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30 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN JUNE 2003 RODGER DOYLE news SCAN M any think that globalization is a recent development, but its origins go back to the early 19th century. This fact is apparent from a new study by sociologist Christopher Chase-Dunn of the University of California at Riverside and his colleagues. Their data, which are based on the relation between imports and gross domestic product, show that the initial wave of globalization be- gan about 1830 and peaked about 1880. Dur- ing this time, international commerce, with the abandonment of mercantilism, first be- came a force in the lives of ordinary people. Before the 19th century, international trade was a paltry affair mostly confined to luxuries, such as spices and tobacco. This early wave is associated with the growth of railroads, more efficient ocean transport, and the political victory of manufacturing and trading interests over those of the landowners, signaled by the 1846 repeal of the British corn laws. (Those laws im- posed duties on imported corn and thereby kept prices high.) The second wave co- incided with the rise of elec- tricity and steel around 1900 and peaked in the 1920s. The current wave began after World War II as a result of the creation of in- ternational institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the prede- cessor of the World Trade Organization. Decreasing costs of transport and com- munication underlie the long-range increase in world trade, but no satisfactory reason ex- plains the wave pattern. Chase-Dunn cites “hegemonic stability,” in which a great power provides stable conditions. The first and third coincide with, respectively, the eras of British and U.S. hegemony, but, as he notes, the theo- ry does not account for the second wave, which occurred when Britain was in relative decline and the U.S. had not yet asserted its power. During most of the 19th and early 20th centuries, America did not follow Britain’s free-trade policy but instead imposed high tar- iffs to protect manufacturing. The U.S. be- came more open to imports only after World War II. But it still lagged behind other major countries in trade participationnot surpris- ing considering its vast domestic market, which could supply a larger variety of de- mands than smaller economies could. Never- theless, the greater involvement of the U.S. has been the primary factor in world trade ex- pansion since World War II. In the long run it is very likely that inter- national trade will continue to expand as the costs of transport and communication con- tinue to decline. Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to trade growth in the near future is failure to reform government practices that foster doubt and mistrust. Transparency In- ternational, an organization funded by sever- al European governments, polls well-informed individuals in more than 100 countries regard- ing the extent of misuse of public power for private benefit. Its 2003 report shows that trust in the institutions of industrial nations averages 7.3 out of a perfect score of 10; developing countries average only 2.3. How governments deal with this issue of integrity could largely determine the next phase of worldwide trade. Next: Globalization’s winners and losers. Rodger Doyle can be reached at [email protected] Trade Globalization IT IS NEARLY TWO CENTURIES OLD AND LIKELY TO CONTINUE BY RODGER DOYLE BY THE NUMBERS The 12 Percent of Largest World Goods Trading and Services Countries in 2000 Imports Exports U.S. 18.7 14.1 Germany 8.1 8.3 Japan 6.3 7.2 U.K. 5.5 5.2 France 4.6 5.0 Canada 3.6 4.1 Italy 3.7 3.9 China* 2.6 3.3 Netherlands 3.2 3.4 Belgium 2.7 3.0 Korea 2.5 2.7 Spain 2.3 2.2 * Excludes services, which account for about 20 percent of international trade worldwide. SOURCES: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2000, United Nations; OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services, 1999–2000. BIG-TIME PLAYERS WORLD SOURCE: Christopher Chase-Dunn et al., 2000. Data are shown as five-year moving averages. Imports as Percent of Total Domestic Product U.S. 1800 1840 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1880 Year 1920 1960 2000 Third wave Second wave First wave of globalization Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World- System. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano and Benjamin D. Brewer in American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, pages 77–95; February 2000. Globalization, Trade, and Development: Some Lessons from History. Alan M. Taylor. National Bureau of Economic Research working paper 9326; November 2002. FURTHER READING COPYRIGHT 2003 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.

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Page 1: Trade Globalization

30 S C I E N T I F I C A M E R I C A N J U N E 2 0 0 3

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newsSCAN

Many think that globalization is a recentdevelopment, but its origins go backto the early 19th century. This fact is

apparent from a new study by sociologistChristopher Chase-Dunn of the University ofCalifornia at Riverside and his colleagues.Their data, which are based on the relationbetween imports and gross domestic product,show that the initial wave of globalization be-gan about 1830 and peaked about 1880. Dur-ing this time, international commerce, withthe abandonment of mercantilism, first be-came a force in the lives of ordinary people.Before the 19th century, international tradewas a paltry affair mostly confined to luxuries,such as spices and tobacco. This early wave isassociated with the growth of railroads, moreefficient ocean transport,and the political victory ofmanufacturing and tradinginterests over those of thelandowners, signaled by the1846 repeal of the Britishcorn laws. (Those laws im-posed duties on importedcorn and thereby kept priceshigh.) The second wave co-incided with the rise of elec-tricity and steel around1900 and peaked in the1920s. The current wavebegan after World War II asa result of the creation of in-ternational institutions such as the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, the prede-cessor of the World Trade Organization.

Decreasing costs of transport and com-munication underlie the long-range increasein world trade, but no satisfactory reason ex-plains the wave pattern. Chase-Dunn cites“hegemonic stability,” in which a great powerprovides stable conditions. The first and thirdcoincide with, respectively, the eras of Britishand U.S. hegemony, but, as he notes, the theo-ry does not account for the second wave, whichoccurred when Britain was in relative declineand the U.S. had not yet asserted its power.

During most of the 19th and early 20thcenturies, America did not follow Britain’s

free-trade policy but instead imposed high tar-iffs to protect manufacturing. The U.S. be-came more open to imports only after WorldWar II. But it still lagged behind other majorcountries in trade participation—not surpris-ing considering its vast domestic market,which could supply a larger variety of de-mands than smaller economies could. Never-theless, the greater involvement of the U.S. hasbeen the primary factor in world trade ex-pansion since World War II.

In the long run it is very likely that inter-national trade will continue to expand as thecosts of transport and communication con-tinue to decline. Perhaps the most formidableobstacle to trade growth in the near future isfailure to reform government practices that

foster doubt and mistrust. Transparency In-ternational, an organization funded by sever-al European governments, polls well-informedindividuals in more than 100 countries regard-ing the extent of misuse of public power forprivate benefit. Its 2003 report shows that trustin the institutions of industrial nations averages7.3 out of a perfect score of 10; developingcountries average only 2.3. How governmentsdeal with this issue of integrity could largelydetermine the next phase of worldwide trade.

Next: Globalization’s winners and losers.

Rodger Doyle can be reached [email protected]

Trade GlobalizationIT IS NEARLY TWO CENTURIES OLD AND LIKELY TO CONTINUE BY RODGER DOYLE

BY

THE

NU

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S

The 12 Percent of Largest World Goods Trading and ServicesCountries in 2000

Imports Exports

U.S. 18.7 14.1

Germany 8.1 8.3

Japan 6.3 7.2

U.K. 5.5 5.2

France 4.6 5.0

Canada 3.6 4.1

Italy 3.7 3.9

China* 2.6 3.3

Netherlands 3.2 3.4

Belgium 2.7 3.0

Korea 2.5 2.7

Spain 2.3 2.2

* E x c l u d e s s e r v i c e s , w h i c h a c c o u n tf o r a b o u t 2 0 p e r c e n t o f

i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e w o r l d w i d e .

S O U R C E S : I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d eS t a t i s t i c s Y e a r b o o k , 2 0 0 0 , U n i t e d

N a t i o n s ; O E C D S t a t i s t i c s o nI n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e i n S e r v i c e s ,

1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 0 .

BIG-TIMEPLAYERS

WORLD

SOURCE: Christopher Chase-Dunn et al., 2000. Data are shown as five-year moving averages.

Impo

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as P

erce

nt o

f To

tal D

omes

tic P

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U.S.

1800 1840

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

01880

Year1920 1960 2000

Third wave

Second wave

First wave of globalization

Trade Globalization since 1795:Waves of Integration in the World-System. Christopher Chase-Dunn,

Yukio Kawano and Benjamin D.Brewer in American Sociological

Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, pages 77–95; February 2000.

Globalization, Trade, andDevelopment: Some Lessons from History. Alan M. Taylor.

National Bureau of EconomicResearch working paper 9326;

November 2002.

FURTHERREADING

COPYRIGHT 2003 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC.