Torts Reviewer 2E

TORTS REVIEWER E2014

WEEK 2: ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT/ BREACH OF CONTRACT

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)

Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101)

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the

breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Elements of Quasi-Delict:- Andamo v IAC, PNR v Brunty and BPI v Lifetime practically identified the same

three elements for quasi-delict except that the Court in Andamo v IAC and BPI v Lifetime made the mistake of using the word “damages” instead of “damage”

- Gregorio v CA includes a 4th element which is “that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties”

Quasi-delict and Delict:- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil

Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.

- An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.

- The words “primary and direct” as contrasted with “subsidiary”, refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns.

- While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee.

Quasi-delict and Breach of Contract- Cangco v Manila Railroad has a very good discussion on the difference between a

quasi-delict and a breach of contract.- What must be proved for liability to attach in a culpa contractual are:

o Existence of a contracto Breach of the contract

- Defenses available in culpa contractual are:


o Due diligence in the performance of the obligation (but not in the selection and supervision of its employees, this is not a defense)

o Fortuitous event- Driver cannot be held liable in a contract of carriage between a passenger and a

transporting company since he is not a party to the contract.- Being guilty of a breach of their contract, liability for damages are in accordance

with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code.- Doctrine of proximate cause applicable only in quasi-delict.- Air France, Far East Bank and LRTA cases may be quoted for the existence of a

tort even when there obtains a contractSpouses Andamo v IAC and Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette (1990) Within the land of the Missionaries, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artifical lake, were constructed which allegedly inundated and eroded the land of Spouses Andamo thereby causing a yong man to drown, damaged crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of the spouses and their laborers during rainy days. Spouses Andamo initially filed a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation. They subsequently filed a civil case for damages. Civil case was dismissed by the lower court as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The SC ordered the reinstatement of the civil case holding that the TC and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing civil case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.DOCTRINE(S):A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.PNR v Brunty and Garcia (2006) QUICK FACTS: Collision between a Benz (moving at approximately 70kph which overtook another vehicle just as it was approaching a railroad crossing) and a PNR train. Mercelita and Brunty died while the other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. Mother of Brunty filed a complaint for damages alleging that her daughter’s death were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless

negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing. DOCTRINE(S):In order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage. Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.BPI v. Lifetime (2008) QUICK FACTS: On various dates, Alice Laurel, one of Lifetime’s educational consultants, deposited checks to Lifetime’s account with BPI and, after the check deposit slips were machine-validated, requested the teller to reverse the transactions. Laurel would then present the machine-validated deposit slips to Lifetime which, on the strength thereof, considered her account paid. The above fraudulent transactions of Laurel were made possible through BPI teller's failure to retrieve the duplicate original copies of the deposit slips every time they ask for cancellation or reversal of the. Lifetime sought recovery from BPI on a cause of action based on tort.DOCTRINE(S):There are three elements of quasi-delict: (a) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; (b) damages suffered by the plaintiff; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence in this case lies in the tellers' disregard of the validation procedures in place and BPI's utter failure to supervise its employees. In view of the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty-bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.BPI cannot escape liability because of Lifetime's failure to scrutinize the monthly statements sent to it by the bank. This omission does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of BPI's tellers in failing to require the surrender of the machine-validated deposit slips before reversing the deposit transactions, the loss would not have occurred. BPI's negligence is undoubtedly the proximate cause of the loss.


Nonetheless, the damages awarded to it were correctly reduced on account of its own contributory negligence in accordance with Article 1172 of the Civil Code.Garcia (Community Diagnostic Center) and Bu Castro v. Spouses Salvador (2007) QUICK FACTS: Mrs. Salvador’s medical pre-employment exam at the Community Diagnostic Center indicated that she was "HBs Ag: Reactive." The Company terminated Ranida’s employment for failing the physical examination. A re-test conducted showed that she was in fact not suffering from Hepatitis B. Spouses Salvador filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC (Castro).DOCTRINE(S):Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited to reviewing errors of law. The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. R.A. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law, provides standards which Garcia failed to comply with. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision.Gregorio v. CA, Sansio and Datuin (2009) This case arose from the filing of a Complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by Datuin , as OIC of the Accounts Receivables dept., and upon authority of Sansio, against Zenaida Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. Datuin later submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating that Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution. Case was subsequently dismissed. Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin. Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint. Court held that civil suit was based on quasi-delict.DOCTRINE(S):Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting

contractual relation between the parties. On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.Barredo v. Garcia and Almario (1942) QUICK FACTS: Head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela. Taxi driver was convicted for the death of the passenger of carretela. Parents of the passenger of the carretela filed an action for damages against taxi operator Barredo. Operator held liable.DOCTRINE(S):Employer is primarily and directly responsible under Art. 1903 of the NCC. The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.Art. 365 of RPC punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.To hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust the defendant’s property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.It should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. L.G. Foods v. Philadelfa G.R. No. 158995. September 26, 2006 QUICK FACTS: Parents of a 7 year old boy who died after being run over by Ford Fiera van filed a complaint for damages against employer of driver of van. A criminal case (without a reservation to institute a separate civil action) was initially filed against the driver but the driver subsequently committed suicide before the trial could be concluded. L.G. filed Motion To Dismiss on the ground that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable under the provision of Art. 103 of the RPC. Court ruled in favor of parents of victim. DOCTRINE(S):Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the RPC, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Arts. 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer’s defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for


culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee and that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefore, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible. Cangco v. Manila Railroad 38 Phil 768 (1918) As employee benefit, Cangco used a pass which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. While getting off the train, Cangco’s feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated and was later on amputated. Cangco instituted civil suit to recover damages from Manila Railroad founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. Court held here that Manila Railroad is liable to Cangco based on breach of the contract of carriage.DOCTRINE(S):The contract to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.Art 1903, now Art. 2180, creates a presumption that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a service or employee, the employer is presumed to have been negligent in selection and/or supervision of employee. The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. Nonetheless, Art. 2180 apples only to quasi-delict and not to culpa contractual. Hence, exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee can be a defense in quasi-delict but not in a contractual breach.In culpa aquiliana, legal tie is the wrongful or negligent act and it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove the negligence. On the other hand, in a culpa contractual, the legal tie is the contract itself. Proof ot the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual

obligation had no contract existed between the parties.*Note: Italized texts are my interpretation of the important doctrines of the case. This is one good case to read in the original. There is a discussion here that under Spanish law, the liability is not respondeat superior unlike in the Common law as well as on the difference between a culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual. FGU Insurance v G.P. Sarmiento Trucking (2002) QUICK FACTS: Trucking company undertook to deliver 30 units of Condura refrigerators. Truck carrying the refrigerators collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes. FGU Insurance paid to Concepcion Industries the value of the covered cargoes and in turn, being the subrogee, sought reimbursement from trucking company. Court held that trucking company is not a common carrier. However, it still held trucking company liable based on culpa contractual. DOCTRINE(S):In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. .The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.The driver, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not be ordered to pay petitioner since he is not a party to the contract of carriage. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical position. Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. *Note:There is also a discussion here of expectation interest, reliance interest, and restitution interest which we already covered in Oblicon.Spouses Batal v Mrs. San Pedro-Tominaga and Tominaga (2006) Spouses Tominaga contracted the services of Frank Batal who represented himself as a sureveyor to conduct a survey of their lot. They based the construction of their perimeter fence on the boundaries identified by Batal. In 1996, complaint was lodged against San Pedro and Tominaga before the barangay on the ground that the northern portion of their fence allegedly encroached upon a designated right-of-way. Upon verification with another surveyor it was discovered that their wall indeed overlapped the adjoining lot and it was also discovered that it was not Frank but his wife Erlinda Batal, who is a licensed geodetic engineer. Court held Spouses Batal liable for damages for failing to carry out their contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence.DOCTRINE(S):Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual,


which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability from such already existing obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately following Articles; while culpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for damages suffered by the respondents in accordance with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code.Calalas v CA, Sunga and Salva (2000) Sunga sat on an “extension seat” in a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. An Isuzu truck owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney and as a result, Sunga’s lower leg was fractured. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against the owner of the Isuzu truck. Court affirmed the dismissal of the case against Salva but held Calalas liable for damages based on contract of carriage and not quasi-delict as held by the RTC. Defense of caso fortuito by Calalas not appreciated.DOCTRINE(S):In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.Fores v Miranda (1959) Miranda was one of the passengers on a jeepney which, while descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. Fores was sued for damages. Her defense was that she sold the jeep a day before the accident. The Court still held her liable although the award for moral damages was deleted.DOCTRINE(S):Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. In case of breach of contract, proof of bad faith or fraud, i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages. The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger that entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" but the exceptional

rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith.Air France v Carrascoso (1966) Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced Carrascoso to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff refused but, after a commotion, eventually reluctantly gave his "first class" seat. Court ruled in favor of Carrascoso. It declared that the employee of Air France violated Art 21 and consequently, held the employer liable for the tortuous act of the employee. Nonetheless, Court also awarded moral damages as the evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract with plaintiff in bad faith. DOCTRINE(S):Quoted the case Austro-American S.S. Co. vs. Thomas: And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.Far East Bank v CA and Spouses Luna (1995) Mrs. Luna lost her supplemental credit card. Far East was forthwith informed and, the bank recorded the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. Mr. Luna tendered a despedida lunch at Intercon. He presented his card which was promptly verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Mr. Luis was forced to pay in cash and naturally, felt embarrassed by this incident. Court held Far East Bank liable for nominal damages only. Did not award moral damages as there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the bank.DOCTRINE(S);In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides: Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier. Similarly, Art 21 contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his


contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Art 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that must give way to the specific provision of Art 2220 authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.The test of whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract (as in Air France v Carrascoso) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. PSBA v CA and Spouses Bautista (1992) A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of PSBA prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school. Court ruled that CA was correct in denying the Motion to Dismiss but not because cause of action was predicated under Art. 2180 as held by CA but because the cause of action is culpa contractual.DOCTRINE(S):Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. Jurispurdence provides that under 2180, the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.Using the test of Cangco, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and

environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. Syquias v CA and Manila Memorial Park (1993) Plaintiffs are the parents and siblings of deceased Syquia. They filed a complaint against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract (to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains from desecration) and/or quasi-delict (gross negligence conformably to Art 2176 in failing to seal the concrete vault) after discovering that the concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls. Court upheld the dismissal of the case. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Moreover, the act of Manila Memorial of boring the hole in the vault was found to be in the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving of earth if the vault floated due to heavy rains (BS according to sir :p). DOCTRINE(S):There was no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.LRTA and Roman v Navidad and Prudent Security Agency (2003) Navidad, a paying passenger then drunk, entered the LRT station. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. An altercation between the two ensued that led to a fist fight. Navidad fell on the tracks and an LRT train operated by Roman struck and killed Navidad. Court held that LRTA’s liability stemmed from the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of the common carrier. Security agency was not held liable although the Court mentioned that it may be held liable for tort under Art 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Factual findings were unable to link security agency to the death of Navidad, for the reason that the negligence of its employee guard has not been duly proven.There being, similarly, no showing that the driver of the train was guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. The contractual


tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the passenger and the driver thus the driver can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.DOCTRINE(S):Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.On the issue of whether the security agency may also be held liable: If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.On the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand: It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Consolidated Bank v CA and LC Diaz Company (2003) Cashier of L.C. Diaz instructed their messenger to deposit money with Solidbank. Messenger went to Solidbank and presented deposit slips and passbook. Since the transaction took time, messenger left the passbook with Solidbank. When he returned to retrieve the passbook, teller informed him that “somebody got the passbook.” It also learned of unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from its savings account. Court held Solidbank liable for breach of contract due to negligence. It failed to discharge the burden that it was not negligent or at fault as it failed to proved that their teller exercised the “high standards of integrity and performance” required of bank employees.DOCTRINE(S):Since a bank deposit is a simple loan, there is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The savings deposit agreement is the contract that determines their rights and obligations.Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks – that banks must observe “high standards of integrity and performance” in servicing their depositors. In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent.Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_145804_2003.html#fnt12

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_145804_2003.html#fnt13


WEEK 3: CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE; STANDARD OF CONDUCT (CHILDREN, EXPERTS, MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS)New Civil CodeArt. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)NegligenceOmission of diligence required by the nature of the obligation, as defined by the ordinary prudent personGen. rule: diligence required is that of a good father of a familyExceptions: Common carrier, pharmacists, children, medical professionals, medical providersTest to determine negligenceOrdinary prudent personStandard of Conduct Reasonable care which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstancesin light of human experiences, and

1) facts of the case

ChildrenBelow 9 y.o. – presumed incapable of negligence (Jarco v. CA, 1999)9-15 y.o. – presumed incapable of negligence, but rebuttable through evidence (Taylor v. Manila Electric, 1910)Above 15 y.o. – can be negligent, if proven to have discernment

Standard of diligence – ordinary prudent child

ExpertsWhen a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. (Culion Ice v. Philippine Motors, 1930)

*No matter if you are an expert or not, if you claim to be, you will be held liable as an expert.

Medical ProfessionalsPharmacists

The highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine (US v. Pineda, 1918 | Mercury Drug v. De Leon, 2008)

Physicians As observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. Expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. (Cruz v. CA, 1997 | Cayao-Lasam v. Sps. Ramolete, 2008 | Lucas v. Tuano, 2009)

HospitalsAs observed by an ordinary prudent medical provider (Professional Services v. Agana, 2007)

Elements of Medical Negligence1) Duty – brought about by a physician-patient relationship2) Breach 3) Injury4) Proximate cause - the connection between the negligence and the injury must be

a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes5) Expert testimony – must prove that elements of breach, injury and proximate

cause are present (Lucas v. Tuano, 2007)

Picart v. SmithMarch 15, 1918 | Street, J.

Quick FactsPicart was riding a pony on a 75 x 4.8m bridge on the wrong side of the road. He tried to evade Smith, who was driving an automobile, to no avail. Smith didn’t stop but swerved to avoid the horse. He still hit them, resulting to the death of the horse and Picart’s injuries.

Who was negligent?Smith, the driver, for failing to bring his car to an immediate stop and running straight on until he was almost upon the horse.

Doctrine


Test to determine negligence: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences. “The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.”Personal insightsSir emphasized on the fact that in the first place, it was Picart who was on the wrong side of the road. But it must also be noted that Smith was driving at 10-12 mph, which was very slow, and he gave out warning signals while approaching the horse. The Court also held on Smith’s liability based on the last clear chance doctrine.

PNR v. BruntyNovember 2, 2006 | Callejo, Sr., J.

Quick FactsRhonda Brunty et.al., at 2:00 am, were approaching the railroad crossing at 70 km/hr in their Mercedes Benz. They were unaware that they were about to collide with the approaching train. There were no warning signs.

Who was negligent?PNR, for (1) its failure to provide flagbars or safety railroad bars, 2) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3) lack of proper lighting within the area.

DoctrineRailroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossing. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or

ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.

PNR v. CAOctober 15, 2007 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Quick FactsAmores was driving his car towards the PNR railroad track. He stopped for a while and crossed. Unfortunately, there was an approaching train which bumped his car and dragged it 10 meters beyond the center of the crossing. There was no signal nor crossing bar to warn motorists, and only a defective standard signboard “Stop, Look and Listen,” where Listen was missing and Look was bent. Amores died.

Who was negligent?PNR, for 1) running at fast speed, evidenced by it dragging the car 10 meters, 2) no crossing bar nor flagman or guard, 3) no reliable signaling device.

DoctrineAffirmed PNR v. Brunty

On PNR’s right-of-wayPNR argued that they had a right-of-way in a railroad (RA 4136, Land Transportation and Traffic Code). But the Court argued that “the obligation to bring to a full stop vehicles moving in public highways before traversing any “through street” only accrues from the time the said “through street” or crossing is so designated and sign-posted.” Amores was seen to have stopped, looked and listened (my own words, haha) and saw no impending danger to his life; therefore, he did everything, with absolute care and caution, to avoid the collision.

Personal insightsSir says that the Court is teaching PNR a lesson here. Brunty and this case were decided on consecutive years (2006 & 2007), and PNR still hasn’t learned. It seems, however, that in a case between a private person and a railroad company, no matter how negligent the former is, the latter will always be held liable, unless they fix their warning signs and crossing bars.

Sicam v. JorgeAugust 8, 2007 | Austria-Martinez, J.

Quick Facts


Jorge pawned some jewelry to Sicam’s pawnshop with knowledge that Sicam’s practice is to deposit all jewelry pawned to the bank near the pawnshop. One day, 2 armed men entered the pawnshop, pointed guns at Sicam et. al. and took away cash and jewelry, including that of Jorge’s.

Who was negligent?Sicam, for 1) leaving the vault open, 2) not proving if there was really a security guard in his pawnshop (he did not testify to support Sicam’s claim), and 3) failing to screen the persons he allowed entrance to the premises.

On robbery as a fortuitous event

Sicam insists that the robbery is a fortuitous event and therefore he is not negligent. The Court held that a robbery in a pawnshop is an event that is foreseen and anticipated.

Personal insightsIt must be noted that Sicam should’ve deposited the jewelry pawned to the bank, as agreed upon by him and Jorge. Instead, he left it in the vault of the pawnshop, which he also left open at the time of the robbery, therefore giving easy access to the robbers to take the jewelry inside the vault.

Corinthian Gardens v. Sps. TanjangcoJune 27, 2008 | Nachura, J.

Quick FactsThe Tanjangco and Cuaso spouses respectively owned adjacent lots in Corinthian Gardens. The Cuasos wanted to construct a house on their lot, but Corinthian required a relocation survey to be done before house construction. The Cuasos complied, and Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections. Unfortunately, when the construction was done, their perimeter fence encroached the Tanjangcos’ property by 87 sqm.

Issue/sW/N Corinthian is negligent (YES)W/N such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos (YES)

Held

Corinthian failed to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’ property. It cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos’ building plans was only limited to a so-called "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. To accept some such postulate is to put a premium on negligence. Corinthian was not organized solely for the defendants Cuasos. It is also the subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos - and of all others who have their dwelling units or abodes therein.

It goes without saying that this Manual of Rules and Regulations applies to all - or it does not apply at all. Moreover, Corinthian must not imply that while it may take the benefits from the Builder’s cash bond, it may, Pilate-like, wash its hands of any responsibility or

liability that would or might arise from the construction or building of the structure for which the cash bond was in the first place posted. That is not only unjust and immoral, but downright unchristian and iniquitous.

Taylor, 15 y.o., son of a mechanical enginner, mature for his age and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics, went in the premises of the power plant with some friends to bring home some blasting caps they found in the power plant’s dumpsite of cinders and ashes. They experimented on said caps, and at one point applied a lighted match on one, which led to its explosion. His right eye was removed.

DoctrineRequired diligence for children is based, not on the age, but on the evidence of maturity and experience of the child. Even if Taylor was just 15 y.o., a minor, he is still negligent having had the maturity and experience to know the dangers of his act.

Jarco Marketing v. CADecember 21, 1999 | Davide, Jr., J.

Quick FactsMother Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the payment counter of Syvel’s Department Store when her daughter, 6 year old Zhieneth was crushed and pinned by the bulk of the store’s gift-wrapping counter. Zhieneth died 14 days later.

Doctrine

Taylor v. Manila ElectricMarch 22, 1910 | Carson, J.

Quick Facts


Children below nine (9) years old are incapable of contributory negligence. But even if the Court attributes contributory negligence to Zhieneth, the remote cause of the fall was that the counter was unstable because it was not nailed to the ground. Had it been nailed, Zhieneth wouldn’t have been able to cause the counter to collapse.

Quoting SangcoIn our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Obiter: On the difference between accident and negligenceAccident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.

Ylarde v. AquinoJuly 29, 1988 | Gancayco, J.

Quick FactsYlarde, et. al. are 10-11 year old students who dug a hole in campus to bury a concrete block, upon instruction of their teacher Aquino. Aquino left for a while with clear instructions not to touch the stone but the students played in the pit and the stone fell in the pit, crushing and killing Ylarde.

HeldAquino was negligent because 1) a clear warning was not enough for the children, left to themselves and in front of an attractive nuisance, and 2) he shouldn’t have left he kids.

DoctrineThe degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as

an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.

Culion Ice v. Philippine Motors November 3, 1930 | Street, J.

Quick FactsCranston wanted to have a fuel-efficient boat, so he commissioned Quest to study the structure. Quest suggested that they should install a new carburetor. Upon installation, the carburetor was flooding and the fuel was trickling freely from the carburetor to the floor. Eventually the boat burned and resulted to the total loss of the boat.

HeldWhen a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.

The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.

Personal insightOne is required to be as diligent as any expert. Sir says that as long as you claim to be an expert on something, you will be held liable as an expert. Remember the case of the group of people who said they knew how to clean the poso negro but they were not allowed to do so. To prove the people wrong, they snuck into the poso negro in the middle of the night, but did not survive the fumes inside and eventually died. Obviously, they were not experts, but the Court held that they shall be liable as such if they claim to be.

US v. PinedaJanuary 22, 1918 | Malcolm, J.

Quick FactsSantos had 2 sick horses and went to the pharmacy. Pharmacist Pineda gave him a concoction which turned out to be barium chlorate, a poison, and not potassium chlorate, the medicine prescribed for the horses. As a result of the poisoning, the horses died.


HeldThe standard of care for pharmacists is "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." In other words, the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Mercury Drug v. De LeonOctober 17, 2008 | Reyes, R.T., J.

Quick FactsJudge De Leon, upon noticing that his left eye was reddish and he had difficulty reading, consulted his friend Dr. Milla, who prescribed him some medicine. He went to Mercury Drug to purchase said medicine. Unfortunately, he was given ear drops.

HeldMistake is negligence and care is no defense. Druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.

Cruz v. CANovember 18, 1997 | Francisco, J.

Quick FactsLydia underwent a hysterectomy operation. Finding the clinic to be untidy, Lydia’s daughter suggested that the operation be postponed, but Dr. Cruz refused. During the operation, Dr. Cruz asked the family to buy ampules, and then blood. After a few hours, Lydia ran out of oxygen and went into shock. She died 2 days later.

HeldDr. Cruz did not commit reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The presumption is that she has taken the necessary care as a physician, and without expert testimony contradicting this, she is therefore acquitted.

Standard of care for Physicians

As observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. Expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.

A doctor has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances.

On the necessity of expert testimonyGeneral rule: A doctor takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients.Exception: Contrary expert testimony

Professional Services v. AganaJanuary 31, 2007 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Quick FactsDr. Ampil performed a hysterectomy on Natividad. After the operation, the nurses noted there was a lack in the sponge count. A few months later, Natividad was still suffering excruciating pains. Her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. A few months still, Natividad underwent another surgery to obtain another gauze which was still in her body causing pains.

On negligence of PSI, owner of the hospitalPSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty.

On negligence of Dr. AmpilOnce a physician undertakes the treatment and care of a patient, the law imposes on him certain obligations. In order to escape liability, he must possess that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experience required by his profession. At the same time, he must apply reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application of his knowledge, and exert his best judgment.

Cayao-Lasam v. Sps. RamoleteDecemebr 18, 2008 | Austria-Martinez, J.

Quick Facts


Editha Ramolete was 3 months pregnant when she suffered vaginal bleeding and was rushed to Dr. Cayao-Lasam. The latter performed the “raspa” procedure on her after finding out that the fetus was dead. A few months later, after Editha complained of vomiting and abdominal pains, doctors found out the dead fetus was still there, and she had to undergo a hysterectomy. She has no more chance to bear a child.

HeldThe proximate cause of the injury was Editha’s failure to return for a follow-up check-up, which according to the expert testimony of Dr. Manalo, an OB-Gyne, could’ve seen the misdiagnosis and could’ve prevented further injury to Editha.

Lucas v. TuanoApril 21, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J.

Quick FactsLucas was suffering from redness and swelling in his right eye. Dr. Tuano prescribed him some steroidal eye drops called Maxitrol, the prolonged use of which may cause glaucoma. A few months after using the drug and after constant check-ups with Dr. Tuano, Lucas was diagnosed to have glaucoma.

HeldThe mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result occurs does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care. The result is not determinative of the performance [of the physician] and he is not required to be infallible.

Breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable malpractice. But if no standard is established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon.

Personal insightsThe Court here explains each of the elements of medical negligence, which I have summarized in the notes above. A more encompassing discussion is in the original.


WEEK 4: DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE/BURDEN OF PROOF/ RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Sangco, Vol. I, pp. 10-12

There are several degrees of negligence.

1. Slight negligencefailure to use ordinary care

2. Gross negligencefailure to exercise even that care which would be used by a careless person

3. Willful, wanton and recklessLooks into the actor’s real or supposed state of mind

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

Rule 131 Section 1, Rules of Court

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.

Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority

Article 1735. In all other cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence, as required in Article 1733.

Must-Read Case: Ramos v. CA 321 SCRA 584*Be able to compare this case with Cruz v. CA, regarding the necessity of expert testimony in medical malpractice suits and standard of care to be afforded patients

Amedo v. Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc.May 24, 1954

QUICK FACTS:Plaintiff Elena Amedo’s son was a seaman. Her son died while on board defendant’s vessel, M/S Pilar II, after jumping into the sea to retrieve his 2-peso bill. Amedo sought compensation from defendant for her son’s death. SC ultimately denied her claim, because the Court found that the accident did not “arise out of” his employment. More importantly, her son was found to be notoriously negligent for jumping into the sea, which caused his death.

DOCTRINE:


Pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the employer liable shall be liable to compensate his employee for a personal injury sustained by him from an accident if the accident (1) arises out of the employment (2) happens in the course of employment; and (3) not caused by the notorious negligence of the employee.

Notorious negligencewant of even slight care and diligence; entire want of care, giving rise to the presumption that she is aware of the probable consequences and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others; reckless disregard of the safety of person or property

Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. Workmen’s CompensationJune 30, 1956

QUICK FACTS:Deceased Mamador and his coworkers rode the petitioner corporation’s truck, on their way to work. The truck, while trying to overtake another truck, turned over and hit a coconut tree, killing Mamador and injuring the rest. SC held that the heirs of Mamador are entitled to damages, because “mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily.”

Notorious negligencepursuing a course of conduct which would naturally lead to injuryIlao-Oreta v. RonquilloOctober 11, 2007

QUICK FACTS:Dr. Ilao-Oreta is a gynecologist who was supposed to perform a laparascopy on Eva Ronquillo. She missed her appointment with them because she just came from her honeymoon and claims that she totally forgot to consider the time difference between Hawaii and Manila. She called the spouses Ronquillo right away when she got back and apologized, but the spouses sued her, asking for actual, moral and exemplary damges. SC held that there was only negligence on her part. The spouses were awarded only actual damages.

Gross negligenceimplies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence or the entire absence of care; acting or omitting to act in a situation where there

is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference insofar as other persons may be affected.

Layugan v. IAC November 14, 1988

QUICK FACTS:Pedro Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, because the latter’s driver bumped him, thereby causing his left leg to be amputated. Isidro, in his defense, utilized res ipsa loquitur and argued that it was Layugan who was negligent and he should therefore bear the consequences of his negligence.SC held that Layugan is entitled to actual and moral damges plus attorney’s fees.

DOCTRINE:Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in an absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from a want of care.

COMMENT: In this case res ipsa loquitur was being used as a defense, which is baliktad and makes the case unusual, because the doctrine is supposed to be used for the benefit of the plaintiff.

Ramos v. CA December 29, 1999

QUICK FACTS:Erlinda Ramos, who was supposed to be operated on to remove a stone in her gall bladder, ended up comatose instead. SC, in finding Delos Santos Medical Center, Doctors Orlino Hosaka and Perfecta Gutierrez liable, applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Court, in citing Voss v. Bridwell, said that brain damage is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.

DOCTRINE:


The following are the requisites before res ipsa loquitur may be invoked:1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence.2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants.3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

GENERAL RULE:Expert testimony is necessary in determining whether or not there was medical negligence, but this can be dispensed with when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked and applicable because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence (meaning, kapag masyadong obvious and with the use of common knowledge, you can tell that there was negligence).

NOTES:Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law. It is regarded as a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.

The doctrine is not automatically applicable in medical malpractice cases. It does not apply to suits which involve the merits of a diagnosis or a scientific treatment. It is also not applicable in a case where the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished or achieved.

Finally, the Court ratiocinated that while “res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case, we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.”

Ramos v. CA is an exception to Cruz v. CA (G.R. No. 122445, week 3) because in the former, the Court is not trying to figure out the standard of care required. In Cruz v. CA, expert testimony is required when the standard or degree of care is one that is considered, because in that case, the expert testimony is the only way to establish what

the standard of care should be, vis-à-vis the actual degree of care exercised by the medical practitioner.

Tan v. Jam Transit, Inc.November 25, 2009

QUICK FACTS:Petitioner Luz Tan sued Jam Transit, Inc. for the loss she suffered after the jitney she owns, which contained balut and salted eggs, was bumped by a bus owned by the latter. Tan claims that due to the bus driver’s negligence, she suffered actual damages amounting to 543K. SC applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and awarded Tan temperate damages worth 250K.

DOCTRINE:(Citing Ramos v. CA)The following are the requisites before res ipsa loquitur may be invoked:1. Nature of the accident - the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence.2. Control over instrumentality – if it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant.3. No contributory negligence - the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

Cantre v. GoApril 27, 2007

QUICK FACTS:Spouses Go sued Dr. Cantre due to the wound suffered by Nora in her right arm while she was giving birth, which resulted in an ugly scar. The injury was caused by the droplight in the operating room, which was used to keep Nora and her baby warm when Nora went into hypovolemic shock while giving birth. SC awarded the spouses moral damages, after finding Dr. Cantre negligent.

DOCTRINE: (Also citing Ramos v. CA)The following are the requisites before res ipsa loquitur may be invoked:


1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence (as you don’t normally suffer from arm wounds when giving birth).2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant (within the doctor’s control).3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated (because the patient was unconscious while she was giving birth).

Batiquin v. CAJuly 5, 1996

QUICK FACTS:Petitioner Dr. Batiquin was sued by Mrs. Villegas for damages because she left a piece of rubber inside the latter’s uterus, which resulted to an infection inside the claimant’s abdominal cavity. SC found Dr. Batiquin negligent and granted damages to Mrs. Villegas.

DOCTRINE: (Citing Layugan v. IAC)The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence, is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It can be invoked when and only when direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

Notes:RIL applicable because there was no other means for the rubber to be deposited beside the vagina (pwede pa sana kung ‘inside’ kasi in that case, may ‘means’ aside from surgery).

Professional Services, Inc. v. AganaJanuary 31, 2007

QUICK FACTS:Natividad Agana sued Doctors Ampil and Fuentes, including their employer, PSI, for the injury she suffered due to the pieces of gauze left inside her body after her operation. SC held that only Doctor Ampil and PSI may be held liable because the element of control necessary for res ipsa loquitur to apply is lacking, with regard to Doctor Fuentes’ liability.

RULE:Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. (Note: SC found that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon, i.e. captain of the ship)

Notes:Dr. Fuentes was not even at the hospital so he can’t be held liable; he was not the one in control and under the captain of the ship doctrine, the lead surgeon should be the one liable.

D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CAApril 20, 2001

QUICK FACTS:Petitioner DMCI was sued for damages by the widow of one of its construction workers who fell to his death from the fourteenth floor of the building he was working on. DMCI, as defense, tried to introduce proof that it exercised due care and diligence. SC ruled that DMCI is liable for the death of its worker and ordered DMCI to pay the heirs damages.

RULE:The presumption of negligence arising from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be overcome or rebutted by sufficient evidence. It is NOT for the defendant to prove that it exercised due care to PREVENT the presumption of negligence from arising. Evidence by defendant of due care comes into play only AFTER the circumstances for the doctrine’s application has been established.

College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc.November 22, 2007

QUICK FACTS:Petitioner CAP, who was leasing 2 floors of Belfranlt, was sued for damages by the latter, for causing the fire which destroyed the 3rd floor of the building. CAP argued that the fire was a fortuitous event, for which it cannot be held liable. SC found that the fire was not a


fortuitous event because there were negligent acts committed by CAP. SC awarded temperate damages to Belfranlt.

DOCTRINE:Res ipsa loquitur applies when the following requisites concur:1.) The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent.2.) The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge.3.) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

Tin’s other notes:I’ve noted something here that Prof. Casis said we have to memorize the presumptions. Please memorize the provisions above as the ff. are only summaries:

i. Art. 2184 – disputable presumption of driver’s negligence based on past mishaps i.e., if the driver had been FOUND GUILTY (thus requires conviction) of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations AT LEAST TWICE WITHIN THE NEXT PRECEDING 2 MONTHS this does not apply when the owner is not in the car (in which case, Art.

2180 is applicable), or, if it is a common carrier;ii. Art. 2185 – disputable presumption of driver’s negligence based on current

mishap i.e., if the driver was violating any traffic regulation AT THE TIME OF THE MISHAP (does not require conviction)

iii. Art. 2188 – prima facie presumption of defendant’s negligence if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances Exception: When the possession or use is indispensable in his

occupation or business.iv. Art. 1735 – presumption of fault or negligence of COMMON CARRIERS if the

goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated (LDD) in cases other than those in Art. 1734 Exception: common carrier proves exercise of EXTRAORDINARY

diligence required in Art. 1733


WEEK 5: DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE

Sub-topic: Plaintiff’s Negligence

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

Recommended case: Manila Electric v. Remonquillo

Sub-topic: Contributory Negligence

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.

Relevant note(s): Mere reiteration that contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in the award of damages.

Recommended case(s): Rakes v. Atlantic – I just remember that Prof. Casis bookmarked this case as

“important” – he even asked somebody to draw the scenario on the board (which, unfortunately, I wasn’t able to copy).

Case where there was contributory negligence but the SC did not mitigate the damages awarded – PNR v. Brunty.

Sub-topic: Fortuitous Event

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk… (the exceptions)

… no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (the general rule) (1105a)

Relevant note(s):

Force majeure ≠ Acts of God/fortuitous event General rule: NOT LIABLE. Exception: A1174 (above). Is a tire blow-out a fortuitous event? IT DEPENDS. Case law is actually inconsistent,

but the trend is to say that it often occurs with human intervention (e.g., overspeeding).

Recommended case: Juntilla v. Fontanar

Sub-topic: Volenti non fit injuria(Sangco, pp. 81-84)This maxim applies to non-contractual relations, PROVIDED:

1. Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the damage;2. He understood and appreciated the risk from danger;3. He voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.

Recommended case: Exception to the rule - Ilocos Norte v. CA

Sub-topic: PrescriptionAccording to Art. 1146, an action based on a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. // Prescriptive period commences from the day the quasi-delict is committed. Case: Kramer v. CA.

Sub-topic: Plaintiff’s negligence is proximate cause

Manila Electric Co. (MEC) vs. Remoquillo (guardian of Magno’s minor heirs)


May 18, 1956

Quick Facts: Magno was electrocuted to death when he was repairing the “media agua” (shed roof or alulod) just below the window of the 3rd storey of a house. The lower end of the galvanized iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated wire of the MEC. The SC exonerated MEC, ruling that the proximate cause of Magno’s death was his reckless or negligent act in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. To hold MEC liable, its supposed negligence in failing to properly insulate the wire (although, it was an unrefuted claim of MEC that it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire) should have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident.

Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: “A prior & remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause

did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if between such prior/remote cause and the injury, there intervened a distinct, successive, unrelated & efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion…if an independent negligent act/defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act/condition is the proximate cause.”

Manila Electric can be held liable if it placed the wires in a “public place where persons come to stroll, etc.” (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric). The “media agua” can hardly be considered a public place.

Casis’ insight(s):SC: “Perhaps he was a tinsmith…and had training & experience for the job…he could not have been a stranger to electric wires & the danger….”Casis: There was nothing in the evidence that proved him to be really a tinsmith. The Court merely assumed that Magno was an expert.

Bernardo vs. LegaspiDecember 23, 1914

Quick Facts: Bernardo and Legaspi sued each other (one is a complaint, the other a cross-complaint) for the recovery of damages sustained by their respective automobiles which figured into a collision. The SC affirmed the lower court’s (CFI) ruling that both of them were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering damages.

Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to the

principal occurrence (i.e., accident), as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover.

Such is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can recover.

Casis’ insight(s): There can only be one proximate cause in one accident, i.e., the negligent act that

caused the accident. However, this case mentions “concurrent causes”—thus, there may be two (2)

proximate causes. Do you automatically apply the rule when both are negligent? What if both negligences were only contributory?

My insubstantial comment: This case is really short (1/2 bond paper); you might as well read the original if you

think the above version is over-summarized.

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (supra)October 14, 1918

Quick Facts: Jose Cangco stepped on a sack of watermelons piled on the dimly platform as was alighting from the slowly moving train. He fell violently on the platform, rolled and drawn under the moving car, which caused him to lose his right arm. Manila Railroad contended that Cangco was negligent in alighting from the train before it had come to a complete stop. The SC held otherwise, and held that Manila Railroad was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains. Cangco had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear.Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:


The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care.

This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.

Citing Picart vs. Smith: the test is: Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff, at the time he alighted from the train, which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train, under the conditions then existing, was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.

In this case, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that Cangco was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving.

However, the place was dark or dimly lighted which is also a proof of failure upon Manila Railroad in the performance of its duty to afford its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains.

PLDT vs. CA and Spouses Esteban September 29, 1989

Quick Facts: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open (uncovered) trench, which was an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Both spouses sustained injuries, and the jeep’s windshield was shattered. The SC held that based on the evidence on record (showing unexplained abrupt swerving of and failure to take the jeep into a halt due to fast speed), the lack of diligence (or negligence) of Antonio Esteban was the proximate cause of the accident (not only contributory), hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT. Furthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident; he had the knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations, being a resident of the area.

Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

Casis note(s): If no warning signs: PLDT would still not be liable because:

(1) of spouses’ knowledge of the excavation (their regular route) omission of warning signs is not the proximate cause of the accident

Sub-topic: Contributory negligence of plaintiff

NPC vs. Heirs of CasionanNovember 27, 2008

Quick Facts: Noble Casionan, 19 y.o. and a pocket miner in Benguet, was electrocuted to death when the tip of the 14-ft.-long bamboo pole he was carrying (for his pocket mining) touched one of the sagging and dangling high-tension electrical transmission lines installed by NPC. The SC found no contributory negligence on the part of Noble because the trail where he was electrocuted was (1) regularly used by the community even before the transmission lines were installed, and (2) the only viable way from where he came from to where he was going; hence he should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. That the pocket miners were unlicensed and prohibited by DENR were not justifications for NPC to leave their transmission lines dangling, posing great threat to passers-by who were exposed to the danger of electrocution, especially after previous requests for them to institute safety measures to protect the former.


Contributory negligence:

is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.


Act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the former’s injury.

Underlying precept: a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence.

Effect: reduction of the award for damages

Casis’ insight(s):

The case provided a “dangerous” definition because it equated contributory negligence as a proximate cause by saying “concurrent with the defendant’s negligence”. Perhaps the SC just didn’t want to mitigate the damages awarded.

Genobiagon v. CAOctober 12, 1989

Quick Facts: Gregorio Genobiagon was driving a rig (a large two-part truck) which bumped an 81-y.o. lady who died thereafter. He was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. In his petition for review, he alleged that the reckless negligence of the victim while she was crossing the street was the proximate cause of the accident. The SC affirmed his conviction, saying that the alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.


Defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases (applies only in civil cases).

My irrelevant/insubstantial insight(s): Charge should be “reckless imprudence resulting to homicide” ‘di ba?

This case is also very short; if you want to be more bibo, you may opt to read the case in the original. (Pampagising lang)

M. H. Rakes vs. The AtlanticJanuary 23, 1907

Quick Facts: Rakes was at work transporting iron rails which slid off when the track sagged and caught his leg, which was later on amputated. Atlantic alleged “carelessness” on Rakes part because (1) he continued his work despite having noticed the depression in the track, and (2) he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car despite a general prohibition. The SC held that (1) Rakes’ lack of caution in continuing his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail wasn’t so gross as to constitute negligence. Besides, he’d been on the job for less than 2 days thus he could not have perceived the displacement; (2) his disobedience in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, but not as its primary cause. His act did not contribute to the principal occurrence (accident) but only to his own injury, therefore, he may recover damages less the amount fairly attributable to his negligence.


Negligence contributing to the accident vs. contributing to the injury“Where [plaintiff] contributes to the principal occurrence [i.e., accident], as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.”

P’s Negligence contributed to: accident his own injury

Cause: “event” acts of plaintiff

May recover damages? NO YES, but w/ reduction

Doctrine of Comparative Negligence – plaintiff may recover even if his own act contributed to his injury, PROVIDED, his negligence was slight compared to that of the defendant.

In American jurisprudence: Contributory Negligence, however slight, is an absolute bar to recovery.


Theory of Proportional Damages – reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his responsibility for the accident.

PNR vs. Brunty (supra) November 2, 2006

Quick Facts: The car being driven by Mercelita, with passengers Brunty and Garcia, smashed into a PNR train. PNR was found negligent for failing on its legal duty to provide the necessary and adequate safety devices and equipment within the intersection. PNR insisting on Mercelita’s contributory negligence, that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident and he disregarded the warning signs, whistle blasts & flashlight signals to stop. The SC held that Mercelita was indeed guilty of contributory negligence, but did not mitigate liability.


Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured part, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.

To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.

To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury, and not imply a condition for its occurrence.

In this case, while Mercelita’s acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate PNR’s liability. The only effect, pursuant to A2179, is to mitigate liability which, however, is not applicable in this case because the damages were awarded to Brunty and not to Mercelita. The record is bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and Brunty. Hence, the effect of mitigation of liability due to Mercelita’s contributory negligence, does not apply.

Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray CastillonFebruary 23, 2005

Quick Facts: Castillon, who was driving a motorcycle at a high speed, without a helmet, and after having imbibed one or two bottles of beer, instantaneously died in a collision when the motorcycle he was driving sliced into the side of the jeepney which abruptly and sharply made a left turn. The SC held that the proximate cause of the mishap was the abrupt and sudden left turn by the jeepney driver, because if not for that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap would not have happened. The SC agreed that Castillon was likewise guilty of contributory negligence, thus it equitably increased the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of his negligence (50% as sustained by the SC in previous cases).


The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.

The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The SC has sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes vs. Atlantic, etc.

Casis’ insight(s):Why 50%?

- Implies equal negligence- Very arbitrary; same thing with the determination of damages

Problem: succeeding cases will be decided by reducing damages by 50% (as pegged by the SC to the reduction of damages in previous cases) unless the SC can justify another proportion.

Sub-topic: Fortuitous Events

Juntilla vs. Fontanar (franchisee) – “Omega watch” case May 31, 1985

Quick Facts: Juntilla was a front-seat passenger of a public utitlity jeepney which turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. He sustained injuries and lost his Omega watch. The SC held that Fontanar, et.al. are liable because the


cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will, thus not a “fortuitous event" under Art. 1174. Evidence showed that the jeepney was overloaded and was running at a very fast speed. On the other hand, no evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions, or that precautions were taken by the driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents.


Essential Characteristics of caso fortuito (fortuitous event), citing Lasam vs. Smith (MEMORIZE!):1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the

debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or

if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his

obligation in a normal manner.4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the

injury resulting to the creditor.

Casis’ insight(s): If the tire blow-out was due to factory defect & no negligence on common carrier’s part, the latter would still be liable. Manufacturer is deemed as the agent or servant of the carrier; moreover, the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of its equipment or appliances

Southeastern College vs. CA ( and the Dimaanos) July 10, 1998

Quick Facts: The roof of the U-shaped building of the Southeastern College was partly ripped off and blown away during the Typhoon “Saling”. It landed on and destroyed portions of Dimaano’s house. The SC held that the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Dimaanos was the typhoon which is a fortuitous event—a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. Southeastern has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building.


Fortuitous event (FE) is defined in this case as (MEMORIZE!):1. An event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen2. An unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted3. May be produced by 2 General Causes:

a. By nature – earthquake, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc.b. By the act of man – armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental

prohibitions, robbery (note:robbery is not FE per se in Sicam v. Jorge), etc. Negligence is defined as a conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or

harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.

In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.

An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.

Casis’ insight(s): Could they have used res ipsa loquitur?

Sicam vs. Jorge (supra) August 8, 2007

Quick Facts: Jorge’s jewelries got lost in a robbery of a pawnshop owned by Sicam. Sicam contended that he is not liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all. The SC held Sicam liable because (1) robbery per se, is not a fortuitous event, and (2) they were guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence for failing to exercising the reasonable care that an ordinarily prudent person would have used (i.e., providing security measures) in the pawnshop.


To constitute a fortuitous event, the ff. elements must concur:(a) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the

debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will;(b) It must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fotuito or, if it

can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;


(c) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and,

(d) The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

In order to a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.

An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss.

When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s participation—whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

Sub-topic: Plaintiff’s assumption of risk / volenti non fit injuria

Afialda vs. HisoleNovember 29, 1949

Quick Facts: Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of the Hisoles. While Afialda was tending the animals one day, he was gored by one of the carabaos and later died as a consequence of his injuries. The SC held that the Hisoles are not liable as owners of the animal for it was in the custody and under the control of Afialda, who was paid for his work as caretaker thereof. It was obviously his business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.


Art. 1905 (now Art. 2183, NCC), reads as follows:The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any

damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.

Under this provision, the owner of an animal is not liable for the injury caused by it to its caretaker. “Possessor” or “user” is the one who has the custody and control of the animal, and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.

Casis’ insight(s): He included assumption of risk under this discussion because it is an exception to the

defense of fortuitous event. It is a defense to be raised by the defendant. You cannot sue someone for the injury you sustained if you assumed the risk thereof.The concept of assumption of risk is still vague/not very clear.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INELCO) vs. CA (and the heirs of Isabel Juan) November 6, 1989

Quick Facts: Isabel Juan (a.k.a. “Nana Belen”) waded in waist-deep flood brought about the typhoon “Gening” in order to look after and check her merchandise that might have been damaged. She got electrocuted and died instantaneously due to the electric wire of INELCO dangling from a post which grounded the water. INELCO contended that the deceased’s heirs may not collect damages because of the legal principle of “assumption of risk”. The SC held INELCO liable because Nana Belen was excused from the force of the rule because an emergency was at hand as her property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Moreover, even though typhoons and floods are considered acts of God, it was through the intervention of INELCO’s negligence that Nana Belen died, when INELCO failed to see to it that no harm is done by the grounded wires to the general public.


The maxim volenti non fit injuria does not apply in this case. Emergency Rule: a person is excused from the force of the rule (i.e., assumption of

risk), that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if (1) an emergency is found to exist or (2) if the life or property of another is in peril, or (3) when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.

Calalas vs. CA (supra) May 31, 2000


Quick Facts: Sunga was seated on an extension seat in the jeepney of Calalas, which was already overloaded. She was injured when a truck bumped the jeepney after letting another passenger off. Calalas was contending that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. The SC held that such was the result of his negligence in transporting his passengers. The accident was likewise not a caso fortuito as contended by Calalas. He should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. The SC held him liable for failing to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from breach of the contract of carriage.


Where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.

Nikko Hotel vs. Roberto Reyes (a.k.a. “Amay Bisaya”) February 28, 2005

Quick Facts: Reyes gate-crashed into the birthday party of Nikko Hotel Manila’s hotel manager. Ruby Lim, the hotel’s executive secretary, told him to leave the party. Hotel Nikko and Lim contended that under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave as he was a “gate-crasher”. Reyes contends that it does not apply in this case because even if he assumed such risk, Lim, under Articles 19 and 21, NCC, was still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. The SC held that a person who did not abuse her right in asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be made to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21, NCC; and that any damage which Reyes might have suffered through Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.


The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury, which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.

Assumption of risk = precludes recovery for damages Art. 19, NCC: principle of Abuse of Rights – not a panacea for all human hurts & social

grievances. The provisions objective is to set the following standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties: (1) Act with justice,

(2) Give everyone his due, and

(3) Observe honesty & good faith.

Sub-topic: Prescription

Kramer vs. CAOctober 13, 1989


Quick Facts: A fishing boat owned by Kramer and a vessel owned by Trans-Asia collided at sea on April 8, 1976. The fishing boat sank, taking with it its fish catch. On May 30, 1985, Kramer filed a complaint for damages against Trans-Asia. The SC dismissed the petition and held that the action has already prescribed. The four-year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body (i.e., Board of Marine Inquiry in this case) that the collision was caused by the fault/negligence of the other party; therefore, he can file an action for damages.


Under Art. 1146, NCC: an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed (i.e., the day of collision in this case).

The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, i.e., the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff.

Immediately after the collision, the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.

Casis’ insight(s):

They waited allegedly because the investigation involved technical matter in maritime law.

Perhaps the reason why they waited for the BMI report is because it would have been easier for them to sue using the said report in filing the case.

However, the SC said you don’t need this to file a case. The cause of action arose upon the happening of the collision (1976).


WEEK 6: PROXIMATE CAUSE / BUT FOR SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.(Vda de Bataclan vs. Medina)

Proximate legal cause is “that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”(Vda de Bataclan vs. Medina)

Remote cause:A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. (Manila Electric vs. Remoquillo)

Concurrent cause: Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a 3rd person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either of them is responsible for the whole injury. (Please READ the relevant portion of Far Eastern Shipping vs. CA for explanations)

Formula: There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. (Dy Teban vs. Jose Ching) It is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.(Mercury Drug vs. Baking)

Foreseeable intervening cause:If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent

only for that reason. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence.(Phoenix Construction vs. IAC)

But for test: Simply stated, defendant’s conduct is the cause of the injury which would not have been sustained if the defendant had not been negligent. Conversely, the defendant’s conduct cannot be said to be the proximate cause of the accident unless the accident could have been avoided without such negligent act. De Leon:But for the defendant’s culpable conduct or activity, the plaintiff would not have been injured.

Substantial factor test:If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.De Leon: This test is a supplement to “but for test” when redundant multiple causes would preclude liability under “but for” analysis.

Cause v. Condition: So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.(Please READ the CAUSE AND CONDITION and Art. 2179 portions of Phoenix Construction vs. IAC)

Recovery: When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.(Art. 2179, NCC)

VDA DE BATACLAN v. MEDINA (1957)

Quick Facts: The bus operated (owned) by Medina turned turtle and 4 passengers, one was husband of Bataclan, were trapped. Ten people carrying lighted torches made of bamboo and fuelled by petroleum, came and approached the bus and almost immediately a fierce fire started and consumed the bus including the 4 people trapped.


Held: The proximate cause of the death of the 4 people was the overturning of the bus, which was the result of the negligence of the driver and Medina.

Proximate cause was defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” (THE ONE AND ONLY STANDARD DEFINITION)

Proximate legal cause is “that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”

The necessary link between the act or omission and the damage or injury must be established.

Note:The basis of Medina’s liability was the contract of common carrier where, according to Prof. Casis, proximate cause is not applicable.

GABETO v. ARANETA (1921)

Quick Facts: Araneta stopped a carromata (carriage), by holding the reins connected to the bridle inside the mouth of the horse; the driver pulled the reins to free the horse but the bridle came out from the mouth so he alighted to fix it. The horse became disturbed, pushed the driver, moved forward, struck a telephone box which came down with a crash, was frightened, and went to full speed. The man inside the carriage, Gayetano (husband of Gabeto) jumped out and died of injuries afterwards.

Held: The mere fact that Araneta interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Gayetano.

The evidence is convincing to the effect that, after the driver alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed before the horse started on his career up the street.

The stopping of the rig by Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING v. CA (1998)

Quick Facts: M/V Pavlodar, owned by Far Eastern, was docking with Kavankov as shipmaster, Gavino of Manila Pilot’s Assoc. (MPA) as pilot. Gavino ordered the engine stopped and the left anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. However, matters did not happen as expected and the the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the.

Held: The proximate cause was the concurrent negligence of Gavino (for acting belatedly) and Kavankov (for his unconcerned lethargy / concurring to Gavino’s commands).

Negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.

Whereseveral causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them,it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a


single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC (1987)

Quick Facts:Coming from a cocktails meeting, Dionisio was driving when his light suddenly failed. When he switched it on, he saw a dumptruck that was parked askew on the right side of the road, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices and it was too late to avoid it.

Held: The proximate cause was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked by Phoenix’s driver. Dinisio’s negligence was not an efficient intervening cause but a foreseeable consequence of the proximate cause.

Cause and condition:So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.

Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; except when some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Foreseeable

intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence.

Note: Dionisio was ‘contributory negligent’ here so the Court mitigated the liability of Phoenix to 80% only based on Art. 2179, NCC.

DYTEBAN v. JOSE CHING (2008)

Quick Facts:A prime mover, carrying a bulldozer, was parked on one side of the road but the tires on the left occupy a portion of the road. A bus was approaching from the rear, it tried to avoid the mover so it went to the left; however, a van was also approaching from the front. Both collided with the mover. There were no early warning devices at both ends.

Held:The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the collision.

There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission.

The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as authority for the proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the act or omission.

The Court did not rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of the passenger bus, if any, because it was not a party to the case. Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from the collision.

Note: Unlike in Vdade Bataclan, the liability of the operator of the prime mover was based on quasi-delict.


MERCURY DRUG v. BAKING (2007)

Quick Facts:Doctor found out that Baking’s triglyceride and blood sugar were above normal levels so he was prescribed with Diamicron. However, the pharmacist gave him Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, which he took in for 3 days. On the third day he met a vehicular incident.

Held:The proximate cause was Mercury Drug’s employee’sgross negligence in selling to Baking Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.

Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.

The vehicular accident could not have occurred had Mercury Drug’s employee been careful in reading the Doctor’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that Baking would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.

PILIPINAS BANK v. CA (1994)

Quick Facts:Santos, in depositing the face value of 2 checks, inquired the account number that corresponds with the name FLORENCIO REYES. The bank’s bookkeeper gave the account number that corresponds with the name FLORENCIO AMADOR thus the amount was deposited in Amador’s account.

Held:The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of bank's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of Reyes in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name.

The bank employee isdeemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of

the person notable of which is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen.

URBANO v. IAC (1988)

Quick Facts: Because of an irrigation dispute, Urbano hacked Javier on the right palm of his hand. The 2 later entered into an amicable settlement. But 22 days later, Javier was rushed to the hospital where he died a day later. Urbano was convicted.

Held:There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which Urbano had nothing to do.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.

If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

Note: The Court also said that Urbano may still be civilly liable because the discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of the case.


MCKEE v. IAC (1992)

Quick Facts:Two boys darted across the lane of the car that McKee’s family was riding. To avoid hitting the boys, the driver blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.

Held: Car driver was not negligent. Even assuming arguendo that the driver is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

Applying the doctrine of proximate cause, although it may be said that the act of the driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.

The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.

MANILA ELECTRIC v. REMOQUILLO (1956)

Quick Facts:Standing on “media agua”, Magno turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.

Held:The principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury

was made possible, if there intervenedbetween such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.

If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

Remoquillo cannot recover damages for the death of Magno since Magno’s negligence was the proximate cause of his injury.

Note: The doctrine of remote cause in this case was affirmed by Urbano v. IAC above.

TEAGUE v. FERNANDEZ (1973)

Quick Facts:Because a fire broke out on the other side of the street, students of Teague’s institute numbering to 180 panicked. Despite the efforts of the instructors to calm them down, a stampede ensued, which left 4 people dead, including Fernandez’s sister.

Held:The proximate cause was the failure of Teague to comply with a city ordinance which requires a number and the measure of stairways in public buildings. Teague’s building has only one stairway with the wrong measurement.

The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. (American jurisprudence)

To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. The principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.


Note: Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence and is presumed to be the proximate cause of harm if what it was intended to prevent has happened. (Sangco)

PHILIPPINE RABBIT v. CA (1990)

Quick Facts: The jeepney where Pascua et al were riding as passengers was running when its right rear wheel was detached. The jeepney driver applied the brakes after which the jeepney made a U-turn in such a manner that it inverted its direction.The jeepney stopped on the western lane of the road on the right of way of the oncoming Philippine Rabbit Bus where it was bumped by the latter.

Held:The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the jeepney driver and owner.

Substantial factor test :If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.

CA ruled that the bus driver's conduct of driving the bus so fast and of not making the slightest effort to avoid the accident was a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. SC, however, ruled that the speed of the bus was within the speed limit and that the bus driver has little time to react to the situation.

RODRIGUEZA v. MANILA RAILROAD (1921)

Quick Facts:As one of Manila Railroad’s trains passed over Daraga, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to the houses nearby belonging to Rodrigueza et al, and the same were entirely consumed.

Held:The proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of Manila Railroad in causing this fire.

Assumption of risk:A person cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary prudent man.

The circumstance that Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.


WEEK 7 – LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)

AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR.STREET, J. | G.R. No. L-12219 | March 15, 1918

Quick Facts:

This is the case of an automobile (driven by Smith) “hit” and fatally injured the horse of Picart.

Doctrines:

As [Smith] started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as [Smith] moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and [Smith] must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.

In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not (sic) longer within the power of [Picart] to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the [Smith]; and it was his duty either to bring his

car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.x x xIt goes without saying that the Picart himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of Picart by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.x x x

Malcolm, concurring

The doctrine of “last clear chance” cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. If a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. When a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL v. IAC and LEONARDO DIONISIOG.R. No. L-65295 | March 10, 1987 | FELICIANO, J

Quick facts:

This is the case involving an automobile collision in Bangkal, Makati.


Dionisio had a “drink or two” that night. He was driving his Volkswagen along Bangkal, Makati when his headlights failed. Upon turning it on, he suddenly saw a dump truck owned by Phoenix parked askew. He hit the dump truck.

Phoenix was invoking the doctrine of “last clear chance” in saying that they shouldn’t be liable for Dionisio’s injuries.

Doctrines:

I. Historical background of the doctrine

The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.

Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

II. Application of the doctrine

There is no general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours. Under Article 2179, the task of a court is to determine whose negligence was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance [is] the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and

gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.

Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA PASCUAL v. CA, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO LIPANA, its President & General ManagerG.R. No. 97626 | March 14, 1997 | HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

QUICK FACTS:

This is the story of the RMC’s secretary, Irene Yabut, depositing RMC’s supposed deposit to her husband’s account, also in PBCOM. She was able to do this by leaving blank the second deposit slip she gives the bank and after validation, writes RMC’s account no. The one validated by the bank goes to her husband’s account.

DOCTRINES:

Under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), PBCOM was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.

Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a


defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

Assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the PBCOM, yet it cannot be denied that PBCOM, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO S. AGAD, FELIX LIM and PAUL ZACARIAS y INFANTE v.IAC, CECILIA ALFEREZ VDA. DE CALIBO, Minors ROYCE STEPHEN, JOYCE JOAN, JANISE MARIE, JACQUELINE BRIGITTE JOCELINE CORAZON, JULIET GERALDINE, JENNIFER JILL, all surnamed CALIBO, represented by their mother, CECILIA A. VDA. DE CALIBOG.R. No. 70493 | May 18, 1989 | NARVASA, J.:

QUICK FACTS:

Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, going to Davao City. A cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, were coming from the opposite direction of Davao City. At about 59 yards after crossing a bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided.

DOCTRINE:

Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters and were at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they also admitted that the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away.

From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked. (Picart v. Smith was revisited)

Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latter's additional defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which has not been controverted.

OSMUNDO S. CANLAS and ANGELINA CANLAS v. CA , ASIAN SAVINGS BANK, MAXIMO C. CONTRARES and VICENTE MAÑOSCAG.R. No. 112160 | February 28, 2000 | PURISIMA, J.

QUICK FACTS:

This is the case in which spouses Canlas made a SPA authorizing Manosca to mortgage their property, which was later sold by the spouses to the latter. Manosca was also to mortgage the property to ASB through impostors. Later on, while the spouses were still the owners, ASB foreclosed on the property.

DOCTRINE:

Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applicable here, ASB must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

Assuming that Canlas was negligent in giving Mañosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land, it cannot be denied that ASB had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them. For not observing the degree


of diligence required of banking institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest, ASB has to bear the loss sued upon.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION v. CA and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPA’s, respondents.G.R. No. 138569 | September 11, 2003 | CARPIO, J.

QUICK FACTS:

This is the case about the teller who erroneously gave the passbook of a company to another person, not to the company’s representative who deposited the funds.

DOCTRINE:

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.[

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. The bank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.

ROGELIO ENGADA v. CA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 140698 | June 20, 2003 | QUISUMBING, J.

QUICK FACTS:

A man was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly

saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center of the road.

Engada was invoking the doctrine to exonerate himself from liability.

DOCTRINE:

The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by Engada to support his invocation of the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Engada’s act of swerving to the Tamaraw’s lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v. ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIAG.R. No. 169891 | November 2, 2006 | CALLEJO, SR., J.:

QUICK FACTS:

This is the case of PNR hitting a Mercedes Benz in Tarlac. The car drove past a vehicle at 70 km/hr. unaware of the railroad track up.PNR was invoking the doctrine to exonerate itself.

DOCTRINE:As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the

negative. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the


last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of PNR, we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case.

LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LADECO), HENRY BERENGUEL, and APOLONIO R. DEOCAMPO, v. MICHAEL RAYMOND ANGALAG.R. No. 153076 | June 21, 2007 | CARPIO, J.

QUICK FACTS:

On 4 May 1993, a vehicle driven by Deocampo bumped into a vehicle owned by Angala and driven by Borres. LADECO owned the vehicle driven by Deocampo which was assigned to its manager Mendez. Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.

DOCTRINE:Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance

applies.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.

In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.


WEEK 8: THE TORTFEASOR/ VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS, GUARDIANS & TEACHERS

Note: Article 1904 being referred to in the old cases is now Article 2180 in the NCC

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

Worcester v Ocampo

Facts:

"Birds of Prey"

Worcester filed an action against owners, directors, writers, editors, administrators of newspaper for a libelous article. The lower court sentenced them joint and severally (solidarily) to pay Worcester. The court found that a preponderance of evidence shows that the defendants were the co-owners of the newspaper.

Held:

Since the basis of the action is tort and by virtue of the universal doctrine that joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit, the person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all.

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They can not insist upon an apportionment, for the

purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.

It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.

Chapman v Underwood28 March 1914

Facts:

Chapman in his automobile driven by his driver entered Calle Herran. The car in front of him went off the main line, which he did not follow. The car which Underwood intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the Chapman's vehicle was going. When the front of the car, the one the Underwood attempted to board, was almost in front of the Chapman's automobile, Chapman's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the Underwood. Court found driver guilty of negligence.

WON owner of the car who has in the vehicle at the time of the accident is liable.

Held:

The driver does not fall within the list of persons in A1903 (now A 2180, NCC) for whose acts employer Chapman would be responsible unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct driver to desist. In a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.

On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.

Court found with fair clearness that the interval between turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.


Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai18 December 1968

Facts: Vehicular Accident.

Marcial was driving Mercury car with family. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai with driver Bernardo at the wheel. Ahead of the Cadillac going in the same direction was a caratella owned by Bautista.

Bernardo instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carratela until lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rigs left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded to the other lane where it collided with the Mercury. Court found driver Bernardo liable due to his negligence.

WON employer who was also in the car solidarily liable with driver.

Yes. Applicable law is ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code (Chapman v Underwood) The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the employer, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.

Court found that there was no reasonable opportunity for employer to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly because he was only made aware of the carratela when they were 12meters away, road wide open, no traffic. He had no reason to rely on the skill and experience of driver.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

FAMILY CODE

Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the


unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.chan robles virtual law library

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

RA 9344 – JUVENILA JUSTICE SYSTE ACT OF 2006

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.

http://www.chanrobles.com/civilcodeofthephilippines.htm


However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

NEW CIVIL CODE

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

Subtopic: Parents

Exconde v Capuno29 June 1957

Facts: Dante Capuno, on the way to a parade upon instruction of city school supervisor, boarded a jeep, took hold of the wheel, drove while the driver sat on his side. Jeep turned turtle and two of the passengers died. Dante was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence.

Parents of the deceased filed a suit against the father of Dante, Delfin asking for damages.

WON father Delfin may be held solidarily liable for the death caused by the negligent act of his son given that at the time of the accident he was not under the control and supervision and custody of his son.

Held: Yes. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code).

Defense available to parents: Prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which in this case the father failed to prove.

Why the school is not liable.(Casis discussed this in relation to next topic, v.liability of schools)


"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Balintawak Elementary school is not a student of institution of arts and trades but an academic educ. institution. Hence, head of the school nor city school supervisor is not liable.

Dissenting opinion of JBL Reyes (with regard liability of school):

There is no reason to limit application to teachers of arts and trades and not academic institutions as there is no substantial difference between them.

The father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he trusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable.

Salen v Balce27 April 1960

Facts: Balce was convicted of homicide. Payment of indemnity was unsatisfied due to his insolvency. Father of deceased demanded payment from the father of Balce.

WON father is subsidiarily liable to pay indemnity which the son was sentenced to pay in criminal case.

Held: Yes. Under Article 101, RPC father may be civilly liable only if the child acted without discernment. RPC is silent as to liability if the child acted with discernment.

Court said that it would be absurd to hold that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Hence, resort must be made to the Civil Code.

Citing Exconde v. Capuno, Court held that the civil liability imposed upon parents is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,

educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieved themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code.) This defendants failed to prove.

Elcano v. Hill26 May 1977Facts:Reginald HIll was acquitted in killing Agapito Elcano for lack of intent to kill coupled with mistake. Reginald HIll was a minor and married at the time of occurrence and getting subsistence from the father. Complaint was filed against the parents of Reginald HIll for recovery of damages.

WON parents may be held liable.

Held: Yes. Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."

The reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with the offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (Manresa)

The marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.

In this case, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Hence, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.


Libi v IAC18 September 1992

Facts. Tragic love story of Julie Ann and Wendell. Sweethearts died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed in the name of the father of Wendell, Cresencio Libi.Parents of Julie Ann field a case against parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from their vicarious liability under A2180.

WON parents may be held liable for damages.

Held: YES. Courts found that Wendell could not have gotten hold of they keys of the safebox unless is was negligently left lying around or had free access to his mother's bag where it was kept. Parents failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris families to prevent the damages. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.

The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children and as contemplated in A2180 is primary and not subsidiary. If A2194 which provides for soldiery liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence, the last paragraph of A2180 provides that the responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Liability of parents in felonies committed by children is likewise primary and not subsidiary and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

Tamargo v CA03 June 1992

Facts:

October 20 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, 10y.o., shot Jennifer Tamargo which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was filed by Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living.

In the Criminal case against Adelberto, he was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.

10 December 1981, the spouse Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto which was granted in 18 November 1982, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Adelberto's natural parents claimed that not hey but adopting parents Sps Rapisura were the indispensable parties since parental authority shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition was filed.

Held. This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

In this case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

Retroactive affect may be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. However, parental authority may not be retroactively lodged in the adopting parents so as


to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented.

Subtopic: Teachers

Mercado v CA30 May 1960Facts: Kids quarreling over a pitogo. Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing quarreled over a pitogo, Augusto, who started the aggression, gave successive blows and wounded cheek of Manuel with a razor. Complaint was filed against parents of Mercado by parents of Quisumbing. Mercados arguing that since the incident occurred in the school, no fault to be imputed against the parents as the teacher or head of schooled was then responsible.

Held.

Citing Exconde v Capuno, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution

In 2180, "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody…" contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. the responsibility does not pass to the school.

Palisoc v Brillantes04 October 1971

Facts:

Palisoc and Daffon fought. Started with a remark by Daffon which was followed by exchange of blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. he died.

Parents of Palisoc, 16years old and student in automotive mechanics at Mla Techinal Institute, filed a case for damages against owner and President of the school.

WON school officials and teacher-in-charge are liable.

YEs.

Dictum in earlier cases, Mercado and Exconde. "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado"

Manila Technical Institute is a technical vocational and industrial school.

The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.

In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

"where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the


child is under instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.

President and teacher in charge are jointly and severally liable for the quasi delict of Daffon. The death could have been avoided had they provided adequate supervision over the activities of the students. Their liability could have been avoided of they observed the diligence of a good father of a family.

*Owner not liable because MTI a corporation, not owned by a single person.

Amadora v CA15 April 1988

Facts: Daffon fired a gun in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose which killed Alfredo. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Alfredo's parents field a civil action for damages against Colegio, rector, principal, dean of boys, physics teacher. Colegio is an academic school. School contends that student came to school only to submit report, semester has already ended, hence he was no longer under their custody.

WON A2180 covers even establishment which are not technically not schools of arts and trades and if offending student is supposed to be in its custody.

Held. NO. The Court believes that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic as there is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. HOWEVER, 2180 remains unchanged. Provision must be interpreted according to its clear mandate until the law is amended.

WON responsibility of the teacher/head of scholl of arts and trades is co-extensive with the period when student is actually undergoing studies during school term.

Held. NO. the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.

The liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.

Defense: show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury

The teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age, unlike the parents.

In this case, Court found that the teacher was not negligent in disciplining Daffon or that he had waived observance of school rules.

Salvosa v IAC05 October 1988 Facts: BCF is an academic institution and one of arts and trades. Within its premises is an ROTC unit under the control of AFP. Abon, AFP-appointed and employed armorer and a commerce student of the BCF. In the pasking space of BCF, Abon shot Castro, a student of UB with an unlicensed firearm from the armory. Heirs of Castro sued Abon, BCF officials, and BCF.WON BCF officials may be held solidarily with Abon for damages under A2180.

Held: NO. Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time."

A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without


more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. (Palisoc v Brillantes)

In this case, Court found that Abon was not at attendance in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Castro. Hence the officials cannot be held liable under 2180.

St. Mary's v Carpitanos06 February 2002Facts: St. Mary's enrollment campaign involving visitation of schools of prospective enrollees. One of the students drove wrecklessly resulting in the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.WON St. Mary's may be held liable for the death.

NO.

Special parental authority and responsibility under A218, Family Code, applies to all authorized activity, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity, or institution. Under A219, if the perosn under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages.

For the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of th injury because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.

IN this case, there is no proof that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause. Court found that the cause was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, an event which the school had no control over.


WEEK 9: VICARIOUS LIABILITY – OWNERS/MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYERS, STATE

Art 2180

The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx

[4] The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

[5] Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry

[6] The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

5 Cases:

Castilex v. Vasquez, for:

1. Discussion on applicability of par. 5 and 6 of 2180 CC2. American Jurisprudence principles on employer’s liability (discussed in class)

when injuries happen to 3rd persons when employee is using company car.

Subtopic: Owners, Managers, Employers

Cangco v. Manila Railroad, supra

Quick Facts: Employee of Manila Railroad Co road the train towards home then stepped off the train while it is still moving not realizing the sacks of watermelons on the platform. He fell off the train and was injured resulting to the amputation of his arm. He instituted

an action for damages against Mla Railroad Co. CFI held that the Co not liable since the Cangco was negligent in alighting the train.


Liability imposed upon employers with respect to damages caused by his employees is not based on respondeat superior but on Art 2176 (QD) and Art 2180.o Liability of the employer was based on culpa contractual (contract of

carriage) and not QDo Liability is direct not arising from the negligence of its servants

Proof of diligence in selection and supervision of servant does not relieve the master from liability – it shows that the responsibility does not exist.

Liability under Art 1903 is only applicable in culpa aquiliana

Phil Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. 25 March 1975

Quick Facts: The driver was injured when the bus (Phil Rabbit) was hit by a truck owned by Phil-Am that was driven recklessly. The manager of Phil-Am, along with the truck driver, was impleaded in the quasi-delict suit filed by Phil Rabbit. TC dismissed the case against the manager.


The manager of a corporation is not included in the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise” used in Art. 2180 of CC.

It may be gathered from the context of Art. 2180 that the term “manager” (“director” in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of employer.

xxx

[N]o tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on the manager of Phil-Am Forwarders in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer.

Philtranco v. CA 273 SCRA 562, supra


Quick Facts: The victim was riding a bicycle along Gomez street while the bus was allegedly being pushed by several people in Magsaysay Blvd. which is a road perpendicular to Gomez St. The bus allegedly abruptly started, bumped the victim and ran over him. After running over the victim, the bus driver did not stop until a police officer jumped into the bus, identified himself and told the driver to stop. Philtranco also argued that it exercised diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees and the driver exercised the diligence of a very cautious person in driving the bus.


The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct (Art 2180), and joint and several or solidary (Art 2194) with the driver.

The recourse of the employer is to recover what was paid from the employee.

Lampesa v. De Vera, Jr. 14 Feb 2008

Quick Facts: TC and CA found that the truck driver was negligent in his maneuvering of the truck (owned by Lampesa) when it hit the jeepney, which caused the injury sustained by De Vera, a passenger of the jeepney. Lampesa was also held liable because he failed to exercise due diligence in the supervision of his driver.


The owner of the truck should not have been satisfied by the mere possession of a professional driver’s license, when it was presented when the driver applied for his job.

As an employer, he was duty bound to do more. He should have carefully examined the driver’s qualifications, experiences, and record of service, if any. He must also show that he exercised due supervision over the driver after his selection.

Spouses Jayme v. Apostol 27 Nov 2008

Quick Facts:

Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, when it hit a boy crossing the highway causing the latter’s death. The parents of the deceased impleaded the Mayor, that the latter is vicariously liable as the driver’s superior.


The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver’s employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle.

It was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment…An employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists.xxxMayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.

Requisites, vicarious liability of employers:1. That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;2. That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer

has the authority to give at all times; and3. That the illicit act of the employee was of the occasion or by reason of the

functions entrusted to him.Significantly to make the employee liable under par. 5 and 6 of Art. 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.

Test to determine employer-employee relationship:1. The employer’s power of selection;2. Payment of wages or other remuneration;3. The employer’s right to control the method of doing the work; and4. The employer’s right of suspension or dismissal.

Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez21 Dec 1999

Quick Facts: Abad was a manager of Castilex; he was issued a company car. Abad did OT work in Castilex. He left the office, stopped by a seedy place to meet friends and get


snacks. On his way home, while driving his company-issued car, the car collided with a motorcycle causing the death of the latter’s driver.


Par. 5 is an expansion of par. 4 of 2180 NCC in both (1) employer coverage and (2) acts included.Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service in the of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.

The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge Castilex with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. xxx Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. Using his vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of fringe benefit attached to his position. Hence, Castilex is not liable.

“Daddy! Daddy!”

Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC17 Aug 1992

Quick Facts: Funtecha was a part-time janitor (a working student) for Filamer. Having a student driver’s license, he requested the driver of the school jeep and was allowed, to take the wheel while en route to their home. The school jeep figured in an accident.


The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitotrial duties. The clause “within the scope of their assigned tasks” for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interest of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.

Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a “frolic of his own” but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the school (he was learning how to drive).

Your Insights, if any:

For the benefit of or for the furtherance of the interests of the employer – considered “within the scope of” employment for the purposes of Art 2180.

National Power Corp (NPC) v. CA14 Aug 1998

Quick Facts: A head-on collision between a dump truck owned by NPC and a FX caused the death/injuries of the latter’s passengers. The heirs of the victims filed damages against NPC, as the owner of the truck, and PHESCO, as the contractor supplying workers to NPC, including the driver of the truck.


PHESCO is a “labor-only” contractor, and therefore, NPC is held liable as employer of the driver that figured in the accident.In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship exists between the principal employer and the employees of the “labor-only” contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the “labor-only” contractor as is such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.

Job (independent) contractor or “labor-only”Job (independent) contracting is present if: (1) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof; and (2) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. Else, it is a “labor-only” contract under which the contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.

Valenzuela v. CA


7 Feb 1996

Quick Facts: Li, an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc., was driving his company-issued car collided with the vehicle of Valenzuela, causing injuries to the latter’s person. Li was coming home from a visit to his officemate’s house. SC held his employer solidarily liable in the damages caused by his negligent act.


The privilege of unlimited use of a company car serves important business purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purposes of furthering the company’s image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.


Expanded the scope of liability of employers with respect to damages caused by company issued cars (as compared to Castilex), i.e., as long as it enhances the company’s image and goodwill.

Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana31 Jan 2007

Quick Facts: Two pieces of surgical sponges were left inside the body of the patient during a hysterectomy operation. This caused infection that led to the death of the patient. Dr. Ampil was the surgeon in charge of the operation and PSI is the owner of the hospital where the surgery was conducted. PSI was held vicariously liable as employer of Dr. Ampil.


For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. (Ramos v. CA)

Control test: Private hospital hire, fire, and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While “consultants” are not technically employees, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of payment of wages.

Doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel: By Accrediting Dr. Ampil and advertising his qualifications, PSI created the public impression that he was its agent. PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it. It’s act is tantamount to the public that Medical City, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services.

Doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility: PSI committed a serious breach of its corporate duty when it failed to conduct an immediate investigation into the reported missing gauzes.

Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana (MR) 11 Feb 2008

The Ramos ruling stands in the holding that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the hospital and its consultants for the purposes of 2180, using, among others, the “control test.”

Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana (2 nd MR) 2 Feb 2010

SC upheld the use of the “control test” to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the hospital and doctor. … Under the “control test,” an employment relationship between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the physician is to accomplish the task.

However, in this case, there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and details of the specific process by which


Dr. Ampil spplied his skills in the treatment of the deceased. (Note: PSI was still held liable using the agency by estoppels doctrine)

Mercury Drug Corp. v. Huang22 June 2007

Quick Facts: A 6-wheeler truck owned by Mercury Drug collided with the car driven by Huang. Huang suffered injuries and caused his paralysis. The driver was found negligent and Mercury as the employer of the driver was found solidarily liable.


How to show diligence in the hiring and supervision of employees:In the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

Subtopic: Government

Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands21 Mar 1916

Quick Facts: A collision between an ambulance of the General Hospital (State) and a motorcycle resulted in the injuries of the latter’s driver, Merritt. Merritt is suing the Government for damages, as the employer of the ambulance driver.


That the responsibility of the State is limited by Art. 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order of commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.

The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents…


This case is important for its definition of “special agent”

Rosete v. Auditor General31 Aug 1948

Quick Facts: Buildings of petitioner was destroyed by fire that originated from the adjacent property, the Emergency Control Association (ECA, a government agency) warehouse. The fire was caused by negligence of ECA’s employee.


The Government cannot be held responsible as ECA officers are not acting as special agent of the State, based on the definition of a “special agent” in the Merritt case.

Perfecto, dissenting:

Under the meaning of [par 5 Art 1903], the word official comprises all officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public offices. All others who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class of special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies.

ECA is not a branch or office of the government, i.e., not legislative, executive, or judicial. It is one of groups of special agents created by the government for activities ordinarily non-governmental in character.

Mendoza v. De Leon11 Feb 1916


Quick Facts: The defendant councilors (De Leon, et al.) regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege to the plaintiff (Mendoza) for two years. After continuous use of a little more than one year, they forcibly evicted him on the pretext that he was not operating the ferry leased to him.


Under the evidence of record, there is no manner of doubt that this pretext was absolutely without foundation and as there was therefore no occasion whatever for rescinding the contract, the defendant councilors are liable personally for the damages resulting to the lessee by their wrongful action.

The Municipal Code confers both governmental and business or corporate powers upon municipal corporations. For the exercise of the former it is not liable to private persons. Its liability to them for the wrongful exercise of the latter is the same as that of the private corporation or individual.

Officers and agents of municipal corporations charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial are not liable for the consequences of their official acts unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.

Officers of municipalities charged with the administration of patrimonial property of a municipal corporation are liable for mismanagement of its affairs as are directors or managing officers of private corporations; not for mere mistakes of judgment, but only when their acts are so far opposed to the true interests of the municipality as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests xxx.

Fontanilla v. Maliaman27 Feb 1991

Quick Facts: Son of the petitioners were killed by the driver of NIA. They filed a case for damages against NIA. In thi MR, the Sol Gen maintains that NIA does not perform solely and primarily propriety functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions and is therefore not liable for tortuous act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.


The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.

NIA was not created for purposes of local government, but for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines xxx.” Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by their services, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.


WEEK 10: INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS

ART 32. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

1. Freedom of religion;2. Freedom of speech;3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;5. Freedom of suffrage;6. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;7. The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;8. The right to the equal protection of the laws;9. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures;10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same;11. The privacy of communication and correspondence;12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary

to law;13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress

of grievances;14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;15. The right of the accused against excessive bail;16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

17. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

19. Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil

action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Notes:

Elements:o Offender: by any person -> even private personso Act: Directly or indirectly a violation of the rights listed regardless of whether the act

or omission constitutes a criminal offenseo Relief to aggrieved party: commence an entirely separate civil action for damages

(including moral and/or exemplary)o Proof required: preponderance of evidence

Justification:o present laws are inadequate for the protection of individual rights as intended by

the fundamental lawo In most cases, the threat to freedom originates from abuse of power by

governmental officials and peace officerso The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt often prevented the appropriate

punishment Relief is available regardless of the pendency or result of the criminal action

Right to institute an independent civil action under Art. 32-34 is a substantive right intended as an exception to and held as an amend- ment of the general rule in specific sections of the Rules of Court.

One Case highly recommended: Vinzons-Chato v Fortune Tobacco

ART 33. DEFAMATION, FRAUD AND PHYSICAL INJURIES. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Notes:


According to Sir there is no problem with fraud -> any form of estafa or fraudulent act would fall under Art 33. The only case falling under this section is the violation of a trust receipt law.

One Case highly recommended:

Defamation: MVRS v Islamic Physical Injuries:

o Effect on Employer’s Subsidiary: Joaquin v Ancietoo Prescription/When to Commence Action: Capuno v Pepsi Colao Definition: Madeja v Caro

ART. 34. NEGLECT OF DUTY. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Notes:

Elements:o Offender: Member of city/municipal police forceo Circumstance:

Complainant either sought police assistance or protection or police was aware of complainant’s need of such assistance/protection

damages to complainant due to inactionAct: refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property

o Liability: Police officer: direct and primary; City/Municipal: subsidiary Subsidiary liability of city/municipality under this article is an exception to its non-

suability as a political subdivision of the State for the crimes or torts of its employees Difference from Art 27: It pertains to general inaction which does not constitute a

criminal act + State not subsidiarily liable Difference from subsidiary liability under Art 102 and 103: conviction of defendant

policeman is absolutely immaterial and irrelevant

ART. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

Notes:

Elements:o Act: injury by a criminal offense

justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or

prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings if prosecuting attorney filed an information during the pendency of the civil action, it

would be suspended until termination of the criminal proceeding Double Jeopardy? None, since this pertains to a different action. Q from Sir Casis: Would all non-conviction fall in this article?

Subtopic: Violation of Political and Civil Rights

MHP GARMENTS V CA 02 September 1994

Quick Facts: MHP Garments was granted by the Boy Scouts of the Phils with exclusive franchise to sell and distribute BSP uniforms, supplies, etc. but received information that Villa Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales were selling BSP items without authority. MHP sought the help of Phil Constabulary to conduct surveillance, seize the items (which were turned over to MHP) and file a case for unfair competition against the 3. The case was subsequently dropped but the return of the seized items were delayed and constituted inferior items, prompting them to file a case for claim of money and damages against MHP.



The law (Art32) speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible also has to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights... Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse using good faith as an excuse.

SILAHIS V SOLUTA 20 February 1996

Quick Facts: The General Manager (GM) of the security agency of Silahis Hotel allegedly received information of illegal activities including sale of marijuana, dollars smuggling, and prostitution going on in the Union Office at the hotel. GM with other security personnel allegedly entered the Union Office with the permission of the union officers and found marijuana, prompting the hotel file a case for violation of the dangerous drugs act against the union officers. According to the union officers, the drugs were planted by management and the search was done without their permission and despite their protest.


The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Waiver by implication cannot be presumed. Requisites of valid waiver:o the right exists; o the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of

such right; o the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

VINZONS-CHATO V FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP 19 June 2007

Quick Facts: Cigarette brands of Fortune were reclassified to another category which subjected it to a higher ad valorem tax, as ordered by the RMC issued by CIR Chato-Vinzons 2d prior to the effectivity of RA 7654. Fortune filed a motion for reconsideration calling for the recall of the RMC but was denied and instead assessed for a tax deficiency of P9.6M. The CTA ruled that the RMC is defective, invalid, and unenforceable. CA and SC affirmed. Based on the decision in the tax case, Fortune filed a complaint for damages against the CIR in her private capacity under Article 32 of the Civil Code, on the ground that the issuance of RMC violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.


General Rule: A public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks…as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.o Exception: A public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal

capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial…otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer and not the act itself would determine whether the act was wrongful.

The intention of the Code Commission in Art 32 was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.

VINZONS-CHATO V FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP 23 December 2008

Quick Facts: Please refer to previous case.


There are 2 kinds of duties exercised by a public officer:


o Duties to Public - pertains to those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.

o Duties to Individuals - refers to those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual.

General Rule. When what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. o Exception. When the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on

account of the public officer's improper performance or non-performance of his public duty.

It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular individuals. The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-performance.

Subtopic:Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries

JOAQUIN V ANICETO 31 October 1964

Quick Facts: Joaquin was on the sidewalk when a taxicab driven by Ancieto and owned by Rodelas bumped her, causing her physical injuries. Ancieto was charged and found guilty of serious physical injuries but the court made no ruling on the civil damages in view of Joaquin’s reservation to file a separate civil action. While the criminal case was pending appeal, Joaquin filed a civil case for damages against Ancieto and also impleaded the owner of the taxi cab.


Article 33 authorizes an action against the employee on his primary civil liability. It cannot apply to an action against the employer to enforce his subsidiary civil liability as stated above, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any action brought against him before the conviction of his employee is premature.

While a separate and independent civil action for damages may be brought against the employee under Article 33 of the Civil Code, no such action may be filed against the employer on the latter's subsidiary civil liability because such liability is governed not by the Civil Code but by the Penal Code, under which conviction of the employee is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability.

If the court trying the employee's liability adjudges the employee liable, but the court trying the criminal action acquits the employee, the subsequent insolvency of the employee cannot make the employer subsidiary liable to the offended party or to the latter's heirs.

MADEJA V CARO 21 December 1983

Quick Facts: Carmen Madeja filed a criminal case against Dr. Japzon for homicide thru reckless imprudence, after the former’s husband died after an appendectomy. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages. While the criminal case was still pending, Madeja filed a civil action for damages against Japzon alleging that her husband died due to the doctor’s gross negligence. Judge Caro dismissed the case ruling that: The civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered on the criminal action.


The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto…The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney.

General Rule: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted.o Exception. Under Art 33 -> When the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical

injuries, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated.

The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries as defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but


consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. -> Considering that defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense which have no specific provisions in the RPC.

ARAFILES V. PHIL JOURNALISTS 5 March 2004

Quick Facts: Despuig, an employee of Nat’l Institute of Atmospheric Science and a student of Feati University, filed a complaint against Arafiles, NIAS Director, for forcible abduction and rape. After she filed her sworn statement in the police statement, a certain Morales interviewed Despuig and after the interview tried but failed to contact Arafiles. Morales then wrote an account of Despuig’s complaint and submitted it to his editor. The article appeared as the headline of People’s Tonight the following day. One year after the publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages against Morales, his editor, and the publisher for grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item based on Art33.


In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.

The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit, and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.

A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency, or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.

MVRS V. ISLAMIC 28 January 2003

Quick Facts: Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines and 3 individual Muslims filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila in their behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS and 3 of its employees/officers for publishing an article related to the prohibition of not eating pigs allegedly because they treat pigs as gods.


Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. o Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which

others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and

mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual

The Muslim Faith is too fragmented -- one cannot determine the effect to each and every member of that group.

Notes: What if the person already has a bad reputation? It does not matter, because it is the perceived effect on the readers that constitutes defamation.

CAPUNO V. PEPSI COLA 30 April 1965

Quick Facts: A vehicular accident which arose in Pampanga involving a Pepsi-Cola truck (driven by Elordi) and a car driven by Capuno resulting in the charging of 3x homicide through reckless homicide which was later amended to include claims for damages by the heirs against Elordi.While the criminal case was pending, the intestate estate of Buan’s heirs filed a civil action for damages against Pepsi and Elordi. Subsequently, the parties (BUAN and Pepsi) entered into a compromise and settlement agreement.

Elordi was acquitted of the charges but prior thereto, Capuno filed a claim for damages against Pepsi which was dismissed by TC reasoning that since Capuno chose to include the claim for damages in the criminal case, the civil action could not be instituted until the final decision was made in that case. Pepsi contended that the action had already prescribed.


For purposes of prescription, the Court deemed Art. 33 as QD, thus Article 1150 governs as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years begins to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the day the QD occurred or was committed.


The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.

CORPUS V. PAJE 31 July 1969

Quick Facts: A passenger bus of the Victory Liner, driven by Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons. An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje wherein the latter was found guilty and convicted of the crime charged. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. While defendant's appeal was pending decision in the CA, Clemente Marcia's heirs, instituted a separate civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Paje and Victory Liner.

CA reversed decision of TC; defendants in the civil case filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the CA of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal action.


Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries.

The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other persons. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense.

ARAFILES V. PHIL JOURNALISTS 5 March 2004

Quick Facts: Despuig, an employee of Nat’l Institute of Atmospheric Science and a student of Feati University, filed a complaint against Arafiles, NIAS Director, for forcible abduction

and rape. After she filed her sworn statement in the police statement, a certain Morales interviewed Despuig and after the interview tried but failed to contact Arafiles. Morales then wrote an account of Despuig’s complaint and submitted it to his editor. The article appeared as the headline of People’s Tonight the following day. One year after the publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages against Morales, his editor, and the publisher for grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item based on Art33. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.

The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit, and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.

A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency, or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.

MVRS V. ISLAMIC 28 January 2003

Quick Facts: Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines and 3 individual Muslims filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila in their behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS and 3 of its employees/officers for publishing an article related to the prohibition of not eating pigs allegedly because they treat pigs as gods. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. o Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which

others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and

mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.


Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual

The Muslim Faith is too fragmented -- one cannot determine the effect to each and every member of that group.

Notes: What if the person already has a bad reputation? It does not matter, because it is the perceived effect on the readers that constitutes defamation.

DULAY V. CA 3 April 1995

Quick Facts: An altercation between Torzuela and Atty. Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Dulay. Dulay’s widow filed a claim for damages against Torzuela, the Safegaurd and Superguard – alleged employers of Torzuela. Superguard alleged that the there is no cause of action because the shooting was beyond Torzuela’s scope of duty and that the filing of the complaint was premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability


The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation.

There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts that are voluntary and intentional.

In the case of Andamo v IAC: Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.

The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.


WEEK 11: HUMAN RELATIONS

Human Relations Torts Abuse of RightsActs Contra Bonus Mores

Breach of promise to marrySeduction and sexual assaultMalicious ProsecutionPublic HumiliationUnjustified Dismissal

Illegal ActsDereliction of DutyUnfair CompetitionViolation of Human Dignity

A. Abuse of Rights

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Notes on the Provisions

Arts. 19, 20, and 21 are catch-all tort provisions.

With these articles, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles.

- Tolentino, as cited in Albenson v CA

Art. 19 is a mere declaration of principles and provides for the standard of conduct. Art. 21 implements Art. 19 by providing for the remedy (e.g. to compensate the injured for the damage inflicted), which is not provided by Art. 19. According to the Code Commission, the purpose of Art. 19 is to “vouchsafe adequate legal remedies for that untold number of

moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.” (Velayo v Shell, 1956)

Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. (Globe McKay v CA, 1989)

Art. 19 sets certain standards which must be observed, 1) not only in the exercise of one’s rights, but also 2) in the performance of one’s duties (Globe McKay v CA, 1989).

Art. 19 – Abuse of rightsArt. 21 – Acts Contra Bonus Mores/ Against Good MoralsCommon element under Arts. 19 and 21: acts are intentional. Art. 20, on the other hand, does not distinguish: the act may be done either willfully or negligently. It is the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not provide their own sanction. (Albenson v CA, 1993)

Elements of Abuse of Right (LES)1. Legal right or duty2. Exercised in bad faith3. Sole intent of prejudicing another (Casis: this is a very high threshold, breach of

promise per se not applicable)

Standard of Conduct (AGO)1. Act with justice2. Give everyone his due3. Observe honesty and good faith

These standards limit the exercise of one’s rights.


Velayo v. Shell Oct. 31, 1956 | Felix, J.

Quick FactsCALI informed its principal creditors that it was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operations. The creditors agreed to form a committee that would take charge of the distribution of assets. Fitzgerald, an employee of Shell, was appointed member of the committee. After the committee met, Shell assigned its credits to its sister company, the American Shell Oil Company, which filed an action for collection against CALI. A writ of attachment was issued on CALI’s C-54 plane.

HeldArts. 19, 21, and 23 given retroactive effect.

On provisions on Human Relations:In order would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.

What constitutes the abuse of right?Not the assignment of credit per se, but the fact that Fitzgerald was already appointed as a member of the working committee. The committee was formed specifically for the creditors to not sue CALI, so that the assets could be divided among them.

Thus, Shell had no vested right to betray the confidence of the insolvent CALI and its other creditors. Shell’s act of taking advantage of the knowledge of the plane showed bad faith and betrayed the trust and confidence of the other creditors.

Albenson v. CAJan. 11, 1953 | Bidin, J.

Quick FactsGuaranteed Industries issued Albenson a check as payment for the mild steel plates it ordered. The check bounced. Albenson found that the check belonged to Eugenio Baltao. It filed a BP 22 case against Eugenio S. Baltao, the president of Guaranteed. Baltao denied issuing the check because Guaranteed had already ceased operations. It appears that the transactions were made by his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages another business located in the same building as Guaranteed. The elder Baltao filed a suit for damages under Art. 19 against Albenson.

Held

Article 19 Elements: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction

Anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.

Article 21 Elements: (deals with acts contra bonus mores)1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.In case at bar:Case will not prosper under 19,20,21

True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof.

In order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice

In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. No abuse of rights. Elements not present. Albenson’s complaint was a sincere attempt to find the best possible means to collect the money due to it. The law does not impose a penalty on the right to litigate. While Albenson may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of Baltao for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award for damages.


DoctrineThere is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. It depends on the circumstances of each case.

NoteA person injured by the filing of a case against him, if absolved, may file a case for damages grounded on the principle of abuse of rights or on malicious prosecution.

UE v. JaderFeb. 17, 2000 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Quick FactsJader was a law student at UE. He took the removals for Practice Court I and was given a grade of five, but was not informed of the results. He was included in the list of candidates for graduation. He graduated and prepared for the bar, but then learned of his deficiency. He sued for damages.

HeldWhen a student is enrolled in any educational or learning, a contract of education is entered into between the institution and the student. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for graduation. UE showed bad faith in belatedly informing Jader of his removals, particularly when he was already preparing for the bar.

Quotable QuoteSchools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.

Barons Marketing v. CAFeb. 9, 1998 | Kapunan, J.

Quick FactsBarons Marketing was a dealer of electrical wires and cables of Phelps Dodge and thus was given 60 days of credit for its purchases. Barons defaulted and wanted to pay in installments, but Phelps declined. Phelps filed a complaint to recover the amount. Barons disputed the amount and said that it suffered injury to its reputation, that the acts of Phelps Dodge (e.g. rejecting offer of settlement, filing an action for collection) were calculated to humiliate it and constituted abuse of rights.

HeldPhelps had legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons’ offer and instituting the action for collection. A person who, in exercising his rights, does not act in an abusive manner, is not deemed to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy as to violate Art. 21. In this case, there was only exercise of rights, and not abuse thereof.

NotesThis case cited Tolentino’s Test of Abuse of Right: Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although lawful, are anti-social. There is abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose f prejudicing or injuring another. Every abnormal exercise of right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.

B. Acts Contra Bonus Mores/ Against Good Morals

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Elements: 1. There is an act which is legal2. But is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy3. Done with intent to injure

a. Breach of Promise to Marry; Seduction

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong Seduction: 1) there must be inducement by deceit 2) woman must yield because

of the inducement


Wassmer v. VelezDec. 26, 1964 | Bengzon, J.P., J.

Quick FactsWassmer and Velez were about to be married. Invitations had been printed and distributed, the wedding gown and dresses for the entourage were ready, bridal showers had been held, and the matrimonial bed and other accessories had been bought. Two days before the wedding, Velez wrote a note saying they would have to postpone the wedding because his mother was opposed to it. A day before the wedding, he wired Wassmer saying he would return soon. He never showed up again.

HeldThis is not a case of mere breach to marry. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations and publicity and spend for it, only to walk out is different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which Velez must be held answerable to damages in accordance with Art. 21.

NoteCasis: This is not a money thing. Can still apply and damages can be awarded even if there was no pecuniary loss.

Tanjanco v. CADec. 17, 1966 | Reyes, J.B.L., J.

Quick FactsTanjanco and Santos, both adults, had a relationship and maintained sexual relations for a year. Santos said she consented to sexual intercourse because of Tanjanco’s promise of marriage. Santos eventually got pregnant and resigned from her job due to embarrassment. Tanjanco refused to marry her.

HeldTo constitute seduction, there must be 1) sufficient promise or inducement and the 2) woman must yield because of the promise or inducement (Buenaventura ruling).

If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. In this case, Santos was of age and repeatedly had sex with Tanjanco for a year. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.

Notes- It is implied here that seduction can only occur during the initial sexual contact. - If there is sexual desire, there is no seduction.

DoctrineThe essential feature of seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of promise to marry, is that it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. (US v Buenaventura)

Baksh v. CAFeb. 19, 1993 | Davide, Jr., J.

Quick FactsBaksh, an Iranian, courted Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they get married. Baksh then forced Gonzales, who was a virgin, to live with him, but later on beat her and threatened to kill her. Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement and told her that he was already married to someone else. Gonzales’ parents had already prepared for the wedding by looking for pigs and chickens and inviting sponsors.

HeldIf a man’s promise to marry is the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention to marry her and the promise was only a ploy to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages under Art. 21. This is not because of the promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation that followed. It is essential, however, that the injury should have been committed contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

Notes- If a man never intended to marry the woman but still promised to marry her, it

would be equivalent to inducement and he would be liable under Art. 21.- Art. 21 does not require that the promise to marry should be the proximate

cause of the sexual congress.


Pe v PeMay 30, 1062 | Bautista, J.

Quick FactsAlfonso Pe, a married man and a collateral relative, frequented Lolita Pe’s house on the pretext that he wanted to teach her how to pray the rosary. They fell in love. Lolita’s parents heard about the affair and refused to let them see each other. Lolita left the house and disappeared. Her family sued Alfonso, claiming great damage to their name and reputation.

HeldAlfonso, a married man, seduced Lolita through trickery to the extent that she fell in love with him. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy as contemplated in Art. 21.

Casis: There was no seduction here because Lolita did not bring the suit.

b. Malicious Prosecution

Defense: Probable cause

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

Diaz v. Davao LightApril 4, 2007 | Callejo, Sr., J.

Quick FactsDue to unpaid electric bills, Davao Light (DLPC) disconnected the electricity of Doña Segunda Hotel, which is owned by Diaz Realty Inc., the VP of which is Diaz. DLPC refused to reconnect until payment of dues. Diaz installed his own electric meter. They had a compromise agreement, but DLPC filed complaint for theft of electricity. Diaz said that the complaint was intended to harass and humiliate him. He had media interviews. DLPC filed complaint against Diaz for defamation.

Held1. No abuse of rights. Diaz was not able to show that the acts of DLPC were done

with the sole intent of injuring him. Diaz himself admitted that he installed the

meter unilaterally, plus the compromise agreement did not say that DLPC was barred from instituting further action.

2. No malicious prosecution. Requisites not present. 1) No information filed against Diaz and the cases were dismissed before they could be filed in court 2) There was probable cause for theft 3) Malice was not proved.

Requisites that must be proven by petitioner1. The fact of prosecution, that defendant was the prosecutor, and that action

terminated in an acquittal2. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause 3. That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, or by improper or

sinister motive

Albenson v. CA, supraJan. 11, 1953 | Bidin, J.

Quick FactsAlbenson filed a BP 22 case against the wrong Eugenio Baltao. HeldThere was no malicious prosecution. There was no proof that Albeson had a sinister design to vex or humiliate Baltao. 1) There was probable cause in filing the BP 22 case, and 2) There was no legal malice. The presence of probable cause signified as a legal consequence the absence of malice.

DoctrineThe adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. If damage results from a person’s exercise of his legal rights, there is only damnum absque injuria.

Que v. IACJan. 13, 1989 | Cruz, J.

Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas because the 5 checks issued by the latter as payment for canvass strollers were dishonored. Nicolas said he discontinued payment


because the canvass strollers were defective, but he did not return the strollers. The charge was dismissed by the fiscal. Nicolas filed a complaint for malicious prosecution.

HeldThere was no malice because there was probable cause when Que filed the complaint. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was: (SIF)

1. Prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person2. Initiated deliberately by the defendant3. Knowing that his charges were false and groundless

DoctrineThe presence of probable cause signifies the absence of malice. To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that is initiated deliberately by the defendant, knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

Right to litigate must be protected. Why? It is one of the virtues of our system of government that if a person feels he has been aggrieved, he does not have to take the law into his hands or resort to the use of force to vindicate his injury. The courts are there to hear and act on his complaint. The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the pressures of personal disagreements that might otherwise explore in physical confrontation. It is necessary for upholding of people’s claims and the maintenance of peace and goodwill.

Drilon v. CAMarch 20, 1997 | Hermosisima, Jr., J.

A letter-complaint to DOJ Sec. Drilon resulted in an investigation of several individuals, including Adaza, for their participation in the failed Dec. ’89 coup. The investigation found that there was probable cause, and thus an information for the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder was filed. Adaza filed complaint against Drilon for MP, for knowingly filing an information for a crime that does not exist.

HeldThere was no malicious prosecution. 1) The presence of probable cause signified the absence of malice. 2) The case only involved disagreements regarding a question of law (whether or not the Hernandez ruling still applies).

Definition of malicious prosecution in Philippine Jurisdiction

It is an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. (Cabassan v Anota)

Casis: This definition is incompatible with the elements

DoctrineA suit for MP will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried without probable cause. The reason for this ruling is that it would be a great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried.

Magbanua v CAFeb. 12, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J.

Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in Junsay’s house, was charged with robbery. The prosecution relied on her alleged confession. She was later acquitted after it was found that she was physically maltreated in an attempt to extract the confession from her. Her father filed a suit for damages.

HeldThere was no malicious prosecution because there was no proof of sinister design on the part of Junsay to vex or humiliate Magbanua. Junsay, who was robbed of her jewelry, could be expected to bring the matter to the authorities. Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

c. Public Humiliation

Casis: In public humiliation, it seems that there should be imputation of a crime. It is not necessary whether other people believed the accusations against the person who was humiliated. It is about the manner of attacking the person.

Grand Union v EspinoDec. 28, 1979 | Guerrero, J.


Espino, a civil engineer and an executive of Procter & Gamble, forgot to pay for a rat tail file when he left the Grand Union Supermarket. He was accosted by the guard, led to the rear of the store, and made to file an incident report. He offered to pay but his money was taken as an incentive to the guards for apprehending pilferers. A lot of people witnessed the incident.

HeldThe false accusation charges against Espino and the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouted at, and imposed a fine in the presence of many people in the supermarket, brought him humiliation and embarrassment. It is against morals, good customs, and public policy to humiliate, embarrass, and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, privacy, and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. (Art. 26) And one must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Art. 19)

Carpio v ValmonteSept. 9, 2004 | Tinga, J.

Valmonte, a wedding coordinator, was accused by Carpio, the bride’s aunt of stealing her diamond jewelry. Everyone in the hotel suite saw Carpio accuse Valmonte, who was bodily searched in their presence. She was interrogated and trailed by the police all throughout the evening. Carpio refused to apologize so Valmonte filed a suit for damages.

HeldCarpio willfully caused Valmonte injury in a manner contrary to morals and good customs. Although Carpio had the right to know the identity of the thief, she should not have openly accused Valmonte without proof.

d. Unjustified Dismissal

Globe McKay v. CAAug. 25, 1989 | Cortes, J.

Quick FactsTobias was a purchasing agent at Globe McKay and he discovered fraudulent transactions. Hendry, an EVP, accused him of being a crook and a swindler and charged him with estafa, but the cases were dismissed. Tobias was threatened with a hundred more cases and was

fired. Hendry sent a letter to Tobias’ potential employer alleging his dishonesty. Tobias did not get the job and was unemployed for a long time.

DoctrineA right, though by itself legal because it is granted by law, may nevertheless become the source of illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Art. 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed. Although an employer who suspects an employee to be dishonest may dismiss the latter, the employer should not do so in an abusive manner.

On Art. 19This provision sets certain standards which must be observed, not only in the exercise of one’s rights, but also in the performance of one’s duties. The law recognizes the primordial limitation of all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Art. 19 (AGO) must be observed.

Quisaba v. Sta. InesAug. 25, 1989 | Castro, J.

Quisaba, an internal auditor at Sta. Ines, was ordered by Robert Hyde, the VP, to purchase logs for the company’s plant. He refused because it wasn’t part of his job. As a result, he was demoted. Quisaba filed a complaint for damages, termination pay, and attorney’s fees. Sta. Ines moved to dismiss, saying that the case should have been filed in NLRC.

HeldQuisaba’s complaint was grounded not on his dismissal but on the manner he was dismissed and its consequent effects, thus TC had jurisdiction. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, then the respondents violated Art. 21.

DoctrineThe right to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner this right is exercised.

Standard of dismissal laid down in this caseDismissal should not be done anti-socially or oppressively


C. Illegal Acts

Amonoy v. GutierrezFeb. 15, 2001 | Panganiban, J.

Quick FactsThe lot on which the Gutierrez spouses built their house was bought by Amonoy in an auction sale. He was granted an order for the demolition of the house, but a TRO was granted to the Gutierrez spouses. Amonoy went ahead with the demolition. The SC later made the TRO permanent.

HeldAlthough Amonoy’s actions were legally justified at the start, their continuation after the TRO was issued amounted to an abuse of right. His actions were tainted with bad faith. The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The demolition of the house despite the TRO constituted not only an abuse of right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended, thus it was illegal.

Casis: There was no right here to abuse here, because the act was illegal. What Amonoy did was contempt of court.

D. Violation of Human Dignity

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

1. Prying into the privacy of another's residence: 2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; 3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; 4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Casis: What is the problem with this article? We don’t know exactly what the violations are.

Garcia v. SalvadorMarch 20, 2007 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Salvador, a trainee at Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, underwent medical exam as a prerequisite for regular employment. Garcia, a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag test. The results revealed that Salvador had Hepatitis B. Her employment was terminated for failing the physical exam and her father had a heart attack when he found out. She underwent 3 more tests, which found her negative for Hepa B.

HeldSalvador suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply standard operating procedure. Her termination and anxiety could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

Legal basis for the award of damages is Art. 20

St. Louis Realty v CANov. 14, 1984 | Aquino, J.

St. Louis Realty caused to be published an ad in the Sunday Times depicting the Arcadio family in front of Dr. Aramil’s residence, without the latter’s permission, and making it appear that the house was owned by the Arcadios. Aramil protested. St. Louis stopped publication but did not publish apology or erratum. Aramil filed complaint under Art. 26, claiming that the unauthorized portrayal of his house was a transgression to his private property and damaging to his professional integrity. He said other people uttered remarks saying he was only renting the house or that his wife was with another husband.

HeldSt. Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times for its promotional gain. It never made a written apology and explanation of the mix-up. Persons who know the residence of Dr. Aramil were confused by the distorted impression that he was renting his house or that Arcadio leased it from him. His private life was mistakenly and unnecessary exposed. He suffered reduction of income and mental anguish.

Casis: Was there really invasion of privacy? Only the exterior of the house was seen. Other people who pass by it see the same thing anyway.


Gregorio v CASept. 11, 2009 | Nachura, J.

Gregorio, a respected Kagawad, was arrested after Datuin, an accountant at Sansio, filed a complaint against her for issuing bouncing checks, even though she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn, and her signature was radically different from the signatures in the bounced checks. Datuin eventually desisted and the case was dismissed. Gregorio filed a complaint for damages.

HeldGregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Datuin and Sansio when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person who tendered the bounced checks. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she held several positions in public service.

E. Dereliction of Duty

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Elements:1. Material or moral loss2. Public servant’s refusal or neglect to perform a duty3. Without just cause

F. Unfair CompetitionArt. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

Intention is to place one’s products in a better light Should be in the context of giving advantage to one party (e.g. derogatory

commercials)


WEEK 12

Possessor of AnimalArt 2183:The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

VESTIL V IACQuick FactsTheness tan Uy (3yrs old) was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child in the house PuritaVestil’s father. She died of rabis. Uys sued for damages alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of the dog that bit Theness. Vestil rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to her deceased father and that it was a tame animal.Issue: WON Vestilis liable for dog under 2183 (Y)Held:What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the houseThe law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. Manresa: the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. Affirmed.

Thrown/Falling from a Building

Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.

DINGCONG JOSE v. KANAAN (Spanish case. Spanish eyes. Spanish Bread.)

Quick Facts:

Brothers Dingcong are co-renters of the top floor of Emilia Saenz's house where they established the Central Hotel as owners and managers. Kanaan et al on other hand occupy lower floor of hotel where they had established their "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise. At about 11pm, Echevarria, retiring to bed, carelessly left open the faucet flowing on a regular bowl with no drainage. As the pipes of the hotel at that time were in repair, water from the pipes spread over the floor, passing and dunking the articles and merchandise on the low setting "American Bazaar," causing loss that the CFI estimated at P1, 089.61.

Kanaan et al filed this case for damages on behalf "American Bazaar" against brothers Dingcong and Echevarria.

CFI acquitted Jose and Echevarria, while Loreto died.

CA reversed.

Issue: WON Jose is liable for damages (Y)

Held: YES. As Jose is a joint tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the heights of the house, he must answer for the damage caused by the things that were thrown or fell from it (Article 1910 of the Civil Code).

Echevarria was a guest of the hotel and was the one who directly caused the neglect; however, Jose did not practice the diligence of a good family man to prevent the damage. Since he knew that the pipes are under repair, he should have presumed that Echavarria could not use the tap and should have provided some container with adequate drainage, not just a regular bowl.Affirmed.

Death/Injuries in the Course of Employment

Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the


employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.

AFABLE v SINGER SEWING MACHINEQuick Facts:LeopoldoMadlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in San Francisco del Monte and was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company.One afternoon, while riding a bicycle was run at the streets of Manila by a truck driven by Sumoay (convicted of reckless impru resulting in homicide). Madlangbayan had moved to Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.Widow and children brought action to recover from the corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812Issue: WON Singer liable (N)Held:

1. Case at bar: Accident not due to and in pursuance of his employment. 2. Recovery depends on the nature of his employment. (Here, not within scope of

work – see reasons below)To come within the term "injury received in the course of employment " it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it was received the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs of the employer. Case at bar: If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.Deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the Company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not

require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.

Affirmed.

Product Liability

Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)

Consumer ActArticle 97. Liability for the Defective Products. – Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof.A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:

a) presentation of product;b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;c) the time it was put into circulation.

A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market.The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when it evidences:

a) that it did not place the product on the market;b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect;c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault.


Article 99. Liability for Defective Services. – The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof.The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:

a) the manner in which it is provided;b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it;c) the time when it was provided.

A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques.

The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven:a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.

Article 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.

RA 9803 – AN ACT TO ENCOURAGE DONATION OF FOOD FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES

Sec 5. Liability for Damages from Donated Food.A person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability arising from the nature, age, packaging, or condition of apparently wholesome food that a person donates in good faith for charitable purposes. This shall apply, however, to an injury or death of an ultimate beneficiary of the donated food that results from act of omission of a person constituting gross negligence or intentional misconduct.

Interference with Contractual Relations

Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n)

GILCHRIST vs. CUDDY, ET AL. Quick Facts:Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomarwhich he rented to Gilchrist for a week.A few days prior to specified dates, Cuddy sent Gilchrist his money back, saying that he had made other arrangements with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these defendants Espejo.Injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for the said week.Cuddyaccepted offerby Espejobecause latter was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist for. CFI: An ex parte mandatory injunction was issued on the 22d of May, 1913, directing the defendant, E. A. Cuddyto send to the appellee a certain cinematograph film

Issues: WON Espejo wrongfully interfered with contractual relations and WON injunction is proper.

Held:ESPEJO WRONGFULLY INTERFERRED BUT NO MALICE, NO DAMAGESAppellants knowingly induced Cuddy to violate his contract with another person. But the only motive for the interference was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. HOWEVER, while Court does not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, it finds that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. INJUNCTION PROPERThese injunction saved the plaintiff harmless from damages due to the unwarranted interference of the defendants, as well as the difficult task which would have been set for the court of estimating them in case the appellants had been allowed to carry out their illegal plans. Courts in the United States have usually granted such relief where the profits of the injured person are derived from his contractual relations with a large and indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity of proving in an action against the tort-feasor that the latter was responsible in each case for the broken contract, or else obliging him to institute individual suits against each contracting party and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits. Affirmed.SO PING BUN v. CA (1999)


Quick FactsTekHua Trading entered into a lease contract with DCSSI for a warehouse. The term is yearly but if TekHua Trading fails to renew lease contract but continues to occupy the warehouse the term would be monthly. After some time, TH Trading was dissolved; but some time later most of the original partners formed the TH Enterprises.Meanwhile, So Ping Bun, grandson of So PekGiok (from TH Trading), found its business named Trendsetter Marketing and occupied the warehouse. DCSSI demanded payment of rent from TH Enterprises but all demands were ignored. THEnterprisesdemanded So Ping Bun to vacate the warehouse since TekHuaEbterprises would need it.So Ping Bun refused to vacate the warehouse and went to DCSSI and they entered into a formal lease contract.

TekHua Enterprises filed suit to nullify the lease contract between So Ping Bun and DCSSI and also asked for damages. TC and CA ruled in favor of TekHua Enterprises holding that So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract but did not award damages.

Issue: WON So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract

Ruling: Yes.

Elements of tort interference are: a. existence of a valid contract; b. knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and c. interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.

(Justification Debate) WON interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest:

One view: as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.

Another view: some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.

And yet another: Justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.

Gilchrist vs. Cuddy:Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer.

Case at Bar:1. So Ping Bun’s Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its

favor, and as a result petitioner deprived TekHua Enterprises of the latter's property right. Clearly, the 3 elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present.

2. So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of TekHua Enterprises. Though So Ping Bun took interest in the property of TekHua Enterprises and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.

3. NO DAMAGES ONLY BECAUSE SUCH IS NOT QUANTIFIABLE

It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist.

But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.

CA correctly nullified the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages.Affirmed.

LAGON V CALagon purchased from the estate of BaiToninaSepi two parcels of land A few months after the sale,MenandroLapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against Lagon claiming that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Sepi over land. One of the provisions agreed upon was for Lapuz to put up commercial buildings, tobe leased to new tenants.


The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay BaiToninaSepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.When BaiToninaSepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that Lagon, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. Issue: WON the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of private respondent's lease contract with the late BaiToninaSepi, constituted tortuous interference

Held: No.Recall So PingElements: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.Applying So Ping Bun:

1. 1st element present: Notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late BaiToninaSepi actually renewed their lease contract.

2. 2nd element NOT present: Lagon has no knowledge of Lapuz-Bei contract. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire property's title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the same.

3. 3rd Element present: No malice."Induce" refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late BaiToninaSepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with BaiToninaSepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established.

Reversed.

Liability of Local Government Units

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

GUILATCO v. DAGUPAN

Quick FactsGuilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk in Perez Blvd., Dagupan City when she accidentally fell into a manhole which caused her to be hospitalized and to stop from work. Guilatco filed suitNOTE: Perez Blvd is owned by the national government but is maintained by the City Engineer, including ensuring that manholes are properly coveredTC ruled in favor of Guilatco. CA reversed holding that Perez Blvd, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the city but of the Ministry of Public Highways.Issue: WON control or supervision over a national road by the city exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with Art. 2189Ruling: YES.It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

1. In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer.

2. The same charter also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.

Reversed.

QC v. DACARAQuick Facts:


The son of Dacara was driving a car when he rammed against an earth mound in a street being repaired by the SC government and the car turned turtle. Son sustained bodily injuries. Car was damaged.Dacara, in behalf of his minor son, filed for damages. The city government’s defense was they exercised due care by putting up warning devices like the visible reflectorized paint with sticks.TC ruled in favor of Dacara holding that the city government was negligent under Art. 2189The city government assailed the decision of TC, inter alia, the application of Art. 2189 which supposedly applies only to liability for the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to property.CA affirmed TC holding that indeed Art. 2189 is applicable that the negligence of the city government was the proximate cause of the injury and damage Issue: WON the city government id liable under Art. 2189RULING: YES. The court upheld the findings of the lower courts that the city government was negligent for not putting up warning devices.Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical injury - hencem also to damage to property.

The provisions of Article 2189 capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.

Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable.

Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable.

Affirmed .

Proprietor of Buildings

Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)

Engineer/Architect of Collapsed BuildingArticle 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)


WEEK 13: DAMAGES

Subtopic: Definition, concept

Article 2195: The provisions of this Title (Damages) shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157 (Sources of obligations).

Article 2197: Damages may be: 1. Actual or compensatory; 2. Moral; 3. Nominal; 4. Temperate or moderate; 5. Liquidated; 6. Exemplary or corrective

Subtopic: Actual or Compensatory

Definition: Compensation for pecuniary loss which one has duly proved (Article 2199)

Inclusive rules:

1. Indemnification comprehends not only value of loss suffered, but also profits which the obligee failed to obtain (Article 2200).

2. In contracts and quasi-contracts: obligor who acted in good faith is liable only for the natural and probable consequences of the breach, which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted; obligor who acted in bad faith, with fraud, malice or wanton attitude liable is liable for all damages which may be reasonable attributed to the non-performance (Article 2201).

3. In crimes and quasi-delicts – defendants shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or ommission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonable been foreseen by the defendant (Article 2202).

4. Damages may be recovered: a. For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury; b. For injury to plaintiff’s business standing or commercial credit (Article 2205).

5. In case of death caused by crime or quasi-delict – amount of damages shall be at least P3,000 regardless of mitigating circumstances. Also: a. Defendant shall be liable for loss of earning capacity of the deceased which shall be assessed and awarded by the court to his heirs; b. liable to give support to person entitled who is not an heir for a period not exceeding five years; b. liable for moral damages which the deceased’s spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants may demand for mental anguish (Article 2206).

Recommended cases:

For required proof of pecuniary loss: PNOC vs CA, Yu vs Ngo Yet Te

For computation of earning capacity: Philippine Hawk vs Lee

For the illustration of court’s discretion in assessing damages specifically for loss of earning capacity: Mercury Drug vs Huang

Civil indemnity from crime: People vs Buban, People vs Astrologo, People vs Apacible

Special topic: Attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation

Rule: In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, EXCEPT:

1. When exemplary damages are awarded;

2. When the defendant’s act or ommission has compelled plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

6. In actions for legal support;

7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

8. In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;

9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

10. When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and


expenses of litigation should be recovered.

*In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. (Article 2208)

Subtopic: Interest

Rules:

1. Interest upon delay in obligation for the payment of sum of money –that agreed upon or, in the absence of stipulation, legal interest at six percent per annum. (Article 2209)

2. Legal interest – shall be earned from the time judicially demanded (Article 2212)

3. Interest upon breach of contract – allowable upon discretion of the court (Article 2210).

4. Interest in crimes and quasi-delicts – adjudicated in the discretion of the court (Article 2211).

5. Interest upon unliquidated claims or damages – cannot be recovered except when demand can be established with reasonable certainty (Article 2213).

Subtopic: Mitigation of liability

Source: The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or ommission in question (Article 2203)

Rules:

In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover (Article 2214)

In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceeding article, as in the following instances: (1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract; (2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract; (3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel; (4) That the loss would have resulted in any event; (5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff’s loss or injury (Article 2215)

Recommended cases: Quirante vs IAC (on the nature of attorney’s fees), Gomez vs Gomez-Samson, Frias vs San Diego-Sison (deletion of atty’s fees in Article 2213 situations), Soriamont vs Sprint (on interest), Bank of America vs Philippine Racing Club (on mitigation of liability)

PNOC VS. CA (1998)

Doctrines:

“Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.”

Two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: (1) Loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente); (2) Failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).

“To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.”

The SC, in this case, deemed that the evidence presented by the MEFC, through Del Rosario, was insufficient. Price quotations used to assess the damage is only “hearsay” since it is not based on personal knowledge and the signatories were not presented as witnesses. Also, the said documents cannot be considered “commercial lists and the like” under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence since they were personally


issued to Del Rosario and not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter.

Absent any competent proof to support the award of actual/compensatory damages, the SC instead awarded nominal damages which are “not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.”

GATCHALIAN VS. DELIM (1991)

The “Thames” minibus owned by Arsenio Delim turned turtle and fell into a ditch injuring several passengers including Reynalda Gatchalian. Among her injuries was a lacerated wound on her forehead which, she claimed, caused her to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She then sued Delim and claimed P10,000 for loss of employment and other opportunities and P10,000 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead. Gatchalian lost in the trial court, which ruled that damages cannot be awarded because she signed a waiver which Delim’s wife asked the injured passengers while they were in the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying the Gatchalian’s claim for damages but decided that the cited waiver was not valid. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the CA and granted the award for actual damages covering the cost of plastic surgery in the amount of P15,000. It did not grant the claim for damages for loss of employment opportunities since her employment as a substitute teacher was merely sporadic and she was no longer employed when the incident happened.

Doctrines/quotes:“A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable.”

“Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.”

In Araneta, et al. vs. Areglado, et al., the damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is undeniable.

YU VS. NGO YET TE (2007)

Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu purchased from Ngo Yet Te bars of detergent soap worth P594,240 and issued three postdated checks as payment for the purchase price. The checks, however, bounced and despite demands from Te, the Yu spouses did not do anything to fulfill their obligation to pay. Te then filed a collection suit with prayer for preliminary attachment against the spouses. In response, the trial court then issued an order of attachment/levy on, among others, a parcel of land and a passenger bus operated by the spouses. The spouses Yu then filed a counterclaim for damages arising from the wrongful attachment based on loss of earnings from the passenger bus. The Supreme Court earlier ruled (affirming CA) that the attachment was improper. The trial court hearing the counterclaim, however, was unaware of the cited earlier SC decision. The trial court nonetheless denied the claim for damages, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The SC ultimately also did not award actual or compensatory damages for insufficiency of evidence (presented was ticket stubs for five days which was improperly used to compute the average daily income from the bus). On the other hand, the high court awarded temperate damages and attorney’s fees.

Doctines/quotes:The CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful did not relieve Spouses Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis of their counterclaim for damages.

To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.

If the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be estalished and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.

In this case, the actual damages cannot be determined. Defendant-appellant Josefa Yu testified on supposed lost profits without clear and appreciable explanation. Despite her submission of the used and unused ticket stubs, there was no evidence on the daily net income, the routes plied by the bus and the average fares for each route. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented.


CANDANO VS. SUGATA-ON (2007)

M/V David, Jr., a passenger vessel owned by Candano Shipping Lines, sank together with its cargo and several crew members. Melquiades Sugata-on, who was working on board as Third Marine Engineer with a monthly salary of P7,800, was missing, prompting his wife, Florentina Sugata-on to go to the office of Candano Shipping to claim death benefits which the latter refused to pay. This urged her to file an action seeking indemnity for the death of Melquiades before the Manila RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Florentina and awarded P988,400 in actual damages, using the formula in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs CA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but reduced the award for the cited damages to P608,400, using the standard in Article 194 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court reinstated the award given by the RTC.

Doctrines/quotes:Formula in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs CA: The annual expenses of the deceased are deducted from his gross annual income and multiplied by life expectancy (gross annual income – annual expense x life expectancy)

Standard in Article 194 of the Labor Code: …The System shall pay to the primary beneficiaries upon the death of the covered employee under this Title an amount equivalent to his monthly income benefit, plus ten percent thereof for each dependent child, but not exceeding five, beginning with the youngest and without substitution… Provided, however, That the monthly income benefit shall be guaranteed for five years: Provided, further, That if he has no primary beneficiary, the System shall pay to his secondary beneficiaries the monthly income benefit not to exceed sixty months; Provided, finally, That the minimum monthly death benefit shall not be less that fifteen thousand pesos.

The remedy availed by Sugata-on in filing the claim under the New Civil Code has been validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter (the Villa Rey formula).

In Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the SC declared that the employees may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy.

The exception is where the claimant who had already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

This doctrinal rule is rooted on the theory that the basis of the compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code. Compensation is given to mitigate harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer.

MERCURY DRUG VS. HUANG (2007)

A six wheeler truck, owned by Mercury Drug Corp. and driven by Rolando del Rosario, figured in a collision with a Toyota Corolla driven by Stephen Huang. The latter sustained massive injuries and resulted in his paralysis from the chest down which would then require continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. Stephen’s parents sued Mercury Drug and Del Rosario for damages. The RTC of Makati awarded, among others, P2,973,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages, P23,461,062 for the life care cost of Stephen, and P10,000,000 for the lost or impaired earning capacity of Stephen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the said awards for damages.

Doctrine/quotes:Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that "[E]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved x x x."

The amount of P2,973,000 represented cost of hospital expenses, medicines, medical services and supplies, and nursing care services provided respondent Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of the accident, until December 1998.

Mercury drug is also liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of (Article 2202, NCC).

The doctors who attended to respondent Stephen are one in their prognosis that his chances of walking again and performing basic body functions are nil. For the rest of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications. The high court thus affirmed the award of P23,461,062 for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years that he is expected to live.


The court also affirmed the award of P10,000,000 for loss or impairment of earning capacity, considering that “blah… blah… blah… Stephen was an exceptional student, varsity player, had a rosy future ahead of him… blah… blah… blah…”

Note: This case is weird in the sense that Stephen was not yet employed or earning and the court clearly had no basis for the computation of his supposed earning capacity. As such, this case must be used with caution unless the facts of a given case fits squarely with the circumstances presented in this case. Jurisprudence, while imprudent, is still jurisprudence.

PEOPLE VS. BUBAN (2007)

Francisco Buban was charged for killing Arsenio Imperial. Imperial’s wife and son testified that they saw Buban and two others insert the muzzle of a rifle through a torn portion atop their bamboo wall. The apparent motive was that Imperial saw Buban and the others illegally slaughtering cattle by the river. The RTC convicted Buban and ordered him to pay Imperial’s heirs P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the award for damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA and increased the civil indemnity to P75,000 consistent with current jurisprudence.

Doctrine/quotes:Since the aggravating circumstance of treachery was present, the imposable penalty should have been death. However, since RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of such penalty, Buban was penalized with reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

As to damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Based on current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000 was given to the heirs of Arsenio Imperial.

Note: In civil indemnity ex delicto or death indemnity, the application is pretty much automatic if the crime resulted in the death of a victim. What is important is to account for the applicable rates based on the most recent jurisprudence. However, look at People vs Apacible first for a more integrated rule.

PEOPLE VS. ASTROLOGO (2007)

Norberto Astrologo Y de Dios was accused of raping his own daughter. The daughter used to live with her grandmother but was fetched by Norberto to live with him and his family. One night, after watching television from the neighbor’s house, she slept beside her siblings. She woke up after feeling that someone was kissing her, which turned out to be Norberto. She was raped. The RTC convicted Astrologo and ordered him to pay AAA (his minor daughter) P75,000 as civil indemnity and P75,000 as moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but reduced the amount of both civil indemnity and moral damages to P50,000. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA and sustained the amount of damages it fixed and added an award for exemplary damages.

Doctrines/quote:Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.

Case law also requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.

The reduction of civil indemnity to P50,000.00 and moral damages to P50,000.00 is proper because the crime committed by the appellant is only simple rape.

PEOPLE VS. APACIBLE (2010)

Arman Apacible was charged with the murder of Arnold Vizconde whom the former stabbed to death in his own home. Vizconde’s wife surmised that the motive of the killing was Vizconde’s refusal to amicably settle the malicious mischief case he filed against Apacible’s brother who broke the windshield of Vizconde’s car. The RTC convicted Apacible and ordered him to pay P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages to Vizconde’s heirs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but increased the amounts of both civil indemnity and moral damages to P75,000 and added exemplary damages based supposedly on recent jurisprudence. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA but reinstated the amount of damages fixed by the RTC.

Doctrines/quote:The court explained that the award of P75,000 is only proper in cases where the proper imposable penalty is death as cited in People vs Anod.


In this case, the imposable penalty was only reclusion perpetua, thus the SC reduced the amount for civil indemnity.

Note: Hence, civil indemnity is set at P50,000. The amount of P75,000 can only be applied if the proper (theoretical) imposable penalty is death (which in reality, however, cannot actually be imposed because of the statutory prohibition).

CRISOSTOMO VS. PEOPLE (2010)

Rodel Crisostomo was charged with robbery with homicide. He was accused to have been one of the motorcycle-riding gunmen who robbed a gasoline station and shot the cashier, Janet Ramos. Jose Buencamino, owber of the gasoline station stated the money stolen amounted to P40,000. Receipts in the amount of P14,500 were presented as funeral expenses. The RTC convicted Crisostomo of robbery with homicide and ordered him to pay Ramos’ heirs P75,000 as civil indemnity, to pay Buencamino P40,000 plus P14,500 for funeral expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but reduced the civil indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling.

Doctrines/quotes:In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each is granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstances. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the fact of the commission of the crime.

To be entitled to compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. "[R]eceipts should support claims of actual damages."

Thus, as correctly held by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, the amount of P14,500.00 incurred as funeral expenses can be sustained since these are expenditures supported by receipts. Also, the RTC and CA correctly held Crisostomo liable to return the amount of P40,000.00 which was stolen from the gas station before the victim was shot and killed.

Note: Reiteration of the P50,000 applicable rate. This is the most recent case among the four criminal cases. Thus, this rate for civil indemnity should apply. Be wary, however, of the qualifications: “in the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstances.”

PHILIPPINE HAWK VS. LEE (2010)

Vivian Tan Lee and her husband Silvino Tan, while on board a motorcycle driven by Silvino, figured in a collision with a Metro Bus owned by Philippine Hawk Corp. and driven by Margarito Avila. Silvino died on the spot while Vivian suffered phyisical injuries which necessitated medical attention and hospitalization. Silvino, prior to his death, operated a gasoline station that yielded P1,000,000 a year in revenue. They also had a copra business, which gave them an income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a year. The RTC ruled in favor of Lee and ordered Philippine Hawk and Avila to solidarily pay Silvino’s heirs P745,575 representing loss of earnings and actual damages plus P50,000 in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision but modified the amount of damages: P168,019.55 as actual damages, P10,000 as temperate damages, P100,000 as moral damages, P590,000.00 as unearned income, and P50,000 as civil indemnity. The Supreme Court affirmed but modified the award for damages. Doctrines/quotes: The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.

EXCEPTIONS: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses. In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income.

Formula used: NEC (Net Earning Capacity) = LE x NAI

LE (Life Expectancy) = [2/3(80 – ATD*)]NAI (Net Annual Income) = (Living Expenses Rate x NI)

NI (Net Income) = GAI* – NE *Living Expenses Rate (Fixed at 50 percent unless otherwise provided) = 0.50


*Variables supposed to be provided by the case:ATD (Age at the Time of Death) Provided in case = 65GAI (Gross Annual Income) Provided in case = 1,000,000NE (Necessary Expenses) PEGGED by the court at 80% of the GAI representing the cost of leasing the gasoline station = 0.80(100,000) = 800,000.

THUS: NEC = {[2/3(80 – 65)] x [0.50(1,000,000 – 800,000)]}NEC = {[2/3(15)] x [0.50(200,000)]}NEC = 10 x 100,000 NEC = P1,000,000

QUIRANTE VS. IAC (1989)

Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building contractor named Norman Guerrero. The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted as bondsman for Guerrero. In view of Guerrero’s failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Casasola, through his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both Guerrero and PHILAMGEN for damages. The RTC ruled in favor of Casasola and ordering Guerrero and PHILAMGEN to pay Casasola actual damages in the amount of P129,430, moral damages in the amount of P50,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P40,000, and attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000. PHILAMGEN appealed but in the meantime, Casasola died. In the interim, Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, Casasola promised to pay him P30,000 in case of the recovery of the P120,000 surety bond and, in case the court awarded damages in excess of the cited amount, the surplus would be divided equally between the heirs of Casasola, himself, and another lawyer. The trial court granted the motion. The IAC, however, deemed it premature.

Doctrines/quotes:Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered . It also rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The rule against multiplicity of suits will in effect be subserved.

What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.

Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client.

YU VS. NGO YET TE (SUPRA)

On Attorney’s fees: As a rule, attorney’s fees cannot be awarded when moral and exemplary damages are not granted, the exception however is when a party incurred expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment. Without a doubt, Spouses Yu waged a protracted legal battle to fight off the illegal attachment of their properties and pursue their claims for damages. It is only just and equitable that they be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P30,000.

GOMEZ VS. GOMEZ-SAMSON (2007)

Augusto Gomez, special administrator of the intestate estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, sued his cousins and an uncle for allegedly forging a deed of donation supposedly executed by Consuelo for their benefit, involving parcels of lands in one civil case and movables including shares of stocks and a car in another civil case. The RTC of Pasig consolidated the two civil cases, in which the Augusto’s cousins and uncle filed their counterclaim, seeking damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the cousins and uncle, upholding the deeds of donation as valid and ordering Augusto and Consuel’s estate to pay them P1,000,000 in moral damages, P250,000 in exemplary damages, and P200,000 in attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA but deleted the awards for damages.

Doctrines/quotes:The lower courts ruled that Augusto was motivated not by a sincere desire to insure the totality of the estate of Consuelo, but rather by his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to appropriate for himself and the rest of the Gomez brothers and nephews, other


than the donees, properties which were clearly validly disposed of by Consuelo, via Donations Inter Vivos, in filing the suit – forming the basis for the award of damages.

The Supreme Court, however, noted that the respondents never assailed the authenticity of Augusto’s evidence, and merely presented their own evidence to support their assertions. Augusto’s evidence had successfully given the court doubts as to the authenticity of the subject Deeds of Donation. Petitioner’s institution of the present case was carried out with good faith. The subpoenas directed against respondents merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioner’s counsel to represent its client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against its clients. Absent bad faith, there can be no moral damages as a consequence of Augusto’s institution of the civil action.

The high court has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, no exemplary damages can be granted, for exemplary damages are allowed only in addition to any of the four kinds of damages mentioned.

The attorney’s was also be deleted, as it was not the consequence of an unfounded civil action or proceeding by Augusto (Refer to Article 2208)

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. RAMOY (2008)

The National Power Corporation filed an ejectment case against several persons allegedly illegally occupying its properties in Quezon City. Among them was Leoncio Ramoy whose electricity, supplying power to the appartments he had for lease, was cut after the NPC requested MERALCO to cut the lines of addresses found within the parameters of NPC’s properties. It was found out later, however, that Ramoy’s property was outside the property of the NPC. This prompted him to sue MERALCO, seeking moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The RTC dismissed the Ramoy’s claim. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the RTC and ordered MERALCO to pay the cited awards of damages. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, reversed the CA and deleted the awards.

Doctrines/quotes:The award of moral damages was deleted since there was no testimony of wounded feelings, anxiety, shock, experienced by Ramoy’s co-respondents. Moral damages, who proved wounded feelings on the stand, was the only one awarded such.

There was also no showing that MERALCO acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner to give credence to the award of exemplary damages.

The Court finds that MERALCO fell short of exercising the due diligence required, but its actions cannot be considered wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent. Records show that MERALCO did take some measures, i.e., coordinating with NPC officials and conducting a joint survey of the subject area, to verify which electric meters should be disconnected although these measures are not sufficient, considering the degree of diligence required of it. Thus, in this case, exemplary damages should not be awarded.

Since the Court did not deem it proper to award exemplary damages in this case, the CA's award for attorney's fees was deleted, as Article 2208 of the Civil Code states that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees cannot be recovered except in cases provided for in said Article. (See Article 2208 exceptions to the general rule that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered)

BRIONES VS. MACABAGDAL (2010)

The Macabagdal spouses purchased from Vergon Realty Investments (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R. The Briones spouses, petitioners, meanwhile, were owners of the adjacent lot, Lot. No. 2-S. The Macbagdals proceeded to construct their house on their Lot. No. 2-R, thinking that it was Lot. No. 2-S. After being informed of the mix up by Vergon’s manager, respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to heed their demand. Thus, the Macabagdals filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the RTC of Makati City. The RTC ruled in favor of the Macabagdals and ordered the Briones spouses to pay moral damages (P50,000) and attorney’s fees (P30,000). The Briones were also ordered to pay Vergon, in the counterclaim suit, compensatory damages (P20,000) and attorney’s fees (P10,000). The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. The Supreme Court, however, deleted the award of damages and remanded the case back to the RTC to determine the “builder in good faith” options of the Briones spouses.

Doctrines/quotes: Considering that petitioners acted in good faith in building their house on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the award of moral damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court deletes the award to Vergon of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees for the litigation expenses Vergon had incurred as such amounts were not specifically prayed for in its Answer to petitioners’ third-party complaint.


Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs.

Hence, such must be specifically prayed for—as was not done in this case—and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for "such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable."

It must also be noted that aside from the following, the body of the trial court’s decision was devoid of any statement regarding attorney’s fees. In Scott Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated that attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.

The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees.

BANK OF AMERICA VS. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB (2009)

The president and vice-president of the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) pre-signed blank checks before leaving the country to ensure that cash/money would become available whenever its obligations become due to maintain smooth operations even when they are absent. The checks are usually left with the company accountant. One day, however, a john doe was able to encash the check for P110,000 with Bank of America. PRCI then sued the bank for payment. The RTC ruled in favor of PRCI and ordered Bank of America to pay P220,000, P20,000 as attorney’s fees, and P10,000 as costs of the suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court, however, mitigated the liability of the bank with respect to the P220,000 (only 60 percent was to be paid) and deleted the awards for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses since PRCI was found to be also negligent in its practice of pre-signing blank checks (Bank of America was still primarilly negligent via the doctine of “last clear chance”)

Doctrines/quotes:Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, the Court held: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.

“Following established jurisprudential precedents, we believe the allocation of sixty percent (60%) of the actual damages involved in this case (represented by the amount of the checks with legal interest) to petitioner is proper under the premises. Respondent should, in light of its contributory negligence, bear forty percent (40%) of its own loss.”

FRIAS VS. SAN DIEGO-SISON (2007)

Doctrines/quotes:The agreement that the amount given shall bear compounded bank interest for the last six months only, i.e., referring to the second six-month period, does not mean that interest will no longer be charged after the second six-month period since such stipulation was made on the logical and reasonable expectation that such amount would be paid within the date stipulated. Considering that petitioner failed to pay the amount given which under the Memorandum of Agreement shall be considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the last six months continued to accrue until actual payment of the loaned amount.

The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and thus, until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal amount.

It has been held that for a debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.

SORIAMONT VS. SPRINT (2009)

Doctrines/quotes:


Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, when an obligation not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, then an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.

Clearly, the monetary judgment in favor of Sprint does not involve a loan or forbearance of money; hence, the proper imposable rate of interest is six percent.

As declared in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the interim period from the finality of the judgment awarding a monetary claim until payment thereof is deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

When the judgment awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent of a forbearance of credit.

Thus, from the time the judgment becomes final until its full satisfaction, the applicable rate of legal interest shall be twelve percent (12%).

Note: Review Eastern Shipping Lines Rule

PAN PACIFIC VS. EQUITABLE (PCIB) (2010)

Pan Pacific, engaged in contracting mechanical works on airconditioning system, was asserting its right to price adjustment provided for in the contract with PCIB due to escalating labor costs and prices of materials. PCIB, however, found the price adjustment too much and pressed Pan Pacific to accept a cheaper adjustment. Since Pan Pacific was losing operational capital was dwindling, it was forced to concede on PCIB’s offer to lend them P1.8 million. The loan matured but Pan Pacific refused to pay it, reasoning that PCIB’s delay in paying the price adjustment forced it to take out the loan and that the loan should instead be considered an advanced payment for the said adjustment.

Doctrines/quotes:Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the appropriate measure for damages in case of delay in discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a sum of money is the payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon in the contract of the parties.

In the absence of a stipulation of a particular rate of penalty interest, payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the regular monetary interest becomes due and payable.

Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon by the contracting parties, then the damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest which is 6%, or in the case of loans or forbearances of money, 12% per annum. It is only when the parties to a contract have failed to fix the rate of interest or when such amount is unwarranted that the Court will apply the 12% interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of money.


WEEK 14 : MORAL DAMAGES

MORAL DAMAGES

Civil Code

Art. 2217 – Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission

Art. 2219 – Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts4) Adultery or concubinage5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest6) Illegal search7) Libel, slander, or any other form of defamation8) Malicious prosecution9) Acts mentioned in article 309 (showing disrespect to the dead or wrongfully

interferes with a funeral)10) Acts and actions mentioned in arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused, referred to in No. 3, may also recover moral damages

The spouse, descendants, ascendants and brothers and sisters, may bring the action mentioned in No. 9, in the order named.

Art. 2220 – Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are correctly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith

Taken from Sangco:

- Purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. They are not intended to enrich a complaint at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action.

- It is aimed at a restoration of the “spiritual status quo ante”- Assessment of such damage is left to the discretion of the court, according to the

circumstances of each case (Art. 2216)- Enumeration in Art. 22198 was not intended to be complete and exclusive. The

‘analogous circumstances’ for recovery of moral damages should be left to the courts to determine

In awarding moral damages, the following requisites must be taken into consideration:

1. Proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee’s acts2. There must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the

actual basis for damages3. The award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases

enumerated under the Civil Code

For rape, seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and physical injuries: no need to prove moral damages. The same is awarded automatically.

Kierulf vs. CAFacts: The victims of a vehicular mishap pray for an increase in the award of damages. In this case, the husband of the victim of the vehicular damages claims compensation for the loss of his right to marital consortium which, according to him, has been diminished due to the disfigurement suffered by his wife.

Held:

- Claim of deprivation of his right to consortium is not supported by evidence on record. His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in the consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was affected.

- The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. Social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages


may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender’s knowledge of his or her social and financial standing

Sulpicio Lines vs. Curso

Are the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks during a voyage entitled to recover moral damages from the vessel owner as common carrier?

Held: No.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith. As an exception, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger

The conditions for awarding moral damages are:

a. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly substantiated by the claimant

b. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established

c. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant

d. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases in Art. 2219

Moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when:

a. Where the death of a passenger results

b. It is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result

Article 2206 of the Code entitles the descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children and surviving spouse of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages. Therefore, brothers and sisters CASNNOT claim moral damages.

BF Metal vs. Lomotan

Facts: Umuyon wass driving the owner-type jeep owned by Lomotan when it met an accident. Jeep was destroyed, Umuyon suffered injuries. TC and CA granted moral damages only to Umuyon

Issue: Whether Lomotan is also entitled to actual damages

- Only Umuyon (the jeepney driver) can be awarded moral damages. The owners of the jeepney cannot. Moral damages can only be given in a QD for the persons injured

- Nature of moral damages: not punitive in nature.

- Now, damages can be divided into punitive and compensative. Moral damages is compensatory and not punitive because it seeks to restore the person, spiritually, to its status quo ante.

- Damages were not awarded to Lomotan spouses. The driver awarded P30K to Umuyon because he did not die.

- In this case, damage was not made willfully since it was an accident

Expert Travel vs. CA

Facts: - CA and RTC issued judgment:

1. Pay defendant Ricardo Lo moral damages in the amt. of 30K2. Attorney’s fees 10K

- Expert Travel sued Lo alleging that he did not pay four round trip tickets he ordered. Lo says that he paid the amount to Ms. De Vega, who was authorized to deal with clients of Expert Travel.

Is moral damages properly awarded to Lo. YESHeld:

- Petition meritorious. - Award for moral damages require certain conditions to be met:

1. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by defendant


2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of

the injury sustained by the claimant4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stipulated in

Art. 2219- Moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results

from a breach of carriage- In a quasi-delict, moral damages may be recovered if:

1. An act or omission causes physical injuries2. Defendant is guilty of intentional tort

- Unfounded civil suits – not a ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone haled to court.

- Here you have a case supporting the view that if not listed is not under 2219, it cannot be awarded moral damages

- Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages.

Mijares vs. CA

Facts: Metro Drug sued Mijares, owners of Aklan Drug, for the total value of various products they ordered which they refused to pay despite demand. Aklan Drug interposed a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. RTC dismissed the case and ruled for the defendants; ordering the plaintiff to pay 30k moral damages, 10k attorney’s fees and cost of suit. CA reversed the decision of the RTC. SC reinstates RTC decision, affirming only the dismissal of the complaint

Held:

- Trial court however erred when it awarded moral damages in favor of petitioners. Petitioners have failed to show that private respondent was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. Unfounded civil suits encompasses malicious prosecution.

- Malicious prosecution requires:1. Malice2. Absence of probable cause

- It must be noted that it cannot be malicious prosecution because a civil case was filed, not a criminal case.

- Award for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must likewise be deleted.

Casis: The elements of malicious prosecution is a mistake because it would mean it is the same as an unfounded civil suit. They are not the same.

Industrial Insurance vs. Bondad

Facts: collision between three vehicles – a gallant sigma car driven by Morales, a packed jeepney driven by Bondad and a DM Transit Bus. Industrial Insurance Company and Morales filed complaint for damages to the RTC against DM Transit, Diaz and Bondad. RTC and CA ruled that the plaintiff had no valid cause of action against Bondad. CA however deleted the expenses for attending the hearings since it was not sufficiently proven

Issue: Whether the award for moral and exemplary damages is proper

Held: petition not meritorious

- Petitioner knew that respondents were not the cause of the accident. This is evident from its failure to even make a prior formal demand on them before initiating the suit. Indeed, the cause of the accident was the negligence of DM transit driver. In impleading the respondents, petitioner clearly acted in wanton disregard of the facts that were as obvious then as they are now. The careless and lack of diligence of petitioner destroys its claim of good faith. Accordingly, award for attorney’s fees should be sustained.

- SC affirms the award for moral damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that:

1. The claimant suffered injury

2. Such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in 2219, 2220 CC.


- It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive. In this case, it has been shown that the petitioner acted in bad faith in compelling respondents to litigate an unfounded claim. As a result, Bondad could no longer concentrate on his job. Moreover, Pablo Bondad became sick and even suffered a mild stroke.

- Suit filed: Civil. Court awarded moral damages in basis of an unfounded suit.

1. Thing to do here: padamihan nalang.

2. 2219 does not include unfounded suit, but it includes analogous cases. You have conflicting jurisprudence

- Exemplary damages also affirmed because petitioner’s conduct needlessly dragged innocent bystanders into an unfounded litigation. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good

Triple 8 vs. NLRC

Facts: The contractor-employee agreement between Osdana and 888 was for her to be employed as waitress in KSA for 12 mos for $280. She was made to work long hours and under harsh conditions. She was dismissed from work without separation pay and she was not paid her salaries for the period when she was not allowed to work. NLRC ordered 888 to pay Osdana her salaries for the unexpired portion of her contract, unpaid salaries, salary differential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

Held: With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is proper but should be reduced. Moral damages is recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award

for attorney’s fees is upheld. 888 is ordered by SC to pay respondent 30k moral damages, 10k exemplary damages and 10% attorney’s fees

People vs. Pirame

Facts: Cleopas and Pirame are found guilty of murder by the RTC. They are sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs P50K each and the amount of P23K for the burial and incidental expenses and P50K each representing moral and exemplary damages. Only Pirame appealed.

Held: The award of 50k from each accused as moral and exemplary damages is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husband’s death. Absent any generic aggravating circumstance attending the crime likewise precludes the award of exemplary damages

Arcona vs. CA

Facts: RTC found Carlos Arcona guilty of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstances. He was sentenced to indemnity the heirs of Ong the sum of 30k for his death, 10k actual damages and 10k as moral damages. Arcona appealed his conviction for homicide. CA affirmed and increased the civil indemnity to 50K.

Held: CA was correct in increasing the amount of civil indemnity to 50k. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the amt. of 50k is automatically granted.

Moral damages in the sum of 10k should be increased to 50k. A violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes a victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprived them forever of his love, affection and support, but leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice be done to them. For this reason moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heir’s emotional suffering.


Sps. Valenzuela vs. Mano

Facts: Dispute of ownership over piece of land; action for reconveyance was filed. It was not a breach of contract RTC ordered the defendants to return the plaintiffs the disputed portion consisting of 447 sq. m., demolish and or remove the concrete fence erected on the premises, and pay 50k moral damages, 30k exemplary damages, 50k attorney’s fees. CA overturned RTC ruling and dismissed the complaint. SC finds the petition meritorious, ruling that Federico is the owner of the disputed property

Held: Petitioners are entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages.

- Person claiming moral damages should prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and serious anxiety as the result of the actions of one party. Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.

- Having ruled that Jose committed fraud in obtaining the title to the disputed property then he should be liable for both moral and exemplary damages. Likewise, since petitioners were compelled to litigate to protect their rights and having proved that Jose acted in bad faith, attorney’s fees should likewise be awarded.

Lopez vs. Pan American

Facts: Senator Lopez reserved first class accommodations in Flight 2 of Pan-Am from Tokyo to SanFo. Pan-Am’s head office confirmed said reservations. Tickets were thereby issued and the total fare for all of them was paid before tickets were issued. However, when they arrived in Tokyo, the first class seats were all booked up. They were constrained to ride in the tourist class of Flight 2. They did so under protest. Thus, this suit for damages filed by Lopez against Pan-Am

- RTC ordered Pan-AM to pay 100k moral damages, 20k exemplary damages, 25k attorney’s fees and the costs of this action. RTC reconsidered and increased the moral damages to 150k, 25k exemplary damages; with legal interest on both from the date of filing of the complaint until paid and 25k attorney’s fees and costs of the action.

- Both parties appealed. Defendant, though admitting it breached its contracts with plaintiffs, says that it did not act in bad faith. Plantiffs wanted a raise in the award of damages awarded, seeking it to be increased to a total of P650k.

- At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such willful non-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that the reservations for plantiffs stood not simply the erroneous cancellation itself is the factor to which is attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as above stated, in this respect, defendant clearly acted in bad faith.

- First, moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently and in bad faith

- In addition to moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be interposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive and malevolent manner.

- Third, a written contract for an attorney’s services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable

- Moral damages – as a proximate result of defendant’s breach in bad faith of its contract, plantiffs suffered social humiliation… it may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking

- Sen. Lopez was then Senate President pro Tempore. International carriers should know the prestige of such an office. For the moral damages sustained by him, court awards P100k

- Court awards 50k moral damage to Mrs. Lopez and 25k each to the spouses Montelibano. Court granted these awards since they shared in the prestige of Senator Lopez, as his wife and children


People vs. Lizano

Facts: Lizano is convicted of rape. SC affirms conviction. SC affirms also the award of civil indemnity and moral damages which amounts to 50k each.

Held: Moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim had actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.

PNR vs. Brunty

The SC awarded moral damages to Ethel Brunty for having sufficiently establishing that she deserved said award in her deposition.

SC awarded P500K moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. This is in view of existing jurisprudence which the court cited. In People v. Teehankee, Jr. and in Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we awarded moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased. In Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan, the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held in keeping with the purpose of the law, while in Macalinao v. Ong, the amount of P50,000.00 was held sufficient.

ABS-CBN vs. CA

Facts: ABS-CBN and Viva Films entered into an agreement whereby Viva gave ABS an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. Negotiations broke down and the package was sold to RBS. ABS CBN sued RBS and Viva Films. RTC ruled in favor of RBS, ordering ABS-CBN to pay, among others, attorney’s fees and P5M moral damages. As regards moral and exemplary damages, RBS asserts that ABS-CBN filed the case and secured injunctions purely for the purpose of harassing and prejudicing RBS. Pursuant then to Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, ABS-CBN must be held liable for such damages. Citing Tolentino, damages may be awarded in cases of abuse of rights even if the done is not illicit, and there is abuse of rights where a plaintiff institutes an action purely for the purpose of harassing or prejudicing the defendant. RBS avers that they suffered humiliation and that reputation has been debased by ABS-CBN’s acts in this case.

Held: The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no

feelings, no emotions, no senses. (general rule) It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if it “has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation” is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.

There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person’s exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria

Republic vs. Tuvera

Facts: A complaint was filed by PCGG against Juan Tuvera, as Presidential Executive Assistant of President Marcos. It alleged that he took advantage of his relationship to influence upon and connection with the President by engaging in a scheme to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of the Republic and of the Filipino people. This was allegedly accomplished on his part by securing TLA No. 356 on behalf of Twin Peaks despite existing laws expressly prohibiting the exportation of mahogany of the narra species and Twin Peaks’ lack of qualification to be a grantee thereof for lack of sufficient logging equipment to engage in the logging business.1[10] The Complaint further alleged that Twin Peaks exploited the country’s natural resources by engaging in large-scale logging and the export of its produce through its Chinese operators whereby respondents obtained a revenue of approximately P45 million.

Held: The claim for moral damages deserves short shrift. The claimant in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, a juridical person. A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Article 2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar does not involve any of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic could sustain any of the injuries contemplated therein. Any lawyer for the Republic who poses a claim for moral damages in behalf of the State stands in risk of serious ridicule.

1


Casis: It somehow also ruled an exception to ABS-CBN because it elucidates that moral damages may be awarded to juridical persons for libel, slander, or any other form of defamation


WEEK 15: NOMINAL, TEMPERATE, LIQUIDATED and EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

Nominal DamagesArt. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.

Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.:

Robes-Francisco Realty & Dev. Corp. v. CFI Rizal & Lolita MillanOctober 30, 1978 |Munoz-Palma, J.

Quickfacts Millan bought a lot from RFRDC and paid in full her installments for a total sum of P3,864. After repeated demands, RFRDC failed to execute final deed of absolute sale within their 6 months stipulation and convey the TCT. It was later found out that the land was included among other properties of the corporation mortgaged to GSIS to secure an obligation of 10M.

RFRDC Liable for nominal damages? Yes, but 20k awarded by lower court is excessive and must be reduced to 10K.

DoctrineMillan submitted her case without presenting evidence on the actual damages suffered by her as a result of the nonperformance of RFRDC’s obligation under the deed of sale. Nonetheless, the facts show that the right of the vendee to acquire title to the lot bought by her was violated by the corporation and this entitles her at the very least to nominal damages.

Nominal damages are recoverable where some injury has been done, the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. The amount, by its very nature, should be small without regard to the extent of the injury done.

The admitted fact of failure to convey TCT because of previous mortgage does not show in itself bad faith or fraud. Bad faith is not to be presumed. Moreover, there was expectation of the vendor that arrangements were possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of the subdivision lots from overall REM.

• Francisco v. Ferrer February 28, 2001 |Pardo, J

QuickfactsOn the day of the wedding, the three-layered cake which should have been delivered by 5pm did not arrive on time. At 6pm, upon arrival of Ferrer newlyweds at the venue, the cake was not yet there. 7pm follow-up was made but Fountainhead Bakeshop reasoned that it was probably due to traffic when the truth is they forgot to make the cake because they lost the order slip. Delivery of a 2-layered cake was made by 10pm, which was rejected by the Ferrers. Francisco sent a letter of apology with P5k check but was also rejected.

Francisco Liable for nominal damages? YES

DoctrineNominal damages are recoverable where (1) a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or

(2) there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages have been or can be shown.

When confronted by their failure to deliver, the bakeshop gave lame excuse of traffic and concealed the truth. For such prevarication Francisco is liable for nominal damages due to insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customer’s anxiety and need of the hour

Gonzales v. PeopleFebruary 12, 2007 |Quisumbing, J

QuickfactsGonzales was convicted of arson for setting fire to a 2-storey residential building rented out to tenants with the value of P5.465M. Records failed to show concrete proof of the amount of actual damages suffered by Canlas (lessor) and each tenant, actual damages were NOT granted.


Is Gonzales liable for nominal damages instead of actual damages? YES

DoctrineNominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party. However, it is generally held that nominal damages is a substantial claim, if based upon violation of a legal right. The law presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not proven.

Nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact and are allowed, not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.

Temperate DamagesArt. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.

Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.

Pleno v. CAMay 9, 1988 |Gutierrez, Jr., J

Quickfacts A snub-nosed Volkswagen kombi driven by Pleno, was suddenly w/o warning hit on its left rear corner by a red colored cargo truck owned by Philippine Paper Products. Due to the impact the kombi moved faster veering to the right and smashing unto the right rear portion of another truck, parked along the shoulder of the road. The parked truck moved forward hit Ruben RIevera, its driver who was at that time standing in front of his parked truck urinating.

Maximo Pleno sustained multiple fractures, lacerations, had to undergo many operations and suffered double vision which affected his social and business life. At the time of the accident he was a mechanical engineer, a topnotcher, and a director, VP and general manager of Mayon Ceramics Corp.

Is the CA correct in reducing award of temperate damages to Pleno from 200k to 100k? NO

DoctrineThe gravity of the injuries Pleno received and the resulting pain and mental suffering is very much evident from his medical diagnosis.

Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages and may be awarded where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, but the court is convinced that there has been such a loss. The judge is empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the defendant’s wrongful act.

Ramos v. CADecember 29, 1999 |Kapunan., J

QuickfactsErlinda Ramos was until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, a 47-year old robust woman. During her operation, her surgeon was very late. The anesthesiologist intubated her wrongly which caused her comatose.

Can actual and temperate damages be awarded at the same time? YES

DoctrineActual damages contemplates injury already incurred, while temperate damages may be awarded in such cases so as not to lead the victim in constantly coming to courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded because the resulting injury continues with possible future complications directly arising from the injury.

The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.

Casis Comment : this case is an aberration since temperate damages are only awarded when there is no basis for actual damages.

Republic v. TuveraFebruary 16, 2007 |Tinga, J

QuickfactsJuan Tuvera, who was Presidential Executive Assistant of Marcos influenced the former to grant Timber License Agreement to Twin Peaks, a corporation 48% owned by Victor


Tuvera, Juan’s son. Twin Peak’s asset was subjected to sequestration by PCGG on the ground of ill-gotten wealth.

Should temperate damages be awarded in the absence of clear evidence establishing actual degree of injury (PhP 48M) sustained by the State by reason of such wrongful act? YES

Jurisprudence is clear that temperate damages may be awarded even in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proven with certainty. The allowance of temperate damages when actual damages were not adequately proven is ultimately a rule drawn from equity, the principle affording relief to those definitely injured who are unable to prove how definite the injury.

There is no impediment to apply this doctrine which involves one of the most daunting and noble undertakings of our young democracy – the recovery of ill-gotten wealth salted away during the Marcos years.

Liquidated Damages Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.

Third parties are not bound by stipulation of liquidated damages in the contract- For liquidated damages, breach of contract need be proven;- For moral damages plus liquidated damages, breach and bad faith should be

proven; (Art 2220)

Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

Giovani Serrano v PeopleJuly 5, 2010 |Brion, J

QuickfactsA rumble between 2 groups resulted in the stabbing in the stomach of Galang by Giovani Serrano while being held by the latter’s brother Gener and one Obet Orieta. Galang was left when he fell into a nearby creek with a stab and wound showing a portion of his intestines. Giovani was positively identified charged for frustrated homicide.

Is award of temperate damages proper? YES

DoctrineTemperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. In this case, the victim is entitled to the award of P25k as temperate damaged considering that the amount of actual damages is only P3,858 (medical expenses and loss of income for one month). The amount of actual damages will be deleted.

People v MurciaMarch 9, 2010 |Perez, J

QuickfactsAfter a heated discussion, Murcia, adopted son of Felicidad burned his room, some clothes and boxes in the sala. Murcia with a knife stabbed Alicia (sibling of Eulogio[owner of 2-storey building used as their residence] & Felicidad) in the breast and ear. Felicidad died out of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to third degree burns. Eight (8) houses were razed due to the fire

Is Murcia liable for temperate damages to heirs of Felicidad even if actual damages proven is lesser? YES

DoctrineTemperate damages increased from P10k to P25k and accordingly deleted the amount of actual damages, in line with the ruling in People v. Villanueva. In said case, when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25k, the award of temperate damages for P25k is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.

Titan Construction v. Uni-FieldDecember 29, 1999 |Carpio, J

QuickfactsTitan purchased on credit from 1990-93 various construction materials and supplies from Uni-field. Balance of P 1.4M remained unpaid despite demand.

Should liquidated damages and attorney’s fees be awarded? YES

Doctrine The law allows parties to a contract to stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach and attorney’s fees may be recovered under a written agreement.


A stipulation on liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the obligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound to pay the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach.

The court reduced the attorney’s fees and the liquidated damages because they served the same purpose: that is a penalty for the breach of contract

Pencapital Investment Corporation (PIC) v MahinayJuly 5, 2010 |Nachura, J

QuickfactsMahinay was counsel of Ciudad Real Development Inc. (CRDI). Pentacapital Realty Corp. (PRC) offered to buy Molino Properties paying only a downpayment. CRDI allegedly instructed PRC to pay its creditors including Mahinay and agreed that a charging lien equivalent to 20% of total consideration be given to Mahinay as commission in the sale. Various court actions prevented the timely payment of Mahinay’s commissions. He obtained loans from PCI evidenced by two promissory notes, which remain unpaid after repeated demands by PIC.

Is Mahinay liable for liquidated damages and attorney’s fees due to non-payment of loan? YES

Doctrine

Mahinay promised to pay 25% of his outstanding obligations as attorney’s fees in case of non-payment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages. As long as said stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon Mahinay. Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such rate of the same is iniquitous or unconscionable.

Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.

Exemplary or Corrective DamagesArt. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

People v. DalisayNovember 25, 2009 |Nachura, J

QuickfactsDalisay (common-law husband of victim’s mother) molested the victim since she was 13 years old and on one fateful day raped her. She finally had a chance to disclose to her aunt about the abuse when she ran away from home after she had a fight with her sister. Dalisay was convicted of qualified rape in the trial court but was modified to simple rape by CA because of failure to sufficiently allege qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

Is Dalisay liable for exemplary damages even if the aggravating or qualifying circumstance has not been alleged? YES

Doctrine Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.

People v. Diunsay-JalandoniFebruary 8, 2007 |Ynares-Santiago, J

QuickfactsAAA, a 21 year old mentally retarded person with the mental age of 4years old was raped by ice cream vendor in a guard outpost. When Diunsay-Jalandoni was turned over to the police station, it was found out by AAA’s mother that it was not the first time AAA was raped. The information did not allege that Diunsay-Jalandoni knew of the mental retardation of AAA.

Is defendant liable for exemplary damages even if the information failed to allege aggravating circumstance? YES

Doctrine Presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Aggravating circumstances which


were not alleged in the information but proved during trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining liability for exemplary damages.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.

Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.

In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Republic v Tuvera, supraFebruary 16, 2007 |Tinga, J

Quickfacts: as above

Is Tuvera liable for exemplary damages?YES

Doctrine Allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the award of exemplary damages. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook demonstrations where damages by way of example or correction for the public good should be awarded.

Fewer causes of action deserve the stigma left by exemplary damages, which “Serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.”

Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.

PNB v. CAApril 2, 1996 |Romero, J

QuickfactsExpropriation proceedings were instituted by the government against Tan and other property owners. PNB thru Assistant Branch Manager Tagamolila issued manager’s check to Sonia Gonzaga, purportedly as agent of Tan. When Tan demanded payment, it was denied by PNB because of prior payment to Sonia and denied issuing any special power of attorney in Sonia’s favor.

Is PNB liable for exemplary damages? NO

Doctrine Requirements for the award of exemplary damages:1. They may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to them has been established.2. They cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant.3. The act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

In the case at bench, while there is a clear breach of PNB’s obligation to pay Tan, there is no evidence that it acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive manner, Furthermore there is no award of compensatory damages which is a prerequisite before exemplary damages may be awarded.

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