To Save the African State, Negotiate with Terrorists

7/31/2019 To Save the African State, Negotiate with Terrorists

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To Save the African State,

Negotiate with Terrorists

Alexander Laverty

5 March 2012

University of Southern California


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o Save the African State,Negotiate with Terrorists

ALEX LAVERTY

blished: March 5, 2012

n Islamic jihadst terrorist group that uses

violence in an attempt

to expel Western

influences is growing

in notoriety and

expanding its tactical

audacity.

It opposes the teaching

of Western education, and

targets state institutions such asthe police and government

buildings through assassinations

and car bombings. The state, an

ally of the United States, has

attempted to use its oil wealth to

quiet dissent, but economic and

political disparity located on

hnic, lingual, and regional lines has caused unrestbuild among those who feel their share is

sufficient. In response to the violence perpetrated

y the terrorist organization, the state has violently

acked down on the movement and recently killed

e leader of the group while he was being held in

olice custody.

nday, March 5, 2012

Geoffrey Wiseman
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/l/mark_landler/index.html?inline=nyt-perhttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/l/mark_landler/index.html?inline=nyt-per


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his description is not of a country in the Middle

ast, but a recap of recent events in Nigeria.

oko Haram, the colloquial Hausa name for the

eople Committed to the Propagation of the

ophet's Teachings and Jihad, is based in northern

geria and has undertaken such operations as a car

ombing on the United Nations headquarters in the

pital Abuja, brutal attacks on police stations in the

orth, and a Christmas Day bombing of a Christian

urch also in the capital. They claim to be a reaction

the Western influence they see being forced upon

the people of the Muslim

north by a corrupt Christian-

led government.

These actions have signaled

Boko Harams increasing

reach within Nigeria, as well

as highlighting the inability of

the Nigerian state to prevent

e group from conducting their operations outside of

eir region of support. This sets Boko Haram apartom other militant groups within Nigeria, and

poses the frailties of the modern African state that

ave persisted since the end of colonialism.

hen colonialism ended, the founding fathers of

frican independence made a critical decision in state

rmation. They accepted the borders drawn up in

urope as the sovereign domains of the newlyberated African states. However, these lines were

ten arbitrary, and neglected ethnic and geographic

nsiderations. The colonial state imposed these borders through the agreement

awn up at the Berlin Conference in 1884, and enforced control through repression

nd manipulation.

Boko Haram

xposes theailties of theodern Africanate that haveersisted since thend of colonialism


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he post-colonial state lacked the resources, the skills, and often the legitimacy to

mply subsume the capacity of the colonial

dministration. Thus, groups were able to exist

utside of the purview of the central

vernment or in prominent

pposition to the state.

ver the past 20 years, as

mmodities have become a

rger part of African countries

DP, the benefits of controlling

e state have risen

nsiderably. Thus the

onomic differences between

ose in favor by the central

dministration or those

arginalized have increased

bstantially.

ithout the same economic

centives, violent pressures,

nd geographic partitioning that

aracterized state and nation formation in other parts of the world, Africanates remain colonial amalgamations. To overcome those origins, there needs to be

muli introduced to inspire greater cohesion among the populace, in a way that will

courage and incentivize the citizens of these states to pool their combined

sources, rather than seeking to divide themselves along older ethnic or tribal

oundaries.

o create this incentive, the Nigerian government should work towards immediately

gaging in constructive talks with Boko Haram in order to grant them some level oflf-governance and to negotiate a level of autonomy. This would be a radical break

om previous government interaction with non-state armed groups and seemingly

unter-intuitive in terms of nation-building. However, despite military campaigns to

ush radical opposition groups around the world, the underlying causes of the anti-

vernment sentiments have not been solved. Poverty, political corruption, economic

arginalization, and the lack of investment are well known to be root causes of

Nigerian Oil Supply locations

Source: Le Monde

Oil Extraction

Ethnic groups

Major roads

Paved roads


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surgencies, radical movements, and jihadist groups. Military defeat will not create

eater national harmony, in fact it will create the opposite.

oko Haram claims to have substantial support in the north, and whatever their

umbers, they grow each time retaliation is carried out by the government. Thus, the

gerian state needs to immediately cease their attacks on areas where Boko Haram is

cated, and seek to negotiate their terms. This should involve deciding on which

gerian states will be given more self-rule powers, how quickly state taxation and

cial services should be discontinued (including any receipts from oil

oceeds), and how to deal with those wishing to move to the newly

rmed autonomous region, and those who wish to leave.

he end goal is to show non-state armed groups around the world

at self-governance and the expulsion of the modern state will not

ad to the economic empowerment that underlie much of theirotives.

ery soon after the transition of power, those residents that chose to

ove to or remain in the Boko Haram-administered areas will see the

fects of the lack of financial support from Abuja. Creating a state within a state will

a task greater than that faced by the founders of post-colonial states. In the case of

is new Boko Haram-region, a small population, few natural resources, and a group

at has no administrative training or background means changes will cause drasticgative effects and will be felt rapidly.

this scenario, Nigerian public diplomacy can begin to engage the people of this

tonomous region to reinforce how unity under the state, while far from perfect and

need of much reform, is a better option to the fractious alternative that they chose.

ready, the northern region of 60 million people rely on government funds to prop

p their economy as their previous enterprises have faired badly in the face of Chinese

mpetition or dwindled through agricultural decay. The Nigerian government will

ed to back up this outreach through quality and lasting reforms. Education shouldthe forefront of any engagement with the north as the benefits from increased

hooling and skills can directly dispute the content of Boko Harams message that

estern education is a negative influence.

his scenario will send a message to other non-state armed groups and African

vernments that interaction within existing state structures is the fastest way to

Military defeawill not creategreater nationharmony, in fait will create thopposite


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mplement reform and to increase services

r the countrys citizens when compared

partition. Forming breakaway

ovements that challenge the sovereignty

the state will not be the panacea to

fricas ills. The case of South Sudanould be monitored closely, but early

idence suggests that even ample supply

natural resources does not guarantee

olitical and economic success post-

dependence.

oko Haram cannot be bought off like

her groups in Nigeria because their

urces of bitter disagreement stem from

ss material issues, and are expressed

rough religiously infused rhetoric.

is important for the international community to not aggregate Boko Haram as a

ct of the global jihadist movement. The origins of Boko Haram lie more so in the

lonial state formation of the continent of Africa and its failures in the 50 years

nce. This is an armed revolt against a serially corrupt government that responds to

protests with abusive security forces. Theincreasing economic disparity that exists between

these two regions, the oil-drenched Christian

South, and the drier Muslim North, is a significant

source of Boko Harams rise and growth.

Boko Harams ability to inflict great damage on a

powerful African state that has responded with the

pical counter-terrorism playbook without success, shows that new ideas and newrategies are needed to deal with the movement itself as well as the underlying

uses. Structural change will take time in Nigeria, thus one option that should be

nsidered is the opportunity to give Boko Haram exactly what it wants, in order to

ow that their radical goals cannot achieve what they promise their followers.

The origins of Boko Haramie more so in the colonialstate formation of thecontinent of Africa and itsailures in the 50 yearssince.

Boko Haram attacsince 2001

Nigerian Army po

Source: Africa Confid


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he stability of Nigeria depends on the actions taken by its leaders in the coming

onths. The future of the state in Africa could be solidified if Nigerian leaders can

ake an example of Boko Haram. Solutions should come from compromise as part of

greater whole, not through division and segregation. As the the transnational ties

tween the globe grow and strengthen, African governments need to quickly address

e issue of insufficient service delivery, corruption in politics, and attractingvestment if the non-state armed groups are to be dealt with. How governments

sponds to these issues will decide whether the African state will thrive in the 21st

entury

eborah McGrath contributed reporting.

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To Save the African State, Negotiate with Terrorists