Transitions - Preparing for changes to government

8/8/2019 Transitions - Preparing for changes to government

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Transitions: preparingor changes o governmentPeter Riddell and Catherine Haddon


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Transitions: preparing or changes o government 1

Contents

Pre ace 2

Summary 4

Introduction 8

1. Be ore the election 13

1.1 Opposition party preparations or government

1.2 Civil Service preparations or a possible change in government

1.3 Contact between oppositions and civil servants

1.4 Assessment

2. The election and a terwards 27

2.1 The campaign

2.2 The handover

2.3 The 100 days trap

2.4 Assessment

3. Transitions in practice fve case studies 373.1 Conservative public expenditure plans 1979

3.2 The Treasury 1997

3.3 Education and Employment 1997

3.4 The Home O ce 1997

3.5 Constitutional re orm 1997

4. Lessons rom elsewhere 49

4.1 Local government

4.2 Mayor o London4.3 Scotland and Wales

4.4 Canada

4.5 Australia

4.6 New Zealand

Conclusions 60

Recommendations 64

Appendices 69

Bibliography 72


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by Peter Catterall, on the origins o the so-called Douglas-Home Rules in 1963-64, and by

2 INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT

This report originated in the belie that changes o government in Britain do not work aswell as they should. One o the authors, Peter Riddell, has written as a journalist about threesuch transitions going back to the 1970s, and has observed the dislocations, and the initialmisunderstandings and mistakes, both in policies and people. Some o these errors havehad a lasting impact, requiring later ministerial reshu fes and big shi ts in policy. So newgovernments have not maximised their potential. With a general election coming up by June 2010 at the latest, it seemed timely to look back at past transitions and to see how theprocess could be improved.

Comparatively little has been written speci cally about transitions in the UK, apart rompassing re erences in the memoirs o politicians, in historical studies o the origins oGovernment policy, and in books about Whitehall. The three main exceptions are articles

David Richards, on the 1997 change o government, and some discussion o the issue in awider analysis o Opposition policy-making by Peter Hennessy. We are indebted to all three

or their analyses and or suggesting urther lines o inquiry.

The project has involved three stages. First, Catherine Haddon, the other author and apro essional historian, has delved into the National Archives and party archives to examinethe background o preparations or changes in government by Opposition parties, by theCivil Service, and contacts between the two. Second, interviews have been carried outwith more than 30 participants in past transitions: ormer Cabinet Secretaries, permanent

secretaries, chie s o sta to Leaders o the Opposition, special advisers, as well as currentcivil servants and politicians. We have also looked at experience away rom UK CentralGovernment: in Scotland, Wales, the London Mayor, English Local Government and incomparable parliamentary democracies in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Third, we haveheld a number o seminars and workshops to test out our ideas with senior civil servants(both current and past), special advisers, historians and political scientists.

Many people generously gave up their time or interviews and discussions with us, orwhich we are very grate ul. At times, we elt like a social networking site or veterans opast transition planning. We are grate ul to three ormer Cabinet Secretaries, Lords Butler oBrockwell; Wilson o Dinton; and Turnbull o En eld; as well as to several ormer PermanentSecretaries: Sir Michael Bichard, also now Executive Director o the Institute or Government;Lord Burns o Pitshanger; Sir Richard Mottram; Sir David Omand; Sir Kevin Tebbit; and SirDouglas Wass.

Lords Howe o Aberavon and Howell o Guild ord gave us the bene t o their unique insightsamong leading politicians o Opposition preparations dating back to the 1970s and late1960s respectively. Jack Straw commented on the case study on the Home O ce transitionin 1997. Sir Adam Ridley, who was both a civil servant and special adviser during the 1970sand 1980s, was extremely help ul in providing us with papers on the preparations o theConservative Opposition be ore the 1979 election, as well in giving us a lot o his timein interviews and in written comments on our work. Charles Clarke and Jonathan Powell,chie s o sta to Neil Kinnock and Tony Blair respectively, were characteristically shrewdin their memories and observations, as was Patricia Hewitt who was closely involved inLabours preparations be ore the 1997 election. Conor Ryan, a long-serving ormer adviser toDavid Blunkett, was very help ul about the background to the Education and Employmenttransition in 1997. Thanks also go to the sta at the National Archives in Kew, the ChurchillArchives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, the Conservative Party Archive at the BodleianLibrary, Ox ord and the British Cartoon Archive at the University o Kent. Nick Boles, Boris

Pre ace


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general election. O course, they wish to remain anonymous but they gave us insights not


Johnsons rst chie o sta ; Anthony Mayer, chie executive o the Greater London Authority;and Tony Travers o the London School Economics and pre-eminent authority on the politicso the capital were candid and stimulating about the mayoral transition in 2008. We learntmuch during our inquiry about how local government o ten prepares or transitions betterthan central government, notably rom Christina Dykes and Joe Simpson o the LeadershipCentre or Local Government. We are also grate ul to those who have researched this subjectin Canada, New Zealand and Australia re erences to these studies can be ound at the endo our report. Mel Cappe, a ormer Clerk to the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet inCanada with vast experience o transitions, was also kind enough to review our analysis othat countrys procedures.

We discussed our ideas with a number o the people listed above but also with severalacademic observers o Whitehall - Pro essor Peter Hennessy, Pro essor Kevin Theakston andDr Peter Catterall (not only a pioneering writer about transitions but also an academic withworking experience o local government).

We also talked to a sizeable number o serving senior civil servants, politicians and advisersinvolved in the current preparations or a possible change o government a ter the next

only into what is happening, but also, signi cantly, suggestions as to how the process canbe improved. We are grate ul to all o them. Naturally, however, all the views given here areour own.

To avoid burdening the report with ootnotes, we have quoted other published material butnot given speci c re erences to interviews. We have re erred to people by their descriptionsat the time, not to subsequent titles. So it is Sir Robin Butler as he was during the transitionsstudied, not Lord Butler o Brockwell. Moreover, to protect the anonymity o current civilservants and politicians, we have not identi ed them even indirectly.

We have throughout been stimulated, and encouraged, by all our colleagues at the Instituteor Government, which made this project possible. Sir Michael Bichard, David Halpern, Zoe

Gruhn, Nicole Smith and Jill Rutter all made valuable comments on dra ts o the report andSuzanne Roy provided invaluable assistance in the production o the report.

This report is certainly not the last word, or even the penultimate chapter, on the subject.Our intention is to stimulate a debate. So any comments are welcome.

Peter Riddell and Catherine Haddon

October 2009


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A change of administration following a general election tests both the quality and thee ectiveness o government. This report examines how such transitions have worked in theUnited Kingdom (UK) in the past, at di erent levels o UK government and in comparableparliamentary systems overseas. It then concludes what lessons can be drawn or centralgovernment in the UK. The main ocus is on elections where a change o government wasexpected to occur and in most cases, apart rom 1992, did so. Our analysis and conclusionsapply regardless o the result o the next general election, and, at the time o writingseveral months be ore a general election, we do not seek to examine current preparationseither by Opposition parties or by Whitehall departments.

In the UK, the formal handover from one administration to another has generally beenrelatively smooth and uncontentious or the last century. However, the wider transitioncovers a much longer period, beginning well be ore a general election is called, andcontinuing well into the rst ew weeks, months and years o a new administration. Unlikeother countries, transitions have not previously been studied in depth in the UK.

There are many ways of measuring the success of a transition, even before subsequenthistorical assessments o a governments policies. However, or those most closely involvedat the heart o government, and or new governments entering o ce, the main testis e ectiveness; how quickly a new government is able to get to grips with o ce andimplement its plans. Good preparation can ensure a new minster and a department workmore closely and more harmoniously together than they might otherwise do, and develop

a better relationship sooner. This study highlights the paradox that because of the necessary impartiality of the Civ

Service and avoidance o politicisation both an incoming government and the CivilService prepare largely separately, with minimal contact between them, yet with eachsecond guessing the other.

For Opposition parties, the longer they are out of power, the harder it is to prepare foro ce. Fewer spokesmen and advisers have any direct experience o Whitehall and it isdi cult to bridge the gaps in knowledge and understanding. Our study examines in detailthe preparations ahead o the 1970, 1979 and 1997 elections, showing how oppositionshave relied on outside consultants, think tanks and retired civil servants to bridge this gap.

On the Civil Service side, the prospect of a new administration means potential changesin government machinery, practices and personnel, as well as policy. Unless, and until, adissolution o Parliament occurs, preparation is constrained both by the requirement tocontinue to serve the government o the day and by uncertainty about Opposition plans,aggravated by the lack o direct contacts. So the Civil Service has o ten had to guesswhat the Opposition proposals mean, or work on the basis o indirect contacts and partystatements and mani esto pledges intended as much as or internal party or electoralconsumption as a programme or government itsel .

Opposition spokesmen have been able to meet Permanent Secretaries since the late1960s under the so-called Douglas-Home Rules. This convention allowed contacts upto about six months be ore an election until 1992, and around 16 months be ore anelection since then. The absence o xed term parliaments has meant uncertainties over

the length o contacts though, in practice, when governments are in trouble, and likely tolose, parliaments have tended to run to nearly ve years and this has allowed a reasonableperiod or contacts.

Summary


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The history of the convention on pre-election contacts has been characterised by a degree o dont ask, dont tell complicity as civil servants are caught in the cross rebetween loyalty to the incumbent government and a desire to prepare or possiblechange. So the practice has been a mixture o Feydeau,Yes Minister and John Le Carr.The overriding principle is o civil servants listening, not advising. These discussions arerestricted to actual background, machinery o government and organisational issues. Theinherent ambiguities o the relationship, and uncertainties over the nature and requencyo meetings, have resulted in considerable variations in its operation between departments,depending on the personalities involved.

The convention was devised in a different era when departments were monolithic andhierarchical. But a wide range o non-departmental public bodies now exist which operatesemi-independently o departments by maintaining their own public pro les, includingcontacts with Opposition parties, e ectively outside o the letter, and o ten the spirit, othe convention.

Britain is unusual in having an immediate handover on the day after the general electiowhen the incoming Prime Minister and new Cabinet are exhausted rom campaigning andelection night. At present, governments are ormed quickly and the legislative programmehas to be decided only a ew days a ter polling day. In this hectic climate, there is a clearadvantage in having had extensive prior contacts with the Civil Service and in continuitybetween Opposition and Government. But in both 1979 and 1997, around two- ths othe incoming Cabinet had not occupied the same post in Opposition. Moreover, in 1997,and prospectively in 2010 i there is a change o government, most o the new ministersand advisers will have had no experience at all o working at the top o a department.

The report looks in detail at ve case studies: the development of Conservative spendingplans be ore the 1979 general election and their subsequent implementation; thepreparations by Gordon Browns shadow team and the Treasury in 1997; the success ulexamples o departmental transitions in the Department o Education and Employmentand the Home O ce in 1997; and the work on the largely new area o constitutionalre orm in 1997. These studies underline the importance o the individual, and highlypersonal, interpretation o the convention by both shadow spokesmen and senior civilservants; the desirability o achieving mutual understanding well be ore an election inorder to make a quick start; the key role in each case o special and outsider advisers

in developing policies; and the value o having precise plans on paper prepared be oreelection day which can be handed over to civil servants a terwards.

The unusual nature of transitions in the UK central government is highlighted bylooking elsewhere at changes in administration, both within Britain at the ScottishParliament, Welsh Assembly, the London Mayor and English local government and atcomparable parliamentary systems in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These aremostly characterised by more open procedures set out in public guidelines; a delayed andnot immediate handover o power a ter elections (apart rom the London Mayor); andmentoring and training or prospective leaders (in the case o local councils).

The report concludes that the basic constitutional requirement of a smooth anduncontentious handover o power a ter a general election has generally worked well. But

these ormal mechanisms are only a part, a necessary but not a su cient condition, or asuccess ul transition, as de ned by the ability o the incoming government quickly to takeup the reins o power.

There are many strengths in the present system and the inherent ambiguities of the three way nature o pre-election contacts can protect, as well as cause con usion.Nevertheless, we have identi ed several ways in which transitions could be improved tothe bene t o all:

1. Opposition leaders, while understandably reluctant to appear to be taking the electorateor granted, need to give more attention to what they would do in government. They

should consider whether members o their shadow team are going to occupy thesame posts in government in view o the strong past experience o the advantages

o continuity between the two. Opposition politicians at all levels, including specialadvisers, need to be given more training and preparation or o ce, both when anOpposition orms a government and, later, in ministerial reshu fes. In preparing theirplans, oppositions should, where possible, develop ully costed, and worked out, policies


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the

and reshaping departments is inevitably disruptive and expensive, and o ten

the exhaustion o the campaign and to refect on his or her new administration. Even i


on paper which can be taken into departments and presented to the Civil Service a tertaking o ce.

2. The present guidelines on contacts between Opposition parties and the Civil Serviceneed to be updated. The emphasis should remain on guidance rather than a ormal codeto provide fexibility and to protect the impartiality o the Civil Service and to ensurethat trust with the incumbent Government is maintained. Among the main pointsshould be:

Greater clarity on the timing of the start of contacts. In view of the uncertainties

produced by the absence o xed term parliaments, discussions should be permittedthree and a hal years a ter the previous general election. This would allow at least sixmonths even i the parliament lasts only our years.

Both the timing and the process should be under the control of the Cabinet Secretaryrather than the Prime Minister o the day. The Cabinet O ce should also take a moreactive role in co-ordinating, but not controlling, the Whitehall approach on issuescutting across several departments, though this should allow room or fexibility andinitiative by departments. This has begun to happen as the lead on transition issues isbeing taken by a Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet O ce.

Permanent Secretaries should supervise contacts but not be the exclusive channel.Small units should be set up within departments during the ormal period o contacts

to seek con dential clari cation about the plans o Opposition spokesmen. There alsoneeds to be explicit recognition o the important role o non-departmental publicbodies, and they should be permitted to hold talks with Opposition spokesmen on thesame basis as their sponsoring departments.

3. The ormal handover o power should be phased over several days, as in similarparliamentary democracies, to give time or an incoming Prime Minister to recover rom

the Prime Minister takes o ce immediately on the Friday a ter the election, most o therest o the Cabinet and Government could be appointed the ollowing week.

4. The Queens Speech could be delayed rom the recent usual date o a ortnight a ter theelection to three or our weeks a ter polling day to allow time or new ministers to get

to grips with their departments and to consider their policy priorities as well as longer toagree the legislative programme. The Commons Modernisation Committee has alreadysuggested a delay to the rst meeting o the House o Commons to allow time or theinduction o new MPs.

5. Incoming Prime Ministers should be wary o machinery o government changes: creating

counter-productive.

Many of the lessons of this report apply not just to changes of government after generelections but also to changes o Prime Minister between elections, as in 1976, 1990and 2007, as well as to more requent ministerial reshu fes. These all tend to be suddenevents with poor prior planning. Many o the challenges or civil servants dealing with a

new minister apply as much a ter reshu fes as a ter general elections. Moreover, muchmore thought needs to be given to the development o ministers and advisers. Talents andhabits honed in Opposition are not easily trans erable to government.

There are also wider issues that would aid the transition process:

Many of the dif culties of current transitions could be avoided if there were xed-terour-year parliaments.

New guidelines should be established about the factual and background information tobe made available to Opposition parties.

All parties aspiring to form a government should have their plans costed byNational Audit O ce be ore a general election campaign starts.


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junior spokesmen and advisers.and non-departmental public bodies. The Shadow Secretary o State brings along


Template or a success ul transition Start contacts between Opposition parties and Whitehall departments three and a half

years a ter the last general election.

Both sides work out a programme on phasing and content gradually increasing therequency o meetings and moving rom getting acquainted to increasingly detailed

discussions on policy priorities.

The Permanent Secretary involves senior of cials and heads of executive agencies

The Opposition team identi es priorities and a timetable what will be announcedvery quickly, what will come later in the rst year, and what later. At the same time,MPs and advisers receive advice on what being a minister involves, the nature o largeorganisations and relations with civil servants rom ormer ministers and o cials.

The Permanent Secretary discusses what will require organisational changes, thecreation o new units and the deployment o o cials to private o ces. A small unit inthe Permanent Secretarys o ce establishes close relations with the shadow team toquestion and discuss policy statements, but not to o er advice.

A group of three or four Permanent Secretaries meet three or more Shadows to discusissues cutting across their departments.

After the election, the new minister arrives, refreshed from a long weekends rest afterthe campaign, with a dossier setting out policy and spending priorities. The team o junior ministers and advisers is largely the same as be ore the election.

The Permanent Secretary already has detailed briefs in place on early announcementsand legislation, though with less rush than be ore since the Queens Speech is a montha ter the election, not a ortnight.

The new Secretary of State quickly establishes good relations with the Civil Service anis able to demonstrate a grasp o the issues acing the department, take decisions andplan a programme or our years.

All should prepare for the unexpected: new ministers who did not previously shadowthe post; changes in the machinery o government; emergencies; scal problems; andspending cuts.

Throughout all this the Civil Service must not fall into the trap some civil servants diin 1992 and assume a change is certain. They need to prepare or all contingencies,including the possibility o an election result o no overall control. This may meanpreparation or the possibility o an extended transition or the possibility o a di erentstyle o government, whether a coalition or minority administration.


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This report examines what happens when a general election leads to a change ogovernment rom one political party to another. Our main aim is to consider how suchtransitions have worked in the past in central government in the UK; to look at the lessons

rom the experience o other administrations within the UK and overseas; and to makerecommendations about how the process can be improved. The yardstick or judging suchtransitions is how ar both an incoming administration and the Civil Service are prepared

or such changes, and how quickly a new government is able to unction e ectively. This isemphatically not about the Civil Service neutering a new government; rather, it is the reverse,about how a new administration can use the levers o power to implement its programme.

Introduction

Source: Michael Cummings,Daily Express, 21 June 1974. Express Newspapers, 1974


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access to intelligence product or the rst time and will have to learn how to use it.

notably in 1970 and 1992. All involved Government, Civil Service and Opposition partiesthough the expansion o opinion polling since 1959 has not prevented some surprise results,Opposition parties preparations are also dependent upon expectations about the outcome,


One o the central themes is the knowledge and experience gap between Oppositionand Government, which has been rein orced and underlined by the rarity o changes ogovernment over the past three decades. Many o the problems experienced both by theThatcher and Blair governments in their early years can be traced to insu cient thoughtabout how to prepare or o ce. But this is not a negative story. There are plenty o positiveexamples o what works, at Westminster and, particularly, elsewhere.

The ocus is primarily on when the party in o ce changes, but much o the analysis andmany o the recommendations have wider implications. Many o the preparations within theCivil Service ahead o an election could apply i the same party remains in power. Similarly,much o the discussion about preparing politicians with no experience o Whitehall orministerial o ce is as relevant to the promotion o backbenchers at reshu fes betweenelections as it is to changes o government at elections. The whole question o ministerialdevelopment needs ar more attention; how politicians amiliar with being selected ascandidates and elected as MPs then adapt to the wholly di erent world o administrationand large organisations.

Seventeen general elections have been held in the UK since 1945, o which seven have seena change o party in o ce. British general elections involve long-established traditions yetthe handover itsel the visit to Buckingham Palace, the immediate move into DowningStreet and the appointment o a Cabinet, all within two or three hours is only part o theprocess. The wider transition can span a year to 18 months be ore an election, and severalmonths a terwards, involving many activities out o the public eye. Changes o governmenthave o ten been preceded by preparatory work both by Opposition parties, hoping to getinto government, and the permanent Civil Service1 in Whitehall, in anticipation o a changeo government. The amount o preparation done by both has varied considerably romelection to election. Much depends on the wider circumstances in which a general electionoccurs. The economic crises be ore the February 1974 and March 1979 general electionsundermined, and required late changes, in the preparatory work. Moreover, in both o thoseelections, dissolutions o parliament occurred suddenly.

make some judgment about the likelihood o a change, which can lead to embarrassment

and rapid backtracking when the expected handover does not occur.When a change o government happens, the ormer Leader o the Opposition and his orher new Cabinet will nd themselves with not only the political levers o powers but alsothe guardianship o the ull resources o Her Majestys Government. A new government,particularly i many o its members have not held ministerial o ce be ore, may be getting

General elections and the constitutionThe peace ul and generally accepted handover o power rom one party to another ollowinga general election is one o the hallmarks o a democratic system. British general elections,always on a Thursday in modern times, use a rst-past-the-post system and the electionresults come in overnight. The outcome is usually clear by the Friday morning, so that theoutgoing Prime Minister is able to resign around, or just a ter, lunchtime, with the incomingPrime Minister and his sta entering 10 Downing Street or the rst time later in the day,o ten only about 16 or so hours a ter the polls have closed.2

The ormal handover rom one party to another ollowing a general election result is de nedby the Sovereigns prerogatives in the dissolution o Parliament and the appointment oa Prime Minister. These are almost the only remaining personal prerogative powers o theMonarch, as opposed to the executive prerogative powers exercised in the Crowns name bythe Prime Minister and Government, such as public appointments and deploying troops inaction. In most cases, the Sovereign has merely a ormal role a ter an election since the

[There needs to be] amuch clearer generalacceptance than atpresent that thereare State services which need to be run

e ciently whicheverParty is in power.

Sir William Armstrong to Tony Benn MP,2 June 1971

1 And to a lesser extent the Diplomatic and Armed Services and the intelligence agencies, which are also involved in developing bri e s.2 An exception in the last hal -century was in July 1945 when, because o the large numbers o military voters still overseas, the election

results took some weeks. The most recent exception to a new Prime Minister taking over on the day a ter polling was in March 1974 whenthe ailure o any party to win an overall majority in the Commons led to a weekend-long, but ultimately unsuccess ul, attempt by EdwardHeath to establish a coalition between his Conservative Government and the Liberals. Harold Wilson was appointed Prime Minister onthe Monday.


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(The Constitution Unit/Institute or Government, orthcoming, December 2009) or Westminster and WhitehallMaking Minority Government Work: Hung parliaments and the challenges

It is possible to identi y six phases in a UK government transition.

as the ormal start o preparations or government though oppositions usually start work


rst-past-the-post system produces a clear-cut result, so there is no dispute either thatthe losing Prime Minister should resign, or that the Leader o the Opposition should beinvited to orm the new government. The sole exception since 1945 was the absence oan overall majority a ter the February 1974 contest, which was resolved by the politicianswithout involving the Monarch. As noted later in this report, various contingency planshave been discussed about what would happen in a hung parliament when no party has anoverall majority. There are now precedents, underpinned by statutory procedures, about the

ormation o governments in Scotland and Wales where the electoral system (a version oproportional representation) makes a single party administration with an overall majorityhighly unlikely and negotiations over a coalition the norm. But, in practice, the interplay opoliticians determines the outcome rather than the constitutional by-ways oCrown prerogatives.3

Defning the transition

1. OppositionMuch depends on how long a party has been in Opposition and how quickly its leaders thinkit will win o ce again. Parties that have just been in o ce, such as Labour a ter losing in1970 or the Conservatives a ter 1974, are o ten only semi-detached rom power. Most otheir leaders have recently been ministers and they are amiliar with the ways o Whitehalland senior civil servants. But when parties have spent a great deal o time out o o ce, such

as Labour in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Conservatives in the early 2000s, an Oppositionmindset can become ingrained. Many o their ormer ministers have le t the Commons orgone onto the backbenches, and the new leaders o ten have little experience o o ce.

2. Civil Service preparationThis comes in two parts: rst, the traditional preparation o brie s on policy or alternativegovernments; and, second, the contacts with the leading spokesmen o Opposition parties(see point three below). However, any such work has to be balanced against the overridingpriority to serve the government o the day. Civil Service preparation is, there ore, ar morelimited or non-existent until closer to an anticipated election or the election campaignperiod itsel in the event o a sudden election.

3. The start o pre-election contact between the Civil Service and oppositions

The timing has varied rom a ew months to 16 months be ore an election. This can be seenon policy much earlier. Much depends on what the Opposition partys chance o winninga uture election is perceived to be. The timing, nature, content and use ulness o suchcontacts have varied greatly. Moreover, the conventions or these contacts have been putunder a lot o strain by the changing structure o both politics and government. The ocus onPermanent Secretary/Shadow Secretary o State contacts is now only a very limited guide towhat happens.

4. The election campaignPoliticians ocus on winning the election and have little time or appetite or preparations

or government. They also ear that any public hint o such preparations will be seenas presumptuous and counter-productive electorally. Normal government business issuspended, though the Civil Service uses the month be ore the election to prepare in greaterdetail or possible changes or a continuation o the incumbent government.

5. The election result and the handoverThe ormal handover o power is straight orward. As discussed above, there is usually a loserand a winner, and the Whitehall machine is adept at handling arewells and arrivals. Therehave invariably been contacts between the Cabinet Secretary and the 10 Downing StreetPrincipal Private Secretary, and the Chie o Sta o the Leader o the Opposition to discussthe practical arrangements. There are questions, considered later, about the timing o suchhandovers but the process is smooth and works well.

6. The frst ew days, weeks and months o a new administrationThis is the key period or the success o transitions when new and o ten inexperienced

3 This whole issue is discussed in Robert Hazell and Akash Paun (editors),


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conventions originated in the 1960s. Permanent secretaries no longer rule all they survey;

Government and the Civil Service adequately prepared to be up and running soon; is the new


ministers and their advisers come to terms with the challenges o o ce, and the un amiliarworld o Whitehall and the Civil Service. This is when new relationships are created,pre-election policies are tested and a new ministers reputation is established. Our analysisshows clearly that early pre-election preparation pays o and the more continuity oministers and advisers there is the better.

Who is involved in the transition?There are three uneasy participants in the marriage the incumbent Government, thepermanent Civil Service, and the Opposition (the government-in-waiting) with a varietyo interested, and vocal, onlookers in the media, think tanks, pressure groups, consultants,business, trade unions, and so on.

The Civil, and other, services are intended to be impartial, yet loyal to the Government o theday. Trust is, there ore, undamental between current ministers and their senior civil servants.But it has been tested, at times severely, by Civil Service preparations or an alternativegovernment, and any contacts, approved although covert, with the main Opposition party.It is a world o ambiguity and secretiveness rather than clarity and candour.

For incoming governments, one o the greatest problems is inexperience, principally oworking in Whitehall. This is even more o an issue today because o the in requent changesin government since 1979 (only one a ter three changes in the 1970s see Figure 1 onpage 12). It is just as much a problem or civil servants, ewer o whom will have had muchexperience o a transition and, or those who joined since 1997, o a government o adi erent political complexion. That is more important than the political colour o the parties.

Measuring the success o a transitionThe e ectiveness o transitions can be measured in several ways: are the incoming

Government able to understand and begin using the levers o power quickly; is there a hiatusas new ministers and the Civil Service take time to get the measure o each other?

Our study identi es some successes (ostensibly, or example, in the Home O ce, Educationand constitutional re orm in 1997), but also some serious weaknesses inherent in thesystem o preparing or, and implementing, transitions. The 40-plus year old conventions oncontacts between the Civil Service and Opposition parties have not ully taken account o

changes in the structure o government. Government is no longer as monolithic as when thenon-departmental public bodies and all the various bodies coming under the umbrella oquangos can, and do, operate semi-independently and have their own separate relationshipswith political parties. Some variation in practice is inevitable in view o the ambiguities othe three way relationships, the dependence on individual relationships and the inherentvariations between departments. But there are many ways in which the process o transitioncan be improved.

A central nding o our report is the lack o institutional memory aggravated by the longperiods o one party rule over the past thirty years. We aim to remedy this by looking atthe history and origins o the Douglas-Home Rules covering contacts between Oppositionparties and Whitehall, preparations by Opposition parties since the early 1960s, and whathas happened in practice ollowing general elections. Our research also looks at experiencein comparable parliamentary democracies overseas, Scotland and Wales, UK local authorities,and the election o the Mayor o London. The report then goes on to conclude what works,and makes short-term recommendations on improvements in practice and some longer-term refections on how to improve preparations or changes o government and ministers.

Areas not coveredAs the reports ocus is on changes o government there are a number o areas relating togeneral elections that either do not appear, or may appear to be under-examined. We donot attempt to examine how parties try to revive and reinvent themselves in Opposition, orto discuss their general policy-making processes. This is not a report on li e in Opposition,but speci cally on preparing or power. Though the report has been researched and written

during an election year, it makes no assumptions about the result. One o the reportsmessages is the need or comprehensive contingency planning and the need, particularly orthe Civil Service, to be fexible and plan or a range o possible outcomes. Furthermore this is,o course, not a narrative on current election preparations.


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policy and de ence where preparations are di erent. We do not discuss the veryocuses on aspects o transitions relating to economic and domestic policy, rather than oreign


Most o the evidence comes rom looking at the prior work undertaken by oppositions thatwent on to orm new governments. We only re er in passing to Opposition research andpolicy development and Civil Service preparation ahead o elections 10 out o the last17 when a change in government did not occur, with the signi cant, and revealing,exception o the widely expected change that did not happen in 1992. The report also

important impact o long periods out o o ce on the lack o institutional memory overParliamentary management and the Whips O ce.

We also do not discuss the preparations made or changes in government by outside groups a wide range o organisations including businesses, unions, pressure groups, voluntarybodies and charities all o which have extensive contact with Opposition parties.

The report naturally concentrates primarily on the two big British political parties in thepost-war period, Labour and the Conservatives. There would be much bigger transition issuesi we had a hung parliament and minority governments became the norm. The experiencein Scotland and Wales since the rst devolution elections in 1999, and especially in 2007,provides pointers to what might have to happen at Westminster. Senior civil servants have inthe past, notably in 1974 and 1992, prepared contingency plans or such possibilities and willdo so to some extent or the next general election.

Figure 1: parties in government since 1945


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, 26 April 1979 Telegraph Media Group

1960s, particularly ahead o changes to the party in power. A recurrent theme is addressing the

election and to be able to orm a government. Everything else is secondary. In practice, the

go through the motions o policy preparations, not least to convey the impression that

knowledge gap between Opposition and Government. The ability, and desire, to bridge that


1. Be ore the election

This chapter is what happens be ore elections: the preparations by oppositions and Whitehalldepartments. This is the crucial time certainly not during campaigns themselves whenpreparations can be made and contacts established. This chapter examines preparations byOpposition parties, by the Civil Service, and then contacts between the two. This is not astudy o the experience o Opposition, but solely on when and how preparations are made

or government. The ocus is primarily historical to what has happened since the late

gap depends on how strong the chances are o an Opposition party returning to government.

1.1 Opposition party preparations or governmentThe aim o Opposition parties is to win as many seats as possible at the next general

behaviour o Opposition parties depends on the political and electoral circumstances. Someparties have no realistic hope o returning to power in the immediate uture: Labour in 1955,1959, 1983 and 1987; and the Conservatives in 1966, 2001 and 2005. Parties still, however,

they are a credible alternative government. But the seriousness and urgency o the workvaries depending on whether the party has a realistic chance o winning an election. Thischapter concentrates on those situations.

The rst modern Opposition exercise was in the late 1960s under Edward Heath. Refectinghis managerial view o government, he ordered a thorough series o reviews o policy,involving outside consultants and the advice o ormer civil servants and ministers rom theprevious Conservative Government, in addition to detailed policy work by the ConservativeResearch Department (CRD). They included papers on machinery o government, Civil Servicere orm, strengthening the Cabinet O ce and how to prepare or government. A series o

all-day seminar sessions were held between 15 and 26 September 1969.

Source: Nicholas Garland,The Daily Telegraph


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o the politician who

within her Shadow Cabinet on issues such as incomes policy and industrial relations law. But

It was the act that 'The Right Approach'[published in 1976] concentrated on the big general

again a ter 1974. A group under Adam Ridley, deputy head o the CRD under Chris Patten,


These included ormer civil servants and ministers, journalists, academics, industry andnancial experts, representatives rom the United States, and members o the shadow

cabinet. The seminars covered a range o issues relating to understanding the Governmentscapacity, the application o corporate managerial methods and policy issues. It also includedUnited States advice on budgetary and delivery questions. All o this preparatory work cameto the attention o the Civil Service. The amount o material obtained by the Civil Service,including the programme o seminars and all the reports, shows the degree o e ort inidenti ying Conservative policy and plans. As the historian Pro essor Peter Hennessy hasdescribed, it was rather akin to Kremlinology, learning about personality and policies atseveral stages removed: a paper intelligence or a paper culture.4

The Heath experience can be seen in retrospect as being too detailed and too rigid. DavidHowell was closely involved as a young MP working with Mark Schreiber in the Public SectorResearch Unit under Ernest Marples examining how to improve the structure o government.In o ce, only some o their ideas were implemented, such as the eventual creation oagencies to deal with employment and de ence procurement, but they were o ten indi erent orms than had been proposed in Opposition. A Central Policy Review Sta (CPRS)was set up but put in the Cabinet O ce, not in 10 Downing Street, on the insistence oSir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary. As Howell put it, the line rom Sir William Armstrong,then Head o the Home Civil Service was so glad you have done all the work. Weve beenthinking similar thoughts and tried some o these ideas which havent worked. The embraceo Trend and Armstrong isolated Heath and neutralised some o the proposed changes. This is

leaving aside the later u-turns in scal and industrial policies.The Conservatives adopted a very di erent approach when they were in Opposition

produced a paper entitled Preparation or Government. Its purpose was to review the actionwhich a prospective government should take be ore coming in to power and to identi y anyproblems which might be encountered or advantages gained in the early days in o ce. Thisdiscussed in detail the machinery o government and how 10 Downing Street should beorganised, the uture o the Central Policy Review Sta , the organisation o the legislativeprogramme and early priorities. It recommended the preparation o ministerial dossiersand contingency plans in case o a hung parliament. Its work was very much or the eyes oMargaret Thatcher, Sir Keith Joseph and Sir Geo rey Howe.

Ridley recorded the infuence o the 1970 election in his Preparation or Government report:It is interesting that o cials, too, believe it harm ul i a party arrives in o ce with too manydetailed commitments such as the Industrial Relations Bill o 1970. They will o ten be able toimprove proposals, i allowed to do so, in ways an Opposition has not the expertise to consider

ully. And naturally they see very clearly the political complications which ollow rom restricting anadministrations reedom to negotiate and compromise by rm pledges given in Opposition.5

Howell notes that proposals were less detailed, in public, and there was more ocus on thebattle o ideas. I the ault o the Heath team was being too technocratic and leaving out thepolitics, the Thatcher team was ocused primarily on the politics rather than the managerial

It was the act that 'The Right Approach [published in 1976] concentrated on the big general

arguments, restating what di erentiated our approach rom that o socialism, that made it thesuccess it was.6

This reluctance to get into too much detail was partly because o continuing disagreements

the problem o devising policy in detail be ore entering government was a urther reason orher caution about overly-detailed policy commitments ahead o the 1979 election.

However, extensive research and debate over uture policy was undertaken even i many othe studies, such as on what later became known as privatisation, remained private. Indeed,there were various groups, both o cially under the direction o the Shadow Cabinet by theCRD, and uno cially, under the patronage o Thatcher and Joseph, with the Stepping Stones

While many people(including politicians

and public servants)do try to make thedistinction betweenpolitical aims andgood governmentas such, I am notsure that it is notpart o the politicalsophistication o the people o thiscountry that they should be very suspicious indeed

preaches such adoctrine!

Sir William Armstrong to Tony Benn MP,2 June 1971

4 Peter Hennessy,Whitehall (London: Pimlico, 2001), p.2835 Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), THCR 2-6-1-194, Papers relating to preparations or Government, January 1978-[May] 1979, Adam Ridley,

Preparation or Government, Spring 19786 Margaret Thatcher,The Path to Power (London: Harper Collins, 1995), p.317


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briefy at the IPPR, was working at Andersen Consulting, later Accenture. The rm was doingleadership had direct experience o government. Hewitt, ormer press secretary to Kinnock and

tanks and policy institutes, both non-partisan ones like the Institute or Fiscal Studies and

o the Heath years, was also infuential. The work done on public expenditure planning

Washington, was recruited as Chie o Sta , starting in January 1995. Part o his role was

years (also the danger with ormer chie s o the de ence sta and retired law lords). In


initiative o John Hoskyns, then an uno cial adviser but later head o the Downing StreetPolicy Unit. Stepping Stones was a plan to reverse Britains economic and industrial decline,though the main infuence o Hoskyns was on the debate about trade union re orm. TheCentre or Policy Studies, set up by Joseph and Thatcher in 1974 in reaction to the ailures

ahead o 1979 orms one o the case studies in Chapter 3.

When Labour went into Opposition in 1979, its priorities or a long time were survivalrather than serious preparations or government. Even in 1987, eight years a ter losingpower, Labour was primarily in a de ensive mode, eliminating negatives on Europe, de encepolicy and the economy, rather than getting ready or o ce. In the late 1980s, a moreserious attempt to produce policy was launched by Labour leader Neil Kinnock, with reviewsconsisting o leading parliamentarians and trade unionists (including one by Tony Blair onindustrial relations law which helped make his name). Future Labour Cabinet ministers,Charles Clarke and Patricia Hewitt, both then on Kinnocks sta , were closely involved. Yetthis work was only hal -completed by 1992, as both Blair and Brown privately acknowledgedat the time. An attempt was made to put Labour policymaking on a pro essional basis withthe oundation and launch in 1988 o the Institute or Public Policy Research (IPPR), thoughthe main ruits only came a ter the 1992 election, notably in the work o the Gordon BorrieCommission on Social Justice which produced a lot o the ideas or restructuring wel are andsocial services which were implemented a ter 1997.

One o the biggest changes since the 1970s has been the expansion in the number o think

more partisan ones such as the IPPR and Policy Exchange. Each period o Opposition tendsto see the oundation o new partisan think tanks with close ties to the re orming leadershipo the parties. Some o the sta have had brie experience o government, but seldom at ahigh level. So while the pro usion o policy proposals may have expanded the market-place

or ideas, and broken the quasi-monopoly o policy thinking previously enjoyed by Whitehalldepartments, it has not bridged the knowledge and experience gap. The ideas have not beentested or how, and whether, they would work in practice. More signi cant in their impacthas been the role o management consultants who have worked inside government and theadvice o ormer civil servants.

The involvement o the ormer permanent secretaries is important but ambiguous. In many

cases, such as, say, in the post-2005 Better Government Initiative and in the private adviceo ormer cabinet secretaries, their role is primarily altruistic, to help improve the waygovernment operates, not just or the Opposition but generally. This spills into direct advice

or Opposition parties, especially when they look like winning the next election. Formerpermanent secretaries can supply experience and greater candour than current o cials(in the limited contacts discussed in section 1.3). But there are risks: de ending their ownlegacies, pushing their own pet views and, o course, they can get out o touch a ter a ew

general, the involvement o retired senior civil servants is a de nite plus, but that is partlybecause consultations with current civil servants be ore an election are so limited.

The key stage in Labour preparations occurred rom 1992 until 1997. John Smith, theLeader o the Opposition, was cautious about making new policy commitments, though he

did inspire most o the main constitutional pledges, as discussed in the later case study inChapter 3. A ter Smiths death in 1994, Blair inaugurated a more thorough exercise. The aimwas primarily, o course, to make Labour electable again, hence the overtures to business andthe media. But, as Labours electoral prospects began to improve, more outsiders began bothto support what became known as New Labour and to be willing to provide help and advice.This helped to bridge the gap but only to a limited extent given the increasing lack o direct

amiliarity with the workings o Whitehall the longer that Labour was out o o ce.

Jonathan Powell, a middle ranking diplomat then working in the British Embassy in

to introduce some order and structure or Blair himsel . Early in 1996 he talked to Clarke,Hewitt (neither then MPs) and Sir Nicholas Monck, a recently retired Permanent Secretary.They met each month to discuss preparations and rom this group came the idea o trainingshadow ministers. This was to address the problem that virtually no one in the Labour

quite a lot o behind the scenes work or Labour a pattern which would be repeated

Parties come to

power with silly,inconsistent andimpossible policiesbecause they havespent their wholeperiod in opposition

orgetting about thereal world, destroying the lessons they learnt in governmentand clambering slowly back on tothe ideological plain where they eelhappiest.

Sir Adam Ridley, RIPA Report,Winter 1985


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need or training, also involving Keith Ruddle, who provided a link between Andersen and

involving ormer permanent secretaries, such as Sir Frank Cooper and Sir Terry Heiser, and

But the overall conclusion o those involved was that the sessions did not ul l earlier

ocused on the possibility o a change o government:


amongst consultancy rms a ter 2005 with the Conservatives. The rms governmentpractice was keen to get to know those involved and to build relationships with those whowere generally expected to be in o ce soon. Hewitt had discussions with Powell about the

the, then, Templeton College at Ox ord. This led to a bid and a pilot weekend, withre nements made or later sessions. The planning ocused on what would help shadows tounderstand what it would be like to be a minister wrestling with the system. Hewitt heldinterviews with members o the Opposition team about their perceptions ahead o theTempleton session in 1996.

The outcome was, however, disappointing. The consultants sought to get across howlong everything takes in government: policymaking, consultation both inside and outsideWhitehall, then a bill.Then implementation could take another year or two, so the wholeprocess could take close to the length o a whole parliament. The Labour participants,

ew o whom had ever run anything or worked in a large company or organisation, weresceptical. Their line, based on their largely media-driven experience in Opposition, waswe make decisions, then it happens. According to Hewitt, there was one session with asenior private sector businessman who had turned a big company around. He explainedabout trans ormational change in big organisations. At the end o the session, one Labourspokesmen questioned privately what the point o it all was:

What has the private sector to teach us what have we as politicians got to do with changingorganisations: it is a matter or the permanent secretary and o cials to run departments wedecide policy.

At that stage, and in several cases later, these ministers-in-waiting did not see themselvesas being in charge o big departments and directing change. This illustrates the big gap inthinking between being a spokesman in Opposition and a minister in Government and thelimits o training be orehand. The aim was to get their minds into gear to understand whatbeing a minister involved. As one close adviser to Blair has remarked:

The sessions were never about training to be good managers; they were more about giving thema bit o a shock about how di erent it was going to be to run something as opposed to justtheir mouths.

Two or three other sessions were held, and there was input rom ormer senior civil servants.

hopes. Revealingly, neither Blair nor Brown came, and so did not bene t rom this particularopportunity to learn about how big organisations work.

A parallel exercise was run by the Fabian Society, more ocused on how Whitehall works and

close observers such as Peter Hennessy. This covered the nuts and bolts o being a minister,how a private o ce is run, and the nature o a public spending round. This was more politicaland based around the themes o Gerald Kau mans entertaining book,How to be a Minister ,which originally appeared in 1980, shortly a ter Labour lost o ce, but was re-issued in a newedition in 1997.7 In a sense, this was an upgraded undergraduate course on politics and theconstitution, but again no substitute or direct experience o being a minister, or contactwith current participants. Moreover, such acclimatisation/preparatory sessions should not

just involve members o the Shadow Cabinet but also more junior spokesmen and specialadvisers. The role o special advisers is critical. Both then, and more recently, special advisershave come into government to occupy important roles close to ministers, with little priorknowledge o how Whitehall and Parliament works, or even rudimentary preparation.

1.2 Civil Service preparations or a possible change in governmentOne o the most traditional and unchanging parts o pre-election preparations is by theCivil Service. Towards the end o a parliament (always a matter o guesswork in the absenceo xed terms) permanent secretaries order preparations in case o a change o government.In addition to getting ready or the ormal procedures required or an election, the CivilService have in the past also undertaken two other orms o anticipatory work partially

7 Gerald Kau man.How to be a Minister (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), and (London: Faber and Faber, 1997)


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o Opposition plans which have not been made public. As Sir Burke Trend in ormed the


The preparation of briefs about departmental activity for either an incoming orreturning government and (primarily or a new Prime Minister) signi cant issuesrequiring immediate attention usually o a security, de ence and economic nature.

Work anticipating likely policies of Opposition parties in case of a change ofgovernment and possible machinery o government changes.

Briefng papersIn February 1974 the list o brie s or the Prime Minister ran to 15. They were on theCabinet O ce, intelligence arrangements, three oreign policy issues (and two EEC ones

separately), de ence (including ongoing development on the nuclear deterrent and on DiegoGarcia), terrorism, Concorde, and housing. There were also several brie s on issues relating toeconomic matters which included the Return to Normal rom the Present Emergency, theeconomic situation, pay and prices and energy policy. In 1979, there were 12 subject-speci cbrie ng papers prepared or Thatcher which included a paper on the timing o the budget(the election period included April so an interim budget was required) and the continuingcrisis resulting rom industrial action. In addition, each new Cabinet member received amajor brie on their departmental responsibilities.

There is also a paper produced or the Cabinet Secretary to go through with the PrimeMinister on the rst day (see Panel 3 on page 35). Departments also prepare their ownbrie ng papers, both on the departmental structure and its work; and on speci c subjects.The quantity and variety o these papers has varied, particularly depending on the amounto time available. In some cases, such as in February 1974, ministers receive general brie ngpapers on urgent issues (pay policy and energy). Exactly the same approach has continuedsince then, our various ormer permanent secretary interviewees have con rmed, thoughwith some scepticism, as noted in Chapter 2, about whether they have been read byincoming ministers.

Anticipating policiesPreparation based upon attempts to predict the likely policies o a new government has onlybeen undertaken in a more ormal manner in the last 40 or so years. In 1964, piecemealwork was undertaken, particularly on possible machinery o government changes such asthe creation o a Department or Economic A airs (DEA). This was partly because o thethirteen years in which Labour had been out o o ce and the consequences o this in termso Labours experience o o ce, but also because o the change Labour appeared to want toundertake in Whitehall.

In 1964, 1970 and 1974 much o this work was necessarily based on mani estoes, publicspeeches, newspaper clippings and, quite requently, internal party documents and copieso reports that civil servants had obtained (as occurred extensively regarding Heaths plansbe ore the 1970 election). O course civil servants can o ten interpret the real meaningo public statements o policy, and permanent secretaries have sought out the details

Conservatives in the late 1970s, the danger is that material or public consumption, or orelectioneering, is taken at ace value. From the opposite angle, Powell, as the new DowningStreet chie o sta , complained a ter the 1997 election that civil servants had taken some oLabours pre-election commitments too literally.

From 1968 Civil Service work on preparing or a change o government was particularlyhelped by having a body able to ocus on such e orts. The Fulton Report on The Civil Servicein 1968, led to the creation o the Civil Service Department (CSD),8 which was able to

ocus more resources on preparation or changes o government. This involved coordinatingbrie s or incoming ministers, developing Civil Service responses to Conservative plans andconsidering possible machinery o government changes well in advance o the election. TheCSD would play a similar role in 1974, sel -consciously refecting upon the quality o theirwork pre-1970 and undertaking an unambiguous lessons-learned process. The abolition othe CSD in 1981 led to this work being taken on by the Cabinet O ce.

In 1979, as be ore 1970, certain civil servants, particularly in the Treasury, made a deliberatee ort to discern Conservative policy and plans but they were o ten dependent upon

public material and in ormal meetings. Ridley, as a ormer civil servant, attached speci cimportance to giving the Civil Service a uller appreciation o Conservative thinking than just

8 Cmnd. 3638,The Report o the Committee on the Civil Ser vice(London: HMSO, 1968)


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and 1970s when there were requent changes o party in control and Opposition spokesmen

Panel 1, on the origins and early development o the Douglas-Home Rules, shows that


the mani esto. One o the problems is that oppositions have understandably o ten wantedto keep some o their work and their ideas con dential. In 1979, the Thatcher Governmentkept secret the details o its detailed proposals to shi t taxation rom earnings to spending,though, as noted later, Sir Douglas Wass was told during the campaign. In 1997, Laboursought to keep secret its plans to make the Bank o England independent. In both cases,Whitehall departments coped.

Countering this problem was part o the reasoning behind pre-election contacts betweenoppositions and civil servants (see Panel 1). It was noticeably easier to do this in the 1960s

had been ministers only a ew years be ore and were known by civil servants. For instance,Wass, as Treasury Permanent Secretary, had known Howe, the Shadow Chancellor, rom thedays o the Heath Government only a ew years earlier when they had met at Chequersweekends in the planning o incomes policy. When Wass and his senior o cials saw Howe,and Conservative spokesmen and advisers at con erences, meetings or social occasions, theywere renewing acquaintance rather than introducing themselves or the rst time. This wascommon at the time. Wass had, unusually, expressed obvious scepticism about monetarypolicy in a public speech, prompting a response rom Howe. But ollowing this exchange,Wass and Howe met each other or lunch and, despite their ideological di erences, turned,in Howes words, a riendly truce into a potential or working rapport. This was in contrastto the absence o a working rapport9 between Gordon Brown and the Treasury PermanentSecretary, Sir Terry Burns, 18 years later, underlining the importance o personal relationships.

The di erences o view over policy meant, however, that, as Chancellor, Howe increasinglyturned to other o cials or advice, notably Peter Middleton and then Burns himsel when hebecame chie economic adviser in 1980.

Familiarity has naturally decreased with the recent, much longer, intervals between changesin government. In 1997, ew permanent secretaries and senior civil servants had workedwith, or knew, members o the Opposition rontbench and the same applies now. At asocial level too, there is less meeting on common ground, at clubs, parties and the like, thanin the past. Charles Clarke, the son o a leading civil servant o the post-war era, argued, in amemorandum to the Treasury and the Civil Service Committees inquiry into the Civil Servicein 1993-94, that:

Opposition politicians do not, in general, move in the same circles as senior civil servants. They donot meet socially, they are not members o the same organisations, and the long absence o anypro essional relationship in government means that there are ew continuing personal riendships.10

There is a gap which requires direct contacts to bridge.

1.3 Contact between oppositions and civil servantsThe most sensitive eature o preparations is the contact between Opposition parties andsenior civil servants. It is sensitive because o the inherent constitutional ambiguity ocivil servants talking to Opposition MPs when their duty is to serve the ministers o theday. So there is bound to be an element o subter uge and secrecy. That has been both thestrength and weakness o the arrangements as they have evolved since the mid-1960s.These, it should be stressed, are completely separate rom the occasional meetings on PrivyCouncil terms between the Prime Minister and other senior ministers and the Leader o the

Opposition and senior Opposition spokesmen, on de ence and security issues (covering,in particular, Northern Ireland and terrorism). Leaders o the Opposition have also beenbrie ed by the chie s o de ence sta and the heads o the intelligence agencies, and havehad contacts with Buckingham Palace. But these and any ministerial brie ngs betweenelections are di erent in content and orm rom the pre-election meetings that solelyinvolve civil servants.

contradictions were built in rom the start as the arrangements developed in an ad hocway relying heavily on individual interpretation by permanent secretaries and shadowministers rather than any coherent overall strategy. The underlying assumption has beendont tell and dont embarrass. In brie , the convention, as set-out in the 2000Directory o Civil Service Guidance, states that towards the end o a parliament, or when a general

The mani esto isdesigned to persuadevoters to supportus, not as a brie ng document or theCivil Service. So thereare bound to beimportant gaps in it.

Sir Adam Ridley, Preparation or Government, 1978

9 Geo rey Howe,Con ict o Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.10910 Treasury and Civil Service Committee,The Role o the Civil Service(HC 27-I, 1993-94)


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will have some access to, and understanding o , the major de ence and security issues


Panel 1: contact between oppositions and civil servants: the Douglas-Home Rules

Leaders o the Opposition and senior opposition MPs elevated to the Privy Council

o the day. Leaders o the Opposition can also have meetings with the heads o theintelligence agencies and pre-election contacts with Buckingham Palace. Contactmeetings between the opposition and senior civil servants prior to an election are also

o the Opposition but has to be approved by the serving Prime Minister and with limitsplaced on their timing, number and content. The convention or pre-election contacts,the Douglas-Home Rules, is based on a precedent that occurred in 1964 during thepremiership o Sir Alec Douglas-Home and was consequently attributed to him, but itmight equally have been credited to the ait accompli per ormed by the Labour DeputyLeader George Brown. The issue arose a ter Brown had already made several approachesto the Treasurys two permanent secretaries, Sir Laurence Helsby and Sir WilliamArmstrong, about Labours plans or a Department o Economic A airs. On 22 and27 April 1964 the Prime Ministers Private Secretary, Sir Tim Bligh, wrote toDouglas-Home to warn him o these contacts and that:

Brown armed with some papers [...] had a private talk away rom Whitehall with Sir WilliamArmstrong. Helsby wanted you to know o this in case you heard a possible exaggerated version

rom some other source.12

Douglas-Homes views are not in the les, but Bligh seems to have seen the PrimeMinisters approval o the consultations as necessary:

The Civil Service are servants o the Queen and serve the Government o the day. They cannotalso serve the Opposition. But there is a real problem here and the Nations well-being might beseriously a ected and this is because a newly elected Prime Minister has, in practice, very littletime to orm an administration [...]. There is every possibility o a hasty ill-thought out decisionbeing taken which might, as well as redounding to the discredit o the new administration, do realharm to the country. 13

There was no speci c written approval given by Douglas-Home, but a note by Blighsuggests it was given and speci ed that they be discreet and on a actual basis. Mostimportantly, it was noted that the Prime Minister must know nothing whatsoever aboutthis, despite having already been brie ed on it.14con dentiality, this last suggestion was because these contacts and Douglas-Homesapproval o them could be misconstrued i they became public. This intentional ignorancewas to maintain plausible deniability. Concerns that such contacts would undermine theCivil Services impartiality have resur aced periodically since 1964. The contacts have

requently been viewed as blurring the line between preparing the Civil Service or achange o government, and assisting the opposition in obtaining power in the rst place.

There is also little reason to describe the precedent at this stage as a set o rules. Itwas only as the issue became more politicised, as Douglas-Home eared, that greater

ormalisation occurred. When roles were reversed in the run-up to the 1970 election, theConservatives under Edward Heath sought to remind Prime Minister Harold Wilson othe precedent.

What would be thee ect on the moraleo the Party i they thought that thePrime Minister wasconniving at the CivilService, preparing the Labour Party orthe responsibilitieso government? This

really is the oppositeo justice: it perhapsought to be done butit certainly mustnt beseen to be done.

Tim Bligh to Alec Douglas-Home,22 April 1964

11 Cabinet O ce, Directory o Civil Service Guidance. Volume II Collected Guidance (Cabinet O ce, 2000)http://www.cabineto ce.gov.uk/media/cabineto ce/propriety_and_ethics/assets/csg%20vol2.pd

12 The National Archives (TNA), PREM 11/4834: Tim Bligh to Alec Douglas-Home, 22 April 196413 Ibid.14 Ibid.

election has been called, the Prime Minister authorises special arrangements under whichOpposition spokesmen may have contacts with senior civil servants without ministers havingthe right to be privy to the content o their discussions.11 These contacts are intended to

ocus on preparing or major changes in the machinery o government, but shadows maylet department o cials have some idea o their plans, to enable changes to be made assmoothly as possible i the election results in a change o government. The Cabinet O cehas acted as a central in ormation point to which the timing and nature o all contactsshould be reported by permanent secretaries.

allowed more generally in the run up to an election. The process is initiated by the Leader


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practice, proved to be inadequate and ull o ambiguities.

held a ter our years, as in 1983 and 1987, then any meetings would only occur during


In April 1970 newspaper reports suggested that Wilson was preventing the Conservativesrom meeting with senior civil servants and that this was in direct opposition to the

access Douglas-Home had granted. In reality, the problem had arisen over ConservativeMP Eldon Gri ths attempt to meet with senior policemen. The correspondence betweenHeath, Wilson and Callaghan, the Home Secretary, is greatly revealing, not only o the

evered political atmosphere, but also the way in which the both sides sought to makepolitical capital out o the consultations. Wilson attempted to clari y matters through anannouncement in Parliament on 21 April 1970 and subsequent discussion in Cabinet.15

There was a clear e ort, emanating rom Wilson, to track all contact and ward against anyimproper activity, to maintain some control over this process. This was seen in the 23 AprilCabinet minutes, and subsequent correspondence whereby senior civil servants detailedall contact between themselves and opposition MPs. As a result, Sir William Armstrong,Head o the Home Civil Service, provided the rst guidance on the matter, advice that hasbeen dusted o by cabinet secretaries ever since and which orms the backbone to thelatest incarnation. The two main acets o this guidance refect the main concerns o 1964and 1970. First, it established responsibility or their authorisation and the ability to tracksuch contacts. Second, it emphasised the distinction between machinery o governmentconsultation, which was allowed, and policy advice, which was not.

The precedent led to the speci c idiosyncrasies o 1964 and 1970 becoming ingrained.The limited scope o the talks, the danger o them being viewed with suspicion by

members o government, and in this leading civil servants to be extra cautious in theirapplication, has o ten led to varied perceptions o their use ulness, with some oppositionsnding them to be close to useless. Ridley expressed this in a paper prepared or the

Conservative opposition in 1978:

Such ormal i limited discussions would be o great value as an election approaches and ipermission or them can be obtained. But in our view it would be just as valuable to developin ormal private contacts with senior civil servants on a strictly con dential basis. An e ort shouldbe made to identi y key areas where such in ormal meetings should be promoted.16

Ridley eared, as was ound in 1970 and has been subsequently, that asking or ormalcontacts could undermine the in ormal ones that exist as in all probability a pretty sticircular would be issued to all senior o cials warning them not to make or respond to

any approaches to or rom us.17

In 1970, the limited contacts that occurred were not as signi cant as the political all-outrom Heaths initial request or them. This was partly because o continuing in ormal

contacts in other places, and because o the relative experience o Heaths team.

15 House o Commons (1970),House o Commons Debates, House o Commons Weekly Hansard , 800, 21 April, cc243-54 Deb.; TNA, CAB128/45, Cabinet conclusions, 23 April 1970

16 CAC, THCR 2-6-1-194, Ridley, Preparation or Government, 197817 Ibid.

In his note on pre-election contacts in January 2009, Sir Gus ODonnell, the CabinetSecretary, stressed that permanent secretaries should be in listening mode and talks shouldconcern actual questions o departmental organisation, and to in orm senior o cials o anyorganisational changes which would stem rom Opposition policies. Moreover, civil servantsshould not disclose con dential Government policy/plans, discuss current Government

policies/plans, or give policy advice to the Opposition. It is an opportunity or Oppositionspokesmen to give senior civil servants any in ormation they wish to provide on theirpolicies. None o these phrases are as straight orward as they might seem and they have, in

The key issues are outlined here.

TimingThe absence o xed term parliaments has meant a very uneven practice about whencontacts begin. In 1979 con usion and disruption caused by Winter o Discontent strikeslimited contacts ahead o the election. The initial understanding that contacts could startsix months be ore the end o a ull ve-year parliament meant that, i a general election was


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help, though it would leave a very long period i the parliament ran to a ull ve years. The risk


the campaign a ter an election was announced. There were virtually no contacts in 1983 andonly very limited ones in 1987 just during the May/June period o the campaign itsel . Inany case, Labour was seen as having no chance o winning either election. O course, whenthe governing party is in trouble, the parliament tends to run to nearly its ull ve-yearlength, as in 1959-64, 1987-92, 1992-97 and 2005 to, probably, 2010. Ahead o the 1992election, there were extensive contacts even under the six-month convention starting in January o that year. But John Major had re used a request rom Neil Kinnock or the processto begin earlier in 1991.

Sir Robin Butler, the Cabinet Secretary, was keen to keep in touch with the Labour ShadowCabinet and brie ed them in November 1991 on the Next Steps initiative, which involvedthe creation o executive agencies. However, a session with Butler did not go quite accordingto plan thanks to John Prescott having imbibed too much, on his own admission, at theannual Spectator Awards:

It so happened I had to go to a meeting o the Shadow Cabinet being chaired by Kinnock, at whichwe were going to be addressed by the cabinet permanent secretary. The thinking was that we shouldknow the inner workings o the Cabinet, in case we ever got elected.18

Kinnocks o ce tried to sober Prescott up but in he stumbled, only to proclaim:

I know Im pissed, but I rst want to ask one question why do I want some permanent cabinetsecretary telling me things? Ill nd out soon enough when were in government.19

Prescott was then escorted out, but the episode illustrates, however crudely andunintentionally, the gap in understanding still to be bridged, and in some cases never bridged.

Following the 1992 election Butler suggested that the timetable or pre-election contactsshould be relaxed, and a ter discussions with Kinnock and Clarke, the departing Leader othe Opposition wrote to Major, who agreed that con dential exchanges between seniorcivil servants and Opposition spokesmen could begin rom January 1996, that is 16 monthsbe ore the end o the parliament. That would have permitted contacts or at least a ewmonths even i the election had occurred a ter our years in the spring or early summero 1996. As it was, since the election did not occur until nearly the end o the ve years,contacts were long and extensive. The 16-month guideline has continued since then asBlair authorised contacts rom January 2001, ahead o the June 2001 election, and rom

January 2005, ahead o the May 2005 election. In both cases, they were compressed,though, as in the 1980s, neither the Conservative Opposition nor permanent secretariesexpected a change o government. In December 2008, Brown agreed to a request romDavid Cameron, the Conservative Leader, or discussions to take place rom January 2009.The Liberal Democrats have also been given the same opportunities. Based on his experienceas Kinnocks chie o sta in two elections, Clarke suggested the process o contacts andbrie ngs should start no later than three and a hal years a ter a general election. This would

o earlier contacts is a lack o purpose or sense o urgency compared to when an election isnearer at hand. The inherent problems o uncertain timing have not been ully addressed, andperhaps cannot be unless parliaments are given a xed term.

Authorisation

The decision on whether to authorise talks lies with the Prime Minister o the dayollowing a request rom the Leader o the Opposition. While Blair and Brown have ollowedMajors post-1992 practice, this is, in theory, still discretionary rather than automatic.There is a strong case both or clari ying the timing and or making the Cabinet Secretaryresponsible or the timing, in order to remove the process even urther rom the hands ocurrent ministers.

Where and whenThe management o contacts depends in part on the attitude o the incumbent secretarieso state. Most take a relaxed view, believing that it was desirable or the main Oppositionparty to be brie ed properly, provided they remain con dential. Michael Portillo, the De enceShadow, was relaxed about Sir Richard Mottram, his Permanent Secretary, talking to theLabour shadow team. This enabled Mottram to hold meetings over lunch in his Ministry oDe ence o ce, rather than urtively elsewhere. But some ministers are prickly, and worried

18 John Prescott,Prezza: My Story Pulling No Punches(London: Headline Review: 2008), p.16719 Ibid.


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by the variable experience: Why is my Shadow not in touch with me? Others did not take

Conservative Partys James Review o potential savings in his department had major faws,


about being treated as losers on their way out. The legacy o the dont tell origins o theconvention still permeates the contacts. The aura o a Feydeau arce and the mysteries oa Le Carre thriller have never been ar away. A ter the early contacts that Butler establishedwith Powell, a dinner was arranged in early 1996 at the home o Roy Jenkins or Blair tomeet Butler and some leading permanent secretaries, including the main candidates or thepost o Cabinet Secretary. But, in order that they would not be spotted entering the Jenkinshome, they were told to arrive at ve to ten minute intervals, presumably to con use anyWhitehall-watching paparazzi. So eminent knighted permanent secretaries could be seenwandering the streets o Notting Hill looking at their watches to see when it was the timeto enter the Jenkins home, without even the distractions o spotting Julia Roberts or HughGrant. It was apparently an awkward occasion, as such inspections can be, which underlinedhow little Blair knew about the ways o Whitehall.

As part o the dont embarrass policy, meetings between permanent secretaries andOpposition shadows were supposed to be conducted away rom the eyes o ministers.This involved a lot o ingenuity and an element o arce. Permanent secretaries have quietlylooked at a secretary o states diary to see when he or she is out o the o ce to avoidpotential embarrassment, and then arranged meetings. Sir Andrew Turnbull, then PermanentSecretary at the Environment Department, had to meet John Prescott away rom Londonin Doncaster to maintain secrecy. Frank Dobson was shadowing Environment but Blairplanned a super-ministry, also including Transport, in order to give a big job to Prescott, hisdeputy. Butler, who, in turn, had heard rom Powell in Blairs o ce, had told Turnbull o this

plan. But Turnbull had to go through the charade o meeting Dobson, who anyway had aninkling o what was likely to happen, as well as seeing Prescott. The whole a air was ull oproblems (how many Cabinet ministers and permanent secretaries should be in the enlargeddepartment?) that were eventually and sensibly sorted out.

There are no guidelines about how many meetings there should be. Butler remembers atthe weekly meetings o permanent secretaries how some o his colleagues were disturbed

the procedure as seriously. Similarly, Opposition spokesmen vary between the wary anddi cult and the eager and assiduous, with one or two in uriating permanent secretariesby their persistence, and lack o understanding o the limits o the convention. In practice,the contacts are more like a slow courtship, an initial getting to know you period, somepracticalities about how a ministers li e is run, and then, as the election, approaches, more

detail. Timing is bound to vary. Some permanent secretaries argue the earlier the better.Others are against premature meetings since Opposition parties do not want to disclosetheir thinking too early. While much depends on the individuals, and the departmentsinvolved, this is again a case where the absence o clarity and co-ordination, on both sides,can create problems and misunderstandings.

ContentsPermanent secretaries agree that they should not be giving advice be ore an election. Butthe o cial ocus on the organisation and machinery o government contains ambiguitiesand is too restrictive. Many new policies, such as the New Deal or human rights legislation,involve organisational changes in departments. O course, there are ways round; as one

ormer Permanent Secretary put it: You can ask questions and lay out ve pages o analysiswithout the nal page o conclusions. There is bound to be a mutual process o education. Aconsistent theme in conversations with both ormer and current senior o cials is their desireto warn possible uture ministers o the pit alls ahead: about the di erence between howinitiatives get on to the ront page in Opposition, and how policy emerges in government.How, one ormer o cial asked, do you convey to a new government that policiesdeveloped in Opposition will not work as stated, and need development, without appearingobstructive? Similarly, o cials are keen to suggest that the right way to introduce a boldnew initiative might be to run a pilot project rst. But there are no mechanisms at present toconvey such warnings except through retired senior o cials, as, in practice, happens.

Permanent secretaries eel the need to say something when an Opposition party isdemonstrably going in the wrong direction or, or example, should take legal advice.For example, during the 2005 election, one Permanent Secretary was worried that the

which risked creating unrealistic assumptions and would, there ore, restrict the thenConservative shadow i he took o ce. The Permanent Secretary could not advise him, buthe could, and did, raise questions, which allowed the Shadow to work out the implications


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normally have no means o assessing (other than through gossip and innuendo) alternative

o senior public appointments in the six months be ore an election.

power lies with the Prime Minister. All this underlines the need or a review o the whole areao the Opposition may eel compromised i his or her views/conse

Documents

Transitions - Preparing for changes to government