Todd J. Billings, John Milbank's Theology of the Gift

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

JOHN MILBANK’S THEOLOGY OFTHE “GIFT” AND CALVIN’STHEOLOGY OF GRACE: A CRITICALCOMPARISON1

J. TODD BILLINGS

For about a decade, John Milbank has been developing a trinitarian theol-ogy of grace using the language of “gift” and “gift-giving”. In the first partof this essay, I examine a series of his early articles which articulate his gifttheology, as well as his account of opposing viewpoints.2 In these earlyworks, the Reformed tradition as such is never referred to, but Reformationthinking in general is an invisible opponent which exemplifies a “donative”or “unilateral” view of grace. Milbank criticizes doctrines in which grace is“passively” received, along with its corollary in Anders Nygren’s “unilat-eral” portrait of agape.3 After presenting Milbank’s early gift theology, I givea possible response in terms of Calvin’s theology of grace.

The second part of this essay continues the same task with Milbank’s morerecent book, Being Reconciled, published as the first in a series of books whereMilbank’s “gift-giving” paradigm will be used to examine the major loci oftheology.4 In this work, Calvin, Luther, and “Reformation” theologies aremoved from the shadows to the sideline, as Milbank makes generally nega-tive comments about how “Reformation” theology cannot provide an adequate theology of active reception. As I continue comparing Calvin’s theology of grace with Milbank’s theology of the gift, I hope to show howCalvin’s theology is quite resilient in the face of Milbank’s criticisms of“Reformation” theologies in which grace supposedly functions as a “unilat-eral” gift “passively” received. Calvin’s theology of grace blends elementsof divine initiative with participatory mutuality, developed through a trini-

Modern Theology 21:1 January 2005ISSN 0266-7177 (Print)ISSN 1468-0025 (Online)

J. Todd Billings,24 Quincy Street #1, Somerville, MA 02143, USA

tarian account of the double grace of justification and sanctification, and a multivalent account of the doctrinal loci. Thus, Calvin shares more ofMilbank’s concern for “active” reception than one might expect. However,the comparison with Calvin also illuminates Milbank’s heavy reliance upona narrow range of terms drawn from the anthropological gift-giving discus-sion. This proves to be a weakness in that Milbank’s use of these terms andconcepts in a schematic way both diminishes the possible biblical complex-ity of his account and distances him from his own patristic and medievalsources.

In his first series of articles on gift-giving, Milbank sets out his main con-structive proposal and his central arguments against other interlocutors onthe gift.5 Constructively, he wants to build upon a French anthropologicaldiscussion about “gift-giving” that emerges from the work of Marcel Mauss.For Mauss, gift-giving is a distinct sort of “economy” which serves as a tran-sition between an economy of “total services”, with exchange from clan toclan, and a market economy.6 Mauss believes that the virtue of the gift-givingeconomy is that gift-giving practices can enable competing factions to makepeace by finding common ground in the mutual pleasures and mutual inter-ests created by gift-giving. Against Mauss, Jacques Derrida has written inGiven Time that Mauss manages to speak “of everything but the gift”.7 ForDerrida, a gift should be an interruption of an economy of exchange,whereas for Mauss gifts are necessarily involved in exchange.8 Anthropolo-gists like Mary Douglas and David Graeber have offered a more positiveassessment of Mauss, looking upon his account of the bonds and relationsestablished through gift-giving as one of the few possible non-Marxist alter-natives to capitalism.9 Milbank takes up Mauss’ discussion in seeking tothink through Christian redemption in terms of the gift, such that Chris-tianity can help lead to a gift economy that is purified from its agonistic ele-ments.10 For Milbank, a purified gift is a gift that replicates itself in cycles ofgratitude and obligation: gift-exchange involves “delay” and “non-identicalrepetition” of the gift in gratitude, thus extending obligation as a new gift isgiven.11 Milbank believes that Christian theology can point the way to thesepurified gift-exchanges.

As an Augustinian, Milbank is fortunate to find that the language of the“gift” already has a place in his tradition. “Gift” is a name for the Holy Spiritin Augustine’s De Trinitate. While this language of “gift” does not providethe overarching framework for Augustine’s trinitarian theology—a point towhich I will return at the end of this essay—it does play a part in the trini-tarian ethic of love in Augustine, providing Milbank with a starting point.12

From there, Milbank extends Augustine’s account of the Trinity and its corresponding ethic of love in distinctively gift-giving terms, saying thatthrough the Spirit persons are brought into the trinitarian “exchange”.13 Inaddition, Milbank sees the doctrine of creation in terms of “gift exchange”.14

Although from one perspective, there is an “excess” to creation such that

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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005

there will be an asymmetry regarding anything the Creator receives backfrom the creature, the act of creation also creates receivers, creating the rela-tionship between God and humanity. It implies “less an absolutization of theunilateral gift, than an absolutization of gift-exchange”.15 From creationthrough redemption, God gives, and brings humanity into a trinitarian gift-exchange. Yet, in receiving this divine gift, the human is always involved ina vital way: in “active reception”.16 That is, one gives the love one receivesfrom God to one’s neighbor even as one is receiving it from God. It is impos-sible to receive God’s gift while refusing to give to one’s neighbor. The gift“is not prior to but coincident with relation” such that they are inseparable—interlinked on horizontal and vertical planes, so to speak.17 As such, “reci-procity” is inseparable from receiving a gift.18

In this initial set of articles, Milbank opposes his position to two otherviews. First, he argues against Kant and a long list of ethicists, includingDerrida and Levinas, whom he sees as carrying on a Kantian ethical legacy.Milbank’s central claim is that these Kantian and post-Kantian figures make“disinterested” self-sacrifice the high point of their ethic, encouraging uni-lateral giving without payback, without reciprocation, even without recog-nition of the “gift” as such.19 While there are certain aspects of Milbank’scritique which do seem to apply to Derrida’s view of the gift, his repeatedreferences to Kant’s ethics seem to stem from a misinterpretation of Kant’sGroundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.20 In the Groundwork, Kant fre-quently contrasts the call of “duty” with “inclination” to clarify the finalityof duty.21 Kant’s point is that duty cannot be constituted by inclination or abare concern for mutual pleasure. Nevertheless, in analyzing the type ofobligation incurred by “duty”, Kant is quite willing to speak of the impor-tance of reciprocity and mutual regard.22 Thus, while Milbank’s defense of“reciprocity” has validity in itself, his corresponding interpretation of Kantis uncharitable at best. Yet, Milbank is able to make a significant pointregarding Derrida: structurally speaking, Derrida’s gift is annihilated bymutuality. Derrida openly admits this, for a “gift” which is recognized assuch incurs obligation, thus ceasing to be a free gift.23 In contrast, Milbank’s“gift” is a mutual exchange, with “giver” and “receiver” becoming fluid cat-egories. Unlike Kant, Derrida’s “gift” does exhibit a radically unilateralcharacter.

Milbank’s second repeated interlocutor in these essays is Marion, with hisportrait of the “saturated phenomenon” as a model for revelation. The sat-urated phenomena is a “gift” which overwhelms the receiver, surpassing herconcepts and expections.24 Marion describes an “excess” in the gift of reve-lation that cannot be comprehended; the “distance” between the gift and thereceiver is irreducible, forcing one to speak in a non-predicative, apophaticmode.25 However, although Marion is “exactly half right” according toMilbank in his account of the divine donum, his portrait, too, is unilateral.26

Marion seeks to show how the intentionality of the receiver does not add to


Milbank’s Theology of “Gift” and Calvin’s Theology of Grace 89

or in any way constitute the phenomena of revelation. For Milbank, Marion’saccount reflects a view of the “will” with “an infinite capacity for ‘indiffer-ence’”.27 In contrast, Milbank sees the will as caught up in ecstatic, activereception by participating in the exchange of the Trinity and of the humancommunity.28 Milbank claims that there is an inherent danger in any accountof the human reception of divine gifts in which the human is merely passive.Milbank detects a similarity between Marion and Derrida on the “unilateral”character of the gift. Yet, unlike Derrida, Marion’s account does not involvean a priori denial of the receiver and her response; rather, Marion’s focus ishow the “gift” of revelation appears—a gift with irreducible “excess”. Nev-ertheless, however one assesses Milbank’s criticisms of Marion, it is clearthat Milbank has developed a critical account of the “gift” by which he cancriticize a range of theologies as cultivating “passivity” because of an under-lying “unilateral” character to their notion of the gift.

How are we to think through Calvin’s theology of grace in relation toMilbank’s proposal? There might be more than one way of doing this.Certain recent account of Calvin’s theology place the language of gift at thecenter—for example, Brian Gerrish’s eucharistic account of Calvin’s overalltheology in Grace and Gratitude. Another approach which makes gift lan-guage central is the social-historical approach of Natalie Zemon Davis in TheGift in Sixteenth Century France, analyzing the social practices in Geneva interms of Mauss’ gift-giving paradigm, and then seeking to link it withCalvin’s theology. While each of these approaches have certain merits, Isense that there is a danger of failing to remember that “gift” and “gift-giving” are not, in fact, dominant theological terms for Calvin. Instead offocusing on “gift” terminology per se, I think that examining several relevantpoints about Calvin’s theology of grace can illuminate key commonalitiesand differences with Milbank’s “gift” theology.

First, regarding Milbank’s idea of “active reception”, Calvin would havea certain amount in common with Milbank, but would need to push him forfurther clarification. For Calvin, it is crucial to distinguish between justifica-tion and sanctification as two aspects of union with Christ—one fully real-ized, and the other only partially completed. They are inseparable for Calvin,being a “double grace” (duplex gratia) that is held together in the very personof Christ. It is impossible to have one without the other; they do not comein temporal stages. Furthermore, as one receives grace through the gift offaith, one will necessarily be active in outward holiness, just as Milbank saysthat one must be active in giving while receiving. Concerning justificationand sanctification, Calvin writes, “As Christ cannot be torn into parts, sothese two which we perceive in him together and conjointly are insepara-ble—namely, righteousness and sanctification. Whomever, therefore, Godreceives into grace, on them he at the same time bestows the Spirit of adop-tion, by whose power he remakes them into his own image.”29 On the onehand, believers are “passive” in receiving grace, in the sense that we add

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nothing to God’s grace that was missing—God’s grace is completely suffi-cient. The pardon and adoption involved in justification is received extra nos,from outside ourselves. Yet, Calvin makes it clear that this process of receiv-ing grace has a second part (hence the duplex gratia), activating one for a lifeof piety and love through the Spirit. Indeed, the ethical “ought” and theanthropological “can” are fulfilled, for Calvin, only through regeneration bythe Spirit.30 Living “in Christ” is living a life of love, according to the thirduse of the law utilized by Calvin.31

Thus, if one is searching for a theology of grace in which the reception ofgrace in salvation will not be severed from being reborn for a life of holinessthrough the Spirit, Calvin’s theology is a good place to look. Rather than“active reception”, Calvin’s reception of grace might be better called “acti-vating reception”. Yet Calvin’s clarity about issues like justification and sanc-tification leave one wondering how long Milbank can avoid using moreprecise terms in his own theology of the gift. For Milbank, the gift coincideswith relation.32 Thus, the divine gift “is itself grounded in an intra-divinelove which is relation and exchange as much as it is gift”.33 Moreover, thedivine gift is impossible without the “necessary reception of Christ by Israelin the person of Mary”.34 Where exactly does this leave Milbank amidst themyriad of theological options concerning the divine priority of grace and thehuman “contribution” to salvation? For example, what would Milbank’sattempt to think through the divine donum and the [necessary] humanresponse lead him to say about justification? Calvin does have clarity onthese issues—the first grace is pardon, extra nos, while the second grace is aparticipatory regeneration by the Spirit.35 This occurs within a trinitariancontext. God is revealed as a gracious and generous Father because of hisfree pardon of sin, which takes place through the believer’s union withChrist by faith, the first grace. This same union with Christ also involves avivification by the Spirit to grow in love and holiness, the second grace. Incontrast, Milbank’s use of anthropological language—that “gift” coincideswith “relation”—simply does not have this soteriological precision.

Secondly, Calvin’s theology of grace calls into question one of the assump-tions inherent in Milbank’s adoption of “gift” language in relation to grace:that grace, and the divine-human relationship within that, can be adequatelycharacterized in terms of either “unilateral” giving or reciprocal “exchange”.Calvin does not begin with such a schematic framework, turned into a trini-tarian metaphysic. Rather, a central concern for Calvin is expositing thevariety of soteriological language used in scripture about God’s saving workin humanity. Calvin’s exposition of certain scriptural concepts, such as elec-tion, might seem to have a unilateral gift character. In election, God choosesand secures the salvation of believers, apart from their worthiness. Yet, theconcept of “unilateral” giving does not adequately account for other bibli-cal images that Calvin draws upon to describe God’s saving relation tohumankind.



For example, Calvin has a complex and nuanced theology of covenant. Onthe one hand, he emphasizes that in some sense, the covenant is unilateral,with God fulfilling both sides of the covenant because sinful humanity couldnot be left on its own to fulfill its pledge. However, as Peter Lillback haspointed out, Calvin also makes extensive use of the language of a mutual,bilateral covenant, particularly when he wants to emphasize human respon-sibility.36 For Calvin, it is important that believers make a voluntary pledgesincerely to seek to fulfill their side of the covenant. Yet, it is the Spirit thatmakes this voluntary pledge possible. This is not a contradiction, but a mul-tivalent biblical teaching which is neither simply unilateral nor bilateral. Inthis way, Calvin refuses to see human and divine agency as two opposingpowers. The polarities built into Milbank’s language of “unilateral” givingand “bilateral” giving preclude such insights.

In a similar way, Milbank frequently uses the term “reciprocity” todescribe a desirable alternative to theologies of God-human relations characterized by “passivity”.37 Since Calvin does have a place for salvationcoming to the believer extra nos in justification, it may seem that Calvinwould be subject to this criticism. Yet, once again, have not Milbank’s termsdrawn from anthropological discussions led to an oversimplication? InCalvin, justification never occurs by itself; it is inseparable from the active,empowering work of regeneration enabled by the Spirit. On a deeper level,there is also a sense in which the terms “reciprocity” and “passivity” implyan exteriority in divine-human relations that is foreign to Calvin. Calvindelights in speaking of how the union within the Trinity extends to includehumanity, such that, “Just as he [Christ] is one with the Father, so we becomeone with him.”38 Calvin also speaks about the believer being united into “onelife and substance” with Christ.39 In Calvin, identities are not “fixed” in sucha way that sharing in another makes us less like ourselves. Rather, it is byliving in the Spirit, by participating in Christ, by becoming “one substance”with Christ that we find our full identity as creatures. Commentators likePhilip Butin are right to call Calvin’s trinitarian account of divine-humanrelations “perichoretic”.40 It is not a matter of “reciprocity” or “passivity”,but a differentiated union of identities in a trinitarian context.

In summary for part one of this essay, Milbank’s concept of “active recep-tion” of grace has certain commonalities with what I call a notion of “acti-vating reception” in Calvin. Yet, concerning the nature of justification andthe human contribution to salvation, Calvin articulates a clear positionwhich differentiates yet unites justification and sanctification, emphasizingthe priority of divine grace for salvation. In contrast, Milbank remains vagueon these questions: “active reception” means that the gift of grace coincideswith relation, but it does not address the ground of justification and its rela-tion to sanctification. Secondly, I have argued that Milbank’s account of graceas a “unilateral” gift requiring “passive” reception or relations of mutual“reciprocity” and “exchange” set forth false alternatives. These anthropo-

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logical notions assume an exteriority between agents that is inadequate fordescribing God’s saving relation to humanity. Calvin’s attempt to appropri-ate a variety of biblical imagery concerning the divine-human relationship—including that of election, covenant, and the trinitarian incorporation ofhumanity—complicates and moves beyond Milbank’s simpler scheme ofgrace as “unilateral”, “passive”, or “reciprocal”.41

In his more recent work, Milbank extends and develops the ideas of theseearly essays, explicitly criticizing Reformation theologies as theologies of the“unilateral” gift. Milbank offers his central exposition in Being Reconciled,42

which presents a number of concrete theological-social proposals. Heextends the account of Christology which he gave in The Word Made Strange,speaks of his program of Christian Socialism, and defends a privation theoryof evil. What holds these essays together? The language of “gift” serves asone unifying strand, but even more so than in his previous works on the“gift”, Milbank makes repeated reference to the notion of “participation”.

What is a theology of “participation”? The word is a surprisingly flexibleone in theological discussions, and it is not always clear in what sensesMilbank uses the term. On one level, Milbank seems to be appropriating thenotion of “participation as deification”; this doctrine is taught by variouspatristic and medieval writers, and was recently re-attributed to Augustine,contra Harnack.43 However, there are many different types of doctrines of“deification”.44 Thus, the fact that Milbank includes deification in his accountof “participation” is not in itself a significant clarification.

In assessing the different possible senses of “participation”, it is worthnoting that theologies of “participation” have a history in Milbank’s Angli-can heritage. On the one hand, “participation” has been used as shorthandfor a relatively loose set of Platonic metaphysical claims affirming somesense of ontological “participation” of creation in the creator. Anglican the-ologians as far back as Richard Hooker have used the language of “partici-pation” in this way, later given prominence by the Cambridge Platonists.45

In the nineteenth century, these early Anglican traditions are drawn upon byJohn Henry Newman in his Anglican years, who again revives the languageof participation.46 With Newman in particular, the language of participationhas implications for the theology of grace, offering a via media betweenCatholics and Protestants. In Newman’s hands, a theology of participationfavors the Catholic side of the divide. His work on justification was funda-mentally suspicious of Protestant claims about justification by faith alone.For Newman and other Tractarians, such a “dry” doctrine of justification(extra nos) has lost the participatory sense of faith as formed by love. Justifi-cation and sanctification should be seen as inseparable, a single act.

In Being Reconciled, Milbank seems to follow Newman in his impatiencewith a Reformed account of grace and his preference for language of “par-ticipation”. Milbank, like Newman, rejects “all Protestant accounts of grace”



that affirm “mere imputation”, because “an account of the arrival of gracemust for me also mean an account of sanctification and ethics”.47 Further-more, a theology of participation lacks the “negative” anthropology ofProtestants who set nature against grace, thereby disrupting the Platonic par-ticipation of the creature in the divine. For Milbank, an essential point of the-ological anthropology is that humans are created for union with God, andhe finds the doctrines of sin and human incapacity as framed by Reforma-tion theology—particularly with their emphasis upon the bondage of thewill—threatening to this emphasis.

Juxtaposing Calvin’s viewpoint with this distinctively [high] Anglican the-ological language about “participation” is a peculiar task. On the one hand,it might seem as though Calvin could provide precisely the sort of theologythat Newman and Milbank are looking for: a theology of grace that is never“mere imputation”, but in which justification and sanctification are heldtogether tightly in one act of grace, united in the person of Christ. Just asMilbank cannot account for the reception of grace without speaking of sanc-tification, neither can Calvin—as my earlier discussion of Calvin on theduplex gratia indicated.

Yet, Milbank’s view involves a deeper objection to Calvin’s theology ofgrace. According to Milbank, Calvin and others who deny the freedom ofthe will before regeneration have a negative anthropology, emphasizing sinin such a way that the created human nature must be destroyed rather thanfulfilled in the “new creation” of regeneration. In a particular section of BeingReconciled, Milbank gives a sympathetic account of Augustine on thefreedom of the will, despite the widespread caricature of Augustine asopposing nature to grace in his account of the will.48 Yet Milbank simulta-neously argues against Reformation and post-Reformation “misreadings” ofAugustine, which appear to oppose grace to free will, and ultimately, graceto nature.49 I am afraid that Milbank has corrected one caricature (that ofAugustine) to replace it with another (that of Reformation theologies).

Calvin’s view of the “bondage of will” is frequently misunderstood. Thecentral reason for this is inattention to his work that directly addresses theRoman Catholic concerns about his “negative” view of humanity in redemp-tion, Bondage and Liberation of the Will. It is also a work with great insight intoCalvin’s interpretation of Augustine and other church fathers, with morepatristic citations than any other work besides the Institutes. In Bondage andLiberation of the Will, Calvin responds to the criticisms that his RomanCatholic adversary, Albert Pighius, brings against the 1539 edition of theInstitutes. One of Pighius’s central concerns was how human nature seemedto be diminished rather than fulfilled in the action of grace, giving an insuf-ficient account of the human side of redemption. Pighius was particularlydisturbed when Calvin wrote: “whatever is of our own will is effaced [inregeneration]”. While this passage is later qualified by Calvin in the Insti-tutes,50 his response in Bondage and Freedom of the Will is insightful. “By ‘what-

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ever is ours’ I understand that which belongs to us. Moreover, I define thisas what we have in ourselves apart from God’s creation.”51 What Calvin istrying to preserve is the Pauline language of the conflicted human will(Romans 7), torn between the “old self” (which should be “crucified”) andthe “new creation” in Christ. Our own will—our fallen will—must be effacedand even crucified in regeneration. But this must not be confused with theoriginal good will given to Adam in creation, for Adam was “united” to Godbefore the fall.52

In Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Calvin uses Aristotelian distinctions toexpress this relationship.53 The substance of human nature was created good,oriented toward union with God. Indeed, as Calvin notes elsewhere, thisoriginal creation enjoyed a “participation in God”.54 Through the fall, human-ity developed the accidental characteristic of sinning, which brings alienationfrom God. This “sinful human nature”, then, is only “human nature” in a sec-ondary sense, for the substance of human nature is good.55 In regeneration,the substance of human nature is led toward fulfillment in Christ through theSpirit. Grace does not destroy this primal human nature, but fulfills it. Interms of the will, the original, created orientation of the will is fulfilled inredemption. It is in this context that Calvin claims that human freedom mustbe contingent upon the work of the Spirit, affirming with John’s Gospel that“without me you can do nothing” (John 15:5). For it is only through unionwith Christ by the Spirit that the alienation which destroys human freedomcan be overcome. Thus, the work of God’s original creation is fulfilled in thebeliever through the free will empowered by the Spirit.56

Yet, one may object, even if Calvin’s view of the will does not entail a neg-ative view of created nature in relation to grace, is the human left with any-thing beyond a “passive” role in sanctification? Milbank continues to presshis case against “passivity” in Being Reconciled, frequently associating it withReformation theologies in which grace and pardon have a “unilateral” char-acter rather than one of “exchange”. On the question of “passivity” in Calvin,Milbank would be correct about the “first grace” of justification if justifica-tion occurred in isolation; but according to Calvin, it is impossible to isolatethe first grace from the second—justification is distinguishable but insepara-ble from regeneration. Even a brief look at the pastoral aspects of Calvin’stheology confirms that the human is not “passive” in receiving this duplexgratia. For example, in his lengthy chapter on prayer in the Institutes, Calvinmakes a number of paradoxical claims. Initially, he asserts that humanscannot pray rightly on their own.57 Right prayer involves reverence, thanks-giving, yielding confidence in oneself, and praying with hope.58 Never-theless, even though prayer is God’s work—both in enabling andresponding—it is a profoundly human work as well.59 In the opening pagesof the chapter, Calvin draws repeatedly upon Romans 8, giving a trinitarianaccount of the Christian experience of prayer: the Spirit enables persons to“confidently cry, ‘Abba! Father!’ ” as the Spirit also shows us Christ, through



whom God is revealed.60 Yet Calvin insists that we should not take thisemphasis upon the Spirit’s enabling us as license for laziness. We should notbe passive in the sense that we “give over the function of prayer to the Spiritof God, and vegetate in that carelessness to which we are all too prone”.61

Believing that the Spirit helps Christians to prayer should “by no means”lead one to “hold back our own effort”.62

Thus, through the Spirit, the Christian is empowered for growth in realholiness (with real effort) in the practice of prayer. Yet, Calvin is always quickto add, the “credit” and “honor” for this improvement—for these goodworks—goes completely to God. Is this a negative, “passive” anthropology,as Milbank claims? I do not believe so. Rather than a negative anthropology,it is a christologically-conditioned anthropology, wherein it is only throughthe empowering, activating presence of God that a human can do a workthat is “good”. As with the incarnation, humanity only reaches its fulfillmentwhen the human is united with the divine. Calvin is insightful enough torealize that this christologically-conditioned account of grace has a negativecorollary (“without me, you can do nothing,” John 15:5). Both the positiveand “negative” aspects of this christological principle apply to all human-ity—through Calvin’s concept of “common grace” and the imago dei (whichentails “participation in God.”)63 Yet humanity finds fullness through faith inChrist, in whom God and humanity are reconciled and fully united. Calvin’semphasis upon the powerful effects of human sin does not lead to a “nega-tive” anthropology. Rather, his concern for alienation from God by sin is partof a larger soteriological account that seeks to remedy what sin disrupts: theoriginal goodness of creation, corrupted by sin, can be restored only throughunion with God, in Christ, by the Spirit.

Considering Calvin’s emphasis upon union with God in Christ throughthe Spirit, how does his theology relate to the language of “participation asdeification” that Milbank utilizes in Being Reconciled? On this point also,Calvin may have more commonality with Milbank than is generally recog-nized. Contemporary discussions of deification and theosis are plagued bytwo opposing tendencies: on the one hand, some works use a late Byzantinestandard of theosis to evaluate and polarize Western theologians such asAugustine and Thomas Aquinas, claiming that their distance from lateByzantine terminology leads to fundamentally deficient notions of deifica-tion.64 On the other side, certain recent works have failed to recognize the dis-tance that genuinely exists between late Byzantine theologies and Westerntheologians who do not share their categories or terms.65 In the midst of thisdiscussion, Milbank presents an account of “participation as deification”whose strengths lie precisely in his Anglican eclecticism: he is happy to gleaninsights from Maximus the Confessor alongside Augustine and Thomas.Certain aspects of Milbank’s doctrine of deification—such as his interpreta-tion of Thomas—are questionable on historical grounds.66 Yet, the way inwhich Milbank creatively draws upon the traditions of East and West is

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nevertheless promising from the systematic perspective, for it emphasizes thegenuine complementarity of theologians like Augustine and Maximus theConfessor, while not succumbing to some less plausible attempts to makeWestern theologians sound like Maximus or Gregory Palamas.67

Perhaps Milbank should consider adding Calvin to his eclectic list of the-ologians who give an account of how “the end of the gospel” is “to renderus eventually conformable to God, and, if we may so speak, to deify us”.68

While Milbank is skeptical about claims that Luther teaches deification,69

there is good reason to take Calvin seriously on the subject. Although Calvinhas considerable distance from late Byzantine notions of theosis, he drawsdeeply upon the common sources for theologies of deification: scripture andthe church fathers. In particular, he makes extensive use of the Johanninelanguage of union, indwelling, and ingrafting; the Pauline language of a par-ticipation in Christ by the Spirit; and the patristic developments of this lan-guage by Irenaeus, Augustine and Cyril of Alexandria.70 While Calvin’saccount of deification has many “Catholic” dimensions, such as the beatificvision and the affirmation of union without assimilation between Creator-creature, he makes a distinctive contribution in his thoroughly Paulinenotion of “gospel”. Recent research has confirmed that the book of Romansis absolutely central for the development and logic of the Institutes.71 Calvin’slanguage of “participation” is shaped by his close reading and rereading ofthis book, gradually extending the language of “participation” to a widevariety of doctrinal loci, including justification, baptism, the Lord’s Supper,the resurrection, the incarnation, the Trinity, the atonement, the imago dei and“participation in God”.72 Calvin’s contribution on the issue of “participationas deification” lies in the way in which he blends the appropriation of patris-tic developments with careful biblical exegesis. In particular, Calvin’sstrongly Pauline understanding of the gospel—and his notion of the duplexgratia emerging from this—provides a much-needed supplement to con-temporary theologies of deification which risk forgetting Romans 1–3 in theirenthusiasm for Romans 6 and 8.73

In developing his theology of participation, Milbank has the opportunityto counter the externalist tendency in the language he has drawn from theGift discussion. Theologies of participation tend to undercut the polaritiesof “unilateral” versus “reciprocal”, even “passive” versus “active”. Indeed,although Calvin is among the “Reformation” theologians that Milbank fre-quently opposes, his theology of grace makes the union of God and human-ity both the original and final telos of creation; Calvin’s anthropology is not“negative”, but christologically conditioned, affirming that the primalhuman nature is fulfilled through union with God, by partaking of Christthrough the Spirit. Calvin has much in common with Milbank’s concerns indeveloping a theology of “participation as deification”. Perhaps Milbank’stheological interest in the incarnation and participation will caution himabout making the categories of Gift so central to his future theological work.



There are striking commonalities between the concerns of Milbank’s the-ology of the Gift and Calvin’s theology of grace. Perhaps this is indicativeof a tendency of Anglo-Catholic theologians to show hostility to the Refor-mation, all the while remaining deeply dependent upon it in their sensibil-ities. One of these commonalities between Calvin and Anglicans likeMilbank is a profound dependence upon Augustine’s theology. Indeed, inBeing Reconciled, Milbank makes no secret of seeking to reclaim Augustinefrom Reformation interpretations.74 Furthermore, in terms of his theology ofthe Gift, Milbank claims that Augustine is one of his main sources.

Yet, if one views the broad theological context of Milbank’s theology ofthe Gift in relation to Calvin’s theology of grace, I think there is little doubtthat Calvin is much closer in many ways to their common theologicalfather.75 The difference in theological context between Milbank and Calvinemerges from different ways of doing theology and different resultsobtained from these methods. I see two major aspects to this difference.First, for Augustine and Calvin, a theology of grace is always developedwithin a broad context of scriptural exegesis, whereas for Milbank thiscontext is thin. Second, neither Augustine nor Calvin use the notion of “gift”in a highly schematic manner, while Milbank elevates the language of “gift”to the level of an overarching metaphysics to explain the Trinity, grace,ethics, and more.

Calvin’s theological method incorporated a central cry of renaissancehumanism: ad fontes, back to the sources, related both to scripture and tra-ditional sources like the church fathers. Although there is some difference ofmethod between his commentaries, the Institutes, and occasional treatises,Calvin is consistent in his approach that the first task in theology is return-ing to the preeminent source of theology: scripture. Previous generations of Calvin scholarship have not always understood this; sometimes theyclaimed that a “central dogma” was the starting point for a deductive“Calvinist” system developed from that doctrinal foundation.76 But recentscholarship has shown how deeply misguided this approach to Calvin’s the-ology is: Calvin’s theology, particularly as seen in the Institutes, is a readingof the doctrinal loci ordered on his reading of Romans, and supplementedover decades of painstaking work in biblical exegesis.77 The result of this“method” is a theology that is complex and multivalent: the variety inCalvin’s biblical and patristic appropriations of the notions of “grace”,nature, Covenant, the Trinity, justification and sanctification and “participa-tion” cannot be forced into highly schematic language. Yet, Milbank’s ambi-tious project seems to do just that: to read the doctrinal loci through theschematic structure provided by the “gift” discussion, functioning as a“central dogma”. In contrast to Calvin, Milbank’s theology of the gift offersrather sparse serious attention to scripture; sometimes when Milbank doesclaim to have reference to scripture, he simply gives another exposition ofAugustine.78

98 J. Todd Billings


Milbank’s sparse attention to scripture stands in sharp contrast to theapproaches of his own theological mentors, such as Augustine and Aquinas.In Augustine’s most important work for Milbank’s Gift theology, De Trini-tate, Augustine takes an expansive approach to the interpretation of scrip-ture, carefully citing and commenting upon a vast range of scripturallanguage and imagery that may relate to the doctrine of the Trinity as givenby Nicea.79 When Augustine uses the language of “gift”, it is in this largerscriptural context, textured and shaped by Augustine’s attention to scripturepassages which seem to be supporting his constructive case, as well as thosethat do not. Milbank’s account of the gift lacks this basic engagement withscripture as the source for theology; because of this, it misses the “complex-ifying context” that scriptural engagement provides. Aidan Nichols makesa similar observation about Milbank and Pickstock’s appropriation ofThomas Aquinas: “what is missing from their work . . . is the awareness that,for Thomas, the truth delivered by sacra doctrina is above all a biblical truth”.80

Milbank’s shortcomings on this point not only distance him from Calvin, butfrom Augustine and Aquinas as well.

Secondly, and related to the first point, Milbank has utterly transformeda rather narrow tradition of speaking of the Holy Spirit as “gift” into anoverarching paradigm for his gift theology—which would have been quiteforeign even to Augustine. For Augustine, “gift” is proposed as a “name”for the Spirit to distinguish it as a person of the Trinity, since both “Holy”and “Spirit” are attributes which apply to the whole Godhead.81 Augustinewas alone among patristic authors in using the term “gift” with regard tothe Holy Spirit in this sense. However one evaluates the success of Augus-tine’s attempt, he nevertheless does not make “gift” or “gift-giving” thecentral or paradigmatic categories for Trinitarian metaphysics—neverspeaking as Milbank does of “exchange” in the Trinity, both eternally andad extra, and the relations as self-giving, gift-giving. When not only theHoly Spirit is “gift”, but also the trinitarian relations are constituted by“exchange” and gift-giving, a peculiar exteriority seems to develop amongpersons of the Trinity, potentially pushing Milbank toward a more“social”—and speculative—model of the Trinity than he desires.82 WhileMilbank’s notion of trinitarian “exchange” has precedence in Hans Urs vonBalthasar’s doctrine of kenotic self-giving takes place between all threepersons of the Trinity, von Balthasar’s notion itself is without patristicprecedent.83 Even Thomas Aquinas, who draws upon Augustine’s “gift”language with regard to the Spirit, uses it cautiously and does not give ita central place in trinitarian metaphysics.84 Milbank has taken an importantyet subordinate theme in Augustine (a theme even more subordinate in theWestern tradition, not to mention its near absence in the East85), and madeit into his central paradigm for thinking through the doctrines of God, cre-ation, and ethics. In this way, he takes advantage of the utility of conceptslike “gift” and “gift-giving” at the cost of the biblical complexity and spec-



ulative modesty with which Calvin—and also Augustine—approachedthese issues.

In sum, I have sought to show that there are important and perhaps sur-prising areas of commonality between Calvin’s theology of grace andMilbank’s emerging theology of the gift. These include the close connectionbetween the receiving of grace and the active life of Christian self-giving andlove; also, both seek to articulate the fulfillment of human nature in unionwith God, through the Spirit, by participation in Christ. At the same time, Ihave sought to contrast Calvin’s approach with Milbank’s. In comparison toMilbank’s claim that the Gift coincides with relation, Calvin’s duplex gratiahas much greater clarity in relating divine and human agency in the recep-tion of salvation. Moreover, rather than seeing grace as “unilateral” or “rec-iprocal” gifts, Calvin develops a nuanced variety of biblical and patristicteaching about God’s saving relation to humanity which cannot be capturedby the simple contrast of “unilateral” to “reciprocal”. Ultimately, Milbank’sschematic use of “gift” categories is foreign not only to Calvin, but also toAugustine and Aquinas. Milbank’s limitations seem to come from trying todo too much with too little: he uses anthropological language from the gift-giving discussion to describe a trinitarian soteriology of the “gift”—but withinsufficient conditioning of these concepts through biblical exegesis, andinadequate apophatic modesty in making the gift scheme central to trinitar-ian metaphysics.

NOTES

1 Portions of this essay were presented at Engaging Radical Orthodoxy, a conference at CalvinCollege on September 14, 2003. I am grateful to Sarah Coakley, Benjamin King, MichaelHorton and Rachel Billings for their very helpful feedback in refining this essay.

2 John Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic”,Modern Theology, Vol. 11, no. 1 (January, 1995), pp. 119–161; John Milbank, The Word MadeStrange: Theology, Language, Culture (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), chapter2; John Milbank, “Gregory of Nyssa: The Force of Identity” in Christian Origins, ed. L. Ayresand G. Jones (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 94–116; John Milbank, “The Ethics of Self-Sacrifice”, First Things, No. 91 (March, 1999), pp. 33–38; John Milbank, “The Soul of Reciprocity. Part One, Reciprocity Refused”, Modern Theology, Vol. 17, no. 3 (July, 2001): pp. 335–391; John Milbank, “The Soul of Reciprocity. Part Two, Reciprocity Granted”,Modern Theology, Vol. 17, no. 4 (October, 2001), pp. 485–507.

3 Milbank identifies Nygren’s approach to agape as a “purism” regarding the gift, “whichrenders it unilateral” and is thus “over-rigorous in a self-defeating fashion”. See “Can aGift be Given?”, p. 132, n. 31.

4 John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon, (London: Routledge, 2003).5 See the articles in note 2.6 See Marcel Mauss, The Gift: the Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans.

W. D. Halls, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990).7 See Jacques Derrida, Given Time, I: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 24, emphasis added.8 For Derrida, the gift “must remain aneconomic” and “foreign to the circle” of give and take

exchange (ibid., p. 7; also see ibid., pp. 7–13, 24–27). In contrast, Mauss’ central point aboutgiving is that from an anthropological perspective, gifts do exchange. While gifts may

100 J. Todd Billings


appear to be “free”, they always incur obligation. Thus, Mauss’ The Gift seeks to discoverthe logic behind this obligation. See The Gift, especially pp. 1–18.

9 Mary Douglas (see Preface to the 1990 Norton edition of Mauss); David Graeber, Toward anAnthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin Of Our Own Dreams (New York: Palgrave,2001).

10 While aspects of Mauss’ portrait of “gift exchange” may be romanticized, Mauss is veryclear that such practices often involve violence. Milbank recognizes that a gift economy isnot necessarily a peaceful economy; thus Milbank seeks to “purify” the gift economy fromthe violence that it frequently entails. See “Can a Gift be Given?”, pp. 131–133.

11 Ibid., p. 131.12 This connection is developed by Milbank in the final chapter of Theology and Social Theory

and is also well articulated by Rowan Williams in “Sapientia and the Trinity: reflections onDe trinitate” in Collectanea Augustiniana: mélanges T. J. van Bavel, T. J. van Bavel, BernardBruning, Mathijs Lamberigts, and Jozef van Heutem, eds. (Leuven: Leuven UniversityPress, 1990), pp. 317–332.

13 “Can a Gift be Given?”, pp. 136–137, 144–154.14 Ibid., pp. 124, 143–137.15 Ibid., p. 137. “Soul of Reciprocity: Part Two”, p. 504.16 Milbank coins the term “active reception” in his essay on Gregory and Nyssa and the Gift.

See Milbank, “Gregory of Nyssa: The Force of Identity”, p. 95. The phrase is helpful inexpressing Milbank’s constructive alternative to theologies of “passive” reception, a themedominating his essays on the Gift.

17 “Can a Gift be Given?”, p. 137.18 Ibid., p. 136.19 See Milbank, “The Ethics of Self-Sacrifice”.20 Although Milbank makes many brief references to Kant in his “gift” articles, he presents a

sustained critique in “Soul of Reciprocity: Part One”, pp. 371–384. In the first part of thisaccount (pp. 371–377), Milbank makes it clear that his understanding of the notions of“interest” and “feeling” in the Groundwork is foundational for his assessment of Kant’sethics. Milbank then extends this account of the notion of “interest” to Kant’s aesthetics inthe Third Critique (pp. 377–382), reading the First Critique in light of the Third Critique (pp.382–384). While my account only directly addresses Milbank’s criticism of Kant’s ethics, Isense that his understanding of the Third Critique and the First Critique would be quite dif-ferent if he had a more nuanced understanding of the notions of “interest” and “feeling”in the Groundwork.

21 See Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung Zur Metaphysik Der Sitten, ed. Karl Vorländer, Philosophis-che Bibliothek, Bd. 41 (Leipzig: Dürr, 1906), especially pp. 395–401.

22 For an account of Kant’s notion of obligation which addresses the criticisms of the Ground-work related to mutual affection and regard, see Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating theKingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 55–67.

23 Derrida writes that “for there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange,countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to give me back what Igive him or her, there will not have been a gift” (Given Time, p. 12). Thus, Derrida mustspeak of the “forgetting and gift” as “the condition of the other” because anything recog-nized as a receiver as a gift necessarily incurs obligation (pp. 17–18). Yet, for Derrida theobligation is precisely what the gift seeks to overcome, for obligation always implies thenomy of law, which is inseparable from economy (p. 6).

24 See Jean-Luc Marion, “The Saturated Phenomenon” in Phenomenology and the “TheologicalTurn”: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), pp. 176–216.

25 For more on Marion’s non-predicative form of apophaticism, see his reading of Denys inJean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies (New York: Fordham University Press,2001).

26 Milbank, “Soul of Reciprocity: Part One”, p. 352.27 Ibid., p. 353.28 See especially, “Can a Gift be Given?”, pp. 132, 144–154.29 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles; John T. McNeill

ed., (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1960), 3:11:6.30 See Institutes, 2:2:26–27.



31 With Luther, Calvin affirms that the first use of the law is to reveal our sinfulness and thuslead to repentance; the second use of the law is to restrain evildoers in civil society. (Insti-tutes, 2:7:6–11.) However, Calvin also teaches a third use of the law which he considers tobe primary: guidance for Christians in living a life of holiness (Institutes, 2:7:12). In Calvin’shands, the third use of the law makes an ethic of love, justice and equity central to sancti-fication. See Guenther H. Haas, The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics (Waterloo, Ontario:Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997).

32 “Can a Gift be Given?”, p. 137.33 Ibid., p. 136.34 Ibid.35 Institutes, 3:11:4–6.36 Calvin’s use of the bilateral covenant is particularly prominent in his sermons on Deuteron-

omy. See Peter A. Lillback, The Binding of God: Calvin’s Role in the Development of CovenantTheology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), chapter 8. While Lillback does a servicein calling attention to this bilateral material, he does not give an adequate account of howCalvin upholds a strong view of divine agency in the midst of this emphasis upon a bilat-eral covenant. For a more satisfactory account of how Calvin holds together the unilateraland bilateral covenant material, see Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studiesin the Foundation of a Theological Tradition (New York: Oxford University, 2000), pp. 154ff.

37 See especially “The Soul of Reciprocity: Part One” and “The Soul of Reciprocity: Part Two”.38 My own translation of “et quemadmodum unus est in patre, ita nos unum in ipso fiamus”.

Sermon on 1 Samuel, 2:27–36 found in Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia from CorpusReformatorum, G. Baum, E. Cunitz, E. Reuss, and E. Alfred, eds., (Brunsvigae: C. A.Schwetschke, 1863–1900), 29:353.

39 Commentary on 1 Corinthians 11:24 in Calvin’s Commentaries, trans. Calvin TranslationSociety, John King et al. eds., (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1845/1981). See also Ioannis Calviniopera quae supersunt omnia, 49:487.

40 “Perichoresis” is not a term that Calvin uses, but Butin uses it to describe the mutualindwelling and interpenetration between the divine and the human in Calvin’s trinitariantheology. See Philip Butin, Revelation, Redemption, and Response: Calvin’s Trinitarian Under-standing of the Divine-Human Relationship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.42, 82–83.

41 While the first part of this essay responds to the use of key terms such as “passivity”, “uni-lateral”, and “reciprocity” in Milbank’s early gift essays, one should note that he contin-ues to use these terms extensively in Being Reconciled. Thus, although the second part ofthis essay interacts with other aspects of Being Reconciled, my critique of the earlier workapplies to Being Reconciled as well.

42 Being Reconciled sets forth Milbank’s constructive project to be continued in later booksexpositing a theology of the gift. In a forthcoming essay, “Alternative Protestantism”,Milbank explicitly interacts with Reformed theology and Calvin. However, this essayspeaks in terms of the broad aims of Radical Orthodoxy rather than the specific concernsof a theology of the “gift”. Since a general account of the relation between Radical Ortho-doxy and Reformed theology is beyond this scope of this essay, I will only draw upon“Alternative Protestantism” where it clarifies Milbank’s defense of his Gift theology. SeeJohn Milbank, “Alternative Protestantism” in Creation, Covenant and Participation: RadicalOrthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthius, eds., (GrandRapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005).

43 Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. James Miller, (London: Williams & Norgate,1897), Vol. 3, p. 165. Gerald Bonner, “Augustine’s Conception of Deification”, Journal of The-ological Studies, Vol. 37, no. 2 (October, 1986), pp. 369–386; Gerald Bonner, “Deification,Divinization” in Augustine through the Ages, Allan D. Fitzgerald, ed., (Grand Rapids, MI:Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 265–266.

44 On the importance of identifying the differences between the various theologies whichclaim to teach “deification”, see Gosta Hallosten “The Concept of Theosis in RecentResearch—the Need for a Clarification” and J. Todd Billings, “United to God throughChrist: Assessing Calvin on the Question of Deification”. Both essays are forthcoming inPartakers of the Divine Nature: Deification/Theosis in the Christian Tradition, James Pain,Michael Christensen, and Boris Jakim, eds.



45 See Edmund Newey, “The Form of Reason: Participation in the Work of Richard Hooker,Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth and Jeremy Taylor”, Modern Theology, Vol.18, no. 1(January, 2002), pp. 1–26. Unfortunately, Newey tends to caricature Calvin and “reforma-tion” theology, so he does not see how Hooker and the Cambridge Platonists exhibit con-tinuity with Calvin precisely in the language of participation which Newey traces.

46 See especially Newman’s Christmas Day sermon on “The Incarnation” in Parochial and PlainSermons (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1987) pp. 242–250.

47 Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. 138.48 Ibid., pp. 7–12.49 Milbank repeatedly points to the “Lutherans” as the example of this distortion, but also

uses language indicating that this critique applies more generally to common Reformationand post-Reformation readings of Augustine. See Being Reconciled, pp. 9–10, n. 2; p. 214.

50 The addition is lengthy, but the first part is particularly significant: “I say that the will iseffaced; not in so far as it is will, for in man’s conversion what belongs to his primal natureremains entire.” Institutes, 2:3:6.

51 The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defence of the Orthodox Doctrine of Human Choiceagainst Pighius, trans. Graham I. Davies, A. N. S. Lane, ed., (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996),p. 212.

52 “It was the spiritual life of Adam to remain united and bound to his Maker.” Institutes,2:1:5.

53 See Bondage and Liberation of the Will references in Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia,2:263, 264, 284, 290, 4:331, 5:361, 6:381. Also see “Calvin’s Use of Aristotle” in Lane’s intro-duction to Bondage and Liberation of the Will, pp. xxiv–xxvi.

54 Institutes, 2:2:1.55 See Bondage and Liberation of the Will in Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, 2:259,

263–264.56 In “Alternative Protestantism”, Milbank does recognize a point of commonality with

Calvin on the notion that true freedom must be divinely empowered by the Spirit. See“Alternative Protestantism”, p. 7.

57 Institutes, 3:20:1.58 Institutes, 3:20:4, 8, 11. Calvin articulates a set of “rules” to right prayer in Institutes,

3:20:4–14.59 See especially Institutes, 3:20:4–5.60 Institutes, 3:20:1.61 Institutes, 3:20:3.62 Institutes, 3:20:5, emphasis added.63 Institutes, 2:2:1.64 For an influential approach undergirding many East versus West accounts of deification,

see Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St.Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976), pp. 130–34, 96–216. For the use of Gregory Palamas“against” Thomas Aquinas, see Eric D. Perl, “St. Gregory Palamas and the Metaphysics ofCreation”, Dionysius, Vol. 14 (December, 1990), pp. 105–130. For an evaluation of Calvin bylate Byzantine standards, see the appendix of Joseph P. Farrell, Free Choice in St. Maximusthe Confessor (South Canan, PA: St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press, 1989).

65 This is the tendency of much of the Finnish school on Luther. See Carl E. Braaten and RobertW. Jenson, Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids, MI:Eerdmans, 1998); Tuomo Mannermaa, Der Im Glauben Gegenwärtige Christus: RechtfertigungUnd Vergottung Zum Ökumenischen Dialog (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1989).However, Reinhard Flogaus does seek to differentiate Luther more carefully from Palamaswhile still affirming that Luther teaches deification. See Reinhard Flogaus, Theosis BeiPalamas Und Luther: Ein Beitrag Zum Ökumenischen Gespräch (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1997). For an account which overestimates the commonality between Calvin andPalamas, see Joseph C. McLelland, “Sailing to Byzantium” in The New Man: An Orthodoxand Reformed Dialogue, John Meyendorff and Joseph C. McLelland eds., (New Brunswick,NJ: Agora Books, 1973), pp. 10–25.

66 Milbank’s account of Aquinas on deification, for example, is Aquinas read through a dis-tinctly Neoplatonic lens, with contemporary constructive concerns at the forefront. AsChristine Helmer notes about Truth in Aquinas, the most charitable (and helpful) way to



engage this approach is frankly to admit that aspects of it are historically questionable,while nevertheless engaging the contemporary theological concerns that such a readingraises. For both historical questioning and constructive engagement with Milbank’s readingof Aquinas, see Christine Helmer’s review, “Truth in Aquinas”, International Journal of Sys-tematic Theology, Vol. 5, no. 1 (March, 2003), pp. 93–95; Aidan Nichols’ review, “Truth inAquinas”, Theology, Vol. 104, no. 820 (July/August, 2001), pp. 288–289.

67 Both the Finnish School (see note 41 and 65) and Anna Williams tend to overestimate thesimilarities between Western conceptions of deification and late Byzantine notions oftheosis. See A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also Nonna Verna Harrison’s review, “TheGround of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas”, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly,Vol. 45, no. 4 (2001), pp. 418–421.

68 See Calvin’s commentary on 2 Peter 1:4 in Calvin’s Commentaries and in Ioannis Calvini operaquae supersunt omnia, 55:446.

69 This can be inferred from Milbank’s comments on Luther’s “Scotist” metaphysic. See BeingReconciled, p. 214, n21. In “Alternative Protestantism”, Milbank expresses uncertainty aboutthe extent to which Calvin shares this metaphysic with Luther, but Milbank thinks Calvinis probably less of a “Scotist” than Luther. “Alternative Protestantism”, pp. 6–7.

70 For more on these biblical and patristic elements of Calvin’s teaching on deification, see J. Todd Billings, “United to God through Christ: Assessing Calvin on the Question of Deification”.

71 Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin, chapter 7.72 There are many examples of participation language applied to a variety of loci. Here are a

few examples from the Institutes on the topics listed above: justification (3:17:11), baptism(4:16:2), the Lord’s Supper (4:17:10), the resurrection (3:3:9), the incarnation (2:12:5), Trinity(4:1:3), the atonement (2:16:12), the imago dei (2:2:1), and “participation in God” (1:13:14).

73 Contemporary discussion of deification/theosis has frequently followed Lossky in seekingto avoid the “negative” tendencies of western accounts of sin and grace. However, ratherthan giving an alternative, fully developed hamartology (in dialogue with Paul’s stronglanguage of Romans 1–3), contemporary accounts frequently move quickly on to the morecomfortable language of adoption, participation and indwelling (Romans 6 and 8). In con-trast, Calvin combines a strong harmatology with a strong theology of participation.

74 See especially Being Reconciled, pp. 7–12.75 Some readers may wonder whether a sola scriptura theologian like Calvin would think it is

worth the effort to argue that he is closer to a father like Augustine than another theologi-cal interlocutor. Yet Calvin clearly did. Calvin’s chief burden in Bondage and Liberation of the Will is not a scriptural defense of his position, but an argument that his account is abetter appropriation of Augustine and other fathers than Pighius is able to give.

76 See Muller’s account of the “central dogma theories” in Calvin scholarship in chapters 4and 5 of After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford; New York:Oxford University Press, 2003).

77 Muller chronicles this change in Calvin scholarship in The Unaccommodated Calvin and AfterCalvin, Part 1.

78 For example, when Milbank claims to exposit Paul in Being Reconciled, pp. 7–9, he neverreturns to the language or the text of Paul but keeps with the language of Augustine.

79 See especially Augustine’s extensive review of relevant passages of scripture in Books 2–4of De Trinitate.

80 Nichols, “Truth in Aquinas”, p. 289.81 In Book 5, chapter 3 of De Trinitate, Augustine seeks to articulate distinctive names for each

person of the Trinity which express their eternal relation to the Godhead. The Son’s rela-tionship to the Father is one of eternal relation, for the Son is eternally begotten of theFather. What are we to say about the Spirit? The Spirit proceeds from the Father and theSon (filioque), and is called the “gift of God” (Acts 8:20). Thus, Augustine proposes “gift”as a possible name for the Spirit to express this eternal relationship of procession.

82 In The Word Made Strange, Milbank calls Moltmann’s social trinitarianism an “effectivelytritheistic” approach (p. 180). Milbank does not want to advocate a “social” trinitarianism,and Milbank’s trinitarian theology of the Gift is quite distant from Moltmann; yet, thenotion of “exchange” and self-giving between the persons of the Trinity posits a mode of



relation with a greater externalist tendency than traditional notions of “generation” and“procession”. In addition, by adding “exchange” to the modes of relation in the inner-Triune life, Milbank’s move has a speculative character that pushes the boundaries ofapophatic modesty.

83 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1988), Vol. 3, pp. 515–523 and Vol. 4, pp.317–332.

84 See Summa Theologica, Vol. 1, Pt. 1., Q. 38, Art. 1 and 2. Also see Yves Cognar’s, I Believe inthe Holy Spirit, trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury Press, 1983), Vol. 1, p. 90.

85 See Cognar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, Vol. 3, pp. 84–88. An important reason for the near-absence in the East of using the name “Gift” to express the Spirit’s eternal relation to theGodhead is the Augustinian connection of the Spirit as “Gift” with the filioque clause. ForAugustine, the term “Gift” is appropriate because the Spirit proceeds from the Father andthe Son.



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Todd J. Billings, John Milbank's Theology of the Gift