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8/3/2019 Too Much Self Confidence 2009
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Too much self confidence - a high contributing human factor
in maritime accidents
Lecturer Ph.D. ALINA LUCIA BOSTINA
Department of NavigationConstantza Maritime University
Mircea cel Batrin street no.104
Abstract: - Is definitely good to have your knowledge. Ideally you can successfully apply experience gained over timecorrelated with good theoretical background knowledge. But sometimes, factors involved third parties which you can
remove their own theories. A second, a decision can change everything: credibility, career and sometimes even lifeIncorrect attitudes are suspected to have contributed to many of the major accidents.
Key-Words: attitude, decision, limited conditions, human error, collision
1. IntroductionVarious statistics show, in shipping, when vessel
comes to grounding, 71% of accident is caused by
management errors, and only 10% of lack of skills.
Fig.1 Trends in attributed accident causes (by TheSwedish Club)
What is an attitude ? What is a behaviour ? Are theseterms representing the same thing? Of course not.
Attitude: It is a way of thinking about somebody orsomething.
Behaviour: Your behaviour towards somebody or
something depends on your attitudes.
A decision making and action in a certain situation
depends on attitude. Incorrect attitudes can lead to awrong decision making and consequently occurrence of
accidents.
Fig.2 Negative attitude = negative &hazardous thoughts
0
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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Technology, equipment
Human performance
Organisation
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering
ISSN: 1792-4707 100 ISBN: 978-960-474-222-6
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]8/3/2019 Too Much Self Confidence 2009
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To improve safety it is needed to take into account theHuman factor.
Contributing Human factors in accidents:
Lack of communication Excess fatigue Too much self confidence Lack of motivation/ money Loss of situation awareness Lack of teamwork Not challenged decisions/ mistakes Not complying with rules Complacency Risk assessment Leadership
2. Such experiences old and current
About Titanic have been written a lot. Do we knowexactly why did occur this accident? What was the mainfactor?
See bellow a statement from a presentation by E. J.Smith in 1907:
Of course there have been winter gales and storms
and fog and the like in the forty years I have been on
the seas, but I have never been in an accident worth
speaking of.
In all my years at sea I have seen but one vessel in
distress.
I never saw a wreck. I have never been wrecked.
I have never been in a predicament that threatened to
end in disaster of any sort.
Cpt. E.J.Smith
And five years later, on April 14th 1912, the
Olympic Class passenger liner, owned by British
shipping company White Star Line, RMS Titanicsank with a loss of 1500 lives.....
one of which was the Master, Captain E. J. Smith
Titanic sinking
The master was one of the best and experienced of
those years. He knew the danger of sailing area. He alsoreceived warnings from other vessel about presence oficebergs.Too much self confidence on this? An incorrect attitude
May be he thought: It wont happen to me. I can do it!Do something quickly to get the Blue Ribbon.Obviously it seems so! Sometimes the best people
make the worst mistakes.
Back to our days
On March 08th 2010 in Port of Constanta Sud Agigeaa Very Large Container Ship (VLCS) in lenght of 299
meters during her departure maneuver, collided with aassisting tug and a bulk carrier alongside.
The conditions at the sailing time were the following:
- NEly wind 35 kts in squall;- Moderate visibility, slight snowing;- Shallow waters in the basin (less than 5 meters
Under Keel Clearance);
- Narrow turning area (400 meters);- 3 tugs used for maneuvring (approx. bollard pull
1 x 30 t, 2 x 22 t);
- 12,6 meters deepest draft.
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering
ISSN: 1792-4707 101 ISBN: 978-960-474-222-6
8/3/2019 Too Much Self Confidence 2009
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3. Interaction of the effects
Effect of wind force on maneuvering self
explanatory in the bellow drawing:
Fig.3 Effect of wind force
Magnitude and direction of the wind force dependson the relative wind direction.Pivot Point is pushed forward if wind blows from fwd
sector and is pushed aft if the wind blows abaft the beam.
Shallow Water effect experienced when Under Keel
Clearance (UKC) is less then the draft itself. Turnsometimes 2 times larger than in deep water! RudderForce is less effective, Pivot Point is pushed aft,rudder/steering lever is reduced. Ship lists to the side
opposite of the rudder, sinks at that side (draft increase!)
Tug Bollard Pull versus Wind ForceIt is important to have a broad idea as to what wind
force in tonnes is being exerted upon the ship, incomparison to the total bollard pull which is availablefrom the tugs. This can help, for example, in
establishing the wind limits for certain vessels.
With an approximate knowledge of the ship's lengthoverall and freeboard, plus the length and height of thesuperstructure, including any deck cargo such ascontainers, it is possible to calculate roughly how many
square metres of area the ship is presenting to a beamwind.
The container ship in fig.4, for example, has thefollowing approximate overall dimensions and area of
windage:
Length 280 m, Freeboard 25 m, Total Area = (280x25)
= 7000 sq metresIf we know the predicted wind speed for the
intended movement it is now possible to establish arough idea as to the force in tonnes that the ship is
likely to experience.
Example:
Wind speed = 30 knotsWind speed in metres per second (V): knots/2
= 30/2 = 15 m/sWind force in Tonnes per 1000 sq. m: V
2/18 =
152 /18 = 225/18 =12.5t/sq.m
Total Wind Force 12.5 x 7 = 88 tonnes
Fig.4 Container ship
To hold this ship steady with a beam wind of 30knots would require, at the very least, a combination of
tugs that offer a total bollard pull of at least 88 tonnes.However, it must also be remembered that the windforce varies as the square of the wind speed, and a gustywind, or squall, may take the wind force well beyondthat of the tugs, thereby placing considerable strain on
the tug's wires. This particular ship would, for exampleexperience the following increases in wind force if thewind gusts to:
35 knots - 119 t
40 knots - 156 t
With an approximate knowledge of the wind force andknowing the type and size of tugs to be used, it is now
possible to take a closer look at a movement involvingseveral tugs.
The master experienced and well trained in ship-handling simulator decided to un-berth the vesselknowing all the existing conditions: weather and basin
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering
ISSN: 1792-4707 102 ISBN: 978-960-474-222-6
8/3/2019 Too Much Self Confidence 2009
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limits. In the bellow drawing sequences of shipsmanoeuvre.
Fig.5 Ships manoeuvre
The shallow water and the pivot point pushed
forward due the strong wind made very difficult to turnsafe the vessel requiring more time and more space ofstern. The bollard pull of the tugs were not enough tohold the vessel in the basin and she drifted southerly,hitting one vessel alongside and colliding with one of
the tug.
Fig.6 a Collision of vessels
Fig. 6 b Collision of vessels
4. Conclusion
Could this accident be prevented?It was a cumulative of factors: weather conditions
ports limits, infrastructure, services & management, buwhat was the main factor?
For sure it was a wrong decision of the Master. He
should hold the vessel alongside and wait until theweather conditions are proper for safe maneuvring.
Why a wrong decision making? An incorrect
attitude? Too much self confidence?
May be the Master thought: It wont happen to me. I
can do it! Do something quickly to maintain theships schedule
Obviously it seems so!
References:
[1] *** - MaritimeResource Management2009 TheSwedish Club.[2] *** - Ship-Handling Training Course 2009 ENMM Simulator.
[3] http://www.shipsandoil.com/
[4] -Own sources
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering
ISSN: 1792-4707 103 ISBN: 978-960-474-222-6
http://www.shipsandoil.com/http://www.shipsandoil.com/