Tom Pink Ethics Of Freedom.doc

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THOMAS HOBBES AND THE ETHICS OF FREEDOM

THOMAS PINK

King's College, London1

ABSTRACT Freedom in the sense of free will is a multiway power to do any one of a

number of things, leaving it up to us which one of a range of options by way of action we

perform. What are the ethical implications of our possession of such a power !he

paper e"amines the pre#$obbesian scholastic view of writers such as %eter Lombard and

Francisco &uare( freedom as a multiway power is lin)ed to the right to liberty

understood as a right to e"ercise that power, and to liberation as a desirable goal

involving the perfection of that power. Freedom as a power, liberty as a right, and

liberation as a desirable goal, are all lin)ed within this scholastic view to a distinctive

theory of law as constituting, in its primary form of natural law, the normative

recognition of human freedom.

$obbes's denial of the very e"istence of freedom as a power led him to a radical

revision both of the theory of law and of the relation of law to liberty. Law and liberty

were no longer harmonious phenomena, but were left in essential conflict.

*ne legacy of $obbes is the attempt to base a theory of law and liberty not on

freedom as a multiway power, but on rationality. +nstead of an ethics of freedom, we

have an ethics of reason as involving autonomy. !he paper e"presses some scepticismabout the prospects for such an appeal to reason as a replacement for multiway freedom.

1. Introduction

This is a paper not about modern philosophical theories of autonom! but about "hat

preceded them# $or before there "as e%er an ethics of autonom! there "as an ethics of

freedom# This earlier ethics of freedom sou&ht to e'plain the implications for ethical theor

of the realit! as part of the human pscholo&ical ma(e)up! of freedom as a distincti%e (ind of po"er to determine for oursel%es ho" "e act ) a po"er or capacit to determine that is

multi"a! in that it ma(es a ran&e of alternati%es a%ailable! so that the %er same po"er that

is emploed to do A could ha%e been used to refrain#

The e'istence of such a po"er of freedom is no" "idel disbelie%ed in! or doubted! at least

b modern moral and political theorists# Such scepticism be&ins! "ithin the modern *n&lish)

lan&ua&e tradition! in the "or( of Hobbes! "ho denied that freedom e'isted as an (ind of

1 Correspondence ddress+ Professor Thomas Pin(! ,epartment of Philosoph! Kin&-s

Colle&e .ondon! Strand! .ondon! /C0R 0.S# *mail+ tom#pin(1(cl#ac#u(

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po"er to determine and "ho opposed the then still %er important scholastic ethics of

freedom that presupposed belief in such a po"er# After Hobbes crucial fi&ures "ithin the

*n&lish)lan&ua&e ethical tradition! from Hume throu&h Sid&"ic( to Bernard /illiams in our

da! follo"ed him in stri%in& to detach ethical theor from an dependence on a substantial

metaphsics of freedom#

The ethics of freedom is no lon&er a li%e part of contemporar *n&lish)lan&ua&e philosoph#

Indeed the %er e'istence of an ethics of freedom of the form that I shall describe has been

for&otten e%en b historians of moral philosoph# 0 But the theoretical needs that this ethic of

freedom "as desi&ned to meet continue to be felt# Ideas of libert and liberation are as

important to modern political theor as the e%er "ere# The ethics of freedom "as a

sophisticated and intuiti%e attempt to e'plain the %alue of libert and liberation in human life2

and the frame"or( that that ethics once pro%ided has et to be replaced# It remains to be seen

"hether a modern ethics of autonom can replace the ethics of freedom as the foundation for

a &eneral theor of libert and liberation# That is somethin& "e can onl tell once "e reco%er

a proper understandin& of "hat an ethics of freedom reall amounts to#

2. Against the schoastic nor!ati"it# o$ a%& Ho''es on ius and lex

The ethics of freedom "as historicall lin(ed to a theor of la"# And for this reason a

passa&e central to Hobbes-s re3ection of the ethics of freedom comes in his theor of la"#

This is his discussion! in the Leviathan! of the relationship of le", or la" in &eneral! and ius,

"hich ma mean la"! or "hich ma more specificall mean! as Hobbes uses it! a ri&ht+

$or thou&h the that spea( of this sub3ect! use to confound +us! and Le"! -ight and Law2 et the ou&ht to bedistin&uished2 because Ri&ht! consisteth in libert to do! or to forbeare2 /hereas .a" determineth! and bindeth toone of them2 so that .a"! and Ri&ht! differ as much! as Obli&ation and .ibert2 "hich in one and the same matter

are inconsistent# Thomas Hobbes 456657 chapter 58! -Of the first and second naturall la"es! and

of contracts-! p# 65

This passa&e ma appear initiall pu99lin&# $or at one le%el! &i%en his characteri9ation of ius

and le"! Hobbes seems borin&l ri&ht# If "e mean b ius some normati%e a%ailabilit of

alternati%es in the form of a ri&ht to each! and if "e mean b le" a remo%al of all but one

normati%e option throu&h an obli&ation to do that! then clearl ius and le" must be opposed

notions# But "ho "ould ha%e supposed other"ise! "or(in& "ith that %er specific

understandin& of the terms: On the other hand! if Hobbes means to con%e a &eneral theor

of la"! it seems he is e;uall borin&l "ron&# $or le&al sstems unproblematicall combine

both the pro%ision of alternati%es and their remo%al+ there are le&al ri&hts to do an one of a

number of thin&s! as "ell as le&al obli&ations to do 3ust one thin&# So "hich is Hobbes

meanin& to do+ to refer tri%iall to t"o contrastin& le&al notions as contrastin&! or to &i%e an

o%ersimple theor of la" as no more than obli&ator! as if le&al sstems could not &rant ri&hts

as "ell as impose obli&ations# And ho" could either be paraded as a &reat disco%er:

It is crucial to understandin& this passa&e that Hobbes is not primaril discussin& ordinar

2 $or e'ample! it recei%es no proper discussion in the "or( on libert of Isaiah Berlin! thou&h echoes

of it are addressed in Berlin-s "or(! as I discuss else"here#

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sstems of positi%e la"! but la" as a distincti%e (ind of normati%e standard# $or Hobbes is

attac(in& the ethical theor of late scholasticism# And on the scholastic %ie"! law primaril

refers not to positi%e la"! the le&al sstems created throu&h human le&islation! but to a

distincti%e form of ethical norm ) the moral standard termed natural la"# B natural la" "as

meant a %er special form ta(en b reason ) a normati%e standard that pro%ides direction inthe form of rational 3ustifications! but "hich ser%es to appraise more than 3ust a capacit to

respond to reason# $or natural la" constitutes reco&nition at the le%el of ethical normati%it

not 3ust of the human capacit for rationalit! but of the human po"er of freedom ) a form of

reco&nition that in%ol%es both the imposition of moral obli&ations or duties and also the

pro%ision of ri&hts and! in particular! of ri&hts to libert# It is the idea of a distincti%e (ind of

normati%it that &i%es reco&nition to human freedom e;uall throu&h imposin& obli&ations

and throu&h &rantin& liberties that Hobbes condemns as a confoundin& of ius and le", of

obli&ation and ri&ht#

Hobbes-s claim is that there is no po"er of freedom! and so no distincti%e form of normati%it

to constitute the reco&nition of it# Conse;uentl there is no such common source at the

normati%e le%el of both ri&hts to libert and obli&ations# The idea that such a common source

e'ists! is precisel the -confoundin&- of ius! and le"! ri&ht and la"! that Hobbes condemned#

And so understood! Hobbes-s claim is not a borin& one! and its truth or falsehood is far from

ob%ious or tri%ial#

(. Three )inds o$ $reedo!

The ethics of freedom that Hobbes attac(ed related three distinct phenomena understood b us

as %arious (inds of freedom! and e'plained "h! thou&h %er different! each phenomenon isreco&ni9abl a (ind of freedom# It did so b pro%idin& an account of the ethical si&nificance

of freedom! especiall in terms of the normati%it of la"! the ethical standard that &i%es

normati%e reco&nition to freedom#

The first use of freedom is to pic( out a natural or metaphsical po"er# No" a po"er is a

capacit to determine# And in the case of freedom "e are considerin& a capacit to determine

for oursel%es ho" "e decide and act# In e%erda life "e tend to refer to this po"er b

tal(in& of our action and decision as bein& "ithin our control or as bein& up to us# And of

course the application of terms such as up to us to pic( out the po"er is %er old and %er

&eneral across man cultures# /e find such application in pre)Hellenistic <reece2 in the

icomachean /thics Aristotle deplos the <ree( e;ui%alent of up to us! eph hemin, preciselto con%e this po"er o%er ho" "e act# The first use of freedom to pic( out our po"er o%er

our decisions and actions occurs in the Hellenistic period! "hen philosophers come to appl

eleutheria! a <ree( term that had pre%iousl been used to pic( out political freedom! to

con%e this capacit to determine for oursel%es "hat "e decide and do#

The immediate &rasp "e ha%e of this po"er in%ol%es! as the phrase up to us su&&ests! its

multi"a form# The phrase is naturall follo"ed b -"hether- introducin& a ran&e of

alternati%es or contrar options! each of "hich "e could use the po"er to perform# The %er

same po"er that I emplo to raise m hand could also be emploed to lo"er it! the po"er

lea%in& it up to me "hich I do#

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Notice too that this po"er is ordinaril understood to include not 3ust the actions "e choose

bet"een and decide on! such as raisin& a hand or lo"erin& it! but also the prior decisions so to

act# It is up to me "hether I raise m hand or lo"er it 3ust because I can decide "hich I do!

and it is up to me ho" I decide# This decision)ma(in& capacit "as traditionall called the"ill! and so freedom as a natural or metaphsical po"er to determine for oursel%es ho" "e

act has traditionall been referred to as freedom of "ill or free "ill#

If a po"er is a capacit to determine! then there are man (inds of po"er# One ob%ious (ind

is causation# A bric( thro"n at a "indo" ma "ell brea( it# And "hen this happens "e

thin( of the brea(a&e as somethin& determined b the bric(! or at least b the e%ent of its

hittin& the "indo"# Causal determination is one case of determination! and causes ha%e the

capacit to determine the occurrence of their effects ) "hich is "h "e thin( of causes as

possessin& po"er o%er their effects# But there ma also be other (inds of po"er#

$or not all po"ers are causal2 not all capacities to determine are capacities to determine

causall# Ta(e a moral or normati%e po"er for e'ample# As a promisee I ma "ell ha%e the

po"er to release ou as promisor from our obli&ation under our promise to me# That is! I

ha%e the capacit to determine that ou are no lon&er obli&ed to deli%er on our promise#

/hen I e'ercise this moral po"er! m e'ercise of it ma "ell consist in the utterance of

certain "ords ) such as -I release ou from our promise- ) "hich determine that ou are

released2 but this e'ercise of m po"er constitutes! rather than causes! our bein& released

from the obli&ation to me# The relation bet"een m utterance and our release is a relation

of determiner to determined ) but the determination is not causal#

Some po"ers ma occur in one)"a form# That is! the po"er ma e'ist to determine onlone outcome! not a ran&e of alternati%es# Standard causation seems li(e this# The bric(-s

hittin& the "indo" ma ha%e the po"er to cause but one effect ) that the "indo" brea(s#

But! as alread obser%ed! our natural conception of the po"er of self)determination! as

freedom! seems not li(e this# $reedom seems b its %er nature to be a po"er that can be

e'ercised in more than one "a+ the %er po"er that could be e'ercised to determine one

outcome could e;uall "ell be e'ercised b us to determine another# That is precisel ho"

"e identif the po"er of freedom ) that po"er "hich lea%es our action up to us or "ithin our

control#

So freedom as a po"er is a multi"a po"er to do other"ise that is initiall e'ercised in and

throu&h decision and choice# This is crucial for the implications of its e'istence to normati%etheor# But as a po"er entertained "ithin the metaphsics of nature in &eneral it alread

raises man problems# One central ;uestion is concerned "ith its relation to causal po"er#

$irst there is the familiar free "ill problem of "hether the possession and e'ercise of freedom

as a po"er o%er ho" "e act is consistent "ith the causal determination of our decision and

action b prior e%ents outside our control# Precisel because the po"er of freedom is

supposed b its %er nature to lea%e us free to act other"ise! it is unclear ho" far this

freedom is consistent "ith our alread bein& causall determined to act as "e actuall do#

But then there is a further ;uestion! namel "hether freedom is itself a causal po"er# Must it

be true! "hen I determine for mself ho" I decide! that I determine "hat I decide causall! so

that m decision is an effect that I produce as its cause:

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The ans"ers to these ;uestions about the relationship of the po"er of freedom to causal

po"er are not ob%ious# And scepticism about the realit of freedom as a po"er arises

principall from the distincti%el multi"a nature of freedom and the conse;uent pu99le of

its relation to causation# As b its %er nature a multi"a po"er to do other"ise freedomalread seems unli(e ordinar causal po"ers to be found in "ider nature# So it is unattracti%e

to an metaphsician "ho "ishes to establish a fundamental continuit bet"een human

bein&s! their po"ers and capacities! and po"ers and capacities found in nature &enerall#

And it is the same multi"a nature of freedom that! as "e ha%e seen! threatens conflict

bet"een freedom and causal po"er in "ider nature+ it is because freedom is a po"er to act

other"ise that there is a problem about its compatibilit "ith causal determinism#

But the phrase -It-s up to me- need not simpl pic( out a po"er or capacit to determine# It

ma be used in other "as# If someone tells ou "hat to do! and e%en threatens ou "ith

some sanction if ou do not follo" their direction! then! if ou thin( the lac( the authorit so

to direct ou! ou ma %er "ell protest+ -,on-t tell me "hat to do2 it-s up to me "hat I do=-

And here "e find up)to)us)ness bein& used not to assert a po"er! but a ri&ht# Here "e find

another (ind of thin& called freedom+ not a capacit to determine for oursel%es "hat "e do!

but a ri&ht to determine for oursel%es "hat "e do# This is the idea of freedom as a ri&ht to

libert that mi&ht comprise %arious more specific ri&hts# One central such ri&ht is the ri&ht

not to be coerced2 that is! the ri&ht not to be directed to do somethin& throu&h the threat of

penalties if "e do not act as directed#>

The use of terms such as up to me to assert both the po"er and the ri&ht is hi&hl si&nificant#

It su&&ests some intimate conne'ion bet"een the t"o phenomena ) a conne'ion that must also

be behind the historical transfer to appl to the po"er of a term! eleutheria! that ori&inall pic(ed out political freedom! or the normati%e condition of a free citi9en# And there is one

immediatel ob%ious! indeed almost irresistible! "a of understandin& the conne'ion bet"een

the po"er and the ri&ht+ namel that the ri&ht is! fundamentall! a ri&ht to e'ercise the po"er#

$reedom as a ri&ht is a ri&ht to determine thin&s for oneself2 and that is 3ust the ri&ht to

e'ercise one-s po"er of freedom ) one-s capacit to determine thin&s for oneself# Ho" could

there be a ri&ht to determine thin&s for oneself "ithout the capacit to determine thin&s for

oneself: And "hat else could the ri&ht be than the ri&ht to e'ercise the capacit: /e shall

return to this "a of understandin& the conne'ion bet"een freedom as a po"er and freedom

as a ri&ht#

$inall there is a third (ind of freedom# This is freedom not as a po"er or capacit todetermine! nor as a ri&ht that other humans must respect! but rather as a desirable state or

condition that one mi&ht see( to attain# This is the idea of freedom as a state of liberation ) a

state opposed to ser%itude or ensla%ement#

There are man conceptions of "hat liberation mi&ht in%ol%e# /e find the idea of freedom as

liberation runnin& throu&h the Ne" Testament! as a state of ethical fulfilment imparted b

3 There mi&ht be et further ri&hts in a political or social conte't! such as the ri&ht to others

(eepin& their a&reements "ith one 4as "ell as the dut to (eep those a&reements oneself7! as

discussed in Pin( 0??6a2 or ri&hts to information2 or! as befittin& a free citi9en! the ri&ht to a

sa in &o%ernment#

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di%ine &race throu&h Christ# On the other hand! "e find rather different and %er much more

political conceptions of liberation entertained b mo%ements opposed to forei&n or colonial

rule! or to the domination of one class b another# And "e find et further conceptions of

freedom as a form of cultural and social liberation in the chan&es of the 56@?s and 56?s#

These %arious conceptions ma not e;uall attract e%erone! but the are all intelli&ible in

outline# And the sho" that thou&h freedom as liberation and its opposition to ser%itude ma

be understood as a political state or condition! it need not be understood in political terms! or

certainl not e'clusi%el# /e ma see( liberation throu&h the remo%al of rulers "ho den us

political ri&hts! and specificall the ri&ht to libert# But "e ma also see( liberation throu&h

the remo%al of ensla%in& passions or i&norance or other internal pscholo&ical conditions )

pscholo&ical states that "hether or not the turn out to ha%e causes that are political! ma b

their %er nature appear as ensla%in& or as obstacles to liberation# A&ain thou&h liberation

ma enhance freedom as a metaphsical po"er! liberation or its opposite ser%itude is not the

same as the en3oment or lac( of freedom as a po"er# Those ensla%ed b inner passions need

not actuall be depri%ed b those passions of their control o%er "hat the do ) of their po"er

of freedom ) e%en if their e'ercise of that po"er to determine their o"n actions is made more

difficult

So freedom as free "ill! freedom as a ri&ht to libert and freedom as a desirable state or

condition of liberation are three %er different (inds of thin&# But the three %er different

phenomena! the po"er! the ri&ht and the desirable condition! are %er clearl related in our

thou&ht and in our lan&ua&e# I mi&ht sa that it is up to me "hat I do either to assert a po"er!

or to assert a ri&ht! or to base some demand for liberation and release from ser%itude# It is not

plausibl a coincidence that "e use the same e'pressions to assert the e'istence and mutual

relations of these three distinct phenomena#

*. The cassica theor# o$ $reedo!

The classical theor of freedom is a theor of the relations bet"een the three (inds of

freedom# It proposes "hat must be a central re;uirement on an theor of freedom ) an

e'planation of "h in thou&ht and speech "e should so closel relate a po"er! a ri&ht and a

desirable condition# The theor-s roots &o bac( at least as far as Au&ustine! and "e find

statements of it throu&hout the medie%al scholastic tradition from Peter .ombard to $rancisco

Suare9# This theor of freedom is lin(ed! as alread mentioned! to a theor of la"# $or on

this classical theor! freedom and la" are treated as harmonious phenomena# $reedom doesnot oppose le&al direction! but both re;uires and permits it2 and la" &i%es reco&nition to

freedom! and indeed enhances and perfects it# Hobbes-s re3ection of the classical theor "as

also a re3ection b him of this %ie" of freedom and la"# $or Hobbes freedom and la" are

instead essentiall opposed phenomena! "ith la" b its %er nature ser%in& to remo%e and

limit freedom#

The classical theor ta(es one (ind of freedom ) freedom as a natural or metaphsical po"er )

to be fundamental2 and e'plains the other t"o (inds! freedom as a ri&ht and freedom as a

state! in terms of the po"er#

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$reedom as a po"er is clearl concei%ed on the classical theor as a multi"a po"er o%er our

decision and choice ) as a multi"a freedom of "ill! "hich .ombard describes as

a po"er and capacit of the "ill and reason that "e termed abo%e freedom of choice2 "hich is

free to choose bet"een alternati%es! since it can be freel mo%ed to this or to that # .ombard45657 boo( 0! distinction 0! chapter 5 D0! p# 8@5

Then the ri&ht to libert is considered as a reco&nition at the normati%e le%el of this po"er!

namel in the form of a ri&ht to e'ercise it# $reedom as ri&ht is! as I su&&ested earlier! the

ri&ht to the e'ercise of freedom as a po"er# Notice the follo"in& passa&e from Suare9! in

"hich nature e;uips man both "ith libertas in the form of a po"er to determine his actions!

and "ith the ri&ht to e'ercise that po"er# The ri&ht to libert is a dominium libertatis or ri&ht

o%er his o"n metaphsical freedom#

If! ho"e%er! "e are spea(in& of the natural la" of dominion! it is then true that libert is a matter of

natural la"! in a positi%e! not merel a ne&ati%e sense! since nature itself confers upon man the true

dominion of his libert 4dominium libertatis7#

$or libert rather than sla%er is a precept of the natural la"! for this reason! namel! that nature has

made men free in a positi%e sense 4so to spea(7 "ith an intrinsic ri&ht to libert! "hereas it has not

made them sla%es in this positi%e sense! strictl spea(in&# Suare9 45@7 boo( 0, chapter 14,§16, p# 141

The term dominium could be used in scholastic discussions "ith e'actl the same shiftin&

reference as attaches to our up to us+ either to refer to freedom as a po"er! 4an ori&inall

political term dominium bein& transferred! as "as Hellenistic eleutheria! to refer to an aspect

of our nature72 or to refer to the ri&ht to e'ercise that po"er#

$inall liberation or freedom as a desirable &oal is understood as the perfection of that po"er#

This is a condition in "hich the po"er e'ists in a form entirel consistent "ith its function!

"ith a remo%al of all conditions obstructi%e to or de&radin& in relation to that function#

$or .ombard! as for other thin(ers in his tradition! the po"er of freedom has a clear function#

The function of the po"er of freedom is to ta(e us! throu&h decisions that are ri&ht and

meritorious or deser%in& of re"ard! to the beatitude of hea%en# In this future beatitude the

po"er of freedom "ill ta(e the form! not of a libertas minor that in%ol%es a freedom to do

"ron& as "ell as ri&ht! but a libertas maior that in%ol%es onl a freedom to do ri&ht! "ith the

remo%al of an po"er to do "ron&# The po"er that is thus perfected is seen not onl as

perfected but also as increased+

Indeed a choice EarbitriumF that is ;uite unable to sin "ill be the freerGafter the confirmation

of beatitude there is to be a free "ill in man b "hich he "ill not be able to sin2 and this free

"ill is no" in the An&els and in the Saints! "ho are "ith the .ord2 and certainl it is the more

free! as it is the more immune from sin and the more prone to &ood# $or one is the further from

that ser%itude of sin! of "hich it is "ritten+ $e who wor)s sin is the slave of sin! as ones

3ud&ment is freer in choosin& the &ood# .ombard 45657! boo( 0! distinction 0! chapter 8

p# 8@>

7



Notice that the idea of freedom as a po"er "ith a function is essential to the theor of

liberation# $or "ithout the appeal to its function or point! there "ould be no theor of "hat

"ould constitute the perfection of the po"er# But it is important to distance the idea of the

function of the po"er from the specificall theolo&ical conception of that function that "e

find in .ombard# $or freedom-s function as classicall concei%ed can be understood apartfrom the classical theor-s theolo&ical frame"or(#

The po"er of freedom as "e naturall understand it is e'ercised at the point of the "ill ) in

decision or choice# And decision or choice %er clearl has a function or point2 there is an

e%ident reason "h "e bother to ta(e decisions or ma(e choices! and do so ha%in& deliberated

or reasoned first about "hat to do! as opposed to blindl plumpin&# The point of deliberatin&

and decidin& is %er clearl to ensure that "e end up doin& a or the &ood thin&! and a%oid

doin& bad thin&s# So decisions are aimed at attainin& outcomes that are &ood2 and if that is

the point of ta(in& decisions! then! %er plausibl! so too it is the point of e'ercisin& freedom!

the po"er "e e'ercise in and throu&h ta(in& decisions#

$reedom as a po"er o%er alternati%es can then be seen as ha%in& the function of ma(in&

alternati%e &oods a%ailable to us! or puttin& them "ithin our po"er# And if that is the point of

e'ercisin& freedom! "e can indeed understand the perfection of the po"er of freedom as

consistin& in a condition "here it is bound to be e'ercised in accordance "ith that function )

"here it is bound to be used to attain the &ood and a%oid the bad ) and "here conditions

obstructi%e to or de&radin& to its proper e'ercise are remo%ed#

Notice .ombard-s rather problematic %ie" that the remo%al of the %er capacit for freedom-s

improper use ) the remo%al of the po"er freel to do "ron&! or to attain outcomes that are

bad ) constitutes not onl a perfection of the po"er! but also its increase# The %ie" is;uestionable! e%en "ithin the terms of the classical theor# $or the po"er of freedom is b its

%er nature a multi"a po"er ) a po"er o%er alternati%es ) and is introduced as such b

.ombard# So the addition of ne" options or alternati%es is surel an increase in the po"er2

and a remo%al of options is e;uall clearl a decrease in it# *%en "here such options are

"ron& or bad! their remo%al is no less a decrease in the po"er# And in an case there is no

reason "h the perfection of a po"er need! as .ombard supposes! constitute its increase# The

perfection of a po"er need not impl its increase! if some increases in the ;uantit of that

po"er are irrele%ant to its proper function or in fact inconsistent "ith it#

It is true that if "e thin( in terms not of freedom! but of reason! then remo%al of an capacit

for improper use ) in this case! of an capacit for irrationalit ) seems much more plausiblan increase in the a&ent-s rationalit! not a decrease# But then the capacit for rationalit is

not ob%iousl a po"er o%er alternati%es# The capacit for rationalit enables us to respond to

3ustifications# And in cases "here there is onl one rational option ) "here the 3ustifications

oppose the other options ) the capacit for rationalit need do nothin&! of itself! to enable us

to pursue those other options# Indeed! here it does seem that the &reater the a&ent-s

rationalit! the less capable he "ill be of pursuin& those other options# And this is a point to

"hich I shall return#

+. The schoastic nor!ati"it# o$ a%

8



I ha%e noted that the classical theor of freedom comes "ith a theor of la"# Accordin& to

this theor! la" is not primaril a sstem of humanl imposed and le&islated directi%es ) a

sstem of positi%e la" &o%ernin& this or that particular communit# Rather the primar form

of la" is a distincti%e form of normati%it! natural la"! that &o%erns all possessors of humannature# As alread obser%ed! "e are dealin& in natural la" "ith a (ind of rational standard

that constitutes! at the ethical le%el! the reco&nition! not 3ust of human rationalit! but of

human freedom ) and a reco&nition that in%ol%es each one of the three (inds of freedom#

$irst! la" presupposes and &i%es reco&nition to freedom as a metaphsical po"er# .e&al

direction! throu&h the imposition of obli&ations! is needed at all onl because freedom e'ists

as a po"er o%er alternati%es! a po"er that ma be misused in the direction of the bad# .a"

ser%es to direct us to"ards the &ood! and a"a from the bad! b constitutin& the bad as "ron&

or a breach of obli&ation#

Then! as "e ha%e alread seen from Suare9! the ri&ht to libert is somethin& that la"

pro%ides! as a ri&ht to the e'ercise of the po"er of freedom ) and so as another "a of &i%in&

ethical reco&nition to the po"er#

$inall la"! especiall la" in its hi&hest form! the la" of &race! then directs us to"ards

freedom as a desirable condition or &oal# To conform to la"! and arri%e at the condition to

"hich it directs us! is to be liberated#

The scholastic conception of the conne'ion bet"een libert as a ri&ht and the po"er of

freedom has alread been noted# The ri&ht to libert is the ri&ht to e'ercise the po"er# But it

is "orth sain& somethin& about the "a the scholastic ethics of freedom understood theconne'ion bet"een the po"er of freedom and moral obli&ation#

Moral obli&ation or obli&ation under natural la"! on the scholastic understandin& of it! is

restricted to &o%ernin& and directin& action! because it is in the performance and deliberate

omission of action that "e e'ercise the po"er of freedom ) and obli&ation is seen as

specificall directi%e of the po"er of freedom#

This in%ol%es an important contrast bet"een scholastic ethical theor and modern *n&lish)

lan&ua&e theories of obli&ation# $or "here modern ethical theor admits a restriction of

obli&ation to the direction of action! the e'planation &i%en usuall omits appeal to an

multi"a po"er of freedom# Appeal is made instead to "hat! follo"in& Hobbes! I shall termvoluntariness#

To do A %oluntaril is to do A as an effect of a "ill or moti%ation to do A! such as on the

basis of an intention or desire or other pro attitude to"ards so actin&# And from Hobbes to

,a%idson! *n&lish)lan&ua&e moral pscholo& has often identified action "ith %oluntariness

so understood# To do A intentionall is to do A %oluntaril! as an effect of some pro attitude

to"ards doin& A# No" %oluntariness is much less metaphsicall problematic a phenomenon

than multi"a freedom# $or %oluntariness in%ol%es an ordinar case of causal po"er! and so

po"er in a one)"a form familiar from "ider nature# The po"er to do A %oluntaril! as an

effect or a desire or moti%ation to do A! does not itself constitute or impl an po"er to do

9



other"ise# As .oc(e pointed out! one can ha%e the po"er to do A %oluntaril! "ithout

ha%in& the po"er %oluntaril to refrain# A man can be stain& in a room %oluntaril! because

he desires to sta# But e%en if he "anted to lea%e! he "ould not2 for un(no"n to him! the

room is loc(ed#8 And of course %oluntariness and its e'ercise is full compatible "ith causal

determinism#

Ho" mi&ht obli&ation be tied to action understood as a mode of e'ercisin& %oluntariness: A

common "a is to follo" #S# Mill and understand obli&ation as a standard fairl enforced b

punishment or sanction! or more &enerall b social pressure understood as somethin&

analo&ous to punishment# Indeed moral blame ) blame for breach of moral obli&ation or for

doin& "hat is morall "ron& ) has itself often been seen as a mode of sanction2 and so Mill

understood it+

/e do not call anthin& "ron&! unless "e mean to impl that a person ou&ht to be punished in

some "a or other for doin& it2 if not b la"! b the opinion of his fello" creatures2 if not b

opinion! b the reproaches of his o"n conscience# Mill 456@07! p# >?8

/e can then appeal to intuiti%e conditions on fairness for sanctions or punishments# Herbert

Hart put for"ard a famous account of such conditions in his theor of la" as a fair choosin&

sstem# Hart ar&ued that fair punishment must in%ol%e a reasonable opportunit to a%oid the

threatened sanctions# The punishment or sanction must be a%oidable on the basis of a "ill so

to do# Hence sanction)bac(ed le&al obli&ations must appl to the %oluntar ) to "hat "e can

do or refrain from doin& on the basis of a "ill so to act! such as a means to a%oidin&

sanctions# Moral obli&ation as a standard fairl enforceable throu&h sanction or pressure

must be a standard on the %oluntar#

The "a the scholastic ethics of freedom tied moral obli&ation to &o%ernin& action "as ;uitedifferent# $irst! the (e propert of action that lin(ed it to obli&ation "as the fact that action

is a mode of e'ercisin& freedom# It is because it is up to us ho" "e act ) "hether "e do A or

refrain ) that "e can be under a moral obli&ation to do one thin& rather than another! and

fairl blamed and held responsible for doin& "ron&# But it is also important that blame itself

is not seen as a mode of punishment or sanction! but rather as a distincti%e form of rational

criticism# The criticism is for disre&ardin& practical reason in a correspondin&l distincti%e

form ) a form that &o%erns and addresses not 3ust some e'ercise on our part of our capacit

for reason! but the e'ercise b us of a po"er of freedom#

A;uinas &a%e a characteri9ation of moral blame that "as deepl influential "ithin thesubse;uent scholastic tradition! and "hich remains %er intuiti%e# To blame someone is to

critici9e them rationall ) b reference to a standard of reason that the ha%e failed to meet#

But to blame someone is not simpl to critici9e them as foolish or less than sensible# $irst!

4 See .oc(e 456>7 boo( 0! chapter 05 D5?! p# 0>#

5 See JProle&omenon to the principles of punishment and J.e&al responsibilit and e'cuses

in Hart 456@7#

G"hat a le&al sstem that ma(es liabilit &enerall depend on e'cusin& conditions does is

&uide indi%iduals choices as to beha%iour b presentin& them "ith reasons for e'ercisin& choice in

the direction of obedience! but lea%in& them to choose# Hart 456@7 p# 88#

10



moral blame condemns some action or omission b them not as foolish! but as bad# The

criticism then &oes further! and imputes the fault in their action 4or omission7 to them as their

fault! and as their fault because the "ere in control ) the had dominium o%er the act#

Hence a human action is "orth of praise or blame in so far as it is &ood or bad# $or praise and blameis nothin& other than for the &oodness or badness of his action to be imputed to someone# No" an

action is imputed to an a&ent "hen it is "ithin his po"er! so that he has dominion o%er the act# But

this is the case "ith all actions in%ol%in& the "ill+ for it is throu&h the "ill that man has dominion o%er

his action###Hence it follo"s that &ood or bad in actions of the "ill alone 3ustifies praise and blame2 for

in such actions badness! fault and blame come to one and the same# A;uinas 456?7 ;05 a 0! resp p#

550

And is this not e'actl ho" "e first understand moral blame+ as the thou&ht! communicated

b some parent or friend! that "hat "e did "as %er bad2 and 4e;uall essential to blame7 that

it "as our fault that "e did the bad thin&:

I ha%e said that natural la" is understood "ithin scholastic ethics as a distincti%e form ta(en

b reason ) in "hich reason addresses and &o%erns the e'ercise b us not simpl of a capacit

for rationalit! but of the po"er of freedom# The scholastic understandin& of blame is (e to

this understandin& of natural la"# $or practical reason is seen "ithin scholastic ethical theor

as containin& a %ariet of (inds of 3ustificator force# And each 3ustificator force is

identified b the distinct form of ethical appraisal made of those "ho respond to! or disre&ard!

the force# One such 3ustificator force or vis directiva is the force of moral obli&ation ) of la"

in its pre)positi%e or natural form ) a force that is lin(ed to the distincti%el condemnator

ethical appraisal that is moral blame! and that imputes the badness in our a&enc to us as our

fault#

/e must distin&uish t"o importantl distinct elements "ithin practical reason+ on the one

hand reason)&i%in& features ) features that &i%e us reason to perform this or that action2 and on

the other hand the (inds of 3ustificator force or support that those features &i%e to performin&

the actions "ith those features#@

/hen I deliberate about "hat to do! I consider a %ariet of options b "a of possible

%oluntar action# Thus I mi&ht consider the options of handin& the mone o%er! or of (eepin&

it mself# These options "ill possess reason)&i%in& features! "hich lie either in "hat the

actions are li(e in themsel%es! or else in the further ends that performin& those actions mi&ht

attain# Thus (eepin& the mone allo"s me to spend it on mself# /hereas handin& themone o%er mi&ht fulfil a contract! and thereb enable me to escape action for debt collection

and the li(e# As reason)&i%in&! these features support performance of the actions that possess

them# In e%erda life "e often use the term force to pic( out this support+ "e sa of an

ar&ument that pro%ides much 3ustificator support for its conclusion! that the ar&ument has

&reat force# The scholastics li(e"ise used the .atin term for force! vis, to pic( out the

3ustificator support &enerated b reason)&i%in& features# The force is ob%iousl not causal

but normati%e#

6 See Pin( 0??8 and Pin( 0??#

11



And this 3ustificator force applies not 3ust to the %oluntar action that possesses a reason)

&i%in& feature! but also to the decision! intention or "ill to perform that action# Indeed that is

ho" as rational bein&s "e respond to rational 3ustifications for! sa! handin& o%er a sum of

mone# That handin& the mone o%er "ould fulfil a contract supports not onl handin& themone o%er! but also becomin& moti%ated to or "illin& to hand the mone o%er# /ithout that

3ustificator support for the moti%ation that the %oluntar action-s performance re;uires! e%en

rational a&ents "ould ne%er become moti%ated to act in the "as that practical reason directs#

The "ould ha%e e%er 3ustification for actin& %oluntaril! but fail e%er to act because the

lac(ed an 3ustification for decidin& or becomin& moti%ated so to act# nless the 3ustificator

support for performin& a %oluntar action also applied to the prior decision and intention so to

act! reason "ould ne%er mo%e e%en rational a&ents into action! and so reason "ould ne%er be

practical#

But "hile the 3ustificator support pro%ided b a reason)&i%in& feature must appl both to the

%oluntar action that possesses it and to the prior decision or moti%ation to perform that

action! the reason)&i%in& feature itself is often! or e%en tpicall! found at the point of the

%oluntar action alone# It need not be a feature of the prior decision or moti%ation itself# It is

handin& the mone o%er that fulfils the contract2 not! unfortunatel for debtors! simpl

decidin& or intendin& to hand the mone o%er# Hence a reason)&i%in& feature and the

3ustificator force or support that it &enerates are importantl distinct elements of practical

reason# The differ in their e'tension! reason)&i%in& features bein&! in &eneral! specific to the

%oluntar2 "hile the 3ustificator force the &enerate applies both to the %oluntar action and

to the prior decision or "ill to perform it#

0otivation or will oluntary ction

,ecisionL Intention to do A ,oin& A

ustif "ith &i%en force $eatures $! <### of doin& A

So an account of practical reason must e'plain "hat features of the %oluntar are reason)

&i%in&# And it must further e'plain "hat (inds of 3ustificator support or force there are! and

"hich (inds of force are &enerated b "hich reason)&i%in& features#

One (ind of 3ustificator force is "hat I shall term the force of Recommendation# This lea%es

the performance of a particular %oluntar action ad%isable or sensible2 and if that %oluntar

action is ad%isable or sensible! so too is the prior decision or intention to perform it#

Correspondin&l! if the force of Recommendation opposes the performance of another action!

it lea%es that action and! e;uall too! the prior decision to perform it inad%isable! or foolish!

or less than sensible# /e are all familiar "ith this 3ustificator force# It is found in

theoretical reason also# *%idence lea%es some beliefs sensible! and other foolish# Indeed I

suspect that the force of Recommendation is found in e%er case of rational 3ustification# $or

an 3ustification must! b its %er nature! recommend or ma(e ad%isable the action or attitude

12



that it 3ustifies#

The force of Recommendation is lin(ed to a distincti%e form of criticism and appraisal of

those "ho respond to or disre&ard its force# Indeed I ha%e 3ust used the rele%ant terms! and it

seems impossible to communicate the nature of the force "ithout reference to them# People"ho respond to the force are! "ith their actions and attitudes! sensible# People "ho disre&ard

or &o a&ainst the force are! "ith their actions and attitudes! foolish or less than sensible#

No philosopher "ho is not an outri&ht sceptic about reason and 3ustification "ould den the

e'istence of the 3ustificator force of Recommendation# But there mi&ht be further (inds of

3ustificator force that ha%e pro%ed more contro%ersial# And one such is the 3ustificator

force that I shall term ,emand ) the force! as understood "ithin scholastic ethical theor! of

la" or moral obli&ation#

Moral blame! as "e ha%e seen! is a form of criticism importantl distinct from an criticism of

someone as foolish or as less than sensible# It is a criticism of someone as responsible for

ha%in& done "hat is bad+ &i%en the lac( of an e'cuses! and &i%en! in particular! their

possession of control o%er ho" the acted! it "as their fault to ha%e done the bad thin& that

the did# Moral blame so understood is used b scholastic ethical theorists to identif a

further force of reason distinct from the force of mere consilia or counsels ) of mere

recommendations# A force to disre&ard "hich "ithout e'cuse is to be responsible for doin&

"hat is bad is precisel the force not of counsel! but of la" ) of praecepta or precepts# Moral

obli&ation or obli&ation under natural la" is that standard to breach "hich "ithout e'cuse is

to be! not foolish! or not simpl foolish! but to be responsible for action that is bad# And

moral obli&atoriness is the 3ustificator force inherent in that standard# /e ha%e "hat I term a

Force model of moral obli&ation#

It follo"s that for scholastic ethical theor! moral obli&ation is a standard not simpl on

%oluntar actions! but also on the "ill or capacit for decision and intention to perform

%oluntar actions# Moral obli&atoriness is a mode of 3ustificator support! parallel to but

distinct from ad%isabilit# ust as the ad%isabilit or inad%isabilit of performin& a %oluntar

action implies the correspondin& ad%isabilit or inad%isabilit of decidin& or intendin& to

perform it! so the moral obli&atoriness or moral "ron&ness of a %oluntar action implies the

correspondin& moral obli&atoriness or moral "ron&ness of decidin& or intendin& to perform it#

If handin& the mone o%er is morall obli&ator! so too must be decidin& or intendin& to hand

the mone o%er# If (eepin& the mone is "ron& and a breach of moral obli&ation! so too must

be decidin& to (eep the mone# And this is 3ust "hat scholastic ethical theor claims#

Consider $rancisco Suare9! "ho treats the matter as completel uncontro%ersial ) "hich!

"ithin his tradition! it "as# If moral obli&ation is to mo%e us to pa a sum of mone! then! in

Suare9s %ie"! it follo"s that it is decidin& to pa the mone and not 3ust pain& the mone

that must be morall obli&ator# The la" of nature spea(s to us! he sas! as the %oice of our

reason2 and so it must appl to and direct the "ill itself+

So teaches Saint Thomas and on this point e%erone# And the point is established because the

la" of nature is placed in reason! and immediatel directs and &o%erns the "ill# So it is on the

"ill first and foremost that as it "ere b its %er nature the obli&ation of the la" is imposed#

So the la" is not (ept unless throu&h the e'ercise of the "ill# Suare9 45@7 boo( 0! chapter

13



5?! D8! p# 50>

/e ha%e seen that moral blame presupposes in the person blamed not 3ust a capacit for

reason! but the po"er of freedom# Hence the 3ustificator force of la" identified throu&h thedistincti%e criticism that is moral blame is seen as li(e"ise addressin& the po"er of freedom!

and so too the capacit for action in and throu&h "hich "e e'ercise the po"er of freedom#

The force of ,emand is a 3ustificator force that is tied to &o%ernin& and directin& the po"er

of freedom! and so is a&enc)specific! bein& directi%e specificall of action and omission#

This has implications for the capacit for decision or "ill "hich an 3ustificator force "ithin

practical reason must address# The force of la" is a&enc)specific! bein& b its %er nature

directi%e of action and omission as the locus of human freedom# But then the capacit for "ill

or decision and intention that it addresses must in particular be a capacit for free action# The

scholastic force of la" addresses and directs a free "ill# So the $orce model of moral

obli&ation is lin(ed to a %er distincti%e and important element in scholastic moral pscholo&) "hat I term the practical reason#based model of action# The capacit of decision or "ill b

"hich "e respond to the 3ustifications pro%ided "ithin practical reason must itself be a

capacit for action# And so it can be if the %er nature of action is e'plained as consistin& in

that mode of e'ercisin& reason b "hich "e respond! as a&ents! to an force of practical

reason#

Practical reason presents certain %oluntar actions and the further ends the mi&ht attain as

&ood or desirable &oals for us to attain# And "e respond to the &oodness or desirabilit of

those actions or ends b directin& oursel%es to them as &oals# And that is "hat &oal)directed

a&enc is! on the scholastic practical reason)based model# It is a distincti%el practice)

constituti%e mode of e'ercisin& reason! in "hich our response to an ob3ect of thou&ht is one

"e specificall ma(e as a&ents# /e are not respondin& to the ob3ect as true! as "hen "e

e'ercise reason purel theoreticall! in the formation of a belief directed at that ob3ect# Nor

are "e respondin& to the ob3ect simpl as &ood! as "hen "e are merel attracted to it! and

form a mere desire directed at the ob3ect# Rather a&enc consists in our respondin& to the

ob3ect both as &ood! and as to be attained throu&h our response to it2 in other "ords! a&enc

consists in our respondin& to an ob3ect of thou&ht as our &oal# And that occurs "hen "e

decide on the ob3ect! formin& an outri&ht intention to attain it2 or "hen "e act %oluntaril to

attain the same ob3ect on the basis of such a decision or intention#

So lin(ed to its $orce model of moral obli&ation under natural la"! the scholastic ethics offreedom also contains a practical reason)based model of action as consistin& in a distincti%el

practical mode of e'ercisin& reason# This mode of e'ercisin& reason first occurs at the point

of the "ill! in our respondin& to reason b directin& oursel%es to"ards rationall supported

%oluntar actions and outcomes as &oals to be attained b us#

The scholastic ethics of freedom thus in%ol%es a comple' and distincti%e theor of

7 Besides the pre%iousl cited papers on moral obli&ation! see on the practical reason)based

model of action Pin( 0??! Pin( 0??6b! and Pin( 0??6c

14



normati%it! lin(ed to an e;uall distincti%e moral pscholo& and theor of action ) all built

upon the realit of the human possession of freedom as a multi"a po"er o%er alternati%es#

The po"er of freedom is &i%en normati%e reco&nition throu&h a distincti%e form of

normati%it "ithin practical reason! "hich is the normati%it of la"# .a" reco&ni9es the

po"er of freedom in t"o "as# $irst! la" pro%ides a mode of rational direction ) of 3ustificator force ) that is freedom)specific# This is moral obli&atoriness understood as a

distincti%el le&al mode of 3ustificator force! tied to the direction of free action throu&h its

constituti%e lin(a&e to moral blame as a freedom)specific mode of rational criticism#

Secondl la" reco&ni9es the po"er of freedom b pro%idin& the ri&ht to e'ercise it ) the ri&ht

to libert understood as a dominium libertatis! or ri&ht to determine alternati%es# Thus does

the normati%it of la" combine le" and ius! obli&ation and libert! as dual "as of &i%in&

ethical reco&nition to metaphsical freedom#

,. Ho''es-s attac) on the schoastic nor!ati"it# o$ a%

Hobbes-s attac( on the scholastic ethics of freedom and its concomitant theor of la" "as

directed at the theor-s foundation# He denied the %er e'istence of freedom as a

metaphsical po"er to determine for oursel%es "hich of a ran&e of alternati%e actions "e

perform# Hobbes "as not e%en a compatibilist about freedom as a po"er# $or pro%ided the

e'istence of the po"er is admitted! compatibilism about its nature is not of itself an threat to

the scholastic %ie" of the po"er-s ethical si&nificance# Rather Hobbes denied that the po"er

e'ists at all! the supposition that it does bein&! in his %ie"! incoherent because %iciousl

re&ressi%e+

And if a man determine himself! the ;uestion "ill still remain "hat determined him to determine

himself in that manner###true .ibert! "hich doth not consist in determinin& itself! but in doin& "hat

the /ill is determined unto# Hobbes 45@@7 p# 0@

The onl po"er in nature that Hobbes reco&ni9es is ordinar causal po"er ) somethin& that

e'ists onl as a po"er in one)"a form to determine one specific outcome! an outcome that

the cause! a motion in matter! then necessitates# The scholastic cate&or of freedom as causal

po"er in contin&ent multi"a form is dismissed# The "orld is a deterministic material

sstem# All causes are "hat "as termed necessar causes ) causes that necessitate one

specific effect! and that are themsel%es necessitated and determined b earlier e%ents# Human

actions are no e'ception# The in particular are necessitated to occur b prior causes2 and

their immediate causes are passions ) prior and passi%e moti%ations to act#

/hat then is libert: Since it is no lon&er a form of po"er in its o"n ri&ht! it must be

somethin& ;uite different ) the absence of obstacles to po"er# Thus a human is free in so far

as there are no obstacles from outside his nature to the po"er of his o"n "ill or moti%ation to

cause the actions "illed or moti%ated# And li(e"ise a ri%er is free in so far as there are no

obstacles in the form of dams or brid&es or %e&etation to the po"er of its current# As Hobbes

puts it+

.ibert is the absence of all impediments to action! that are not contained in the nature! and in the

intrinsecal ;ualit of the a&ent# Hobbes 45@@7 p# 0

15



Hobbes is correspondin&l re%isionar in his %ie" of libert as a ri&ht and in his %ie" of

obli&ation ) the t"o cate&ories b "hich scholastic natural la" &a%e reco&nition to the po"er

of freedom#

Obli&ation! Hobbes a&rees! is a specificall le&al phenomenon# It is a (ind of le&islati%elimposed obstacle! or potential obstacle! to the po"er of moti%ations# The la" commands the

performance of one action! and imposes penalties on and see(s to pre%ent the performance of

alternati%es! thereb bloc(in& satisfaction of the moti%ations to perform those alternati%es# If

obli&ation is a (ind of obstacle or impediment! libert as a ri&ht is the absence of that

obstacle# .ibert as a ri&ht consists in those alternati%es or options left us b an structure of

restricti%e obli&ation# .ibert as a ri&ht and obli&ation are then inherentl opposed

phenomena! libert b its %er nature arisin& throu&h the absence of restriction throu&h

obli&ation# There is no (ind of normati%it that in%ol%es both the ri&ht and the obli&ation as

t"in "as of reco&ni9in& freedom as a po"er# Instead the idea of a ri&ht to libert and that of

an obli&ation remain "hat the immediatel mi&ht appear to be ) opposed notions! one

mar(in& the pro%ision of alternati%es! the other the denial of them# And if "e ta(e la" as a

source of obli&ation ) "hich Hobbes proposes to do ) then la" must be inherentl opposed to

libert! and the imposition of la" must b its %er nature ser%e to remo%e libert+

And la" "as brou&ht into the "orld for nothin& else! but to limit the Natural libert of particular men!

in such manner! as the mi&ht not hurt! but assist one another! and 3oin to&ether a&ainst a common

enem# Hobbes 456657 chapter 0@! -Of ci%ill la"es- p# 5

.a" is a standard bloc(in& the satisfaction of moti%ations to act b forbiddin& all but one of a

set of options b "a of %oluntar action# Hence le&al obli&ation as directi%e of action is b

its %er nature a standard on the %oluntar# And action itself is no lon&er a distincti%e modeof respondin& to practical reason! but a mere effect of the moti%ation to perform it# Action is

3ust %oluntariness ) b its %er nature an effect of prior moti%ations so to act# In "hich case

the moti%ations that &i%e rise to actions must! if the theor is not to be %iciousl re&ressi%e!

themsel%es count not as actions but as passi%e ) as mere passions# And in an case! in

Hobbes-s %ie"! moti%ations of the "ill cannot an"a be actions because moti%ations are not

%oluntar themsel%es+

I ac(no"led&e this libert! that I can do if I "ill! but to sa! I can "ill if I "ill! I ta(e to be an

absurd speech# Hobbes 45@@7 p# 06

/e see no" the radical and hi&hl re%isionar implications of Hobbes-s %ie" of freedom#The ri&ht to libert can no lon&er be the ri&ht to e'ercise the po"er of freedom! because the

po"er of freedom no lon&er e'ists# And moral obli&ation can no lon&er be a distincti%el

freedom)directi%e and a&enc)specific force! because! a&ain! there is no po"er of freedom to

direct2 and also because there can no lon&er be an such thin& as an a&enc)specific

3ustificator force# $or the "ill or moti%ation that an 3ustificator force must address is no"

a locus of passion! not action# And so an action)3ustificator force must straddle the acti%e)

passi%e di%ide! applin& e;uall to moti%ations that are passi%e#

If it is to remain a&enc)specific! obli&ation can e'ist onl as a standard specific to the

%oluntar# And the ob%ious model is le&al obli&atoriness! or obli&atoriness under sanction)

16



bac(ed positi%e la"# $or "hether or not moral obli&atoriness is a 3ustificator force! it loo(s

as thou&h positi%e le&al obli&atoriness is a reason)&i%in& feature# A le&al obli&ation to dri%e

belo" >? miles per hour is a feature of that %oluntar action ) the feature of bein& re;uired or

directed throu&h some positi%e le&islation ) that la")abidin& citi9ens! or those at an rate

an'ious to a%oid sanction! treat as &i%in& them some reason to dri%e belo" thirt miles perhour# So "e mi&ht e'tend this model to the moral case as "ell! and adopt a $eature model of

moral obli&atoriness# The obli&atoriness under an (ind of la"! natural or positi%e! of an

action is ;uite &enerall the feature! applin& to %oluntar actions! of bein& commanded or

re;uired b a le&islator "ith so%erei&n authorit and the po"er to punish# And so Hobbes

seems to suppose#

.a"! properl is the "ord of him! that b ri&ht hath command o%er others# Hobbes 456657 chapter

5 -Of the other la"es of nature- p# 555

And so obli&ation under la" ma sometimes be restricted b him to the %oluntar+

As for the in"ard Thou&ht! and belief of men! "hich human <o%ernors can ta(e no notice of! 4for <od

onl (no"eth the heart7 the are not %oluntar! nor the effect of the la"s! but of the unre%ealed "ill!

and of the po"er of <od2 and conse;uentl fall not under obli&ation# Hobbes 456657 chapter 8? -Of

the ri&hts of the (in&dome of <od- p# >0>

. Ho''es-s egac#

If "e den the e'istence of a po"er of freedom! then "e must abandon the ethics of freedom

and its theor of natural la" as the normati%e reco&nition of the po"er# But "e ma still "antto ma(e sense of freedom both as a ri&ht to libert and as a desirable state or condition of

liberation# In particular "e ma "ell re&ard as ;uite inade;uate Hobbes-s account of the ri&ht

to libert as no more than "hat is left us b "hate%er obli&ations la" happens to impose on

us#

A&ain! "e ma "ell feel that the reduction of obli&ation in &eneral to an analo&ue of

obli&atoriness under positi%e la" &i%es an inade;uate account of obli&ation# $or moral

obli&atoriness or demand does seem to be a further 3ustificator force besides that of

ad%isabilit! and one "hich can be &enerated b one reason)&i%in& feature in particular ) b

le&al obli&atoriness! understood as the feature of bein& re;uired b a positi%e le&islator# It is

not simpl ad%isable to meet our obli&ations under positi%e la" but! "hen the are imposed"ith 3ustice! it is morall obli&ator to meet them# And this is a moral demand that &o%erns

and addresses not 3ust the %oluntar action specificall re;uired b the state but also our prior

"ill# It is a moral demand that "e decide and intend to do "hat the ci%il la" 3ustl re;uires us

to do# It "ould be morall ;uite "ron& of people to be un"illin& to meet 3ust positi%e le&al

re;uirements! or to be indifferent to them# And this is so! e%en if decisions and intentions are

not themsel%es obli&ator under positi%e la"#

Can "e ma(e sense of libert as a ri&ht "ithout appeal to freedom as a multi"a po"er: And

can "e li(e"ise ma(e sense of moral obli&atoriness as a distincti%e (ind of 3ustificator force!

a&ain "ithout appeal to freedom as a multi"a po"er: These are not eas ;uestions to

17



ans"er! and I can do no more here than s(etch certain issues that an comprehensi%e theor

"ould ha%e to ans"er#

Re&ardin& moral obli&atoriness! the issue mi&ht turn on the correct understandin& of moral

blame ) the rational criticism in terms of "hich! on the scholastic $orce model! the force ofobli&ation or ,emand is identified# A;uinas-s %er natural understandin& of blame builds into

its content the presupposition of the a&ent-s dominium or multi"a control o%er "hat he is

bein& blamed for# Because the a&ent had the po"er to determine for himself "hat he did! so

the fault in "hat he did "as trul his fault2 and on A;uinas-s readin& of this po"er! that means

that "hether he did it "as up to him or "ithin his control#

Is there some other "a of understandin& self)determination ) the po"er to determine for

oneself "hat one does! so that "hat one does can &enuinel be one-s fault: ,o "e reall ha%e

to appeal to freedom as a multi"a po"er:

One possibilit to e'plore mi&ht be some theor of self)determination as a metaphsicall less

problematic one)"a po"er# And such a conception of self)determination mi&ht be found in

a conception of reason or rationalit as in%ol%in& a po"er to determine that is not tied to an

po"er to do other"ise ) but that can e'tend beond the %oluntar to include reason)responsi%e

attitudes and so! in particular! can be e'ercised! li(e freedom traditionall concei%ed! in one-s

decision or "ill to act#

Mc,o"ell in the passa&e belo" uses the term freedom# But e%en if for clarit "e oursel%es

reser%e that term for the metaphsicall problematic multi"a po"er o%er alternati%es! it

seems e;uall accurate to understand him to be usin& the term to mean somethin& importantl

different from that# Mc,o"ell seems to be referrin& to a po"er of self)determination! but in areason)e'pressi%e form that need not be multi"a+

ud&in&! ma(in& up ones mind "hat to thin(! is somethin& for "hich "e are! in principle! responsible

somethin& "e freel do! as opposed to somethin& that merel happens in our li%es# ### This freedom! e'emplifiedin responsible acts of 3ud&in&! is essentiall a matter of bein& ans"erable to criticism in the li&ht of rationall

rele%ant considerations# So the realm of freedom! at least the realm of freedom of 3ud&in&! can be identified "ith

the space of reasons# Mc,o"ell 40??67 p# @

$re;uentl "hen "e e'ercise reason to form a belief! "e are not plausibl free to belie%e

other"ise# Indeed! as "e noted abo%e! there seems no inherent conne'ion bet"een rationalit

and a capacit or po"er to do more than one thin&# In an situation "here onl one belief!

decision or action is rationall 3ustified! it seems that the more rational "e are! the less

capable "e "ill be of belie%in&! or decidin&! or actin& other"ise# But perhaps our possession

of the belief can still be somethin& that "e ha%e determined for oursel%es! and so be deepl

our responsibilit or our fault in the "a re;uired for moral responsibilit and blame# /e

mi&ht use autonomy as a label for a po"er of self)determination so concei%ed ) a po"er that is

an e'pression of our rationalit! and "hich as such is not inherentl multi"a# /e mi&ht then

to e'plain moral obli&ation as a 3ustificator force that in%o(es a special moral responsibilit )

but one based not on multi"a freedom! but on this po"er of autonom#

/e mi&ht see( a similar solution to the problem of basin& libert as a ri&ht# A&ain "e are

see(in& to base the ri&ht on some foundation less metaphsicall problematic than the

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multi"a po"er of freedom# And! a&ain! one such possible foundation mi&ht be found in the

human capacit for reason# On this %ie"! coercion and other intuiti%e %iolations of libert as

a ri&ht are affronts not to "hat is o"ed to us as possessors of a po"er of multi"a freedom!

but rather to "hat is o"ed us as possessors of a capacit for reason# And once a&ain a theor

of human rationalit concei%ed as basin& a ri&ht to libert mi&ht be labelled a theor ofautonom#

But here the abandonment of an commitment to po"er in multi"a form leads to an

immediate problem# $or it "as the %er multi"a nature of the po"er of freedom as

traditionall concei%ed that "as essential to basin& a ri&ht not to be coerced# It is eas to see

"h coerci%e threats mi&ht be an affront to freedom as a multi"a po"er! at least as that

po"er "as understood "ithin the scholastic ethics of freedom# The po"er of freedom!

understood "ithin scholastic ethics! has a function# And that function is deepl lin(ed to its

multi"a nature# The function of the po"er of freedom is to pro%ide us "ith alternati%es b

"a of &oods! so as to lea%e it "ithin our po"er ho" "e attain the &ood# But coerci%e threats

are b their %er nature in tension "ith this function# $or coerci%e threats ser%e to direct us to

ta(e up one option in particular precisel b remo%in& or diminishin& alternati%e &oods#

/hereas coerci%e threats are not in such direct tension "ith our rationalit# Rationalit ser%es

not to pro%ide us "ith alternati%e &oods! but to enable us to respond to 3ustifications# Our

rationalit is onl obstructed should our capacit to respond to 3ustifications be impaired# But

coerci%e threats 3ust present further 3ustifications for us to respond to ) 3ustifications for actin&

in "hate%er "a "ould a%oid the threats# Hence coerci%e threats in no "a intrude upon our

rationalit! but rather address it#

The heart of the problem lies in the relation bet"een freedom and reason# $reedom astraditionall concei%ed is a po"er to determine alternati%es that ser%es to lea%e it up to us ho"

"e pursue the &ood# This po"er traditionall based ri&hts to alternati%es! and "as also lin(ed

to liberation as a desirable condition that "as the perfection of that po"er o%er alternati%es )

of our po"er to determine for oursel%es "hether "e pursue this &ood or that#

/hereas reason is a capacit to respond to 3ustifications that seems not to in%ol%e! at least

essentiall! an po"er to determine alternati%es# Indeed! contrar to "hat Mc,o"ell-s %ie"

of reason su&&ested! as a capacit to respond to 3ustifications reason ma not in%ol%e the

rational a&ent-s e'ercise of an po"er at all! e%en in one)"a form# ust in respondin& to

3ustifications "e ma not be e'ercisin& an capacit to determine thin&s for oursel%es#

A po"er is a capacit to determine# But reason or rationalit is ar&uabl a ;uite different (ind

of capacit# Rationalit is a second order capacit ) a capacit to e'ercise other capacities in a

"a that is responsi%e to 3ustifications# These other capacities ma themsel%es be po"ers or

capacities to determine# But the ma also be the opposite! as capacities to be determined#

*ither "a! the are ;uite distinct from the hi&her order capacit for reason itself ) the

capacit to e'ercise these capacities in a 3ustification)sensiti%e "a#

Some capacities "e e'ercise rationall ma be %er far from capacities to determine thin&s for

oursel%es! but the %er re%erse# Ta(e perceptuall based beliefs! such as m present belief

that I am in a &reat cit! surrounded b a multitude of streets and people# This belief in%ol%es

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m capacit for reason! and is sub3ect to 3ustification for and a&ainst# But that I hold this

belief is not ob%iousl somethin& I determine for mself# If I am unable to belie%e other"ise!

that is not because of some peculiarit ) its supposedl one)"a nature ) in an alle&ed po"er

on m part to determine such beliefs for mself! but because in this case "hat I belie%e is not

bein& determined b me# Somethin& outside me is imposin& the belief upon me# It is the"orld! as represented to me throu&h perception and memor! "hich determines that I hold this

belief and not another# The function of rationalit is not to chan&e this dependence of "hat I

belie%e upon determination from "ithout! but to reinforce that %er determination# The more

rational I am! then &i%en m perceptions and memories! the less capable I should be of

belie%in& other"ise#

So reason is not a po"er to determine alternati%es! because as a second order capacit to

e'ercise capacities! po"ers included! it is not itself a po"er at all# If an po"er to determine

thin&s for oursel%es is in%ol%ed in the e'ercise of reason! then it has to come from outside the

capacit for reason itself# It cannot be a simple e'pression of our reason#

Reason then is a capacit radicall different from freedom as traditionall concei%ed# Reason

is not a po"er at all! and so is not itself constituti%e of an form of self)determination# Since

it is so far from bein& a capacit to determine thin&s for oursel%es! reason seems an

inade;uate basis on its o"n for our ri&ht to determine thin&s for oursel%es# It is less than

ob%ious "hether! dressed up as autonom! rationalit can still do the "or( in e'plainin& ri&hts

and obli&ations once done b the multi"a po"er of freedom#

Re$erences

A;uinas! Thomas 456?7 &umma !heologiae %ars 1a2ae 4Turin+ Marietti7

Hart! Herbert 456@7 %unishment and -esponsibility, 4O'ford+ O'ford ni%ersit Press7

Hobbes! Thomas 456657 Leviathan! Richard Tuc( 4*d#7 4Cambrid&e+ Cambrid&e ni%ersit

Press7

Hobbes! Thomas 45@@7 !he 3uestions Concerning Liberty, ecessity and Chance, clearly

stated between 4r 5ramhall 5ishop of 4erry, and !homas $obbes of 0almesbury 4.ondon7

.oc(e! ohn 456>7 n /ssay concerning $uman 6nderstanding Peter Nidditch 4*d#7

4O'ford+ O'ford ni%ersit Press7

.ombard! Peter 45657 &ententiae in + libris distinctae, 4<rottaferrata+ St Bona%enture7

Mc,o"ell! ohn 40??67 'Sellars on perceptual experience', in Having the World in View:

Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars pp. 3-22 (Harvard: Harvard University Press)

8 This ar&ument "ill be de%eloped in m !he /thics of ction 4forthcomin& O'ford

ni%ersit Press7 ) %olume one "ill address the nature of self)determination! %olume t"o the

nature of normati%it#

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Mill! ohn Stuart 456@07 6tilitarianism Mar /arnoc( 4*d#7 4.ondon+ Methuen7

Pink, Thomas 40??87 'Moral obli&ation- in 0odern 0oral %hilosophy Anthon OHear

4*d#7 pp# 56) 4Cambrid&e+ Cambrid&e ni%ersit Press7

Pin(! Thomas 40??7 -Normati%it and reason- in 7ournal of 0oral %hilosophy 8! pp# 8?@)>5#

Pin(! Thomas 40??7 -Intentions and t"o models of human action- in -easons and +ntentions

Bruno erbee( 4*d#7 pp# 5>)6 4Aldershot+ Ash&ate7

Pin(! Thomas 40??6a7 -Promisin& and obli&ation- in %hilosophical %erspectives ohn

Ha"thorne 4*d#7 pp# >6)80? 4O'ford+ /ile7

Pin(! Thomas 40??6b7 -Po"er and moral responsibilit- in %hilosophical /"plorations 50! pp#

50)86

Pin(! Thomas 40??6c7 -Reason! %oluntariness and moral responsibilit- in 0ental ctions

.uc O-Brien and Matthe" Soteriou 4*ds#7 pp# 6)50? 4O'ford+ O'ford ni%ersit Press7

Suarez, $rancisco 45@7 4e legibus et legislatore deo, %olume in *pera *mnia 4Paris+

.ouis i%es7

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Tom Pink Ethics Of Freedom.doc