7/29/2019 Torres vs. Gonzales

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Torres vs. Gonzales

FACTS:

In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition

that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of

estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president

cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in

convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not

yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can

be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly

to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are

purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper

consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under

Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and

conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the

President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial

pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final

judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional

pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned

convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for

which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted

with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have

breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against

him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article

159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict whohaving been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of

such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of

the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and

is not subject to judicial scrutiny.