled to receive them.30

And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the

exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them.31

Where

such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo instant

A common carrier is entitled to fair representation of the nature and value of the goods to be carr ied, with the concomitant right to rely thereon, andfurther noting at this juncture that a carrier has no obligation to inquire into the correctness or sufficiency of such information. The consequent duty to

conduct an inspection thereof arises in the event that there should be reason to doubt the veracity of such representations

Cathay Pacific v. CA:

Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private respondent when it failed to deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it being theobligation of a common carrier to carry its passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay their

transportation, and the evidence shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad faith

Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine government, saidconvention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute

limit of the extent of that liability. TheWarsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations

o However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much lessexempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful

misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established, as the Warsaw Convention itself provided that the carrier shall not be

limited to its liability where the damage is caused by the wilful misconduct by himself.

Ysmael v. Barretto:

It has been held in the case of Aguinaldo v. Daza, where the action was not commenced for more than a year after the delivery of the goods by the plaintiffand the receipt of the bill of lading, that the contractual limitations in the bill of lading is insufficientwith respect to the time for presentation of thewritten

claim insofar as it is affected by the slowness of communication between the points of destination. All things considered, we are clearly of the opinion that

the action was brought with a "reasonable time".

The lower court points out that the conditions in question "are not printed on the triplicate copies which were delivered to the plaintiff," and that byreason thereof they "are not binding upon the plaintiff."

The clause in question which limits the carr iers liability cannot be sustained as the value of the said limitation is unconscionable and against public policyo It was sufficiently shown that the result of such limitation would reduce the value of the cargo to less than one-eighth of its actual value.


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Shewaram v. PAL:

It having been shown that the loss of the transistor radio and the camera of the appellee was due to the negligence of the employees of the appellant, it isclear that the appellant should be held liable for the payment of said loss. Article 1750 of the New Civil Code which provides that A contract fixing the

sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the

circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.

In accordance with the above-quoted provision, the pecuniary liability of a common carrier may, by c ontract, be limited to a fixed amount. It is required,however, that the contract must be "reasonable and just under the circumstances and has been fairly and freely agreed upon."

The requirements have not been met. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to readwould not warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions

Ong Yiu v. CA:

While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh. "12"), he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions havebeen held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the

regulation".5

It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion", in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a

ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract

is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent

Aboitiz Shipping Corp v. New India Assurance Company:

The Court clarified the exception on the doctrine of limited liability; when the damage is due to the fault of the shipowner or to the concurrent negligenceof the shipowner and the captain. In which case, the shipowner shall be liable to the full-extent of the damage. To limit its liability to the amount of the

insurance proceeds, petitioner has the burden of proving that the unseaworthiness of its vessel was not due to its fault or negligence. Considering the

evidence presented and the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that petitioner failed to discharge this burden

Tabacalera Insurance v. North Front Shipping:

Laboratory analysis revealed that the corn grains were contaminated with salt water. North Front Shipping Services, Inc., failed to rebut all thesearguments. It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the following: (a) flood, storm,

earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (c) act or omission of the

shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of competent public authority.

This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is rightly liable.

Common Carriage of Passengers

Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado:

The liability of the employer under Articl

e2180 of t

heCivil Cod

eis direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent

employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption

of negligence on its own part

While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a commoncarrier, they are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence

in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are

equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways

Necesito v. Paras:

While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should nevertheless be held to answer for the defects of its equipment if such flawswere at all discoverable. In this case, the manufacturer of the defective appliance/ equipment is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good

repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability

Gacal v. PAL:

The failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident, all members of the MNLF, without any connection withprivate respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers

Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking ofpassengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a military

take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international

flights

The security checks and measures and surveillance precautions in all flights, including the inspection of baggages and cargo and frisking of passengers atthe Davao Airport were performed and rendered solely by military personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the

same in all airports in the Philippines. Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a nominal manner and

obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the exclusion of the former


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Sulpicio v. CA:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that although Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner, still the latter is liable as a common carrier for hisdeath. ALC had a contract of carriage with petitioner. The presence of the stevedores sent by ALC on board the barge of petitioner was called for by the

contract of carriage. Definitely, petitioner could not expect the shipper itself to load the lumber without the aid of the stevedores. Furthermore, petitioner

knew of the presence and role of the stevedores in its barge and thus consented to their presence. Hence, petitioner was responsible for their safety while

on board the barge

Quisumbing Sr. v. CA:

PAL's "failure to take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or misconduct which mingles with

force majeure as an active and cooperative cause."

The armed robbery that took place constitutesforce majeure for which defendant is not liable because the robbers were able to gain entrance to the planewith the guns they used already in their possession, which fact could not have been prevented nor avoided by the defendant since it was not authorized to

search its passengers for firearms and deadly weapons

Pan American World Airways v. Rapadan:

There was such a notice appearing on page 2 of the airline ticket stating that the Warsaw Convention governs in case of death or injury to a passenger orof loss, damage or destruction to a passengers luggage. The notice states that if the passengers journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a

country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and the Convention governs and in most cases the liability of carriers for death or

personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage. Furthermore, par.2 of the Conditions of Contract also appearing on the ticket states that

the carriage is subject to the rules and limitations established by the Warsaw Convention unless such carriage is not international carriage

The Notice and Paragraph 2 of the Conditions of Contract should be sufficient notice showing the applicability of the Warsaw limitations whichspecifically provides that it is applicable to international carriage. In the case at bar, the baggage check is combined with the passenger ticket in onedocument of carriage. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines v. IAC:

We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two collidingvehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to

exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."

Accommodation of Passengers

Lara v. Valencia:

As accommodation passengers or invited guests, Valencia as owner and driver of the pick-up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care sothat they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, an owner of an automobile owes a guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to

avoid injuring him

Commencement, Duration and Termination of Carriers Responsibility for Safety of Passengers

La Mallorca v. CA:

The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability ofthe carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the childthat she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand

him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the

child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at

a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to

leave the carrier's premises

Aboitiz Shipping Corp v. CA:

Vda. De Abeta v. PAL:

BLTB v. IAC:

On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer, appellant BLTB, is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the death of or injuries toits passengers was through the negligence of its employee, and such liability does not cease even upon proof that BLTB had exercised all the diligence of a

good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees


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The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to theirdestination

They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Article 1756,Civil Code). In the present case, the appellants have failed to prove extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that

the bus driver of BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the driver and the owner must answer for injuries or death to its passengers. The liability of

BLTB is also solidarily with its driver even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while that of the bus company from contract

Negligence or InternationalAssault by Carriers Employees

Gillaco v. Manila Railroad:

No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree of care and diligence in the protection of its passengers; but, considering the vast andcomplex activities of modern rail transportation, to require of appellant that it should guard against all possible misunderstanding between each and every

one of its employees and every passenger that might chance to ride in its conveyances at any time, strikes us as demanding diligence beyond what human

care and foresight can provide

When the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila.Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of

Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation,

and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's

assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier

Maranan v. Perez:

Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty ofexecuting the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guiltyemployee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties

Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by itsemployees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to

passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority

or in violation of the orders of the common carriers

The basis of the carr ier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests on the principle that it is the carrier's implied dutyto transportthe passenger safely where, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was

done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carriers liability herein is absolute

Passengers Duty to Observe Diligence

Isaac v. A.L. Ammen Tranportation

where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation mustbe taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but

must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to

exercise the best judgement the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his part which renders the company liable. However a

contributory negligence on the part of the passenger cannot relieve the common carrier of its liability but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount

of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil Code),

Philippine National Railways v. CA:

Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under thecontract of carriage

But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributorynegligence. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as

moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside.

Injury to Passengers Due to Acts of Other Passengers/Strangers

Fortune Express Inc v. CA:

Pilapil v. CA:

The law does not make the CC an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Art. 1755 qualifies the duty of the CC in exercising vigilance to only suchas human care and foresight can provide. The presumption created by law against the CC is rebuttable by proof that t he CC had exercised extraordinary

diligence in the performance of its obligations and that the injuries suffered were caused by fortuitous events

Under Art. 1763, the diligence required, with regard to its liability in cases when intervening acts of strangers directly caused the injury, is the diligenceonly of a good father of a family and not the extraordinary diligence generally required. The CC would only be negligent if the tort caused by a third person

could have been foreseen and prevented by them

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