Upload
others
View
0
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Working Paper No. 11/2017 | June 2017
Trade in Services and Development: The Case of Perception in Chile Dorotea López Giral, Camila García Pérez, Felipe Muñoz Navia Institute of International Studies University of Chile
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] Trade in services and its positive relation with countries’ development has been a consideration in the design of public policies. In particular, since the return of democracy, it has been pointed out by Chilean authorities the intention to improve services exports to add value and diversify its basket. Since the first decade of the 2000 the State has implemented a series of programs and strategies directed to achieve these objectives. However, the matrix remains anchored in natural resources, particularly copper. Although trade in services has increased, it has not done so as expected. In order to understand the reasons why public policies intend to promote the service sector have failed achieving their objective, this work has interviewed experts from the public, private and academic sector, international organizations and NGOs to collect their perception on policies to promote services exports implemented in the period 1990 – 2014. For a better understanding of the results, three overlapping levels are distinguished, in a logical hierarchy from greater to lesser extent: Level I: Considerations on economic doctrines and corporate cultures. Level II: Considerations on the specificity of service industry and economic considerations. Level III: Considerations on specific policies and instruments. Some conclusions and recommendations are presented at the end. Research for this paper was funded by the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs under the SECO / WTI Academic Cooperation Project, based at the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern, Switzerland. SECO working papers are preliminary documents posted on the WTI website (www.wti.org) and widely circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. These papers have not been formally edited. Citations should refer to a “SECO / WTI Academic Cooperation Project” paper with appropriate reference made to the author(s).
TRADE IN SERVICES AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF PERCEPTION IN CHILE
Dorotea López G.1 - Camila García P.
2 - Felipe Muñoz N.
3
Abstract
Trade in services and its positive relation with countries’ development has been a consideration in the design
of public policies. In particular, since the return of democracy, it has been pointed out by Chilean authorities
the intention to improve services exports to add value and diversify its basket. Since the first decade of the
2000 the State has implemented a series of programs and strategies directed to achieve these objectives.
However, the matrix remains anchored in natural resources, particularly copper. Although trade in services
has increased, it has not done so as expected. In order to understand the reasons why public policies intend to
promote the service sector have failed achieving their objective, this work has interviewed experts from the
public, private and academic sector, international organizations and NGOs to collect their perception on
policies to promote services exports implemented in the period 1990 – 2014. For a better understanding of the
results, three overlapping levels are distinguished, in a logical hierarchy from greater to lesser extent: Level I:
Considerations on economic doctrines and corporate cultures. Level II: Considerations on the specificity of
service industry and economic considerations. Level III: Considerations on specific policies and instruments.
Some conclusions and recommendations are presented at the end.
Key words
Services export - export promotion - Chile - diversification - development - trade and value added
1 Ph. D. in Social Science, University of Chile. M. Phil in Economics, University of Cambridge; B. A. in Economics,
ITAM. Associate Professor, University of Chile, WTO Chair holder. [email protected] 2 Master in International Studies, Universidad of Chile. Political Scientist, Diego Portales University, Chile. Analyst,
Strategic Planning Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. Lecturer at Institute of International Studies,
University of Chile. [email protected] 3 Master in International Studies, Universidad of Chile. B.A. in Economics University of Chile. Assistant Professor,
University of Chile. [email protected]
3
INTRODUCTION
Chile is a country renowned for its trade openness and high economic integration to the world. It is also very
well studied case for its substantial reliance on cooper and other natural resources exports. This has been a key
issue for the different governments, no matter the ruling political party, for which they had establish various
strategies and policies to transform the export and productive matrices into services. With the consideration
that services could be one way to reach a higher degree of development.
The effects of exports over economic development are closely related to their value-added content. This
means that products with superior quality and more innovation incorporated will have better results in
economies. Those countries that have managed to diversify and add value have done so through programs that
contains public policies; this is, with State intervention.
The importance of the services sector in economic development has increased in the last decades, with a
progressive strengthening of its weight in economic activity and employment generation. There is increasing
evidence that the activities with the highest added value are those that allow more development and services,
according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), generate two-thirds of the globally value added. The
increasing integration of markets and the emergence of new tradable services, as a result of technological
changes and new forms of production, have led countries to identify more complex services as a way to
develop and diversify their productive and export baskets.
Meanwhile, the composition of Chilean exports remains anchored on the exploitation of natural resources with
low added value. This concentration has been a concern in all administrations since the return to democracy.
The presidential speeches of the first governments, which reaffirmed the strategy of openness, aimed at
reorienting it towards an improvement in the quality of exports and it was not until the first government of
President Bachelet (2006-2010) when it was recognized the need for industrial policies, and the improvement
of the productive structure and export to achieve development and overcome the inequity problem.
There is consensus in the academic, public and private worlds that the diversification of the export basket,
especially oriented to qualified services, is essential, both to reach the goals or expectations of national
development, and to achieve the consequent improvement in the living conditions that such development
would enable. In this sense, the role of the State through the implementation of general strategies of economic
development is fundamental and has been so in those countries that have reached higher levels of
development. Despite of the above, in Chile the results obtained account for an insufficiency or poor quality
of public policies implemented.
4
The article focuses on carrying out, together with the literature review, a series of interviews, to identify the
ideological and academic discussions that exist in relation to the convenience of the State intervention for the
economic development or, on the contrary, the limits that it is considered to have. In other words, the
arguments those defends or refuse to have a State that acts by prioritizing or promoting the export of services.
In Chile some export promotion policies have been implemented in a punctual way however the real situation
is that the matrixes are still highly primary concentrated. Exports of services have grown but not in the
expected and necessary amount to modify the Chilean situation. The objective of this article is to capture the
perception of key actors in the public, academic and private sectors regarding their opinion of the results of
the different attempts to increase services exports and create a solid new export sector in the period 1990 -
2014. Understand the tension between the manifested intention of diversifying the economy and the
persistence of an export basket primarily based.
The interviews were conducted to key informants form public, academic and private sectors, including
international organizations and non-governmental organization. The selection used as main criteria the
relation between the interviewed and the services sector. The sample is biased to public sector mainly to
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Treasury.
In the first section we will review the literature that sustains the positive relation between trade in services and
development. In the second, the different programs implemented in Chile will be mentioned. Then the results
of the interviews will be presented and finally some conclusions.
TRADE IN SERVICES AND DEVELOPMENT
Trade in services and development is still a difficult to probe causal relation, the absence of a strong
theoretical corpus is compensated with a high degree of agreement and empirical evidence that value added by
some services in exports boost growth which is a precondition for development (Adlung, 2007; Coll-Hurtado
& Córdoba y Ordóñez, 2006; Mattoo, Rathindran, & Subramanian, 2006; UNCTAD, 2010b, 2016; World
Bank, 2010). Theory accords no special role to services activities in growth, with the exception of financial
services (Hoekman & Mattoo, 2008a; King & Levine, 1993). There are some stylized facts that support this
positive relation like that develop countries services export participation is higher than those of developing
countries; and that countries have shown to be more resilient to crisis when they are services oriented.
This absence of theory is also reflected in the insufficient empirical research on how trade in services are
relevant for an economy and which policies support the emergence of dynamic and efficient tradable services
sectors (Hoekman, 2017). It is more common to find literature about the role of services as the backbone of an
economy and the role they have to overcome poverty (Barngrover, 1963; Eschenbach & Hoekman, 2006;
5
Hoekman & Mattoo, 2008b; Riddle, 1986). CEPAL (2012) explained the consistency of studies correlating
countries’ income level with the preponderance of the service sector in the economy. Services are identified as
the pillar of growth while open services markets have become the underpinning for global growth (Kenneth,
2006; UNCTAD, 2010a).
Trade in services matter for growth and development in different ways. Trade liberalization is a fundamental
channel for improving services performance (Borchert, Gootiiz, Grover, & Mattoo, 2015; Cali, 2008). With
the increasing tradability of services due to the technological changes allowing more services to be traded
cross-border more research has been develop (Hoekman, Mattoo, & Sapir, 2007; Mattoo & Payton, 2007;
Mattoo & Sauvé, 2003). According to WTO (2010), the benefits of trade liberalization could be divided in a
domestic and an international dimension. The first one is that liberalization improves the domestic services
market, attract investment, which enhances services, and increase competition, which theoretically improves
innovation. Nevertheless, these results depend on how liberalization is executed. The international dimension
states that having a better domestic services market increase the probability of export both services and
manufactures. Robinson, Wang, and Martin (2002) considered that service sector trade liberalization not only
directly affects world service production and trade, but also have significant implications for other sectors.
Konan and Maskus (2006) determine that services liberalization increase economic activity in all sectors, raise
the real returns of capital and labour and generate large welfare gains.
The more conclusive studies are those for financial services. For example Francois and Schuknecht (1999) in
a cross country growth regressions found a high correlation between financial sector openness and the
increase in sector competition, and then a relationship between growth and financial sector competition.
Hoekman and Mattoo (2008b) explore the role of services in economic growth, focusing in particular on
channels through which openness to trade in services may increase productivity. They mainly conclude that
financial services can affect growth through enhanced capital accumulation or technical innovation. They also
conclude that low cost and high quality telecommunications will generate benefits. Francois, Van Meijl, and
Van Tongeren (2005) established that opening foreign bank entry does improve access to financial services,
improve banking sector efficiency and promote economic growth directly and indirectly.
Literature also deals with the effect of openness in services on economic growth for countries at different
stages of economic development (Bhagwati, 1984a, 1984b; Wölfl, 2005). Francois and Reinert (1996) point
out that value added originating in services is positively linked to the level of per capita income. Regarding
developing countries, Cattaneo (2010) in an individual analysis for different sectors found the positive effect
between trade in services and develop. A. López, Niembro, and Ramos (2012) analyse the insertion
possibilities of Latin-American countries and the advantages form opening. El Khoury and Savvides (2006)
measure the influence of services liberalization in developing countries and found a relationship between
6
openness in telecommunication services and growth for countries with income per capita below an
endogenously determined threshold level and no evidence of a significant relationship for countries above it.
There is an increasing amount of literature that measures trade in services impact on growth subject to the
pattern of comparative advantage in producing manufactures and services (Hogan, Keesing, Singer, &
Mundial, 1991). Hogan et al. (1991) have empirically studied the relations of trade or trade in services
liberalization and their effect in manufacturing. Deardorff (2001) points out that trade liberalization in services
can yield benefits, by facilitating trade in goods that are larger than one might expect from analysis of the
services trade alone, and can also stimulate fragmentation of production of both goods and services. Arnold,
Javorcik, and Mattoo (2006) conclude that services policy matters for manufacturing performance and that
there is a strong correlation between services sector reform and productivity of local producers relying on
services as intermediate inputs. Deardorff and Stern (2008) explained that opening services sectors to foreign
providers is a fundamental channel through which services reforms affect downstream productivity in
manufacturing.
The positive effects in labour force services have and the effect over development is another relevant route of
research (Bosworth & Triplett, 2004; Browning & Singelmann, 1978; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2011b; Hansda,
2001; Riddle, 1986). Services is one of the most important labour force origin and will be each day more
relevantly in the global value chains (Miroudot & Shepherd, 2016; UNCTAD, 2016). The low mechanization
of services is one of the reasons of the increasing labour force in this sector (Soubbotina, 2004).
Some country`s cases are emblematic for understanding the links between services and development as India
(Banga, 2005; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2011a; Hansda, 2001; Singh, 2006), United States (Alejandro et al.,
2010; Bosworth & Triplett, 2004), Singapore (Anwar & Sam, 2008; Yue, 2005), amongst others. Empirical
literature mainly those of the cases of south Asia have given a turn to Latin American research, mainly
because we were some decades ago in very similar conditions of non-diversified export baskets and most of
Asian countries reverted this situation which is not the regions actuality (Arriagada, 2007; Coll-Hurtado &
Córdoba y Ordóñez, 2006; A. López et al., 2012; A. López, Ramos, & Torre, 2009; Luna, 1989; F. Prieto,
2004; F. Prieto, Sáez, & Goswami, 2011).
Trade in services and its liberalization matters for growth, a requirement for development. This positive
relation is dependent on how the implementation of opening markets is performed and also the benefits are in
direct association with the level of development of each country. Trade openness improves the domestic
services sectors and its possibilities of increasing exports. That also has a positive effect over manufactures
and improves labour. Trade in services is a key issue in the global value chain (GVC) structures and in adding
value to exports, which are the real challenges for the region of Latin America, a region with highly
concentrated export and production baskets. Telecommunications and transport particularly are identified as
7
essential element of the GVC that have increased in the last years. The liberalization of these services is to
open new trade opportunities for all the world firms to improve the world development.
The next questions that we try to deal with is how we can improve the trade on services, and which is the new
role of the State in promoting services in Latin America, mainly the case of Chile. This in a context of more
competitiveness of participation in GVC, where the process of relocation and fragmentation of production of
goods has moved to services and global offshoring in recent years has had significant growth (Direcon, 2015;
Muñoz et al., 2014).
SERVICES EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES
Policies and institutions, and their interaction, may explain in some aspects the dissimilarities in countries´
services sector performance. There is an increasing literature analysing the role of export promotion policies
and services trade development (Cali, Ellis, & Williem, 2008; Mattoo & Payton, 2007; OCDE, 2005; World
Bank, 2010). The existence of a positive relation has a diverse degree of consensus with a high agreement that
some kind of promotion policies are needed to boost or to create trade services exports in different sectors. As
A. López et al. (2012) argue, public policies play a fundamental role at the moment when a country wants to
attract investments and export services.
During the second half of the XX century exports promotion emerged as a fundamental element in any
economic development strategy. Nowadays, most of the States have export promotion institutions (EPI)
working against the market failures and supporting economic insertion of their countries (Lederman,
Olarreaga, & Payton, 2009; Seringhaus & Botschen, 1991). There are less studies regarding services export
promotion policies, and particularly in Latin-American countries compared to those on goods (Cali et al.,
2008; F. Prieto, 2003).
The non-traditional exports promotion emerges as a particularly appropriate field for trade selective policies.
Without an active promotion in these sectors exports tend to be concentrated in few firms and in products with
less dynamic demand. A central idea is that export promotion policies require not just liberalization or
macroeconomic stability; they should be directed to exporters to help them to overcome the sectorial barriers
and to have a fast reaction to price or other signals (Agosin & Basch, 1997). The capacity to export services is
determined by the interplay of endowments, institutions and infrastructure.
Regarding trade in services a series of arguments could be acknowledged to justify the State interventions
additionally to those identified for goods. First, owing to the nature of services, they are characterized by
elements of natural monopoly, high barriers to entry and asymmetries of information. Second, they are subject
not to easily identified tariffs, they are subject to regulations, norms and laws form other States. In third place,
8
the higher complexity in selling intangibles implies also more difficult for exporters in getting to other
markets. As we see the multimodality of transactions a characteristic of services creates different and more
barriers to trade, than those in goods.
To have a strategy in services demands to link institutions and instruments with the design of scenarios of
short and long term that allows creating competitive advantages more than use the existing ones (Cali et al.,
2008; F. Prieto, 1991) states that these policies should: a) create a level playing field and enable competition
between market players; b) warranty the quality of the services provided; c) protect consumers and guaranty
transparency; d) protect the environment; and e) guaranty access to services.
There are some barriers to services exports that governments must overcome: a) services are not goods, most
of the knowledge in how to improve export sectors has been develop to goods, many times the problem is that
policy makers just try to replicate these strategies in services (Francois & Hoekman, 2010); b) the absence of
an international agreed definition is a recurrent problem and the absence of trustable statics does not help to
design these policies (D. López & Muñoz, 2016); c) the unknown aspect of barriers, in services barriers are
more difficult to identify; there are no tariffs as in goods, there are domestic regulations, norms, etc.
(Hoekman & Mattoo, 2008b). Recently there has been developed a services restrictions index that could be
very useful (Service Trade Restrictions Index - STRI); d) identify those export potential sectors, how to get to
services producers that need support to export, and not to aim to less sectors or with low association levels (F.
Prieto, 2000). Finally, the dynamic changing nature of the sector and its necessities, are increasingly, more
complex than they were ten years ago.
The most common trade in services promotion instruments used had been: Trade openness and trade
agreements; Support to market exploration and commercial intelligence; Information spreading; Improving
capabilities; Cluster; Associativity; Subsidies; Tax and regulatory support; Mechanism of finance; Exchange
rate policies; and Policies for investment attraction. The export promotion State entities are essential for the
insertion of a country in global value chains GVC and in adding value to its exports through services. Services
have characteristics that made them more susceptible for this kind of support. Latin American still has a lot of
space to become a services exports region. Chile has explained his intention to become an important services
export economy. ProChile is the main export promotion agency and has a services department; also CORFO is
directed to services, in the next section this and the different instruments will be revised.
CHILEAN STRATEGIES FOR TRADE ON SERVICES PROMOTION
One of the main problems in Chile regarding diversification is the unsolved discussion between selectivity and
neutrality of economic policy. This is also a common disagreement in academic literature. For some authors,
intervention in certain sectors in developing countries is absolutely justified due to information and
9
coordination problems (Volpe, Carballo, & Gallo, 2011). Countries also have to choose between promotion
policies due to budget limitations. Most of Chilean economic policies have followed a neutrality approach,
despite its high dependency on natural resources exports, and that since more than 30 years ago the political
discourse claims that we have to diversify, identifying services as a way for achieving this objective.
On an institutional basis, trade in services promotion has been based mainly in two Ministries: Foreign Affairs
and Economy. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, first DIRECON (Dirección General de Relaciones
Económicas Internacionales) created in 1979, which is responsible for international economic relations and
trade negotiation has a specialized department on services, investment and transport. Second, ProChile,
created in 1974, the export promotion agency that since 2004 has a services department. At the Ministry of
Economics is CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción), established in 1939 with the objective to
enhance national productive activity oriented to create industrial capacity. For many years concerned with
traditional sectors, services appeared with the clusters Programme during the first President Bachelet
government. In the last years, other institutions related to services have also started to get involved in facilitate
trade in services. Particularly, at the Treasury Ministry, the customs service (Servicio Nacional de Aduana),
the internal revenue service (Servicios de Impuestos Internos) and the foreign investment attraction office
(before Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras, today Agencia de Promoción de la Inversión Extranjera or
InvestChile,) have begun to get awareness of the importance of services exports.
Below we present the main policies implemented in Chile towards services promotion in the last years. We
must take into consideration, as stated above, that for the most years, a neutrality approach was in place,
leaving selective policies aside, until the implementation of the clusters program during the first Bachelet
government.
Trade Openness
In the context of a neutral economic policy, Chilean governments worked to set up the conditions for the
development of all industries, including services, allowing them to compete both at the domestic and
international markets. Therefore, trade openness becomes sort of the base of economic policy. As Chile is a
small economy, opening and guaranteeing access to new markets was the main objective in the decades of
1990 and 2000.
Services become part of this strategies, particularly after their inclusion in the GATT`s Uruguay Round, and
the establishment of the WTO GATS in 1995. Chile placed horizontal limitations on commercial presence and
movement of natural persons on its list. The specific commitments undertaken by Chile under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) cover 5 of the 12 service groups defined in the Sectorial
Classification List of Services: business services, communications services, Financial services, tourism
services and travel related services, and transport services. Chile only assumed commitments related to the
10
auxiliary services of air transport in the last item. As this was the first negotiation regarding services,
commitments made by Chile are less than their actual openness, and it is possible to affirm that the country
offers better entrance conditions than those consecrated in the lists.
The main advances made in services negotiations have been in Chilean preferential agreements. In 1996, after
the failure of NAFTA because of the United States government's inability to obtain approval of a Fast Track
by its congress, Chile opens itself to negotiate bilaterally with Canada in what would be the first Free Trade
Agreement, and the first time services were included in a bilateral negotiation. After this agreement, the
inclusion of the services in the work agendas at the time of starting each new negotiation becomes an
important condition for Chile. In general, the service chapters contain commitments in three of the four modes
of provision, as mode 3 is confined to specific chapters of foreign investment or bilateral agreements in these
areas.
Out of the 26 Chile`s trade agreements in force today (annex I), 18 contain provisions related to trade in
services. Chile negotiated with the modality of positive list the chapters of services contained in the
agreements with the European Union, with EFTA, Hong Kong, China and Mercosur. In the latter cases, the
issue was dealt with in supplementary agreements. The rest of the agreements that include services (including
the United States, Canada and Mexico) were negotiated following the negative list NAFTA model. According
to estimates made in the WTO, through its preferential trade agreements Chile has commitments in more than
85% of the service sectors in mode 3 and more than 75% in mode 1 (Roy, 2011). Chile is also part of the
ongoing TiSA negotiation, the trade in services agreement negotiated aside WTO. For Chile, this negotiation
is important due to the participation of economies with which we do not have chapters of services in force;
substantial improvements in offers from partners with which we already have FTAs in force, such as the EU;
agreement with new or improved disciplines and broad sector coverage, including matters of particular
interest to Chile, such as temporary entry of service providers, professional services, electronic commerce and
services related to air transportation; and due to Chile`s will to play a leading role in the design of the rules
that will govern world trade in services over the coming decades, as it is an agreement that aims to be
multilateralized and involving economies that account for 70% of global trade in services, including important
partners Chile, such as the US, the EU and 5 other Latin American countries (DIRECON, 2017).
In order to complement trade agreements markets access, Chile has also signed Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreements (IPPAs, Annex II) and Double Taxation Agreements (DTAS, Annex III). IPPAs were
signed as a way to attract FDI, by securing conditions and delivering legal certainty to foreign investors at a
time when the country needed the inflow of capital. But the development of the national economy, and in
particular of some economic sectors, has led Chile today to use these agreements as a way to protect its
investments, particularly in other South American countries. Annex II presents a list of IPPAs subscribed by
Chile that are in force at the date of this work. DTAs were signed with the aim of facilitating the establishment
11
of companies in the country and allowing national firms to set up branches and representations in third
countries. The double taxation agreements are international legal instruments signed between two states,
which are incorporated into the domestic legal system of each of them and whose purpose is to eliminate or
reduce double international taxation that affects or hinders the exchange of goods and services and Capital
movements, technologies and persons, benefiting exclusively the natural or legal persons resident or
domiciled in one of the contracting States.
Sectoral Brands
This program originates with the objective of supporting the Chilean productive sectors through the
international positioning of sectorial brands, representative of national productive sectors and that contribute
to the image of Chile abroad. According to E. Prieto (2013), the incorporation of Sectorial Brands into
ProChile since 2011 has made it possible to order and strengthen state support for the internationalization of
companies and productive sectors, by taking advantage of the institution's experience in promotional matters
of exports, knowledge of the markets and its wide international network. This program is planned for one year
and must be renewed annually. ProChile undertakes to co-finance up to 60% of annual activities with no
ceiling. The idea is that when a sector "already has its sectorial brand, they can continue with the work done
by postulating an implementation project, as it seeks to give continuity to existing brands, in order to
consolidate brands in time, and not Lose the efforts and the initial investment made " (E. Prieto, 2013). Since
the inception of the program, 19 sectoral brands have been created, based on both goods and services. The
sectorial brands focused on the export of services include gastronomic, architecture, biotechnology, education,
cinema, engineering, information technology, manufacturing; mining suppliers and tourism (annex III).
CORFO has different programs, not only oriented to services.4 These programs are mainly directed to
overcome financial problems, and the development of new industrial areas, amongst its programs that could
be used by services providers, we may acknowledge:
On competitive creation:
o NODOS: export promotion platform;
o FOCAL: quality improvement program;
o PROFO: associative development program;
o PDP: program for suppliers development;
o PFC: a program for competitiveness capacitation;
On innovation:
o IFI: support projects on technological investment;
o PDT: technological diffusion program;
o CATAPULT(A): on technological innovation, business and validation;
4 A full description may be found in their web page www.corfo.cl.
12
On entrepreneurs support:
o Scale up; co-financing and support of dynamic business;
o COBEX, trade coverage;
o FOGAIN: investment and working capital guarantee;
o PROINVESTMENT, on investment coverage.
Additionally, some tax exceptions for services had been implemented such as value added tax (VAT)
exemption for those services supplied by foreigners not living in Chile that the Customs Service classifies as
services exports, and to those received by tourism hotels in foreign currency. A stamps tax exemption is also
considered for documents oriented to finance credit operations for exports (Law No 3475). Article 36 of the
Decree Law No. 825 of 1974 provides that exporters are entitled to recover the VAT they have been charged
when buying goods or using services for their export activity. They have the same right regarding the tax paid
when importing goods for the same object. The recovery of VAT occurs, either by charging directly to the tax
debts that originate from operations within the country, or by requesting its return. A series of measures to
facilitate the reimbursement of value added tax and capital goods imports, through online platforms (SIF-M
system) have been implemented.
Global services cluster
In 2006, at the beginning of Michelle Bachelet's presidential term, the National Innovation Council for
Competitiveness (CNIC) defined the National Innovation Strategy for competitiveness, with a view to
doubling GDP per capita by 2020. In the framework of this Strategy, and based on the diagnosis made by the
international consulting firm Boston Consulting Group in 2007 and the recommendations arising from its
"Cluster Competitiveness Study of the Chilean Economy", five clusters are defined by the sectors with the
greatest potential for growth in the medium and Long term: food, mining, special interest tourism, aquaculture
and offshoring (Boston Consulting Group, 2007). At the end of 2007, the clusters are implemented, through
the formation of strategic councils, the election of executive secretaries and the elaboration of specific
agendas. During 2011, under the administration of President Sebastián Piñera, CORFO defines non-selectivity
as a management criterion and reformulates the cluster program, in order to support private sector initiatives
in a neutral way. It is recognized that markets are dynamic and therefore public policies must adapt to the
circumstances (CORFO, 2012).
In order to evaluate the results of the policies implemented towards the promotion of the services export
industry, the following section presents the results of interviews conducted with key stakeholder, in order to
analyse their perception regarding this topic.
13
RESULTS: KEY STAKEHOLDERS PERCEPTIONS
This section presents the results of the research on why development-oriented policies in Chile's exporting
services sector did not achieve the expected results. Through the identification of the reasons perceived by the
key stakeholders related to services and promotion policy. They have a diagnosis of what happened during
the process from their different spheres and participated in different ways in defining what was done or not.
They were classified for reporting purposes according to their most relevant job in services. Three main
categories were defined: public sector (A), private sector (B) and other stakeholders (C); due to confidentiality
clauses, interviewees will be identified according to these categories. From the 49 interviews, 24 are from the
public sector, 11 were ministers in different governments (Foreign Affairs, Treasury, Economy and
Agriculture) or vice-presidents of CORFO or directors of ProChile; they will be identified for reporting
purposes with an A1. Then, 13 are directors or department responsible from DIRECON, CORFO, Treasury
Ministry, Customs and Agriculture, identified as A2. The second category, private sector, includes 6 actors
form individual firms (B1) and 5 representatives from private associations or business chambers (B2). Finally,
14 belong to academy, NGOs and international organizations, they were identified C. The sample has a bias
towards the public sector and mainly to the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy and Treasury. This was
because the question sought to understand why more aggressive strategies were not designed, used or
considered from different administrations, since there was a deep awareness that the lack of complexity in the
country's export and production baskets was insufficient to achieve better jobs, greater equity and improve
individuals’ life quality.
In general, they start from the initial premise that confirms an absence of a state policy to promote services.
They show consensus that there was no policy to promote the export of services, beyond specific initiatives, at
least until the first government of President Bachelet. Likewise, they consider that the current productive
export matrix - intensive in copper and agroindustry with low added value, and not in services - is the result of
a lack of consistency, resources and will. In this direction, it can be said that another explanation of this
insufficient development was the absence of many factors, mentioned in this section, and of such depth that it
made it very difficult to try to achieve such an ambitious goal. In this way, the question operates as an
analysing element of the vision of the economic development experts regarding the corporate, institutional and
even cultural ideological supports of our society. More than talking about a failure, it is a clear awareness of
the impossibility of meeting a goal such as that proposed for the services sector.
For a better understanding of the results, three overlapping levels are distinguished, in a logical hierarchy from
greater to lesser extent:
Level I: Considerations on economic doctrines and corporate cultures.
Level II: Considerations on the specificity of service industry and economic considerations.
Level III: Considerations on specific policies and instruments.
14
Below, an in depth analysis of these levels is presented.
Level I: economic doctrines and corporate cultures
On this level the first order determinants in our research have been grouped together and identified by the
relevant actors, which are the economic doctrines adopted in Chile and its business groups. In all the
interviews these first order elements present an important explanatory load.
The consensus answer was that there has been an absence of policies that could modify in a significant way
the Chilean export structure into services. They acknowledged that at least until the first Bachelet government
there were only punctual initiatives to promote services. Interviewees indicated that the latter is a consequence
of the neoliberal model´s high permeation into Chilean society. With the concept of subsidiary State deeply
incrusted in all the governments. This implies the agreement on the non-State intervention in economic
aspects. “The State subsidiarity was very clear, and it was fundamental to sustain it for the market well
operation” (A1). The model generated an institutional and a thinking structure that defined the policy making
in productive development. As one interviewee pointed out, "the model penetrated so much that it convinced
policymakers that neutrality was best. It not only generated a political class, but companies also preferred this
scheme of neutrality" (B2). Other acknowledged that "what the market cannot solve is difficult to think that an
intervention could achieve, since in general it deepen the distortion" (A1). It is recognized that there has been
a fear of using expressions such as 'industrial policy', not to mention 'planning'.
The principle of neutrality marked the policy of productive development in a definitive way, and economic
textbooks indicated that the danger of choosing the winners outweighed the benefits of doing so, therefore the
productive development policy to implement was to give the market the conditions to function as close to
perfect competition. As one stakeholder mentioned "neoliberalism punctured any policy of incentive in any
sector" (A2). There was a high agreement amongst them that neutrality was the approach that defined the
approximation of the State to the productive sphere. In what they differed, and more like a posture in the light
of results, is whether or not this position was correct. What was repeated is that the absence of strategy was
indeed the strategy: "there was no national productive strategy, much less to look at services in a formal way"
(C), or that, in fact, "there were more relevant priorities than to industrialize the country and less to support
services" (B2).
Thus, the model becomes a kind of internal law due in large part to the desire for peace and governance
present at a particular moment in recent history. That is, this model replied to a specific need for stability that
would allow the peaceful democratic transition. One interviewee mentioned that "the rest of the region had
emerged from dictatorships with severe problems of hyperinflation and economic disorder. We had to
15
demonstrate that we were capable of giving governance without a military government in command" (C). And
while there were dissenting voices about how the model should be implemented, finally "we were attached to
the neoliberal model, because we had to ensure governance, and for that, every economic strategy should be
international" (A1). Some believed that the conditions for the model were determined by external and existing
factors and that "the model implanted by the Chicago boys5 would have arrived even without them" (C), or
that "it was the model demanded by conditions prevailing in the country in the 70s and did not depend on the
government on duty" (A1). The model, according to this view, "had worked and had damaged those
companies or interests that could rebel against its imposition, so it was not very difficult to think that was the
way to go" (C). That is, those who had already endured privatization, openness and change under the
dictatorship were not going to oppose, and those who might have opposed had not resisted previous reforms.
The other problem with the model is that by eliminating any type of planning attempt and leaving everything
to market forces, a problem was repeated in many countries of Latin America: a short-term vision in the
government's action. As one of the stakeholders mentioned "the general view of the region is short-term. This
was radicalized before the neoliberal model and is notorious, for example, in the change that Chile did
modifying the presidential periods to four years. This makes impossible to achieve processes of greater
magnitude" (A2). Another added that "the problem is that services, innovation or simply trying to add value
necessarily imply a vision of investing now to collect later, and this is outside the type of society we have
moulded" (C).
For some experts there has to be a shift towards a more active horizontal policy in the direction of selectivity:
"not to return to industrial policy has to do with a fearful society, a conservative business and a State reduced
to a minimum. Chileans stopped being entrepreneur and if it does not recover it, we will not develop" (C).
The other determinant of the first order refers to business community, entitled in this context to assume the
complex initiative of organizing the production processes of exportable services. There is a conception that
Chilean business class did not have the necessary characteristics to assume such responsibility. The existing
entrepreneurial culture was restricted for reasons of cultural and historical class formation, in neo-rentier
forms, by climate, latitude and even by geology. We have, what we can name, an elite that is different from
the Asians; traditionally rentiers and landowners. The particular feature of Chile is that they are small elites,
isolated and used to agree amongst them. In the case of the rentier element, "it would respond to the presence
of factors associated with a society that lives off the exploitation of its natural resources and does not develop
capitalism" (C). The military coup replaced these elites with transnational capital that did not obtain its gain
from work or from the added value that labour produces, but from the income of the wealth of natural
resources, from the land. Therefore, they did have not incentives to innovate and create wealth.
5 “Chicago boys” is the name used to refer to the economic team of the Pinochet regime, due to their academic
preparation in the University of Chicago, US.
16
On the contrary, the development of an export services sector requires highly trained entrepreneurs in the
logic of complex management of productive advantages not necessarily associated with natural factors. Some
views that defended the model argued that "entrepreneurs are called rentiers only because they like to earn
money. And if they do it by exploiting natural resources and nobody regulates or prohibits them, why should
they make efforts in another direction?" (A1). In addition, they pointed out that "they are more committed
towards work, because they do not profit from the State. Look what happened with import substitution model"
(A1).
Meanwhile, from the institutions of the State responsible for the services sector they considered that to the
extent of their restrictions, they have reacted permanently to the demands placed by the business sector. But,
they pointed out that in services there is a serious problem in the ability of entrepreneurs to associate, because
of their heterogeneity and size: "the government tells them to identify their necessities and they are not
capable to get organized" (A1). The problem of associativity is very deep in this sector. From the point of
view of one of the respondents: "in a demand response scheme, those who can export are very large or
exceptions, such as the Sonda6 case" (B1).
Level II: specificity of service industry and economic considerations
In this level, we have identified considerations associated with the specificity of services sector, their
conditions and how these are exacerbated due to some Chilean characteristics. Specifically, economic
considerations are analysed as a result of the design of the economic model and the consequences it has had.
The understanding of decision makers on important aspects of services sector and their potential was
identified to be insufficient or null. It is possible to indicate that this unfamiliarity was explained as a
consequence of the following aspects, developed below: i) the recent irruption of the services in the
commercial world; ii) coexistence in a designed and structured world for goods; and iii) the difficulty of
measuring them and the meagre efforts made in this direction.
The possibility of exporting services as part of a development strategy appears in the region relatively late.
Moreover, according to one interviewee, Chile was quite "pioneer in considering them as a development
option" (B2). Services comprehension intention came in the 1990s, while for "goods there was absolute clarity
of what could be done" (B2). Another interviewee added that "in the 1990s there was only awareness that
there are services and that they can be traded" (B1). Services trade promotion came very late. For example, in
the framework of promotion policies: "ProChile just created a service department in 2004" (A1). And it was
6 Sonda is one of the biggest ICT Chilean companies, with presence in most of the Latin American markets.
17
established with "a low budget and at the request of a small group and due to the requirement of international
commitments" (A2).
In contrast, there was an increasingly developed view that we cannot speak of a broad service sector and that
individualizing them is essential: "services are difficult to understand and in turn are very heterogeneous.
They put all the services together and that does not how it should be" (B2). Interviewees recognized services
as a heterogeneous sector, but in spite of this there is no evidence of an intention to institutionally divide their
promotion or support. Nominally there is in ProChile a Services Department, but in contrast with goods, this
department has to work with the heterogonous service sector as a whole. As one interviewee said, "it is a
much dispersed sector, so it is difficult to have an objective, and all efforts are concentrated in small
departments" (A2).
Definitely it is complicated to understand services in a world of goods. The reason might be that "policies
have always been designed for goods and copied for services, which does not work" (A1). It is more
understandable a transaction in goods and to generate the policies around it, but to approach services is a more
complex task: "For example, regarding taxes, how to tax a service? It is still very complex, because you have
the logic of goods. In the case of tax returns, there is the need to enable customs to understand what is being
discussed and to proceed with tax refunds" (A1). This happens in most areas, where "excessive orientation to
goods as a result of the large endowments with which Chile has historically counted has tarnished the
development of services" (B1).
In a model whose logic of operation and design of public policies is based on indicators such as efficiency and
accounting results, it is hard to incorporate a sector that has not been statistically weighted: "a first problem
that is detected with the development of the services sector are problems in registering them, which would
account for a first great difficulty" (A1). There are no statistics, even at the global level, except for some
efforts by the WTO and the OECD, "but they will of course depend on national efforts as well" (A2). For this
reason, it is complex to make public policy without statistics in the framework of a model such as the Chilean,
which operates with indicators logic, "it is impossible to convince the ministers to do something if you do not
explain the profitability and less to the Parliament, not to mention the Treasury" (A2). Also, this becomes a
problem for the private sector, where associativity is fundamental: "how do we make our partners understand
that we have to submit numbers to the authorities to help us, or vice versa? We have asked the Central Bank
many times for support, but it has no interest" (B2). In this respect the role of the Central Bank as collector of
data is questioned, beyond those that can handle other public services. In particular, it is criticized not to have
made an effort to include new items in the balance of payments to have statistics on the sector. But, "it is
something involuntary that they do not support services. Because they do not know what it is, it is very
difficult to get into. On the other hand, goods are very simple" (C). Nevertheless, there have been some
attempts, "small strategies to develop statistics, but it is probably necessary to get rid of this marked trend of
18
indicators and to design support programs in areas that are considered potential based on other, less
quantitative criteria" (C).
It is interesting to highlight the responses of services exporters or those companies that have not been able to
export. They pointed out that their problems are linked to two institutions: National Customs Service (SNA)
and Internal Revenue Service (SII), which depend of the Treasury Ministry. Despite this critical look, these
interviewees argued that "there are customs problems that are not their responsibility to solve, but to Treasury.
Finally, the interests of the SII prevail before the SNA and as there is not enough lobby, they are allowed to
protect certain attributes" (B2). When consulted on this subject both the Treasury and the National Customs
Service responded that these dependencies only operate within the framework of a law and, in addition, do not
have sufficient resources to train and inform their operators or users: "we cannot facilitate more than we have
done. The law allows us to only make the tax exemption on mode 2” (A2). The size of the State is also a
limitation: "we do not have enough personnel, but it is clear that if it is a priority project of interest for the
country, we would have to dispose of them" (A1).
The model has created its own actors, that is to say, a public sector that has lack of creativity and that is not
able to establish those areas in which it wants to innovate. As already mentioned it responds permanently to
demands and does not venture into the creation of projects. It has not identified them, perhaps for fear of
choosing the winners and going against the theory. As one interviewee said, "we are full of barriers to
entrepreneurship. The government does not make changes, like stamp taxes. I'm not even suggesting deeper
changes" (C). Again, State´s neutrality has not demanded professionals thinking about the generation of value
added, since "the model has created a political class that does not consider industrial policy" (C). It seems that
"Chile is a country of improvisation and little politics" (C).
The size of the Chilean State was not considered adequate for the implementation of any type of industrial
policy and, more complex, the evaluation and monitoring thereof. The model has had the clear objective of
diminishing the role of the State, whose size and forms of participation are inferior to that of any developed
country: "public companies were eliminated and concessions were granted. There could be a larger State, but
with the same conviction it would not do either" (C). The objective of this process has been "to dismantle the
State. That is why Corfo’s status was lowered" (A1).
In addition, for some interviewees Chile is in a complex region regarding the level of trade openness of the
country, because where Chilean exports have greater added value are precisely its neighbours: "natural
commerce is with whom you share links, history, distance, even colonial ties, so the natural destiny is South
America, obviously" (C). This is reinforced by the fact that "SME entrepreneurs cannot go very far, at least at
an early stage. It would be logical to go to the countries of the Southern Cone, but the region is very bad as a
natural destination" (B2). In the private sector there was a negative perception about trading partners, as in the
19
case of Argentina, although they are recognized as attractive markets, they are considered to have conditions
that make it impossible to invest in them.
In another point, regarding human capital English proficiency had been identified by all diagnoses as essential
in the service export process: "we need skilled manpower and we do not speak English. There is a shortage of
human capital. With better labour we could create new sectors" (A2). This diagnosis was widely accepted,
even among the sectors with the necessary labour force: "how are we going to be service providers, if we do
not have the qualification to be one" (B2). In some sectors this has a greater impact. For example, "in tourism
we have no possibility without trained human capital" (A2). In addition, there is no determination of what the
country needs in the creation of skills, because "vocational training of technical staff is very important in the
development of a country. We not only need professions with advanced academic degrees" (A1).
Another great issue that the interviewees perceived was that in Chile there is lack of confidence amongst
society. This creates a crisis in associativity and reduces collaboration, which is very detrimental to growth
and development. One stake holder mentioned that, "we are not able to believe in the other" (C). The Legatum
Prosperity Index is an indicator developed by the Legatum Institute and considers 110 countries in 2014,
according to a variety of factors, including wealth, economic growth, personal well-being and quality of life.
The conclusion: "collaboration, a fundamental aspect in value aggregation, is at a deficient level in Chile"
(Marshalll & Rodríguez, 2010).
In their perception, the process of Chile's trade insertion in the world and its prominent role as part of the
economic policy strategy could not by itself modify the export basket, but it was expected. Treaties rarely
appeared in the interviewees' opinion as an aspect to be addressed, although most FTAs subscribed by Chile
have some reference to services, and in no case were identified as a useful exporting instrument. One of them
expressed that "the policy of agreements would be the main one, and the sectoral policies, driven mainly from
Corfo, more limited, to link public private partnership" (B2).
However, overvaluing trade policy in a country's economic policy may lead to neglecting the internal aspects
of this insertion: "trade agreements have not had a sufficiently relevant effect, apart from the opening of
markets and double taxation" (B2). And the worst thing is that this conception has disqualified the design of
other policies, because "the agreements served in many aspects, especially they gave Chile a kind of
international certification as a reliable country. What we must now do is move on to a second stage" (A1).
Public-private partnerships in Chile were not perceived to be developed, and although "there are some
initiatives, they are small. There are no such cases of success as was the one of the salmon, for example" (C).
It is possible to mention some experiences in the services sector, such as the case of architects, engineers or
even some timely export in areas of information technologies, but they do not yet have characteristics that
20
allow them to be sustainable and successful. Alliances are strengthened within the framework of a subsidiary
State model, under a new relationship in which the private sector and the public sector pursue common goals
and share the risks. However, it is difficult to conceive of these alliances without some apprehensions, such as
the private co-opting the State, or companies committing real resources and risk jointly: "entrepreneurs in
Chile always want the capital to be risked by the State" (B2).
The economic aspect has been a priority and has defined most of the State strategies, with a focus primarily on
the market and a subsidiary State, which has manifested itself in several of the structural issues that have been
revised. That is, "in Chile the economic world has been privileged over the political, which from a technical
view has been positive" (A2). As for the budget for the programs, another interviewee stresses that "if an idea
does not have the support in money, it does not work. The issue is because there are other (social) spending
priorities" (C). The relevance attributed to some ministries is evidence of the weight of the economic view:
"the power of Treasury is an indicator that the patterns that define policies are economic" (A2). Thus,
economic policy decisions have been centralized in the Treasury Ministry, reducing the force to ministries like
Economic, which are somehow called upon to do industrial policy: "the supremacy of the Treasury Ministry
against a country project is of high consensus" (A1).
The financial system, despite being a service, does not seem to understand or be willing to support service
companies. Services sector to its international insertion needs the financial provision: "there is no access to
risk capital. The financial had not developed a logic to work with services, which have no capital, so there is
no access to financing" (C). In some cases it was possible to move forward without pretending major changes:
"the credit sector has been full of regulations, but none to promote competition" (B2).
Other problem perceived is that in order for the market model to work, it is necessary to have competition:
"the level of collusion is evident in many sectors, not only in pharmacies. The difference is that there are those
who suggest giving greater power to the National Economic Prosecutor, including jail sentences" (A1).
Although competition policy in Chile they clarified is modern compared to the rest of the region, it is
insufficient. The fault is obvious, as one expert exposed: "retail is known to use internet platforms for price
matching and it is not possible by law to prove collusion" (B2). Competition is essential in the world of
services, because the margins are small and they are intensive in human capital, in particular to be an SME to
survive.
The exchange rate was identified as a very relevant factor and they highlighted that there had been given little
attention to it, not only in terms of services. There is little awareness that the exchange rate reduces
competitiveness: "there is a kind of obsession for inflation and excessive Central Bank´s power in it. It has
had strong consequences on the composition of the export basket and as long as this is not understood, it is
impossible to think of a change" (C). The model was very severe in establishing that the exchange rate should
21
not be transformed into a productive policy, but clearly it is an instrument that has devastated the export
basket and its composition: "moreover, if we review its evolution, it has not succeeded in helping non-
traditional exports emergence. For services competitiveness is essential to address this issue" (C). In other
words, it will never be possible to diversify if we are unable to control the exchange rate problem with
coherent strategies.
The pre-eminence of taxes for services export was highlighted as more important than for goods. As noted
previously, services are human resource intensive and their earnings depend on income from the payment of
human resources. Therefore, when exporters have to pay taxes in both countries it is impossible for them to
trade in this sector. This issue is directly related to the problem of ignorance regarding its nature and lack of
statistics. Understanding of barriers is very scarce and taxes are identified as a very relevant one. There have
been very general ideas, such as creating investment platforms, but the real problem is that "in Chile the
service export industry is affected by local taxes" (C). In some cases double taxation agreements were
reached, but they have not been sufficient. In other cases, users do not know their scope or existence, and
there seems to be no incentive to disseminate these agreements: "given the lack of knowledge of the services,
the SII performs its functions strictly and this discourages companies" (B2).
Level III: specific policies and instruments
Finally, at this level, a number of policy considerations and specific instruments and sectors related to services
are addressed. The interviewees pointed out that there were some initiatives for the design of programs
towards the services sector development, but they emphasized that they clearly did not correspond to a project
of greater complexity or even "for each of the subsectors. They were the response to specific needs or
individual ideas and budgets" (C). In addition, "there is little money and there is an important dispersion of
efforts" (A2). Moreover, there were no vertical policies and "there was never a policy aimed at specific
companies that selected winners, but rather more inquisitive cases" (A1).
Although it was possible to perceive an intention in many civil servants who had clarity on the potential of the
sector, no changes were made, even in aspects that were sometimes minimal: "there are few or no strategies in
the modification of norms or regulations that will help to advance in the conversion. The speeches have not
been translated into regulatory changes and much less economic" (B2).
At this level, a number of policies and instruments are analysed. In the process of this research the
interviewees were consulted regarding the evaluations that they had on the programs implemented. Neither the
private sector nor the public had structures to evaluate these programs, not only as a consequence of the short
term measures, but also because of lack of instruments and priorities: "they are such a small amounts, badly
22
distributed, that no one evaluates them, for what" (A1). As an example, one stakeholder explained that
CORFO failed to evaluate a program that was as relevant as the global services cluster. The program was
discontinued and funds were redirected. Although there was a possibility of renewing this policy, "the cluster
had not been evaluated and that is fundamental to justify its return" (A1).
In all the interviews, references were made to ProChile and CORFO as the entities most closely linked to
diversification and service-oriented policies. Opinions were divergent, but they have in common to describe
them as institutions with little functionality and with few resources, which support as much as possible, but
not in a relevant manner. Furthermore, the multiplicity of institutions oriented to the promotion and support of
services exports that do not have any kind of institutionalized coordination becomes an obstacle to the
implementation of the support itself. For example, "there is no link between ProChile and CORFO. It is more
about a personal relationship than a process of coordination. There is a great disarticulation of institutions like
CORFO, ProChile and Sercotec" (A1). They mentioned that there is something similar in the private sector,
because "those who make policies do not coordinate, nor do we the chambers on more obvious issues" (B2),
and there is an uneven or duplicate distribution of resources. In general, it seems that you have to be close to
CORFO, which have more funds, but the truth is that it operates heavily as isolated units. In the responses of
the interviewees was clear that the personal relationship and links over ranked institutional communication.
The lack of coordination, the diffuse role of different institutions on the same subject and the lack of success
of the implemented programs revealed that there has never been an agent "sufficiently empowered to make
policies in this direction" (B2). Service companies are primarily smaller, human-capital-intensive firms, this
means that unlike the goods sector -where there are strong incentives and possibilities for partnership- there
was no leadership or partnerships with which to dialogue: "not only is there a lack of leadership among the
diversity of public institutions; in the private sector as well" (B2).
Regarding ProChile, in some civil servants we found a negative perception of the institution, which was seen
as an inoperative entity, with a very marked orientation to goods and has a limited budget and receives little
attention. The private sector has a better perception, but always individually, for the support received, but not
thinking something will drastically changes its situation.
For a long time ProChile has reacted mainly to a demand logic and not to country strategy policies. It creates
programs and allocates budget depending on the requests of the guilds or associations: "the Department of
Services does not have the time, or an area that analyses the possibilities of development of any sector. In fact,
we have sections and these have already relation with the sectors" (A2). Also, the budget for services is very
low: "to a lesser extent, the promotion policies would be within ProChile (Sectorial brands), where services
are not a priority, for example, the budgetary differences with the forestry and livestock sector: they receive
23
ten times more" (A2). This is something to have in mind when you contrast ProChile performance and their
scarce resources.
Coordination and liaison with CORFO and other agencies that have similar objectives involve matters of a
non-institutional nature: "personal relationships are what make strategies more than cooperation between
institutions through established formal channels" (A2). We found in the interviews consensus on the little
coordination between the entities and no institutional structure that forces these synergies to occur. One
stakeholder explained that in part they respond to the interests of each organization, but fundamentally
attributes it to a coordination problem. A successful outcome depends very much on the type of leadership of
each institution at a specific time, which responds to a personal. An example was the null contact between
ProChile and CORFO during President Piñera government, due to conflict of styles between those who were
running them: "there was never as little contact between CORFO and ProChile as during this government"
(A2).
Regarding CORFO, it was distinguished as more relevant than ProChile in terms of budgetary advantages for
the programs in services. Thy perceived it as an institution with independence and resources, but strongly
influenced by the economic model, and that also underwent through an important process of dismantling.
Although CORFO has more budget than ProChile, their programs are very directed to goods although it
"would be the institution that could be successful in some diversifying policy. It has more weight than the
other" (C).
Finally, respondents were particularly asked about the reasons why the global service cluster did not function.
As we mentioned, it meant a turning point in the policy of neutrality that emerged in the first administration of
President Bachelet, which was the result of a job commissioned to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)7. In
some cases, the stakeholders' responses showed that the problem refers only to the suspension of funds
directed to the program. However, they recognized that the structure of the policy allowed it to be dismantled
so easily: "it is necessary to think with more long term perspective the policies in productive matters, since the
effects are only long term" (A2). So it cannot be thought that in a framework of four-year presidential periods,
certain policies continue to be pursued, which also require significant amounts of resources. As one
interviewee summarized, "with respect to the cluster initiative, they are long-term processes that should have
been allowed to mature, as was trade policy" (C). There are more critical expressions, which consider that "the
cluster failed because there was no clarity about what was wanted to propose. The cluster failed because what
was raised to attract high technology actually attracted cheap labour rather than modern services" (A1), or
that" the cluster failed because there was not enough long-term vision," (A1).
7 The government commissioned the Boston Consulting Group to develop a study identifying potential areas to boost
growth.
24
Through the interviews the stakeholder expressed voluntarily some recommendations for a future services
export promotion policy that we will present in the next section with the conclusions.
CONCLUSIONS
This research carried out an analysis of the role of the State in the planning and orientation of development
strategies for the sector of exportable services in Chile, in order to understand the relation and the tensions
derived from the dichotomy between the manifested aspiration to diversify the export production and the
subsistence of a little diversified basket based on raw materials with low added value. In the first section we
attempted to demonstrate that trade in services can have a positive impact on development, and that Chile has
been aware of this. Chile has made limited efforts to promote exports of services, as discussed above and has
failed to promote this sector to diversify the export matrix. The reality is that, beyond the negotiation of free
trade agreements, the efforts have been modest and very recent. In order to answer the question, interviews
were carried out with a series of stakeholders from the public and private sectors, as well as international,
academic and non-governmental organizations. The selection was based on their linkage and knowledge on
the subject of services or productive development policies in Chile.
The results obtained in this research arise from the analysis of the perception held by key stakeholders
regarding the role that the State had in the development of the service industry after the return to democracy.
This was done through the study of the public policies implemented, as well as the promotion programs for
the services sector that did not materialize, in order to represent the instruments used, both from the
knowledge of its general guidelines and from conceptualization that incorporated in its elaboration. The
results of the interviews, allowed the identification of three overlapping levels, in a hierarchy ranging from
macro problems to more technical and regulatory aspects
In the first level we grouped the considerations on economic doctrines and business cultures. This point refers
us to two reasons: on the one hand, the penetration of a neoliberal model with a conception of subsidiary State
embedded in all levels of society. It is a State that has limitedly promoted the service industry as a
consequence of the predominance of ideologies or political philosophies that privilege minimal State
intervention. On the other hand, is the existence of an entrepreneurial class that has not had the strength or will
to modify productive and export pattern.
The second deals with considerations of specificity in the service industry and associated economic aspects. In
the first instance, it is indisputable that in the short term services are less profitable with respect to the
development of alternatives such as agricultural or mining industry. In a country whose policy perspective is
closely related to electoral periods, it is complex to think of implementing strategies whose results would be
noticeable over longer periods.
25
In addition to the above, there is a high ignorance of the services sector and its potentialities, particularly with
respect to those of greater complexity, which explains, in some way, the low effort to support this sector. In
turn, this lack of understanding can be explained by the following reasons: the recent irruption of services in
the commercial world, their coexistence in a world designed and structured for goods, and the methodological
difficulty in measuring them.
Given the short-term vision and ignorance regarding the services sector, the situation is exacerbated by the
lack of institutional coordination in Chile to address the issue. This absence has meant that the programs are
dispersed, have divided resources and have little continuity. CORFO and ProChile do not have institutional
structures of coordination and this one is based on the will of people and their good or bad personal relations
with others. Likewise, there is a primacy of finance in the decisions of economic policy, under a marked
vision of non-intervention in the productive processes. An example illustrates the latter aspect: although the
private sector itself has identified the main obstacles in the SII and SNA, obstacles have not been removed.
In this same level, is recognized as a disadvantage the Chilean remoteness and isolation and the small size of
its market. In another aspect, the scarcity of skilled labour is diagnosed as one of the obstacles to the
development of a sector that is intensive in human capital. Finally, a low impact of openness is identified, a
process in which it was almost magically entrusted as an option for services to reach external markets, in
addition to the absence of a public-private action system. Amongst economic considerations, the policy of no
exchange rate intervention was another pillar of the model's severity, coupled with the volatility that has
historically affected companies to reach third markets. The tax structure has also been an impediment, in
particular due to double taxation.
The last level reviews specific service-oriented policy, instrument and sectoral considerations. ProChile and
CORFO are the object of deep criticism, which in many cases are linked to the foreground analysed, that is,
those associated with economic doctrine and business culture. ProChile has an area dedicated to services with
a very low budget - on average, one million dollars annually - and that arises only in 2006. Amongst these
programs, the Cluster of Global Services was the most representative, but in conjunction with the rest of the
initiatives has not managed to modify the panorama in a relevant way. This program ended with the change of
government between President Michelle Bachelet and President Sebastián Piñera, and its end shows the short-
term policy design and the little capacity for self-criticism.
Since the end of the field work, some new policies had been implemented in the country. In July 2015, the
Public-Private Technical Committee was created. The mission is to identify, analyse and evaluate and analyse
and evaluate the measures implementation that promote services exports, to ratify that they are feasible in the
context of the regulations and norms and the budgetary restrictions. Chileservicios.com is a new electronic
26
platform containing all information needed related to service export, mechanisms of support and promotion,
that helps exporters to export services. The National Customs Services has a new services classification valid
from June 2016, to make easier to apply the benefits to service exporters, fundamental to implement other
programs as the reimbursing the imported raw material in to services exports according to Law No 18708/88.
The Committee of Ministers of the Economic Area, composed by the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of
Economy, Development and Tourism, announced in March 2016 a package of 22 measures to boost
productivity and increase the economic growth capacity. The initiatives were focused on three areas: financing
of new initiatives, agenda for promotion and expand the definition of service to include them in the 0% VAT
benefit when exporting. Recently, the vice minister of treasury, Alejandro Micco, acknowledges that if the
country could not boost their exports on services it will impossible to have higher growth rates. “Chile should
be in the services engine. This is what we expect” (Micco, 2016). The current Ministry of Treasury, Rodrigo
Valdés, listed three commitments: create a public-private working group in services; revision of the regulatory
and procedures in tax and customs aspects related to services exports; and to develop an analysis of the private
or public financial mechanisms for the sector (Valdés, 2016).
Finally, there are a number of recommendations that are presented below, which address aspects ranging from
macro to micro:
It is recognized that the model has penetrated the different social strata and that the size of the State
makes it impossible to generate aggressive industrial policies that can cause deep disagreements. For
this reason, promoting and guiding small enterprises requires a lot of resources and it is more difficult
to internationalize them, so it is possible to condition the aid to large companies with the condition
that they work with the small ones.
The Government must create strategies and intervene. The debate is whether this should be done with
vertical promotion policies or not. For some interviewees, with great guidelines would be sufficient
and this would not have to attack the model. For others, the intervention should directly encourage the
creation of new sectors or the development of services that contribute in the areas where there are
comparative advantages, in the Chilean case of natural resources. If the State does not choose
winners, sectors would not develop.
In order to move towards better models of services development policies, there is a need to raise
greater ambitions. There must be a law that defines the modification of the basket as a priority and
that determines a coordinated institutions, with the necessary resources. ProChile should be part of the
Ministry of Economy and respond to an internal industry development plan, not only to demand.
ProChile also needs to be empowered to eliminate some systemic failures, as well as to develop
27
business capacity and design international marketing strategies. Inter-agency coordination should be
improved.
International certifications should be encouraged and disseminated so that service providers can
understand and use them.
The financial sector must raise its understanding of services of greater complexity, so that there are
incentives for entrepreneurship.
Public-private partnership is urgent for the country development, structured in such a way that there
are shared risks and in areas of national interest.
Tourism services should be encouraged and a definition of the type of tourism that the country
aspires to position in the world can be given, as well as a boost to the human capital needed to
promote this activity.
Finally, this paper proposes new topics for research with respect to those already established in the service
literature:
• How you establish development promotion policies with a long-term conception, as the alternative to
be able to modify the country's export and production matrix?
• Analyse each of the sectors with greater depth and relevance for the country.
• Detect the country's regional opportunities and potential in services, as well as the effects of its
integration into regional linkages in this area.
• The study of possible public-private partnerships.
REFERENCES
Adlung, R. (2007). The contribution of services liberalization to poverty reduction: What role for the GATS.
J. World Investment & Trade, 8, 549.
Agosin, M., & Basch, M. (1997). Export performance in Chile: lessons for Africa. WIDER Working Papers,
144(144).
Alejandro, L., Forden, E., Gosney, A., Herfindahl, E., Luther, D., Oh, E., . . . Wohl, I. (2010). An Overview
and Examination of the Indian Services Sector.
Anwar, S., & Sam, C.-Y. (2008). Services sector growth in Singapore. Singapore Management Review, 30(2),
19-33.
Arnold, J., Javorcik, B., & Mattoo, A. (2006). The productivity effects of services liberalization: Evidence
from the Czech Republic. World Bank working paper, 1-38.
Arriagada, I. (2007). Abriendo la caja negra del sector servicios en Chile y Uruguay. María Alicia Gutiérrez
(Comp.), Género familia y trabajo: rupturas y continuidades. Desafíos para la investigación política,
23-47.
Banga, R. (2005). Critical issues in India’s service-led growth. Indian Council for Research.
Barngrover, C. (1963). The Service Industries in Economic Development: A Note. American Journal of
Economics and Sociology, 22(3), 331-334.
Bhagwati, J. (1984a). Splintering and disembodiment of services and developing nations. The World
Economy, 7(2), 133-144.
Bhagwati, J. (1984b). Why are services cheaper in the poor countries? The Economic Journal, 279-286.
28
Borchert, I., Gootiiz, B., Grover, A., & Mattoo, A. (2015). Services trade protection and economic isolation.
The World Economy.
Bosworth, B. P., & Triplett, J. E. (2004). Productivity in the US services sector: New sources of economic
growth: Brookings Institution Press.
Browning, H., & Singelmann, J. (1978). The emergence of a service society: the significance of the sectoral
transformation of the US labor force. Politics and Society, 8(3), 481-509.
Cali, M. (2008). The contribution of services to development and the role of trade liberalisation and
regulation: Overseas Dev't Institute.
Cali, M., Ellis, K., & Williem, D. (2008). The contribution of services to development and the role of trade
liberalisation and regulation O. D. Institute (Ed.)
Cattaneo, O. (2010). International trade in services: new trends and opportunities for developing countries:
World Bank Publications.
CEPAL. (2012). Panorama de la Inserción Internacional de América Latina y el Caribe 2012. Santiago:
CEPAL.
Coll-Hurtado, A., & Córdoba y Ordóñez, J. (2006). La globalización y el sector servicios en México.
Investigaciones geográficas(61), 114-151.
Deardorff, A. V. (2001). International provision of trade services, trade, and fragmentation. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper(2548).
Deardorff, A. V., & Stern, R. M. (2008). Empirical analysis of barriers to international services transactions
and the consequences of liberalization. A handbook of international trade in services, 169-220.
Direcon. (2015). Servicios: Evolución reciente y oportunidades
DIRECON. (2017). TiSA.
Eichengreen, B., & Gupta, P. (2011a). The service sector as India's road to economic growth. Retrieved from
Eichengreen, B., & Gupta, P. (2011b). The service sector as India's road to economic growth. Retrieved from
El Khoury, A. C., & Savvides, A. (2006). Openness in services trade and economic growth. Economics
Letters, 92(2), 277-283.
Eschenbach, F., & Hoekman, B. (2006). Services policy reform and economic growth in transition economies.
Review of World Economics, 142(4), 746-764.
Francois, J., & Hoekman, B. (2010). Services trade and policy. Journal of Economic Literature, 642-692.
Francois, J., & Reinert, K. (1996). The role of services in the structure of production and trade: stylized facts
from a cross-country analysis. Asia-Pacific Economic Review, 2(1), 35-43.
Francois, J., & Schuknecht, L. (1999). Trade in financial services: Procompetitive effects and growth
performance. Retrieved from
Francois, J., Van Meijl, H., & Van Tongeren, F. (2005). Trade liberalization in the Doha development round.
Economic Policy, 20(42), 350-391.
Hansda, S. (2001). Sustainability of Services-Led Growth: An Input Output Analysis of the Indian Economy.
Reserve Bank of India Occasional Paper, 22(1), 2.
Hoekman, B. (2017). Trade in services: Opening markets to create opportunities. Retrieved from
Hoekman, B., & Mattoo, A. (2008a). Services trade and growth. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
Series, Vol.
Hoekman, B., & Mattoo, A. (2008b). Services trade and growth. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
Series.
Hoekman, B., Mattoo, A., & Sapir, A. (2007). The political economy of services trade liberalization: a case
for international regulatory cooperation? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(3), 367-391.
Hogan, P., Keesing, D. B., Singer, A., & Mundial, B. (1991). The role of support services in expanding
manufactured exports in developing countries (Vol. 28): World Bank Washington, DC.
Kenneth, S. (2006). hoeckInfrastructure Service Liberalization in Developing Countries: Key to Growth and
Global Competitiveness: New York and Geneva: United Nations.
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993). Finance, entrepreneurship and growth. Journal of Monetary economics,
32(3), 513-542.
Konan, D. E., & Maskus, K. E. (2006). Quantifying the impact of services liberalization in a developing
country. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1), 142-162.
Lederman, D., Olarreaga, M., & Payton, L. (2009). Export promotion agencies revisited. Policy Research
Working Papers, 5125.
29
López, A., Niembro, A., & Ramos, D. (2012). Posibilidades de inserción de los países de América Latina en
cadenas globales de valor en servicios: un análisis de las políticas de promoción de exportaciones y
atracción de inversiones. Paper presented at the REDLAS, Santiago.
López, A., Ramos, D., & Torre, I. (2009). Las exportaciones de servicios de América Latina y su integración
en las cadenas globales de valor. Documento de Proyecto LC/W, 240.
López, D., & Muñoz, F. (2016). Diversificación y agregación de valor, desafíos pendientes de la política
económica en América Latina: perspectivas de análisis. CICLOS EN LA HISTORIA, LA ECONOMIA
Y LA SOCIEDAD, 22(44).
Luna, M. (1989). Comercio de servicios: contribuciones al debate internacional: Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas.
Marshalll, J., & Rodríguez, J. (2010). Análisis del Desarrollo Productivo en Chile: Tendencias y
Determinantes. Serie de Políticas Públicas UDP, 6.
Mattoo, A., & Payton, L. (2007). Services trade and development: the experience of Zambia: World Bank
Publications.
Mattoo, A., Rathindran, R., & Subramanian, A. (2006). Measuring services trade liberalization and its impact
on economic growth: An illustration. Journal of Economic Integration, 64-98.
Mattoo, A., & Sauvé, P. (2003). Domestic regulation and service trade liberalization: World Bank
Publications.
Micco, A. (2016). De la Teoría a la Práctica en el Comercio Internacional de Servicios. Paper presented at
the VI Convention Annual de la Association de Export adores de Services de America Latina (ALES)
Santiago.
Miroudot, S., & Shepherd, B. (2016). Trade Costs and Global Value Chains in Services. Research Handbook
on Trade in Services, 66.
Muñoz, F., López, D., Hernández, R., Mulder, N., Fernández-Stark, K., & Sauvé, P. (2014). Latin America’s
emergence in global services A new driver of structural change in the region? Santiago: ECLAC.
OCDE. (2005). Growth in Services. Retrieved from
Prieto, E. (2013) Exportadores agrupados bajo marcas sectoriales potencian la imagen de Chile en el
extranjero/Interviewer: E. Mercurio. El Mercurio, Santiago.
Prieto, F. (1991). La promoción de exportaciones de servicios en América Latina. Pensamiento
iberoamericano(20), 101-124.
Prieto, F. (2000). The GATS, sub-regional agreements and the FTAA: How much is left to be done. In S.
Stephenson (Ed.), Services Trade in the Western Hemisphere: Liberalization, Integration and Reform.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Prieto, F. (2003). Fomento y diversificación de las exportaciones de servicios (9213223234). Retrieved from
Santiago:
Prieto, F. (2004). Fomento y diversificación de las exportaciones de servicios: United Nations Publications.
Prieto, F., Sáez, S., & Goswami, A. G. (2011). The Elusive Road to Service Export Diversification: The Case
of Chile Exporting Services (pp. 309-360).
Riddle, D. (1986). Service-led growth: the role of the service sector in world development: Praeger New York.
Robinson, S., Wang, Z., & Martin, W. (2002). Capturing the implications of services trade liberalization.
Economic Systems Research, 14(1), 3-33.
Roy, M. (2011). Services commitments in preferential trade agreements: An expanded dataset. WTO.
Seringhaus, R., & Botschen, G. (1991). Cross-national comparison of export promotion services: the views of
Canadian and Austrian companies. Journal of International Business Studies, 22(1), 115-133.
Singh, N. (2006). Services-led industrialization in India: Assessment and lessons. MPRA Paper.
Soubbotina, T. (2004). Beyond economic growth: An introduction to sustainable development
UNCTAD. (2010a). Services, Trade and Development. Retrieved from Geneva:
UNCTAD. (2010b). Services, Trade and Development. DITC/TNCD/2010/5.
UNCTAD. (2016). Servicios, desarrollo y comercio: la dimensión
reguladora e institucional. Retrieved from
Valdés, R. (2016). Exportación de Servicios como Nuevo Eje de Crecimiento. Paper presented at the
Exportando servicios: talento, creatividad y conocimiento para el mundo, Santiago.
Volpe, C., Carballo, J., & Gallo, A. (2011). The impact of export promotion institutions on trade: is it the
intensive or the extensive margin? Applied Economics Letters, 18(2), 127-132.
Wölfl, A. (2005). The service economy in OECD countries: OECD Paris.
30
World Bank. (2010). Poverty Reduction and Economic Management. Economic Premise.
WTO (Producer). (2010). Módulo de formación sobre el AGCS.
Yue, C. S. (2005). The Singapore model of industrial policy: past evolution and current thinking. Singapore
Institute of International Affairs, 29-29.
31
ANNEXES
Annex I Chile’s Trade Agreements
Country Agreement Type Entry into
force
Country Agreement Type Entry into
force
Australia Free Trade Agreement 6 March 2009 Japan Economic Association
Agreement
3 September
2007
Bolivia
Economic
Complementation
Agreement
6 April 1993 Malaysia Free Trade Agreement 25 February
2012
Canada Free Trade Agreement 5 July 1997 MERCOSUR
(1)
Economic
Complementation
Agreement
1 October
1996
China Free Trade Agreement 1 October
2006 Mexico Free Trade Agreement 31 July 1999
Colombia Free Trade Agreement 8 May 2009 P4 (4) Economic Association
Agreement
8 November
2006
South Korea Free Trade Agreement 2 April 2004 Panama Free Trade Agreement 7 March 2008
Cuba
Economic
Complementation
Agreement
27 June
2008 Peru
Economic
Complementation
Agreement
1 March 2009
Ecuador
Economic
Complementation
Agreement
25 January
2010 Turkey Free Trade Agreement 1 March 2011
EFTA (3) Free Trade Agreement 1 December
2004
European Union
(2)
Economic
Complementation
Agreement
1 February
2003
United
States Free Trade Agreement
1 January
2004 Venezuela
Economic
Complementation
Agreement
1 July 1993
Hong Kong
SAR Free Trade Agreement
9 October
2014
Central
America (7) Free Trade Agreement
14 February
2002
India Partial Agreement 17 August
2007 Vietnam Free Trade Agreement
1 January
2014
Pacific
Alliance (6) Commercial Protocol 1 May 2016 Thailand Free Trade Agreement
25 November
2015
(1) Mercosur: Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, Brazil and Uruguay. Chile participates as an associated
country.
(2) European Union: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Rumania, Sweden.
(3) EFTA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
(4) P4: Chile, New Zealand, Singapore y Brunei Darussalam.
(5) Transpacific Partnership: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, United States, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan.
(6) Pacific Alliance: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
(7) Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua.
Source: Direcon (2017)
32
Annex II Investment Promotion Protection Agreements (IPPAs)
Agreement
partners
Subscription
Date Entry into force
Agreement
partners
Subscription
Date
Entry into
force
Germany 14 April 1997 17 November 2000 Iceland 26 June 2003 16 May 2006
Argentina 02 August 1991 27 February 1995 Italia 08 March 1993 23 June 1995
Australia 09 July 1996 18 November 1999 Lebanon 13 October 1999 n.d.
Austria 08 September
1997 18 June 1999 Malaysia
11 November
1992 04 August 1995
Belgium 15 July 1992 05 August 1999 Nicaragua 08 November
1996
10 December
2001
Bolivia 22 September
1994 21 July 1999 Norway 01 June 1993
04 November
1994
Brazil
22 March 1994
24 November
2015
n.d. New Zealand 22 July 1999 n.d.
China 23 March 1994 14 October 1995 Netherlands 30 November
1998 n.d.
Colombia 22 January 2000 n.d. Panama 08 November
1996
21 December
1999
South Korea 06 September
1996 18 November 1991 Paraguay 07 August 1995
21 December
1999
Costa Rica 11 July 1996 08 July 2000 Peru 02 February
2000 11 August 2001
Croatia 28 November
1994 31 July 1996 Poland 05 July 1995
22 September
2000
Cuba 10 January 1996 30 September 2000 Portugal 28 April 1995 22 September
2000
Denmark 28 May 1993 30 November 1995 United Kingdom 24 April 1995 23 June 1997
Ecuador 27 October 1993 21 February 1996 Czech Republic 24 April 1995 02 December
1996
Egypt 05 August 1999 n.d. Dominican
Republic
28 November
2000 n.d.
El Salvador 08 November
1996 18 November 1991 Romania 04 July 1995 27 August 1997
Spain 02 October 1991 27 April 1994 South Africa 12 November
1998 n.d.
Philippines 20 November
1995 06 November 1997 Sweden 24 May 1993
13 February
1996
Finland 27 May 1993 14 June 1996 Switzerland 24 September
1999 22 August 2002
France 14 July 1992 05 December 1994 Tunisia 23 October 1998 n.d.
Greece 10 July 1996 07 March 2003 Turkey 21 August 1998 n.d.
Guatemala 08 November
1996 10 December 2001 Ukraine 30 October 1995 29 August 1997
Honduras 11 November
1996 10 January 2002 Uruguay 25 March 2010 18 March 2012
Hong Kong, China
SAR
18 November
2016 n.d. Venezuela 01 April 1993 17 May 1994
Hungary 10 March 1997 n.d. Vietnam 16 September
1999 n.d.
Indonesia 07 April 1999 n.d.
Source: UNCTAD (2017)
33
Annex III Sectoral Brands supported by ProChile in services.
Sectoral Brands
Partners: 21 Superior Education Institutions
Year: 2014-current
Market: China, Europa, United States and Brazil
Partners: Association of Film and Television
Producers
Year: 2009- current
Market: Latin America, United States and
Europe
Partners: Gastronomic Association of Chile.
Year: 2011
Partners: Association of Offices of Architects
-AOA
Market: China-Latin American
Year: 2009–2014
Partners: Chilean Association of Biotechnology
Companies
Country: United States
Year: 2010-current
Partners: Association of Consulting
Engineering Companies of Chile A.G.
Country: Canada
Partners: Chilean Association of Information
Technology Companies
Country: United States
Year: 2010-current
Partners: Corporative Development
Corporation of Capital Goods, Asexma Chile
A.G .; Minnovex A.G.
Market: The entire value chain of the item
Partners: Wine Association of Chile
Year: 2009-
Market: United States of America
Partners: Association of Advertising Film
Producers (APCP)
Year: 2013-
Market: United States and Europe
Source: ProChile
34
Annex IV Main activities of the outsourcing services cluster 2008 -2009
Scope Main results [2008-2009]
International
Promotion
Country promotion campaign on global services in the US market.
Public-private presence at major global service events in the US, Europe
and India.
Project search: expert consulting for US and India markets.
Meetings 1 to 1: Visits to more than 80 of the leading multinational
companies and service providers in the US, Europe and India.
Presence in international markets through the offices of InvestChile in
New York, Los Angeles, Madrid and Delhi.
Human Capital
Extension of the National Registry of CORFO English in more than
41,000 people.
Implementation of the English Training Program for Professionals and
Technicians of IT careers.
More than 3,000 scholarships awarded and coverage in all regional
capitals.
Plan for the diffusion of technological careers and job opportunities
offered by the sector, focused on young people of secondary education.
Line of credit for IT careers with CORFO guarantee, with availability for
more than 1,500 credits for technical careers.
Execution of two labour fairs for IT professionals
Local Industry
Development
Internationalization of Chilean companies. ACTI Global Services Platform in
the US.
Implementation of the 3 projects of Image Country in the following areas:
Information Technologies (USA), Contemporary Chilean Architecture (Beijing,
China) and Audio-visual Industry (USA and Europe).
Regulations
Proposed Draft Law on the Protection of Personal Data
Qualification process of global services export centres
Facilitation of the visa process for ISG professionals.
35
Annex IV Double Taxation Agreements
Country Entry in to force
Country Entry in to force
Australia 2013 Mexico 1999
Belgium 2010 Norway 2003
Argentina 2016 China 2017
Italy 2017 Japan 2016
Brazil 2003 New Zealand 2006
Canada 1999 Paraguay 2008
Colombia 2009 Peru 2003
South Korea 2003 Poland 2003
Croatia 2004 Portugal 2008
Denmark 2004 United Kingdom 2004
Ecuador 2003 Russia 2012
Spain 2003 Sweden 2005
France 2006 Switzerland 2010
Ireland 2008 Thailand 2010
Malaysia 2008 South Africa 2016
Czech Republic 2012 Austria 2012
Source: SII (2017)