Toward an improved analysis of Soviet ethnic relations

LEE WALKER National Academy of Sciences

The future direction of Soviet political development and the fate of the U.S.S.R. itself will be largely determined by the resolution of the con- temporary conflict between two contradictory yet complementary processes: internal dissolution (and possible civil war) and the reimpo- sition of authoritarian control by the center. Depending upon which Soviet sources one consults, the first or the second (sometimes both) has already become a reality. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain poised for inter-republican battle, clashes among Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Meskhetian Turks have resulted in hundreds of deaths in Central Asia, the Georgian government has revoked the autonomous status that protected such internal minorities as the Abkhazians and the Ossets, and proclaimed "Georgia for the Georgians," and millions of Soviet citizens, including, but by no means limited to Germans, Jews, Armenians, and Russians, have become internal refugees and emigres, seeking sanctuary from acts of terrorism, pogroms, discrimination, and war. Six months after Gorbachev authorized the KGB and the internal security forces (MVD) to disarm vigilante forces and threatened to use the army to safeguard popular security and the integrity of the union, Soviet tanks and security forces were used to support the pretensions of self-proclaimed Committees of National Salvation in Lithuania and Latvia, raising the stark possibility of a coup d'etat by the forces of order under the guise of protecting minority rights, law, and order.

The articles included in this issue clearly demonstrate the salience of ethnic relations in the Soviet Union and the importance of developing improved theoretical and conceptual tools to assist social scientists, policy analysts, and political decision makers both in the United States and the U.S.S.R. in their efforts to analyze and cope with questions relating to ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic conflict in the contempo- rary U.S.S.R. A clear analysis may even help citizens of the two coun-

Theory and Society 20:711-721, 1991. �9 1991 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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tries to understand and act upon the vast political changes now sweep- ing the Soviet Union. The National Research Council's Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation sponsored the publication of these articles in the interests not only of exposing Western social scien- tists to Soviet research and analysis on these issues, but more impor- tantly to explore the possibilities for serious collaborative work in such a controversial and highly politicized field of study.

This issue embodies the results of a collaborative project that brought together a diverse group of Soviet and American social scientists, representing fields ral}ging from political science to oriental studies, whose research interests span the globe, from Botswana to Indonesia. The articles are as varied as their authors, providing detailed informa- tion conceming demographic and socioeconomic change in the ethnic cauldron of the Caucasus, previously unreleased data from the still secret Soviet census of the thirties, and documentation of the "ecocide" and "ethnicide" that accompanied Soviet forced-draft industrialization. The issue's theoretical contributions include a typology of ethnic con- flict, an elucidation of ethnicity as a cultural construction, a clarifica- tion of the explanatory problem, and a singling out of political threats and opportunities as the key to unravelling the recent upsurge in nationalism and ethnic mobilization in the U.S.S.R.

Before turning to a consideration of the individual articles, let me ground the discussion in the Soviet context, outline Marxist and Soviet thinking on the "national question" trace the historical development of ethnic relations in the U.S.S.R., and clarify a few issues that have bedev- iled the study of Soviet ethnic relations in Soviet and Western historiog- raphy.

The widely accepted view in Western Sovietology that maintains that Marx and Lenin (and more recently Gorbachev) did not "understand" or that they "underestimated" nationalism, and that Soviet social science, which is still imbued with Marxist-Leninist concepts and ana- lytical techniques, suffers from the same fundamental flaw, deserves examination. I suggest that the important point is that these theorists understood the issue differently from those levelling the charge. Whereas Marx was the first to raise the issue of a nation's "fight to self- determination," he conceived of this right in a manner consistent with his theory of historical materialism, i.e., he limited its application to "historic" and "progressive" nations, specifically Poland and Ireland, the liberation of which would have weakened and potentially destabi-

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lized the oppressive imperial regimes of Russia, Austria-Hungary, Ger- many, and Great Britain. Lenin extended Marx's vision to the global arena in his "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," and he identified the exploited nations that inhabited the Great Powers' inter- nal and external colonies as a revolutionary reserve, the awakening of which would topple the seemingly impregnable imperial regimes of Europe. He clearly identified Russia's submerged nations as internal colonies and as early as 1905 called for the formation of a broad anti- Tsarist coalition that would ensure that all the forces working against the regime, be they democratic, nationalist, or socialist, cooperated to achieve their common goal.

Neither Marx nor Lenin understood the right of self determination as something abstracted or distinct from the historical process, the level of development of the nation in question, or the nature of the seceding and the central regimes. In contrast to political philosophers whose work derived from the tradition of "natural law," neither Marx nor Lenin envisaged this, or any other, right as an absolute, existing outside of time and concrete material conditions. The overriding consideration for both was whether the particular movement was progressive, i.e., did it advance the cause of human liberation by bringing closer the transi- tion to the next stage of historical development, socialism.

All of the radical trends in the Russian revolutionary movement paid lip service to the notion of self-determination, but only the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic movement specified that this meant the right of nations to determine their own political and socioeconomic system, including the right to secession and complete independence. Lenin countered the storm of controversy aroused by this heretical notion with an analogy to the right of divorce. Support for the latter did not indicate a desire to see marriages dissolved, but a commitment to a relationship based on free choice and mutual respect. Far from under- estimating the role of nationalism, Lenin recognized its powerful at- tractive force and sought to neutralize it by depriving the "national bourgeoisies" of what he considered to be an ideological fig leaf in the struggle to insulate their homelands from the radicalization of the revo- lution.

The promise of self determination and constitutional guarantees of an "escape hatch" were advanced by the Bolsheviks in order to remove the threat of subordination in a future Russian-dominated state, expose the hollowness of the national bourgeoisie's identification of the establish-

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ment of independent states with liberation, and enable the proletariat to recognize its inherently international character and act to create a state of a new type. This new state would serve as an example that would inspire and mobilize the oppressed peoples of Europe's colonial empires and rally them to the Soviet standard. The Soviet state would not constitute a new state in the old world order, but would represent a challenge to that system and incorporate the bases for a new world order in its fundamental declarations and state documents.

All too frequently Western analyses of Soviet policies on the "national question" commence with the facile assertion that once in power the Bolsheviks forcibly reimposed the territorial structure of the Russian empire and reneged on the promises of self determination that they had previously advanced strictly in the interests of political expediency. An examination of the historical record, however, reveals a far more complex set of circumstances and processes. The overriding reality for the Bolshevik regime during the first three years of its existence was the Civil War and the Allied Intervention. Inasmuch as the White generals had "Rossiia, one and indivisible" inscribed on their banners, the Bolshe- viks were able to use their support for self determination to fracture the anti-Bolshevik coalition and neutralize the threat posed by the forces of the nascent successor regimes in the borderlands of the Baltic, East- ern Europe, and the Caucasus. Regimes that broke with the Whites and refused to allow their territories to be used as either sanctuaries or bases for White armies (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), or that rejected the coordination of their armies' attacks with those of the Whites ,(Poland) obtained recognition of their independence. It should be noted that all of the states that fell into these categories remained independent until the East European territorial settlement that result- ed from the collapse of the three great regional empires in the wake of World War I was destabilized by the resurgence of an avowedly re- vanchist Third Reich in the late thirties.

The Russian Civil War, the Intervention, and the various attempts to establish independent national regimes on the territory of the former Russian empire were integrally interrelated. This fact deserves em- phasis not only because of the frequently unexpressed assumption to the contrary that pervades Western historiography on the topic, but particularly because many Soviet historians are currently attempting to reconstruct the history of their country on the basis of the Western lit- erature in the field (note Tishkov in this regard).

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The federal structure of the Soviet state was first established in the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (1918) and received further development in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922) after the victorious conclusion of the Civil War. In keeping with the Bolshevik program on the national ques- tion, large, territorially based ethnic groups (located on the borders of the new state) were incorporated into the union as formally equal, sovereign nations irrespective of their population size or geographical extent (smaller ethnic groups or those that were not located on the periphery of the Soviet state were granted various degrees of autono- my, depending on a range of factors of which population size and phys- ical location were the most important). A close reading of the debates that surrounded the formulation and adoption of both documents clearly demonstrate that the sovereignty of the member states repre- sented far more than a legalistic formality, and that the Bolshevik vision of international revolution and the mobilization of the oppressed nations of the world behind that standard played an important role in determining the nationally-based structure of the Soviet state.

Behind the official federal apparatus of the state the Communist party maintained not only its monopoly position in the internal political sys- tem, but its unitary, hierarchical structure and its adherence to demo- cratic centralism. Theoretically democratic centralism ensured a full airing of all opinions within the party prior to the moment of decision, and unity of execution thereafter; in practice it meant the subordination of decision making at all levels to the center. With the Stalinization of the Soviet political system in the late twenties and thirties the effective sovereignty of the national republics was reduced to little more than a guarantee of affirmative action Soviet-style: access into the ranks of the elite for those members of the indigenous nationality who agreed to play by the rules of the game, guarantees of education in the national language, and the preservation and encouragement of national litera- tures and arts so long as the rule "national in form, socialist in content" was observed.

It hardly needs repeating here that the social sciences in the U.S.S.R. suffered at least as much, if not more, than the natural sciences from the ideological rigidities and dogmatism introduced under Stafin and perpetuated by his successors. The Soviet study of ethnic relations was no exception. For decades apologists for the regime asserted the "na- tional question" had been solved in the U.S.S.R., that brotherhood and the friendship of the peoples characterized domestic ethnic relations,

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and that a new "nation" was in the process of formation, that of the "Soviet people" Since the "national and social oppression" that Marx and Lenin had identified as the sources of national antagonism and nationalism were held to have been abolished, the study of ethnic con- flict was relegated to those who analyzed foreign, capitalist states, e.g., India, Indonesia, and the United States.

It is no coincidence that of the five Soviet contributors to this volume, one is a specialist in Oriental studies (Prazauskas), one on the United States and Canada (Sergeev), and one heads the Estonian republic's Institute of Philosophy, State and Law (Park). This is by no means intended as an attempt to devalue the work of the Soviet contributors from the recently renamed Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, quite the reverse. In attempting to judge the quality of their contribu- tions one should keep clearly in mind the extent of the advance that their work represents and its break with traditional Soviet ethnographic methodologies.

In view of the extensive coverage of the articles by Prazauskas, Yams- kov, and Tishkov in the commentaries by Sergeev, Park, Lapidus, and Gitelman, I will confine myself to a consideration of the major contri- butions of each author, and of those points not discussed elsewhere in this volume. Anatolii Yamskov's article on Nagorno-Karabakh embo- dies not only original research and an explicit, non-ideological theoreti- cal frame of analysis, but a fairly rigorous application of that frame- work to the data collected during his field studies in the Caucasus. His attention to "material factors" and "objective conditions" reflects his Soviet social science training and his grounding in Marxist analysis, but it should be noted that his focus on the demographic and economic dimensions of the problem reveals a powerful dynamic that has been largely overlooked in Western analyses that dwell on the impact of his- torical, religious, and cultural explanations.

Algis Prazauskas's article is the most theoretically ambitious of the Soviet contributions. He explores the relation between class and eth- nicity, and explicates the fundamental divide between analyses that uti- lize one or the other as the touchstone for their interpretations. Pra- zauskas raises the issue of the interrelation between perestroika's "shock" to the Soviet sociopolitical system and the outbreaks of intra- communal violence, but fails to pursue the point at any length. Most importantly, Prazauskas directly addresses Charles Tilly's question of why ethnicity has proved to be if not the most, then one of the most,

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significant sources of group identification and the basis for some of the most important political movements in the contemporary U.S.S.R. In contrast to the other Soviet authors, he explicitly recognizes the fact that ethnic communities provide only the potential for political mobili- zation, and that other factors determine whether group identification and mobilization take place on ethnic bases. Prazauskas also identifies the key role played by ethnic elites in the process of determining and disseminating the nationalist program and mobilizing group support, and he suggests that impediments to vertical social mobility and dis- putes over the distribution of rewards and resources are key factors that promote elite mobilization.

Valery Tishkov's article provides a more general overview of Soviet ethnic relations and seeks to present a comprehensive picture of internal Soviet ethnic developments. The article incorporates a great many fas- cinating and frequently appalling data concerning the fate of the "deported peoples," the ecological devastation wrought by Soviet forced-draft industrialization in the non-Slavic regions of the U.S.S.R., and the health problems that afflict Soviet ethnic populations. But he also deals with a series of more theoretically interesting questions.

Tishkov calls attention to the role played by mass discontent with the stagnation, and possible decline, in Soviet living standards that has characterized the 1970s and 1980s in his analysis of the bases of the various nationalist movements. He notes that the center and the cen- tralized administrative-command system are being held accountable for the general economic and ecological crises in the U.S.S.R., and asserts that popular dissatisfaction is being directed against local party and state bosses who are seen as representatives of the center. He also identifies social despair and the lack of any confidence in the resurrec- tion of the old system as key factors motivating people to support national groups in their attempt to cut themselves free of the Soviet albatross and introduce change on a national level. Finally, the Tishkov article is worthy of note for its analysis of the contending plans ad- vanced by various reformers in the effort to cope with the centrifugal forces that threaten the integrity of the Soviet (dis)Union.

The articles by Yamskov, Prazauskas, and Tishkov also provide us with insights of an entirely different order. They offer a window on the diffu- sion of opinion in the contemporary Soviet political scene, not only on the vital issues of unity and secession, but on more general issues as well. Yamskov's article embodies the conservative, centrist view: ethnic

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relations are manageable and generally benign, in those instances where antagonisms or conflict prevail, a strong, central power needs to step in to ensure order and the security of Soviet citizens. Tishkov’s article represents the reform trend: yes, the system failed in the past and mistakes occurred, but they can be corrected, and a new, demo- cratic confederation can be established that will ensure the prosperity and harmonious development of all the people and nations of the Soviet Union with a minimum of tinkering. Prazauskas appears to be torn between two distinct political tendencies. On the surface Prazaus- kas presents the radical democratic line: the current regime is irrepara- bly discredited and only radical and thoroughgoing change, and the institution of a new, democratic regime offer the possibility for forward movement. Sotto vote, however, he advances the separatist case: the differences in the various internal political cultures are irreconcilable, further development is impossible within the confines of a single state, and he suggests, a la Brzezinski, that a democratic Soviet Union may in fact be an oxymoron.

The Soviet commentaries by Viktor Sergeev and Andrus Park incorpo- rate far more politicized analyses of ethnic relations in the U.S.S.R. than those elaborated in the three major Soviet articles, Sergeev places the contemporary ethnic struggle squarely in the context of post-1985 Soviet political developments. He sees the various nationalist move- ments as but one example of the dangerous populist movements that threaten to overwhelm the reform project and the prospects for the democratization of the Soviet Union. Sergeev explodes one of the more popular Western myths, that there is something inherently progressive or democratic about Soviet national movements. Although it is not at all clear what Sergeev means by attributing “totalitarian” features to Soviet populist movements in general, he accurately identifies the con- solidation of conservative and progressive political forces within nation- al borders, and their concerted effort to advance national interests against the center as vital factors impeding the consolidation of pro- gressive and democratic forces on a union-wide scale and “prevent(ing) any real reforms in the socioeconomic sphere.” The recent upsurge in support for the national movements and the growing separatist threat to the integrity of the Soviet Union may well prove to be the single most important factor explaining recent policy reversals in the U.S.S.R., and Gorbachev’s shift from the effort to forge a Center-Left coalition in the Fall of 1990 to his increasing reliance on the forces of order and a coa- lition with the Right in the early months of 1991.

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Although Park states that his comment is "part of the academic debate" and advanced in the effort to promote "objective social knowledge," his criticism of Yamskov for this reticence concerning "predictions and policy suggestions" and his statement that Tishkov's "main idea is to save the union," reveal that his is a commentary that is seriously en- gaged with the debate currently raging in the U.S.S.R. over secession and the new union treaty. Nevertheless Park raises some interesting theoretical questions. Is it possible to reform the Soviet political and economic system without destroying the U.S.S.R.? Is the continued existence of the union compatible with a market economy? He also addresses the question of the sources of the contemporary nationalist movements and traces it directly to the "cycle of economic crisis, attempted reform and economic failure" that have characterized the entire post-Stalinist period.

The commentaries by Gail Lapidus and Zvi Gitelman constitute bal- anced, informative, and thoughtful additions to the issue and represent a step forward from much of the Western literature in the field that interprets the current outbreaks of ethnic conflict in the U.S.S.R. as simply the "natural" result of glasnost's "firing the lid" off the Soviet Union's oppressed peoples. Lapidus highlights the role that language and metaphor play in obscuring the hidden assumptions on which both Soviet and American analyses of Soviet ethnic relations rest, and calls for greater attention to the interaction between ethnic and national self-assertion and the political and economic environment in which these groups are embedded. She also notes that social scientists far too often seek the explanation of complex processes in the particular char- acteristics of the group in question, and consequently miss the vital relations and interactions between these groups and the larger environ- ment.

John Comaroff's article presents an original theoretical and analytical contribution to the study of ethnic relations in general, not just in the U.S.S.R. Comaroff poses a series of questions that can only be touched on here: Where should one look in order to seek an answer to the ques- tion of the origins of modem nationalism? Are all things grouped in the category "nationalism" the same? Are all assertions of national con- sciousness attributable to the same causes?

Comaroff calls for a critical analysis of the language we use and the concepts and frameworks we employ in studying ethnicity and nation- alism. Employing a radical historicist approach, Comaroff argues that

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ethnicity is a modern invention, that the idea of its primordiality is a chimera, and that ethnic identities and nationalist movements have been created as a response to colonialism and other forms of external domination. Comaroff advances the position that ethnicity is not a thing, but a set of relations, and that its specific atttributes in any par- ticular case are shaped and constructed by the historical processes in which it is embedded.

If ethnicity and nationalism are constructed in a process of opposition to be a dominant center as Comaroff argues, how does this process take place? Ideologies do not spring full blown from the heads of gods, but are produced by particular individuals in specific circumstances. More importantly, they only reach mass publics and redefine social consciousness after their adoption and active dissemination by elites, or more properly by elites in formation. Historically it has been intel- lectuals, particularly teachers, writers, religious leaders and newspaper editors, that have played the most prominent roles in the process of constructing both the myths and the social reality of ethnic groups.

Could it be that we have mistaken the relation between glasnost and the upsurge in ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union, and that a more complex process is at work than that described by the metaphor of "lifting the lid?" Is it possible that the contribution made by the relaxing of central control over the mass media was that it permitted elites-in- formation to articulate their grievances, recognize fellow thinkers, form groups on the basis of nationalist programs, and disseminate those views to a mass audience? Might the upsurge in mass identification with nationalist movements be more the result of the current economic crisis, the loss of faith in the omniscience of the center, and the pro- found disillusionment with socialist ideology than it is the expression of a previously existing attachment in conditions of relatively greater free- dom?

Reconceptualizing ethnic relations on the basis of the theoretical approaches suggested by TiUy and Comaroff advances the project of improving the analysis of ethnic relations, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, on a number of levels. First it directs the attention of the analyst to a study of the actual entity/process under analysis, no mean feat in view of the role played by unconsidered assumptions and reifi- cation in much of the Western and Soviet literature in the field. More importantly, these and the other articles included in this volume pro- vide far more than the new angles of vision called for in Tilly's intro-

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ductory essay, they direct attention to new issues, raise theoretically interesting questions, offer testable research hypotheses, and provide the bases for a new research agenda.