17
Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Tranching and RatingBrennan, Hein, and Poon

Comments byMark Flannery

Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Page 2: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Motivation

Many CDOsLarge majority were “arbitrage” issuances,

inconsistent with arbitrage-free asset pricing.Why?

Moreover, bond CDOs had many tranches.Why?

E.g., could manufacture AAA tranches with only one subordinated tranche.

2

Page 3: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Hypothesis: Some Investors Mis-value Complex Securities

• Sophisticated investors properly price corporate bonds.

• Naïve investors price complex securities according to ratings.

Selling securities to naïve investors should permit profits.

Paper shows how those profits depend on multiple tranches.

3

Page 4: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Hypothesized Security Pricing

• Ratings-based investors consider– Possible cash flows– Physical probabilities (pi)

• “True” security value depends on – (Possible cash flows)*(state prices)– “risk-neutral probabilities” (qi)

4

Page 5: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Sources of CDO Mis-valuation

1) Bonds default in high-value states (if β > 0)

2) Bond’s cash flows have high variance relative to “reference” bond the rating agency has in mind.

5

Page 6: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Firm’s Asset Value DistributionProbabilities

Vmax

Physical probabilities

V~

6

Page 7: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Positive Beta and State PricesProbabilities

Vmax

Physical probabilities

Risk neutral probabilities

V~

7

Page 8: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Mispricing Cash-flows’ Beta

V~

maxV

Bond Payoffs ($)

F8

Page 9: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Mispricing Cash-flows’ Beta

V~

maxV

Bond Payoffs ($)

F

Credit Risk Premium, physical probabilities

“Rf”

9

Page 10: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Β > 0 Promise higher repayment

V~

maxVF F’10

Page 11: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Asset Variance and Default LossesProbabilities

V~

PD=5% PD=5%

“A” rated Bond repayment, LOW variance. “A” rated Bond

repayment, HIGH variance.

11

Page 12: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

V~

maxV

Bond Payoffs ($)

F

Rf

Reference Bond

Risk Premium on a Reference Bond’s Volatility

12

Page 13: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

V~

maxVF F’

Mispricing Asset Return Variance

13

Page 14: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Issues: #1

Model provides a hypothesis that is consistent with multiple tranches.

Is it consistent with the data? Were the bonds selected for CDOs

1. Higher beta?2. Higher asset volatility?3. Correlated with one another?

14

Page 15: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Issue #2

Can other hypotheses generate same prediction re: multiple junior tranches?

E.g. knowing investors purchased these tranches as a way to write out-of-the money puts. – Hence “earn alpha”– Hence earn asymmetric hedge fund fees

15

Page 16: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Issue #3

What to do about rating agencies?• Credibility may be slightly damaged (!)• Some evidence of poor “care” on CDO ratings,

at least for subprime mortgage pools.• Fairly extensive government/regulatory

reliance on these private firms.• Help set new standards, that reflect cross-

security distinctions?

16

Page 17: Tranching and Rating Brennan, Hein, and Poon Comments by Mark Flannery Financial Innovations and Crises, May 11-13, 2009

Issue #4

Returning to the model here: can it be applied to corporate debt structures?

Higher beta or volatility assets support more complex debt structures?

Or, with unbiased information asymmetries, does higher volatility generate a greater range of selected debt structures?

17