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TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

GILCHRIST v. CUDDY(Jon)INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

FACTS:Cuddy was the owner of the film Zilgamar and that on April24 he rented it to Gilchrist for a week in the sum of P 125. Itwas supposed to be delivered on May 26, but a week prior todelivery, Cuddy returned the money and said that he hadmade other arrangements with the film. The arrangementCuddy mentioned was with Espejo in the amount of P 350 for aweek.Gilchrist filed an injunction to prevent the showing of the film inEspejos theater. In the trial for permanent injunction it seemsthat Espejo was advised by his agents not to acquire the filmsince he would need to wait 6 weeks before he could acquire it.But Espejo went to Cuddy to offer him personally the amountof P 350 for the film.

Cuddy was found guilty of breach of contract, but Espejo in hisdefense contended that he was free to compete with Gilchristfor the film since there was no contract between Cuddy andGilchrist.

ISSUE/S:1. Whether Injunction was a proper action?2. Whether Espejo is guilty of Tortious Interference?

HELD: YES to both.1. The feature film is depended upon to secure a largerattendance than if the place were filled by other films ofmediocre quality. Hence Gilchrist was face with the immediateprospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that ifEspejo would be allowed to exhibit the film in Iloilo then itwould be useless for him to show it again, as the desire of thepublic to witness the production would have been satisfied.2. In the case at bar the only motive for interference with theGilchrist-Cuddy contract was the desire of Espejo to make aprofit from exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no

malice beyond this desire, but this fact does not relieve themof legal liability for interference with that contract causing itsbreach.

DAYWALT v LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRESAGUSTINOS RECOLETOS(from Torts Reviewer) (Pau)

Facts: in 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contractwhereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They agreed that a deedshould be executed as soon as Endencias title to the land wasperfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title

issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued,Endencia found out that the property measured 1248 hectaresinstead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because ofthis, she became reluctant to transfer the whole tract toDaywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large anamount and that she had been misinformed as to its area.Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SCordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt.

Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos(Recoletos), was a religious corp., w/c owned an estateimmediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia toDaywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative ofthe Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy overEndencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject tothe influence of other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence ofthe contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her fromconveying the entire tract.

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Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos onthe ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain fromthe performance of her contract for the sale of the land inquestion and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywaltsclaim for damages against the Recoletos was for the huge sumof P 500000 [in the year 1919], since he claims that because ofthe interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate acontract with another person for the sale of the property andits conversion into a sugar mill.

Issue: whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?

Held: No, it is not liable.

The stranger who interferes in a contract between other partiescannot become more extensively liable in damages for thenon-performance of the contract than the party in whose

behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order to determine theliability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider theliability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed byDaywalt from Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first,because these are special damages w/c were not w/in thecontemplation of the parties when the contract was made, andsecondly, these damages are too remote to be the subject ofrecovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos be held liable. As already suggested,by advising Endencia not to perform the contract, theRecoletos could in no event render itself more extensivelyliable than the principal in the contract.

RUBIO v COURT OF APPEALS (Grip)(interference in contractual relations)(other respondents: ROBERT O. PHILLIPS & SONS, INC.,MAGDALENA YSMAEL PHILLIPS, MANUFACTURERS BANK &TRUST COMPANY, INC., HACIENDA BENITO, INC., VICTORIA

VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and ROBERT O.PHILLIPS)

Facts: The petitioner seeks to reverse the decision of the CA,which ordered respondents to pay petitioner 4.25M, butordered petitioner to pay respondents 4.4M and 7M in actualdamages.

The case arose from a 1966 case filed by respondentsRobert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc. (ROPSI) against petitioner,asking for a TRO to stop Rubio from unlawfully and willfullyinterfering in the transaction between the company and theYuchengco regarding the sale of the stocks in Hacienda Benito,Inc. Rubio had shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, and theysold these shares to ROPSI for 5.5M payable in installments.Meanwhile, Robert O. Phillips, on behalf of his wife and ROPSI,entered into negotiations with Yuchengco for the sale of shares

in the Hacienda. The spouses Rubio, through their lawyer,reminded ROPSI of their unpaid obligation. ROPSI then toldRubio not to interfere with the negotiations. Rubio declined, soROPSI asked the above mentioned TRO. Rubio filed a certioraricase in the SC, wherein the SC lifted the TRO. (The respondentbank foreclosed on certain properties of the Hacienda, and theSC also allowed this, against the objections of Rubio. Rubioalleged that it was a ploy of ROPSI to hide properties of theHacienda from him.)

After trial on the merits, the above stated decision wasrendered. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner unlawfully interfered in thetransactions which made the award of damages proper?

Held: No

Taking into consideration, all the details of thenegotiations in the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda

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Benito, Inc. from ROPSI to Mr. Yuchengco, there is no factual orlegal basis for the appellate court's conclusion that thepetitioner unlawfully and inofficiously interfered with thenegotiations. We fail to see any reason why the petitionershould be accused of unlawful interference in maintaining hisstand regarding the sale of shares of stock The petitioner neverpretended that he still had full control of the shares of stockwhich he sold to ROPSI. He in fact admitted that the shares ofstock were already transferred to the corporation and that hedid not have a recorded lien therein. He merely made of recordhis right to rescind under the original contract of sale. Thedetails pertaining to the earlier transaction governing the saleof the shares of stock between the petitioner and Phillips andSons were in fact, all known to Yuchengco. And, moreimportant, it is obvious from the records that the petitioner'sinterest was only in the payment of the P4,250,000.00 balancedue him from ROPSI.

The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that thepetitioner is not liable for any form of damages in favor ofROPSI and the Phillips spouses. (the award of damages in favorof the bank was also removed and set aside.)

SO PING BUN v CA (Irah)

Facts:Tek Hua Trading (Trading) entered into agreements with

Dee C. Chua & Sons Inc. (DCCSI) for the lease of severalpremises which Trading used to store its textiles. Thesuccessor of Trading, Tek Hua Enterprising (Enterprising),allowed So Ping Bun, the grandson of the managing partner ofTrading, to use the premises to store his own textiles. Later,Manuel Tiong, one of the members of Enterprising, asked SoPing Bun via a letter to vacate the premises within 14 dayssince he needed it for his textile business. So Ping Bun refusedto vacate. Instead, So Ping Bun entered into lease contracts

with DCCSI over the same premises. Enterprising and ManuelTiong filed an action to nullify the contracts between So PingBun and DCCSI and also claimed damages against So Ping Bunfor unlawful interference in the lease contracts between DCCSIand Enterprising.

Issue/s:Did So Ping Bun commit unlawful interference? (YES)Is So Ping Bun liable for damages? (NO)

Held:The elements of tort interference are:

a) existence of a valid contract;b) knowledge on the part of the third person of

the existence of the contract; andc) interference of the third person is without legal

justification or excuse

In this case, Trendsetter Marketing (So Ping Bun'scompany) asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor,and as a result, it was able to deprive Enterprising of itsproperty rights. The three elements of tort interference arepresent since So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease thewarehouse to his enterprise at the expense of Enterprising.

However, So Ping Bun still cannot be held liable fordamages. Though he took interest in the property ofEnterprising and benefited from it, nothing on record imputesdeliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. The businessdesire is there to make some gain to the detriment of thecontracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludesdamages. But it does not relieve So Ping Bun of the legalliability for entering into contracts and causing breach ofexisting ones. Thus, the appellate court correctly confirmed thepermanent injunction and nullification of the contracts betweenDCCSI and Trendsetter, without awarding damages.

LAGON v CA (Ysan)3B 08-09 3

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Facts:Lapuz claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with thelate Bai Tonina Sepi over three parcels of land in SultanKudarat beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed uponwas for Lapuz to put up commercial buildings which would, inturn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by thosetenants would answer for the rent Lapuz was obligated to payBai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the leasecontract ended but since the construction of the commercialbuildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract wasallegedly renewed.

When Bai Tonina Sepi died, Lapuz started remitting his rent tothe court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when theadministrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from thetenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that

Lagon, representing himself as the new owner of the property,had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed acomplaint against the latter, accusing Lagon of inducing theheirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, therebyviolating his leasehold rights over it.

Issue:Whether the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, duringthe supposed existence of Lapuzs lease contract with the lateBai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for whichLagon should be held liable for damages

Held: No.In our view, Lagons purchase of the subject property wasmerely an advancement of his financial or economic interests,absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. Inthe very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declaredthat a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct isimpelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a

financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a personan officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is nomalice or bad faith involved.

In sum, the Court ruled that, inasmuch as not all three

elements to hold Lagon liable for tortuous interference arepresent, he cannot be made to answer for Lapuzs losses.

This case is one ofdamnun absque injuria or damage withoutinjury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right whiledamage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from theinjury.

Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludesrecovery of damages.

BANEZ v. VALDEVILLA (Vince)

Bebiano Banez was the sales operations manager of privaterespondent Oro Marketing, Inc. (ORO). In 1993, OROindefinitely suspended Banez and the latter filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal with the NLRC in Iligan City. The LaborArbiter found that Banez had been illegally dismissed andordered the payment of separation pay in lieu ofreinstatement, and of backwages and attorneys fees. Thedecision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same

for having been filed out of time.

In 1995, ORO filed a complaint for damages before the RTC ofMisamis Oriental against Banez for lost profit and earnings dueto the abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager.Banez opposes this and claims that the action for damages,having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, wassquarely under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the

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NLRC under the Labor Code and is barred by final judgment inthe labor case.

RTC Judge Valdevilla dismissed Banez motion to dismiss andhence, this appeal.

Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction in the claim for damagesfiled by ORO.

Held: NO.

There is no mistaking the fact that OROs claim againstpetitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship.

Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestowsupon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over

claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award notonly the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damagesgoverned by the Civil Code.

This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of action fordamages where the employer-employee relationship is merelyincidental and the cause of action proceeds from a differentsource of obligation. The jurisdiction of the regular courts wasupheld in such cases.

Thus, it is obvious that OROs remedy is not in the filing of theseparate action for damages, but in properly perfecting anappeal from the Labor Arbiters decision. Having lost the rightto appeal, the labor case stands a final judgment on the merits.

DMPI EMPLOYEES v VELEZ (Krisette)

FACTS:

An information for estafa was filed against CarmenMandawe for alleged failure to account to Eriberta Villegasthe amount of about P600K. Villegas entrusted this amountto Mandawe, an employee of DMPI-ECCI, for deposit withthe teller of DMPI-ECCI.

Subsequently, Villegas filed with the RTC a complaintagainst Mandawe and DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money anddamages with preliminary attachment arising out of thesame transaction. DMPI-ECCI filed a motion to dismiss onthe grounds that there was already a pending criminal casearising from the same facts, and that the complaint failed tocontain a certification against forum shopping.

TC dismissed the case, but later upon motion forreconsideration of Villegas, it reversed itself and recalledthe dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: Whether the civil case can proceed independently of the

criminal case for estafa.

HELD: YES. The civil case can proceed independently of thecriminal case for estafa.

Under Rule 111, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure, which became effective on Dec.1, 2000, the civilaction for the recovery of civil liability arising from theoffense charged shall be deemed instituted with thecriminal action unless the offended party waives the civilaction, reserves the right to institute it separately, or

institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Sec.2of the same rule provides that after the criminal action hasbeen commenced, the separate civil action arisingtherefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment hasbeen entered in the criminal action.

However, only the civil liability arising from the offensecharged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unlessthe offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right

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to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior tothe criminal action.

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to filethe independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and2176 of the Civil Code.

The reservation only refers to the civil action for therecovery of the civil liability arising from the offensecharged [under Art.100 of the RPC]. This does not includethe recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act oromission which may be prosecuted separately even withouta reservation.

Thus, the civil case instituted by Villegas, an independentcivil action for damages on account of the fraud committedagainst him under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceedindependently even if there was no reservation as to itsfiling.

COJUANGCO, JR. v CA (Alpe)

FACTS: In the 14 June 1972 issue of the Graphic, a weeklymagazine in the Philippines, under the column socialclimbing, an item appeared.

Claming that the item alludes to them, the Cojuancospouses, and that the item was false, malicious and constitutesa vicious attack on the wifes honor and accuses her of theimmoral acts of following up a loan, as well as adultery and

prostitution, they filed a civil action for damages based on libelin the CFI against Graphic Magazine and the writers on 11 July1972. On December 1972, the fiscal of the court mentionedfiled a criminal case for libel against the Graphic writers. TheCojuangco spouses filed a separate motions to consolidate thecriminal case with the civil case, saying that time and efforts ofthe court and the parties would be saved by suchconsolidation. Art. 360 of the RPC also provides that the civil

action should be filed where the criminal action is filed, andvice versa, provided that the court where the civil action or thecriminal action is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. Two of the defendants opposed.The RTC ruled against the opposition and consolidated thecases. The CA reversed.

ISSUE: May a criminal case for libel and an independent civilaction for damages arising therefrom be consolidated for jointtrial pursuant to Art. 33 of Civil Code?

HELD: Yes. It is common knowledge that both the civil andcriminal case involve common or identical issues, and that theywould have the same witnesses. Also, the Cojungco spousesare correct in invoking Art. 360 of RPC. The Rules of Court alsoalso allows that an independent civil action based on Arts. 32,33, 34, or 2176 of the Civil Code filed before the insitution of

the criminal case may be instituted with the latter, subjecto thecondition that no final judgment has been made in the criminalcase. Therefore, the decision of the CA should be reversed. Thefeared chaos or confusion of the CA in procedure is at bestspeculative and the possible difficulty the judge may face inlight of the different tests of sufficiency of proof in each caseunfounded for it fails to consider the instances when the civilaspect is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.

ANDAMO V. IAC (Kristel)191 SCRA 195

Facts:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo arethe owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of privaterespondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.,a religious corporation.

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Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpathsand contrivances, including an artificial lake, wereconstructed starting from the middle-right portionthereof leading to a big hole or opening which serves asthe exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of

defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point ofthe same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year afteryear, during rainy or stormy seasons and which allegedlyinundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a youngman to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants,washed away costly fences, endangered the lives ofpetitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormyseasons, and exposed plants and other improvements todestruction.

The Andamos instituted a criminal action against theofficers and directors of herein respondent corporation,for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324

of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently, they filed another action against

respondent corporation, this time a civil case fordamages with prayer for the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction before the same court. The civilcase was suspended until after judgment of the criminalcase.

The trial court then dismissed the civil case statingunder section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court whichprovides that "criminal and civil actions arising from thesame offense may be instituted separately, but after the

criminal action has been commenced the civil actioncannot be instituted until final judgment has beenrendered in the criminal action."

Petitioners contend that the trial court and the AppellateCourt erred in dismissing civil case since it is predicatedon a quasi-delict.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing thecivil case

Held:

YES.

A careful examination of the complaint shows that thecivil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of theCivil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by theplaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, orsome other person for whose acts he must respond; and(c) the connection of cause and effect between the faultor negligence of the defendant and the damagesincurred by the plaintiff.

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Courtheld that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is aseparate legal institution under the Civil Codewith a substantivity all its own, and individualitythat is entirely apart and independent from adelict or crime a distinction exists between thecivil liability arising from a crime and theresponsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damagesmay produce civil liability arising from a crime under thePenal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpaextra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the

acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirelyirrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the eventof an acquittal where the court has declared that thefact from which the civil action arose did not exist, inwhich case the extinction of the criminal liability wouldcarry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

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In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that inquasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent ofthe criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 ofthe Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion thanthis, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in

the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecutionwhether it be conviction or acquittal would rendermeaningless the independent character of the civilaction and the clear injunction in Article 31, that hisaction may proceed independently of the criminalproceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

The ruling of the lower court is reversed and set aside.

JOSE S. CANCIO, JR. vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP (Mayco)

An independent civil action which is separate and

distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require noprior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicataand forum-shopping will not operate to bar the same.

Facts:Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three

cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa,against respondent for allegedly issuing the following checkswithout sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No.25001151 in the amount of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No.25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3) Interbank

Check No. 25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00.The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissedCriminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of B.P. No. 22 coveringcheck no. 25001151 on the ground that the check wasdeposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date ofthe check. The two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22(Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with and

subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua,Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of failure to prosecute.

Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with theRegional Trial Court of Pampanga, after failing to present itssecond witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafacases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reservedits right to file a separate civil action arising from the saidcriminal cases. On the same date, the trial court granted themotions of the prosecution and the cases were dismissedwithout prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect of the cases.

Petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum ofmoney, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject ofthe estafa cases.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaintcontending that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine ofres judicata. Respondent further prayed that petitioner shouldbe held in contempt of court for forum-shopping.

Issues:1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases againstrespondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection ofthe value of the checks subject of the estafa cases2) whether the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.

Held:1.) No. One of the elements of res judicata is identity ofcauses of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed thatthe action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action,which remains separate and distinct from any criminalprosecution based on the same act. Not being deemedinstituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, aruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing onsaid independent civil action based on an entirely differentcause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

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2) No. The filing of the collection case after the dismissal ofthe estafa cases against respondent did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing ofmultiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause ofaction, either simultaneously or successively, to secure afavorable judgment. Although the cases filed by petitionerarose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are,however, based on different causes of action. The criminalcases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civilaction for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant casebecause the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civilaction which can proceed independently of the criminal action.

PADILLA, et al. v COURT OF APPEALS (Edz)129 SCRA 558

Acquittal

Facts: Padilla (P), et al. were found guilty of grave coercion forunlawfully preventing, by means of threat, force and violence,Vergara (V) and his family from closing their stall at a publicmarket and for forcibly opening the door of the stall,demolishing and destroying it and the furnitures therein byaxes and other massive instruments, and carrying away thegoods, wares and merchandise.

Accused allegedly took advantage of their positions: P wasthe incumbent municipal mayor, while the rest were policemenexcept for one civilian.

P, et al. appealed to the CA, claiming that P had the powerto order removal of the stall, which was deemed a nuisance perse under a municipal ordinance. The CA acquitted the accusedon ground of reasonable doubt, but still held them liable foractual damages (P9,600).

Issue: Did the acquittal based on reasonable doubt as to thecriminal liability result in the extinction of the civil liability?

Held: NO. P, et al. were acquitted not because they did not commit theacts stated in the charge against them. They were acquittedbecause their acts were denominated coercion when theyproperly constituted some other offense such as threat ormalicious mischief. (Crime of coercion requires that theviolence be employed against the person, not against property)

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in thecriminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto underArt. 100, RPC. The civil liability must have arisen from the actas a crime.

The same punishable act or omission can create 2 kinds ofcivil liabilities against the accused: that arising from the act asa crime and that arising from the same act as a quasi-delict.

Either of these 2 may be enforced against the accused.However, the offended party cannot recover under both typesof liability.

Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where theacquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderanceof evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expresslydeclares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but onlycivil in nature; and where the civil liability does not arise fromor is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused wasacquitted.

There are no sound reasons to require a separate civil action

to still be filed sincce the facts to be proved in the civil casehave already been established in the criminal proceedingswhere the accused was acquitted. Due process has beenaccorded the accused. The accused themselves do not denythat they caused the destruction of Vs market stall and had itscontents carted away.

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HEIRS OF GUARING v. CA (Jon)EFFECTS OF AQCUITTAL

FACTS:The case arose from a vehicular accident which happened onNovember 7, 1987 along the North Expressway in San Rafael,Mexico, Pampanga. Teodoro Guaring was driving a MitsubishiLancer who died as a result of the accident. The heirs ofGuaring contended that the Philippine Rabit Bus, tried toovertake the car of Guaring by passing to the right, but the bushit the rear of the car, due to the impact the car swerved to theopposite lane and hit the Toyota Cressida.The respondents countered that it was Guaring who wasnegligent while trying to overtake the buss he went to the

opposite lane which caused him to crash to the ToyotaCressida. The RTC in its decision found the Bus Company andits driver at fault. The CA reveresd the Decision of the RTC onthe strength of the Decision on the criminal case filed againstthe driver, the case being dismissed. The Court rationalizedthat since the action was based on negligence, the acquittal ofthe driver in the case of Reckless Imprudence made the casefor quasi-delict untenable.ISSUE:Whether the dismissal of the criminal case of the driver whocommitted the tort, also removed the civil liability?HELD: NOThe damages sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict,the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damagesbecause the acquittal was based not on a finding that he wasnot guilty but only on reasonable doubt.It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal actionwhen the fact is that they did not take part therein. Thus thewitnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are differentfrom those presented by the prosecution should have brought

home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness ofconsidering the decision in the criminal case conclusive on thecivil case.

SAPIERA v CA (From Torts reviewer) (Pau)

Facts: Sapiera bought merchandise from Sua and paid for themusing 2 checks issued by Arturo de Guzman and signed at theback by Sapiera. The checks were dishonoured. Sapiera wascharged w/ 4 counts of Estafa and de Guzman was charged w/2 violations of BP 22. the RTC acquitted Sapiera of all thecharges of estafa but did not rule on whether she could be heldcivilly liable for the checks she indorsed to Ramon Sua. DeGuzman was convicted. Sua appealed on the civil aspect andprayed that the court order Sapiera to pay the aggregate valueof the checks indorsed be her plus interest, etc. The CA denied

the appeal, but on MR, held that Sapiera was liable for P 335kminus P 125k that de Guzman had already paid.

Issue: Whether Sapieras acquittal extinguished her liability fordamages?

Held: No, Sapiera could still be and was properly held liable fordamages.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of theaccused for damages only when it includes a declaration thatthe fact from w/c the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where:a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; b) where thecourt expressly declares that the liability of the accused is notcriminal but only civil and nature, and c) where the civil liabilityis not derived from or based on the criminal act of w/c theaccused is acquitted. In this case, Sapieras acquittal was dueto the fact that conspiracy was not proved before the trialcourt. However, despite the absence of conspiracy, she did

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sign the back of the checks and became an indorser thereonand obliged herself to pay the amount of the checks to theholder.

MACCAY v NOBELA(civil liability arising from crime)

Facts: The petition for review seeks to reverse the decision ofthe CA dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner Maccayagainst the spouses Nobela for falsification of publicdocuments.

A certain Adelaida Potenciano was looking for buyers oftwo parcels of land of Maccay. She eventually got to talk to thespouses Nobela. She introduced herself as the wife of Maccay(who had a different name, Barba). Maccay, who met the

spouses in his police uniform (he was a colonel), impressed thespouses, and a good relationship flourished. Potenciano wastreated like a queen in the Nobelas residence, where shebathed, got a massage, was fed and even allowed to use theirvehicle. The sale of one of the properties was eventuallycompleted for a price of 300k.

The relationship started to sour, due to the fact thatPotenciano faked her relationship and connections with thePolymedic hospital, and asked the spouses to engage in a fakeappliance business. One day, Potenciano filed a complaint inthe Eastern Police District against the spouses for allegedlystealing her title to the land and some appliances in her

business. The spouses were subpoenaed by the Fiscals office.Mrs. Nobela found out that the real estate agent they asked toregister the deed of sale, dela Vega, forged the document andmade it a sale in favor of them.

Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint againstrespondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification of PublicDocument before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of

Rizal. After trial, the trial court found respondent spousesinnocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse respondentspouses P300,000 and to pay damages and attorneys fees.The trial court found out that it was the petitioners whoswindled respondents. Petitioners appealed the civil aspect ofthe case to the CA. The appellate court denied petitionersappeal and affirmed the trial courts Decision.

Issue: Can the trial court rule on the civil liability of theCOMPLAINANT in the criminal case where the civil action wasnot reserved or filed separately?

Held: NoA court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in

favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited todetermining the guilt of the accused and if proper, todetermine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper

proceedings to determine the private complainants civilliability, if any. The trial court erred in ordering complainantpetitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano, as partof the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse theP300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondentspouses. This Court ruled in Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos[7] thata court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminaland civil liability of the accused, thus:

[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminalaspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arisingout of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or

third-party complaint, if any) should be set aside or

refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separateproceedings at the proper time.

BUNAG v CA (Irah)

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Bunag and Cirilo were former sweethearts. Allegedly,Bunag forcibly abducted Cirilo, brought her to a motel andraped her. He then brought her to her grandmother's housewhere they lived together for 21 days. Bunag promised tomarry her, but suddenly disappeared. A criminal action forforcible abduction was filed against Bunag, but this wasdismissed by the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage.Cirilo then filed a civil action for damages against Bunag onaccount of the forcible abduction. The trial court awarded Cirilodamages. Bunag claims that the dismissal of the criminalaction should have extinguished his civil liability.

Issue/s:Does the extinction of the criminal action against Bunag

during the preliminary stage also extinguish the civil liabilityfor damages? (NO)

Is Bunag liable for damages? (YES)

Held:Extinction of the criminal action does not carry with it

the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceedsfrom a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from whichthe civil case might arise did not exist.

In this case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcibleabduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at thepreliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in afinal judgment that the fact from which the civil case mightarise did not exist. The reasons why, in general, the dismissalof the criminal action does not carry with it the dismissal of the

civil action are:a) the two proceedings do not involve the same parties

(in criminal action, the State is the plaintiff; in civil action, theperson affected is the petitioner); and

b) the two proceedings have different rules as to thecompetency of witnesses and the quantum of evidencerequried (in criminal action, proof beyond reasonable doubt isrequired; in civil action, only preponderance of evidence is

needed).With regard to the liability for damages, although

generally, a breach of promise to marry per se is notactionable, except where expenses for the weddingpreparations have been incurred, Article 21 of the Civil Codenevertheless provides that "any person who willfully causesloss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter forthe damage." In this case, the act of Bunag in forciblyabducting and raping Cirilo, and thereafter promising to marryher in order to escape criminal liability, only to renege on suchpromise after 21 days of co-habitation, constitute acts contraryto morals and good customs. Hence, the award for moral [andexemplary] damages is warranted.

APA v FERNANDEZ (Ysan)

Facts:A criminal case was file alleging that: on February 1990, orprior thereto, in Lapulapu City, Apa et. al. took advantage ofthe absence or tolerance of Tigol by occupying or possessing aportion of her real property, whereon they constructed theirrespective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol,which acts deprived the latter of the use of a portion of herland, to her damage and prejudice.

Apa et. al. moved for the suspension of their arraignment onthe ground that there was a prejudicial question pending

resolution in another case which concerns the ownership of lotin question.

Issue:Whether the question of ownership of the lot in issue, whichwas pending in a civil case, is a prejudicial question justifyingsuspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against Apaet. al.

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Held: Yes.In the criminal case, the question is whether petitionersoccupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to Tigolagainst the latter's will.

Now the ownership of the land in question is the issue in thecivil case now pending. The resolution, therefore, of thisquestion would necessarily be determinative of Apa et. al.scriminal liability for squatting.

BELTRAN v. PEOPLE (Vince)

Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine Felix were married on June16, 1973. In 1997, after 24 years of marriage and 4 children,Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

In her answer, Felix alleged that it was Beltran who abandonedthe conjugal home and lived with a certain woman namedMilagros Salting. Felix subsequently filed a complaint forconcubinage against Beltran and Salting.

Beltran, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest,argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration ofnullity posed a prejudicial question to the determination of thecriminal case.

Issue: Whether the civil case poses a prejudicial questionagainst the criminal case.

Held: NO.The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is toavoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimatelyrelated to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the

resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminalaction may proceed.

The pendency of the case for the declaration of nullity is not aprejudicial question to the concubinage case.

The accused in a case for concubinage need not present a finaljudgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduceevidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriageother proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

A subsequent pronouncement that the accuseds marriage isvoid from the beginning is not a defense in a charge forconcubinage he who contracts a second marriage before thejudicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes therisk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Petition dismissed.

MARBELLA-BOBIS v BOBIS (Krisette)

PEOPLE v. CONSING (Alpe)

FACTS:On February 1997, Consing and his mother represented to PlusBuilders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of4.2 HA lot in Imus, Cavite. They also said that they acquiredthe lot from Tang Teng and Yu. Relying on these

representations, PBI purchased the lot..On April 1999, PBI discovered that Consing and his

mother did not have a valid title over the land. PBI came toknow that Tan Teng and Yu never sold the lot to Consing, andthat TCT where Consings TCT was based was not filed in theRegister of Deeds.

On August 1999, PBI was ousted from possession of thedisputed land by Tan Teng and Yu. Despite written and oral

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demands, Consing and his mother refused to return theamount paid to them.

On 22 July 1999, Consing filed for an action of injuctiverelief against PBI. Consing wanted to be declared as an agentof his mother, and therefore was not under any obligation toPBI.

On 13 October 1999, PBI filed against Consing and hismother a complaint for damages and attachment. Consingfiled a motion to dismiss on ground of forum shopping becausethe action for injunctive relief and for damages and attachmentwere still pending.

On 21 January 2000, a criminal case for estafa throughfalsification of a public document was filed against RafaelConsing and his mother.

On April 2000, Consing filed a motion to deferarraignment on the ground of prejudicial question. The TCdenied this motion. The CA reversed and enjoined the TC from

proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the civil casesfor injunctive relief and damages and attachment are resolved.

ISSUE: Are the the civil cases for injunctive relief and damagesand attachment prejudicial questions justifying the suspensionof the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa?

HELD: No.A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case,the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issueinvolved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains toanother tribunal. The prejudicial question must be

determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdictionto try and resolve the question must be lodged in another courtor tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct andseparate from the crime but so intimately connected with itthat it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For acivil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as tocause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final

resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must bepresent:(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those uponwhich the criminal prosecution would be based;(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civilaction, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarilybe determined; and(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in anothertribunal

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that wouldjustify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.The issue in the Civil Case for Injunctive Relief is whether ornot respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Ceciliade la Cruz; while in the Civil Case for Damages andAttachment, the question is whether respondent and hismother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount

paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even ifrespondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in thetransaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannotbe adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any personmay be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.Hence, the determination of the issue involved in the Civil Casefor Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of therespondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsificationof public document.

Likewise, the resolution of PBI's right to be paid damages andthe purchase price of the lot in question will not be

determinative of the culpability of the respondent in thecriminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of thepurchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow thatrespondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsificationof public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court inthe civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase priceplus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of

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liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still beestablished under penal laws as determined by other evidence.

YONAHA V. CA (Kristel)255 SCRA 397

Facts: On April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M. in Basak,

Lapulapu City, Elmer Ouano was driving a ToyotaTamaraw duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahugand owned by EK SEA Products

He bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the

latter's instantaneous death, due to the multiple severetraumatic injuries at different parts of his body.

He was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting inHomicide and after a plea of guilty, a penalty ofimprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8months and payment of P50,000.00 for the death of thevictim; P30,000.00 for actual damages incurred inconnection with the burial and the nightly prayer of thedeceased victim and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

He manifested inability to pay so that the trial courtissued a subsidiary writ of execution against his

employer. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the

subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on thelack of prior notice to her and on the fact that theemployer's liability had yet to be established.

Issue:

Whether or not notice and hearing are necessary beforethere is an execution against the employers forsubsidiary liability

Held:

YES.

The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liabilityis found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. ThisCourt has since sanctioned the enforcement of thissubsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings inwhich the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesisthat it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, theexecution process of the judgment. But, executionagainst the employer must not issue as just amatter of course, and it behooves the court, as ameasure of due process to the employer, todetermine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set

for the purpose, the legal applicability andpropriety of the employer's liability. Therequirement is mandatory even when it appears

prima facie that execution against the convictedemployee cannot be satisfied. The court mustconvince itself that the convicted employee is in truth inthe employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged inan industry of some kind; that the employee hascommitted the crime to which civil liability attacheswhile in the performance of his duties as such; and thatexecution against the employee is unsuccessful by

reason of insolvency.

The subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) the existence ofan employer-employee relationship; (b) that theemployer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) thatthe employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act andfound to have committed the offense in the discharge of

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his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits"while" in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that saidemployee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of theemployee, of course, concludes the employer 8 and thesubsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminalcase, but to afford the employer due process, the court

should hear and decide that liability on the basis of theconditions required therefor by law.

CATACUTAN vs. HEIRS OF NORMAN KADUSALE, et al.(Mayco)

The employer is, in substance and in effect, a party tothe criminal case against his employee, considering thesubsidiary liability imposed upon him by law.

Facts:Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan is the registered ownerand operator of a jeepney, driven by the accused PorferioVendiola, which bumped a tricycle in Banilad, Bacong, NegrosOriental, thereby causing the death of its driver, NormanKadusale, and its passenger, Lito Amancio, and seriousphysical injuries to another passenger, respondent Gil B. Izon.

Respondents thus filed a criminal case against PorferioVendiola, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in DoubleHomicide with Physical Injuries and Damages to Propertybefore the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental.

The trial court rendered judgment that accused is guilty

of negligence and imprudence under Article 365 of the RevisedPenal Code in the collision which occurred in Banilad, Bacong,Negros

Accused Vendiola did not appeal the judgment ofconviction. Instead, he applied for probation. Meanwhile, whenthe judgment became final and executory, respondents movedfor the issuance of a writ of execution and the correspondingwrit was issued by the trial court. However, per the Sheriff's

Return of Service, the writ was unsatisfied as the accused had"nothing to pay off the damages in the decision."

Respondents filed a Motion for Subsidiary Writ ofExecution before the trial court, praying that such writ beissued against petitioner Aureliana Catacutan as registeredowner and operator of the jeepney driven by the accused when

the collision occurred. Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan filed herOpposition thereto, arguing that she was never a party to thecase and that to proceed against her would be in violation ofthe due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioner alsoargued that the subsidiary liability of the employer is notdetermined in the criminal case against the employee.

Issue: Whether or not a subsidiary writ of execution mayissue against the employers of an accused, against whom ajudgment of conviction had been entered, even when saidemployers never took part in the criminal proceedings where

the accused was charged, tried and convicted.

Held:Yes. As stated in Martinez v. Barredo:"The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of

his day in court, because the situation before us is not onewherein the employer is sued for a primary liability underarticle 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement issought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependentupon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue tobe tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words,the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon hisdriver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in

the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee'sprimary liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability forsuch criminal negligence

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CONNEL BROS. COMPANY, ET AL. v ADUNA, ET AL. (Edz)91 Phil 79Subsidiary Liability: Diligence not a defense

Facts: Aduna (A), while driving the passenger bus owned by the Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Company (EMETC), in acareless and negligent manner, w/o taking necessaryprecautions to avoid accident to persons and damage toproperty, bumped and hit an oldsmobile car owned by ConnelBros Company (CBC). The car fell into a canal, and itspassengers, Boomer (B) and Nichol (N) were injured andhospitalized.

A was convicted of damage to property and serious physical

injuries thru reckless imprudence. CBC, B and N reserved theirright ot file the corresponding civil suit for damages.

EMETC: they have been following the same practices andprocedure employed by Meralco in exercising due diligence inhiring and supervising its employees, esp. the drivers andconductors of the transpo buses; the company had scrutinizedAs previous records as a driver, esp. during his employment inMeralco for 5 years, which was a prerequisite condition to hisemployment by EMETC; company has been carefullysupervising the work of its employees in the field, esp. itsdrivers and conductors, and that the accident is the firstcollision in which a bus or an employee of EMETC has beeninvolved.

EMETC is invoking Art. 1903 of the Civil Code which statesthat subsidiary liability will not apply if the person being heldliable exercised all the diligence of a good father of the familyto prevent the damage. But the trial court held that Arts. 102and 103 of the RPC which provides for the subsidiary liability ofthe employer should apply.

Issue: Whether EMETC can rightfully invoke diligence asdefense

Held: NO.Barredo v. Garcia and Almario: The offended party seekingdamages has the right to choose between a criminal action anda civil suit.

In this case, the plaintiffs have chosen to rely on theprovisions of the RPC and have based their action on the resultof the crim case against A. No evidence to show the negligenceof A was submitted except his conviction in the criminal case.Furthermore, both A and EMETC were sued.

However, EMETC should be held merely subsidiarily liable.

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