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8/8/2019 Trainees Report
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SUMMER TRAININGReport
Sumitted by:Amar Sood , 3rd semester, M. Planning, Dept of Urban Planning.
ABOUT GFDRGLOBAL FORUM FOR DISASTER REDUCTION (GFDR) is dedicated to the promotion of
sustainable disaster reduction through a synergy of knowledge and skills. It endeavours to be a
platform for collating knowledge and information and its dissemination to the society. The USP ofGFDR is the creation of a vital, extensive and comprehensive data base, updated constantly to
accelerate the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation towards sustainable development.
GFDR aims to create a pool of global knowledge, experience, practices and skills for application
at the local level. Hence the motto, global vision local action.
GFDRs core area of activities would include : providing consultancy regarding incorporation of
disaster management concepts in business plans and creation of a network of professionals to
provide specialized disaster information and training.
WORLD CONFERENCE ON DISASTER REDUCTIONThe First Ever International Conference on Disaster Reduction, focusing on corporate sectors
role and responsibility will be held in India with an objective to connect government agencies,
relief organizations and the corporate world.
The conference focuses on the crucial role the corporate sector could play in mitigating humansuffering wrought by disasters, by effectively collaborating with the government, international and
national relief organizations.
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While disaster reduction is a collective responsibility of the entire society, the corporate sector is
better placed to deal with it than others. The vibrant global corporate sector can play a vital role in
disaster reduction.
The conference will facilitate convergence of the best rains in disaster management from across
the world. Eminent experts with national and international exposure share their knowledge andexperience and present case studies to prove how the world is sitting pretty on a pile of disasters,
utterly unconcerned.
It will launch an exhaustive reference manual-cum-diary of Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) for Disaster Reduction. SOPs will draw from the vast knowledge of the key participants,
professional disaster managers on the latest technology and best practices available in the world
to meet the disasters.
Overall, the conference aims to create awareness about disasters, which come unannounced andhelp the people in their preparedness with the message that prevention is safer and cheaper than
firefighting and to make them proactive rather than reactive.
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CITY PLANNING AND DISASTERS
Role of Corporate Sec tor
1.0 URBAN PLANNING
Definition And Purview
Urban Planning or Town Planning can be defined as:
The art and science of ordering the use of land and the character and citing of buildings and communication
routes so as to secure the maximum practicable degree of economy, convenience and beauty. (Principles and
Practice of Town and Country Planning, Lewis Keeble, 1969).
Urban planning encourages the systematic development of a city. It is a system through which comprehensive
plans that guarantee people a healthy and cultural lifestyle, the rational use of the land and facilities, which form
the city's core, and the development of an orderly urban landscape can be effectively achieved. Specifically,
urban planning deals with, among other things, urbanization zones, zones to be urbanized in a regulatedfashion, land use in zoning areas, roads, parks, sewerage, other urban facilities, land readjustment projects,
urban renewal projects, other urban development enterprises, and district planning to make the best use of an
area's special characteristics in order to develop a favorable urban environment.
When planning for a city, the various dynamics of the city come into play that has to be considered, for they
demand space and infrastructure. These include the major activities of the cities such as trading, administration
etc, the economic centers of the city, and residential areas for the population of the city, physical and social
infrastructure required for the activities and the population and other such elements. Other considerations such
as sustainability, safety, aesthetics etc, are also taken into account.
1.1 RECENT TRENDS IN PLANNING
In an ever-evolving world, the needs of the society and its dynamics are also changing. Hence, the approach to
plan for such societies is also undergoing metamorphosis. Planning, in India, started with the five-year plans
initiated with the central government determining the direction of development. City level master plans first came
into being with the adopting of the Delhi Master Plan of 1962, the aegis of which can be traced to the Interim
General Plan of 1959.
The Master Plan approach was adopted from the British system of planning and basically deals with the spatial
aspects of the city in terms of a landuse plan. The master plans, if implemented properly and timely, are anexcellent tool to achieve planned development of cities and surrounding areas. Plagued with the inadequacies in
the approach and its implementation, newer ways of planning for the city are being adopted. One of them is the
City Development Strategy, which aims towards developing a financial implementation plan. In the overall
planning scenario, some paradigm changes have occurred:
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1. Prescriptive to Proactive planning Planning, from the its beginnings in the five-year plans, was being done
by the higher echelons of the bureaucracy prescribing the direction of growth and development with little or
no contact with the people who were to be affected. The lack of awareness hence, generated a sense of
distrust towards the intentions of the planners, which eventually, along with other factors, led to failure of
many plans. Today, the approach is more towards a participatory nature of planning where the community
and the private sector is involved from the inception to the implementation stage of a plan.2. Long term to Short term planning A major reason of failure of the master plans was the time taken for the
formulation of a master plan and the duration for which a plan was made. The data collection stage took
about 1-3 years, which made the data itself old, and the plan was made for upto 20 years, enough time for a
number of changes to occur to make the plan defunct. The approach has changed from making such long
duration plans to shorter duration plans of upto 5 years.
3. From Top down to Bottom-up approach This is a paradigm change in the planning process that has
occurred only very recently, although the seeds were sown from the first five-year plan. The focus of
planning has changed towards meeting distributional equity growth with justice and improvement in the
quality of life resulting in bottom-up approach. Decentralization, thus involves delegation of decision-makingpowers with corresponding devolution of resources. Decentralization thus helps in a balanced regional
development at one level, as well as helps in removing disparities between regions at the regional level.
Top-down planning, on the other hand, was creating imbalances between regions by concentrating
development in one region or concentrating development initiatives in one sector within a region.
Planning for an urban area hence involves a number of aspects, which are working in the city. It not only deals
with the actual infrastructure on ground, but also with the financial, institutional, administrative, legal and social
aspects.
1.2 CORPORATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN URBAN PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT
Need for Participation
In planning of urban areas, policies are usually made by public bodies while shelter provision has substantial
contributions by the private sector through individual and corporate efforts. The public sector is focused on social
goals of equitable access to land, public health, education and environment whereas the private sector
developers have main goal of expedient urban development as a means of increasing returns on investment.
Furthermore, under the New Economic Policy of India directives based on principles of market economy,
funding from different government bodies to its subordinate organizations will gradually diminish. The only viable
alternative for public bodies is to foster an environment to help develop a more efficient, financially sustainablesystem for urban development with basic services.
Thus, under the model for Public-Private Partnership, the strengths of public and private sectors would
be combined so that each ones strength off-sets the weakness of the other to meet development requirements.
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Public Private Partnership models
A Public-Private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a public agency (central, state or local) and for-
profit corporation. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in
delivering a service or facility for the use of general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party
shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility.
- Partnerships are means to increase the availability of financial, human and technical resources.
- The partnership involves mutual commitment for mutual benefits.
In this, role of public and private sector actors is clearly defined. This could be in form of public agencies
restricting their role by supply of land, provision of infrastructure, facilities and handling over the developed land
to private developers under stipulated terms and conditions and private sector on their part, providing requisite
on-site infrastructure along with development of built spaces for different uses. Public-Private partnership can
happen through varying degree of participation at various stages of plan preparation, implementation and
monitoring of the project. These partnership models can be described as follows:
(i) Build / Operate / Transfer (BOT) or Build / Transfer / Operate (BTO)
The private partner builds a facility to the specifications agreed to by the public agency, operates the facility for aspecified time period under a contract or franchise agreement with the agency, and then transfers the facility to
the agency at the end of the specified period of time. In most cases, the private partner will provide some, or an,
of the financing for the facility, so the length of the contract or franchise must be sufficient to enable the private
partner to realize a reasonable return on his investment through user charges.
At the end of the franchise period, the public partner can assume operating responsibility for the facility,
contract the operations to the original franchise holder, or award a new contract or franchise to a new private
partner. The BTO model is similar to the BOT model except that the transfer to the public owner takes place at
the time that construction is completed, rather than at the end of the franchise period.
(ii) Build Own Operate (BOO)
The contractor constructs and operates a facility without transferring ownership to the public sector. Legal title to
the facility remains n the private sector, and there is no obligation for the public sector to purchase the facility or
take title. A BOO transaction may qualify for a tax-exempt status as a service contract if all Internal Revenue
Code requirements are satisfied.
(iii) Buy Build Operate (BBO)
A BBO is a form of asset sale that includes a rehabilitation or expansion of an existing facility. The government
sells the asset to the private sector entity, which makes the improvements necessary to operate the facility in a
profitable manner.
(iv) Contract Services
(A). OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCEA public partner (central, state, or local government agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to
provide and/or maintain a specific service. Under the private operation and maintenance option, the public
partner retains ownership and overall management of the public facility or system.
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(B) OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE AND MANAGEMENT
A public partner (center, state, or local government agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to
operate, maintain, and manage a facility or system proving a service. Under this contract option, the public
partner retains ownership of the public facility or system, but the private party may invest its own capital in the
facility or system. Any private investment is carefully calculated in relation to its contributions to operational
efficiencies and savings over the term of contract. Generally, the longer the contract term, the greater theopportunity for increased private investment because there is no more time available in which to recoup any
investment and earn a reasonable return. Many local governments use this contractual partnership to provide
wastewater treatment services.
(v) Design Build (DB)
A DB is when the private partner provides both design and construction of a project to the public agency. This
type of partnership can reduce time, save money, provide stronger guarantees and allocate additional project
risk to the private sector. It also reduces conflict by having a single entity responsible to the public owner for the
design and construction. The public sector partner owns the assets and has the responsibility for the operation
and maintenance.(vi) Design Build Maintain (DBM)
A DBM is similar to DB except the maintenance of the facility for some period of time becomes the responsibility
of the private sector partner. The benefits are similar to the DB with maintenance risk being allocated to the
private sector partner and the guarantee expanded to include maintenance. The public sector partner owns and
operates the assets.
(vii) Design Build Operate (DBO)
A single contract is awarded for the design, construction, and operation of a capital improvement. Title to the
facility remains with the public sector unless the project is a design / build / operate / transfer or design / build /
own / operate project. The DBO method of contracting is contrary to the separated and sequential approach
ordinarily used in the United States by both public and private sectors. This method involves one contract for
design with an architect or engineer, followed by a different contract with a builder for project construction,
followed by the owners taking over the project and operating it.
A simple design build approach creates a single point of responsibility for design and construction and can
speed project completion by facilitating the overlap of the design and construction phases of the project. On a
public project, the operation phase is normally handled by the public sector under a separate operations and
maintenance agreement. Combining all three passes into a DBO approach maintains the continuity of private
sector involvement and can facilitate private sector financing of public projects supported by user fees
generated during the operations phase.
(viii) Lease / Develop / Operate (LDO) or Build / Develop / Operate (BDO)Under these partnerships arrangements, the private party leases or buys an existing facility from a public
agency; invests its own capital to renovate, modernize, and/or expand the facility; and then operates it under a
contract with the public agency. A number of different types of municipal transit facilities have been leased and
developed under LDO and BDO arrangements.
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(ix) Lease / Purchase
A lease / purchase is an installment purchase contract. Under this model, the private sector finances and builds
a new facility. The public agency makes scheduled lease payments to the private party. The public agency
accrues equity in the facility with each payment. At the end of the lease term, the public agency owns the facility
or purchases it at the cost of any remaining unpaid balance in the lease.
Under this agreement, the facility may be operated by either the public agency or the private developer duringthe term of the lease. Lease/purchase arrangements have been used by the General Services Administration for
building federal office buildings and by a number of states to build prisons and other correctional facilities.
(x) Turnkey
A public agency contracts with a private investor / vendor to design and build a complete facility in accordance
with specified performance standards and criteria agreed to between the agency and the vendor. The private
developer commits to build the facility for a fixed price and absorbs the construction risk of meeting that price
commitment. Generally, in a turnkey transaction, the private partners use fast-track construction techniques
(such as design-build) and are not bound by traditional public sector procurement regulations. This combination
often enables the private partner to complete the facility in significantly less time and for less cost that could beaccomplished under traditional construction techniques.
In a turnkey transaction, financing and ownership of the facility can rest with either the public or private partner.
For e.g. the public agency might provide the financing, with the attendant costs and risks. Alternatively, the
private party might provide the financing capital, generally in exchange for a long term contract to operate the
facility.
Public Private Partnerships in Urban Planning : India
Successful public-private partnership models are being followed worldwide today in various fields of Urban
Development. In many parts of the world, urban facilities like electricity and power, water supply, roads,
sanitation, etc are being run through contractual agreement between the public and the private enterprises. In
India, though, this concept has gain popularity in the recent past whereby various urban services like roads,
highways and electricity are being successfully implemented by the means of a public-private partnership model.
Flyway, Greater NOIDA
t and very successful example being the construction of the toll plaza near Greater NOIDA. DND Flyway grew o
bridge the growing population of Delhi with its neighbours across the Yamuna.
Today, 30% of Delhi's population lives in the Trans-Yamuna area and there was a need to build a major conn
facility between the areas growing on both sides of the Yamuna. The project has been supported by Indiainternational engineers, contractors, operators and investors. The Flyway, an outcome of innovative technic
financial engineering, has been built with due care for environmental concerns. The Noida Toll Bridge Compa
(NTBCL) has been promoted by Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Ltd. (IL&FS) and New Okhla Ind
Development Authority (NOIDA), as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to develop, construct, operate and maint
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DND Flyway on a Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) basis.
2. Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (RUIDP)
Rajasthan is the largest state of the country (areawise). At the time of its formation the population of the state was
1.60 crores which has now increased to 3 times and has been recorded at 5.65 crores as per the 2001 census.
Out of this a population of 1.32 crores (23.38%) is residing in the urban areas ant the six major cities viz Ajmer,Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota & Udaipur having a combined population of 1.32 crores constitute nearly 40% of
Rajasthan's urban population.
Because of the rapid growth and urbanization, there has been an increased pressure on the urban infrastructure
facilities. Keeping this in view the Government of Rajasthan (GoR) has with the loan assistance from Asian
Development Bank (ADB), taken up Rajasthan Urban Infrastructure Development Project (RUIDP) to provide
integrated quality infrastructural facilities in six divisional headquarters of the State. The GoR has formed RUIDP
and entrusted the works of the infrastructure development in the six cities to RUIDP.
This integrated urban development project, under which assistance is being given to the state of Rajasthan;
helps meet basic human needs by developing urban services for water supply and sanitation, solid waste andwaste water management, and slum and environmental improvements. The project also supports street
improvement and traffic management, and strengthens other civic services required to improve the quality and
safety of urban life. The project provides assistance towards capacity building and community participation at the
state and local levels to support the effective devolution of urban management, taking into account the importance
of good governance. In addition, assistance for Project implementation is provided.
Public participation and coordination is important in various works under the project especially for improvement of
slums, utilization of sewer lines, solid waste management, and reduction of non revenue water, proper
maintenance of assets created in project, cleanliness of places of historical importance and their conservation.
People's participation is ensured by involving NGOs and CBOs in all phases of the project cycle starting from
identification of works, implementation and monitoring. At the same time, full cooperation and support of various
public representatives and State and Central Government departments (e.g. PHED, PWD, IRRIGATION, JDA,
UITs, Dist. administration, FOREST Dept. etc.) has always helped in smooth implementation of activities of the
project.
The project involves high degree of private sector participation in form of the various technical consultants like
Louis Berger Inc., Tata Consulting Engineers, Consulting Engineering Services, Shah Technical Consultants Pvt.
Ltd.
3. Performance Based deferred payment structure (PBDPS)
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Financing Corporation (KUIDFC) is also an urban developmentproject undertaken through a new type of public-private partnership model called the PBDPS. The system has the
following features :
Payments are made only for services that meet desired levels and only on demonstration of meeting
parameters.
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The premise for performance based contracting is to pay only for achieved performance and quality targets.
It involves procurement of service and not of works alone.
Entails transferring risks to private contractors.
Will require major reform in revenue generation and budgeting at ULB level.
The PBDPS model has the following advantages :
Designed to allow developers to utilise their own designs and methodologies to meet contracting agencysservice/performance targets, and to achieve appropriate performance quality levels.
The payments are typically spread over the life of the period of operations, though would be structured to
match developer/contractor to recover capital cost in first few years.
The annuity model of payments, successfully adopted by the National Highways of India (NHAI), in its road
expansion programme is one variant of PBDPS.
Public Private Partnerships in Urban Planning : Global
1. Water and Sanitation Services in Cartagena, Colombia
Facilitated by the recent legislation by the state of Cartegena opening the door to private sector participation, andspurred on by the worsening financial crisis of its wholly-owned company, the Empresa de Servicios Pblicos
Distritales de Cartagena, on 5 March 1994 the municipal council of Cartagena authorised the mayor to close
down the municipal water company and to establish a joint venture in partnership with a private company that had
a reputable experience in the delivery of water supply and sanitation. Following an international tender, the
Spanish water utility, Aguas de Barcelona (AGBAR), was selected as the private sector partner in the new public-
private partnership. Aguas de Cartagena (AGUACAR) was created on 30 December 1994 as a joint venture
between the Municipality of Cartagena and AGBAR. It was the first public-private partnership for the delivery of
basic public services to be created in Colombia.
There has been a noticeable improvement in the delivery of water and sanitation in Cartagena since the
introduction of private sector participation in 1995. When operations began there was a water deficit of 60,000m3
which caused periodic cutoffs in supply. AGUACAR soon eliminated this deficit by reducing the level of
unaccounted for water from 60 per cent in December 195 to 40 per cent by December 1999. The reliability of
water supply rose over the same period from 80 per cent to 99 per cent. AGUACAR carried out $30m in
investment during 1995-1999. Some 260 km of new pipeline was added to the network over the same period,
bringing the total to 700 km. Some 30,000 new connections were made, bringing the total to 95,000. Some
220,000m3 of water is now treated per day and water quality has markedly improved. The number of employees
was reduced from 494 to 262, bringing the employee/connection ratio down to an acceptable level of four
employees per 1,000 connections.
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Key lessons learnt :
The joint venture arrangement confuses the regulatory role of the public sector
The clarity of the regulatory role that the municipality normally exercises under the purchaser-provider split found
in most PPPs is dulled by the joint venture arrangement. This is because the municipality wear two hats. At one
and the same time it is the purchaser (as owner of the assets) and the provider (as a shareholder in the joint
venture).
The absence of a municipal career service calls into question the sustainability of PPPs
The lack of job security and constant rotation of senior and middle-ranking staff within the municipality produces a
structural imbalance within the PPP. The institutional memory of the partnership becomes embodied in the private
partner. This superior knowledge soon translates into a power imbalance within the PPP.
A public-private partnership can exist in the absence of municipal capacity
The Municipality of Cartagena lacks the minimal technical support in its negotiations within the joint venture. To all
intents and purpose it is a sleeping partner. However, by wilfully neglecting capacity building for its ownorganisation, the municipality is running the risk of very negative consequences for the long-term sustainability of
the partnership.
Co-ordination of activities by external regulatory bodies is necessary for municipal capacity building
The question of regulatory co-ordination emerges as a major issue of institutional change. A plethora of regulatory
and supervisory agencies exist for water supply and sanitation - Comisin de Regulacin de Agua Potable y
Saneamiento Bsico(CRA), Superintendencia de Servicios Pblicos(SSP), Contralora Nacionaland Contralora
Departamental. There is a problem of co-ordination, conflict of interest, and overlapping jurisdiction among them.
Furthermore these bodies do not co-ordinate their activities with the municipality, which in turn is required to carry
out its own audit, interventora, of the activities of AGUACAR.
Legal mechanisms for citizen participation are of little use if they are not implemented
Extensive national legislation exists in Colombia to promote citizen participation in local government. But in
Cartagena many of the plethora of institutional mechanisms for safeguarding transparency and defending the
rights of ordinary citizens exist only on paper. The municipality is required to establish a citizen watchdog
committee for monitoring basic public services, including water and sanitation, Comit de Desarrollo y Control
Social. It exists but appears not to function. The municipal-wide Master Plan for the development of the city, Plan
de Ordenamiento Territorial(POT) was drawn up without citizen participation, even though the procedural norms
require such consultation.Skills development in order to combat corruption among municipal authorities emerges as a major concern from
this case study. The anti-corruption strategy being actively pursued with the support of NGOs emphasises the
training of community leaders rather than of the municipal authorities themselves. When asked how the
municipality can be strengthened in its work in favour of the urban poor in the water and sanitation sector, almost
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all community leaders emphasised the need to eradicate political corruption, especially among municipal
councillors. A major task to ensure the success of public-private partnerships is for a massive training program for
community leaders (in the JALs and JACs) who liase between the municipality, AGUACAR and local citizens.
Without such training, community leaders remain very susceptible to manipulation by corrupt municipal
councillors, with deleterious efforts for the partnership as a whole. The same danger applies to the citizen
watchdog committees for monitoring public services.
2. Solid Waste Management partnership in Biratnagar, Nepal
The concept of private sector participation in the delivery of municipal services was introduced to the city of
Biratnagar in the 1997-98 in the solid waste sector. No other municipal public-private partnerships existed or
have been developed since. The partnership itself has progressed from a dubious arrangement on the verge of
collapse, to one where the operator has developed the confidence of the council for the services provided.
Notwithstanding this achievement the partnership is still vulnerable and the municipality has not taken any
significant steps to bring about a sustainable and viable arrangement.
Establishing a Solid Waste Management Partnership
A partnership for integrated solid waste management services in Biratnagar was first discussed in 1996 when an
international businessman proposed to the municipality that they enter a joint venture with his US-based
company, Americorp Environmental Services Incorporated (hereafter AES Inc). It is now known that he came to
Biratnagar Sub Municipal Corporation (hereafter referred to as the municipality) after the Kathmandu
Metropolitan City declined his proposal to establish a private-public partnership for the management of solid
waste in Kathmandu. In Biratnagar, he found a willing partner, a municipality keen to enhance their own
resources with those of the private sector and eager to delegate responsibility for solid waste services.
The means by which the municipality arrived at an agreement amongst themselves or with AES Inc. is not clear,
but in 1997 the proposal was accepted and a contract was finalised. The arrangement incorporated a joint
venture called BMC-Americorp Environmental Services Group (hereafter called Americorp) in which the
municipality was given, without investment or risk, a 10% share in the company. Decision-makers in the council
were attracted and convinced of the benefits a private sector partner could bring - not only in technology, skills
and financial resources but also that the partnership would become a profit making concern and bring additional
revenue into the council.
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Nature and Scope of agreement
Issue Contract Provision Comments
Parties to the
agreement Biratnagar Sub-MunicipalCorporation (the municipality)
Americorp Environmental
Services Group (AES Inc.) (the
operator)
AES Inc. supported theirproposal with a letter of
recommendation from the US
Embassy.
Ownership
A joint venture BMC-Americorp
in which the 90% ownership is
AES Inc. and 10% of the share
ownership is with theMunicipality
The landfill site and the
recycling plant are to remain in
the ownership of BMC-
Americorp for the life of the
facility.
Without any investment, the
municipality was given 10%
share in the BMC-Americorp
venture.
Duration
10 years
Objectives
and scope of
the
agreement
The provision of integrated solid
waste management services
including: storage, collection,
processing, recycling and reuse
and final disposal of household
waste including the design and
management of a sanitary
landfill.
Household level services are to
be provided to the entire
municipal area every 3rd day.
There is no specification of
method, standards of
cleanliness to be achieved,
or types of waste to be
collected.
The implication of the scope
of the agreement are that the
whole waste cycle would be
self sustaining after an initial
period (despite the lack of
sanctions available to the
private operator).
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Financial
requirements The private operator commits:
NRs. 121.5 million ($1.73m); a
modern safety tank suction
cleaning tanker; and computer
hardware and software for themunicipality for revenue
collection.
The municipality makes no
capital investment, but is
required to provide NRs. 2.5
million (approx. $36,000) per
annum for the first 2 years of the
contract to subsidise operatingcosts in the start-up period. The
cost to be decreased
proportionately over this period
as service charges are
collected. The rate of decrease
shall be mutually agreed upon.
The method and timing of the
municipal subsidy payments
is not specified.
Cost recovery
The municipality is responsible
for collection of the service
charge and penalties (at a
commission of 5%). Americorp
to provide assistance in a
computerised billing system.
The domestic service charge is
set at NRs. 20 per month (for
the collection of 2 containers)
plus the initial purchase of the
containers (NRs. 100).
Differential charging is providedfor various residences,
hotels/tea stalls and shops, and
government facilities.
This is the primary area of
revision between the contract
and the agreement being
implemented. The
municipality currently plays
no role in collection.
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Environmental
requirements,
Worker
Conditions,
and health
and safety
requirements
Not mentioned Although the objective states
that there will be no negative
impact on the environment,
no requirements are
specified in the contract. (e.g.
enclosing trucks or covering
loads). The contract is silent
on worker salaries and
conditions, and health and
safety requirements.
Rights of each
party Not mentioned
Renegotiation
Not mentioned
Risks
Not mentioned
Performance
measurement,
monitoring
The contract stipulates that a
monitoring and evaluation unit
will be established with the
membership of both partners.
There are no performance
standards specified in the
contract. No provision is
made for penalties for non-
performance. No
quantitative outputs aredefined (such as the amount
of waste to be collected).
Regulatory
requirements Municipality to request
exemptions on behalf of the
operator
Dispute
resolution and
arbitration
Problems shall be mutually
solved by the parties, and if not,
shall be solved in accordance
with the rules and regulations of
the Nepal Arbitration Act.
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Key Issues
The situation that has developed in Biratnagar over the last 3 years during the implementation of the partnership
arrangement is a complex one filled with uncommon practices. Yet despite this, the Mayor reports that the
majority of councillors are quite satisfied with the performance of the partnership - and that the council is in favour
of further private sector initiatives in service delivery. From an objective viewpoint however, there would appear
to be fundamental problems with this solid waste initiative that are not being addressed by municipal decision-
makers. Foremost among these is that the partnership, under the current terms, is unviable and unsustainable.
This view is largely supported by the operator.
While many aspects of the Biratnagar case are unusual and unlikely to be widely replicated, the very existence of
this PPP is instructive as it describes the sort of irregular partnerships that can develop. It therefore provides
important lessons for development professionals and municipal officials alike. A number of the key issues are
discussed further in this section.
Financial and Technical Viability
One of the key characteristics of the arrangement, and one that differs from the norm, is that the private sectorrole in municipal solid waste management in Biratnagar has not led to a convincing commercialisation of the
service. Typically, PSP is associated with improved commercial practices that include long term planning and
rectify municipal accounting systems and do not capture costs or present grants and transfers in a transparent
manner. However the partnership approach in Biratnagar has not led to strategic planning and budgeting for solid
waste services in the municipality; the sector has not been ring fenced, a process which would isolate all the
costs of the municipality providing solid waste services (including direct and indirect staff salaries, vehicles, repair,
leases, interest on loans etc); and it has not led to an informed examination of the potential sources of revenue
needed to support this improved level a service.
The lack of rigour on the municipal side is exacerbated by the less-than-commercial actions of the operator.
Currently the only reason the arrangement can continue is that the private partner is willing to underwrite the
costs of this loss making investment as part of a long term strategy to gain a stake in municipal environmental
services in Nepal. The private sector operation is somewhat misleading and unreplicable and incomparable with
other solid waste initiatives. The municipality does not appear to have taken on the importance of the sustainable
financial management of the operations, but has inadvertently supported the under-reporting of Americorp costs.
Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that there is an understanding that solid waste management is rarely
a self-financing operation and that it generally requires some public investment or subsidy from the municipalities
own revenue sources. On the contrary, most actors in Biratnagar both private and public continue to makedecisions on the understanding that at some point in the future there is significant profit to be made in solid waste
activities.
The Biratnagar case also illustrates the sort of inappropriate technical (and consequently financial) options that
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might be proposed by operators inexperienced in the specific needs of developing cities. The initial technical
scheme and its associated costs offered a contextually inappropriate and financially unviable proposition, there is
little question in hindsight that they were incongruous in the socio-economic context of Biratnagar. Based on
figures provided by the UN, Nepal appears to have one of the lowest rates of urban solid waste generation (at
0.50 kg/capita/day) and is only expected to increase to 0.60kg/capita/day by 2025. The high proportion of people
living below the poverty line and the low levels of waste produced by this group account for this figure. The wastegenerated per head in Biratnagar is therefore only 50% of that generated in urban Thailand. These figures are
consistent with the pattern of waste generation in relation to GNP per capita and consistent with small cities in
Latin America. Despite this, the operator suggested and the council accepted, a proposal relevant for waste
generation rates of highly developed cities.
One of the simple lessons of the Biratnagar case thus relates to the lack of viability of high technology proposals
and high levels of investment proposed at the outset. The lesson is then developed by the modifications that
have been necessary to bring capital inputs in line with local conditions. Modifications proposed or implemented
to date include the lower technology, lower cost options of: the landfill site: the original proposal fora sanitary landfill (lined, gas emission and leachate management
system) has been abandoned;
the vehicles: the original proposal for modern compactors has been replaced by simple tractor trailers.
the containers: The provision of 25 litre waste bin containers to all households has been reduced to smaller,
lower quality containers purchased at a lower cost but charged at the same rate.
Typically, in municipalities in low-income countries such as Nepal, expenditure on solid waste management is
predominately made up of collection and transportation costs and not on disposal. As a result costs are biased
toward the micro-level of service. Biratnagar is no exception, the practice of dumping waste free of charge has
continued into the contract to date and, at present, there is little to no cost associated with the disposal stage of
the service. The cost of disposal elsewhere in the region of $0.25 per capita per annum suggest that operational
costs are likely to increase significantly when the practice of dumping is ceased. It is likely therefore that solid
waste operations within the town will require significantly more subsidy or a different financial arrangement for the
partnership to continue once disposal costs are introduced.
At this stage however, the disposal stage is not being presented in this manner. The ambitious proposal of the
operator is to run a self sustaining compost plant and recycling operation on leased land. This includes the
construction of facilities and services for this purpose. However research by Blore shows that the most valuable
waste in South Asian cities is generally reclaimed at source and this limits the potential of recycling schemes.Picking over such waste is frequently considered to be a marginal economic activity.
The problems of franchising solid waste services
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Given the fact that the original entrepreneur had no intention of operating the service over any period of time, it is
hardly surprising to find that the contract proposed was favourable towards the municipality and that the
municipality is allocated very little risk. However, the agreement established in practice is far more onerous for
the operator than the initial contract envisaged. Not only does the private operator now have the responsibility for
collecting the tariffs for household collection services, by extension they take on the full risk of non-payment of
service charges. In terms of municipal solid waste management, this franchise arrangement is unusual and thisform of contract is rarely appropriate as it is generally very difficult for operators to collect fees from householders.
More commonly, the municipality pays the contractor/operator a fixed fee and the municipality recovers the cost
from user charges (often a cess or property tax) or general revenues (such as inter-governmental grants)
effectively creating a management form of contract.It is also not clear whether the municipality is aware that the
current system whereby the operator is responsible for collecting tariffs is considered unviable elsewhere, or
whether they are taking this approach to test the genuineness and capacity of the operator.
Another problem that has arisen for the operator is that the contract does not adequately specify the means and
processes which will ensure that operational charges are levied and paid by service users. The operator arguesthat it is vital that there is a means of addressing non-payment through sanctions and enforcement. The
municipality is also considering the introduction of a range of penalties and sanctions that might be imposed on
defaulters. This might include refusing users other municipal services (e.g. citizenship applications, business
licensing, land purchase, asset transfer and planning permission) unless payment for refuse collection is made.
The more significant proposal under discussion is for the municipality to integrate the waste collection charge into
the wider system of municipal tax collection without transferring the risk of non-payment to the municipality. The
municipality stresses that it needs more capacity to formulate appropriate penalties and enforce sanctions. They
argue that it is necessary for municipalities to have more autonomy to impose new penalties and fines and that
amendments to the Local Self-Governance Act are required to enable municipalities to act.
Tariffs and Collection
Neither the municipality nor the operator has demonstrated an understanding of the mechanics and implications
of tariff structures and the (substantial problems of) and mechanisms for effective cost recovery for slid waste
services. The simple tariff structure in place at present differentiates between domestic customers twice-weekly
service and commercial customers daily service but the level of the tariff is not commensurate with the service
provided. A simple comparative study indicates lower charges per household than other selected municipalities.
At NRs. 20 ($0.28) per month (1% of an average low-income household monthly income) the current tariff is one-third of a similar service provided by the Vientiane Municipality in Laos (which operates a cost-recovery approach)
and where the equivalent cost is $0.62 per month (2.5% of an average low-income household monthly income).
In India, tariffs for household collection are generally in the order of IRs. 20 ($0.45) per month in small cities and
IRs. 40 ($0.90) in large cities where the costs are higher and processes more commercialised.
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Contract preparation
The preparation and development of the contract in Biratnagar was not undertaken with the diligence and
thoroughness essential for private sector participation initiatives. The lack of feasibility studies or comparative
studies detailing the various options for the private sector role initially led to an inappropriate and unviableapproach and arrangement. The municipality simply reacted to the proposals placed before it by the entrepreneur
concerned who convinced officers and elected members that he possessed sufficient technical expertise and
could therefore propose optimal solutions. In the absence of sufficient technical information on solid waste
management the municipality was easily misled by the private party in the original contract negotiations as to
what kind of waste service would be practical, cost effective and feasible. At the same time there was inadequate
financial information on solid waste costs (although there was some data on area-wise expenditure) and a lack of
access to comparative costs of municipal solid waste management initiatives elsewhere.
This lack of a thorough financial appraisal meant that neither the municipality nor the operator undertook anyaffordability or willingness-to-pay studies which would support or challenge the viability of the overall proposal and
which would have enhanced their understanding of an appropriate tariff and collection system within the city.
During the contract preparation stage, there was no attempt to seek tenders to validate the proposal or to
introduce other mechanisms that would enhance transparency and accountability or ensure the financial
capability and soundness of the operator selected. Owing to the solicitous nature of the proposal (and the
recommendation rendered by the US Embassy), the municipality did not conduct standard contracting procedures
including financial checks and guarantees.
With respect to the contract, there was no consideration of a standard form of contract for PSP in municipal solid
waste management (available through international agencies), no effort was made to contact other municipalities
involved in such an initiative. Local legal counsel were consulted but unlike many PPP initiatives studied the
municipality did not obtain consultancy support or legal advice was sought during the contract preparation (or any
other) stage. The lack of preparation at an early stage is undoubtedly the root cause of the major problems which
arose in relation to the fraudulent representative and thence the unsustainable nature of the current arrangement.
Subsidies for waste operations
While a subsidy is specified under the contract agreement (NRs. 2.5 million annually for two years) the operator
has not been able to obtain the full municipal subsidy intended to help cover their operating costs in the initial
stages (to date the operator has only been paid 30%, ostensibly because collection services only cover 25% ofthe town. An obvious oversight is that the contract does not specify the terms and conditions upon which this
subsidy will be released. Inadequate specification of these conditions has meant that the municipality has been
able to withhold the full release of funds until the operator has reached all the target households. The private
contractor meanwhile argues that that the subsidy is required as the means to extend the service.
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Efficiency
There appears to be a general consensus that, despite the constraints, the private operator has been able to
perform more efficiently than the municipality. This can be attributed to more effective supervision of staff and
operations, the flexibility possible outside the public sector and the labour relations prevailing in the private sector.
Perhaps the most tangible and significant evidence of improved efficiency can be seen from a cost benefit
analysis of the street cleaning operations before and after private sector involvement. The contractor undertakesstreet cleaning in the core city at 20% less cost than the municipality, at the same time the quality of service is
reportedly higher and public satisfaction greater.
Efficiency has been significantly enhanced by delegating further responsibilities to the private operator. The
viability of the door-to-door collection scheme has been greatly enhanced by the operator assuming responsibility
other waste activities. This has enabled some economies of scale but even more importantly has led to an
integrated approach with one service (i.e. street sweeping) mutually supporting another (i.e. household
collection). The Mayor of Biratnagar suggests that further delegation is a more effective means to establish the
financial viability and future sustainability of the partnership. To this end, he proposes to extend further municipalmanagement contracts to the private operator for street sweeping, but sees this as a form of support which could
take the place of the contractual obligation to pay the agreed subsidy. While the private operator would welcome
additional contracts that intrinsically promote their household collection as well, they argue that the municipality
has a contractual obligation to pay this subsidy and that they took over the Americorp activity on that basis.
Failure to pay the subsidy is in their terms in breach of contract.
Lack of Capacity
The Biratnagar case demonstrates that the capacity of both the municipality and the operator has been
problematic. Neither the municipality nor the operator have had experience in managing an integrated solid waste
management programme. Both parties have had to learn from experience and to experiment with systems and
procedures. The main areas of capacity requirement have been concerned with contract formulation and
negotiation, technical analysis of waste management operations, financial analysis and management, integrated
waste management practices, public consultation processes, alternative waste management systems, role of
NGOs and CBOs and community participation in waste operations. These issues are discussed in detail in the
capacity section below.
Labour Issues
In most Hindu parts of South Asia, waste workers are drawn from a socially and economically marginalised caste.
In Biratnagar these castes form an identifiable part of the low-income community in the city. They live in an
inadequate and insanitary environment and work for low wages with little or no job security in conditions harmful
to their health. Typically, the solid waste sector absorbs some of the child labour in the city and Biratnagar is no
exception.
Labour issues can be argued from diverse viewpoints. On the one hand it is possible to argue that the gradual
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shift to private sector operations taking place in Biratnagar does little to benefit workers and that it has not
significantly improved the opportunities available to waste workers. For former municipal employees the operator
is said to provide the same terms and conditions as the public sector (except workers are supervised and
therefore do work their 7 hours) but for the remainder of the work force, employment is provided on a temporary
basis. Job insecurity therefore forms a key aspect of the workers lives. Temporary workers interviewed report
that they receive less pay than their colleagues on a permanent municipal arrangement, and argue that conditionsof work are better in the public sector.
From the operators perspective, one of the primary operational issues concerns labour. The operator stressed
that the lack of a work discipline and motivation creates
ongoing difficulties in achieving satisfactory performance. The operator argues that sweepers do not perform
their duties properly, are not reliable and are frequently given supplementary informal payments to keep
operations going. However, unlike the public sector which employs staff on a permanent basis (and the staff
seconded to work for Americorp), temporary staff can be penalised by retrenchment and the operator has used
this threat successfully to achieve better performance and changing attitudes. Both the private sector operator
and municipal officers argue that casual labourers work more efficiently than permanent labourers who are more
secure and complacent about work tasks and discipline.
The exact nature of employment conditions in relation to performance and to other sweepers was not possible
within the scope of this study, however it was clear that the private operator employer has not brought any socio-
economic benefit to these groups. However the flexibility within the private sector offers greater opportunity for
improvement in terms and conditions than does the public sector. In this regard there are many lessons in South
Asia for the operator to draw upon to improve incentives and work practices.
Scaling Up
Despite the achievements of the arrangement, the Mayor of Biratnagar argues that the current scope and contentof the partnership will be limited in the middle to long term. He argues that Americorp alone does not have the
resources and technical capacity to undertake all the waste-related activities required by the city. The current
Mayor, like his predecessor is ambitious and optimistic about the financial opportunities of the waste sector. He
envisages a situation where waste is treated as a resource: waste will not be allowed to leave the municipal
area, other waste will be imported and the income earning potential of waste as a commodity will be maximised.
The Mayors long term strategy is to develop a range of activities and involve a range of actors to address all
aspects of solid waste management. By its nature, this would involve a more complex set of partnerships, rather
than being reliant upon a single bi-lateral arrangement. These includes for instance:
an emphasis on private service providers appropriate to the task (e.g. community based organisations for
household collection and larger industrial enterprises for upstream recycling activities).
an emphasis on economies of scale. (e.g. upstream activities such as recycling and disposal could cover 2-3
towns in order to achieve economies of scale.
an emphasis on heavy waste such as iron, steel and other products which typically leave Biratnagar for use
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and recycling elsewhere.
However in relation to the existing service there is also some question over the capacity of the operator to
replicate the initiative and significantly increase the scale of the operation. In particular, the makeshift and ad hoc
nature of the operations and the personal attention paid to each facet of the operation by the General Manager,
suggests that significantly greater coverage and replication may not be sustainable without increasedsystematisation.
3. Private Sector Participation in Water and Sanitation services in Stutterheim, South Africa
Objectives of private sector involvement
At the time the partnership in Stutterheim was established, a primary goal of the city council was to streamline
municipal functions. The council at the time (particularly the Chair of the Public Works Committee) aimed to
redirect conventional forms of management to address the resource deficiencies of the council. To this end, thecouncil envisaged partnerships with actors outside the government and co-ordination with other municipal bodies.
Amongst other issues they sought to tackle the problems of small municipalities that can not sustain sufficient
technical capacity to run a properly skilled water and sanitation service. As the engineering department was
going through a difficult stage (beset by uncertainty in contracting practices), service was deteriorating, and a
partnership arrangement with the private sector for water and sanitation services solved both particular and
strategic problems. The objective of private sector participation was to buy in the technical skills needed to
improve the efficiency, management and delivery of water and sanitation services to the population of
Stutterheim. However, the objective at that time did not include capital investment, and the pre-democratic council
was only concerned with bulk supply to low-income areas. Decisions were set within the context of political
change in South Africa.
Establishing the Contract
In 1992, the council in power agreed to pursue private sector involvement in a range of municipal functions. In
order to initiate the process the council agreed to test the market and advertised nationally for expressions of
interest for the management of water and sanitation services in the town. In the early nineties there was little
direction for public-private partnerships in South Africa (nor was there any significant assistance available
internationally) and the process of preparation, tender and evaluation process was carried out with the same
methodology as that undertaken for the construction of civil works.
The council at the time was dominated by business acumen, the councillors were willing and able to identify gaps
in council skills and were then agreeable to the appointment of (and fees for) consultants to fill these gaps and
manage the formulation of a contract. However it should be noted that expertise in public-private partnerships
were not available in South Africa in 1993. As late as 1995, the WRC in their guidelines for private sector
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participation noted the complexity and nature of long term contracts makes it imperative for local authorities to
appoint a multi-disciplinary team of professional advisers It should be noted that very few firms in South Africa
have all the expertise that is likely to be required and the experts will have to be drawn from different firms. The
disciplines needed cover business and financial management, legal as well as engineering and technical fields.
The proposal for the form of contract was presented by WSSA in their tender. An investigation into alternative
contract types was not pursued. The contract was considered appropriate because it met the key technical,managerial and efficiency objectives of the council and did not include a significant investment component.
Partnership Arrangements
The partnership arrangement in Stutterheim is an affermage contract for 10 years. The affermage (or lease) form
of contract farms-outor contracts out to the private sector responsibility for providing management, operation and
maintenance. Unlike the management form of contract, the private operator must provide working capital, but
capital investments remain the responsibility of the authority.
The scope of the contract in Stutterheim includes the management, operation and maintenance of the water and
sewerage system, replacement of pipework due to normal wear and tear and record keeping. It also includes forcustomer management services as a future option. In addition, WSSA has an obligation for some rehabilitation
works on the existing system: to replace a fixed amount of pipework annually, to replace all meters (older than 7
years) by the 5th year of their contract and to replace any malfunctioning electro-mechanical equipment. Thus,
maintenance, replacement and ongoing repair are the responsibility of the Operator, while upgrading and
expansion is the responsibility of the Stutterheim Council.
Responsibilities and Coverage
WSSA Responsibility Municipal (STLC) Responsibility
Water
Primary Raw water supply and water
treatment from sources (4 sources)
to Stutterheim town, Mlungisi and
the semi-rural villages of the
Amatola District Council.
Upgrade and new infrastructure
Safety, maintenance and repair of dams and water
sources.
Bye law enforcement
Secondary Secondary distribution and
reticulation within Stutterheim town
area .
Pumping and secondary distribution network to and
within Mlungisi.
Tertiary Operation and maintenance ofneighbourhood level distribution
within Stutterheim town area
Operation and maintenance of neighbourhood levelnetwork distribution within Mlungisi area
Sanitation
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Operation and Maintenance of
sewerage network in Stutterheim
town.
Treatment of effluent for all areas.
Operation of conservancy tanker
services to all areas (including 80%
of the population of Mlungisi).
Operation and maintenance of sewerage network in
Mlungisi.
Provision of capital equipment for all tasks
(including new tankers for sanitation services);
Customer Services
WSSA is responsible for operation
and maintenance of meters and
technical complaints.
Stutterheim TLC is responsible for meter reading,
billing, collection and account complaints.
Conclusions
Stutterheim serves, potentially, as both teacher and student in Municipal Service Partnerships. As one of the
three early public-private partnerships in South Africa, Stutterheim can provide important feedback and lessonsfor peer learning. Conversely, it needs significant support at this time if it is to overcome the barriers hindering
efficiency improvements and pro-poor arrangements. The process of demarcation provides a potential turning
point for the contract and an opportunity for WSSA and the Stutterheim Council to build in the last years of the
contract an effective and sustainable partnership approach, convergent with the principles of reconstruction and
development. Stutterheim also serves, potentially, as a pilot for the development of linkages between Local
Economic Development and Municipal Service Partnerships in South Africa. It is up to the contract parties, the
supporting institutions and other parts of civil society to seize this opportunity and explore the possibilities that the
partnership may offer.
Corporate Sector Initiatives in Disaster Management : India
Even though corporate sector participation is a relatively new concept in India, but the recent disasters which
struck various parts on India have seen a tremendous response from the private sector and community groups
who extended their hand towards the relief works. A few of such initiatives have been cited as follows :
1. Outbreak of Plague in Surat:
Just when plague was believed to have been wiped off from the face of the earth, the sudden resurgence of
bubonic plague in Beed district of Maharashtra and pneumonic plague cases in Surat city of Gujarat state, in
September-October 1994, took the central, state and local administration and health officials in the country by
surprise. It also caused a global concern. The casualities were a total of 146 presumptive (seropositive) cases
and 54 deaths considered as due to plague occurred between 19 September and 22 October 1994 (WHO
Report 1994).
The plague created widespread panic in the city and approximately 60 per cent of Surats population fled. It was
a severe blow not only to Surats economy which suffered a loss of several millions of rupees every day but also
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to the national economy because it affected industrial production, tourism, export, etc. Indias international image
suffered a severe blow. Some of the foreign airlines temporarily stopped their flights to and from India and some
countries banned the import of food grains from here and quarantined passengers from India for exhaustive
medical check ups.
As the local administration, in this case the SMC, was responsible for providing public health facilities to the
citizens, the public, media, researchers and health officials squarely blamed the local body not only for a grosslyinadequate response during plague but also for its general lack of performance. It was therefore considered
imperative, for the moment though, to call in for private sector involvement in order to control the spreading of
the disease. Therefore, the private initiative started on a temporary basis during the plague epidemic to cleanse
the filth and remove dead carcasses accumulated in the water logged areas, but looking at the performance the
participation was strengthened and regulated in the post-plague period. At present, privatisation initiatives are
limited to: i) hiring of private vehicles with driver for garbage collection ,ii) contracting out cleaning of certain
roads and iii) employing private sweepers for transporting municipal refuse from collection points to disposal
sites. Private contractors, at present, handle almost 40 per cent of the solid waste generated in the city
everyday. However, private contractors work under strict supervision of the municipal staff and penalties areimposed on them for not performing their assigned work.
The control of epidemic in the city and maintenance of sanitary and infrastructure facilities in the post-plague
period by the private sector enterprises has been one of the most quoted examples of public-private partnership
in urban areas. The level of services has improved to an extent that today Surat claims to be one of the cleanest
cities in the country.
2. Gujarat Earthquake
Gujarat Earthquake has been one of the best shows of mankind in the country. Not only did the government
agencies, but also the private sector enterprises, school and colleges, community groups and various NGOs in
their own ways; got together and made the seemingly wiped out cities after the disaster living. As per the private
sector initiatives, various engineering firms like the Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. and other contacting
companies had deployed heavy engineering equipment, skilled manpower and engineers to facilitate the efforts.
Besides, the entire cadre of its officers and employees donated a minimal days wage as a token of support.
Besides that, the top companies like Reliance and the Tata Group shed out large funds in order to carry out the
relief funds and also provided new facilities like the mobile hospital vans. Also, various other private sector
enterprises shed out huge funds which had made the relief and rehabilitation process a very successful one
giving life back to thousands who had lost both their shelter and livelihood.
Corporate Sector Initiatives in Disaster Management : Global
1. Tsunami and Earthquake in Asia and Pacific region :
A devastating earthquake of 9.0 magnitude on the Richter' scale struck the area off Sumatra's northwestern
coast on December 26, 2004. The earthquake also caused the creation of tsunami waves that invaded the
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coasts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Maldives, Thailand and Malaysia, and even east African countries have
been affected.
At least 295,000 people died in the disaster, with 1,500,000 displaced and over 500,000 homeless. (source:
IFRC, February 9)
Ericssion, which is a private sector enterprise, extended its help to the entire region struck by the disaster.
The help was in two ways: by restoring damaged telecommunications and by supporting humanitarianorganizations working with the recovery and rescue efforts. Ericsson also donated a complete mobile telephony
system to the Indonesian government. And a number of satellite phones, heavy-duty waterproof phones and
standard phones were given by Ericsson and Sony Ericsson to relief organizations, as well as a cash donation.
Local Ericsson companies in Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and Malaysia have also initiated contributions, mainly in
donations and providing support for the telecommunications infrastructure. Ericsson Response has sent a
complete container-based GSM system to enable communications between different aid organizations, mobile
phones in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The aid has helped tremendously in getting back the communication routes
and helping the people who have been left homeless.
2. Earthquake in Luzon (Philippines) 1990 :
On July 16, 1990 an earthquake of a magnitude 7.2 on the ritcher scale hit Luzon in Phillipines causing
tremendous damage to life and property. There were 1,666 deaths, about 1,000 persons were reported missing
and over 3,000 were injured. Most casualties occurred in Baguio City and surroundings. The rainy season,
which began soon after the tremor, produced new casualties, some as the result of reactivation of earthquake
induced slides. Nearly 100,000 houses were damaged, 40% of them were completely destroyed. All these
happened in a wide area including Baguio, the coastal area south of San Fernando in La Union, along the
Lingayen Gulf and in the area between Dagupan and Tarlac where intense liquefaction occurred. Seven bridges
collapsed, eight others were seriously damaged and about 20 were affected by various types of lesser damage.
The road network of Central Luzon and the Baguio region was significantly damaged.
The business sector mobilized relief and rehabilitation resources. The resources mobilized went beyond
cash, medicine, blankets and old clothes. Corporate aircraft as well as ten-wheelers and communication facilities
were deployed free of charge. Search and rescue groups from among the mining companies were pressed into
service. Teams of psychiatrist-trained groups were organized to handle the psychosocial needs. In the
succeeding months, after an assessment of the economic and infrastructural damages, the private sector again
dug into its collective pocket to fund rehabilitation activities, including resettlement projects and programs to
rehabilitate livelihood, schools and other community l ifelines.
AUTHORS Amar Sood : [email protected]
Annu Talreja : [email protected]
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GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT
1.1 INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
On 11 December 1987 at its 42nd session, the General Assembly of the United Nations designated the 1990's asthe International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The basic idea behind this proclamation of the
Decade was and still remains to be the unacceptable and rising levels of losses, which disasters continue to incur
on the one hand, and the existence, on the other hand, of a wealth of scientific and engineering know-how which
could be effectively used to reduce losses resulting from disasters.
The objective of the IDNDR is to reduce through concerted international action, especially in developing countries,
the loss of life, property damage and social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters such as
earthquakes, windstorms, tsunamis, floods, landslides, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, grasshopper and locust
infestation, drought and desertification and other calamities of natural origin.
The General Assembly called on all governments to take appropriate measures and actions during the Decade,
and in particular to:
1) Formulate national disaster mitigation programs.
2) Take part in concerted international action to reduce the effects of natural disasters.
3) Establish, where appropriate, national IDNDR committees (in co-operation with the relevant scientific and
technological communities).
4) Encourage support from the public and private sectors.
5) Take measures to increase public awareness of risk and the value of preventative measures.
By 1994, over 150 countries had established national IDNDR focal points or committees, which included
representatives of governments, disaster 'professionals' and many non-government organizations. This
'networking' has facilitated the transfer of knowledge to those countries and communities most at risk. In addition,
much effort has been put into new scientific and engineering developments. Typical examples are work on
hazard-resistant structures (houses, factories, bridges, flyovers, etc.), and the development of electrical
measuring techniques to predict earthquakes.
IDNDR works through IDNDR National Committees and Focal Points which exist in 138 countries. The IDNDR
secretariat, located in Geneva, is part of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The IDNDR Scientific andTechnical Committee is an advisory body with experts in economics, social science, engineering, public health,
industry, geology, meteorology, etc. A UN inter-agency group works regularly with the IDNDR secretariat, as well
as a contact group of Geneva-based diplomatic missions.
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In 1994 an international conference was held in Yokohama to look at the IDNDR's initial progress and chart a
course for the remainder of the Decade. This brought many of the governments and other bodies active in the
field together for the first time. The conference demonstrated how much of the IDNDR's work was shifting from
'rapid-onset' disasters (for example, floods and landslides) to 'slow-onset' disasters (principally drought), more
complex multiple disasters involving a range of hazards and causes, and the social consequences of disasters.
1.2 WORLD CONFERENCE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
The WCNDR was held at Yokohama between 23 to 27 May 1994. To make people aware of how much they can
do to make themselves safer from natural disasters, the United Nations launched the International Decade for
Natural Disaster Reduction. The World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction was an important milestone in
IDNDR awareness-building process.
The conference was initiated with the background of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction and
other considerations:1. Recognizing the rapidly rising worldwide toll on human and economic losses due to natural disasters.
2. UN resolution to launch a far-reaching global undertaking for the 1990s to save human lives and reduce the
impact of natural disasters.
3. To adopt an integrated approach for disaster management in all its aspects and to initiate a process towards
a global culture of prevention.
4. Sustainable economic growth and sustainable development cannot be achieved in many countries without
adequate measures to reduce disaster losses, and that there are close linkages between disaster losses and
environmental degradation, as emphasized in Agenda 21 (Report of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, vol. I, Resolutions Adopted by the
Conference).
5. Reaffirming the Rio Declaration, which stresses the need for the international community to assist States
afflicted by natural disasters and other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects in the
environment of those states.
The conference adopted the Yokohama strategy and plan of action. The basic principles for the strategy were:
1. Risk assessment is a required step for the adoption of adequate and successful disaster reduction policies
and measures.
2. Disaster prevention and preparedness are of primary importance in reducing the need for disaster relief.
3. Disaster prevention and preparedness should be considered integral aspects of development policy andplanning at national, regional, bilateral, multilateral and international levels.
4. The development and strengthening of capacities to prevent, reduce and mitigate disasters is a top priority
area to be addressed during the Decade so as to provide a strong basis for follow-up activities to the Decade.
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5. Early warnings of impending disasters and their effective dissemination using telecommunications, including
broadcast services, are key factors to successful disaster prevention and preparedness.
6. Preventive measures are most effective when they involve participation at all levels, from the local community
through the national government to the regional and international level.
7. Vulnerability can be reduced by the application of proper design and patterns of development focused on
target groups, by appropriate education and training of the whole community.8. The international community accepts the need to share the necessary technology to prevent, reduce and
mitigate disaster; this should be made freely available and in a timely manner as an integral part of technical
cooperation.
9. Environmental protection as a component of sustainable development consistent with poverty alleviation is
imperative in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.
10. Each country bears the primary responsibility for protecting its people, infrastructure, and other national
assets from the impact of natural disasters. The international community should demonstrate strong political
determination required to mobilize adequate and make efficient use of existing resources, including financial,
scientific and technological means, in the field of natural disaster reduction, bearing in mind the needs of thedeveloping countries, particularly the least developed countries.
Approaching the mid-point of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the World Conference has
identified, on the basis of national reports and technical discussions, the following main accomplishments and
failures:
1. Awareness of the potential benefits of disaster reduction is still limited to specialized circles and has not yet
been successfully communicated to all sectors of society, in particular policy makers and the general public.
This is due to a lack of attention for the issue, insufficient commitment and resources for promotional activities
at all levels.
2. Activities during the first years of the Decade in training, technical applications and research at local, national
and international levels and in regional cooperation, have had positive results in some regions in reducing
disaster losses.
3. These new efforts in the field of disaster reduction have not systematically been part of multilateral and
bilateral development policies.
4. Education and training programs and facilities for people professionally involved and the public at large have
not been sufficiently developed with a focus on ways and means to reduce disasters. Also the potential of the
information media, industry, scientific community and the private sector at large has not been sufficiently
mobilized.
5. A number of positive results have been achieved during the first five years of the Decade, although unevenlyand not in the concerted and systematic way.
6. The concept of the disaster reduction should be enlarged to cover natural and other disaster situations
including environmental and technological disasters and their interrelationship which can have a significant
impact on social, economic, cultural and environmental systems, in particular in developing countries.
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The Yokohama strategy and plan of action for natural disaster reduction calls for emphasis and implementation of
the following points:
A. Development of a global culture of prevention as an essential component of an integrated approach to
disaster reduction.
B. Adoption of a policy of self-reliance in each vulnerable country and community comprising capacity buildingas well as allocation and efficient use of resources.
C. Education and training in disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation.
D. Development and strengthening of human resources and material capabilities and capacity of research and
development institutions for disaster reduction and mitigation.
E. Identification and networking of existing centres of excellence so as to enhance disaster prevention, reduction
and mitigation activities.
F. Improvement of awareness in vulnerable communities, through a more active and constructive role of the
media in respect of disaster reduction.
G. Effective national legislation and administrative action, higher priority at the political decision-making level.H. Making available the existing technology for broader application to disaster reduction.
I. Integration of the private sector in disaster reduction efforts through promotion of business opportunities.
The WCNDR was a consolidated beginning in the area of disaster reduction. The major challenges put forward by
the conference were the recognition of disaster management in the policies and planning of governments all over
the world. The other aspect emphasized by the conference was the inter-regional cooperation between states to
reduce vulnerability.
1.3 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION
The ISDR is the successor of the IDNDR. The mission of the IDNDR was to influence decisions and help in
creating long-term, pro-active disaster prevention strategies. The scope of the challenge was - and remains -
enormous, but during its ten-year life, the IDNDR succeeded in coordinating a new, global approach to improving
the resiliency of local communities.
As its name implied, the IDNDR officially came to an end in 1999. However, during its ten-year span of activities,
it achieved such important successes - especially in terms of forging vital links among the political, scientific and
technological communities - which the United Nations created a successor body to carry on its work. This new
body of coordinated action programs, with a small secretariat in Geneva, is ISDR. In January 2000, the General
Assembly established two mechanisms for the implementation of ISDR the Inter-Agency Secretariat and the Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction.
Based on its invaluable experience and expertise built up over ten years, particularly in developing countries, the
ISDR is extremely well-placed to foster the multi-disciplinary and inter-sectoral relationships necessary to bring
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about the all-important shift from the mainly reactive mindset of today to the pro-active mindset of tomorrow,
where prevention and risk management are paramount. It has already established a global network of public,
private and local community partners with whom it is developing risk prevention strategies, integrating them into
long-term sustainable development plans. The ISDR has two overall objectives:
Enabling all communities to become resilient to the effects of natural, technological and environmental
hazards, reducing the compound risks they pose to social and economic vulnerabilities within modernsocieties; and
Proceeding from protection against hazards to the management of risk through the integra