Doctrine of Proximate CauseIt is not enough that there be just some kind ofconnection between fault or negligence and the loss orinjury, but that the former must be the proximate causeof the latter. The proximate cause is that which in naturaland continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficientintervening cause, produces the injury and without whichthe result would not have occurred (38 Am. Jur. 695;Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 714). In Taclanvs. Medina, 54 O.G. 1805, 102 Phil. 181, citing with approval38 Am. Jur. 695-696, see also Urbano vs. IntermediateAppellate Court, 157 SCRA 1), the Court held:The proximate legal cause is that acting firstand producing the injury, either immediately or bysetting other events in motion, all constituting anatural and continuous chain of events, each havinga close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,the final event in the chain immediately affectingthe injury as a natural and probable result of329the cause which first acted, under such circumstancesthat the person responsible for the first eventshould, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,have reasonable ground to expect at the momentof his act or default that an injury to someperson might probably result therefrom.

Doctrine of Contributory NegligenceWhen the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediateand proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recoverdamages. But if his negligence was only contributory,the immediate and proximate cause of the injurybeing the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff mayrecover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damagesto be awarded (Art. 2179, Civil Code; PhilippineNational Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87).Where the plaintiff contributes to the principal occurrence,as one of its determining factors (proximate cause),he cannot recover, but if, in conjunction therewith, hemerely contributes to his own injury (results), he maystill recover less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent forhis own imprudence (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad& Light Co., 16 Phil. 8).Where both parties are negligent, but the negligentact of one is appreciably later in time than the other orwhen it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligenceshall be attributed to the incident, the one who hadthe last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harmand failed to do so is chargeable with the consequencesthereof (Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, of SuperveningNegligence, or of Discovered Peril; see Picart vs.Smith, 37 Phil. 809; LBC Air Cargo, Inc., et al. vs. Courtof Appeals, et al., 241 SCRA 619, 23 February 1995).Stated in another way, the doctrine of last clearchance means that an antecedent negligence of a persondoes not preclude recovery of damages for the superveningnegligence of, or bar a defense against liability soughtby, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance,could have avoided the impending harm by exercisingdue diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa,179 SCRA 5; Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, 173 SCRA 462). Thus, itwas ruled that the antecedent negligence of a telephonecompany in not earlier providing warning signs on itsexcavations would not make it liable if the claimant hada clear chance to avoid the accident (Philippine LongDistance Tel. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94).The doctrine does not apply if only one of the twoparties is negligent and the other is not. The volonti nonfit injuria rule does not apply if a person, although knowinga possible danger, takes some risks because he has toin order to preserve life or property (see Ilocos NorteElectric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5; also PhilippineLong Distance Tel. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 178SCRA 94).The doctrine of last clear chance would also be inapplicableto ward off a claim of an innocent third personagainst the parties guilty of the antecedent negligenceand the supervening negligence who, as joint tort-feasors,are both made solidarily liable to said third person (seeArt. 2194, Civil Code).damnum absque injuriaThe term damages refers to the sum of money whichthe law awards or imposes by way of pecuniary compensation,recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or awrong sustained as a consequence of either a breach of acontractual obligation or a tortuous or illegal act, whilethe term damage pertains to the actionable loss, hurt orharm which results from the unlawful act, omission ornegligence of another. In fine, damages are the amountsrecoverable or that which can be awarded for the damagedone or sustained (People vs. Dianos, 297 SCRA 191). Incommon law, injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from theinjury. Damages are the recompense or compensationawarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can bedamage without injury in those instances in which theloss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legalduty. These situations are often called damnum absqueinjuria. Not always is this distinction followed, however,for the words damage and injury are not infrequentlyused interchangeably (22 Am Jur. 2d. 13). In SpousesLim vs. UNI-TAN Marketing Corporation (G.R. No.147328, 20 February 2002), the Court has said that thosewho exercise their rights properly do no legal injury. Ifdamages result from the exercise of their legal rights, it is but damnum absque injuria, which is a loss without injury, for which the law gives no remedy.Damages may be: (a) actual or compensatory; (b) moral;(c) nominal; (d) temperate or moderate; (e) liquidated; or (f)exemplary or corrective (Art. 2197, Civil Code).Except for actual or compensatory damages whichmust be duly proved (De los Santos vs. De la Cruz, 37SCRA 555), no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary inorder that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplarydamages may be adjudicated. The assessment ofsuch damages, except liquidated ones, by and large, isleft to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstancesof each case (see Art. 2216, infra., Civil Code;People vs. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62).

Extraordinary diligence requirescommon carriers to render service with the greatest skilland foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertainthe nature and characteristics of goods tendered forshipment, and to exercise due care in the handling andstowage, including such methods as their nature requires(Tabacalera Insurance Co. vs. North Front Shipping Services,Inc., 272 SCRA 527).The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over thegoods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and1745, Nos. 5, 6 and 7, while the extraordinary diligencefor the safety of the passengers is similarly elaborated inArticles 1755 and 1756 (Art. 1733, Civil Code). The provisionsof Articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passengersbaggage which is not in his personal custody or inthat of his employees. As to the baggage in his custody,the rules in Articles 1988 and 2000 to 2008, concerningthe responsibility of hotel-keepers, shall be applicable(Art. 1754, Civil Code). In all matters not regulated bythe Civil Code, the rights and obligations of common carriersshall be governed by the Code of Commerce and byspecial laws (Art. 1766, Civil Code). To be precise, thegoverning laws are to be applied in the following order:the Civil Code on Common Carriers, the Code of Commerceon Overland and Maritime Commerce, special lawswhenever applicable (e.g., COGSA), and the general provisionsof the Civil Code.The Public Service Commission may, on its own motionor on petition of any interested party, after due hearing,cancel the certificate of public convenience grantedto any common carrier that repeatedly fails to complywith his or its duty to observe the prescribed extraordinarydiligence (Art. 1765, Civil Code).The law of the country to which the goods are to betransported shall govern the liability of the common carrierfor their loss, destruction or deterioration (Art. 1753,Civil Code).The start of extraordinary diligence does not necessarilycoincide with the birth of the contract nor end atthe latters extinguishment; although being predicatedor premised on a contractual relationship, it is co-existentwithin the life thereof. In the carriage of goods, theextraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods aresurrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possessionof, and received by, the carrier for transportationuntil delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable timefor their acceptance by, the person entitled to receivethem (see Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Sarkies ToursPhilippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 87 SCAD 573, 280

CASO fortuitoG.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, the latter assisted by her husband, FRANKLIN G. GACAL,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, BRANCH I,respondentIt is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence (Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it must be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event (Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 [1976]). Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those "events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is synonymous withcaso fortuito(Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is of the same sense as "force majeure" (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Vol. 17, p. 362).In order to constitute acaso fortuitoorforce majeurethat would exempt a person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527 [1971]; Estrada v. Consolacion,supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985]; Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 [1986]).Caso fortuitoorforce majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967]).

Volenti non fit iniuria(orinjuria) (Latin: "to a willing person, injury is not done") is acommon lawdoctrine which states that if someone willingly places themselves in a position where harm might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against the other party in tort or delict.Volentionly applies to the risk which a reasonable person would consider them as having assumed by their actions; thus aboxerconsents to being hit, and to the injuries that might be expected from being hit, but does not consent to (for example) his opponent striking him with an iron bar, or punching him outside the usual terms of boxing.Volentiis also known as a "voluntary assumption of risk."Volentiis sometimes described as the plaintiff "consenting to run a risk." In this context,volentican be distinguished from legalconsentin that the latter can prevent sometortsarising in the first place. For example, consent to a medical procedure prevents the procedure from being atrespass to the person, or consenting to a person visiting your land prevents them from being atrespasser.