Towards a Critique of the Dominant Philosophies of ... · Few will probably object to the claim that Ferdinand de Saussure’s book, Course in General Linguistics (Cours de linguistique

OriginalpaperUDC1:81(045)doi:10.21464/sp32114

Received:February7th,2016

Alen SućeskaVelebitska7,HR–10000Zagreb

[email protected]

Towards a Critique of the Dominant Philosophies of Language from a Historical-Materialist Standpoint

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to offer a critique of some of the main authors of modern linguistics or other approaches to language in general: Ferdinand de Saussure, the “founder” of modern linguistics, Noam Chomsky, one of the most prominent representatives of modern linguistics, and Jürgen Habermas, whose philosophy of language was an important part of his communication project. Critique here offered is based on an approach to language which considers its social character as equally as essential to it as its strictly linguistic or biological traits. It is argued that the dominant philosophies of language, analysed through the work of the three aforementioned authors, abstracted from this social characteristics of language in order to create a “science of language”, whereby language has become a static, synchronous structure with almost no connection to language as it exists in social reality. It is because language is inextricably connected to social, ideological, and political phenomena that Jürgen Habermas also criticised them for idealizing language and considering “speech acts” only those utterances whose goal is cooperation, but not those whose character is conflictual, as is so often the case in various forms of social dialogue.

Keywordslanguage,linguistics,FerdinanddeSaussure,NoamChomsky,JürgenHabermas,historicalmaterialism

Introduction

Whenone readsAristotle’sPolitics, one finds it hard tobelieve thatAris-totle’sclaim,madeovertwomillenniaago,thatthehumanabilitytospeakisinextricablyinterwovenwiththefactthatmanisapolitical animal(Aristotle1998,1253a8–18)issooftencompletelyignoredbymodernscholars,betheylinguistsorthephilosophersoflanguage.Ofcourse,hardlyanyonewilldenythatlanguagehasalottodowithlivinginacommunity,withsociallife,butwhenitcomestotheoreticallytryingtounderstandlanguage,thisfactismost-lyputaside.Languagehasbeenabstractedfromsocietyandpetrifiedinanahistoricalstructure,ormadeintoan“inherentability”toallhumansmerely“triggered”inchildhood;ithasbeenmadestaticandvoidofanymeaningorideology;ithasbeenstrippedofallpowerrelationsimplicitinanystatement,evenoftheimportanceofthesocialandhistoricalcontextwithinwhichitap-pears;ithasbeenproclaimedrationalandthusidealized,makingirrationalityandinternalcontradictionabsentfromit,etc.Ofcourse,thesethesescomefromvariouscurrentsofthought,andalthoughsomeoftheaforementionedclaimsdocometogetherinsomeofthem,theyaremostlytypicalforoneauthororgroup.Inthatsense,Ishallbefollowing

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp32114

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA63(1/2017)pp.(193–214)

A.Sućeska,TowardsaCritiqueoftheDo-minantPhilosophiesofLanguage…194

thepathofJean-JacquesLecercleinhisbookA Marxist Philosophy of Language(Lecercle2009)wherehebeginsfromthecritiqueofvariousinterpre-tationsoflanguageinordertoarrivetoaproposalofahistorical-materialistphilosophyoflanguage.Whatiscommontoallthetheoriesoflanguagediscussedbelowiseitheramethodological individualismoranabstraction,indifferingdegrees, of language from society.Theformerisanapproachwhichseestheindividualasbeingthecorrecttheoreticalstartingpointforunderstandinglanguage,whichthenresultsinneglectingoroutrightdenyingthatlanguagehasanythingtodowithsociety.Itistypicalingeneralfortheorieswhichclaimtobe“scientific”andputmuchemphasisonthatclaim,suchaspsychologismorbiologism,1andinparticulartoChomsky(withwhomwewilldealinmoredetaillater).WhatisinterestingisthatevencertainMarxistshavesuccumbedtothisno-tion:PerryAnderson, inhisbook In the Tracks of Historical Materialism,claimsthat

“…thesubjectofspeechisaxiomaticallyindividual–‘don’tspeakalltogether’beingthecus-tomarywayofsayingthatpluralspeechisnon-speech,thatwhichcannotbeheard.Bycontrast,the relevant subjects in thedomainofeconomic,cultural,politicalormilitary structuresarefirst and foremostcollective: nations, classes, castes, groups, generations.” (Anderson1983,pp.44–45)

Inattemptingtocriticisepoststructuralistapproachestolanguage,Andersonendedupdefendingthenaivenotion,typicalofallpositivistapproachestolanguagerestingonmethodologicalindividualism,thatsinceitistheindivid-ualwhospeaks,languageisbydefinitionanindividualphenomenon,whichhasnothingtodowithwhatAndersonterms“collectivesubjects”.Butthisistoremaincompletelyblindtothefactthatthatparticularindividuallearnedthe languagewithinaparticularsociety,socialgrouporclass,andthatshespeaksinaccordancetothoseeventsinherlife.Itmeanstoneglectthat,byspeaking,oneisutteringthewordsofformergenerations,andisevokinganentirehistoryofmeaningsandsocialprocesses.ThesecondcharacteristicoftheapproachestolanguageIshallcriticisebe-lowisanabstraction of language from society.Thisisobviouslyconnectedtothefirstcharacteristic,sinceitendsupinthesametheoreticalblindalley,fromthehistorical-materialiststandpoint,asdoesmethodological individu-alism.Thedifferenceisthattheseapproachesdonotnecessarilystartfromtheindividual.AnexamplewouldbeSaussureanlinguistics,whoseobjectofresearchislanguageasstructure,independentofanyactsofspeechorthehis-toryoflanguage.Itisthewell-knownnotionofsynchronythatisinthecentreofthisconceptionoflanguage,whilediachronyisproclaimedirrelevantforlinguisticsproper.Bothofthesecharacteristicsarequitesimilar,andentailwhatisinessencethefetishisation of language.Inbothcases,languageisisolatedfromitsso-cialaspectsandfixedintoanimmobileconceptorthing.Itisabstractedfromsocietyandreducedeithertothefacultiesoftheindividualorganismortoascientificsystem–thusneglectingthefactthatlanguageisasocialpractice–whichresultsintheimpossibilityofdiscussingconcretesocialphenomenainrelationtolanguage.Thisreflectsacommontraitortendencyofpositivistsciencesto“fix”objectsoftheirresearchintoaconglomerateoffacts,sys-tems,andstaticconcepts,evenwhentheseobjectsareessentiallyindivisiblefromsociety,andthusallbut“fixable”,sincetheyarehistorical,dynamic,andfullofcontradictions.



Therefore,wemustembarkonapathof“defetishizing”languageinordertobeabletodiscusslanguageasasocialpracticeandtrytoofferahistorical-materialistinterpretationofitintheend.InwhatfollowsIdonotofferanex-tensiveoverviewoftheauthorsandtheoriesIdiscuss,butmoreofafocusedcritiquefromahistorical-materialiststandpoint.

1. The Linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure

1.1. “The science of language”

Fewwill probably object to the claim that Ferdinand de Saussure’s book,Course in General Linguistics(Cours de linguistique générale),wasthemostinfluentialbookofthe20thcenturyinthefieldoflinguistics.Ithasinfluencednotonlymodernlinguistics,butalsoauthorslikeNoamChomskyorgroupsliketheFrench(post)structuralists.CritiqueofSaussurethusseemsthemostlogical first step inbuildingahistorical-materialistconceptionof languagewhichis,aswillbeshown,significantlyopposedtothemainpresuppositionsofSaussureandtheremainingauthorsdiscussedinthischapter.InhisCourse in General Linguistics,Saussuredividedlanguageintolangue,anabstractsysteminternalizedbyaspeechcommunity,andparole,theindi-vidualactsofspeechofthemembersofthatspeechcommunity.Theformeristhesoleobjectoflinguistics,accordingtoSaussure,whilethelatterisde-scribedasapotentialresearchobjectforothersciences,butnotfor“thesci-enceoflanguage”whichshouldexcludespeechfromitsresearch(Saussure1959,p.15):

“…theactivityofthespeakershouldbestudiedinanumberofdisciplineswhichhavenoplaceinlinguisticsexceptthroughtheirrelationtolanguage.”(Ibid.,p.18)

Thus, languageas langue isanabstract,“homogeneous”system,separatedfromtheconcretesocialphenomenarelatedtospeech.Theexclusionofthesephenomenaisnecessarybecauseincludingspeechwouldonlycauseconfu-sioninthelinguist’sconstructionofastaticresearchobject:

“…mydefinitionoflanguagepresupposestheexclusionofeverythingthatisoutsideitsorgan-ismorsystem–inaword,ofeverythingknownas‘externallinguistics’.”(Ibid.,p.20)

Granted,Saussureneverdeniestheexistenceofsocialaspectsoflanguage:heexplicitlyacknowledgestheroleethnologicalphenomena,history,politics,andsocialinstitutionsplayintheformationofalanguage(Ibid.,pp.20–21)whichcomprisetheaforementioned“externallinguistics”.Butbymakingthisdistinction,andproclaimingthatthesephenomenashouldhavenothingtodowiththeobjectof“thescienceoflanguage”,hemarginalizeswhatisinfactessential,andclaimsinsteadaconstructedabstractiontobeessential.Thisiswhat Jean-JacquesLecercle criticizes as the “principle of immanence”, bywhichthestudyoflangueisgoverned:

1

Idonotintendtogointodetailonthesetwocurrents of thought, which today are quitesimilarandtendtointersectmoreoftenthannot.Thegeneraltendencyofbothistoascribelanguage tohumanbeing’sbiological facul-ties,specificallythosewithinthebrainasthemerefunctionofitsnervousstimuli(hencethesimilarity).Psychologismwillthentalkabout

thepsychewhich restsupon these functionsofthebrain,whilebiologismwillrathergointhedirectionofneuroscience.OneofthebestcriticsoftheseapproachesistheevolutionistStephen JayGould,whose general similari-tieswithahistorical-materialistmethodologyarenotable(cf.ClarkandYork2011).



“…nothingexternaltothesystemoflangueisrelevanttoitsdescription.”(Lecercle2009,p.10)

Theeffectofsuchseparationoflanguageintolangueand paroleisthat“…paroleisnothingbutindividualvariationonthenormrepresentedbylangue,withtheresultthattheensembleevolvesaccordingtoitsowntendenciesandthesystemconsequentlyignoreshumanhistory–thatofthecommunityofitsspeakers.”(Ibid.,pp.112–113)

Whatsuchanabstractionoflanguefromsocialrealityneglectscompletelyisthatlanguageisnotjustasystemofsymbolsandinternalrules,butprimarilysomethingrepresentingsocialrelationsingeneral,andtherelationsofpowerbetween speakers in a concrete speech context in particular,which canbediscernedfromthespecificstyleofspeechaspeakerutilises.“To speak is to appropriate one or other of the expressive styles already constituted in andthroughusageandobjectivelymarkedbytheirpositioninthehierarchyofstyleswhichexpressthehierarchyofcorrespondingsocialgroups.”(Bourdieu2012,p.54)

Byignoringsuchproblemsandfocusingitsstudyontheinternalrelationsofwords,Saussureanlinguisticsonlysucceedsincreatingatheoreticalconstructwhichdoesnotexistinreality.AsBourdieunotes:“Theall-purposewordinthedictionary,aproductoftheneutralizationofthepracticalrelationswithinwhichitfunctions,hasnosocialexistence:inpractice,itisalwaysimmersedinsitua-tions,tosuchanextentthatthecoremeaningwhichremainsrelativelyinvariantthroughthediversityof[linguistic]marketsmaypassunnoticed.”(Ibid.,p.39)

WhatSaussureignores,consciouslyorunconsciously,isthefactthateverylanguage is subject to certain conditions of its social production,which iswhatBourdieu’sworkisverygoodatshowingindetail.Finally,according toSaussure, langue shouldbe studied from thepointofviewofsynchrony,while thephenomena thatare related todiachrony are,again,apotentialobjectofresearchforothersciences,butirrelevantforlin-guisticsproper.Thisissignificantbecausethatmeansthatlanguageaslangue,forSaussure,isstatic,immobileandfixable,whichbringsustoanothersig-nificantpointofcritique:“… the Saussurean system has anothermajor characteristic, encapsulated in the concept of‘synchrony’: it is stable – that is, temporally immobile. It is not denied that languages […]haveahistory,butstudyofitisrelegatedtothemarginsofscienceundertheagreeablerubricof‘diachrony’.Butthis‘pointintime’,asarrestedasZeno’sarrowandrecallingtheHegelian‘essentialsection’criticisedbyAlthusser,ignores,infavourofthesystemwhoseconstructionitmakespossible,thecomplextemporalityofreallanguages(adifferentialtemporality,whichisnotthesameforthevocabulary,thesyntax,orthephonemes);andthefactthatlanguagesarenever immobilebutconstantlysubject tohistoricalchange, renderingsynchronicdescriptionsomewhatarbitrary.”(Lecercle2009,pp.10–11)

Thisisanimportantpointtonote,because,inreality,languageiscrossedwithmultiplenon-contemporaneoustemporalities,beitthemere“doubletemporal-ity”ofeverymeaningofaword,whichsimultaneouslysummonsthehistoryofitspreviousmeanings,andgivesspecificmeaningtothecurrentsocialcontextitwasusedin,beitthedifferenttemporalitiesfordifferentpartsoflanguage,asLecerclenotes,suchasitssemantics,itssyntax,etc.2Thus,synchronyactu-allyseemstobequiteamisleadingconceptforthestudyoflanguage.

1.2. “Linguistic value”: The word–money analogy

SinceSaussuredetacheslanguagefromlivingdiscourse,i.e.thesocialprac-ticeof speech,he is forced to findan internal logicwithin the“systemof



language” itself.The strictly linguistic laws of language as system (gram-mar,phonetics,etc.)couldnotpresentasufficientexplanationforthereasonwhyinspeechsomewordsandsentencesareselectedoverothers,wherebyallofthemconfineequallytothesamelaws.Inshort,Saussure’ssystemasiswouldnotbeabletoaccountforlinguistic variety,thevariouswordsandexpressionssignifyingessentiallythesame,andforthelogicbehindchoosingoneofthemovertheotherduringspeech.Sincelocatingthislogicinpoliticsorsocialrelationswas,forSaussure,outofthequestion(simplybecausetheentiretheoreticalbuildingof“languageassystem”wouldthencrumble),hehadtoexplainlinguisticvarietybyanotherlawinternaltolangue:linguisticvalue.Linguisticvalueisfoundedonthefactthattheelementsofeverylanguagestandinarelationandareinterconnected.Awordalwaysstandsinacompara-tiverelationwithothersimilarwords,andthevalueofeachofthosewordsspringsfromthatrelation:

“Languageisasystemofinterdependenttermsinwhichthevalueofeachtermresultssolelyfromthesimultaneouspresenceoftheothers.”(Saussure1959,p.114)

Specificlinguisticvaluesarethuscharacteristicforeachexistinglanguage,anddifferaccordinglyfromotherlanguages.Thesevaluesarethesolereasonwhysomewordsareusedoverother,equallylogicalandmeaningfulwords.Furthermore,linguisticvaluehasnothingtodowithanypotentialcontentofthewordsthemselves,butspringspurelyfromtherelationwithotherwords.Afterheoffersseveralexamples,Saussurequiteclearlystatesthat

“…wefindinalltheforegoingexamplesvaluesemanating from the system.[emphasismine]When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is understood that the concepts are purelydifferentialanddefinednotbytheirpositivecontentbutnegativelybytheirrelationswiththeothertermsofthesystem.Theirmostprecisecharacteristicisinbeingwhattheothersarenot.”(Ibid.,p.117)

The reasonwhy Saussure comes to such an untenable conclusion – valueemanatingfromthesystemitselfonthebasisofthedifferenceofelementsofthesystemstandinginrelationtoeachother–whichhetermsa“paradoxicalprinciple”,isbecauseheconceptualizeslanguelikeacapitalistmarket,wherewordsareanalogoustomoney.

“…evenoutsidelanguageallvaluesareapparentlygovernedbythesameparadoxicalprinci-ple.Theyarealwayscomposed:(1)ofadissimilarthingthatcanbeexchangedforthethingofwhichthevalueistobedetermined;and(2)ofsimilarthingsthatcanbecomparedwiththethingofwhichthevalueistobedetermined.”(Ibid.,p.115)

Saussure then proceeds to give an example of five francs that can be ex-changedforanamountofbreadofthesamevalue,aswellasthat“itcanbecomparedwithasimilarvalueofthesamesystem,e.g.aone-francpiece,orwithcoinsofanothersystem(adollar,etc.)”(Ibid.).Words,hecontinues,areexchangedinfundamentallythesamemanner.Eventakenbyitself, thisanalogyisquiteproblematic,butwhenonetakesintoaccountSaussure’sfundamentalmisunderstandingoftheeconomy,theanalogyandtheconceptoflinguisticvalueitselfloseallplausibility.Saussureseesmoneyasauniversalformcharacteristicofalleconomies,and,further-

2

Theconceptofuniversallineartimeissome-thingSaussureanlinguisticsshareswithmostofpositivistscienceswithincapitalism,which

is a result of capitalism itself (Cf. Bensaïd2009,PartIandIII).


A.Sućeska,TowardsaCritiqueoftheDo-minantPhilosophiesofLanguage…19�

more,hedoesnotunderstandthatmoneyisonlytheuniversalexpressionofvaluecreatedbylabour–whichwasalreadyatheoreticaladvanceoftheclas-sicalpoliticaleconomyofRicardoandhislabourtheoryofvalue(McNally2001,p.52).Hisinabilitytoseethesocialrootsofvalueexpressedinmoneyasitsuniversalformisthereforeironicallyanalogoustohisinabilitytoseethesocialrootsoflanguage.Forhim,boththevalueofmoney,aswellasthelin-guisticvalueofwordsemanatefromtheeconomic,thatis,linguisticsystemsthemselves,respectively.“Bytakingmoneyasauniversalfeatureofalleconomies,Saussurecannotderiveitfromaspe-cificsocialformoflabor.Andthesamethingistrueforhisanalysisoflanguage.Thepureformoflanguage–thelanguagesystem–floatsdetachedfromspeechanddiscourse,justasthepureformofexchange–money–remainsdisconnectedfromtherudimentaryelementsofeconomiclife.Asaresult,heisreducedtoemptypropositionsofthesortthatcharacterizevulgareconom-ics:‘languageisspeechlessspeaking’;‘languageisasystemofpurevalues’;‘inlanguagethereareonlydifferences’;‘languageisaformandnotasubstance’(CGL,77,80,120,122).Thesearetextbookexamplesofabstractionoftheformalfeaturesofasystemfromtheconcretesocialrelationsthatanimatethem.”(Ibid.)

Saussurereproducesthefetishismofcapitalistsocietyingeneral,andofclas-siceconomicsinparticular, inhislinguisticsandthetheoryoflanguageassystem.Bothfindlawswhichemanatefromwithinthesystemitselfanddonotnotice thefundamentalrootsofeconomicandlinguisticrealities inso-ciety,andinvariousformsofsocialpractice.“Saussure’snotionoflinguisticvalueisimbuedwiththeformalistabstractionsofthecapitalisteconomy,indeedwithsomeofitsmostfetishizedappearances.Saussure’sclaimthat‘languageisaformandnotasubstance’mirrorsacentralfeatureofthecapitalisteconomy:thatthingshavevaluenotbecauseoftheirconcrete,usefulcharacteristics,butbecauseoftheirexchange-abilitywithotherunitsofabstracthumanlabor.”(Ibid.,p.54)

AsMcNallynotes,this“invertedlogic”isMarx’sprimaryfocusinCapital(Ibid,p.52).Theconceptof linguisticvalueand theanalogyofcapitalistmarket= lan-guageassystem,aswellaswords=moneyisuntenablebecauseofthefunda-mentallymisguidedpresuppositionstheyimply.Theysuccumbtoanevidentformoffetishism,wherebythesocialrootsofphenomena,thataretheobjectof research, are completelyabstracted from,andnoversionof a theoryoflanguagewhichwouldrestuponsuchananalogycanbefreeofthoseflaws,beitthepoststructuralistversionofJacquesDerrida,3ortheMarxistversionofFerruccioRossi-Landi.4

1.3. Historicizing Saussure

OnemightclaimthatthiscritiqueistooharshonSaussure.Afterall,hewasalinguist,andwhathewastryingtodowiththemainthesesintheCoursewasinpartinfluencedbythehistoricalcontextoftheoreticalknowledgeofhis time.AsPeterIvesnotes,“muchofEuropeanlinguisticsat the timeofSaussure’sdeathfocusedontracingthehistoryofwordformsandattempt-ingtodeterminethepatternsinthesechanges”(Ives2004,p.17),whichwascalled“diachronicchange”.Saussure’sCourseisactuallyarebelliousreac-tionagainstthistraditionwhichwaspreventinglinguisticsfrombecomingasciencebymakingitimpossible–withinthetheoreticalconfinesofthisoldtradition–todelineatea“fixed”objectofstudy(whichseemstobetheulti-matecriteriaof“scientificity”oftheoriesuptothisday).Inshort,“Saussurearguedthatsuchanapproachcouldneverbetrulyscientificbecauseitcouldneverisolatelanguageasadecisiveobjectofstudy”(Ibid.).



Thatisthereasonwhythefollowinghadhappened:

“[Saussure]arguedthatforlinguisticstoseparateitselffromothersciencessuchaspsychol-ogy,anthropologyandphilology,itmusttakethesystemicelementoflanguageasitsprimaryfocus.”(Ibid.)

Itisby“systematizing”language,fixingit,andremovingallirrelevantphe-nomenaoutif it(history,change,“howlanguageisusedinpractice”), thatlinguisticswillobtainan“objectof study”and finallybecome“scientific”(Ibid.).Ifthatwaswhatwasnecessarytofinallyenablelinguisticsto“scien-tifically”researchtherelationsofsignifiersandsignifiedswithinthenewlyborn“structure”of language,wemight say: fair enough.But thecriticismI elaborated above is still applicable; if nothing else, there remains a fun-damentalcontradictionwithin sucha linguistics, asSaussureexplicitlyac-knowledges theeffectssociety,history,politics,etc.haveon language,butatthesametime,hemarginalizesthesefactors,andthesephenomenatothe“un-scientifical”partsof“external”linguisticsandproclaimsthemirrelevantforthe“scienceoflanguage”.ItisnotacoincidencethatSaussure’stheorygavebirthtostructuralism,andlateron,poststructuralism,whichepitomisethistendencyof“scientificab-straction”oftheirobjectofstudyfromtherealworld.5

“Post-structuralistshavehad littlequarrelwith[Saussure’s] initialmethodologicalmoves. Intheirsearchforstructures,discourses,textsandcodesindependentofhumanactors,theyhaveretainedSaussure’sformalistabstractionism.”(McNally2001,p.47)

PierreBourdieubeautifullydescribesthistheoreticalheritageofSaussure’slinguistics:

“The entire destiny ofmodern linguistics is in fact determined by Saussure’s inaugural actthroughwhichheseparatesthe‘external’elementsoflinguisticsfromthe‘internal’elements,and,by reserving the titleof linguistics for the latter, excludes from it all the investigationswhichestablisharelationshipbetweenlanguageandanthropology,thepoliticalhistoryofthosewhospeakit,oreventhegeographyofthedomainwhereitisspoken,becauseallofthesethingsaddnothingtoaknowledgeoflanguagetakeninitself.Giventhatitsprangfromtheautonomyattributedtolanguageinrelationtoitssocialconditionsofproduction,reproductionanduse,structurallinguisticscouldnotbecomethedominantsocialsciencewithoutexercisinganideo-logicaleffect,bybestowingtheappearanceofscientificityonthenaturalizationoftheproductsofhistory,thatis,onsymbolicobjects.”(Bourdieu2012,p.33)

Likewise, it isanironyoftheoreticalhistory,asIvesnotes,“thatlinguisticstructuralismbasedonthisdemarcationof‘objectsofstudy’wasincorporatedintoanthropologyandtheothersocialscienceswhosedomainsarenotlan-

3

Derridaseesnotonlylanguageasanalogousto economy, but also the relations betweensubjects analogous to economic relations.“Theeconomyofthesubjectisaneconomyof calculation, of balance sheets, of creditsanddebts,ofwhatoneowesandisowedinturn.Itfollows,then,thatsubjectsarecapital-ists, calculators intentuponbeingpaidbackwith interest.And since subjects are consti-tuted in and through language for Derrida,languagetoomustbeasystemofcalculation,acapitalistsystem.”(McNally2001,p.61)

4

AlthoughRossi-Landi,unlikeSaussure,foundslinguisticvalueonthebasisoflanguagebe-

ing“linguisticwork”,sothatlinguisticvaluedoes not emerge from the linguistic systemitself,histheorystill“modelslanguageonthecapitalistmarket–and therebycommits thesameerror thatplaguesSaussure”(McNally2001, p. 55). For Rossi-Landi’s work, see:Rossi-Landi1983,particularlychapter2.

5

For a succinct critique of structuralism andpoststructuralism,see thealreadymentionedbookofPerryAnderson1983.Alsocf.Jame-son1974.



guage”(Ives2004,p.17).whichwasdirectlyoppositeofSaussure’sintentionofseparatinglinguisticsfromothersciences.Thus,whatSaussure’stheoryoffersisaconceptionoflanguagewhichsearch-esforthekeyforunderstandinglanguageinitsabstractionfromreality,fromallthephenomenawhich–fromahistorical-materialiststandpoint–arefun-damentalforlanguage,andwithoutwhichlanguageisnotthelivingsocialprocessofeverydaylife,whichparticipatesinthecreationofconceptsandideas,inclassconflict,inculture,etc.

“Saussure’sstructuralismcontainedtheideathatunderneaththeactualmanifestationofphe-nomenawasa‘hidden’structure.BecauseSaussuresawindividualutterancesassecondaryto,andgeneratedby,thesystemoflanguage(whichwasnotobviouslyapparent),theactionsofindividualscametobeseenasmeresuperficialoccurrences,whereasrealunderstandingcamefromuncoveringtheunderlyingstructures.”(Ibid.,p.21)

Givenhisaforementionedtheoreticalintentionoffinallyfoundinglinguisticsscientifically,perhapsSaussure’somissionis“reasonable”(Ibid.,p.19)(al-thougheventhatisquestionable).ButthefactremainsthatSaussureoffersapictureofadeadlanguage,whileweareinterestedsolelyinalivingone.Wecansay,withDavidMcNally,thatforSaussure

“…languageisspeechdematerializedanddehistoricized,speechstrippedofitsentanglementinthebodiesandlivesofrealhistoricalactors.”(McNally2001,p.47)

1.4. Voloshinov and Bakhtin on Saussurean linguistics

WhendiscussingSaussureanlinguistics,especiallyinregardtoahistorical-materialist approach to language,we should not forget aboutValentinVo-loshinov’s critiqueofSaussure,probablyoneof the first from theMarxistcurrentofthought.InhisbookMarxism and the Philosophy of Language,6Voloshinov situates the linguistic theoryofSaussurewithinwhathe terms“abstractobjectivism”.Hiscritiquecanbesummarizedasfollows:

“…languageisnotastablesystemofself-identicalforms,butasystemofsignsadaptabletoever-newcontexts.Utterancesarenot individual acts complete in themselves,but links in achainofdiscursivecommunicationthatisintheprocessofbecoming.Languageisahistoricallydevelopingphenomenonratherthananarrestedstaticsystem.TheSaussureanapproachignoresthecompositionalformsofthewholeutteranceinfavourofanabstractunderstandingoftheelementsoflanguage.Themeaningofawordderivesentirelyfromits(verbalandextraverbal)contextand itmaintainsanevaluativeaccent inuse, something that is ignoredbySaussure.Languageisnotaready-madeproductthatishandeddownbutanenduringpartofthestreamofverbalcommunication.ThesystemoflanguageanditshistoricalevolutionareincapableofbeingreconciledbyaSaussureanapproach.Inaddition,Voloshinovholds thatSaussure’sapproach,whichvaluesa synchronicnational-linguisticunity(langue),easilycoalesceswithoppressivepoliticalpower.ItderivesfromthetraditionofIndo-Europeanlinguisticsthatprizedascholasticstudyof‘deadlanguages’overamoreegalitarianstudyofvitalandinteractivelivingdiscourse.”(Brandist2002,pp.80–81)

ThepointsVoloshinovmakessummarizeeverythingthatwaspointedoutinthispartofthepaperasthefaultsoftheSaussureanlanguage-system.TothiswecanaddBakhtin’scritique:

“Linguistics,stylisticsandthephilosophyoflanguage(…)havesoughtfirstandforemostforunityindiversity.Thisexclusive‘orientationtowardunity’inthepresentandpastlifeoflan-guageshasconcentrated theattentionofphilosophicaland linguistic thoughton the firmest,most stable, least changeable andmostmono-semic aspects of discourse – on the phoneticaspects first of all – that are furthest removed from the changing socio-semantic spheres ofdiscourse.”(Bakhtin2008,p.274)



Bothofthesequotes,especiallytheonefromBakhtin,pointtowhatIconsideroneoftheprimaryargumentsforthesocialityoflanguage.Languageisso-cialbecauseitmanifestsandunfolds in dialogue;becausethroughdialogue,languageisasocialprocess.ThatiswhysayingwithSaussurethatlanguageissocialmerelybecauseitisasocialproductisnotatallenough(andmissesthepoint),althoughthataswellisimportant.ThereisonepointIwishtofocusonabitmore,andoffersomeadditionalinputintowhatVoloshinovconsidersthereasonofsuchanapproachtolan-guagewithinlinguistics:the“scholasticstudyof‘deadlanguages’”.Voloshi-novevokesthisthesiswhenhewritesaboutthe“abstractobjectivist”modeoflinguisticthought(whichistheSaussureanone):

“…atthebasisofthemodesoflinguisticthoughtthatleadtothepostulationoflanguageasasystemofnormativelyidenticalformsliesapractical and theoretical focus of attention on the study of defunct, alien languages preserved in written monuments.”(Voloshinov1986,p.71)

IthinkVoloshinovslightlyoveremphasizesthe“deadlanguages”issue,most-lyasaneffectofthehistoricalcontextofSovietlinguisticsinthe1920s.7Theold linguisticparadigmswerestillverymuchaliveandthenewonesweretryingtoclaimnewgroundandtheoreticallegitimacy.Inordertodothat,ofcourse,onehadtotheoreticallyde-legitimisetheoldtheories,andsincetheirbiggestcharacteristicwasthestudyofancientlanguagesandtheattemptsatreconstructingproto-languages(likeancientSlavic),thiswasthemostobvi-ous“root”oftheproblemsofthoseoldapproachesonecouldfocuson.ThisisnottosaythatVoloshinovwascompletelywronginpointingthisout,butonlythat,inmyview,asignificantpartoftheexplanationforlinguistics’generalinability tograsp the living language is,as Ialreadymentionedabove, thetendencyofsciencesincapitalismingeneraltofetishizetheirobjectofstudybyattemptingtoclaimit for theirspecificscientificdisciplineandsolidifyit,turningasocialphenomenonintoanabstractconceptorthing.ThiswaspreciselywhatSaussurewastryingtodo,finallyestablishinglinguisticsasanobjectivesciencewithitsownobjectofresearch,clearlydemarcatedfromothersciences,whichrenderedhistheoreticalprojectsomewhatsusceptibletosomeofthemostcommontraitsofscientificpositivism.

1.5. Final remarks

ThelinguisticsofFerdinanddeSaussure,asoutlinedintheCourse in General Linguistics,isanattempttoconstructanobjective“scienceoflanguage”byabstractingitfromallthesocialphenomenarelatedtoitandturningitintoanabstractandimmobileobjectofstudy.Thosephenomenathatareabstractedfromarerelegatedintospeech,anditsresearchiscondemnedtothemarginsofscience,or,inanycase,tothosescienceswhichhavenothingtodowith“lin-guisticsproper”.Thisobjectofstudyisasystem,insteadofaprocess,where-bytheactivityofspeakingispresentedonlyasamanifestationofthesystem,

6

Iamawareofthediscussionabouttheauthor-shipofthisbookandthatsomeascribeitnottoVoloshinov,buttoMikhailBakhtin.How-ever, I believeenoughproof to the contraryhas been given in Brandist 2002 (the largenumberofreferencesVoloshinovused,whichBakhtin seldom does in his works; the dif-ferenceof style; the differing approaches tocertainproblems;theexplicitMarxismofVo-

loshinov,etc.).OntheproblemofauthorshipwithintheBakhtinCircle,seealsoBrandist,Shepherd,andTihanov(eds.)2004.

7

SeeBrandistandChown(eds.)2011,particu-larlythefirsttext,byVladimirAlpatov,“So-vietLinguisticsof the1920sand1930sandtheScholarlyHeritage”,pp.17–34.



completely irrelevant for it.Thedepthof thevariousnon-contemporaneoustemporalitiesoflanguageissubstitutedwithacrosssectionoflanguagefrozeninsynchrony.Inshort,itisafetishizingprocedure,inthatitisolateslanguagefromthesocialfactsthatdetermineitandfixesitintoanabstractsystem.Perhapssuchatheoreticalprocedurewasnecessaryfortheformationoflin-guistics.Wemightadd:“alltheworseforlinguistics”.Inanycase,Saussure’sapproachtolanguageisopposedtoanytheoryoflanguagewhichwouldbebasedonhistorical-materialistpremises,andwhichwould,therefore,bein-terestedpreciselyinthosephenomenainlanguagewhichSaussurewantstoleaveuntouched:thesocial, thehistorical, theideological,thepolitical, theeconomic,etc.Thus,inordertodiscussthosephenomena,wehavetoabolishthedistinctionbetweenlangueandparole,aswellastheonebetweensynchronyanddiachrony.Inordertodiscussthosephenomena,wehavetorejectSaussureanlinguisticsthewayitrejectedthem.

2. Methodological individualism of Noam Chomsky

2.1. Consequences of Chomsky’s “biolinguistics”

NoamChomskyis,likeSaussure,oneofthemostprominentfiguresof20thcenturylinguistics.ChomskysharessomeofthecharacteristicsofSaussure’sapproachto language,although,unlikeSaussure,hedoesnotacknowledgethe–atleastpartially–socialcharacteroflanguageatall.ForChomsky,lan-guageisnotevenasocialproduct,likeitwasforSaussure.Thus,Chomskygoesevenfurtherinfetishizinglanguage.WhatisextremelyfascinatingwithChomsky,however,isthathisapproachtolanguageisdiametricallyopposedtohispoliticalactivism.Notonlyinhispoliticalbooks,butalsoinhisinter-viewsandcomments,heshowsa remarkablesensitivity to the relationsofpower,andtheeffectsofideologywithinsociety.However,whenitcomestolanguage,itisasifChomskybecomesacompletelydifferentperson,oblivi-oustothoseprocessesandsocialrelationswhichhesoferventlycriticisesinhispoliticalactivism.Iwillnotgointodetail,butwillfocusinsteadonthecoreargumentsofChomsky’slinguistics.Already in his earlyworks,Chomsky adopts the Saussurean procedure ofdemarcatingthe linguisticobjectofstudyfromall thephenomenaexternaltolanguage:

“Linguistic theory isconcernedprimarilywithan ideal speaker-listener, inacompletelyho-mogeneous speech-community,whoknows its languageperfectly and is unaffectedby suchgrammaticallyirrelevantconditionsasmemorylimitations,distractions,shiftsofattentionandinterest, and errors (randomor characteristic) in applyinghis knowledgeof the language inactualperformance.”(Chomsky1965,p.3)

Asisobvious,thefocusofstudyinglanguageissituatedintheindividual,whois“anidealspeaker-listener”,pulledoutofthecontextofconcretespeech.Itisalreadyaconceptoflanguagefreeofsocietyortime,orevenindividualspeechdisorders.

“Here,wearefacedwithacompletelydecontextualised,detemporalizedanddisembodiedcon-ceptoflanguage.”(Linell2004,p.123)

However,inhislaterworks,8Chomskygoesevenfurtherinthesamedirec-tion,andlinkslinguisticswithpsychologyand,lateron,neuroscience:

“Chomsky(…)declaredthatlinguisticswastobeunderstoodaspartofcognitivepsychology.Cognitionhas,inmainstream(particularlyAmerican)psychology,beenconcernedwithmental



processeswithin the individual.At the same time, a generative grammar, based on abstractformalrulesofsyntax,wasassumedtobetheadequatemodelofthelanguage.Suchastronglytransformedversionofla langue,nowtermedcompetence,wasnowassumedtobeinternalizedbythelanguageuser.”(Linell2004,p.123)

This way, Chomsky got closer to those approaches which I criticised innotethree,namely,psychologismandbiologism.ItisnotacoincidencethatChomsky’s theory is sometimesdescribedas “psycholinguistics” (Ibid.)or“biolinguistics”(Chomsky2005,p.vii),whetherbyothers,orbyChomskyhimself.IshalltrytosummarizewhatisatstakewiththistraitofChomsky’sapproachtolanguage.Firstly,theanalogybetweenSaussure’s langueandChomsky’scompetencethatLinellnotedisdefinitelyananalogywhichpointstoatraitwealreadygotfamiliarwithearlierinSaussure.AsBourdieuwrites,

“Chomskyan ‘competence’ is simply another name forSaussure’s langue.Corresponding tolanguageas‘universaltreasure’,asthecollectivepropertyofthewholegroup,thereislinguisticcompetenceasthe‘deposit’ofthis‘treasure’ineachindividualorastheparticipationofeachmemberof the ‘linguistic community’ in this public good.The shift in vocabulary concealsthefictio juristhroughwhichChomsky,convertingtheimmanentlawsoflegitimatediscourseintouniversalnormsorcorrectlinguisticpractice,sidestepsthequestionoftheeconomicandsocialconditionsoftheacquisitionofthelegitimatecompetenceandoftheconstitutionofthe[linguistic]marketinwhichthisdefinitionofthelegitimateandtheillegitimateisestablishedandimposed.”(Bourdieu2012,p.44)

Whatlinguistics,beitSaussureanorChomskyan,treatsasan“universallan-guage” or as “universal linguistic practice” by looking at official nationallanguage, is in fact a discoursewhich has imposed itself as the dominantdiscourseby themeansof certain socialpractices (suchas class struggle).Theentirehistoryoftheconstitutionofsuchdiscourses,theresultofwhicharenationallanguages,issomethingChomskyanlinguisticsremainsbothun-interestedinandignorantto.Likewise,thesocialconsequencesofsuchproc-essesalsoremainhidden:bynotbeingabletospeakthedominantdiscourse,i.e.thenationallanguage,fluently,certainpeople–whosenumberendsuptobequitesignificant–arenotabletoparticipateinthesocialinstitutionswhereadequateknowledgeofthisdiscourseisobligatory.Ifsuchpeople(thesubal-ternclasses)attempttosaysomethingpublicly,theywilloften,asBourdieunotes,notbelistenedto:

“Thecompetenceadequatetoproducesentencesthatarelikelytobeunderstoodmaybequiteinadequatetoproducesentencesthatarelikelytobelistened to,likelytoberecognizedasacceptableinallthesituationsinwhichthereisoccasiontospeak.Hereagain,socialacceptabilityisnotreducibletomeregrammaticality.”(Bourdieu2012,p.55)

Thus,theconceptoflinguistic“competence”,analogoustoSaussure’slangue,remainscompletelyblindtosuchsocialprocessesandrelationsofpowerre-latedtolanguage.Secondly, forChomsky,“language isamentalorgan:a ‘biologicalendow-ment’thatisspecies-specificandinnate.Chomskyclearlyestablishesananal-ogybetween language– amental organ– and theheart or eye–physicalorgans” (Lecercle2009, p. 19).The “innateness”of language is containedinthefactthat,“accordingtoChomsky,wenomorelearntospeakthanwelearntogrowarmsorreachpuberty”(Ibid.).Inthelifeofanindividualofthe

8

ParticularlyfromChomsky2005[1968]on-wards.



humanspecies,languageisnotsociallyinherited,learnedorsociallyadoptedinanyway;itismerely“triggered”,asageneticprogrammealreadypresentwithintheindividual,byexperience.Thisprocessoftriggeringisthesame,irrelevanttotheformsofsociety,itsdevelopmentoranyothersuch“exter-nal”characteristics.Theonlyimportantthingisthatithastohappen,whichiswhy“experienceplaysanecessarybutlimitedroleinlanguagedevelopment”(Ibid.,p.20).Furthermore,language,asthis“geneticprogramme”,iscompletelyindepend-entfromanyculturaldifferences,whichmeansthat“eachmemberofthehu-manspeciesisidenticalasregardsthefacultyoflanguage,becauselanguageisinscribedinhisorherbrain”andthat“[l]anguagemustthereforebestudiedintheindividual”and“hasnothingtodowithsocialexistence”(Ibid.,p.21).ThisiswhyChomsky’slinguisticsissimilartopositivistsciences,since“thelogical consequenceofChomskyannaturalism ismethodological individu-alism,whichischaracteristicofliberalthinkingineconomicsandpolitics”(Ibid.).Whatderivesfromlanguagethusconceivedisthatithasnohistory–sinceitiscompletelyseparatedfromsociety,sinceforChomskyevenSaus-sure’sclaimaboutlanguagebeingasocialproductwouldbetooun-scientifi-cal–otherthan“thequasi-frozenhistoryoftheevolutionofthespeciesovertheverylongtermandbyleaps”.(Ibid.)Thereisnosuchthingasthesocialhistoryoflanguage:itschangehasbeendictated exclusively by internal biological laws, i.e. the lawsof evolution.UnlikeSaussure,Chomskydoesnotmerelymarginalizediachrony–hecom-pletelyignoresit.Finally,thereisthedistinctionChomskymakesbetweeninternallanguage(I-language)andexternallanguage(E-language),inawaysimilartoSaussure,butmoreradical:

“Theobjectoflinguisticscienceisobviously(…)notlanguagesuchasweuseit,butanabstractconstruct,whichChomskycallsI-language.TheletterIistheinitialofthethreeadjectivesthatcharacterizelanguagethusconceived:itisinternal(thereisatleastoneelementthatChomskytakesoverfromstructuralism–theprincipleofimmanence);individual(languageisnotasocialorculturalobject);andintensional(…)bywhichChomskymeansthatthelanguageobjectheconstructsisagenerativegrammar–thatis,alimitednumberofprinciplescapableofgenerat-inganinfinityofutterances(…).Therest(…)isconsignedto‘commonsense’,astheobjectofwhatChomskycalls‘folk-linguistics’inallthesensesoftheterm.”(Ibid.,p.22)

Thus,we have again, as in Saussure, the principle of immanence, i.e. theapproach according towhich nothing external to language has any impor-tance.However,aswesawabove,ChomskydoesdefinelanguagedifferentlyincomparisonwithSaussure.Languagenowbecomesa“biologicalendow-ment”,sealingthedealwithmethodologicalindividualism.

2.2. Final remarks

ChomskyanlinguisticsisincompatiblewithaMarxisttheoryoflanguageforseveralreasons.9Firstly,itisbasedonmethodological individualism,whichmeansitconsiderslanguagea priorifromana-socialanda-historicalview-point. I-language, the object of linguistics asChomskyhaddefined it, ex-cludespreciselythosephenomenawhichweareinterestedin.ChomskythusrepeatswhatSaussuredoes,butinamuchmoreradicalandtheoreticallyper-niciousway–whichbringsustothesecondpoint:Chomsky’snaturalism.ForChomsky, language is an all-human trait inscribed inourbrain. It hasnothingtodowithlearning,butisafixableaspectofhumannature.Forthe



samereasons,linguisticsisitselfanaturalscience,benefitinghighlyfromtheinsightsofbiology,psychologyandneuroscience.SinceMarxismhadquitealotofexperiencewithitsowntypeofvulgarmaterialism,insomeaspectssimilartoChomsky’snaturalism,todayitisquitewearyofsuchcrudereduc-tions.Finally,wecanfindinChomskyarefusal of history.ForChomsky,thechangethatallconcretesocial languageshaveundergoneuptotodayis irrelevant,and,inessence,presentsnothinginrelationto“languageassuch”foundinourbrain.Whatunderliesallthesedifferentformsoflanguages,beitvariousformsofthesamenationallanguage(dialects),orvariousnationallanguages,isapattern,ageneticprogrammewithinourbrain.Oneenormousfieldofsocialchange–thatoflinguisticchange–isthuscompletelydenieditsexist-ence.ItisironicthatevensuchanisolationandabstractionoflanguagedidnothelpChomskytocometoanirrefutabletheoryoftheinternalfunctionsofthis“geneticprogramme”.10

These threepointsallbringusonceagain to the fetishization of language,althoughChomskywentevenfurtherwithitthanSaussuredid.Chomsky

“…reduceswhatisessentiallyapractice–humanlanguage–toaseriesof‘things’inscribedinthebrainofthespeakerorhergenes.”(Ibid.,p.35)

Chomsky,likeSaussure,triedto“constructlinguisticsasasciencebygivingita specificobject,constructedbyexcluding thenon-pertinentphenomenaencompassedunder thenecessarilyvaguenotionof language”– langue inSaussure,ageneticprogrammeinChomsky.Thus,hesuccumbedtothesameerrors of scientific positivism as Saussure did.However, Saussure at leastacknowledged that language was a social product, which Chomsky vehe-mentlydenies,andthusfetishizeslanguageevenmoreboldly.Therefore,wemightconcludewithJean-JacquesLecercle:

“…ifitisagreedthatChomsky’saimistoconstituteascience,westillneedtoaskwhathislinguisticsaimstobethescienceof–thatis,whatitsobjectis.FortheI-languagedoesindeedpossessallthecharacteristicsofascientificobject:itispresentedasreal–thatis,ashavingamaterialexistenceinthebrainofthespeaker;itisspecific,constructedbypurgingirrelevantphenomena;anditisabstract.Butitisnotobviousthatthisobjectislanguage,construedinthebroadestornarrowestsenseoftheterm.ForChomsky,infact,linguisticscanatbestonlybeaprovisionalscience;and,atworst,notascienceatall–or,rather,notaspecificscience.Atworst,theI-languageisanobjectforscientificpsychology,whichwillitselfonedaybereducedtobiology.Atbest,itiscurrentlytheobjectofthescienceoflanguage,pendingthedaywhentheadvancesinbiologywillrendersuperfluousindirectdescriptionofthelanguagefacultyviagrammaticalstructureswhich,whateverleveltheyareenvisagedat,canonlybesurfacephe-nomena,effectsofthematerialconstitutionofthemind/brain.”(Ibid.,pp.42–43)

3. Idealism of Habermas’ communicative theory of language

TheworkofJürgenHabermasbringsustoasignificantlydifferentapproachto language compared to that of Saussure and Chomsky.Although not a

9

Imostly build upon the summary in Lecer-cle2009,pp.35–37,whereIadoptthethreecharacteristics he describes, although not inthesameorder,andtreatinghissecondchar-acteristic–fetishism–notasacharacteristic,butasaprocesstowhichallthethreecharac-teristicsunderlie.

10

IhavenotreferredtoLecercle’sveryinterest-inganalysisonthis–Lecerclebeingaphilol-ogist,andthusqualifiedforthetopic–whichcanbefoundinLecercle2009,pp.24–34.



Marxistinthestrictsense,Habermaswasdefinitelyinfluencedbyhistoricalmaterialismandtakesoversomeofitstheoreticalpresuppositionsandcon-cepts.Hismagnum opus,The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas1984;Habermas1987),offersaphilosophyoflanguagealreadywellawareof and building uponmost of the fundamental pointswe had to argue forinrelationtoSaussureandChomsky:it isbasedonsocialinteraction,thusavoidingmethodologicalindividualism,anditconceivesoflanguageasaso-cialphenomenon.Thus,thecritiqueofHabermaswillbedifferentfromthatofSaussureandChomskyinthesensethatitisadiscussionwithinourown“theoreticalcamp”,sotosay.ThemainthesesofHabermas’sworkcanbesummarizedasfollows:

“…theverystructureoflanguageasinterlocutionpresupposesagreement,oratleastastrivingforagreement.Philosophywillthereforestartwithananalysisofinterlocution”(Lecercle2009,p.46).

Thisissomethingwecouldbepleasedwith,especiallyincomparisonwithChomskyandSaussure.However,wecanalsoreadfromthatthesisaslightdifferingfromahistorical-materialiststandpointonsociety:

“…theunderlyingtendencyistothinkthesocialinthemodeofco-operation,notstruggle.ThisdoesnotmeanthatHabermasignoresthefactsandthatheisnotawareoftheconcreteexist-enceofclassstruggle,butthathetheoreticallyreconstructssocietyonthebasisofco-operationimplicitintheveryconstitutionoflanguage.”(Ibid.)

OnecannotthusclaimthatHabermasignoresclassstruggle,andtherefore,onecannota prioridismisshisattemptto“theoreticallyreconstructsocietyonthebasisofco-operation”(unlessoneadoptsanorthodoxanddogmaticMarxiststance).But,asweshallseelater,thiswillprovetobethestumblingblockofHabermas’sproject.TherearetwokeyconceptsofHabermas’sphilosophyoflanguage:11firstly,the concept of inter-subjective understanding, according towhich the fun-damental characteristic of humans as social beings is their communicativeactivity,andlanguagethusbecomesinacertainway“[t]heinfrastructureonthebasisofwhichthewholeofsocietyisreconstructed”(Lecercle2009,p.46).Butwhatisessentialforcommunicativeactionisthatitisnotbasedonstruggle,butondialogue,i.e.aprocessofmutualrecognitionandunderstand-ing, thegoalofwhich isanagreementaboutparticular truthclaims.Thus,“Habermas’sphilosophyoflanguageisanethics of discussion”aswell(Ibid.,p.47).Secondly, there is theconceptof lifeworld (Lebenswelt),borrowedfromHusserl,whichHabermasdescribesas“formedfrommoreorlessdif-fuse, always unproblematic, background convictions” (Habermas, 1984, p.70),which define the limits and potentials of a discussion or dialogue bydefiningtheunderstandingandinterpretationofcommunicativesubjectsin-volved.ThepurposeandgoalofHabermas’sprojectisthento

“…establishthe‘basisofvalidityofdiscourse’,whichforHabermasassumesthefollowingstructure:anyspeaker,simplybyvirtueofspeaking,transmitsfouruniversalclaimstovalidity.Shemustinfact(a)expressherselfintelligibly(intelligibilityclaim);(b)giveittobeunderstoodthatsomethingisthecase(truthclaim:weareonlyconsidering‘serious’locutionshere–thatis,thosereallydirectedatphenomena,andthusenjoinedtotruth,atleastasagoal);(c)makeherself understood by her interlocutor(s) (sincerity claim:making oneself understood in theframeworkofconsensusisinfacttostatethetruthaboutoneself,tobesincere);and(d)agreewithher interlocutor(accuracyclaim,which isdefinedasasetofnormstowhich the inter-locutorscollectivelysubscribe).Thesefourclaimsarethepresupposedbasisofinter-subjectiveunderstanding; theyfurnish languagewith itsstructureas interlocution; theyare thebasisoftheagreementrealisedbyeachprocessofenunciation–thatis, thebasisofthefundamental



consensusofwhichlanguageisatoncethesourceandthemedium,andonwhichphilosophyconstructsitsethicsofdiscussion.If,infact,theseclaimsarenothonoured(forHabermasisnotunawarethatthefactsdonotcorrespondtotheidyllicconsensushedescribes),itsimplymeansthathumanbeingsquitthedomainofcommunicativeactionandembarkedonadifferentkindofaction–strategicaction–whichdoesnotpresupposethesamevalidityclaims.”(Lecercle2009,p.48)

Thisiswherethingsbecomeproblematic.WhatHabermasessentiallydoesbyoutlining sucha structureof “thebasisofvalidityofdiscourse” is thatheleavesthesphereofsocialreality,whichlanguageisapartof,inordertoidealisticallyplacelanguagewithinacertainsphereofethics.Butthecoreoftheproblemliesinthefactthat,forHabermas,

“…itisnotaquestionofamoraldecision,ofaconstraintimposedonlinguisticpracticefromwithout,butof theverystructureof interlocution:mutualcommunicativeobligationshavearationalbasisandtorefusethem(e.g.todefendatheoryoflinguisticexchangeasagon–thatis,asaverbalcontest)involvesabandoningtheframeworkofreason.”(Ibid.,p.49)

Inshort,Habermas imposesan idealvisionofdialogueupontherealityoflanguageitself,whichisactuallyriddenwithallsortsofconflicts.ThisbecomesparticularlyobviouswhenHabermaswritesaboutthosespeechactswhich are explicitlyuncooperative, like threats, insults or orders. Forhim:

“Imperatives or threats that are deployed purely strategically and robbed of their normativevalidityclaimsarenotillocutionaryacts,oractsaimedtowardsreachingunderstanding,atall.Theyremainparasitic insofaras theircomprehensionmustbederivedfromtheemploymentconditionsforillocutionaryactsthatarecoveredbynorms.”(Habermas1992,p.84)

Threatsareproblems forHabermasbecause theyclearlyarespeechacts,12althoughthecontentoftheirillocutionaryforceisnotcooperativebutago-nistic.Inordertopreservetheuniversalityofhisstructureofvalidityofdis-course,Habermas is forced toexclude threats from thecategoryof speechacts.Therefore,wearriveatacontradiction:ontheonehand,dialogue(com-municativeaction)isimmanentlycooperative,but,ontheotherhand,thoseutterances(speechacts)whichareexplicitlyuncooperative(likethreats)arenottreatedasspeechacts.

“Theargumentismanifestlycircular:itclaimstodiscoverinspeechactsaconsensualinter-locutorystructure,butonlycountsasspeechactsthoseofthemthatconformtothisstructure.”(Ibid.)

3.1. Reading Habermas with his critics

Weareagainfacedwithanabstraction of language from a certain aspect of social reality,andalthoughHabermasdoesnotatallgoasfarasSaussureorChomskyhavegone,westillcannotneglectthis.WhereasSaussureandChomskysuccumbedtothisprocessinthenameofconstructingalinguisticscience,Habermas isdoing it inorder topreserve theconstructed idealofcommunicativeactionasthebasisofhumaninteraction.Butsuchanideali-zationoflanguageisunacceptable,atleastifone’saimistobuildasocial theory(andnotanethics)oflanguage.

11

AsisnotedinLecercle2009.

12

“Athreathasaspeaker,anaddressee,aprop-ositionalcontent,andexercisesillocutionary

forceover theaddressee,producingaperlo-cutionaryeffectonher.”See:Lecercle2009,p.53.


A.Sućeska,TowardsaCritiqueoftheDo-minantPhilosophiesofLanguage…20�

“Evenifitispurelymethodologicalandprovisional[…],idealization[…]hasthepracticalef-fectofremovingfromrelationsofcommunicationthepowerrelationswhichareimplementedwithintheminatransfiguredform.Thisisconfirmedbytheuncriticalborrowingofconceptssuch as ‘illocutionary force’which tends to locate thepowerofwords inwords themselvesratherthanintheinstitutionalconditionsoftheiruse.”(Bourdieu2012,p.44,footnote4)

Bourdieuremindsus,again,aswithSaussureandChomsky,thatlanguageisasocialprocessandthusdeterminedlargelybytherelationsofpower(classrelations)ofthesocietywhichitisapartof.ImentionedthatHabermasputsclassstruggleasidewhenconstructinghistheoryofcommunicativeaction,and that thatwillprove tobe its stumblingblock.SowhydoesHabermasmakesuchamistake?Habermasdoesnotsimplyconstructasocialphilosophyoflanguage;thereisafundamentalinversionofthisincludedinhisproject,inthatheconceivesofsocietythroughtheprismofanidealizedlanguage,whichshouldthenbethebuildingblockofafuturejustsociety.AsPerryAndersonnotes,languageforHabermas

“…becomes,notmerelythehallmarkofhumanityassuch,butthepromissorynoteofdemocra-cy–itselfconceivedasessentiallythecommunicationnecessarytoarriveataconsensualtruth.(…)Languageassuchisidentifiedwithanaspirationtothegoodlife.”(Anderson1983,p.63)

HabermasthinkswithinthoseframeworksevenbeforeThe Theory of Communicative Action. In Knowledge and Human Interests he observed how“[o]urfirstsentenceexpressesunequivocallytheintentionofuniversalandunconstrainedconsensus”and“thetruthofstatementsisbasedonanticipat-ingtherealizationofthegoodlife”(Habermas1971,p.314).ThesethoughtsarewhatrunsthroughtheentireTheory of Communicative Actionasunderly-ingpremises.Inshort,inHabermas,languageanddemocracybecomeinter-twined:

“…democracycanbedefinedastheinstitutionalizationofconditionsforthepracticeofideal–thatis,domination-free–speech.”(Anderson1983,p.64)

Butthereisnosuchthingas“domination-free”speech.Suchaclaimcanonlybeaconsequenceoftheabstractionofspeechorlanguagefromtherealityofsocialrelations,fromthesocialtotalitywhichlanguageispartof,andwhichthusdefinesit.EvenifweweretogiveHabermasbenefitofthedoubtandcompletelyignorethesocialrelationsbetweenspeakers,thesocio-historicalcontextinwhichthedialogueisoccurring,thespecificworld-viewsandirra-tionalidiosyncrasiesofeachspeaker,etc.,andifweweretopresupposethatallspeakersarehonestlyandeagerlyintentonarationaldiscussionwiththegoalofreachinganagreement–inshort,ifweweretoimagineatrulyidealspeech situation–wewould see again thatpower enters the stagemerelythroughthewayeverydialoguerequiresacertainlevelofclarityateachmo-mentforittocontinue.Thehigherthe“stakes”inthedialogue–whicharealwaysprettyhighinanywidedebateonsocialissues–thehigheristhere-quiredlevelofclaritywhichhastobemaintained.Attheverymomentwhenyouareaskedtoclarifywhatyousaidorwhatyoumean,arelationofpoweremergesbetweenyouandtheotherspeaker(s)dependingonhowsuccessfulyouwere.

“Youalteryourlanguagewhenthoseyouarespeakingtocontinuallyask‘Whatdoyoumean?’‘Explainyourself’[…].Inmanyinstances,noexplicitcoercionisnecessarilyinvolvedhere.Youconsenttochangeyourlanguage.However,dependingonthecontext,thereisconsiderablecoercionatplay.Ifyoudonotmakeyourselfunderstood,youaretheonewhosufferstheconse-quences,notyourlistener.Thisisclearlyapowerrelationship.”(Ives2004,p.123)



Themere ability or competence tomaintain and successfully abide to thespecificrequiredlevelofclarityinadialoguethusbringswithitselftheques-tionsoftheeducationofthespeakers,theirsocialbackground(i.e.classback-ground),andalsotheveryimportantquestionof“who,andbywhatcriteria,setstherequiredlevelofclarity?”,etc.Therefore,Habermasconstructsanidealizedintersubjectivity:

“Uprootedfromtherelationsofproduction(andreproduction)anddomination,thisintersubjec-tivityisasabstractandformalasthatoftheRawlsiantheoryofjustice.Whereastherealityisoneofinequalityandviolence(eveninthecommunicativerelationandthecrueltyofwords),itpostulatesapeacefulgeneralreciprocity.”(Bensaïd2009,p.152)

Therearenumerousreasonswhyreality–eventhatoflinguisticpractice–isfilledwithinequalityandviolence.AsBourdieushowedinhisworks(aswellasBakhtin andGramsci, in their ownway), theway an individual speaksis definedbyher class origin, but alsoby the “institutional conditions”ofspeechproductionmentionedabove.Furthermore,languageitselfispartofclassstruggle:sincenomeaningsarefixedforever,varioussocialgroupsusethesamewordsbutinscribedifferentmeaningstothem,andsinceeachmean-ing,insuchasense,representsacertainworld-view,thereisastrugglefortheimpositionofmeanings,i.e.for“official”oratleast“dominant”orwidelyacceptedmeaningsofwords.

“Thefieldofmeaningisopen,andwordsareneverreliable.Therepetitionofthesignonthesocialbattlefrontmakesmeaningvacillate,ratherthanfixingit.”(Ibid.,p.151)

Finally,whatremainscompletelyunaccountedforisthecorporealityoflan-guage–somethingSaussurewasalsoobliviousto(infact,evenmostsocialtheoriestodaylikewiseare).Itisenoughtoconsiderhowlanguageisessen-tiallyembodied(inaliteralsense)merelybythefactthatnon-verbalcommu-nicationisafundamentalpartofspeech.Gestures,facialexpressions,bodilysensationsandemotions(frompleasureandjoytopainandtorment)areallpartofwhatlanguagealsoexpresses,whichobviouslycoversawiderangeofoftencontraryandincompatiblefeelings.SinceHabermas“effectivelyidenti-fieslanguagewithpropositionalspeech,consideringtheaspirationtorationalunderstanding(asopposed,forexample, toeroticoremotionalexpression)asitsessentialfeature”,healso“detacheslanguagefromthebody,sensation,labor,anderos,justashedemarcatesitfromstructuresofpoweranddomina-tion”(McNally2001,pp.108–109).SinceHabermas’goalisan“emancipa-tory”language,hehastofreeitofallsuchexpressivecontentandignoreitscorporeality(amongotherthingsalreadymentioned).

“Afterall,bysuggestingthatemancipationisnotpossibleintherealmofsociallabor,andbyleavinguswithadehistoricized,ultra-cognitivisttheoryoflanguage,Habermassoreducesthepowerofcritiqueandsorestrictstheconceptofemancipationthatitishardtoseewhatsortof‘utopianperspective’remains.His‘emancipatorypolitics’involvelittlemorethanagesturetowardanoncoercivepublicspherewherethebestargumentcanprevail–aclassicallyintel-lectualistconstruction.Yet,thisisthefruitofdetachinglanguagefromthebody,labor,eros,andhistory.”(Ibid,p.109)

3.2. Final remarks

PriorpointstothereasonwhyHabermas’sabstractionoflanguagefromclassstruggle,thebodyandhistory,isthedownfallofhistheory:itidealizeslan-guageandprojectsthisidealimageontosocietyitself,turningMarxonhishead.



“Totheabstractandcrippleduniversalizationofcapital,tothetyrannicaleruptionoffragmenteddivinitiesandfetishes,communicativerationalityoffersaresponsethatisimmediatelyensnaredin ideology.With a view to establishing an organic link between socialism and democracy,Habermasthusdissolvesclassinterestsintothoseofhumanityconstitutingitselfasaspecies,inpurelyimaginaryfashion.Theproductionparadigmiserasedinfavourofthecommunicationparadigm.Socialrelationsbecomerelationsofcommunication.”(Bensaïd2009,p.152)

Inattempting to reconstructacertain formofhistoricallyand theoreticallyacceptablehistoricalmaterialism,Habermasonlydistanceshimself from itcompletely.Ofcourse,theproblemisnotthetheoreticaldistancingbyitself,buttheconsequencesofsuchaprocess:Habermasreplacespoliticalthoughtwithethics.13Again,thatissomethingwearenotinterestedin,asahistori-cal-materialisttheoryoflanguageshouldbeinterestedespeciallyinpoliticalphenomena,andinshowingthatlanguageitselfisaprofoundlypoliticalphe-nomenon,inthespecificsensethatitisapartofclassstruggle,whichisitselfdeterminedbytherelationsofproductionwithinsociety.Thatshouldnotbereadasavulgarmaterialistapproach,asIdonotwishtoargueforaone-sidedandlinearrelationbetweentheeconomic“base”andtheideological“super-structure”.Rather,whatIargueshouldbetheobjectofahistorical-materialisttheoryoflanguageis

“…the relationship between the structured systems of sociologically pertinent linguistic differences and the equally structured systems of social differences.”(Bourdieu2012,p.54)

Thisrelationship,unfortunately,isnotwithinthetheoreticalgraspofHaber-mas’sphilosophyoflanguage.

5. Totalizing language

Saussure,ChomskyandHabermasdonothelpuswithformulatingpotentialpositivethesesforahistorical-materialisttheoryoflanguage.However,theycanhelpusinthenegativesense:wecanlearnfromtheirexamplesandsetaframeworkforsuchaprojectbyavoidingthemistakestheymade.14Thesemistakescanbesummarizedasfollows:

1) turninglanguageintoa stable system,abstractedfromsocietyanditsuti-lizationwithin it, and focusing exclusively on the internal elements ofsuchasystem,wherebyeverythingexternaltoitisproclaimedirrelevant(tothiswecancounterposelanguage as social practice,whichcannotbeturnedintoastableobjectofpositivesciencewithoutlosingtouchwithitsrootswithinsociety,andwhoseend-resultcanonlybeanabstract,notasociallyrealconceptoflanguage);

2) turning language into a biological endowment, whereby language be-comesmerely thecapacity to speak inherent in thehumanspeciesasaresultofevolution,anditsstudythereforelimitedtotheindividual,thusbecomingseparatednotonlyfromitssocialcontext,butalsofromitshis-tory(tothiswecancounterposelanguage as a sociohistorical process,asasocialproductwhichisneverfinished,but issimultaneouslybeingtransformedfromwithinsociety,andisformativeitselfinrelationtoso-cialgroupsandtheirmembers–itsstudyisthereforenecessarilylinkedtosocietyandtothevariousformsittakeswithinit);

3) turninglanguageintoan ethics of rational discourse,wherebylanguageisidealizedandfreedofallitsconflictualformsandrelationsofpower,andbecomesafoundationforaprojectofademocraticsociety(tothiswecancounterposelanguage as class struggle,wherebylanguagerepresents



andisinpartdeterminedbythesocialrelationsofitstime,whichlinksitnotonlytodominantanddominatedclasses,butalsotothesocialrela-tionsandmodeofproductionwhichproduces theseclasses– languageispoliticalandideological,itisaformofpowerpreciselybecauseitisasocialpractice).

Inallofthesecases,languagewasabstractedfromcertainaspectsofitssocialexistence.Insomecases,suchasthatofChomsky,thisabstractionisextremeandquiteobvious,whileinothers,suchasHabermas,theabstractionismild,butisnonethelessproblematic(Saussurecouldperhapsbeplacedsomewherebetweenthetwo).ThethreenamesIchoserepresentsomeofthemostim-portantcurrentsofthoughtwithinthefieldoflinguisticsorthephilosophyoflanguage,andtheirspecifictheoreticalcharacteristicsarethusoftenfoundinotherworksandauthors,whichmeansthatalotofthecriticalremarksImadepertain tosomeof themostdominant trendswithin thestudyof language,whichJean-JacquesLecercleterms“thedominantphilosophyoflanguage”.15Inrelationtothisprocedureofabstractioncommon,tovariousextents,toallofthesecurrents,ahistorical-materialisttheoryoflanguageshouldstrivetooperatewithintheframeworkofsocial totality.Thismeansthatoneshouldneverlosesightof,marginalize,orputasidethevariousphenomenarelatedtosocial,livinglanguage,i.e.thephenomenaofthe“languageofreallife”(Marx,Engels1976,p.36),asMarxandEngelscall theminThe German Ideology.WecansaywithBourdieu,asaprogrammaticandtheoreticalstartingpoint,thatitis

“…thereforenecessarytodrawoutalltheconsequencesofthefact,sopowerfullyrepressedbylinguistsandtheirimitators,thatthe‘socialnatureoflanguageisoneofitsinternalcharacteris-tics’,astheCourse in General Linguisticsasserted,andthatsocialheterogeneityisinherentinlanguage.16Thismustbedonewhileatthesametimebeingawareoftherisksinvolvedintheenterprise,nottheleastofwhichistheapparentcrudenesswhichcanaccompanythemostrig-orousanalysescapable–andculpable–ofcontributingtothereturnoftherepressed;inshort,onemustchoosetopayahigherpricefortruthwhileacceptingalowerprofitofdistinction.”(Bourdieu2012,p.34)

Thatmeanstodopreciselytheoppositeofwhatlinguistics,or“thedominantphilosophyoflanguage”,hasdone:ithassacrificedtruthfordistinction.Thegoalofahistorical-materialistphilosophyoflanguageshouldbe,onthecon-trary,toremainfaithfultosocialtruth.

13

Lecercle2009,p.60.ForLecercle’sexplana-tionof the historical conjuncture, forwhich–heclaims– is inpart responsible for this,seeibid.,pp.59–60.

14

This is precisely the path Lecercle takes,starting from several negative principles ofwhat he calls “the dominant philosophy oflanguage”, in order to arrive at their oppo-sites, and thus formulate positive principlesforaMarxistphilosophyoflanguage(Lecer-

cle 2009, pp. 64–72). His list and mine dooverlap,buttheyarenotthesame.

15

Lecercle2009,p.64.Seepreviousnote.

16

Hopefully, as I showed, Saussure only ac-knowledgedthatfact,butdidnot“drawout”almost any consequencesof it, and thushe,too, issubject tothis“repression”typicaloflinguistswhichBourdieucriticizes.



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Alen Sućeska

Prema kritici dominantnih filozofija jezika iz pozicije historijskog materijalizma

SažetakCilj je istraživanja ponuditi kritiku nekih od glavnih autora suvremene lingvistike ili drugih pristupa jeziku općenito: Ferdinanda de Saussurea, »osnivača« suvremene lingvistike; Noama Chomskog, jednog od najprominentnijih predstavnika suvremene lingvistike; te Jürgena Habermasa, čija je filozofija jezika važan dio njegova projekta komunikacije. Ovdje ponuđena kritika temelji se na pristupu jeziku koji društveni karakter tretira jednako ključnim kao i strogo lingvističke ili biološke karakteristike. Argumentira se da su dominantne filozofije jezika, analizirane kroz rad troje navedenih autora, apstrahirale od društvene karakteristike jezika kako bi stvorile »znanost jezika«, pri čemu je jezik postao statična, sinkrona struktura nepovezana s jezikom kakav postoji u zbilji. Razlog je tomu to što je jezik neodvojivo vezan za socijalne, ideološke i političke fenomene kakve je i sam Jürgen Habermas kritizirao zbog idealiziranja jezika i »govorne činove« smatrao samo one čiji je cilj kooperacija, ali ne i one čija je narav konfliktna, kako je to obično slučaj u različitim oblicima društvenog dijaloga.

Ključne riječijezik,lingvistika,FerdinanddeSaussure,NoamChomsky,JürgenHabermas,historijskimaterijali-zam

Alen Sućeska

In Richtung Kritik der dominanten Sprachphilosophien aus der Position des historischen Materialismus

ZusammenfassungDas Ziel dieser Forschung ist es, die Kritik einiger der Hauptautoren der zeitgenössischen Linguistik oder anderer Sprachansätze im Allgemeinen zu liefern: die Kritik Ferdinand de Saussures, des „Begründers“ der modernen Linguistik; die Kritik Noam Chomskys, eines der prominentesten Vertreter der modernen Linguistik sowie die Kritik Jürgen Habermas’, dessen Sprachphilosophie ein bedeutender Teil seines Kommunikationsprojekts ist. Die hier gebotene Kritik beruht auf dem Sprachansatz, welcher den gesellschaftlichen Charakter als ebenso ausschlaggebend betrachtet wie die streng linguistischen oder biologischen Merkmale. Es wird argumentiert, die dominanten Sprachphilosophien, analysiert durch die Arbeit der drei erwähnten Autoren, hätten von dem gesellschaftlichen Merkmal der Sprache abstrahiert, um eine „Sprachwissenschaft“ zu schaffen, wobei die Sprache eine statische, synchrone und mit der in der Realität existierenden Sprache unverbundene Struktur geworden sei. Der Grund dafür ist, dass die Sprache untrennbar an die sozialen, ideologischen und politischen Phänomene gebunden ist, die Jürgen Habermas selbst für die Idealisierung der Sprache kritisierte. Als „Sprechakte“ erachtete er nur jene, die eine Kooperation zum Ziel haben, jedoch nicht auch jene, deren Natur konfliktträchtig ist, wie dies üblicherweise bei verschiedenen Formen des sozialen Dialogs der Fall ist.

SchlüsselwörterSprache,Linguistik,FerdinanddeSaussure,NoamChomsky,JürgenHabermas,historischerMate-rialismus



Alen Sućeska

Vers une critique des philosophies du langage dominantes à partir de la position du matérialisme historique

RésuméLe but de cette recherche est de proposer une critique de certains des principaux auteurs de linguistique contemporaine ou, de manière générale, d’autres approches de la langue, notamment celles de : Ferdinand de Saussure, « fondateur » de la linguistique moderne ; Noam Chomsky, l’un des plus éminents représentants de la linguistique contemporaine ; Jürgen Habermas, dont la philosophie du langage constitue une partie importante de son projet sur la communication. La critique qui est ici proposée se fonde sur une approche du langage qui traite de manière essentielle, autant que rigoureuse, des caractéristiques linguistiques ou biologiques. Notre argumentation s’attache à montrer que les philosophies dominantes du langage, analysées à travers le travail des trois auteurs mentionnés, ont fait abstraction des caractéristiques sociales du langage dans le but de créer une « science du langage », où le langage est devenu statique, une structure synchronique sans lien avec la réalité telle qu’elle existe. Notre raisonnement s’appuie sur le lien inhérent du langage aux phénomènes sociaux, idéologiques et politiques, tels que les a Jürgen Habermas luimême critiqués en raison de l’idéalisation du langage à l’oeuvre ; il estimait que les « actes de langage » étaient seulement ceux dont le but était coopératif, et non pas ceux de nature conflictuelle, ce qui est néanmoins habituellement le cas au sein des différentes formes du dialogue sociale.

Mots-cléslangage,linguistique,FerdinanddeSaussure,NoamChomsky,JürgenHabermas,matérialismehis-torique

Documents

Towards a Critique of the Dominant Philosophies of ... · Few will probably object to the claim that Ferdinand de Saussure’s book, Course in General Linguistics (Cours de linguistique