Transpo Cases (PUP)

7/28/2019 Transpo Cases (PUP)

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JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE AGANA., MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA,

ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE MIRANDA, respondents.

Facts: On June 13, 1991, Private respondents boarded the JAL flight No. JL 001 and JL 061to Manila with a stop over at Narita Japan at the airlines' expense. Upon arrival at Naritaprivate respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day,

private respondents went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to theMt. Pinatubo eruption rendered NAIA inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, privaterespondents' trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely. JAL then booked another flight fortthe passengers and again answered for the hotel accommodations but still thesucceeding flights were cancelled. At this point, JAL informed the private respondentsthat it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stayin Narita. Private respondents were forced to pay their accommodations and mealexpenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpectedstay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No.741.

Issue: Whether or not JAL was obligated to answer for the accommodation expenses due

to the force majeure and the award of nominal damages is in order.

Held: No, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligationbecause of "force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damagesfor non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight toManila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in theform of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be chargedto JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for theirunexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.

Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident tothe mode of travel. 7 In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic

changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which thepassenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of allrisks.

We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from June 15to June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and reservation.In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIA's closure, that JAL flightoperations would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JALfrom its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondentson its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport privaterespondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination.

Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages areadjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by thedefendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying anyloss suffered by him. 12 The court may award nominal damages in every obligationarising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any propertyright has been invaded.

JANELLE MAE S. LAZARO

TRANSPORTATION LAWS - SUMMER


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FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner, vs.JOSE A. ESPINAS, Respondent.

Facts: Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Manila. Upon reaching theintersection of Leon Guinto and President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. Whenthe signal light turned green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already inthe middle of the intersection when another car suddenly hit and bumped his car. As aresult of the impact, Espinas car turned clockwise. The other car escaped from thescene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number. After verifying withthe Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, withplate number UCF-545, is Filcar.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor before theMetropolitan Trial Cou,rt (MeTC) of Manila demanding that Filcar and Carmen Flor paythe amount of P97,910.00, representing actual damages sustained by his car.

Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumpedEspinas car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary. Filcar further stated thatwhen the incident happened, the car was being driven by Atty. Flors personal driver,

Timoteo Floresca. Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident wasnot due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty.Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor both said that they always exercised the due diligencerequired of a good father of a family in leasing or assigning their vehicles to third parties.

Issue: Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in anaccident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas.

Held: Yes. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca,and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the CivilCode.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and householdhelpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are notengaged in any business or industry.

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission.Thus, a person willgenerally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another.

Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicatedon an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is heldliable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liableon the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care andvigilance over the acts of ones subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last




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paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense thathe observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

VICTORY LINER, INC., petitioner, vs.ROSALITO GAMMAD, APRIL ROSSAN P. GAMMAD, ROI ROZANO P. GAMMAD and

DIANA FRANCES P. GAMMAD, respondents.

Facts: Respondent Rosalito Gammad's wife Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad board anair-conditioned Victory Liner bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan from Manila. The busfell on a ravine somewhere in Barangay Baliling, Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, which resultedin the death of Marie Grace and physical injuries to other passengers. Respondent heirsof the deceased filed a complaintfor damages arising from culpa contractual againstpetitioner. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the incident was purely accidental andthat it has always exercised extraordinary diligence in its 50 years of operation.

After several re-settings, pre-trial was set . For failure to appear on the said date,petitioner was declared as in default. However, on petitioners motion to lift the order ofdefault, the same was granted by the trial court.

Despite due notices, the trial court Issued an order considering the case submitted fordecision for failure of petitioner and counsel to appear. On November 6, 1998, the trialcourt rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants to pay actual,exemplary, moral and compensatory damages, death indemnity, attorney's fees andcost of suit.

Hence, this petition for review principally based on the fact that the mistake or gross

negligence of its counsel deprived petitioner of due process of law. Petitioner also arguesthat the trial courts award of damages were without basis and should be deleted.

Issue: Whether petitioners counsel was guilty of gross negligence; (2) whetherpetitioner should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage; and (3) whether theaward of damages was proper.

Held: It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on therule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or impliedauthority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence ofcounsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client.

It cannot be denied that the requirements of due process were observed in the instantcase. Petitioner was never deprived of its day in court, as in fact it was afforded everyopportunity to be heard. Thus, it is of record that notices were sent to petitioner and thatits counsel was able to file a motion to dismiss the complaint, an answer to thecomplaint, and even a pre-trial brief. What was irretrievably lost by petitioner was itsopportunity to participate in the trial of the case and to adduce evidence in its behalfbecause of negligence. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought




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to be safeguarded against is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of theopportunity to be heard.

Anent the second Issue, petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of contract ofcarriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human careand foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with dueregard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the

common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.

Nevertheless, the award of damages should be modified.

The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceaseds earning capacityshould be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presentedto substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence ofdocumentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than theminimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the factthat in the deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) thedeceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage

under current labor laws.

Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals computed the award of compensatorydamages for loss of earning capacity only on the basis of the testimony of respondentRosalito that the deceased was 39 years of age and a Section Chief of the Bureau ofInternal Revenue, Tuguergarao District Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per annumwhen she died.No other evidence was presented. The award is clearly erroneousbecause the deceaseds earnings does not fall within the exceptions.

However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the amount ofP500,000.00 should be awarded to respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less thancompensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniaryloss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provedwith certainty.

Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with exemplarydamages because they are based on different jural foundations.

Respondents should be awarded moral damages to compensate for the grief caused bythe death of the deceased resulting from the petitioners breach of contract of carriage.Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the extraordinary diligencerequired for common carriers, it is presumed to have acted recklessly.




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PEDRO R. DAVILA and PRECIOSA C. TIRO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, defendant-appellant

Facts: The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane of the defendant whichtook the lives of all its crew and passengers. The plane, identified as PI-C133, was a DC-3type of aircraft, manufactured in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in 1948. It hadflown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its ill-fated flight. Despite its age, however, ithad been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. On November23, 1960, at 5:30 in the afternoon, it took off from the Manduriao Airport, Iloilo, on itsway to Manila, with 33 people on board, including the plane's complement. It did notreach its destination, but crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutesafter take-off. A massive search was undertaken by the defendant and by other partiesas soon as it was realized that the plane's arrival in Manila was overdue. The plaintiffs,parents of Pedro T. Davila, Jr., who was one of the passengers, had no definite news ofwhat had happened to their son, getting what information they could only from

conflicting newspaper reports, until they received, on December 19, 1960, a letter ofcondolence from the defendant's president Andres Soriano, informing them that theirson had died in the crash. And it was only on December 29 that his body was recoveredan taken back to Iloilo.

Issue: whether or not the defendant is liable for violation of its contract of carriage andif so, for how much.

Held: Yes.

What is undisputed therefore is that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for hisflight, at least between Romblon and Manila. Since up to that point over Romblon, where

he was supposed to intersect airway "Amber I" the weather was clear, the mostreasonable conclusion is that his failure to do so was intentional, and that he probablywanted to fly on a straight line to Manila. It was a violation of air-craft traffic rules towhich, under the circumstances, the accident may be directly attributable.

In any case, absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to howand why the accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at fault, under Article1756 of the Civil Code.




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The next question relates to the amount of damages that should be awarded to theplaintiffs, parents of the deceased. The trial court fixed the indemnity for his death in theamount of P6,000.00. Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the point it should beincreased to P12,000.00. 1

According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant shall be liablefor the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the

heirs of the latter." This Article, while referring to "damages for death caused by crime orquasi-delict," is expressly made applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passengercaused by the breach of contract by a common carrier."

Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) differentsources, namely from managing a radio station, from law practice and from farming, theexpenses incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if hehad only one source. Together with his living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month,or P7,200.00 a year, seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00.

This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which should beawarded to the plaintiffs in this particular respect.

WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of D Rough Riders,and VIRGILIO TE LAS PIASpetitioners, vs. PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN

CONDOR, SERGIO PEDRANO and PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE,INC., respondents.

Facts: The cargo truck marked Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise wasloaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies,

just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio

Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed thedamaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away. Pedrano

left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed

the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a

warning for incoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on.

As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck,which was then

about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid

hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact

damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado

lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa, was brought

to the Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical

Center where she died shortly thereafter.

Respondent Arriesgado filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages

and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against the

petitioners, D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias.

Therespondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and




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high speed along the national road, and that petitioner Laspias did not take

precautionary measures to avoid the accident.

The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint alleged that petitioner

Laspias was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies,

Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that the

truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the

highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspias promptly

applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite

his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on thepassengers, the right

side portion of the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear.

Issue: Whether or not Virgilo Laspinas was guilty of gross negligence.

HELD: Yes. The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of theirpassengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756. It is undisputed

that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed

upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the factthat the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely

to his destination are the matters that need to be proved.This is because under the said

contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the

respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary

diligence with due regard for all circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in

the course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. Upon the

happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes

the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the

care of his passengers. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree

of diligence from common carriers and increating a presumption of negligence against

them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While evidence

may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown that

the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier

must show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and

foresight can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event.

As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such

presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus is,

thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a

common carrier.




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LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner, vs.HON. ALBERTO V. SEERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance

of Zamboanga; JOSELITO AIZON, and FELIPE AIZON, respondents.

Facts: Private respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First Instanceof Zamboanga City with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence.

The accused, being then the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus owned and operated byFELIPE AIZON, through reckless and fast driving, caused the said Isuzu Passenger Bus toturn turtle, as a result of which, the persons of MYRNA PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSABARING, both passengers on board the said Isuzu passenger bus sustained injuries ontheir persons which caused their death.

The court rendered judgment convicting him of the offense charged and sentencing himto indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis. A writ of Execution was

issued against Joselito Aizon but the same was returned unsatisfied because of hisinsolvency. Petitioner filed with the court a motion for the issuance of Subsidiary Writ ofExecution and served a copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of

Joselito Aizon as alleged in the Information. Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on thegrounds, to wit: (1) that he is not the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in questionhaving been sold already to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of transferhas not been executed because the full price has not yet been paid; and (2) that in caseof insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the judgmentinsofar as the indemnity is concerned.




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The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground thatFelipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito, was not a party in the aforesaid criminal case.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, but the same was denied.Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of the

Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award wasmade, or in a separate civil action.

Ruling: Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for afelony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the institution of the criminal action carrieswith it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom, except when there is aseparate civil action or reservation of the latter on the part of the complainant. Asexplained in Ramcar, Incorporated v. De Leon: When no civil action is expresslyinstituted, according to subsection (a) of section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly

jointly instituted with the criminal action.

Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an

employer may be subsidiary liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal actionwhen: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committedthe offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied hiscivil liability. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only afterconviction of the employee in the criminal case.

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case institutedagainst his employee,but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiaryliability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see toit that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in thedefense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is alsohis. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted anddamages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought tocourt, for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day incourt .

Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of thebus but only claims now that he sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would serveno important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent actionagainst the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability. Underthe circumstances, it would not only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs ofthe deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the proceeding for theenforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceedingfor the execution of the judgment.




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LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs.MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENTSECURITY AGENCY, respondents.

FACTS: Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasinga token. While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard

Junelito Escartin approached him. Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight. Nicanorfell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train operatedby Rodolfo Roman.

The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages againstEscartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards)

for the death of her husband. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence whilePrudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending thatNavidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security andJunelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. Prudentappealed. Court of Appeals reversed the ruling by exonerating the appellants from anyliability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the




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Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed topay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees-

Issue: Whether or not LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract ofcarriage.

HELD: NO. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature

of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercisingutmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.

Carriers are presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, thepassenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier orof its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due toan unforeseen event or to force majeure.

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation toindemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure toexercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of itscommitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own

employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm toundertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of itsresponsibilities under the contract of carriage.

There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of anyculpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, thecontractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between thelatter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: The victim Ramon Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along CalbayogCity. Also in Calbayog City, defendant Philtranco driven by defendant Rogasiones Dolina

Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. As the bus was

pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued its running motion and it occurred

at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly infront of the said bus. As the engine of Philtranco started abruptly and suddenly, its

running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby bumped on

the victim Ramon. As a result, fell and was ran over by the bus.

Still, the bus did not stop although it had already bumped and ran over the victim;

instead, it proceeded running. Thereafter, P/sgt. Yabao who was then jogging

approached the bus driver defendant Manilhig and signaled him to stop, but the latter




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did not listen. So, the police officer introduced himself and ordered the latter to stop. The

said defendant drivers stopped the Philtranco bus.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally pay

the private respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner of a public service is

liable for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver.

Held:Yes, petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner is still liable.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that, Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage

done.

Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties, is called a quasi- delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. Further,

Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that, the obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is

demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but for those of persons for whomone is responsible.

In the case at bar, the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like

petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver is primary,

direct, and joint and severally or solidary with the driver. Since the employers liability is

primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by

it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence

which gave rise to the action based on quasi- delict.

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL yMALECDAN, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY,FERNANDO CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE

CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late

Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for thedeath of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on atMarivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. It was alleged that on said date, while petitioner

Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporationin a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules andregulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, PedritoCudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the




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said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, firstbrought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before bangingsaid victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.

On the otherhand, petitioners allege that they observed and continued to observe theextraordinary diligence required in the operation of the company and the supervision ofthe employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at large.

The trial court ruled in favor of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligencewas the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs ofPedrito. However, CA reversed the decision and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moraldamages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of the suit.

Issue: Whether or not Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driverTheodore.

Held: Yes. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had noknowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly notmanifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus

is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signalhis intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuousoffer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, everytime the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to apassenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration ofthe bus in this case was a breach of such duty.

Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger andis entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, ithas been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons extends topersons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom

General rule is that by contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation totransport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligencewith a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by thepassenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier unless thecarrier prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and1755 of the Civil Code.

Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition is apatent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence.

SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental Branch VII,

LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO, respondents.

Facts: Private respondents Atty. Tandog and Tiro, a contractors bought tickets forVoyage at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting inter-island

passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's




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vessel bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was

not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private

respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to another

vessel. Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree

"to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine

Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to

the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits,"and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored

and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof, private respondents

sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before Court of First

Instance of Misamis Oriental. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of

improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the

tickets, Condition No. 14, which reads: It is hereby agreed and understood that any and

all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where

it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. The motion was

denied hence the instant petition.

Issue: Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage ticketspurchased by private respondents, which limits the venue of actions arising from the

contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable?

Held: No. Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shippingindustry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back

of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following

reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island shipping industry, it is

not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of

the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second,

Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this

nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers

located in different places of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file

suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu. Considering the expense and trouble a

passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of

Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus

defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has

branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate

in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was

done in the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. CA




15/17

Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel owned by defendant ABOITIZ, at the port atSan Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North

Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been

provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank

Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier.

After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the

exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum ofAgreement between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and

defendant Aboitiz. The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its

crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the

passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the

cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had

already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes

were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was

pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that

the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was

thereafter brought to the hospital where he later died. Private respondents Vianas filed

a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz

denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was

completely under the control of Pioneer as the which handled the unloading of cargoes

from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an

employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.

Judgment is rendered in favor of the plantiffs. The trial court absolved Pioneer from

liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly established a case of

negligence against the crane operator which the court ruled is never presumed. Aboitiz

appealed the same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of

the trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas. Hence the

instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the responsibility of Aboitiz to the victim ceased when itdisembarked from the vessel.

Held: No. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until thepassenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's

dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the

passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's

conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All

persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance

are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delaywithin this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a

reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-

passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported

has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's

premises to claim his baggage.




16/17

When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes,

which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already

disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without

cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the

vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's

vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently,

under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed apassenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.

As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a

cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also

adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity

was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept

petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned

that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Hence,

Aboitiz is negligent. Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its

unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by

the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptivelyby Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten months from the institution

of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on

extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence

foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz.




17/17

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, petitioner, vs.VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS,

respondents.

Facts. Lolita de Jesus was riding a bus owned by La Mallorca which had a head oncollision against a freight truck. Apparently, the bus had a tire blow out which resultedto the accident. Lolita died. Her father filed a civil case for damages against LaMallorca. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of De Jesus and ordered LaMallorca to pay for actual, compensatory, and moral damages including counsel fees.

This decision was affirmed by the CA. La Mallorca assailed the decision as it arguedthat a tire blow out is a fortuitous event and should not be taken as negligence.

Issue: Whether or not La Mallorca is liable.

Held:Yes. The tire blow out in this case was due to the fact that the inner circle of thewheel of the bus was pressed so closely to the rim which caused it to eventuallyexplode. This mechanical defect in the installation of the wheel could have been easilydiscovered had the bus been subjected to a thorough check up before it was allowed tohit the road. La Mallorca is therefore negligent and the tire explosion is not a fortuitousevent for it could have been avoided had the bus been properly maintained.

The SC also emphasized in this case that moral damages are recoverable by reason ofthe death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, asprovided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.



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