Tocqueville and Nietzsche

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Tocqueville, Nietzsche, and the Problem of Individualism

While Tocqueville is renown for his concept of "individualism", rarely has it been compared

with another of most famous philosophers of the 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche ! closer

analysis reveals not only a Nietzschian notion of individualism which questions the more

popular view of Nietzsche as a radical individualist, but demonstrates for the first time how

Tocqueville influenced Nietzsches understandin# of this concept $owever, while their

dia#noses of the problem of individualism are similar, Nietzsche ultimately tries to solve the

problem throu#h a radicalization of the individual rather throu#h moderation as Tocqueville

does This difference represents a lar#er division on two principle human alternatives, human

e%cellence versus &ustice ' ar#ue that while Tocqueville(s notion of "self interest ri#htly

understood" represents a more feasible alternative, the neo)Tocquevillian reformulation of

this solution throu#h the notion of "social capital" presents a morally ambi#uousconcep

tion

that is antithetical to Tocqueville(s principle ideas and endan#ers &ust political solutions

The radical individualism often attributed to Nietzsche, which we shall term a

half-legend, derives from a mix of historical context, the myths of his own personal

biography, and haphazard textual selections. istorically, the failure of the !erman

revolution of "arch #$%$ was followed by a reactionary period called the Nachm*rz

+after "arch& in !ermany, where civil liberties were severely restricted. 'hilosophy

departments were seriously affected. (nyone considered subversive was purged

from philosophy departments, thus leading to the return, and even gain in respect, of

the philosopher outside the academy. The supposed marginality of Nietzsche played

a large role in his reception in !ermany, and later in )rance. The lone rebel, the

image of the anti-academic intellectual such as that of *chopenhauer +which was

fostered largely due to ulius )rauestdts wor/ at the period&, became synonymous


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with a new image of the anti-institutional philosopher which was emerging in late #0th

century !ermany.

1n addition to the historical context, the reputation of the man who wrote that

2very great philosophy is the personal confession of its author was certainly

affected by his own personal biography, or at least the half-legend that many of his

close friends and family created. # This half-legend depicts Nietzsche, especially

during the years of #$30-#$$0, as a remote ascetic, a solitary ali/e 4arathustra on his

mountaintop. The summers Nietzsche spent in a simple room in *ils-"aria in the

*wiss (lps, and his failure to get married, provided ample biographic fodder for such

myths. They were most notably propagated by his sister, 2lisabeth )5rester-Nietzsche

in her biography of Nietzsche, along with the wor/s of one of !ermanys most

popular poets at the time, *tefan !eorge. 6 *imilarly, 7ou *alome, whom Nietzsche

had an ambiguous friendship with, describes him as reclusive8 "ihi ipse scripsi 91

have written for myself, she points out, was written throughout his Nachlass.*alome writes that her first impression of Nietzsche was of a certain taciturn

solitude and she was also one of the first to divide Nietzsches life into : distinct

periods, which perpetuated the myth of his solitary period. :

;ther popular critics such as !eorg uate Nietzsche with =ier/egaard, while some such as (bert 7evy went so far as to

e>uate him with the anarchist individualist "ax *tirner. % ;n the literary front,

# )riedrich Nietzsche, eyond -ood and .vil +New ?or/@ Aintage


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Thomas "ann would later write that we search in literature in vain for a more

fascinating figure than that of the hermit of *ils "aria.H "ann wrote that upon this

delicate, fine, warmhearted soul in need of love, the coldest solitude, the solitude of

the criminal was imposed.G *imilarly, the influential interpreter and translator of

Nietzsches corpus into 2nglish, Ialter =aufman, wrote that the leitmotif of

Nietzsches life and thought was the theme of the anti-political individual who see/s

self perfection far from the modern world. 3 )inally, the radical and subterranean

Nietzschian self, a legend in part which his own social circles and critics perpetuated,

was not only a formative influence on )reudian psychology and Ieberian sociology,

but was the primary perspective through which deconstructionists such as )oucault

and Jerrida saw Nietzsche. Ihile these movements have waned in their influence,

contemporary treatments of Nietzsche to this day still exist that treat the heroic

individualism of Nietzsche as a matter of fact.

Ie shall see that noble selfishness was indeed an important, albeit dangerous,

aspect of Nietzsches philosophy- and one which has obviously been characteristic of

the image depicted of Nietzsche in the half legend which surrounds him. owever,

there is another half to Nietzsche, which has been lac/ing in secondary treatments of

him in favor of the highly exaggerated view of Nietzsche the solitary. )rom a simple

biographic perspective, the truth is that Nietzsches summers in the (lps at *ils "aria

were not due to his solitary nature, but rather largely to the climate it provided for

his health problems. 1n fact, a study of over HF people who /new him, and had no

HT. "ann, Nietzsche(s philosophy in the 8i#ht of ecent $istory, in T. "ann, 8ast.ssays,

trad. Tania et ames *tern +New ?or/ @ =nopf, #0H0&, pp. #%#-#33.G

'bid, pp. #%:.3 Ialter =aufmann, Nietzsche: 7hilosopher, 7sycholo#ist, !ntichrist +'rinceton@ 'rincetonKniversity 'ress, #03H& pp. :GG.


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ulterior motive in perpetuating this half legend of Nietzsche the hermit, attested that

he was in fact >uite urban and civilized. $

owever, beyond his personal biography told by others is his own wor/, which

contains a very telling attac/ a#ainst individualism- an issue in Nietzschian studies

which, curiously, has not been exhaustively studied. (s (lain Lenaut writes@ 1f one

in fact traces in NietzscheDs wor/ the explicit references to the individual or

individualism, there are surprisingly varied appreciations which are in tension, or in

paradox. Buriously, an investigation of these references has never been the obMect of a

serious study.E 0 ;ne part of this tas/ that merits closer consideration is a comparison

of his ideas on individualism with Toc>ueville, which has also been surprisingly little

remar/ed upon. ( closer analysis of Nietzsches wor/s, and especially his lesser

/nown wor/s, reveals that among the tensions between his various definitions of

individualism in Nietzsche is a Toc>uevillian strand which, on the contrary of

positing individualism as the nascent potential of the will to power, argues that it is infact a destructive force. 1n fact, further analysis reveals that while, as secondary

sources have documented, Nietzsche often maintained his criticism of pure patriotism,

and at times preached in support of the hermit or isolate, he was also revolted by the

thought of the atomism and individualism of his day. 1n fact, the way in which

Nietzsche framed the problem of the increasing isolation of the individual in

modernity has stri/ing similarities to Toc>ueville, and it is li/ely that Nietzsche was

even directly inspired by Toc>ueville on this issue.

Nietzsche could not fully live in the atomistic and power-see/ing Loman-inspired

world that he himself created. 1n his early wor/, ;ntimely 5editations, he criticizes

$

*ander !ilman, 6onversations with Nietzsche, +New ?or/@ ;xford Kniversity 'ress,#0$3&.0

(lain Lenaut, 8(


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individuals who thin/ with a precipitancy and with an exclusive preoccupation with

themselves never before encountered in man.#FNietzsche spea/s about the problem

of atomism in modern society@ Ie live in the age of atoms, of atomistic chaos.

The opposing forces were practically held together in "edieval times by the Bhurch

Nowadays the crudest and most evil forces, the money-ma/ers and the military

despots, hold sway over almost everything on earth.##Nietzsche therefore observed

a similar phenomenon to Toc>ueville, which he thought was unprecedented in its

scope. e also shared the view that it was the pursuit of well being- the principal

activity of the money ma/er- which exacerbated this problem.#6

1n addition, Nietzsches concern with atomism was not simply present in his

early wor/s, but was discussed throughout his Nachlass written from #$$:-#$$$.

owever, by the time he wrote the noteboo/s +which were later assembled into the

Will to 7ower and in part falsified by his sister&, Nietzsche had abandoned the term

atomism in favor of individualism. The predominant aphorisms where the

#F). Nietzsche, ;ntimely 5editations, trans L.. ollingdale, +Bambridge 8 New ?or/ @

Bambridge Kniversity 'ress, #003&, pp. #HF

##'bid

#6There were a variety of definition of individualism before Toc>ueville, which (lain Lenaut

points out, was a term first employed in a saint-simonienne revue in #$6G to denounce thereduction of the economy to Dthe narrowest individualismD (. Lenaut, 8a Fin de8(!utorit


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concept of individualism is discussed are aphorism 3$6, 3$:, 3$% and 3$H.#: The time

periods that these aphorisms were written correspond >uite precisely to Nietzsches

only two references to Toc>ueville in his wor/s- one which was in his noteboo/s in

#$$H, and the other in a letter he wrote to )ranz ;verbec/ on )ebruary 6:rd, #$$3. #%

The first time he mentioned Toc>ueville was in a noteboo/ entry in (pril-une, #$$H

where he writes@ The finest head of the past century, ume and !aliani, all of them

were experienced with service to the *tate@ *tendhal and Toc>ueville as well.#H This

was the same year that he wrote aphorism 3$: discussing individualism.#G

Ie /now for sure that he was reading Toc>ueville again around two years later

from the letter he wrote on )ebruary 6:rd #$$3. Nietzsche writes@ 1 am Must reading

*ybels chief wor/, in )rench translation +after studying the relevant problems in the

school of de Toc>ueville and Taine&.#3 This letter was written precisely around the

time he wrote aphorism 3$6 about individualism +written November #$$3-"arch

#$$$& in hisNachlass, and Must a few months before he wrote the other two aphorisms

about individualism- 3$% +written in *pring-)all #$$3& and 3$H +written in *pring-)all

#$$3&.#$

ueville precisely around the time he was writing about individualism in his

Nachlass, we may also see from the way Nietzsche frames the problem of

individualism that he was directly influenced by Toc>ueville. Nietzsche writes@ The

"odern 2uropean is characterized by two apparently opposite traits@ individualism

#:)riedrich Nietzsche, The Will to 7ower, trans. Ialter =aufmann +New ?or/@ Aintage


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and the demand for e>ual rights8 that 1 have at last come to understand. #0 1t was

therefore late in Nietzsches career, he admits, that he was able to finally see what

Toc>ueville described as the relation between individualism and e>uality +and if he

learned this from Toc>ueville, perhaps this is one reason why Nietzsche places

Toc>ueville among the finest heads of the century&. 6F

Nietzsche also shares Toc>uevilles view that individualism is not a form of

intellectual or social independence, but Must another level of interdependence. )or

Toc>ueville, although (merican Bartesians act as though each man see/s his

beliefs only within himself, they ultimately choose those thoughts inside themselves

which conform with the opinion of the maMority. 6# *imilarly, while describing

individualism, Toc>ueville writes that each man turns all his sentiments towards

himself alone.66 owever, again, these sentiments do not turn out to be uni>ue, but

rather based on a common desire to be free from others. They are therefore all allied

in their desire to be free from responsibility to society as a whole. Toc>ueville writes@

#0'bid, pp =2>

6FBontrasting aristocracy with democracy, Toc>ueville writes that in a democracy, (s each

class comes closer to the others and mixes with them, its members become indifferent andalmost li/e strangers among themselves. Toc>ueville, /emocracy in !merica, pp %$:. 1noneof his most succinct summaries of this phenomenon, he writes 2>uality places men

beside one another without a common bond to hold them. 'bid, pp. %$H. ;ne may also tracethis observation to Lousseau, who as we remember Toc>ueville thought about every day,and who Nietzsche mentioned more often than Toc>ueville. ;ver four decades before thebirthof Toc>ueville, Lousseau described the problem of constructing a viable community inhis.mile. e wrote@ Natural man is entirely for himself. e is numerical unity, the absolutewhole which is relative only to itself or its /ind. Bivil man is only a fractional unity dependenton the denominator8 his value is determined by his relation to the whole, which is the social

body. !ood social institutions are those that best /now how to denature man, to ta/ehisabsolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the 1 intothecommon unity. +ean-ac>ues Lousseau, .mile, trans. (llan


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These QindividualsR owe nothing to anyone, and they expect so to spea/ nothing from

anyone. 6:

Nietzsche observes the same phenomenon. Ihile analyzing the soul of the modern

individual, he writes in aphorism 33G, and later in 3$%, that initially, merely getting

free seems to be the goal. 6% 1ndividualism ma/es one draw apart from society as a

whole. owever, it also forms its own society of individuals which ally against the

totality. e writes@ e Qthe individualR does not oppose them QsocietyR as a person

but only as an individual8 he represents all individuals against the totality. That

means@ he instinctively posits himself as e>ual to all other individuals8 what he gains

in this struggle he gains for himself not as a person but as a representative of

individuals against the totality.6H

(lthough Toc>uevilles influence on Nietzsche most probably lead him to frame

the problem in a similar way, they differ in terms of why they thin/ individualism

limits human beings. Ihile Toc>ueville concentrates largely on why it limits society

as a whole, or its effects on Mustice, Nietzsche is concerned with how it hampers

human excellence. Nietzsche sees individualism as Must another form of

egalitarianism, and he therefore fears that it will homogenize human beings. Ksing the

word individual in the context of individualism, he writes@ The principle of the

individual reMects very #reat human beings.1ts unfairness consists in a boundless

rage, not against tyrants and public flatterers even in the arts, but against noble men,

who despise the praise of the many. The demand for e>ual rights +i.e. to be allowed to

sit in Mudgment on everything and everyone& is anti-aristocratic. 6G The modern

morality of the individual is thus antithetical to the greatness of human beings. 1t

6:'bid, pp. %$%.

6%Nietzsche, The Will to 7ower, pp. %F:, %##.6HNietzsche, The Will to 7ower, pp. %##.6G

'bid, pp. %#F.


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represents what Nietzsche famously called herd morality. 7oo/ing at herd morality

through the context of individualism, we see that it is defined by a mass conformism

to the opinion of ones neighbor. Nietzsche moc/s those who argue that individualism

is, on the contrary, a movement which see/s the autonomy of the individual. e

writes@ The 9growing autonomy of the individual@ these 'arisian philosophers such

as )auillCe spea/ of this8 they ought to ta/e a loo/ at the race moutonni?re to which

they belongS ;pen your eyes, you sociologists of the futureS The individual has grown

strong under opposite conditions63

Ihat separates the two is that Nietzsche, unli/e Toc>ueville, did not fear the

conse>uences of individualism on the citizens relation to the state. 'ractically

responding to Toc>ueville, Nietzsche writes that Ie are feeling the conse>uences of

the doctrine, preached lately from all the housetops, that the state is the highest end of

man and that there is no higher duty than to serve it8 1 regard this not a relapse into

paganism, but into stupidityE6$ e goes on to claim that the individual and the state

are antithetical in their interests. Nietzsche was instead concerned that the atomist

revolution, which he calls it, which has been unleashed by the collapse of the

Bhurch, would in its egalitarianism destroy this elite cadre of philosophers, who

would no lon#er be respected and revered by others, nor amon# one another. Ihile

for Nietzsche the Loman, the instinct towards domination could lead easily to

radical individualism, Nietzsche the philologist maintained the desire to create a

tightly /nit community of philosophers li/e the !ree/s, who would be stepping-

stones to one another and united in friendship founded on intellectual discovery. 7i/e

Toc>ueville, Nietzsche feared that these types of human beings were disappearing in

the hustle of democratic life. e observes of the real philosopher@ e seems to see

63'bid6$

Nietzsche, ;ntimely 5editations, pp. 663.


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the symptoms of an absolute uprooting of culture in the increasing rush and hurry of

life, and the decay of all reflection and simplicity. The waters of religion are ebbing,

and leaving swamps or stagnant pools@ the nations are drawing away in enmity again,

and long to tear each other in pieces. The sciences, blindly driving along, on a laisser

faire system, without a common standard, are splitting up, and losing hold of every

firm principle. The educated classes are being swept along in the contemptible

struggle for wealth. Never was the world more worldly, never poorer in goodness and

love. "en of learning are no longer beacons or sanctuaries in the midst of this turmoil

of worldliness8 they themselves are daily becoming more restless, thoughtless,

loveless. 2verything bows before the coming barbarism, art and science included.60

Nowhere is it more clear than here how Nietzsche resents the loss of love- love for

the intellectual heights that may be shared together by two people- the type of love

that Nietzsche himself felt for *chopenhauer in this essay. 1n fact, we often forget that

Nietzsche, the so-called radical individualist, could never fully give up his hope of

forming a community of philosophers based on friendship8 an experience which he

gives the highest praise for. )urthermore, it was, ironically, the very obMect of his later

attac/s, the !ree/s, that Nietzsche admits, /new so well what a friend is through

referring to their deep, many sided, philosophical discussion of friendship.:F 1n the

60'bid:FNietzsche, $uman, !ll too $uman, pp. #$H. 1t seems, above all, (ristotles thoughts that wefind echoed in Nietzsches conception of friendship. )or both (ristotle and Nietzsche thereare several forms of friendship, but only one which is true friendship. (ristotle writes thatthere are three types of friendship- that which is based on pleasure, utility, and virtue. 1t isonly friendship based on virtue which may endure, because in the other cases the friendshipdissolves when the external sources of pleasure or utility disappear. 7i/e (ristotle, Nietzschecreates a hierarchy of human beings, where only the highest types may experience truefriendship. e writes, for example, that neither the slave nor the tyrant can be a friend. Truefriendship for both thin/ers re>uires on some type of philosophic understanding. Nietzschecalls it the undimmed eye and the glance of eternity, while (ristotle calls it sharingconversation and thought. (ristotle ends his statement on sharing conversation andthought by writing and not sharing the same pasture, as in the case of grazing animals. euses an analogy which later becomes common for Nietzsche in order to describe the antithesis


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same chapter where he praises !ree/ friendship in$uman all too $uman +titled "an

in *ociety&, which is devoted entirely to social man, Nietzsche also reflects on the

psychological intricacies of a simple conversation, which he praises for its capacity to

show ten ways of expressing our inner thoughts. Nietzsche, the apparent radical

individualist concludes that a conversation is one of the most agreeable things in the

world.:#

*hedding spuriously his Loman mas/ for his !ree/ one, his aphorisms on

friendship challenge at the core the half legend of Nietzsche the radical individualist.

)earing the death of friendship in modernity, he even writes (nti>uity lived and

reflected on friendship to the limit, and almost buried friendship in its own grave.

This is its advantage over us@ we in turn can show idealized sexual love. (ll great

achievements on the part of the man of anti>uity were supported by the fact that man

stood beside man:6 *ocial man, which Nietzsche at times reMects in favor of

Loman detachment, turns out to have a place in his thought, despite himself and his

own proMect. 1n this respect, he Moins Toc>ueville who argues for the importance of

social interaction on the development of our minds. :: 2ven during the middle of his

life and at the pea/ of his experimental proMect towards a radicalized Loman world, its

main hero, 4arathustra, cannot remain simply alone. 1n poem at the end of eyond

-ood and .vil, on his high mountaintop, 4arathustra cries out@ 7oo/ing all day and

night, for friends 1 wait@ )or new friendsS BomeS 1ts timeS 1ts lateS :%

of friendship- the analogy of grazing animals. Nietzsches similarly writes, whiledistinguishing between love and friendship, that women only /now the former, and cruellycompares them to cats and birds, or at best, cows. Thus for both thin/ers, human friendshipis not mere companionship such as grazing animals offer to one another, but re>uires anintellectual activity. (ristotle, First 7rinciples, trans. T.. 1rwin, +;xford@ ;xford Kniversity'ress, #0$$& pp. :06.

:#Nietzsche, $uman, !ll too $uman, pp. #06.:6Nietzsche, /aybrea, pp. HFG.:: (. de Toc>ueville, /e la d


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Nietzsches Noble Selfishness vs. Tocqueville Refined and intellient

selfishness! Nietzsches Problematic Reform of Individualism

Jespite their shared fears regarding the problem of individualism, their contrary

conceptions of nature and liberty lead Nietzsche and Toc>ueville to ultimately come

up with radically opposing solutions to the problem. The fundamental philosophical

difference between Nietzsche and Toc>ueville on this >uestion lies in the fact that

while Toc>ueville ta/es the more 7oc/ean view that the passion for comfortable self

preservation leads to a rational calculation resulting in individualism +which, wron#ly

understood, eventually leads to selfishness&, Nietzsche emphasizes the more

primordial obbesian view that the grouping of individuals that results in

individualism, and its conse>uence- herd morality- is ultimately caused by a state of

fear. 1t is fear which is at the root of what Nietzsche calls herd morality. 1f fear is at

the bottom of our morality, then virtues in the eyes of the community of individuals

become >ualities which assist in protecting them such as consideration, pity, fairness,

mildness, and reciprocity of assistance.:H

Nietzsches criticism of democratic morality is therefore based on this primordial

notion of fear, and reMects the progress through rational calculation which has been

used in post enlightenment democracies to bond individuals through what Toc>ueville

called self interest rightly understood. The fundamental recognition of the self with

the other, which, propelled by mans natural ability towards self-perfection and

brought him into civil society is reMected by Nietzsche in favor of a bonding of li/e

minded individuals through higher instincts, which is much more rare. Toc>ueville

:H'bid., p. ##6.


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:GNietzsche, eyond -ood and .vil, pp. ##:.

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on the other hand tries to preserve the dignity of all human beings by proposing a

solution to the problem of individualism based on the mutual recognition of the self

with the other that developed through their natural and ongoing process of self-

perfection. 1n other words, while Toc>ueville tried to moderate individualism in order

to bond the maMority of human beings, Nietzsche sought instead a feed individualism

until it becomes what he called noble selfishness in order to bond a small group of

humans.

The ethical conse>uences of Nietzsches view are a complete reversal of

Toc>uevilles position on morality. Nietzsche sees morality as a derivation of these

base instincts rather than social attributes, such as compassion, which man developed

throughout his evolutionary history. Bonse>uently, the mild and easy human

relations between individuals that Toc>ueville describes, which are grounded in the

later history of the state of nature as man began to perfect himself, are seen by

Nietzsche as merely a sign of human wea/ness. Nietzsche argued that this type of

morality, which is based on fear, would endanger our highest drives, which he often

depicts as being precisely the opposite of those virtues listed above@ The highest

and strongest drivesdrive the individual far above the average and the flats of herd

conscience, wrec/ the self-confidence of the community, its faith in itself.:G

1t is, rather, the freedom of oppression- the !ree/ notion of freedom that he

elaborates in 0chopenhauer as .ducator, which was eventually reMected by Nietzsche

in favor of the Loman definition pointed to in Twili#ht of the 'dols. This nascent form

of the will to power eventually grows into a desire for Mustice, for e>uality of right.

1t finally culminates in a desire to overpower, which Nietzsche coins as his notion

of Loman freedom, and is the state that precedes the green interval where


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:$Nietzsche, eyond -ood and .vil, pp. H6.

14

exceptional men are ready to give birth to grand art. The sentimental disposition

which accompanies this desire to overpower is what Nietzsche called noble

selfishness.

1n order to combat individualism, Nietzsche therefore ironically encoura#es

individualism in its most extreme form through his praise of selfishness and criticism

of the conventional conception of virtues@ Ihat is really praised when virtues are

praised is, first, their instrumental nature and, secondly, the instinct in every virtue

that refuses to be held in chec/ by the over-all advantage for the individual himself.:3

1n praising this noblest selfishness, Nietzsche sets out a series of provisions which

resemble the ten commandments in order to help cultivate true independence from the

herd. e warns against getting stuc/ to a person, a fatherland, to a science, to

ones own detachment, or to our own virtues.:$ e concludes that it is only

learning how to conserve oneself in this fashion that one may become truly free, that

one may become a free spirit. 1n proposing these new commandments, he implies

that they are a replacement of the old ones- the udeo-Bhristian morality that forms

the basis of enlightened democratic morality, in turn wea/ening the very foundation

that Toc>ueville hoped to prop up in order to save democracy from itself.

Self interest rihtl" understood and #ronl" understood

Ihile Nietzsche and his heirs vision of the new self created a legacy which

exacerbated the loosing of social bonds that democracy inevitably drifts towards,

Toc>ueville sought to rescue the selfs isolation from the other. is doctrine of

:3

)riedrich Nietzsche, The -ay 0cience, trans. Ialter =aufmann +New ?or/@ Landomouse, #03%&, pp. 0:.


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15

self interest rightly understood was his famous rescue plan for the unprecedented

level of separation between individuals in modern civil society, which aimed to stri/e

a middle ground between radical selfishness and unrealistic forms of altruism.

Toc>ueville observes that (mericans are unabashedly honest about their true motives.

They do not pretend that virtue is something beautiful, or that self-sacrifice comes

from some type of grandiose altruism. Ihile they admit that each individual acts

according to their own interest, Toc>ueville writes that they complacently show how

the enlightened love of themselves constantly brings them to aid each other and

disposes them willingly to sacrifice a part of their time and their wealth to the good of

the state.:0

1n painting this caricature of (mericans, Toc>ueville contrasts them with

2uropeans, who he argues have not adopted this enlightened doctrine, but instead

want to /eep everything, and often everything eludes them. %F Toc>ueville

recognized that the needs of the individual would inevitably be first priority for

democratic citizens of the future, but he thought that if they were refined, one could

rationally calculate ways of serving oneself and ones community simultaneously.

1t is this calculated and mutually beneficial exchange which forms the basis of the

morality of modern democratic society today. 'hilosophers such as ohn 7oc/e, who

laid the theoretical foundation for modern democratic society, sought to base modern

morality on a passion which was strong and universal.%# Ihat they found, in part, was

the passion for the preservation of ones life. 2very healthy human being wishes to

preserve their own existence. owever, simply preserving ones life is not enough.

The !laconian desire for spices in the city of sows is interpreted by 7oc/e not as

an erotic desire for the 'latonic ideas or forms, but rather for what they are at face

:0 Toc>ueville, /emocracy in !merica, pp. HF6.%F

'bid%# 'ierre "anent, Tocqueville and the Nature of /emocracy, 7anham, "d@ Lowman 7ittlefield, #00G, pp. HH.


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value- extra comforts. Therefore, it is not only preservation, but comfortable self-

preservation which becomes the cornerstone modern morality.

Toc>ueville observes that in (merica this passion for comfortable self-preservation

manifests itself as a love for well-being, which becomes the national and dominant

taste.%6 Ihile this love of well-being produces a certain restlessness that Toc>ueville

describes as a cloud which habitually covered their features %:, he admits that it

does not lead to the type of excesses found among the rich in an aristocracy. e

observes instead that (mericans who pursue well-being realize that good mores are

useful to public tran>uility and favor industry.E %% 1n other words, the businessman

who practices patience and moderation in his deal-ma/ing during the day is more

li/ely to treat his neighbor with respect when he returns home at night.%H )urthermore,

Toc>ueville observes in Bhapter #%, titled ow the Taste for "aterial 2nMoyments

(mong (mericans is Knited Iith 7ove of )reedom and with Bare )or 'ublic

(ffairs that the same business man not only treats his neighbor with respect, but

strives to better his own community as well through the maintenance of free

institutions. The (merican is able to maintain both his private interests and display

the most lively patriotism according to Toc>ueville, because he realizes that freedom

is the best instrument and the greatest guarantee of their well being %G

Ksing (merica as his semi-mythical model, Toc>ueville formulates a solution

through self interest rightly understood, which was also congruous with the

moderating effect of Bhristianity. is chapter in /emocracy in !merica titled ow

%6 Toc>ueville, /emocracy in !merica, pp. H##.%:'bid

%%'bid, pp. H#6.

%H(lbert irschman calls the idea that the rise in commerce will soften mores, tame passions,

and spread enlightenment the doux-commerce thesis. *ee@ (, ;. irschman, The7assionsand the 'nterests: 7olitical !r#uments for 6apitalism efore its Triumph. 'rinceton, N.@'rinceton K', #033. pp. GF-G#.%G Toc>ueville, /emocracy in !merica, pp. H#:.


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the (mericans (pply the Joctrine of *elf 1nterest Iell Knderstood in the "atter of

Leligion comes directly after his chapter laying out the principle of self-interest

rightly understood. e /new that enlightened self-interest would be the dominating

morality of the future, if it wasnt already of the present. owever, it is also, in many

respects, antithetical to the original Bhristian morality of the past, which demanded

complete self-sacrifice before !od. 1n order to find a way of reconciling Bhristianity

with self-interest rightly understood, he argues that the promise of rewards in

heaven for good deeds on earth is a reformulation of self-interest rightly understood.

1n distinction with the tradition materialist utilitarian tradition of thin/ers such as

elvCtius, Bondillac and ueville chose instead a sublimated form of

self interest which was in part inspired by 'ascal@ in loving the body, he loves only

himself because he is a being only within himself, by himself and for himself.%3

This

perceivably blasphemous thought was, of course, not first espoused by Toc>ueville,

but by 'ascal. Toc>ueville paints the (merican as the archetype practitioner of

Bhristianity in this new 'ascalian spirit@ They Q(mericansR therefore practice their

religion without shame and without wea/ness8 but one ordinarily sees even in the

midst of their zeal something so tran>uil, so methodical, so calculated, that it seems to

be reason much more than heart that leads them to the foot of the altar. %$

Toc>uevilles embellishes the ease with which the (merican combines these two

doctrines in order to inspire democratic men, which naturally incline towards the

earth, to, at the very least, raise passing, distracted glances towards heaven. %0

Kltimately, Toc>ueville admits that self interest rightly understood is not a lofty

moral doctrine. 1t produces neither great Bhristians nor great citizens- neither men

%3'ascal,7ens


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li/e 'ascal himself nor the ideal of the ancient !ree/ or Loman citizen- all of which

re>uire a self forgetting that is beyond his expectations for democratic people. (t

times he seems to accept this doctrine only grudgingly, and /nows that it cannot

compare with love of virtue for virtues sa/e alone. 1t inevitably turns a person into a

being who lives neither for himself nor for others- a halfway house which became the

moc/ery of many #0th

century writers, and who one of Toc>uevilles favorite

thin/ers, Lousseau, famously called the bourgeois. 1n the end though, Toc>ueville

loo/ed at the bourgeois and saw that while he is not a great man, he is a good man.

Ihile heroic sacrifice will be rare, as we have discussed, little sacrifices everyday

will be >uite common.

Toc>ueville ultimately regarded individualism as the inevitable byproduct of

e>uality, and therefore instead of see/ing to eliminate it, he sought to sublimate it.

The three ways that he sought to do this was through the spread of Bhristianity, an

enlightened notion of self interest rightly understood, and the spread free

institutions.HF owever, Toc>ueville /new that refined or intelligent selfishness

does not ma/e the machine turnseamlessly. Kltimately, he agreed with Lousseau that

harmonizing private and public interest was not fully possible, and many argue that

sometime between #$:H and #$%F he completely lost hope in doing so. )or example,

(rthur *chlesinger argues that Toc>uevilles apparent pessimistic change of heart

from his first volume of /emocracy in !merica published in #$:H to his second

volume published in #$%F was brought on by the political turmoil of his day and his

HFe summarizes the problem and the possible solution, echoing Lousseaus famous formula

in his 0ocial 6ontract.Lousseau summarizes the goal@ Eow to find a form of associationwhich will defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all, and

under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself,and remains as free as beforeE ean ac>ues Lousseau, The 0ocial 6ontract, trans. "auriceBranston, +7ondon@ 'enguin


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#0

reentry into the real world of )rench politics. H# Ksing (lbert irshmans theory in the

wor/ 0hiftin# 'nvolvements, *chlesinger goes on to even suggest that Toc>uevilles

wor/ reflects a cyclical effect in western society@ western society since the industrial

revolution passes bac/ and forth between times when citizens become wholly

absorbed in the pursuit of private affairs and times of intense preoccupation with

public issues8 a regular alternation, in his words between 9private interest and 9public

action. H6

Ihile at first glance these theories seem tempting given the seemingly

incongruous division between 'art 1 and 'art 11 of Jemocracy in (merica, they

ultimately reflect a vision of self-interest wrongly understood because they neglect the

rhetorical and even poetic nature of /emocracy in !merica. Toc>ueville was trying

to inspire the marriage of two unli/ely bedfellows- the interest of the individual and

the interest of the community- and he used a poetic mix of hope and fear to do so. e

simultaneously embellished the progress made in (merica towards this end in the first

part of/emocracy in !merica in order to inspire 2urope, and exaggerated the dangers

(merica faced to frighten 2urope in the second part. uences of individualism in part two,

Toc>ueville hoped to offer 2urope the delicate blend of fear and hope that he hoped

would lead to its own reform. Bonsistent in his thought, and timely in its need, let us

now loo/ at the current debate surrounding Toc>uevilles relevance in contemporary

H# *ee (rthur *chlesinger r Ds essay titled 1ndividualism and (pathy in Toc>uevillesJemocracy in (braham *eldin 2isenstadt. econsiderin# Tocquevilles /emocracy in!merica, +New


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20

life today, how accurate his diagnosis was, and what place, if any, there are for his

solutions today.

Tocqueville and the Self Toda"

Jespite the wisdom behind Toc>uevilles diagnosis and his solutions, which has

been custom-made for our ills, ironically, it has been rather the post-Nietzschian

vision of the detached self that today forms much of the intellectual framewor/

behind our understanding of the self. owever, over the past few decades, the

problem of individualism has become so apparent, that as a result, there has been a

revitalization of Toc>uevillian scholarship on the issue. *o accurate were his

predictions, scholars are eager now more than ever to mine his wor/s for both its

theoretical premonitions and their contemporary application. 1n fact, the problem of

individualism is among the most highly commented upon issues in all of

Toc>uevilles wor/, and unli/e various other issues, the contemporary relevance and

application of his thought on this problem is prolific. Toc>uevilles reflections on

individualism have inspired a variety of political, sociological, and philosophic

studies- and even a few best sellers on the topic, as we shall see. These studies, and

particularly their popularization through the literature they inspired, struc/ a chord

with democratic citizens. Ihile humans may be able to live without certain

philosophic or artistic achievements, they cannot live without each other.

Neo$Tocquevillianism Reconsidered! %o#lin &lone and the 'imits of the

Social (a)ital debate


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Iith the decline of "arxism in the #03Fs in )rance, thin/ers such as ". Jumont-

Ihite, . "ichel, and B.


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'utnam tests Toc>uevilles own predictions about how democratic individuals will

tend to behave with a vast array of sociological surveys and statistics on the issue.

'utnam shows the importance of social bonds for the health of political, social and

religious institutions, and the variety of social ills, from divorce to low voter turnout,

which result in radical individualism. The statistics on voter turnout, participation in

(merican associations and religious organizations are compelling, and in this respect,

'utnam does provide a convincing argument in support of Toc>uevilles fears that

democracy indeed loosens social bond to a dangerous degree. 1n more Toc>uvillian

terms, if an enlightened notion of self-interest rightly understood, Bhristianity, and

free institutions do not moderate individualism, then soft despotism may emerge. ueville thought could save democracy from its tendency towards a

loosing of social bonds, 'utnam shows us how individualism has increased in

(merica- a foreboding trend that most western democracies are not immune to as

well.

'utnams original theory for owlin# !lone, which was developed in a trilogy of

essays in theournal of /emocracy +#00H&,7olitical 0cience and 7olitics +#00H&, and

The !merican 7rospect +#00G& has attracted a fair number of critics. *ome s/eptics

>uestioned whether group membership and civic activities are actually on the decline,

or if they are merely being replaced by new activities in smaller, more casual

groups.HG

;thers argue that 'utnam neglected the crucial role played by public

authorities in the creation of social capital. H3 owever, by the time he wroteowlin#

!lone, 'utnam was armed with new statistical evidence such as the JJ< Needham

HG2verett B. 7add The Jata ust Jont *how 2rosion of (mericas 9*ocial Bapital,

7ublic 7erspective 3, uneOuly #00G, #3. 2verett B. 7add The 8add eport +New ?or/@)ree 'ress, #000&, #:#-#%H.H3

!rant ordan and Iilliam "aloney, !merican 7olitical 0cience eview 0:, une #000.


23/28

7ife *tyle *urveys, among others, which was a powerful response to many of these

criticisms. The vast array of statistical surveys demonstrates convincingly that civic

activism has not merely migrated to another domain of civic life, and has not been

effectively substituted by other forms of social capital.

Nonetheless, despite the importance of his research, 'utnam and his neo-

Toc>uevillian following have run into both conceptual and methodological

difficulties. (lthough not without its predecessors, 'utnamsowlin# !lone has given

rise to an important, and 1 believe, growing trend in neo-Toc>uevillian scholarship

through spearheading one the most influential and problematic framewor/s for the

neo-Toc>uevillian treatment of the problem of individualism today through the

concept of social capital.H$

ow does the concept of social capital, and the studies

supporting it, posit Toc>uevilles own predictions regarding individualismV Ihat

limits, if any, exist in framing the problem of individualism in this wayV

The rise in popularity of the concept of social capital as a framewor/ for

discussing the problem of individualism in Toc>ueville attests to the interest in

applications of his thought today, although the current framewor/ does not appear

without its own conceptual limits. Ihile it remains mercurial, the primary idea

behind the concept of social capital uses a neo-Ieberian vocabulary to claim that

social networ/s have value, and thus the more social capital one has, the more

H$1nowlin# !lone, 'utnam notes that the term itself social capital has been reinvented at

least six times over the twentieth century. The first /nown use of the concept is by 7..anifan, a state supervisor of rural schools in Iest Airginia. 1n #0#G, he defined socialcapital as@ those tangible substances QthatR count for most in the daily lives ofpeople@namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals andfamilies who ma/e up a social unitThe individual is helpless socially, if left to himself1fhe comes into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be anaccumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and whichmay bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions inthe whole community. (mong many others, anifans definition of social capital resurfaced

in the #0HFs through the urbanist ane acobs, in the #03Fs by economist !lenn 7oury, andinthe #0$Fs by )rench sociologist 'ierre


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values are gained. 1ncluded among the benefits of the reciprocity and

trustworthiness that arises from social networ/s are a variety of values, from

healthy political institutions and economies to even levels of overall happiness.

owever, in measuring levels of happiness, 'utnam tries to >uantify much less

>uantifiable phenomena. (fter all, in gauging the effects of individualism, tabulating

voter turnout rates is much more empirical then, for example, e>uating levels of

depression with simply a lac/ of social connectedness.H0

Ihile it is undeniable that

humans are at least in part social, lac/ of social connectedness may be one of only

many reasons for increased levels of depression.

)urthermore, besides the immeasurability of certain forms of social capital, it is

not at all clear that all forms of social capital may combat individualism, or are

even good for society as a whole. Britics have argued that social capital can be put to

too many uses, both democratic and undemocratic. Ihile social capital may help to

create bowling leagues and in turn create happier and more efficient societies, as

'utnam himself notes, it may also help united members of the =u =lux =lan +===&.

Knli/e Toc>uevilles conception of good mores, social capital is a morally

ambi#uous phenomenon. Ie thus return bac/ to one of the fundamental problems of

the relation between subMectivity and normativity, which is at the core of

individualism. (lain Lenaut summarizes the >uestion at sta/e@ ow, inside the

immanence of the self which defines its subMectivity, can one still thin/ of

transcending a normativity capable of limiting individualityVGF

The same problem

lies at the core of the social capital issue. 1n other words, does the principle

framewor/ for understand the individualism today, and thus its possible solution

through social capital, not contain within itself the germ of its own destruction- a

H0 'utnam,owlin# !lone, p. ::6.GF

(lain Lenaut, 8a Fin de 8(!utorit


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lac/ of all normative standards though which we may limit the immanence of the

selfV Leturning to the very base of our choice, along with Toc>ueville, for democracy

over other regime types, we must as/ ourselves if under this relativistic framewor/

one of the principle virtues of democracy, its relative Mustice, can be preserved after

all.

*inceowlin# !lone was first published in #00H as an essay in theournal of

/emocracy, he had ample time to fine-tune his theory by the time his boo/ came out

in 6FFF. 'utnam responds to this criticism inowlin# !loneby borrowing a

distinction between bonding forms of social capital that are exclusive li/e the ===

and bridging forms that are inclusive, such as bowling leagues.G# owever, this

distinction fails to pin down the strand of social capital that is healthy for society.

'utnam also admits that both types can have EpositiveE and EnegativeE effects, and

that they have not been successfully measured. G6 e calls social capital Eto some

extent merely a new language for a very old debate in (merican intellectual circles.E

G:

owever behind this new language, the concept itself has transformed into a largely

value-neutral concept. Kltimately, the foundation of the most influential

Toc>uevillian attempt at an applied political science turns out to be morally

ambiguous.

*omewhere along the way, have we strayed too far from Toc>ueville himselfV

Leturning to Toc>uevilleDs own language, he argues that self interest rightly

understood +what 'utnam calls reciprocal forms of social capital& must be moderated

by certain /inds of religion, democratic political institutions, and most importantly,

good mores +with laws and circumstance running a close second place&. Iithout the

G# 'utnam credits this distinction to Loss !ittell and (vis Aidal, 6ommunity Gr#anizin#Duildin# 0ocial 6apital as a /evelopment 0trate#y +Thousand ;a/s, Balif.@ *age, #00$& pp.

$.G6 'utnam,owlin# !lone, pp. 6:G:

'utnam,owlin# !lone, pp. 6%


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6G

foundation of good democratic mores, which Toc>ueville spends large parts of

/emocracy in !merica investigating, it is difficult for healthy democracy to emerge.

uevilles thoughts on democracies drift towards the loosening of social bonds,

and puts these problems into a contemporary context, he does not treat at all the wave

of post-Nietzschian thought upon which these phenomena set sail. The two poles of

the modern self +one denying and the other affirming&, which the post-Nietzschian

elements of Ieber and )reuds thought popularized respectively, are an integral part

of our faith in the silent revolution against the self. )or example, much of mechanics

of the estranged self, which was previously called by the teleological term soul, was

largely inherited from Nietzsche and popularized by )reud, who 'utnam never

mentions.G% (fter )reuds post-Nietzschian understanding of the self was popularized,

the *ocratic dictum /now thyself would never loo/ the same8 psychology would

triumph in popularity over philosophy in popular life and, increasingly, in academia,

transforming our notion of the self. The self, under in part the enormous influence of

)reud throughout the western world, became disconnected not only the other and

the world around it, but with its own significance and purpose.

G% )or example, )reuds central concept of repression is largely a reformulation ofNietzschesconcept of oblivion found in The -enealo#y of 5orals. 1n addition to repression, which is

described in numerous other instances where Nietzsche spea/s of unconscious instincts,Nietzsche describes aesthetic capacities as sublimated unconscious sexual drives around #Hyears before )reud did.


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63

1f )reud popularized the Nietzschian denial of the apparent world of the self and

his reMection of the possibility for absolute /nowledge of its essence, it was "ax

Ieber who popularized the Nietzschian call for self affirmation which characterizes

what we argue is the other side of the modern notion of the self today. 2ight years

after the father of psychoanalysis was born came the father of *ociology himself, and

arguably the most influential sociologist of the 6Fth

century.GH

Ieber inherited various

aspects of Nietzschian thought, including much of his grasp of modernity and its

dilemmas, Nietzsches conviction in hisNachlass that the most important aspect of a

political leader is his will to power, and his promotion of an extraordinary, value

setting political figure as necessary to brea/ from the conformities of the bureaucratic

age. Jespite his understanding of the fact-value distinction, following Nietzsche,

Ieber was not able to simply describe humans as a combination of values which are

e>ually valid, leaving us in a directionless void. Iebers notion of personality tried

to attenuate the nihilistic conse>uences of the fact-value distinction. 'ersonality

comes about through the freedom of the individual to follow their internal values,

rather than by external compulsions. umans must anchor themselves in these

ultimate values, and our consistency in this end determines the level of our

personality. 'ersonality consists in nothing less than the absolute devotion to a

cause.

Jespite the exhaustive sociological analysis of 'utnamDs wor/, he overloo/s this

fundamental post-Nietzschian psychological revolution that redefined the modern self

through what we call the two poles of the modern self, the affirming and the denying.

;ne of the reasons for this is that the divorce of the various disciplines in the social

GH

1t is probable that Ieber inherited some of Nietzsches thought through )reud, since theformer had read )reuds maMor wor/s by #0F$ and their circles intersected from as early as#0F3.


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sciences from each other, partly due to the increased narrow specializations that both

Toc>ueville and Nietzsche feared, which shaped the debate about individualism and,

especially in the K.*., has created schisms which have disconnected the various

realms of human /nowledge. Blaiming Toc>ueville as their own, modern sociology,

li/e other fields, has increasingly separated itself from other fields, creating a series of

fault lines in academia since the #0HFs that still exist today.GG owever, in order to

understand the root of the problem of individualism today, one must also treat the

theoretically interdisciplinary revolution which accompanied the natural drift of

democracy towards a redefinition of the self.

Documents

Tocqueville and Nietzsche