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Track 2 Security Dialogue in theAsia-Pacific: Reflections and FutureDirectionsDesmond Ball , Anthony Milner & Brendan TaylorPublished online: 04 Jan 2007.

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Asian Security, vol. 2, no. 3, 2006, pp. 174–188Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 1479-9855 print/1555-2764 onlineDOI:10.1080/14799850600920445

FASI1479-98551555-2764Asian Security, Vol. 2, No. 3, August 2006: pp. 1–14Asian SecurityTrack 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: Reflections and Future DirectionsTrack 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-PacificAsian SecurityDESMOND BALL, ANTHONY MILNER, and BRENDAN TAYLOR

.Abstract: This article critically reviews the literature on Track 2 security dialogue in theAsia-Pacific and suggests a number of possible avenues for further research. From almost astanding start, Track 2 security dialogue in this part of the world has burgeoned over the pastdecade and a half. As these institutions and activities have grown, so too has a body of scholar-ship grown around them which has striven to stay abreast of them and – at least in the case ofsome of the more prominent second track institutions and activities – to evaluate their influ-ence and effectiveness. Just as viable second track processes must constantly adapt in responseto changes in the regional and global security environment, however, this article contends thatthe scholarship on Track 2 security dialogue needs now to evolve beyond its heavy emphasisupon on the “success” of these institutions and activities. While this criterion remains vital, thearticle argues that greater analytical attention should also be given to differentiating betweenthe many and varied Track 2 security processes that are currently active in the Asia-Pacific; todeveloping a closer understanding as to the operating modalities of these institutions and activ-ities; and to better comprehending longitudinal trends in regional Track 2 security dialogue.

IntroductionFrom almost a standing start, Track 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific has bur-geoned over the past decade and a half.1 Although this growth has not been linear, therecent emergence of a host of “new” security challenges – including increased fears ofterrorism in the region; the advent of a number of non-traditional security challenges,such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian Influenza; and a grow-ing interest in the notion of East Asian Community (EAC) building – appear to havebreathed new life into the Track 2 endeavor. So much so that, according to one recentestimate, the number of second track processes engaged in the discussion of Asia-Pacific security issues now numbers close to 150.2 As Track 2 security dialogue in theAsia-Pacific has grown, so too has a body of scholarship grown around it which hasstrived to stay abreast of this increase in activity and – at least in the case of some of themore prominent second track processes – to evaluate their influence and effectiveness.The primary purpose of this article is to critically review that literature and to suggesta number of possible avenues for future research.

For various types of assistance in writing this paper the authors are grateful to the Asia:New Zealand Foundation,Rob Ayson, Sam Bateman, Chris Butler, David Capie, Chris Chung, Malcolm Cook, Ralph Cossa, Peter Cozens,Rebecca Foley, Brad Glosserman, Stuart Harris, Andrea Haese, Gary Hawke, Ron Huisken, Brian Job, PaulineKerr, Kwa Chong Guan, John McFarlane, the New Zealand Ministry of Defence, the New Zealand Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Trade, Derek Quigley, Ian Townsend-Gault, Frank Umbach, Jim Veitch, Karsten vonHoesslin, Ellie Wainwright, Naomi Wagstaff, and Dick Woolcott.Address correspondence to: Brendan Taylor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National Univer-sity, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia. E-mail: brendan.taylor@anu.edu.au

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What is Track 2?The term “Track 2” now has a generally accepted meaning in the Asia-Pacific region –a meaning that is not necessarily completely synonymous with usage in other regions.3

Track 2 refers to unofficial activities, involving academics, think tank researchers,journalists, and former officials, as well as current officials participating in their privatecapacities.4 This is distinct from “Track 1”, which is defined as official, government-led multilateral organizations and processes such as ASEAN, the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and multilateraldefense cooperation programs. A defining characteristic of Track 2, however, is theexistence of some linkage to Track 1, either through the participation of officialsand/or institutionalized reporting arrangements, such as have been formed betweenthe ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

The essential elements of second track diplomacy are evinced in the establishmentof CSCAP, which has emerged as one of the leading Track 2 institutions in theAsia-Pacific region.5 Three themes permeated the discussions that attended its estab-lishment. The first was that the Council should be a non-governmental institution butthat it should involve government officials, albeit in their private capacities. Althoughit was considered essential that the institution be independent from official control inorder to take full advantage of the extraordinary vitality and intellectual richness ofnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in the second track process, it wasalso recognized that official involvement was necessary in order to attract governmentresources and to ensure that the value and practicability of the NGO efforts securedofficial appreciation. In other words, the prospects for implementation should countfor as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second track process.It was considered important that the official involvement include senior military per-sonnel as well as defense civilians and foreign affairs officers.

The second theme derived from the experience of NGOs such as the Pacific AsiaFree Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and the Pacific EconomicCooperation Council (PECC) in the promotion of Asia-Pacific economic cooperationthroughout the 1970s and 1980s. These NGOs contributed to the regional economiccooperation process in several important ways. To begin with, they developed and dis-seminated the ideas and stimulated the discussion that engendered the process. Theyconducted the technical economic studies and analyses which showed the benefits ofliberalization of trade in the region, either through formal free trade arrangements or,more recently, the concept of “open regionalism.” They demonstrated to governmentofficials that meaningful and productive dialogue on complex and important policymatters is possible notwithstanding the extraordinary disparity in the sizes and inter-ests of the numerous parties involved. By providing forums for official but “unoffi-cial” dialogue, the NGOs contributed to greater official interaction and enhancedmutual confidence, as well as providing a sound “building block” for supportingcooperative arrangements at the governmental level itself.

The third theme in the foundation of CSCAP was the acceptance of the need tobuild on existing arrangements in the region wherever possible rather than construct-ing new structures and processes. In practice, this meant building upon the arrange-ments and processes developed by other leading Track 2 institutions – namely the

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ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) – whichwere the most advanced in the region in terms of both their infrastructure and theircooperative arrangements and practices.

The terminology of Track 1 and Track 2 has also been extended to include Track11/2 and Track 3 processes.6 Track 3 is defined as those organizations and individuals,including academics and many NGOs, which are active in the security domain butwhich are not directly concerned with influencing official government policies. Track11/2, by contrast, are officially sponsored, the participants include a large proportion(typically a majority) of officials, usually in their official capacities, but non-officialsfrom Track 2 (and sometimes even Track 3) processes are also included; the activitiesgenerally involve exchanges of views, and are usually exploratory rather than conclu-sive with regard to policy outcomes. The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue(NEACD) remains the region’s best known Track 11/2 process.7 Because it combineselements of Track 1 and Track 2, the relatively new International Institute for StrategicStudies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue could also be seen as falling within this definitionalcategory.8

Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: A SurveyAt the start of the 1990s, there were almost no second track processes engaged in thediscussion of regional security issues. Yet the startling increase in Track 2 security dia-logue which has occurred over the following decade and a half has been neither steadynor straightforward. During the first half of the 1990s the number of such institutionsand activities grew to reach close to 90. An interruption of this upward trend subse-quently occurred and was exacerbated by the onset of the 1997–98 Asian FinancialCrisis – which imposed additional constraints on a number of already cash-strappedsecond track processes and created a sense of disillusionment toward regional securitycooperation more generally (occasioned largely by the region’s generally lacklusterresponse to that event). As noted at the beginning of this article, however, the secondtrack endeavor has experienced somewhat of a resurgence in recent years, to the pointwhere there are now close to 150 such processes engaged in the discussion of Asia-Pacific security issues.9

These processes are incredibly diverse, often differing quite markedly in terms oftheir size, shape and level of institutionalization. At one end of the spectrum, forinstance, are a number of relatively long-standing Track 2 security institutions – suchas ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP – which, over time, have tended to take on a “life of theirown” typified by a high degree of institutionalization. Such institutions are responsi-ble for organizing the region’s largest and most inclusive security dialogues, such asthe ASEAN-ISIS Asia-Pacific Roundtable.10 At the other are a plethora of smaller andarguably more nimble Track 2 processes (for example, bilateral dialogues organized byregional institutes and think tanks such as the Shanghai Institute of International Stud-ies, The Japan Center for International Exchange, the Institute of Southeast AsianStudies and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute) which are also active within theregion.

The number and range of actors engaged in Track 2 security dialogue has alsoincreased during the period in question. Some countries – such as Australia, Canada

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and Japan – have traditionally tended to play a more stimulatory role in Track 2 secu-rity dialogue than others. Consistent with its apparent desire to play a more active rolein the Asia-Pacific region China has, in recent times, also become an increasinglyprominent second track player through the leading role it has assumed in initiativessuch as the Network of East Asian think tanks (NEAT).11 The growth of Track 2 secu-rity dialogue has also taken place alongside an exponential increase in Track 3 activity –particularly throughout Southeast Asia – which has engaged yet another new anddiverse group of non-governmental actors. While the demarcating line between Tracks2 and 3 is not always a clear one in practice, many would argue that the rise of the lat-ter in part reflects some of the limitations of the second track discussed later in thisarticle.

Finally, the range of issues addressed by Track 2 security institutions and activitiesin the Asia-Pacific has also expanded quite markedly. The continuing global war onterror has obviously focused regional attention, giving rise to a flurry of second (andfirst) track activity covering a range of terrorism-related and human security issues.A number of non-traditional security challenges in the region, such as SARS andAvian Influenza, have also provided further incentive for dialogue. Their emergencehas proven particularly conducive to an increased focus on EAC building. Indeed, oneof the most interesting developments to occur as part of the general increase inregional Track 2 activity has been the emergence of a number of institutions – such asNEAT and the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)12 – focused on crystalliz-ing the notion of EAC building. This trend is being mirrored at the Track 1 level, asevidenced over recent years in the ASEAN-Plus-Three process and the establishmentof an East Asia Summit.13

A Review of the ScholarshipA number of efforts have been undertaken to document or “track” the proliferation ofsecond track processes in the region and to identify broader trends in their evolution.The pre-eminent attempt of this kind is the Dialogue and Research Monitor (DRM). TheDRM (initially called the Dialogue Monitor) was established in 1994, with Ford Founda-tion Funding, by Paul Evans and a group of researchers at York University, Canada. Itsprimary aims were to catalogue multilateral dialogue on Asia-Pacific security issues andreport annually on any shifting trends. When Ford Foundation funding expired in 1998,ongoing financial support for the project was provided through the Japan Center forInternational Exchange (JCIE). The JCIE subsequently took responsibility for adminis-tering the DRM in 2003, after practicalities dictated that an Asian institution would bebest positioned to undertake future monitoring of regional dialogue activity.14

The DRM built upon work undertaken by Evans during the early 1990s.15 Whereascataloguing is the primary function of the DRM, a number of other overviews ofTrack 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific have tended to place greater emphasisupon interpreting trends in second track activities and evaluating the contribution ofthese processes. Brian Job’s outstanding chapter in the third volume of MuthiahAlagappa’s equally impressive series on Asian security is by far the most comprehen-sive and sophisticated assessment of this kind.16 Charles Morrison’s description andassessment of Track 2 networks which assist in promoting economic security in the

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region also makes a useful contribution.17 Most recently, Ball, Milner and Taylor havedocumented and evaluated the leading second track processes in this part of the worldas part of a report commissioned by the Asia:New Zealand Foundation examiningNew Zealand’s second track engagement with Asia.18

Efforts have also been undertaken to catalogue the various institutes and thinktanks in the region – such as the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), theShanghai Institute of International Affairs and the JCIE – which engage in Track 2activities. The most ambitious of these attempts is a volume edited by Tadashi Yama-moto during the mid-1990s, which surveys a range of NGOs, research institutions andphilanthropic organizations from throughout the Asia-Pacific region.19 Helen Nesaduraiand Diane Stone have also contributed an oft-cited piece of research examining thepolicy influence of Southeast Asian think tanks.20

Beyond these broader analyses, a number of case studies have been producedaddressing prominent second track processes. Much of this work has concentrated onCSCAP. Evans was once again a pioneer in terms of initiating research on this leadingTrack 2 institution, drawing upon his personal involvement in this process to writeduring the mid-1990s on its origins and prospects.21 Building also upon his earlierresearch22 and close association with the establishment of CSCAP, Ball has producedthe most comprehensive study of the organization in the form of his critical review ofCSCAP’s record and future prospects.23 The other major contributor to the study ofCSCAP is the American academic Sheldon Simon, who has produced at least twoinfluential articles. The first is a study written under the auspices of the NationalBureau of Asian Research which investigates the relationship between CSCAP and theARF, specifically in terms of how ASEAN leaders view the utility of this Track 2 pro-cess.24 The second – which was intended, in Simon’s terms, to complement Ball’s largerstudy through interviews with CSCAP and ARF members – examines CSCAP activi-ties and evaluates their impact at the Track 1 level.25

ASEAN-ISIS has received a similar level of attention as a case study in Track 2security dialogue. A number of scholars, including Mely Cabellero-Anthony, CarolinaHernandez and Pauline Kerr, have actually undertaken research drawing upon boththe CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS experiences.26 Perhaps the most insightful and innova-tive work exclusively on ASEAN-ISIS, however, has been produced by the Filipinodefense analyst Herman Kraft. Kraft’s study of ASEAN-ISIS has shed particular lightupon the so-called “autonomy dilemma” of Track 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, which he describes as a situation where many of the second track processes inthis part of the world have become too closely aligned with their Track 1 counter-parts.27 A more recent contribution comes in the form of Hiro Katsumata’s examina-tion of the ASEAN-ISIS role in developing security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.Katsumata’s study examines the commonly accepted contribution of ASEAN-ISIS inthe establishment of the ARF, specifically in terms of how the Track 2 level introducedand promoted an important set of ideas on regional security cooperation.28

The third dialogue activity to receive close attention is the so-called South ChinaSea (SCS) Workshop process. Much of the analysis examining the SCS Workshops hasactually been undertaken by the founders of this dialogue, Ambassador Hashim Djalalof Indonesia and Canadian academic Ian Townsend-Gault. In an edited volume

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published by the US Institute of Peace in the late 1990s, for instance, Djalal andTownsend-Gault contributed an excellent chapter examining the SCS Workshops asan exercise in preventive diplomacy. This broad-ranging study analyzes the originsand evolution of the process, before assessing its contributions and taking stock ofwhat lessons may be gained from these.29 Djalal went on to produce a short Indonesianperspective on the objectives, approaches and achievements of the SCS Workshopsand Townsend-Gault a useful chapter on the process as part of a widely circulatedCSCAP Working Group report on Preventive Diplomacy.30 Another notable contri-bution is Yann-Huei Song’s short monograph, which provides a Taiwanese perspec-tive on the evolution of the SCS Workshops.31

Gauging SuccessEvaluating the “success” of Track 2 security dialogue – operationalized typically as theinfluence and/or effectiveness of these processes, particularly vis-à-vis the Track 1level32 – is clearly a central motif in this body of work. As Job reflects:

over the last several years, a lively debate has emerged in the academic and policyanalysis literature along several dimensions: What has been the “success” of multi-lateral institution building in the Asia-Pacific in general? What is the record ofTrack 2 security dialogue activities within this regional framework? And whatsorts of indicators and data can be marshalled to facilitate “objective” analysis onthese matters?33

The following benefits of Track 2 security dialogue are typically advanced by the affir-mative side in this debate. First, second track processes are seen as serving as a usefulsource of advice to governments. Typically the most helpful advice usually pertains toeither relatively new or longer-term issue areas, upon which government agenciesrarely have either the time or the resources to develop quickly a substantial base ofexpertise. In this regard, second track processes are seen as providing a useful mecha-nism for building capacity. The ASEAN-ISIS role in the building of ASEAN is com-monly cited as a case in point. As Caballero-Anthony observes:

ASEAN-ISIS has sought to provide ASEAN with policy inputs on various issuesthat affected the region for the consideration of the decision-makers in ASEAN.ASEAN-ISIS has been able to carry out this function by submitting critical policyrecommendations (for example, Memoranda) to the ASEAN officials and theirrespective governments. Among these notable recommendations were the estab-lishment of the ARF, the strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat, the adoption ofthe idea that saw the realization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and theestablishment of human rights mechanisms.34

Second, Track 2 processes are seen as providing a “laboratory” of sorts, where newideas can be generated and tested. Often the ideas in question are simply too sensitiveor controversial to be discussed at the Track 1 level. CSCAP’s role in assisting theARF to develop a working definition of “preventive diplomacy” during the late 1990s

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has been cited as an example of this useful ideational function. As Ralph Cossa, anindividual intimately involved in this process, reflects:

This effort provided a useful example of how tracks one and two can be mutu-ally supportive. At the official or track-one level, ARF ministers first identifiedpreventive diplomacy as a potential future role of the ARF and then called foran independent track-two assessment as to how to bring this about. CSCAPtrack-two participants, not being bound by current government positions, hadthe license to pursue more innovative and forward-leaning approaches andsolutions.35

A CSCAP working group on confidence and security building measures continued towork closely with the ARF on this subject and it is probably the CSCAP work whichhas been most appreciated by the ARF.36 Likewise, CSCAP working group and studygroup meetings on maritime cooperation have produced a number of excellent editedvolumes and memoranda, rendering it one of the most important second track activi-ties concerning maritime security matters in the region. More recently, CSCAP hasalso been intimately involved in the development of measures to further institutional-ize the ARF.

Third, Track 2 security dialogue is seen to have offered an alternative diplomaticroute when progress at the first track level has stalled or become deadlocked. The SCSWorkshop process is used as an example here of where the second track has performedsuch a role. The highly acrimonious nature of claims over the Spratly and other islandsin the region did, after all, initially render discussion of such cooperative possibilitiesproblematic at the Track 1 level. As Townsend-Gault recalls:

When we started, contact between some of the governments of the South ChinaSea region were either nebulous or nonexistent. Vietnam was slowly emergingfrom a long period of isolation, and Cambodia and Laos were further behind inthis regard. The then six members of ASEAN did not regard the countries ofIndo-China as fully part of the region. This changed with a rapidity that startledmany observers, but when the project began, it can not be said that we were buildingon an established network of connections at the political and professional levelsamong the jurisdictions of the region.37

Finally, it has been posited that Track 2 security dialogue also performs a range ofbroader “socializing” functions. At a basic level, second track activities are seen toprovide an opportunity for potential adversaries to meet and get to know one another,where otherwise they might not be able to. CSCAP study group meetings, for exam-ple, allow policy experts from China and Taiwan to interact and exchange views inboth formal and informal settings. In the process, it is assumed that they gain a greaterappreciation of each other’s respective national standpoints and gradually begin todevelop certain shared understandings.

Some analysts of second track diplomacy qualify this observation by suggestingthat frequent participants in Track 2 processes will gradually develop an affinity for

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that particular institution or activity.38 Other versions of these “socialization” argu-ments, however, suggest that involvement in Track 2 institutions and activities willideally not only impact upon the views of the individual participants in question, butthat the greater exposure to global and regional norms which occurs in the processmay exert a positive influence in shaping the foreign policy orientation of the countrythey represent. In recent years, such arguments have typically been made with refer-ence to China as a result of the marked expansion which has occurred in its participa-tion in regional multilateral activities at both the Track 1 and Track 2 levels. (Indeed,this was one of the primary rationales behind granting China membership of CSCAPin December 1996).39 Some analysts have even gone so far as to suggest that the idea ofcooperation can, over time, become learnt across entire regions.40

On the negative side of this debate, skeptics argue that Track 2 security processesexhibit a series of limitations. First, as alluded to previously, Kraft notes that manysecond track institutions in the Asia-Pacific have gradually become too closely alignedwith their Track 1 counterparts.41 This is not an altogether negative development, inthat it has allowed Track 2 institutions access to otherwise privileged information,along with a direct channel of influence into the policy process. The regular meetingsthat Australian CSCAP co-chairs have with Australian Department of Foreign Affairsand Trade officials and with relevant Australian government ministers, for instance,have been immensely beneficial in developing a number of second track initiatives,including the project on contemporary Islam in Southeast Asia detailed below. TheIndonesian and Malaysian CSCAP leaderships enjoy similarly fruitful relationshipswith their respective national governments.

Kraft’s concern, however, stems from the fact that the growing intimacy betweenthe first and second tracks potentially limits the capacity of the latter to engage in crit-ical thinking and analysis. Along similar lines, Joseph Camilleri has suggested that tooclose an alignment between Track 1 and Track 2 will often lead to a replication of thevery geopolitical dynamics of the first track level that second track processes aredesigned to circumvent. Camilleri also maintains that those second track activitieswhich marry their fortunes too closely to the Track 1 level will invariably tend to limitthe strategic options available to them.42

A second common criticism of Track 2 security dialogue is that second track insti-tutions and activities have simply not engaged the Track 3 level. In the process they areseen to have failed to perform an expected “brokerage” function, which envisages sec-ond track processes serving as a conduit between government, on the one hand, and abroad range of Track 3 processes, NGO specialist organizations and academic institu-tions on the other. Writing in 2003, for instance, Job contended that “no groups repre-senting civil society have been engaged in the Track 2 process.”43 More recently, SeeSeng Tan has argued that “regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has long remainedthe exclusive preserve of governments, while the engagement by civil society in thatenterprise has been minimal despite the proliferation of Track 2 processes.”44

The persuasiveness of this latter criticism appears to be somewhat diminishing,however, given the recent emergence of at least three dissenting examples. The first isthe ASEAN People’s Assemblies (APA) – an event organized by ASEAN-ISIS whichbrings together approximately 350 NGO leaders and representatives of grassroots

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organizations from throughout Southeast Asia and a small number of senior ASEANofficials.45 The second is a civil society summit which was recently held on the side-lines of the inaugural East Asia Summit. This civil society summit brought togetherrepresentatives from four Track 2 and Track 3 communities – the APA, ASEAN-ISIS,the ASEAN International Parliamentary Organization and the so-called “InformalASEAN Human Rights Mechanism.”46 The third is a project being carried out underthe auspices of the Australian Committee of CSCAP (with considerable financialbacking from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) to developdialogue between Australians and Muslim scholars and spokespeople in SoutheastAsia. This project has two inter-linked components: a two day conference and theproduction of a sourcebook on Islam in Southeast Asia. It involves a number of part-ner institutions from across the region, including the State Islamic University, Jakartaand the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.

Finally, critics of Track 2 security dialogue point to the inability of these processesto move as quickly as Track 1 on a pressing issue and their inter-related propensity tobecome victims of their own success. When a new security challenge emerges, forinstance, it is not uncommon to find government officials turning to the second trackfor policy advice, in view of the fact that their own agencies may not have had anopportunity to build sufficient policy expertise on the issue in question. As this exper-tise is developed, the interest of the first track in obtaining policy information andguidance from the second track is likely to subside. While this again should not beviewed as an inherent weakness of second track processes, critics argue that it is a fac-tor limiting their capacity to make a sustained impact, particularly on issue areas wheretheir resources are likely to be gradually superseded by those at the disposal of the firsttrack. (Perhaps the real message here, however, is that effective Track 2 processes mustsimply have the flexibility and the capacity to focus on new issues at the time they arepassing older issues over to Track 1).

Going Round in Circles?A healthy debate regarding the “success” of Track 2 security dialogue remains essen-tial. Viable second track institutions and activities, after all, must consistently demon-strate their continued relevance and utility, if only to retain the political and financialsupport of their Track 1 sponsors. Yet beyond the handful of relatively unambiguousexamples of “success” already referred to in this article – the contribution of the SCSWorkshops to stability in the SCS region; the assistance provided by CSCAP to the ARFin its efforts to develop a working definition of preventive diplomacy; and the pivotalrole played by ASEAN-ISIS in the establishment of the ARF itself – demonstratingunequivocally the “influence” and “effectiveness” of Track 2 security dialogue is anotoriously difficult exercise.

First, measuring the “success” of second track processes is highly problematic. Thisis partly because many (if not most) of the benefits of Track 2 security dialogue areintangible and, therefore, not readily quantifiable. While some analysts posit thatsecond track processes can act as a vehicle for spreading global and regional norms, forinstance, the speed, scale and substance of such learning processes are exceedinglydifficult to measure, at least with any real degree of precision. Similar problems also

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surround the identification and measurement of second track policy influence. In par-ticular, although it is possible to isolate some instances where the second track hasbeen able to directly influence the first, far less clear-cut are those cases where Track 2processes have had a more indirect impact or involvement, or where their influence hasoccurred concurrent with a range of other policy inputs.

Second, because Track 2 processes so often constitute a second (and sometimeseven a last) diplomatic resort to which policymakers can turn when progress at thefirst track level stalls or becomes deadlocked, a case could be mounted that it is unrea-sonable to assess them solely against the criteria of “influence” and “effectiveness.” AsDavid Baldwin has observed in relation to the somewhat protracted debate over theefficacy of economic sanctions:

If the menu of choice includes only the options of sinking or swimming, theobservation that swimming is a “notoriously poor” way to get from one place toanother is not very helpful. And if the principal alternative to economic sanctionsis appearing to condone communism, racism, terrorism, or genocide, the observa-tion that they are a “notoriously poor tool of statecraft” may miss the point.47

The same logic can almost certainly be applied to Track 2 security dialogue.Third, these methodological difficulties are further compounded by the growing

complexity of a Track 2 landscape that is populated by an increasing (and at timescompeting) array of actors, institutions, activities and issues. Such complexity anddiversity obviously make it increasingly difficult to arrive at broadly applicable con-clusions regarding the “success” of Track 2 security dialogue. This, in turn, begs thequestion of whether the academic and policy debate to which Job refers is perhaps des-tined to remain unresolved. Further, it also suggests that, just as viable second trackprocesses must constantly adapt in response to changes in the regional and globalsecurity environment, the time may now be ripe for the scholarship on Track 2 secu-rity dialogue to evolve beyond its heavy emphasis upon on the “success” of these insti-tutions and activities. While maintaining that this criterion remains vital for reasonsalready discussed, the remainder of the article will proceed to outline a number ofadditional avenues that scholars of Track 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific mightnow usefully pursue.

Where To From Here?First and foremost, in their continuing attempts to ascertain the influence and effec-tiveness of Track 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, scholars need to move beyondtheir current preoccupation with more established institutions – such as ASEAN-ISIS,CSCAP and the SCS Workshops – to both incorporate and distinguish between thediverse range of other second track processes which are currently active in the region.Such efforts could usefully be based around the question of “does form matter?”A case could be made, for instance, that the rising administrative demands and operat-ing costs which have accompanied the gradual institutionalization of some of the long-standing Track 2 security institutions has become a factor potentially inhibiting theirprogress. (At the December 2004 meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee in

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Kunming, China, for instance, much of the agenda was dominated by administrativedeliberations concerning the guidelines for participation by Taiwanese scholars in thenew CSCAP Study Group arrangements). At the same time, however, inadequateattention has been given to the relative utility of the plethora of smaller and ostensiblymore nimble Track 2 processes (such as bilateral dialogues organized by regional insti-tutes and think tanks) which are also taking place. There is also scope for much morework to be undertaken on the utility of processes which combine elements of Track 1and Track 2, such as the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue.

This exercise in disaggregation might also extend to distinguishing between differ-ent national approaches toward second track processes. Why, for instance, have somecountries such as Australia, Canada and Japan traditionally played a more stimulatoryrole in Track 2 security dialogue than others? What explains China’s growing interestand activism in second track processes? Why do the strength and the proximity of therelationship between the first and second tracks also tend to differ from country tocountry? (In the case of China, for instance, the demarcating line between Track 1 andTrack 2 is often so blurred as to become almost indistinguishable). These observationssuggest that there is scope for further analysis into the sources and the significanceof contrasting national approaches, and beg the question of whether it may evenbe meaningful to speak of differing “cultures” of Track 2 security dialogue in theAsia-Pacific.

Research along such lines would essentially go beyond the issue of whether secondtrack processes work, to ask the question of how they function. This line of inquiryexhibits obvious appeal, not least because of the difficulties commonly associated withdetermining whether or not second track processes are “successful.” Somewhat ironi-cally, by unpacking the operating modalities of Track 2 security dialogue such anapproach may, in the process, also provide scholars with a richer understandingregarding the influence and effectiveness of these institutions and activities. One areawhere such an improved understanding would be invaluable is in relation to cases – ofwhich this article identifies three – where Track 2 has been able to engage with Track3. Given the drastic need for further improvement in the relationship between Tracks2 and 3, future research might usefully give some attention to the questions of how andwhy engagement with the Track 3 level has actually occurred in these instances.

Following over a decade and a half of growth in regional Track 2 security dialogue,a number of longitudinal trends are also beginning to warrant closer attention. Becausethis burgeoning has by no means been linear, scope remains for further work to beundertaken into the factors which contribute toward fluctuations in Track 2 securitydialogue. One possible explanation could simply be methodological – for instance,what appears to be a recent spiking in Track 2 security activity might instead be aproduct of the fact that the range and quality of data which the DRM is able to drawupon has become increasingly richer as a number of second track organizations havebegun to update their websites in a more timely manner.48 Economic factors mayprovide an alternative rationale, with the impact of the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisispossibly contributing toward a slowing in second track security dialogue during themid-to-late 1990s. The uncertainty and challenges generated by major shifts in theinternational strategic environment – such as the ending of the Cold War and the onset

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of the “War on Terror” period – or the emergence of “new” security challenges – suchas increased fears of terrorism in the region or the rise of disease-based threats – mayequally serve to explain past and present surges in Track 2 activity. Related to this,because of the inherently symbiotic nature of their relationship, the potential impactof fluctuations in dialogue at the first track level upon the volume of second trackactivity should not be discounted.

Looking toward the future, one of the most interesting features noted in this articleis the emergence of institutions and activities – such as NEAT and the CEAC –focused on EAC building. Consistent with its apparent desire to play a more activerole in the Asia-Pacific region, Beijing has been one of the main drivers of this trend.The emergence of a number of non-traditional security challenges in the region hasalso proven conducive to this increased focus on EAC building. The jury remains out,however, on exactly how far these new second track institutions and activities will goin advancing this potentially powerful idea of an EAC and whether they could gradu-ally even begin to dislodge or supplant more established processes, such as CSCAP.Monitoring and interpreting the upward trend in these new processes therefore consti-tute important areas for further research.

When contemplating the prospect of an emerging EAC – and specifically the partthat second track processes may perform in shaping this – the European experienceimmediately comes to mind. Dialogue or “conversation,” after all, clearly played anintegral role in the building up of Europe as a focus of political and cultural alle-giance.49 Further work needs to be undertaken, however, in order to better understandthe role that Track 2 institutions and activities – as “agents” bringing with them“ideas” – play in “socializing” regional security cooperation. The emerging EAC maywell serve as an ideal “case study” for such an intellectual undertaking. Simulta-neously, further research is also required on the extent to which second track pro-cesses are themselves shaped or “socialized” by respective national perspectives andapproaches. China’s involvement with CSCAP could be instructive here. While ini-tially part of a larger effort to “socialize” the PRC by exposing it to global andregional norms, consideration could also be given to whether China’s deepeninginvolvement in CSCAP has actually allowed it to shape the direction and outlook ofthis leading Track 2 institution, particularly in relation to the issue of Taiwan.

The socialization function of Track 2, of course, is not only about shaping nationaland regional perspectives. At a basic level, second track activities are also intended topositively impact upon the views of individual participants. Perhaps because Track 2activities rely so heavily on personal linkages and the intellectual contribution whichindividual participants are willing and able to make, there is now a growing recogni-tion of the need to expand that social capital by bringing younger scholars – the “nextgeneration” of the Track 2 community – into the fold. Consistent with this, a numberof the institutions referred to in this article – namely ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP – areactively seeking to expand their networks by involving younger scholars. There is littleevidence to suggest, however, that the manner in which this “next generation” issue isbeing approached has been particularly systematic. Further work also could usefullybe undertaken, therefore, on the important question of how best to identify the likelyTrack 2 personnel of the future and on how to provide them with an entrée into the

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second track community. For a further one and a half decades from now, the state ofTrack 2 security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific will almost certainly have been condi-tioned by how well this “next generation” issue is managed.

NOTES

1. According to Paul Evans, in 1989 only three or four such channels existed. See Paul M. Evans, “The DialogueProcess on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis,” in Paul M. Evans, ed., Asia Pacific Security:The Future of Research Training and Dialogue Activities (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto, YorkUniversity Joint Centre of Asia Pacific Studies; Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994),p. 299.

2. Japan Center for International Exchange, Towards Community Building in East Asia, Dialogue and ResearchMonitor, Overview Report, 2004. Available at http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/overview.html (accessed January30, 2006).

3. Track 2 mechanisms have long existed in Europe and North America, for instance, but their primary functionin these parts of the world have tended to be information exchange and the general discussion of policy issues,rather than that of policy advocacy and even direct participation in the policymaking process. See StuartHarris, “The Regional Role of ‘Track Two’ Diplomacy,” in Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin, eds., TheRole of Security and Economic Cooperation Structures in the Asia Pacific Region: Indonesian and AustralianViews (Jakarta and Canberra: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, in cooperation with theAustralian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996), p. 144.

4. See the entry for “Track Two” in David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 213–216.

5. For a more comprehensive discussion of CSCAP see Desmond Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation inthe Asia Pacific (CSCAP): Its Record and its Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 139,Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, October 2000.

6. See the entries for “Track One-and-a-Half” and “Track Three” in Capie and Evans, The Asia-Pacific SecurityLexicon, pp. 211–212 and 217–219.

7. The NEACD was founded in 1993 by Professor Susan Shirk, who was the Director of the University of Cal-ifornia’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) from 1991 to 1997. At its meetings, foreignand defense ministry officials, military officials (all attending in their private capacities) and academics fromChina, Russia, South Korea, Japan and the US discuss Northeast Asian regional security issues. North Koreawas also a founding member of the NEACD, but has not regularly attended meetings. The NEACD isfunded by the US Department of State and administered through the IGCC. The Japan Center for Inter-national Exchange became the Asian Secretariat for the NEACD in 2005.

8. Initiated in 2002, the Shangri-La dialogue is an Asian security and defense conference held in Singapore.Approximately 200 defense ministers, deputy defense ministers and civilian and military officials fromthroughout the Asia-Pacific region attend. Scholars from around 20 countries are also present by invitation.The dialogue is organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies of the United Kingdom. Itsunderlying function is to provide an opportunity for regional defense ministers to meet coincidentally in themore relaxed setting of an academic conference.

9. Data obtained from Japan Center for International Exchange, Towards Community Building in East Asia.10. The ASEAN-ISIS Asia-Pacific Roundtable was established in 1987. It is held annually in Kuala Lumpur,

Malaysia and provides a venue where more than 250 scholars, journalists and civilian and military officialsfrom more than two dozen countries can meet to discuss regional peace and security matters.

11. NEAT is a relatively new, but significant (Chinese-led) initiative. It was created through the ASEAN-Plus-Three process and as a direct result of proposals contained in the reports of the East Asia Vision Groupand the East Asia Study Group, which convened under the auspices of the ASEAN-Plus-Three SummitMeeting. The purpose of NEAT is to promote the notion of an East Asian Community. While its primaryfocus has thus far been economic, as with the EAC ideal, NEAT also purports to address political, socio-cultural and security issues. As the official Track 2 analogue of the ASEAN-Plus-Three process, its mainfunctions are to provide intellectual support and policy recommendations on issues of East Asia cooperation,as well as to research issues raised during the ASEAN-Plus-Three Summit and from the EASG.

12. The CEAC was launched in May 2004. Japan’s leading 12 think tanks belong to the CEAC, which alsoconsists of 15 corporate members and 66 individual members comprising a mixture of scholars, journalistsand politicians. Representatives from government ministries have joined the activities of CEAC in the capac-ity of “counselors.” The founder and President of this new grouping is the President of the Japan Forum onInternational Relations (JFIR), Kenichi Ito. The CEAC is chaired by former Prime Minister YasuhiroNakasone. It is administered through a secretariat based at the JFIR and organizes a range of second trackactivities, including a Japan–ASEAN Dialogue, a Japan–China Dialogue and a Japan–Korea Dialogue. Forfurther reading see Kenichi Ito, “On CEAC and Community Building in East Asia,” CEAC Commentary,November 18, 2004. Available at http://www.ceac.jp/e/commentary/041215-2.pdf (accessed November 16,2005).

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13. For further reading see Brad Glosserman, “ASEAN Plus Three Leads the Way,” PacNet, No. 51A, PacificForum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2004; and Anthony Milner, “ASEAN+3, Asia Consciousness and AsianValues,” PROSEA Research Paper, No. 39 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2000).

14. See Paul Evans, “Trend Report 2002,” Dialogue and Research Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings onAsia Pacific Security and Human Security Issues and Community Building, February 28, 2003. Available athttp://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/2002/trend.html (accessed November 11, 2005).

15. Evans, “The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis,” pp. 297–318.16. Brian Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asian Security Order,” in Muthiah

Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-sity Press, 2002), pp. 241–279.

17. Charles E. Morrison, “Track 1/Track 2 Symbiosis in Asia-Pacific Regionalism,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17,No. 4 (2003), pp. 547–565.

18. Desmond Ball, Anthony Milner, and Brendan Taylor, “Mapping Track II Institutions in New Zealand,Australia and the Asia Region,” An Independent Study Submitted to the Asia New Zealand Foundation,Wellington, March 2005. Available at http://www.asianz.org.nz/research/TrackIIfullreport.pdf (accessedNovember 14, 2005).

19. Tadashi Yamamoto, ed., Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community (Singapore and Tokyo: Insti-tute of Southeast Asian Studies and Japan Center for International Exchange, 1995).

20. Helen E. S. Nesadurai and Diane Stone, “Southeast Asian Think Tanks in Regional and Global Networking,”Panorama, Vol. 1 (2000), pp. 19–35.

21. Paul M. Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP),”The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1994), pp. 125–139. See also Paul Evans, “The Council for SecurityCooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Context and Prospects,” CANCAPS Paper No. 2, 1994.

22. Desmond Ball, “A New Era in Confidence Building: The Second-track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region,”Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1994), pp. 157–176.

23. Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Its Record and Its Prospects.24. Sheldon W. Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum Views the Councils for Security Cooperation in the Asia

Pacific: How Track II Assists Track I,” NBR Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 2002), pp. 5–23.25. Sheldon W. Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: The CSCAP

Experience,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2002), pp. 167–200.26. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: Institute

of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 157–193; Carolina G. Hernandez, “The ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAPExperience,” in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar, eds., The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 280–284; and Pauline Kerr, “The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific,”The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1994), pp. 397–409.

27. Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” SecurityDialogue, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2000), pp. 343–356. See also Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “Unofficial Diplomacy inSoutheast Asia: The Role of ASEAN-ISIS,” CANCAPS Paper No. 22, February 2000.

28. Hiro Katsumata, “The Role of ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies in Developing Secu-rity Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 1 (June 2003),pp. 93–111.

29. Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: InformalDiplomacy for Conflict Prevention,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds.,Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington, DC: United States Institute of PeacePress, 1999), pp. 107–133.

30. Hasjim Djalal, “Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative,” Ocean Development and International Law,Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 97–103; and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Can International Law Contribute toPreventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia?,” in Preventive Diplomacy: Charting a Course for the ASEANRegional Forum, A Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Confidence and SecurityBuilding Measures (CSBM) International Working Group Report, Issues and Insights No. 3-02 (Honolulu,Hawaii: Pacific Forum CSIS, July 2002), pp. 33–43.

31. Yann-Huei Song, Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: Taiwan’s Perspective (Singapore: EastAsian Institute, National University of Singapore, 1999).

32. See, for example, Simon, “Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific,” p. 173.33. Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asian Security Order,” p. 269.34. Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, pp. 161–162.35. Ralph Cossa, “Promoting Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific Region,” in Preventive Diplomacy:

Charting a Course for the ASEAN Regional Forum, A Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific(CSCAP) Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) International Working Group Report, Issuesand Insights No. 3-02 (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum CSIS, July 2002), p. 3.

36. Ball, The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Its Record and Its Prospects, p. 16.37. Townsend-Gault, “Can International Law Contribute to Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia?,” p. 34.38. See, for instance, Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Track Two Diplomacy and Regional Security in the Middle East,”

International Negotiation, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 2001), pp. 49–77.

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39. For further reading on the possibilities of socialization within international institutions see Alastair IainJohnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 45, No. 4 (2001), pp. 487–515.

40. Kerr, “The Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific,” p. 400.41. Kraft, “The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia.”42. Joseph A. Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order: The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific

Region, Vol. 2 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003), p. 260.43. Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asian Security Order,” p. 251.44. See Seng Tan, “Non-official Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: ‘Civil Society’ or ‘Civil Service’?,” Contemporary

Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 3 (December 2005), p. 377.45. For further reading see Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-State Regional Governance Mechanism for

Economic Security: The Case of the ASEAN People’s Assembly,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2004),pp. 567–585.

46. See Seng Tan and Ralf Emmers, eds., An Agenda for the East Asian Summit (Singapore: Institute of Defenceand Strategic Studies, November 2005), p. 13.

47. David A. Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3(Winter 1999–2000), p. 84.

48. Japan Center for International Exchange, Towards Community Building in East Asia.49. Anthony Milner, Region, Security and the Return of History (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

2003).

Desmond Ball is Special Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian NationalUniversity. He is currently Co-Chair for the Australian Member Committee of the Council for SecurityCooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). He was previously Head of the Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre and a Member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Hisprimary research interests are Asia-Pacific security, Australian defence, and nuclear strategy.

Anthony Milner is Basham Professor of Asian History at the Australian National University. He is amember of the Australian Government’s Foreign Affairs Council and is currently Co-Chair for theAustralian Member Committee of CSCAP. He was previously Dean of the Faculty of Asian Studies atthe Australian National University. Professor Milner is a specialist in Malaysian history and politicalculture, and Australia-Asia relations.

Brendan Taylor is a Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National Univer-sity. He is also a member of the Australian Member Committee of CSCAP. His research interests includeUS foreign policy, economic statecraft/sanctions, Northeast Asian security and alliance politics.

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