Transboundary Water Institutions in Developing Countries:

A Case Study in Afghanistan

June 8, 2016

By: Idrees Malyar

Advised by: Dr. Michael E. Campana

Water Resources Pol icy & Management Program

Overview

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• Introduc+on•  Thesis•  StudyArea

• Objec+ves

• ResearchQues+ons

• Methods–limita+on

• Results

• Discussion

Introduction -Transboundary Water Institutions

Defini'ons“Ins%tu%onsarepeopleandthepa-ernsofregularrepe''veinterac'onsamongthemthattransforminputsintooutputs”(Ostrometal.,1993)

WhyTransboundaryWaterIns'tu'ons

Availableliterature

AmuDaryaRiver

Introduction -Transboundary Water Institutions Exis%ngTransboundaryWaterIns%tu%ons:Ø Interna%onalFundsforSavingtheAralSea–(TheStructure)

Ø Interna%onalBoundaryandWaterCommissionU.S.Sec%on

Ø DanubeRiverProtec%onConven%onØ MekongRiverCommissionSecretariatOpera%onalStructure

Council of Heads of Central Asian States for the Aral Sea Basin Problems

President IFAS

Inspection Committee IFAS Board

Executive Committee IFAS

Regional Center for Hydrology

Executive Directorate in Kazakhstan

Executive Directorate in Kyrgyzstan

ASBP Agency in Uzbekistan

Branch in Turkmenistan

Branch in Tajikistan

Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development

Kyzylorda Branch

Nukus Branch

SRC ICSD

Secretariats

Interstate Commission for Water Coordination

Secretariats

SRC ICWC

BWO “Syrdarya”

BWO “Amudarya”

Coordination Metrology Centre

Introduction – Perceived Risks to Cooperation

PerceivedRisks

“Thepercep%onthatanactofcoopera%onwillexposethecountrytoharm,willjeopardizesomethingofvaluetothecountry,orevenwillthreatenthepoli%calfutureofindividualpolicymakers.”Subramanianetal.(2012)

Introduction – Study Area Afghanistan:

AnnualRenewableWater:75BCM(Qureshi,2002)SurfaceWater 55BCMGroundwater 20BCM

AnnualWaterAvailabilitypercapita:2500CM/Capita

AfghanistanUse:33percentoftheSurfaceWater(GIROA,2008)

RegionalMapofAfghanistan,WorldAtlas

Introduction – Study Area

TransboundaryRiversI.  Kabul/IndusRiverBasinII.  TheAmuRiverBasinIII.  Harirrud&MurghabRiversBasinIV.  HelmandRiverBasin

OutFlow:42.22BCM/year

InFlow:10BCM/year

SurfaceCovered:84percent(Watson,2014)

PeopleLive:87percent(Watson,2014)RiverBasinMapofAfghanistan(WatershedAtlas,2007)

Introduction – Study Area

TransboundaryRiversI.  Kabul/IndusRiverBasinII.  TheAmuRiverBasinIII.  Harirrud&MurghabRiversBasinIV.  HelmandRiverBasin

OutFlow:42.22BCM/year

InFlow:10BCM/year

SurfaceCovered:84percent(Watson,2014)

PeopleLive:87percent(Watson,2014)RiverBasinMapofAfghanistan(WatershedAtlas,2007)

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Propor%on(%)ofTotalRiverFlowbyRiverBasin

TransboundaryRiversNa+onal

TransboundaryGroundwater

I.  TheKabulRiverAquifer

II.  Fariman-TorbatjamAquiferIII.  TaybadAquiferIV.  KaretAquifer

V.  AmudaryaAquifer(TransboundaryAquifersoftheWorld2015,IGRAC)

Introduction – Study Area

Interna%onalGroundwaterResourcesAssessmentCenter(IGRAC)

Introduction – Study Area Exis%ngTrea%es

No RiverBasin Co-riparianStates Treaty 1

KabulRiverBasin(IndusRiver)

Pakistan(IndiaandChina)

The1960IndusTreatybetweenIndiaandPakistan;and

2 The1921TreatybetweenAfghanistanandGreatBritainwithlicleWatercoverage.

3 HelmandRiverBasin

Iran The1973Afghan-IranianHelmand-RiverWaterTreaty

4 Harirud&MurghabRiversBasin

IranandTurkmenistan The1926TreatybetweenIranandTurkmenistan

5 AmudaryaRiverBasin

Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Uzbekistan,andTurkmenistan

The1873Fron+erAgreementbetweenAfghanistanandRussia;

6 The1946Fron+erAgreementbetweenAfghanistanandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics;and

7 The1958TreatybetweentheGovernmentoftheUSSRandtheRoyalGovernmentofAfghanistan.

8 RecentAgreementonDataandInforma%onSharingwithTajikistan.

Objectives

Ins%tu%onalArrangements

•  Designatransboundarywatermanagementunit;

•  Determinethekeystakeholders,andexper+seneededfortheunit.

Objectives PerceivedRiskstoCoopera%on:

◦  Reviewtheexperienceofcoopera+onbetweenAfghanistanandIranovertheHelmandwaters,applyingthe“riskandopportuni%estocoopera%on”frameworkandthesitua+onmappingtool;

◦  Iden+fythecurrent/presentperceivedriskstocoopera+onfromthestandpointoftheAfghanistangovernment;

◦  Recommendriskreduc+onstrategiesfortheiden+fiedrisks.

Research Questions

I.  WhatkindoftransboundarywatermanagementunitisneededforthegovernmentofAfghanistan–toini+allyprepareAfghanistanforitstransboundarybasinnego+a+ons,andlatertomanageandfollowupontheinterna+onalagreementsbetweenAfghanistanandco-ripariancountries?

o Basedonthetransboundarywatermanagementunit’sneedsandac%vi%es,whatexper%seisrequired?

o Whoshouldbeinvolvedand,whataretheobstaclestocrea%onandfunc%oningofatransboundarywaterins%tu%on?

II.  Whataretheperceivedrisksofcoopera+onovertransboundarywaterresourcesofAfghanistan?Andwhataretheappropriateriskreduc+onstrategies?

Research Design

TheHelmandCaseStudy(1950-1973)

CurrentSitua+onofAfghanistan(2001–2016)

RisksandOpportuni+estoCoopera+on

Postscript–Situa+onMap

TransboundaryWaters

Ins+tu+on

Methods

I.   SecondarySources/LiteratureReview:

II.   Interviews(Semi-structured)

III.   RiskAndOpportuni%esToCoopera%onFramework

Methods Interviews(Semi-structured)

I.  InterviewQues+onnaire

II.  InterviewPar+cipants

Number Category Affilia%on NumberInterviewed

1 AfghanistanGovernment MinistryofEnergyandWater 4

MinistryofForeignAffairs 2

2 Interna+onalOrganiza+ons FundingAgencies/WorldBank 2

3 Academia 2

Methods Framework:

Ø The framework illustrates how countriesassess theirplace in transboundarywatercoopera+on based on the net benefits,andnetopportuni+es.

Ø FocusedonRiskandOpportunity, ratherthancostandbenefits

Framework – Perceived Risk 1.CapacityandKnowledge:

Confidence in ability to nego+ate a fair deal; having enough and the correct informa+on andknowledgetodoso.

2.AccountabilityandVoice:

Deliverabilityofbenefitsbytheregionalen+tyandco-riparians,omenrelatedtotrust;havingasayindecisionmakinginthegoverningstructuresoftheregionalen+ty.

3.SovereigntyandAutonomy:

Abilitytoactinbestinterestofthecountrywithoutconstraints;makingdecisionsindependently.

Framework – Perceived Risk 4.EquityandAccess:

Fairnessof(rela+ve)benefitstocountry,including+mingofbenefitsandcostsandobtaining/retainingfairaccesstoriver.

5.StabilityandSupport:

Longevityofpoten+alofagreement;in-countrysupportofagreement,includingra+fica+onlikelihood.(Subramanianetal.2012)

Methods

 PathstoCoopera+on

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Results – Institutional Arrangements

I.   ImportanceoftheUnit/Poli%calWill

Ø  Alloftheinterviewpar+cipantsbelievedandratedtheissueasofhighimportance.

“Ibelieveitisreallyclearthatcrea%onofatransboundarywatermanagementunitiscrucial,necessaryandimportant.Othercountrieshaveoil,we[Afghanistan]havecleanwater.Thus,thereshouldbeaunitwhoshouldbeabletomasternego%a%onsskills,studyourbasinaswellasstudyourco-ripariancountriesneed,anddesires.”

Ø  Aplacetostoreknowledge

“It isgood tohavean ins%tu%onal structure–becauseyouhaveaphysicalplacewhereknowledgecanbestored,andtransferredtofromonepersontoanother.”

“Icreatedamassivedatabase[ontransboundarywatersofAfghanistan],allIcoulddoistogiveittoindividuals.Buttherewasnoins%tu%ontohandovermywork.”

Results – Institutional Arrangements II.   StakeholdersInvolvement

Ø Themajorityoftheinterviewpar+cipants(90%)talkedabouttheStakeholdersinvolvement.

Ø AfghanistanWaterLaw,2009“ManagementandplanningforthetransboundarywatersbetweenAfghanistananditsneighboringcountriesandchangesofwatercoursesaretheresponsibilityoftheMinistryofEnergyandWaterwithagreementsfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,MinistryofInteriorandtheMinistryofBorderandTribalAffairs”

Ø Alsodiscussedtheprofessionals/exper+setobeinvolvedintheunit.

Results – Institutional Arrangements III.   Obstacles

Ø Poli+cal&TechnicalObstacle(CapacityofMEWandMoFA)

“[…]InAfghanistanthereisnosuchfaculty(school)toteachtransboundarywaterresourcesmanagement.”

Ø AbsenceofresearchonAfghanistanwaters

Ø LackofpublicawarenessØ Theproblemofdataandinforma+onsharingamong/betweentheAfghanagenciesandorganiza+ons.

 “Wehavetosortoutthedataandinforma%onsharingproblem;Dataisrestrictedwithinorganiza%onsinthecountry.Wearecurrentlyworkingonahub/portaltocollectthedatafromrelevantorganiza%ons.”

Results - Institutional Arrangements IV.  Funding&ThirdPartyAssistanceØ AbundantFunding;

“[…]therearelotsofagenciesreadytohelpthewatersectorofAfghanistan.Nowinterna%onalcommunityisawarethatwatersecurityispoli%calsecurity.Forinstance,EgyptontheNilestartedbuildingtheAswanDamwhilethegovernmentbeforethatwascollapsedbecauseofwatersecurity.Therefore,boththegovernmentofAfghanistananddonoragenciescanputthemoneytogethertohelpthissector.”

Ø Donorsaskingthegovernmentforaclearpathonitswatersnego+a+onswithco-riparianstates“Ibelievewe[donoragency]havethemostimpactifwebuildthecapacityandbringintherightexpertsaswehavegoodviewofwhoarethegoodexpertonthefield.Andtheactualdecisionaboutengagingwhathasneedtobediscussedshouldcomefromthegovernment.”

Ø Afghanofficialsandothershadsomeobserva+onsonthedonoragencies’assistancemethods“Their[donors]supportisnotcoordinated.USAIDwantsaprojectontransboundarywaters,aswellasADB,WorldBank,GovernmentofGermany,EUandothers–theyarekindofadhoc.Governmentwantstheirfundinginwell-coordinatedmanner,andwehavemee%ngstoaddressthisissue.”

Results – Perceived Risks

Proponents:Ø  “I believe we do need some homework. However,

looking at the situa%on there is a need as well asinten%on,thuswearegoodtogo.Wehavetou%lizetheexistenceandsupportofdonoragencies.”

Opponents:Ø  ”As faraswehavesecurityproblems,andweare ina

war – I do not believe we are prepared for waternego%a%ons.Peaceisverycrucialfornego%a%ons.”

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SupportandOpposi%onfornear-termTransboundaryWaterNego%a%ons

Proponents Opponents

Results – Perceived Risks

I.   CapacityandKnowledge:Ø  ThemostrepeatedthemebyAfghanofficials,aswellasinterna+onalorganiza+ons.Aprominentriskto

Afghanistancoopera+onwithco-riparianstates

§  Capacity“Inregardstonego%a%oncapacity,IthinkAfghanistanhasthecapacity.Forinstance,ifyouseeTAPI,CASA1000,PeaceNego%a%ons[withTaliban]andotherbigprojects,theyallneedlotsofnego%a%ons,soAfghanistaniscapableofdoingso.”

§  Knowledge“Overall thetransboundarywaterresources issue isanewtopic,andthisfield isnotreallymastered inthispartoftheworld.Firstthing[riskforAfghanistan]isthatwedonothavethetransboundarywaterexpertsasrequired.”Ø  Iden+fiedintheHelmandBasinCase-TheestablishmentoftheHelmandRiverDeltaCommission1950

andreportin1951

II.   AccountabilityandVoiceCurrentlythereisnoac+venego+a+onsoverwater,therefore,itwasdifficulttodetermineifthisriskispresent.

Ø  Amajority(70%)oftheinterviewpar+cipantsbelievethatIrandidnotfollowthe1973treaty,“Inregardstothetreatyimplementa%on,Afghanistanhasalwaysbeenveryhonest,however,Iranhasnotobeyedandimplementedthetreaty(astheyshould).Iranhasabusedthepoli%calinstabilityinAfghanistantotheiradvantage.Forinstance,theyareallowedtotakewaterfromthreepoints,however,theydivert/takewaterfrommore100places.”

Ø  Someoftheintervieweesblamedthepoli+calinstabilitysince1970sinAfghanistanasabarriertotheimplementa+onofthetreaty,sta+ng:“[…]inregardstoIran’sroleintheimplementa%onofthistreatywecannotblameIranforitaswell.However,theyusedourinstabilityintheirfavor.Theys%llhaveinfluenceinthewatersectorofAfghanistan,andwanttohavetheirhegemonythroughtheirpoli%calinfluence.

Ø  AfghanistanbeingPartofIFAS

Results – Perceived Risks

III.   SovereigntyandAutonomyØ  Broughtupbythreeofthepar%cipants–Opponentsofnear-termnego%a%ons

“Atthecurrentsitua%onwecannotenternego%a%onswithanyoftheco-riparianstates,becausetheyhavealreadydevelopedtheirwaterresourceinfrastructures,andtheywillnotallowAfghanistantodosobyclaimingtheirrightsbasedonthehistoricaluse.”

Ø  AlsoexistedforAfghanistanwhilenego+a+ngthe1973HelmandTreaty-primaryreasonforAfghanistaninini+allydenyingnego+a+ons

IV.  EquityandAccessØ  Notmen+onedbytheinterviewpar+cipant

Ø  ExistedintheHelmandCase

Results – Perceived Risks

V.   StabilityandSupport:

Ø  Thiswasalsothemostrepeatedthemeintheinterviews.AsignificantconcernforthegovernmentofAfghanistan,aswellasforthepoli+calleadersordecisionmakers.

Ø  Waterbury(2002)-Countriesarenotunitaryactors,therearealmostalwaysbothproponentandcri+csofnewna+onalpolicies.Ø  TheNa+onalUnityGovernmentofAfghanistan(composedoftwodifferentpoli+calpar+esin2014)andtheNUGopinionon

transboundarywaternego+a+ons

“[…]isthereaunitedstandforwaternego%a%onsinsidethegovernmentofAfghanistan?Do/doesDr.AbdullahandDr.Ghanihavethesamestand [overtransboundarywaternego%a%ons]?”

Ø  RisktoTransboundaryWaterExperts“Iamafraidofsugges%onsontransboundarywaters–becausethey[populace]willeasilylabelyouasapro-Iranianor,pro-Pakistani.”Ø  ThesameappliedintheHelmandBasincase

§  TreatyRa%fica%on§  MusaShafiq

Results – Perceived Risks

Postscript-Situation Map

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Blurred

Neutral Posi%veArchetype

Nega%veArchetype Opportuni%es

Situation Map ThePosi%veArchetypes:

Afghan-Iran 1973 Treaty

The Helmand Delta Commission MoFA

MEW

MAIL

Afghanistan

HAVA

World Bank

ADB

Iran

MENA

X

Institutions

MoFA

MEW

MAIL

World Bank

ADB

International Organizations

USAID

Situation Map TheNega%veArchetypes:

Lack of Trust between two countries

Environmental Problems – Wetlands

Evaporation and Seepage

Population Growth

Climate Change

Floods

Drought

Political Instability in Afghanistan

Security Problems

Lack of a Basin-Wide Approach

No Data Sharing

Weak Water Resources Management

Salma Dam on Harirrud

Lack of Gaging Stations

Poppy Cultivation and Transportation

Iran Interventions

Increasing Water Demands by Farmers

Future Developments

Poppy Mafia and Transporter

Poor Infrastructure = Waste of Water

The U.S. Existence in Afghanistan

Sistan – The poorest state of

Iran

No Groundwater Coverage in 1973 Treaty

Building new Infrastructure

Kamal Khan Dam – To build 5,600 Shallow Wells

near to Afghanistan border (2006)

Situation Map TheNeutrals:

Irrigation in Afghanistan

Infrastructure in Afghanistan

Infrastructure in Iran

Agriculture

Fruit Cotton

Arghandab Reservoir Kajakai Dam

4 Dams Charhnimah 1-4

Manmade Lakes - Hamuns

132,000 Ha Irrigated Land

265,000 Ha Potential

BlurredIssues–TheUnknowns:

The political will to implement the 1973 treaty, particularly by

Iran.

Situation Map Opportuni%es

Afghan Migrants

in Iran

Afghanistan

Harirrud and Murghab Rivers Water

Chah-Bahar Seaport

India’s Interests in the Region –

Connecting to Central Asian

Countries

Poor economy

Sound Economy

Poor engineering

skills

Sound engineering skills

Upstream Riparian

Downstream

Riparian

Iran

Recommendations

1.   Trainings&StudyVisitsKnowledgeandskillexpansion,andfacilita+on(thirdpartyassistance)-strategiesforthefirstriskofcapacityandknowledge.2.   Facilita'onFacilita+ngexchangebetweencountries,interpre+ngeachother’sinterest,assis+ngtohighlightbeneficialcoopera+onopportuni+esbetweenriparians.

2.1.AddingAfghanistaninIFAS

3.   DecisionLegi'macyØ  Toensureextensivesupportfordecisionson

transboundarywatercoopera+on.Ø  Publicawarenessontransboundarywatersissue

3.1.BroaderAgreementsØ  Anydealspecificallytalkingaboutwatersharingwould

notbeoutofthestabilityandsupportriskinAfghanistan.4.   Ins'tu'onalDesign Ø  TransboundaryWaterResourcesManagementUnit.

Recommendations

Transboundary Water Resources Management Unit

Technical

TWM-UnitTransboundaryWatersExpert/Coordinator

Hydrology RiverBasinDevelopment

Agriculture

Economics

DroughtManagement

Irriga+on

FloodManagementHydrogeology

EnvironmentalProtec+on

WUARepresenta+ve

ClimateChangeAdapta+on

Administra+on

Finance

HumanResources

DataandInforma+onManagement

+M&E

AmudaryaBasinAuthority

LegalAffairs

Communica+on

BorderandTribalAffairs

HelmandRiverBasinAuthority

KabulRiverBasinAuthority

Harirud&MurghabRiversBasinAuthority

Sociology

Nego+a+on

ForeignAffairs

Questions?

ThankYou