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Trade Policy and Exchange Rates Douglas Irwin Dartmouth College

Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

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Page 1: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Douglas Irwin

Dartmouth College

Page 2: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Trade policy

• International monetary system in background

• Exchange rates affect resource allocation

• Keynes’s theorem:

– 10% devaluation = 10% import tariff + 10% export subsidy

Page 3: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Misaligned exchange rates

• Overvalued currency

– Common developing country problem

– Leads to domestic protectionism

– Remedy: devaluation and trade liberalization

• Undervalued currency

Page 4: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates
Page 5: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Overvaluation

• Schatz and Tarr (2002):

– “one classic pattern is to attempt to defend an overvalued exchange rate by protectionist trade policies . . . . In fact, an overvalued exchange rate is often the root cause of protection”

• Drabek and Brada (JCE, 1998), “Exchange Rate Regimes and the Stability of Trade Policy in Transition Economies”

Page 6: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Welfare cost of overvalued exchange rates

• Hause (JPE, 1966), “Welfare Cost of Disequilibrium Exchange Rates”

• Bhagwati & Krueger, 1970s NBER project

• Krueger (1999), “Nominal Anchor Exchange Rate Policies as Domestic Distortions”

Page 7: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates
Page 8: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Historical evidence

Page 9: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

The Trilemma

Stable exchange

rates

Open trade

Stable internal prices

Page 10: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

The Trilemma

Stable exchange

rates

Open trade

Stable internal prices

Page 11: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Max Corden

• “the inability to use the exchange rate as a policy instrument provides an incentive to impose or increase restrictive trade policies at times of crisis, and thus leads to protectionist measures which often fail to be reduced when the short-term crisis is at an end”

Page 12: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

2008-09 Crisis

Page 13: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

James Meade (1955)

• “free trade and fixed exchange rates are incompatible in the modern world, and all modern free traders should be in favour of variable exchange rates.”

Page 14: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Other evidence

• Great Depression – Eichengreen & Irwin (2010), Irwin (2012)

• Strong dollar in early 1980s

• Real exchange rate and antidumping

– Knetter & Prusa (2003), Bown & Crowley (2011)

• Real exchange rate and protectionist legislation – Broz (2010), Oakley (2011)

Page 15: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates
Page 16: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates
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• Overvalued currency

– Export tax and import subsidy

– contract domestic production of tradables

→ protectionism at home

• Undervalued currency

– Expand production of tradables

→ Protectionism abroad?

Page 18: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Exchange rate protectionism

• Max Corden (1982)

– Undervalued exchange rate

– Protect tradables relative to non-tradables

– Also distorts resource allocation

Page 19: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Salter diagram

Tradables

Non-tradables

Balanced trade

Page 20: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Salter diagram

Tradables

Non-tradables

Trade surplus

Page 21: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Why undervalue?

• Rodrik (2008)

– Undervalued currencies → faster growth

– Overvalued currencies → slower growth

– Externality in tradables sector?

– Undervalued defined as deviation of real exchange rate from PPP

Page 22: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates
Page 23: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

IMF provisions

• Articles of Agreement:

– “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.”

• 1977 decision

– “protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in exchange markets” evidence of currency manipulation

Page 24: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

WTO provisions

• Article 15: – Countries “shall not, by exchange action, frustrate

the intent of the provisions” of the agreement

– Meaning exchange controls, not exchange rates?

• Article 23 – Nullification and impairment

• Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

Page 25: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Another history lesson

Page 26: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Resisting revaluation: foreign exchange reserves

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

bill

ion

s o

f U

S d

olla

rs

Japan

West Germany

Mark revalued (Oct 69)

Mark floated (May 71)

Page 27: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Treasury Secretary John Connally

• “Foreigners are out to screw us. Our jobs is to screw them first.”

• “The dollar may be our currency, but it is your problem.”

Page 28: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Nixon shock of August 1971 10% import surcharge

Page 29: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Coincidence?

Japan

Switzerland Germany

Netherlands Belgium

France Britain

Sweden Italy

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

70 75 80 85 90 95 100

Cu

rren

cy A

pp

reci

atio

n in

19

71

, p

erce

nt

Share of exports to the United States subject to import duties

Page 30: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

• Article XV – Establishes GATT deference to IMF on all exchange rate

matters

• IMF – “justified as a means of improving the U.S. balance of

payments only until it is possible to supplant it by effective action in the exchange rate field”

• GATT – “inappropriate given the nature of the United States

balance-of-payments situation and the undue burden of adjustment placed upon . . . the trade of other contracting parties.”

Page 31: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Smithsonian agreement

• “the most important monetary agreement in the history of the world”

–Richard Nixon

Page 32: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Volcker on the Nixon shock

• “The conclusion reached by some that the United States shrugged off responsibilities for the dollar and for leadership in preserving an open world order does seem to me a misinterpretation of the facts. . . . The devaluation itself was the strongest argument we had to repel protectionism. The operating premise throughout was that a necessary realignment of exchange rates and other measures consistent with more open trade and open capital markets could accomplish the necessary balance-of-payments adjustment.”

Page 33: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

China

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November 2011

Page 39: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

FEER

• “Fundamental equilibrium exchange rate”

– Rate at which external imbalances and capital flows can be indefinitely sustained

– Current account deficit +/- 3% of GDP

Page 40: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates
Page 41: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates
Page 42: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Problems

• How do we know if a currency is “undervalued”? – Limits on accumulation of foreign exchange

reserves?

• Can governments control the real exchange rate?

• What about capital account liberalization as a substitute?

Page 43: Trade Policy and Exchange Rates

Conclusion

• Trade economists should pay attention to exchange rate policies

• Exchange rate misalignments & disputes can lead to trade policy interventions

• If the IMF & WTO don’t provide guidance, countries will act unilaterally