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Transatlantic Security:

The Contributions of Allies, Partners, and Friends

Conference Report

Dr. Regina Karp, Project Leader Director, Graduate Program in International Studies (GPIS)

Old Dominion University

This project is funded by the European Union Delegation of the European Union in the United States

2175 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037. Tel: 202.862.9500 Fax: 202.429.1766

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Contents

Executive Summary 3 “Forging the Future: Leading NATO Military 7 Transformation”

Major General Peter Bayer Conference Papers:

“Capable Partners: How to Share the Security Burden” 8 Celeste A. Wallander “Sharing the Security Burden – the Role of the EU” 14

Per M. Norheim-Martinsen

“Whither NATO? The Future of Burden Sharing in the 19 Transatlantic Partnership” Karl-Heinz Kamp Appendix A: Biographies 26

Appendix B: Evaluation Results 28

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Executive Summary The Transatlantic Security conference held on April 19, 2013 at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, focused on the evolution of NATO since the end of the Cold War and revealed the relevance of strong partnerships in consolidating NATO legitimacy, the importance of NATO flexibility and adaptability, and the threat of declining sources of institutional funding. The conference, funded by the European Union as part of the ACCESS EU initiative, featured five experts in the field from both sides of the Atlantic and was moderated by Dr. Simon Serfaty, Eminent Professor of Political Science at Old Dominion University.

From left to right, Regina Karp, Per Norheim-Martinsen, Karl-Heinz Kamp, Simon Serfaty, and Celeste Wallander

The following were the primary common themes of the day. The role of partnerships is important. NATO has had three missions in its history: collective defense, integration for transparency and reassurance of member nations, and transformation and democratization. All three were priorities during the Cold War, but NATO shifted in the mid-1990s toward a greater emphasis on transformation and democratization. The Partnership for Peace Program increased the capabilities of the first two missions. The focus moved from transformation for membership in the 1990s to the current focus on capabilities.

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If NATO is going to contribute to an array of security missions, building coalitions is important for NATO legitimacy building. Criticism may follow, but legitimacy is a key focus. Partnerships as a vehicle for support for membership exist in Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia. Partnerships as a vehicle for transformation without modernization and without membership still exist in Azerbaijan, northern Africa, and the Middle East. And, partnerships for capabilities still exist as well. Partnership in the 1990s was about partners needing NATO, but partnership in the future will be about NATO needing partners. Partners should have a decision making role. And, NATO should be thinking about a sustainable way to contribute to global security missions with partners. NATO needs to be flexible and adaptive. Control over funding is left to the whims of its members. NATO members do not spend the agreed-upon two percent of GDP. And there is no shared vision for the future, nor is there agreement on where to spend money most effectively. These problems reveal a need for a Strategic Foresight Analysis to examine a framework for future operations up to the year 2030. NATO needs to adapt to changes driven by technology, such as problems dealing with state sovereignty and scarce resources and evolving international governance, policy, and law. Ways to overcome these hurdles are:

• Strengthen the alliance through innovative training and education, future leader development, and instilling in NATO a culture of service

• Maintain international relevance by expanding security partnerships, establishing forward presences, continuing effective management, and partnering with industry

• Focus on technology to develop a rapid capability development and acquisition system

• Focus on operations and maintain relevant and robust capability Accomplishing these goals will aid NATO in being responsive, agile, and resilient to changing circumstances. Sources of funding are in decline. NATO faces burden sharing obstacles. If Europeans do not pay their two percent of GDP, NATO will decline. Because of the international financial crisis, however, not many countries are likely to pay their full obligation. The United States has always paid a disproportionate amount of the NATO budget. This is not an asymmetric relationship, though. The Europeans receive protection, and the US gets influence in Europe, which is united, stable, wealthy, and politically like-minded. Europeans may seem relatively useless, but they provide legitimacy.

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Where is NATO going? With significant, on-going financial problems in Europe and the US only slightly better off, military capabilities will continue to decline. All NATO members, especially European ones, will be risk-averse because of the lack of funds. This tendency will lead to more political risk, and willingness for crisis management will decrease. Meanwhile, the US will continue to strengthen its focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Discussions about NATO’s relevance and role will continue. For the transatlantic relationship, NATO remains the organization of choice. As resources decline, partners are critical to NATO’s ability to act as regional, and increasingly global, security provider.

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Conference Outcome As with all ACCESS EU events held at Old Dominion University, an extensive survey of attendees was conducted by the ODU Social Science Research Center. The full evaluation results are included in Appendix B. Overall, the great majority of the participants expressed a high level of satisfaction with the seminar.

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Capable Partners: How to Share the Security Burden

Celeste A. Wallander

NATO Partnership is the new focus of study, meetings, and work in Brussels. At first glance this seems strange: NATO has always been defined by its membership and the commitment and capabilities that entails. Partners are helpful, but the weight of any alliance must be the countries that have committed to mutual defense. As the most successful alliance in history, why should NATO be focused on partners? One reason is simply reality. Recent high profile real world cases of NATO missions cannot be understood without incorporating evidence of the contributions of partners, particularly in Afghanistan and Libya. Another reason is the weight of activity: everyday NATO activities in counter piracy, counterterrorism, counternarcotic, and fighting transnational trafficking. However, there is a more important reason why NATO has been drawn to the issue of partner capabilities and contributions. It is a logical result of NATO’s evolving role and its ability to effectively address global security challenges. NATO does not have to invest in its ability to work with partners in the coming years, but if it does not, NATO will find itself less effective in meeting the security challenges its members face. A partnership component to NATO’s organizational capacity is simply the latest step in its ongoing evolution. Missions and Partnership NATO has been multi-mission since its inception, although the common thread in all of its missions has been to prevent war. Its quintessential mission is Collective Defense, encapsulated in Article V of the Washington Treaty. Although NATO’s collective defense commitment was not specific in identifying the target of NATO’s defense and deterrence efforts, of course it was the Soviet Union. Thus, NATO first mission was to prevent World War III. The new allies were shaped in their objectives by their history, and that meant that they were driven not only to prevent Soviet aggression, but other sources of European war as well. NATO’s mission was also to provide transparency and reassurance among members that had so many times over the centuries threatened, feared, and fought one another. With the history of the early 20th century still fresh in memory, NATO’s second mission was to prevent World War I. And third, NATO’s mission was transformation and democratization. By the mid-twentieth century, scholars and policymakers had come to understand that the nature of a country’s political system, the health of its society, and the terms of civil-military relations in its governance had a direct impact on its propensity for aggressive security policies and tendency to become involved in conflicts with its neighbors. The experience of wars in the 20th century convinced leaderships of NATO founding countries that Europe would be able to prevent a return to violent conflict only if its members became

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democratic and better-governed. With the experience of fascism and Nazi Germany particularly in mind, NATO’s third mission was to prevent World War II. The political and military components of NATO as an organization were shaped to meet these three missions. NATO’s (unprecedented) integrated military command and the permanent deployment of allied forces in Europe (especially what would be the central front in Germany) were created to build a strong defense for credible deterrence. For credibility and transparency among members, the integrated command served reassurance on the military side, while the North Atlantic Council and permanent civilian staff facilitated transparency on the political side. The North Atlantic Council facilitated political decision-making and bolstered the legitimacy of NATO policies as not merely national self-interest, but common decisions arising from common values. The military and political structures of the alliance organization served as resources for reform, professionalization, and sharing best practices for that were to use membership to anchor newly achieved political transformation. This was particularly important for the alliance with West Germany’s membership in 1955. The prioritization and emphasis shifted over time during the Cold War, but NATO was based upon all three missions throughout its history. With the end of the Cold War, NATO’s mission focus shifted to transformation, democratization, reassurance, and transparency in the middle of the 1990s. Enlargement was also consistent with collective defense (particularly for those members motivated in large measure by concerns and uncertainty about whether Russia’s post-Cold War transformation would result in a less threatening Russia), but enlargement was not driven by the need to expand NATO’s capabilities for defense or deterrence. New members had to be able to demonstrate that they would contribute to the security of the alliance and not diminish security, but it would be difficult to make a serious case that new candidates were elected based upon primarily defense and deterrence criteria. It was in this context that Partnerships originally developed, at least as a formal aspect of NATO as an organization. Although some originally saw Partnership for Peace (PfP) as a vehicle for not enlarging NATO yet reaching out for security cooperation, capacity building, and transformation, PfP quickly became primarily a vehicle for preparing for membership. Yet Partnership without membership took on a purpose and value of its own, even as NATO’s attention shifted to enlargement by the mid-1990s. Early on, countries that did not seek membership – Central Asian states and Russia among them – joined PfP, and usually not reluctantly or because NATO had pursued them. PfP was designed primarily for formerly communist countries of Europe and Eurasia that sought cooperative security, but NATO also developed partnership mechanisms for countries beyond Eurasia: the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 and the structure of Global Partners such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. Over time, NATO expanded the use of partnership tools created in PfP (notably, Individual Partnership Actions Plans and the Planning and Review Process) with partners beyond Eurasia.

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As partnership activities grew with countries that were either not seeking NATO membership or were unlikely to become members, the importance of transformation and reform as mission objectives of partnership – while not lost – slipped in relation to the growing importance of interoperability and operations capacity. Originally conceived as a component of PfP to serve as a vehicle for preparing aspirants for membership, interoperability became more important to the evolving missions of the alliance as NATO shifted to military missions “out-of-area,” beyond Article V. The catalyst for this shift, of course, was conflict in the Balkans. With IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR, the ability to work with partners on a pragmatic, professional, military basis became key to NATO’s post-Cold War cooperative security capability. IFOR was comprised of 32 contributing countries, and only 14 of them were NATO members at the time that the mission began in late 1995. When it replaced IFOR in late 1996, SFOR was comprised of 38 contributing countries, 16 of them NATO members (at the time). The importance of the partners’ contribution was as much legitimacy as capabilities. NATO’s Article V mission was inherently legitimate: the right to self-defense is recognized in international law and the UN Charter. NATO’s mission of transformation and democratization is inherently legitimate, because it entails consent of the partners that choose to sign on for such programs. Similarly, transparency and reassurance is entirely consensual among the sovereign states that choose to join NATO, so legitimacy in this mission area is robust. However, the use of force outside of the NATO area and for missions other than collective self-defense is more complicated in terms of legitimacy. To be legitimate outside of Article V, NATO military missions need to be EITHER:

1. with the consent of the country in questions, as is the case in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping operations; OR

2. at the direction and with the consent of the UN Security Council, as is the case in peace enforcement missions without the consent and indeed against the will of the targeted country, as for example in the 1993-1995 NATO protection and enforcement for UNPROFOR peacekeeping force; OR

3. under the terms of the responsibility to protect or prevention of genocide, entailing peace enforcement without a UNSC resolution, such as the 1999 NATO mission Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia to protect Kosovo.

These three variant of new NATO security missions involving the use of force are in ascending order of problematic legitimacy. My point is not to resurrect debates on the legitimacy of NATO use of force against Serbia in 1999 without a UNSCR, or on the legitimacy of NATO use of force to overthrow the Libyan regime based on UNSCR 1973 which authorized a no-fly zone to protect civilians. It is to highlight that once NATO moves beyond Article V missions, transformation, transparency, and consensual defense operations such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, legitimacy concerns are greater and more problematic. That is the bad news. The good news is that partnership in NATO operations beyond collective defense helps on the legitimacy deficit. In addition to their

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military/operational contributions (which also of course have a capabilities benefit), the commitment of partners – especially partners from the regions in which these non-consensual operations would take place – helps with the legitimacy challenge to NATO’s aspiration to contribute to global security solutions beyond Article V. Much of the focus on the importance of partnerships to NATO in the 21st century has been on the capabilities partners can contribute and the political security dialogue they support. At least as important for NATO’s future effectiveness as a contributor to global security is the legitimacy benefits of partner contributions to difficult military operations that must be undertaken without the consent of all the countries involved. NATO Partnerships: the current state of affairs Partnerships play four roles in NATO’s contemporary – and future – global security strategy. Two are rooted in NATO’s original missions, and two are directly responsive to the new realities of the global security environment. Not surprisingly, the new roles of partnership raise challenging and controversial issues for NATO’s evolution. First, partnership as vehicle/support for membership still exists. Partnership as preparation for membership by 2013 is limited in numbers, but has been enhanced in depth, scope, and impact. The numbers are small: candidates for membership in 2013 are Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia (still, given that the name issue has yet to be resolved, blocking Macedonia’s full membership and making continuing partnership all the more important to sustain its forward progress on transformation). The evolution of partnership from mere planning for interoperability and exercises to partner contributions in NATO operations – especially ISAF – has qualitatively advanced transformation. The Georgian contribution to ISAF – 2 combat battalions on 6 month rotations – has required four years of training under U.S. guidance, built a new capacity for demanding counterinsurgency operation, resulted in command experience for officers, and institutionalized closer cooperation with US military. By going beyond mere exercises, Georgia’s participation in ISAF has built the capacity of its defense forces and shaped them to be more transatlantic. Similarly, through its contributions to NATO missions as a partner, Montenegro is punching above its weight in global security. Montenegro contributes to ISAF, and to peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Cyprus, and Somalia. With armed forces numbering only about 2000, Montenegro has 85 personnel deployed in NATO or UN operations at a time. The Ministry of Defense has used these deployments to prepare for NATO membership, building experience and professionalization through the bilateral and multilateral training programs available to support the deployments. It is important to be clear that partnership is no substitution for membership to achieve integration and sustainable transformation. Furthermore, without the prize of membership, implementing transformational reforms is more difficult to achieve politically. And of course without membership, a country does not achieve full integration, and thus full transparency and reassurance. As long as partnership does

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not become an excuse for failure to truly sustain the Open Door and a substitute for membership, it remains a strong mechanism in NATO’s Open Door and its core missions. Second, partnership as vehicle for transformation and modernization without membership still exists, primarily in Eurasia, but could develop in Middle East and North Africa. In addition to direct NATO interoperability and modernization programs, NATO members use their bilateral defense cooperation programs with partners to support modernization that is consistent with NATO standards and practices. The United States plans many of its bilateral initiatives with Ukraine and Azerbaijan, for example, to be consistent and even synergistic with NATO defense sector transformation seminars and Defense Educational Enhancement Plans. Given the experience with Eurasian partners, these practices could play the same role with NATO’s new partners in North Africa and the Middle East, such as Libya, Mali, and Jordan. NATO programs on cooperative security and defense transformation operate and the George C. Marshall Center in Germany for Eurasian partners, and could expand to defense transformation, professionalization, and capacity building for these partners as well. Third, the new focus in NATO is on partnership for capabilities. A major focus of the 2012 Chicago Summit, enhancing NATO capabilities in an era of fiscal constraints and rapidly evolving military missions has become a priority that partnerships may help to address. Afghanistan and Libya demonstrated not only what partners can bring, but that NATO needs them. Previously, partnership had more of a flavor of helping countries aspiring to modernize. These recent cases suggest that NATO needs partners as much or more than partners need NATO. Sweden, the UAE, and Qatar brought real capability that mattered in the Libya operation, bolstered by domestic political support for the NATO-led mission that some NATO members (Germany as a notable case) could not muster. As NATO faces the reality of defense cuts by many of its European members, capable partners bring concrete military assets to help meet operational requirements. And the potential of multiple partnerships means that countries can contribute where their capabilities are strong so that no one contributor will be strained beyond defense budget realities. Sweden brings aircraft, Finland brings ground forces, and Australia brings ships. Capable partners cannot replace members, but they offer a positive development in the face of a sobering reality. In addition to specific capabilities bolstered by domestic political support, NATO partners can also offer advantages arising from their geographic proximity to crises locations where the international community has identified a humanitarian or related security requirement for intervention. The U.S. has global reach, but always relies on allies and partners for access, over flights, bases, and related logistic support. Building partnerships allows NATO to operate where the need arises, which is especially important for crises in remote locations.

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This suggests, however, that NATO partnership programs will have to evolve as well to effectively implement the new capabilities focus of partnerships. NATO will have to develop programs and invest in “plug and play” systems so that allies and partners are able to respond quickly to emerging demands in humanitarian crises or the need to intervene to protect civilians. After ISAF, NATO (with its partners) will need to go back to planning, capacity-building, and investing in responsive capabilities. NATO partnership program will need to plan for a new generation of interoperability assessments and exercises to test them. Partnership creates the opportunity but probably also the requirement for industrial partnerships to exploit efficiencies, as well as operational partnership in strategic airlift capability and payload sharing for space launches (to name just two such operational partnerships under development). This new dimension to partnership raises difficult questions, of course. These emerged at the February 2013 Defense Ministerial, with disagreements over whether the partners should be allowed to participate in the NATO Capabilities Initiative, relevant decision-making, and operational planning. The U.S. position at the ministerial was that partners that contribute capabilities and are committed to contributing to NATO-led missions should be treated the same as members, but there are strongly held skeptical views of this evolution. Another issue that will have to be resolved is the ability (and proclivity) of certain NATO members to block partner cooperation activities with countries that those allies face extra-alliance difficulties. Although challenging, these issues arise from NATO’s growing pains from its post-Cold War period to its capacity to act as a security institution relevant to global issues. Like NATO, partnership is no longer just NATO’s post-Cold War extension, but intrinsic to its evolution a Global NATO. Fourth, and because of that emergence as global NATO, is the importance of partners for NATO’s legitimacy. This case was made earlier, but it is important to end with a cautionary note emphasizing it. Partnership is as important and perhaps even more important if NATO is to be able to contribute to future security missions on a sustainable basis that not only adds capabilities, but effective global governance and order. This was evident in the important role of Arab countries in the Libya mission, which brought needed legitimacy and regional scope. It is crucial to remember that NATO was never merely about the power of the alliance, but also about its values and purpose. As NATO faces global security challenges, it will need capabilities, but to be successful and effective, it must also act with legitimacy. NATO’s strength lies in its legitimacy as well as the power of its members. NATO’s case for a role in global security is that the alliance can accept missions beyond narrow self-defense and self-interest. In sustaining that case in the face of an often skeptical world, legitimacy is valuable asset. NATO may not need partners more than partners need NATO, but NATO needs partners, and it is lucky to have them. Investing in their capabilities and the relationships, and listening to their views and priorities, seems a small price to pay for the strengths they bring to the alliance.

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Sharing the Security Burden – the Role of the EU

Per M. Norheim-Martinsen This short paper addresses the issue of transatlantic burden-sharing. It aims to draw out some key trajectories and trends that may point towards a more constructive relationship between the United States, NATO and the EU - with a particular focus on the latter. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been the subject of much attention since its inception with the Franco-British St. Malo declaration in 1998, which stated that the EU should have the capability for "autonomous action backed up by credible military forces" as part of a common defence policy. Since then, the EU has carried out more than 20 crisis management operations - eight of them military. However, its track record has been mixed, while its commentators tend to fall into two camps: On the one side, one finds the hard security people, typically coming from a strategic studies tradition, who tend to focus on the national constraints on international defence cooperation, and often end up ridiculing the EU's long-standing bureaucratic battles over issues like typically the placement of headquarters. On the other side one finds those who tend to have a more positive view on the CSDP, typically coming from a European studies tradition, and who typically focus on the unique nature of the EU as both a civilian and military actor. As such, rather than dealing with the larger question of if the CSDP is worthy of attention in the first place they are more interested in studying various – and ever smaller - parts of it, whether it be command and control issues, institutional developments, operations, or typically coordination challenges across various nexuses or interfaces - i.e. civil-military, security-development, internal-external, etc. This has led to a situation where, as an often heard quip goes, more people seem to be studying the CSDP than actually pursuing it. Nevertheless, both camps - one because it does not accept the EU as a military player, and the other because of its tendency towards compartmentalization - arguably miss out on the bigger picture, or the more fundamental changes that have taken place within the transatlantic security architecture over the last 10-20 years, which have allowed the EU, primarily designed to be an economic organization, to develop into a potent security actor, an important supplement to NATO, and a potential partner to the US. Sharing the Security Burden As Andrew James points out, the issue of transatlantic burden-sharing has been a source of tension within NATO ever since its earliest years (James2006: 223-24). But the issue has received renewed attention with the ongoing financial crisis, and the perceived shift of attention in the US away from Europe towards Asia. As the mantra goes, Europe must start to take responsibility for security in its own neighbourhood, as more pressing concerns are forcing Washington to focus on other regions. In this context, the Americans seem to have rediscovered the EU's fledgling CSDP. From a European point of view, this renewed attention comes across as somewhat odd, as the slump in CSDP activities is casting doubts about its future potential- and

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Euroscepticism is thriving. Yet, despite what many tend to think, Washington's support of CSDP has been consistent ever since the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - and the "progressive framing of a common defence policy" - found its way into the Treaty of the European Union in Maastricht in 1991. They just never took it seriously until now. For Washington, European security and defence cooperation was always a good thing regardless of whether it happened inside NATO or the EU. The only demand was that there should be no duplication of what was already there through NATO, as formulated most explicitly in US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright's infamous three Ds - no diminution of NATO, no discrimination and no duplication. Yet for some time, the key problem with CSDP was, indeed, that it was looking too much like a "NATO light". Despite Brussels' pledges towards a Comprehensive Approach, combining civilian and military instruments in a unique EU security blend, the CSDP was, at least in its first ten years, all about the military (Norheim-Martinsen 2012). The development of structures and capabilities for civilian crisis management remained the hidden "success story of the CSDP", while the EU got stuck in a discourse where military robustness in itself was treated as the only or most important benchmark for success (see Kurowska 2009: 34). One illustrative example is the criticism that the EU received for its lack of a military response to the Libya crisis, when, in fact, the EU was quick to deploy civilian instruments under its civil protection and humanitarian assistance mechanisms. The (relative) stabilization of the situation in Somalia is also arguably, at least in part, the result of the EU's civilian peacebuilding efforts onshore, and the turn towards building local capacity rather than merely fighting the pirates at sea. We shall return to this later. This is not to say that the military side is not important, but there are, indeed, other and more pressing concerns that are driving this agenda. The most important one - and the one that defines most other issues- is, as always, economics . The question is whether the Europe's economic troubles will also offer some unexpected opportunities for the CSDP. The Crisis of the Eurozone and the CSDP First of all, the economic trouble that Europe is facing today is probably nothing compared to what will be the shape of things to come. As a result, defence spending will have to go down, the CSDP will suffer for it, and so will NATO. However, taking a look at the numbers, this should not really be of too much concern: European states still spend more than 200 billion USD per year on defence more than double the amount of China. The well-known problem is that only a limited share of these forces is deployable internationally, while effective spending is hampered by unnecessary (and necessary) duplication of capabilities. The solution, as held by most security and defence policy analysts today, lies in more integration by way of "pooling and sharing" of capabilities, and more role specialization amongst the European states. The bad news is that even if Europe manages to turn the situation around and start spending smarter, the economic outlook for the next 20 years suggests that Europe may only be able to slow down the inevitable decline. The good news is that, largely because of the economic crisis, there is a growing political momentum for more military collaboration, as reflected in both the NATO initiative on "smart defence" (see NATO2010), and in the EU's so-called Ghent

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framework for "pooling and sharing" of military capabilities (Germany/Sweden 2010). The problem is that what makes obvious sense to experts and commentators looks very different to national defence ministers. Collaboration takes years to yield rewards, and may initially cost more than it saves. It also carries real political risk, insofar as politicians and journalists will often accuse policymakers of undermining national sovereignty. Europe knows it will have to spend smarter, but it is a slow train coming. Smart defence spending - even smart defence cutting, whereby European states at least do not cut the same capabilities - will not come about without stronger incentives. One of the strongest incentives out there is the forces of the market, a field in which the EU undoubtedly has considerable experience, but which so far has not included the European defence industry. However, in 2009, the EU adopted the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 81EC. With this decision, the European Commission moved Europe an important step towards free a defence equipment market. The last time the EU tried something similar, ten years ago, the proposal was resolutely revoked. Something has apparently changed. Over these last ten years, the EU has worked as a catalyst for a normative shift away from the once so strong idea of protecting national defence industries, notably through the European Defence Agency (EDA). We are now starting to see how the legitimacy of this idea is losing out to a "consolidate or perish" line of argument, which is only getting stronger as the crisis of the Eurozone drags out. This putative change away from a state focus to a European focus on security and defence is arguably more significant in the long run than the more symbolic issues that the CSDP has been about so far - perhaps also more significant than NATO's "smart defence" initiative, which lacks the incentives of the market. The market is what the EU does best. But as with previous contested areas that have been moved into the single European market, the Commission will have to rely on slowly building up case law before the directive will have any major impact on state procurement practices. This will take some time. The danger is that, in the meantime, other aspects of the CSDP are being toned down. One aspect is the relative slump in EU operational activities. Apart from operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, the EU is not deploying military forces to talk about anywhere at the moment. At the same time, the EU is focusing more on internal security. So far, the CSDP has been about external security, but the so-called "solidarity clause" (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, article 222), which was incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty, does open for the deployment of forces in other European countries in case of man-made or natural disasters. Border guards for other member states have already been involved in guarding Greek borders against illegal immigration as part of operation Rabbit. Although we are still some way away from a "fortress Europe," it may be that serious cutbacks in some countries' military capabilities will necessitate more exchange of armed forces inside Europe too. This could be unfortunate from a burden-sharing point of view, especially in light of similar tendencies within NATO, which is also rolling back its out-of-area engagements.

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CSDP Operations However, it is important to note the fact that the EU remains active in places like the Balkans, and Africa in particular. It is just that the role of the military is being toned down. A string of EU military operations in the Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic during the 2000s was by many expected to be the shape of things to come (Ulriksen, Gourlay et al. 2004). Instead it proved to be a short-lived trend (See Norheim-Martinsen 2011). However, the EU's presence in Africa has not come to an end but rather matured towards a heavier focus on civilian capabilities and local capacity building. This move towards a heavier civilian focus is probably a good thing. So far, the CSDP has been too much about the military side. It has made it look too much like a light version of NATO, as illustrated in recurring concerns about duplication, not least from the US side. But as mentioned above, the problem is that that the EU is constantly drawn into a discourse where military robustness in itself is treated as the only or most important benchmark for success. This became obvious with the situation in Libya, where the EU was criticized for not doing anything. Well, it did do something - it launched the Frontex Joint Operation Hermes to assist the Italians in coping with the inflow of refugees, and the emergency instruments deployed under the Commission's civil protection and humanitarian assistance mechanisms. By focusing on civilian instruments for crisis management the EU arguably played up to its strength, but in the end it received little praise for its efforts. Part of the problem was that people like Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and others, as so often in the past, were raising expectations and making promises that the EU could not keep. Washington, on the other hand, was solely focusing on the six NATO countries (including Norway) that contributed to the bombing campaign, failing to recognize that others, with the EU at the forefront, also made an effort. Neither approach is very helpful. There is no reason to expect nor encourage large scale military operations from the EU in the future. There are two reasons for this: First, it cannot afford it. Second, and more importantly, there is little support for it amongst the member states, Germany in particular. Rather, developments in the EU's activities in Africa, points towards an emerging burden-sharing pattern between the EU, NATO, the UN and regional organizations, such as the AU and ECOWAS, in a strategically important region for both Europe and the US. Within this emerging pattern, the EU is finally starting to carve a role for itself more in line with member states' - Germany in particular preferences, and the EU's track record as a predominantly civilian actor. Despite the fact that states like France have been reluctant to formalise any such burden-sharing arrangements, it is already unfolding in Africa. Hence, instead of constantly returning to the military aspects of the CSDP, one should start focusing on the EU's comprehensive efforts in places like Somalia and Mali, where the EU has an important role to play in the conceptual space in between 'hard' peacekeeping and long-term development. It can fill this role by typically combining: (i) non-executive, low cost military training missions, either alone or by supporting organizations like the African Union (AU), as it has in Somalia, where the AU carries out

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the peacekeeping through AMISOM with financial support of the EU, while the EU trains Somali security and police forces through its training mission (EUTM) in Uganda; (ii) with building local capacity, as it has through EUCAP NESTOR in Somalia, which has focused on improving rule of law and maritime capacity in coastal areas; (iii) yet sending in troops in short executive missions when needed, such as in Atalanta or the Congo in 2003; (iv) but leaving it to the French to intervene unilaterally, or with NATO, when rapid action is needed. That way, the EU can become a useful partner to the US and NATO, insofar as its approach corresponds with what seems to be a turn to more proxy thinking in the US these days, and plays up to the EU's key strengths. This will, in turn, distinguish it from NATO, while capitalizing on the EU's legitimacy as originally a project for peace - for which it also got, and deserved, the Nobel Peace Prize for 2012. References Germany/Sweden (2010). Pooling and sharing, German-Swedish initiative. Berlin and Stockholm, Food for thought paper. 10 February. James, A. D. (2006). "The Transatlantic Defence R&D Gap: Causes, Consequences and Controversies." Defence and Peace Economics 17(3): 223-238. Kurowska, X. (2009). The Role of ESDP Operations. European Security and Defence Policy. An Implementation Perspective. M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite. London, Routledge: 25-42. NATO (2010). Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Adopted by the Heads of State and Government, Lisbon, 19 November. Norheim-Martinsen, P. M. (2011). "Our Work Here is Done: European Union Peacekeeping in Africa." African Security Review 20(2): 17-28. Norheim-Martinsen, P. M. (2012). The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Ulriksen, 5., C. Gourlay and C. Mace (2004). "Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?" International Peacekeeping 11(3): 508-525.

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Whither NATO? The Future of Burden Sharing in the Transatlantic Partnership

Karl-Heinz Kamp

Even if it is true that - as a journalist once put it - "Political Scientists are Lousy Forecasters,"1 predictions on NATO's future in ten or fifteen years' time have always been in vogue. A prominent example was the experts' report on "NATO 2020", which was drafted in connection with the formulation of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept in 2010.2 This new strategy, approved by NATO's heads of states and government at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, was supposed to determine NATO's roles and missions for the decade to come. Though the Strategic Concept still seems fairly recent, the question of the Alliance's roles and missions has in the meantime made it on to the agenda again. Since Lisbon, a number of fundamental changes to the international security landscape have occurred and raised questions concerning some of the assumptions NATO based its new strategy upon. The Alliance is shaken by one of the most severe international financial crises in history, it is affected by a major upheaval in the Arab World, and it has even fought a war in Libya. A fresh look at NATO's future might therefore be appropriate. To answer the question of where NATO is likely to be five or ten years from now, and whether the transatlantic link will remain a stable one, three steps need to be taken. The first will be to identify those factors crucially affecting NATO's further evolution - some of which can even be seen as "game changers" on the international security landscape. Second, the paper will analyse some of the consequences of these developments for NATO. The third step will be to examine the issue of burden sharing and the question of how to foster the Euro-Atlantic security relationship. Trends and Developments Among the vast number of security policy developments, eight seem particularly noteworthy, since they entail considerable potential for transatlantic friction and/or are largely underrepresented in the debates on NATO's future. The first trend or development that will significantly affect NATO in the coming years is the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Alliance members have been fighting on the Hindu Kush for more than twice the duration of the Second World War. Their national defence planning, a major part of their threat perceptions and many decisions on the procurement of military equipment have been strongly geared to Afghanistan. NATO's partnership policy, meaning its build-up of a network of countries which cannot - or do not want to - become members but support NATO's activities, has also been determined to a considerable extent by the requirements in Afghanistan. Ending its largest ever

1 The title of an Editorial by Jacqueline Stevens in the New York Times, June 23, 2012. 2 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendation of the Group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO, Brussels, May 2010.

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combat mission is therefore bound to have a profound impact on the Alliance's strategic direction: NATO after 2014 will look different from the Alliance as it has evolved since the 9/11 attacks - probably not fundamentally, but significantly. The second key development is the fact that the transatlantic community is experiencing a financial crisis which - particularly with respect to Europe - differs in at least three ways from economic recessions of the past. First, it is unique in its order of magnitude. Second, this crisis is different in that it has even hit NATO's "big spenders", those members who in the past were able to continue investing significantly in their armed forces even during periods of economic downturn. Third, the current crisis is not predictable in its duration. Indeed, for the problem countries in the south of Europe it might take decades until balanced national budgets can be achieved. Some are already speaking about the need to face a new "Thirty Years' War". For the United States too, the financial problems are severe. However, favourable demographic conditions (higher birth rate, lower average age, immigration) should enable the US to bottom out more rapidly. In many European countries, though, ageing societies, neglected structural reform of the welfare state and accumulated debts add up to a severe obstruction to economic growth. As a result, despite political rhetoric, there is not the slightest chance for higher defence expenditures in any major NATO member state. Deep cuts in NATO's military capabilities will be inevitable. A third, particularly worrisome tendency stemming from the financial crisis is the danger of regional instability within NATO itself. Drastic austerity measures in those countries which have so far lived beyond their means might destabilize entire societies and render states ungovernable. The current outburst of violence and chaos in Greece could merely prove the harbinger for other countries in the south of Europe. Irrespective of whether mass unemployment and lack of prospects (particularly among the young) are self-inflicted or not, they will determine daily life in these regions. It is highly unlikely that electors will consistently vote as reason dictates and accept that policies must focus on the objective needs of economic recovery. Instead, nationalist or xenophobic movements will probably gain ground - again, Greece can be seen as a precursor. Ideologists with simple answers for complex questions will come to the fore, looking for scapegoats outside their own countries on whom they can conveniently blame self-inflicted problems. As a result, domestic violence could spread over national borders, leading to regional crises and tensions among neighbours. The danger of a "Balkanization" of southern Europe might not be an overstatement, given that for the time being many austerity measures have merely been announced or approved but their full implementation has still to come. Fourth, a looming challenge for transatlantic relations is posed by developments in the Arab world. Notwithstanding NATO's successful Libya operation, the entire MENA region (Middle East and Northern Africa) remains highly volatile. Even if what has been called the "Arab Spring" increasingly seems to be turning into an "Islamic Winter" in which religious dogmatism and societal deadlock prevail, developments have far from run their course. Further uprisings or violent protest will surely occur. Despite the already mentioned risk-consciousness of military decision-makers, Libya has set a

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precedent. Thus, the public in many NATO countries might cause political pressure by demanding military action in response to media exposure of unrestrained cruelty against civilians. In such cases the Alliance will always be confronted with the painful debate about whether and when an intervention would be prudent, and who is going to contribute to such a mission. Geographically linked to events in the Arab world is a fifth problematic development for the transatlantic community, namely Iran's effort to develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran could strain transatlantic cohesion in four ways. First, it would revitalize the debate in NATO on the future role of nuclear weapons and the credibility of US deterrence commitments for European members of the Alliance. Ideas of nuclear reductions championed in some NATO capitals might come to a halt. Second, should Washington take, support or endorse military action to prevent Iran from going nuclear, a fierce and divisive debate within NATO on the legitimacy of such a step is likely to follow. Third, given that Iran shares a border with Turkey, any severe crisis could escalate to an Article 5 case, challenging the Alliance with sharp controversy about commitments and contributions. Fourth, even a non-Article 5 escalation, for instance in the event of Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz, would confront NATO with painful decisions on how to react collectively to such a vital threat. The sixth major trend to highlight is Washington's frequently mentioned "pivot" towards the Asia-Pacific region. Despite its prominence, this trend seems less worrisome for the Euro-Atlantic community. The shift of US attention away from Europe does not devalue the American engagement in NATO, but is a logical consequence of the geostrategic changes of recent years. The list of unfinished business in Europe has become constantly smaller, whereas the rise of China and India requires a stronger US presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Most NATO members understand this need and appreciate that Europe remains the largest stationing ground for US forces abroad. Still, the American shift will be accompanied by less US enthusiasm for European affairs and a stronger concentration on domestic issues - something the Alliance will have to cope with. Despite a number of symbolic resets, a seventh trend confronting the Alliance is a constant worsening of the NATO-Russia relationship. Missile defence cooperation remains controversial because of irreconcilable positions on both sides. NATO's Eastern member states still harbor concerns about Russia. In turn, Moscow's often harsh words and behaviour vis-a-vis its neighbours or former allies are hardly likely to alleviate historical worries about Russia. On the international scene, particularly in the MENA region, Russia has lost much of its former influence and seems to be limiting its policy to sheer obstructionism. Most importantly, with regard to its economic, military and societal modernization, Russia has lost ground and is currently occupying an international position lagging well behind its pretensions of being at eye level with NATO. As the gap between aspirations and realities in Russia is likely to widen, the leadership in Moscow might feel tempted to compensate what seems to be a hidden inferiority complex by showing even more confrontational behaviour vis-a-vis NATO. This would spark recurrent debates in NATO about who is to blame for having lost constructive contact with Russia, and how to bring Moscow back towards a more

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cooperative attitude. Eighth, there seem to be almost radical developments in the energy sector. Even if the so-called "shale gas revolution" proves to be at least partly based on hype, the impact of the availability of unconventional sources of energy (shale gas, oil sands) will have a profound impact on international politics. North America is on its way to self-sufficiency with regard to oil and gas – US companies have to pay only a third as much for electricity as their European competitors. Israel will move from 100 percent dependency on energy imports to 70 percent self-supply. China, India and Ukraine will exploit their shale gas resources, even if the ecological consequences are still not fully predictable. Western European countries will follow as soon as ecologically acceptable technologies are available. These developments will have grave consequences for current gas suppliers like Russia or the Gulf countries. They will certainly remain capable of selling their oil and gas for acceptable prices on the international energy markets - not least because of the rising energy demand in Asia. However, the international influence they command as a result of being able to use energy as a means for intimidation or even blackmail will be significantly reduced. The Impact on NATO These eight trends will influence NATO in various ways and are likely to lead to three consequences for the Alliance - not all of them negative. One outcome will be that NATO will have to face austerity. Given the budget cuts in all NATO countries and associated trends like the sequestration in the United States, there is no alternative to severe military downsizing. NATO a decade from now will have significantly fewer standing military forces and far more reserves. Hopefully, the Alliance will manage to keep small but efficient rapidly deployable forces for quick interventions, like the NATO Response Force (NRF). More cooperation and rationalization among Alliance members might help to alleviate the consequences of shrinking defence budgets - NATO's efforts in this direction are known as "Smart Defence". However, initiatives towards pooling and sharing of scarce resources will not make up the shortfall in funds as a result of cuts. Thus, the idea of doing "more with less", as some optimists have put it, will prove to be an illusion. Instead, NATO will do "less with less," which points to the need for cuts in military capabilities to be implemented in a coordinated way. Currently, each Alliance member decides on its own cuts without taking the reductions of other member states into account. Unless NATO manages to achieve a more synchronized approach, it could lose crucial military capacities simply because no one thought of keeping them up. In addition to NATO's "Smart Defence" approach, there is the urgent need for a "Smart Reductions" initiative so as to ensure that, after the cuts, the sum of all remaining capabilities will add up to an effective military force. A second consequence of some of the trends mentioned above will be that NATO's military leaders are likely to become even more risk-conscious when it comes to military operations going beyond self-defence or the preservation of vital interests. In the light of shrinking budgets and the experience in recent operations from Afghanistan to Libya, they might advise against military interventions to protect civilians or to stabilize

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regions outside of Europe when asked by their political masters to assess future actions. As a result, the hierarchy of NATO's three core missions codified in the new Strategic Concept - 1. self-defence, 2. crisis management, 3. Cooperative security/partnership - will change. Military crisis management will fall behind, whereas partnership will become even more important. Partnerships can, at least conceptually, help avoid interventions in two ways. Close cooperation with partner countries might defuse smouldering crises in the regions concerned. Moreover, the training of partner countries' forces can enable regional actors to take security and stability into their own hands. Thirdly, the overall tendency towards shrinking defence budgets might even have a positive impact on the Alliance in the sense that NATO's classic function - executing swift and decisive military action together with others - is likely to increase in importance. Since the impact of austerity extends for the first time to the "big spenders" in NATO, a key consequence will be that no NATO ally - with the sole exception of the United States - will any longer be able to execute significant military operations on its own. Should there be a need to use military force, France, the UK and others will face the alternative of either acting in the framework of NATO or not acting militarily at all. Even a coalition of the willing, composed of NATO and non-NATO countries, will hardly be able to execute a major military intervention without recourse to NATO, and thus ultimately to US military capabilities. This will mean that NATO will increasingly assume the function of the "enabler" or "facilitator" for common military action outside the Alliance's geographical borders and beyond Article 5 missions, even if the general appetite for military crisis management is on the decline. Playing an enabler role of this sort will certainly increase the relevance of NATO, but it also highlights the need to keep up interoperability among NATO's military forces in a post-Afghanistan world in which NATO combat troops will no longer be working together on a daily basis. Redefining the Burden Sharing Debate Shrinking budgets, changing priorities of member states and major international developments on both sides of the Atlantic will affect not only NATO as an institution, but also the transatlantic link in its entirety - particularly with regard to the issue of burden sharing. The question of how to distribute costs and benefits of the Euro-Atlantic security relationship is an issue that has troubled NATO since its foundation more than six decades ago, mostly with the United States complaining about the alleged unwillingness of the European members to contribute their fair share to the common effort for security and stability. One of the more recent examples was the June 2011 farewell speech of the outgoing US secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, in Brussels.3 In a passionate address, he lamented that only a handful of NATO members fulfill the agreed obligation to spend at least two percent of gross domestic product (GOP) on defence. He also indicated that the US might no longer be willing to accept the current situation, in which Washington accounts for 75 percent of the total defence budgets for all NATO states as a whole, whereas the other 27 allies make up the remaining 25 percent.

3 Robert M. Gates, The Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, June 10,2011, http://www .defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581

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Catchy as this kind of number crunching and "two percent bashing" might be in public discourse, it is of limited value for purposes of assessing fairness and contributions within an Alliance. If the two percent rule were the key criterion for the survival of NATO, then the prospects for the Alliance's future would be bleak. In the light of the financial situation in all NATO countries, there is not the slightest chance for an increase of defence spending in order to reach this mark. In addition, the fact that Greece, for instance, is one of the few NATO members clearing the two percent hurdle does not say much about Greece's commitment to NATO, but has much more to do with threat perceptions in Athens. It is also worth mentioning that the ratio of the US defence budget to the aggregate defence budgets of all other NATO states was always around two thirds to one third and that, as mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph, the gap has in recent years become even larger. This is because the US, as the only remaining superpower, has to have a truly global security horizon (and a global military presence), while NATO covers only part of the world. With respect to the three NATO budgets (civil, military, infrastructure) the distribution looks much more appropriate: in each case, Washington provides about 22 percent. Notwithstanding its attractiveness for public discourse, the entire debate about NATO's financial burden sharing seems futile. Nations join an alliance not for altruistic reasons, but to serve their interests. Europe and North America invest in NATO not to please each other, but because the benefits outweigh the investments. NATO was founded and kept up during the Cold War, because it was mutually advantageous to those on both sides of the Atlantic. The US provided protection FOR Europe, whereas the European allies in turn provided Washington with influence IN Europe. Such a transatlantic bargain still exists today, in a slightly different manner. Through NATO, the US guarantees its influence in Europe - a continent which is stable, prosperous, benign and, above all, politically likeminded. No other region in the world combines these attributes in a similar manner, and no other continent offers the US such a strong voice in its own affairs. Moreover, the European NATO members, all committed to the transatlantic ideal and all firm democracies, can provide political legitimacy to military actions conducted by the US beyond its own borders. Lastly, Europe remains a logistical hub for US global military operations. Europe, in turn, benefits from the transatlantic security partnership in at least three respects. The US still provides military protection (with conventional as well as nuclear forces) - a benefit which is of tremendous importance for many Eastern European NATO members. In addition, the US protects the global commons, for instance sea lines of communication or unlimited access to air and space. Thirdly, the US functions as a global power and stabilizes regions which are important for the European allies. Thus, for both sides of the Atlantic, membership of NATO means benefit sharing rather than burden sharing. However, benefit sharing implies that both sides of Atlantic must stick to their Alliance obligations. In that sense, taking part in common efforts, committing forces to common operations and accepting casualties is far more important than meeting formal criteria on defence budgets or force numbers. At this point, Europe has to be prepared for the possibility that the US might indeed

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reduce its engagement in NATO - not to weaken the transatlantic link, but to focus on other regions (Asia/Pacific) which are of relevance for the entire Euro-Atlantic community. Europe will have to take on greater responsibility for its own security and for that of adjacent areas. This would disburden the United States and would enable the only remaining superpower to demonstrate that it is present in regions which are of equal interest to Europe, but too distant for most of the European NATO members to play an active military role there. Washington has already indicated how such a redefinition of the transatlantic bargain could look. Thus, in all wars of need (i.e. the defence of the territory and of NATO's vital interests), the US will stand firmly at the side of its European allies. In other words, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is guaranteed. On the other hand, in all wars of choice (crisis management operations in the European vicinity), Washington reserves the right to decide individually whether an engagement would serve US interests and the answer might be negative. Should this be the case, the onus would be on the Europeans to lead a military mission - for instance, in Northern Africa or in the Middle East. The Libyan war could be seen as a model for a new bargain along these lines: Europe took the lead there, whereas the United States gave crucial but limited support. By doing so, Washington remained committed to NATO, but for a much lower price than in other operations. The cost of the US support for the seven-month-long Libya operation was equal to the cost of keeping the American forces in Afghanistan for a week. The call for Europe to do more towards addressing its military requirements in its vicinity is certainly not new, and has often been ignored. How likely is it, therefore, that Europe will get its act together to lead in the next contingency and that the US will decide to take a back seat? The answer seems rather simple: if Washington becomes earnest about no longer bailing out its European allies (be it in the Balkans or elsewhere), Europe will be bound to act on its own. If it does not, no military action will take place and Europe will have to live with the consequences of accepting a passive role. Libya and Mali - whether one assesses these missions as successful or not - indicate that most European allies have understood that this is the new reality of the post-Afghanistan age.

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Appendix A: Biographies

Major General Peter C. Bayer Jr. Major General Peter C. Bayer, Jr. was commissioned a Lieutenant of Armor in 1984 after graduation from Lehigh University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Marketing. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Germany and the Middle East and is currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy, Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation, NATO. His staff assignments include Observer Controller on the Armor (Cobra) Task Force Training Team at the National Training Center; 1st Brigade 1st Cavalry Division S3 and 1st Cavalry Division Deputy G3 at Ft. Hood; Plans Officer for the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; 3rd Infantry Division G3 during Operation Iraqi Freedom; Chief of Staff Multi-National Force Northwest during Operation Iraqi Freedom; Executive Officer to the Commanding General TRADOC; Deputy Commanding General and Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Armor Center and Ft. Knox; Chief of Staff I Corps and Ft. Lewis and Chief of Staff Multi-National Corps Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of StaffG3/5/7, Headquarters Department of the Army. Dr. Simon Serfaty Simon Serfaty is the first holder of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at CSIS. He was the director of the CSIS Europe Program for more than 10 years and remains a senior adviser to the program. Dr. Serfaty is also a senior professor of U.S. foreign policy with the Graduate Programs in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. From 1972 to 1993, he was a research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., serving as director of the Johns Hopkins Center of European Studies in Bologna, Italy (1972-1976), director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (1978-1980), and executive director of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute (1984-1991). A naturalized U.S. citizen since 1965, Dr. Serfaty holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Johns Hopkins University. In May 2001, Old Dominion University designated him as eminent scholar of the university. Dr. Serfaty was made a Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur (Knight of the French Legion of Honor) in July 2008. Dr. Celeste A. Wallander Celeste A. Wallander is an American international relations expert with a focus on Russia. Wallander is currently an associate professor at the School of International Service at American University. Wallander is an expert on Russian and Eurasian foreign and security policy and served from May 2009 - July 2012 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Wallander was an adviser to Barack Obama during the 2008 Democratic primary campaign.

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Wallander received her B.A. summa cum laude in political science from Northwestern University in 1983. She received her M.A. (1985), M.Phil. (1986) and Ph.D. (1990) degrees in political science from Yale University. Wallander was previously a professor of government at Harvard University (1989-2000), senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (2000-2001), director and senior fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001-2006), and visiting professor at Georgetown University (2006-2008). Wallander founded the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security and the Eurasian Strategy Project. Dr. Per M. Norheim-Martinsen Dr. Per M. Norheim-Martinsen is a senior researcher at the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Oslo, where he heads the research program on Conflict and Belonging. He has a PhD from Cambridge University and is a former officer of the Norwegian Army, having served in UNIFIL/Lebanon. Norheim-Martinsen has published extensively on issues of European security and international peace operations. His most recent publication is the "The European Union and Military Force" (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp is the Director of the Research Division of NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. He studied History and Political Sciences at the Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn and he holds a Ph.D. from the University of the German Armed Forces, Hamburg with a dissertation on NATO's nuclear planning procedures. In 1986 he became a Volkswagen Fellow for research on security policy at the German Council of Foreign Affairs (DGAP). In 1988 he was a research fellow with the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA), John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA. In September 1988 he joined the Research Institute of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bonn. From 1992 to 2000, he was Head of the Foreign and Security Policy Research Section of the Foundation and from 2000 to 2003 he directed its International Planning Staff. In 2003 he became the Security Policy Coordinator of the Foundation in Berlin and in November 2007 he joined the NATO Defense College.

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Appendix B: Evaluation Results: Transatlantic Security Seminar, April 2013 Participants were asked to give feedback regarding the Transatlantic Security Seminar. The event took place in April of 2013 and there were a total of forty-two respondents who completed the evaluation survey. The evaluation was administered immediately following the seminar and respondents were asked a variety of questions regarding what they thought about the quality of the seminar. Additionally, respondents were asked to answer some basic demographic questions. Respondents were asked to rate the quality of the two initial speakers, keynote speaker Major General Peter C. Bayer, Jr. and Dr. Celeste Wallander. The feedback for the two initial speakers was very positive almost everyone that responded to the survey stated they thought the speakers were either “good” or “excellent.”

Speaker

Excellent/Good %

(n)

Major General Peter C. Bayer, Jr. (Keynote)

95.2% (40)

Dr. Celeste Wallander 100% (42)

The next several questions addressed the roundtable discussion that followed the first two speakers. Overall, the responses were very positive towards the roundtable discussion portion of the seminar.

Survey Item

Excellent/Good %

(n)

How would you rate the quality of the speakers?

90.5% (38)

How would you rate the quality of the information shared?

88.1% (37)

How would you rate the quality of the question and answer/discussion during the panel?

83.3% (35)

The next section asked respondents to respond to a series of statements with “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” to various aspects of the seminar. Overall, the responses were extremely positive with the majority of respondents selecting either “strongly agree” or “agree” to every statement. All respondents agreed that they would recommend similar events to others.

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Survey Item

Strongly Agree/Agree

% (n)

The information presented during this event was relevant to my occupation or are of study.

92.9% (39)

The speakers presented their information in an understandable way.

97.6% (41)

I have an increased understanding of transatlantic security as a result of this event.

97.6% (41)

I would recommend similar events regarding transatlantic security to others.

100% (42)

Overall, this event met my expectations. 97.6% (41)

The evaluation asked respondents how they planned to use the information from the seminar in the future. A large percentage (85.7%) of respondents indicated that they would share the information from this event with colleagues. Another 26.2% indicated that they would share the information with students. It should be noted that this seminar had a significantly lower number of educators attending compared to the Globalization workshop held in February due to subject matter. In addition, 21.4 of respondents stated that they would network with other participants and/or speakers and 4.8% indicated that they would use the information in some other way. Only one respondent (2.4%) stated that they would not use the information from the seminar in any way.

Survey Item

% Yes (n)

Will discuss and share with colleagues

85.7% (36)

Will discuss and share with my students

26.2% (11)

Will network with other participants and/or speakers

21.4% (9)

Will use the information in some other way

4.8% (2)

Don’t plan to use the information from this event

2.4% (1)

There was an almost even split between military (42.9%) and non-military (57.1%) in attendance for this seminar. Of those who were military, half indicated that they were

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LTC (lieutenant colonel). Additionally, 40.5% of the respondents were ODU students and 7.1% were ODU faculty/staff.

Are you military? % (n)

Yes 42.9% (18)

No 57.1% (24)

Slightly over half of respondents (57.1%) indicated that they live in Norfolk. Another 28.6% stated that they live in Virginia Beach. The remaining respondents were from Chesapeake, Hampton, Suffolk, and New York. The majority of respondents were male (73.8%) and the average age of respondents was 42.6.

In which city do you live?

% (n)

Norfolk 57.1% (24)

Virginia Beach 28.6% (12)

Chesapeake 4.8% (2)

Hampton 4.8% (2)

Suffolk 2.4% (1)

New York 2.4% (1)

Demographics Male 73.8%

(31) Female 23.8%

(10) Mean Age 42.6 years

Summary Overall, the majority of respondents expressed pleasure with the seminar and indicated that they were satisfied with the overall experience. Many expressed that they would be able to use the information they learned at the seminar in some manner in the future. Below are some additional comments that were made about the seminar:

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“Great seminar!” “I recommend to extend invitation to more people (in particular students and young professionals)” “I would recommend a full day event, to offer enough time for conducting such interesting and informative debates!” “Need ways to discuss capability requirements.” “Excellent opportunity to interact with the military community in the Hampton Roads area.” “Still the core question, “What defines transatlantic link” needs to be answered.” “Superb – great collection of experts and perspectives.”