tRumD. 38196 839

SUPPLEMENTTO

London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the ^rd of FEBRUARY, 1948

byRegistered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

The War Office,February, 1948.

THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN FROM EL ALAMEIN TO TUNIS,FROM IOTH AUGUST, 1942 TO 13x11 MAY, 1943.

The following Despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War on tjhe 2yd May,1947, by HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT ALEXAN-DER OF TUNIS, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., former Commander-in-Chief the Middle East Forces and EighteenthArmy Group.

PART I. THE CONQUEST OF LIBYA

Situation in August 1942The summer months of 1942 formed the most

critical period in the history of the war on allfronts. They witnessed the greatest exertionof strength, both on the part of the EuropeanAxis powers and of the Japanese, of whichour enemies were ever capable and when thesegreat efforts were nullified by the Allied vic-tories of that winter, although it was clear thatthe struggle would be hard and long before com-plete victory could be attained, we could feelconfident that the possibility of an Allied defeathad now been excluded. It was a tremendouschange in the whole climate of the war from thedays when the Japanese were hammering atthe eastern gates of India, the German armiesin Russia were lapping round the northern bul-warks of the Caucasus and a tired and batteredBritish army turned at bay among the sandhillsof El Alamein, only sixty miles fromAlexandria.

At the centre of these three thrusts stood theBritish Middle East Forces. For over two yearsthis small but battle-hardened army had stoodon guard at the centre of communications ofthe three great continents of Europe, Africa andAsia. It was originally intended as part onlyof a larger Anglo-French force, under com-mand of General Weygand; but with the defeatof France and -the entry of Italy into the war

the defence of the Middle East had becomea purely British responsibility and the forcescommanded by General Wavell* and, later, byGeneral Auchinleckf, were in the nature of abeleaguered garrison, connected with the mothercountry by a perilous sea route of twelvethousand miles. During those two years thegarrison, though always outnumbered, hadmade many sorties; northwards to clear uptheir defensive flank in Syria, Iraq and Persia,southwards to overrun the Italian Empire inEast Africa and safeguard the vital life-linethrough the Red Sea and, above all, westwardsto destroy the closest enemy threat to theirpositions and to lay the first foundations forthe reopening of the Mediterranean. Twicethese westward sorties had cleared Cyrenaicaand twice the call of other theatres, the Balkansin 1941,' and the Far East in early 1942, hadrobbed us of the strength to exploit further orto retain our conquests. On the second occa-sion the simultaneous reduction in our strengthand increase in the enemy's had been too greatand before the necessary reinforcements in menand, above all, in tanks could arrive the enemyhad taken the offensive, defeated the EighthArmy at Gazala and Tobruk and driven it backto El Alamein. There it stoo*d and, on thecritical day of 2nd July, defeated the enemy'smost desperate efforts to break through. Bythis stand the survivors of the old Desert Armygained the vital time necessary for the arrivalof the fresh divisions and improved tankswhich were to turn the scale of battle.

I arrived in Cairo by air on 8th August,1942 and on the morning of the same day Ihad a private interview with the Prime Minister,

* Now Field-Marshal The Earl Wavell, PC.,G.C.B , G C.S.I, G C I E , C M.G., M.C.

t Now Field-Marshal Sir Claude J E. Auchinleck,G C B , G C I E , C S I , D S O , Q B E , A D C

840 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

Mr. Winston Churchill, and General Sir AlanBrooke,* Chief of the Imperial General Staffwho had arrived there from Moscow some dayspreviously. At this interview I was notified thatI was to assume command of the Middle EastForces. Shortly afterwards I was informed thatmy commitments were to be reduced by thecreation of a separate command, to be knownas Persia and Iraq Force, which would assumeresponsibility for defending the northernfrontier of the Middle East block against thethreat from the German armies in theCaucasus. I remained responsible for ithedefence of Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan andCyprus but the threat of a German advancethrough Anatolia was now considered re-mote and it was" reasonably certain, at theworst, that Germany would not present an, tultimatum to Turkey before the spring of 1943.I was free, therefore, to concentrate all myattention on the threat to Egypt from the wesl ,and my task is best described in the words o]the Directive, written in his own hand, whichthe Prime Minister handed to me at a subse-quent interview on loth August:

" i. Your prime and main duty will be totake or destroy at the earliest opportunitythe German-Italian Army commanded byField-Marshal Rommel together with all itssupplies and establishments in Egypt andLibya.

2. You will discharge or cause to be dis-charged such other duties as pertain to yourCommand without prejudice to the task des-cribed in paragraph I, which must be con-sidered paramount in His Majesty'sinterests."I assumed command of the Middle East

Forces from General 'Auchinleck on 15!tiAugust. I selected as my Chief of General StaffLieut.-•General McCreery who had been myGSO i when I commanded I Division - a tAldershot and in France in 1939 and 1940.His scientific grasp of the whole sphere of mili-tary matters made him of the greatest assist-ance to me throughout my period of commandin Africa. My.General Headquarters continuedto be located in Cairo, but I established anadvanced Tactical Headquarters at Burg elArab,f adjoining the Headquarters o f ' theEighth Army. My predecessor had, as a tem-porary measure, assumed personal command ofEighth Army but it was intended that he shouldbe succeeded m that capacity by Lieut.-GeneralGott,. previously General Officer Commanding13 Corps. Before he could assume command theaircraft in which he was flying to Cairo wasshot down by enemy fighters over its airfield

' and he was killed by machine-gun fire on theground while assisting the rescue of the otheroccupants. General Gott had been in everybattle in the desert since the beginning; he hadcommanded 7 Support Group in the first cam-paign, 7 Armoured Division in 1941 and 13Corps since February, 1942. It was particu-larly tragic that, having survived the early daysof triumph and disaster when skill and endur-ance alone could be thrown into the balanceagainst the inadequacy of our resources heshould now be robbed of the chance of thehigh command he had so well deserved at a

* Now Field-Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke ofBrookeborough, K G , G C B , O M , D S O

•f General Catroux, when he spent the openingnight of the Battle of Alamein with me there, sug-gested we might rename it " La Belle Alliance "

moment when the balance of power had atlast swung favourably to our side. I wasfortunate in being able to replace him at onceby Lieut.-General Montgomery,* who arrived inEgypt on i2th August from the United King-dom. General Montgomery was an old com-rade in arms from the French campaign and,had served under me in Southern Commandin 1941; I well knew his capacities as an inspir-ing leader and an outstanding trainer of men. ,He soon won the confidence and the affection ofthe men of the Eighth Army, many of whom, inparticular the newly arrived formations, had ',already served under him dn England. . Herapidly made himself familiar with the situa-tion in the desert, and by his frequent visits tothe various units disposed along the battle fronthe brought to all ranks the inspiration of hischeerfulness, enthusiasm and confidence.

The Alamein position had been constructedin 1941 though it had been' recognized longbefore that as offering the best defensive linein the Western Desert. Its strength lay inthe fact that its southern flank could becovered by the Qattara Depression. This isthe dried-up bed of a former inland sea whichstretches from the neighbourhood of Siwaoasis, on the Egyptian frontier, to end at apoint about a hundred and sixty 'miles north-west of Cairo and ninety miles south-west ofAlexandria; the bed of the depression consistsof quicksands and salt marshes, almost every-where impassable even for a loaded camel, andon the northern side at is surrounded by steepcliffs which descend precipitously from anaverage height of over six hundred feet aboveto more than two hundred feet below sea level.At its eastern end the depression approachesto within about forty miles of the coast of theMediterranean which here has a southerlytrend in the large bight known as Arabs Gulf.

This was, for the desert, a very short lineand it had the enormous advantage that itcould not be outflanked to the south which was;true of no other position we had ever held.fThe prepared defences, which had been con-structed by 2 South African Division, werebased on four defended localities: at ELAlamein itself on the coast road, Deir elShein, Qaret el Abd and the Taqa Plateau on-the edge of the Depression. % These Jour strongpositions, thickly surrounded by minefields andwire entanglements, with prepared gun posi-tions and cleared fields of fire, extended rightacross the belt of good going from the Medi-terranean to-the Depression; but when I arrivedin Egypt only one was still in our possession,the so called Alamein " box ". The last sue-cess of the German drive into Egypt, on istJuly, had been the capture of the Deir el Sheinposition. The loss of this position had opened agreat gap in the line as planned. It seriously

* Now Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery ofAlamein, K G , G C B , D S O .

t It was not practicable to pass a force throughthe desert south of the Qattara Depression to reachithe Nile Valley through the Fayum, the Germans senta reconnaissance detachment this way, organized bythe Hungarian traveller, Baron Almassy, but it wasdetected and secured by us.

J El Alamein, after which the line and the battlewere called, is nothing but a halt on the Desert Rail-way to Mersa Matruh The name, which is descrip-tive as are most names-in the desert, means "thetwin cairns " Deir means a depression, of whichthere are several small examples between the mamdepression and the sea, Qaret el Abd means " the-hill of the slave "

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 841:

isolated the much stronger fortress of Qaret elAbd, held by the New Zealand Division, andthe latter had therefore to be abandoned; as aresult the position on the Taqa plateau hadalso to be evacuated, largely owing to the factthat there was no source of water within theposition and even a temporary isolation would'lave meant inevitable surrender from thirst.

The line, therefore, on which the enemy wasfinally halted was not the Alamein line as itoriginally existed; only in the extreme northdid we occupy the ^prepared defences. Moreserious to all appearance was the fact that ourleft flank no longer rested on the Depression;instead it had been taken back to a point justnorth-west of Qaret el Himeimat, a conspicuouspeak from the neighbourhood of which a track,known as the " Barrel Track ", led direct toCairo. This track had been reconnoitred beforethe outbreak of hostilities in the desert and,before the construction of the desert road fromCairo to Alexandria, it had been the principalroute from Cairo to the Western Desert. For-tunately its surface proved worse than had beenexpected and it was badly cut up by the largenumbers of supply vehicles which had used itduring the operation so that our left flankthough not so irnpressively protected as hadbeen intended, proved firmly based. Betweenthe sea and the Barrel Track the country overwhich our defended line ran was a bewilderingmixture of ridges and depressions with manypatches of soft sand providing some of theworst going our forces ever encountered in thedesert. The shore line was fringed with saltmarshes inland from which, in a narrow stripof less than two miles, the road and railwayfrom Alexandria to Mersa Matruh ran parallelto each other.

Just south of the railway.we had extendedour front in July beyond the original line bya westward thrust which had captured the twosmall ridges of Tell el Eisa and Tell elMakhkhad. From this salient the line bentback south-easterly to the perimeter of theAlamein position. Twelve miles south of theshore line rise the slopes of the Ruweisat ridge,a long, narrow elevation about two hundredfeet above sea level; at its western end it runsalmost due east and west but as it extends east-wards it increases in height and alters its courseslightly to north:east, pointing towards ElImayid station, fifteen miles east of El Alamein.It offers an avenue of reasonably firm going,outflanking the Alamein position, and it washere that the decisive battle of 2nd July hadbeen fought; as a memento of that battle theenemy still held the western end. From hereto the south our line trended roughly southby west over ground mainly flat but interruptedhere and there by steep-sided depressions ofwhich the Deir el Munassib was the most im-portant. In rear of this part of the front,south-east of the Ruweisat ridge, was a secondand higher ridge trending in a north-easterlydirection called, from the cairn on its highestpoint (four hundred and thirty feet), the Alamel Haifa ridge. A strong position for a brigadehad been built on the ridge in July defendedby wire and minefields. From this position wecould command the country to the south, ifthe enemy, however, succeeded in occupyingit, it offered him another corridor of goodgoing by which he could outflank all our posi-tions to the north and drive direct onAlexandria.

A a

In July the^initiatiye had passed to EighthArmy and three attacks on various parts of theline had caused the enemy to disperse hisforces and gained us time to improve our ,owndefences. This w.as the more vital since whenthese attacks failed it became obvious that theenemy would take the offensive. once more.He was quick to recover from the disorganiza-tion caused by the rapid advance from Gazalaand the scrambling and incoherent battles ofJuly and for the moment his build-up, par-ticularly in tanks, was faster than ours, theconstruction of defences was therefore ourmain preoccupation. The front was coveredby a triple minefield from the coast almost tothe Taqa plateau. A number of positions werebuilt behind this but their weakness was that,except in the north where we still retainedpart of the old line, they had been 'hastily pre-pared and were not dug deeply enough. Moreserious was the fact that our mobile reservewas small. In the desert a string of positions,however -strong, can be rendered useless unlessthe defence possesses a mobile • reserve strongin armour which can manoeuvre round thesefixed positions and engage any enemy whomay penetrate between or round them; whenI arrived in Egypt, our armour had been soreduced that there was only 7 Armoured Divi-sion available with one medium armouredbrigade, below strength in tanks, a lightarmoured; brigade of " Stuart " tanks andarmoured cars, and a motor brigade.

The plan was to hold as strongly as possiblethe area between the sea and Ruweisat ridgeand to threaten from the flank any enemy ad-vance south of the ridge from a strongly de-fended prepared position on the Alam el Haifa,ridge. General Montgomery, now in commandof Eighth Army, accepted this plan in principle,to which I agreed, and hoped that if the enemyshould give us enough time, he would be ableto improve our positions by strengthening theleft or southern flank. At the moment thenorthern area, down to and including Ruweisatridge, was held by 30 Corps with under com-mand from north to south 9 Australian, iSouth African and 5 Indian Divisions, rein-forced by 23 Armoured Brigade in an infantrysupport role. These forces I judged to beadequate, the more -so as our defences in thissector were stronger than elsewhere. 13 Corps,in the southern sector, consisted of 2 NewZealand and 7 Armoured Divisions, the formerof only two brigades. In the prepared positionson Alam el Haifa ridge there was one infantrybrigade, and a second brigade occupied thereserve positions on Ruweisat ridge.

In my visits to the front to inspect our posi-tions and prepare for the coming battle I paidparticular-attention to the morale and bearingof the troops. I found Eighth Army, inMr. Churchill's phrase, " brave but baffled.>v

A retreat is always a disheartening manoeuvreand the feeling of frustration which it naturallyengenders was made the stronger by the factthat many of the troops, particularly in theinfantry divisions, could not fully understandthe reasons why they had been forced to with-draw from positions which they had stoutlyand successfully defended; in many cases thereason had been a battle lost by our armourmany miles from those positions. A more seriouscause of discouragement was the knowledge thatour defeat had been due in part to inferiority

842 SUPPLEMENT TO THE-LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

of equipment; there is nothing, so, sure to causelack of confidence. The soldier who has beenforced to retreat through no fault of his ownloses confidence in the higher command and theeffect of a retreat is cumulative; because hehas withdrawn already from several positionsin succession he tends to look upon retreat asan undesirable but natural outcome of a battle.It was in any case fairly generally known that,in the last resort, the Army would retreatagain, in accordance with the theory that itmust be kept in being. My first step in restoringmorale, therefore, was to lay down the firmprinciple, to be made known to all ranks, thatno further withdrawal was contemplated andthat we would fight the coming battle on theground on which we stood. GeneralMontgomery, on his arrival, fully concurredin this policy and expressed his confidence inbeing able to fight a successful defensive battlein our present positions.

At the moment the five divisions which Ihave already enumerated were the only battle-worthy formations available and with the ex-ception of 9 Australian and 2 New ZealandDivisions they had all been engaged since thebattle of Gazala opened at the end of May.We were, however, potentially stronger nowthan then and in a few weeks I should be ableto increase my strength to more than twice thatnumber of formations. I had in reserve fourdivisions which had not as yet seen action:8 and 10 Armoured and 44 and 51 Infantry,and two veteran divisions refitting, I Armouredand 50 Infantry. These were in the meantimedisposed for the defence of the Delta togetherwith other non-divisional forces, includingstrong elements of the Sudan Defence Force.

When I took over, the plan for the defenceof the Delta had been to hold the westernedge of cultivation. Along this line the RosettaBranch of the Nile and the Nubariya Canal,which takes off from it midway between Cairoand Alexandria, form in combination a con-tinuous tank obstacle extending from Cairoalmost to Lake Maryut, which covers Alexandriaon the south. The defence consisted of denjdngthe three principal crossings at Alexandria,Khatatba and Cairo with infantry and employ-ing armour in the gaps. The Cairo defenceswere complete and held by the equivalent ofsix infantry brigades, while another infantrybrigade guarded the open southern flank withpatrols operating from Bahariya Oasis to givewarning of enemy approach to the south ofthe Qattara Depression. An extensive positionwas being prepared round the Wadi Natrunto deny the water sources there to the enemyand to act as an advanced position coveringthe Khatatba crossing. This position had beenintended for the infantry of Eighth Army inthe event of a withdrawal, i and 10 ArmouredDivisions were lying at Khatatba itself, engagedin re-equipping, together with 44 Infantry Divi-sion, now almost ready for action. The Inner•defences of Alexandria were complete but the•outer defences, consisting of extensive fieldworks, were still unfinished. The equivalent-of six infantry brigades were deployed in thisarea. Two more infantry brigades were held inreserve.

The original intention, based mainly as Ihave mentioned, on the necessity of preservingour forces to meet a possible threat from thenorth, had been to withdraw in the last resort

in two directions: eastwards into Palestine withthe greater,part of the-forces and southwardsup the Nile valley with the remainder. Com-mand had accordingly been divided betweer10 Corps, which was responsible for Alexandriaand the Delta, and Headquarters, BritishTroops in , Egypt, which was responsible forCairo and the Nile valley. Since I had nowbeen relieved of responsibility for the north-eastern front and was in any case determinedto stand on the Alamein position I altered thisarrangement on 20th August to the extent ofmaking Lieut.-General Stone, commandingBritish Troops in Egypt, responsible for thedefence of the whole of the Delta, and made 10Corps Headquarters available for Eighth Army.I cancelled the construction of defences at theWadi Natrun but instructed General Stone tocontinue working on the outer defences ofAlexandria'and improving communications be-tween the Nile valley and the Red Sea; I alsogave instructions for certain areas roundAlexandria, on the banks of the Rosetta Branchand north of Cairo to be flooded. Cairo,Khatatba and Alexandria were to be defendedby 51, i Armoured and 50 Divisions respec-tively. These troops would serve to protectvital installations against raids which mightpenetrate the Alamein position, or against air-borne attack, for which the enemy had avail-able both German and Italian parachute forma-tions. They could not have been employed ina more active role at that time: 51 Divisionhad only recently disembarked and was mobiliz-ing and carrying out preliminary desert trainingand the other two, both of whom had alreadyserved over six months in the desert, wereengaged in vitally urgent re-equipping. 50Division had had very heavy losses both atGazala and Matruh.

I had therefore available, but not all im-mediately available, four armoured and seveninfantry divisions. As against this the Axisforces in Egypt amounted to four armouredand eight infantry divisions, plus five indepen-dent regiments or regiment-sized groups. Com-mand was exercised nominally by Mussoliniwho acted through an Italian Headquartersknown as Superlibia, an advanced detachment

• of the Commando Supremo, under MarshalBastico. Actual command, however, was exer-cised by Field-Marshal Romrnel. His head-quarters bore the name of " German-ItalianArmoured Army of Africa,"* and under it cameall German and Italian troops in the forwardarea, organized under four Corps Headquarters,the German Africa Corps and the Italian X,XX and XXI Corps. The former consisted of15 and 21 Panzer Divisions, veterans of thelater desert battles. The second of thesedivisions had come to Africa first, under thename of 5 Light Division, in February, 1941,and 15 Panzer Division followed in the springof the same year. The reconnaissancebattalions of these two divisions wereusually brigaded together as a " Recon-naissance Group " under Corps command. 90Light Division, of motorized infantry, whichattained' its final form in Africa in January,1942, was usually employed directly underArmy command. 164 Infantry Division hadbeen flown over from Crete at the end of

* Deutsch-Italiemsch Panzer Armee Afnka orArmata Corazzata Italo-Tedesca, referred to by theItalians as ACIT

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE; 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 843

June, 1942; it was always employed to stiffenthe Italian infantryp'ridminally under opera-tional command of the Italian XXI Corps butadministered direct by Panzer Armee. The samerole was given to the Ramcke ParachuteBrigade of four battalions. This force wasapparently organised in the first place to co-operate with the Italians in an assault on Maltain the summer of 1942 which was cancelledwhen Rommel's success in the desert seemedto render the operation unnecessary. It foughtthroughout in a ground role and showed highqualities of training and courage. Finally therewas a motorized, heavily armed group knownas 288 Special Force, a miniature motorizeddivision, originally organised to take part inthe Syrian campaign of 1941 and sent to Africain April, 1942.

The Italians provided two of the armoured andsix of the infantry divisions in the Panzer Armee.The two former, 132 Ariete and 133 LittorioDivisions comprised, together with 101 TriesteDivision, XX Corps, usually qualified as XX(Mobile) Corps. The ngrthern end of the line,from .the sea to south of Ruweisat ridge, washeld by XXI Corps with, from north to south,the German 164 Division, 102 Trento Divi-sion* and 25 Bologna Division; two battalionsof the Ramcke Parachute Brigade were alsounder command in the sector of the twoItalian divisions. The shorter southern sectorwas held by X Corps with 27 Brescia and 185Folgore Divisions, f The latter was originallya parachute division, the first which Italy hadformed. It was rushed across hastily in Augustto strengthen the infantry of the Panzer Armeeand was always used in that role. Unlike theother Italian Divisions, which were recruitedon a territorial basis, this division was formedof men of outstanding physique picked fromthe whole country and, although quite un-accustomed to African conditions and ham-pered by shortage of equipment and lack ofadministrative services, it gave a very goodaccount of itself. Besides the formations Ihave enumerated there were three independentBersaglieri regiments, of motorized infantry-,employed as Corps troops. In rear of the de-fended line was 17 Pavia Division which wasresting at Mersa Matruh under Army command.16 Pistoia Division, a recent arrival in Libya,v/as in reserve in the Bardia area and the" Young Fascists " Division at Siwa oasis.

The organization and armament of thesetroops reflected the prevailing conditions of thedesert. All the German formations, exceptfor the newly arrived 164 Division, weremotorized; the Italian divisions were not, exceptfor the three in XX (Mobile) Corps. The Ger-man armoured divisions were equipped with theMark III and Mark IV tank; a few of the latterwere of the newer 'type with- the high velocity75 millimetre gun. Italian armoured divisionswere equipped with the Mi3 tank, of thirteentons and mounting a 47 millimetre gun; it wasmechanically unreliable and poorly armoured.In both German and Italian infantry divisionsthe most striking feature was the very greatstrength in anti-tank guns. It is fair to saythat, though all desert warfare is not armoured

* Originally a motorized division but now called" appiedata " or dismounted.

f I use the name by which it was later known.At this time the division was called Cacciatorid'Afnca or "African Sharpshooters'''; it adopted thename Folgore in September.

warfare, it is always conditioned by the presenceof" armour f since the desert allows infinitemobility and flanks are nearly. always open,every formation and unit down to the smallestmust be capable at any moment of all-rounddefence and prepared to meet an armoured •attack. For this reason anti-tank guns were de-centralized down to infantry companies whichhad a total of three apiece and, where possible,six. They were usually of 50 millimetre calibrethough 90 Light Division was equipped with cap-tured Russian 3 inch pieces (7.62 millimetre).*The Italians in 1942 had carried out a re-organization of their infantry on similar lines.fIn both armies, therefore, the unit for infantrywas the company, organized on homogeneouslines throughout and heavily armed with anti-tank guns. A characteristic feature was theformation of " Kampfgruppen " or " Rag-grappamenti " which we should call " columnsof all arms " or " task forces," created for aspecial mission.

The Axis Commander-in-Chief, Field-Mar-shal Erwin Rommel, had commanded theGerman forces in Africa since 'their first arrivalin February, 1941, and a considerable body oflegends had grown up around him. It wasnatural that the British Press should pay par-ticular attention to the German commanderwhose forces were engaging the only Britisharmy in the field at that time, but this interesthad led to an exaggeration of his undoubtedqualities which tended to have a depressingeffect on our own troops, however much itmay have appealed to the newspaper reader athome. I have always considered it vital toobtain all the information possible about myprincipal opponents and I took steps shortlyafter my arrival to sort out the truth from thelegends about Rommel. He was a Wurtem-berger of a middle-class professional family whowas commissioned in an infantry regimentshortly before the first world war; he servedwith distinction on the western, Italian andRumanian fronts, winning among other decora-tions the order " Pour le Merite," the highestPrussian award for gallantry. Between the twowars he was chiefly known as the author ofworks on infantry tactics. A Colonel in 1939he commanded 7 Panzer Division in France in1940 as a Major-General. Since arriving inAfrica he had been rapidly promoted fromLieutenant-General to Field-Marshal and hadbeen awarded the senior grade 'of the Ritter-kreuz, the highest Nazi decoration. As Istudied the records of his- African campaigns itwas soon clear to me that he was a tacticianof the greatest ability with a firm grasp of everydetail of theN employment of armour in actionand very quick to seize the fleeting opportunityand the critical turning points of a mobile battle.I felt certain doubts, however, about hisStrategical ability, in particular as to whetherhe fully understood the importance of a soundadministrative plan. Happiest when controllinga mobile force directly under his own eyes hewas liable to over-exploit immediate successwithout sufficient thought for the future. Anexample was the battle of November, 1941,when, after winning a great tactical success at

* There was also, of course, the 88 millimetre anti-aircraft gun, beloved of Allied War Correspondents,who appeared to be unaware of the existence of anyother calibre in German artillery. - .

f Italian infantry divisions, by contrast with theGerman, had only two infantry regiments.

844 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, -1948

enemy attack would take the form of an out-flanking move to the south. 44 Division, whichhad arrived in Egypt at the end of June, hadjust completed its concentration and trainingand on i5th August I gave orders for it tojoin Eighth Army. The divisional head-quarters, with 131 and 133 Brigades, was sentto relieve 21 Indian Brigade on Alam elHaifa ridge with orders to develop the posi-tions there in the greatest possible strength.The remaining brigade, the I32nd, with oneregiment of artillery, was placed under com-mand of 2 New Zealand Division. 10 ArmouredDivision (8 and 9 Armoured Brigades) had beentraining for some time but it had never foughtas a division, since its tanks had been takento make up for battle losses in I and 7Armoured Divisions. 8 Armoured Brigade,however, had just been re-equipped and Iordered the division, less 9 Armoured Brigade,to proceed to the forward area. On arrivalit took command of 22 Armoured Brigade, of7 Armoured Division, and took up positions atthe, western end of Alam el Haifa ridge,between 44 and 2 New Zealand Divisions. 23Armoured Brigade, which had been dispersedin support of the infantry of 30 Corps, wasconcentrated on the Corps left flank where itwould be available also as a reserve for13 Corps. With the arrival of these reinforce-ments there were ranged on Alam, el Haifaridge, 'threatening the flank of an enemyadvance in the southern sector, some sixteenmedium, two hundred and forty field and twohundred anti-tank guns, all under Corps com--mand, besides the guns of nearly four hundredtanks and over a hundred anti-tank gunsmanned by the infantry. The minefields andwire entanglements had been largely extendedand the position was a very strong one.

While these preparations were going on in thedesert I paid particular attention to thecampaign which was being conducted by theAir Force against the enemy's lines of com-munication. Never had the Axis supply lines inAfrica been so stretched as they were when theystood at El Alamein and the strain was felt,above all, in fuel. In dumps or in motor con-voys fuel was relatively immune from air attackbut to reach Africa from Italy it had to comein tankers and these had been given the firstpriority as objects for air attack. Working toa plan drawn up in consultation with my staff,the Royal Air Force, assisted by 'bombers ofthe 9th United States Air Force* had beenwaging a most successful war against Axistankers during which more had been sunk thanhad arrived. The resulting shortage had a vitaleffect on the development of the subsequentbattle, f •

Sidi Rezegh, he had rejected the advice of histwo divisional commanders and dashed off on araid to the Egyptian frontier which, in face ofthe stubborn British maintenance of the objec-tive, led directly to the loss of his positionsround Tobruk and his retreat to Agheila at the

• cost of sixty per cent, of his forces. His presentposition in front of Alamein I hoped would turnout to be another example of this tendency.Whether it was on his own initiative or by orderof Hitler that he held the whole of his forcesforward at Alamein it is impossible to say; batif- he had organized a firm defensive positionfurther back, at Matruh or Sollum,-"with a lightcovering force to detain us at Alamein, he wouldhave been much more difficult to deal with

Rommel's superior in the Mediterraneantheatre was Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring.Also a regular officer of the old Imperial Army,of Bavarian origin, Kesselring had served asan artillery officer and on the staff until thecreation of the Luftwaffe, when he transferredto the new arm in which he rose rapidly. Aftercommanding the 2nd Air Fleet (Luftflotte) inthe Battle of Britain and on the Russian frontin 1941 he brought it to Italy in October ofthat year. In April 1942 he assumed the tilleof Commander-in-Chief South. His authorityextended to all the shores of the Mediterraneanand by contrast with Rommel, who was anArmy commander only, he was now supremecommander of all three services. This superior"position reflected his superior strategical abilitiesbut he was naturally obliged to leave the actualconduct of operations in Africa to his moreimpetuous subordinate. Rommel had a tend-ency to blame, in certain circumstances, hislack of success on the inadequate logisticalsupport he received from Kesselring—unjustly,for in these matters the latter was obliged towork through the Italians. I was later to bemore directly opposed to Kesselring in the

-Italian campaign arid in my judgment he wasgreatly superior in all elements of generalshipto Rommel.

Preparations 'for a Defensive Battle.< It was obvious, that if the enemy were to'retain any hopes of success they must attackus before we could develop our full strength andthere w'ere not' wanting indications that this,was their intention. I had decided alreadythat we must meet this attack on our presentpositions without any thought of withdrawal.As rapidly as* possible thereafter we should pre-pare _to concentrate our strength and assumethe offensive. On igth August, therefore, Iissued a written Directive to General Mont-gomery in the following terms,, confirmingprevious verbal instructions:

"i. Your p'rirne and immediate task is to• prepare for offensive action against the- German-Italian forces with a view to destroy-

ing them at the earliest possible moment.2. Whilst preparing this attack you must

hold your present positions and on noaccount allow the enemy to penetrate eastof them."I ordered that this decision should be made

known to all troops".,It was now becoming possible to reinfoice

the troops in the desert and Eighth Armydecided to strengthen 13 Corps on the southernflank, since the northern part of the front wash«ld strongly enough and it was likely that the

The Battle of Alam el HaifaI had expected the enemy to attack on or

immediately after 25<th August, the night ofthe full moon, and this was indeed his originalintention, but the fuel situation caused a delay.In the meantime the concentration of forces onthe southern flank made obvious the imminence

* Three squadrons of American fighter aircraft ofthis force at this time formed part of Western DesertAir Force under Air Vice Marshal Comngham; byJanuary, 1943, eight American fighter squadrons'were co-operating with Eighth Army

f The shortage was so serious that the Germanswere reduced to flying in fuel from Greece/ a most,wasteful prbced.urg

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 845

of an attack and the.,direction it would take.Rommel's plan was to break through our lightlyheld line of observation on our southern flankand then, turning north, drive to the sea behind30 Corps and encircle our centre and right. Itwas the same plan as he had used at Gazala inMay and he proposed to use the same force asthen, with the addition of one extra Italianarmoured division. On the left flank of hismarching wing, at the hinge of the encirclingmovement, was 90 Light Division, under Armycommand; south of it was the Italian XX(Mobile) Corps with Ariete and LittorioArmoured Divisions, Trieste Motorized Divisionand a regiment of the Folgore Division; on theextreme right, the outside of the wheel, was themain striking force consisting of the GermanAfrica Corps with 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions.On the remainder of the front XXI andX Corps held their positions and carried outdiversionary attacks. This intention was nosurprise to me and, as has been seen, our dis-positions had been made to meet just such anattack, facing west and south with a strongarmoured force disposed centrally. 13 Corpswas to meet the enemy sitriking force of sixdivisions with four divisions: 7 and 10Armoured, 2 New, Zealand and 44 Infantry.In armour and artillery the two forces wereevenly matched. Both had about three hundredfield and medium and four hundred anti-tankguns; the enemy had five hundred medium andlight tanks, equally divided between Germanand Italian; 13 Corps had three hundredmedium and eighty light tanks and twohundred and thirty armoured cars. A furtherhundred tanks with 23 Armoured Brigade con-stituted a reserve. We had the advantages ofground and prepared defensive positions whilethe enemy's advantage of the initiative hadbeen diminished by the loss of surprise.

The enemy offensive opened on the night of3oth August with two diversionary attacks on30 Corps. A German parachute battalionsecured temporary possession of one of ourpositions on Ruweisat ridge but 5 IndianDivision won back the position by dawn. Anattack in the coastal sector against 9 AustralianDivision was completely unsuccessful. At oiophours on 3ist August, shortly after moonrise,the main striking force began to lift the mine-fields on the southern flank, in the area fromDeir el Munassib to Himeimat. During thisoperation they were enfiladed by the artilleryfire of the New Zealand Division and harassedboth frontally and from the south by7 Armoured Division who had excellent shoot-ing in the bright moonlight. In face of theopposition of two artillery regiments and amotor battalion of 4 Light Armoured Brigadeit took six hours to clear two gaps for the twoGerman Panzer divisions and it was not until0930 hours that the Africa Corps was con-centrated east of the minefield. Even afteroverrunning this obstacle they did not advancewith their customary speed, largely because theItalians on their left and the goth Light stillfurther north were encountering even greaterdifficulties in breaking through^ the minefieldsthere which were heavily enfiladed by the NewZealand artillery and under direct fire from7 Motor Brigade. The two Italian armoureddivisions, indeed, hardly came into action atall in this battle. For nearly 'four hours thetwo Panzer Divisions were known to be gather-

ing inJand'about the Ragil Depression, wherethey presented an * admirable target. Un-fortunately a dust storm which rose about uoohours greatly curtailed our air effort, which infavourable weather might have disrupted theenemy's plan at the outset.

When, at about 1530 hours, the Germanarmoured divisions began to move from Deir erRagil the crucial stage of the battle wasreached. The danger was that they should trya wide encircling movement round Alam elHaifa ridge, moving north-east to <sut our com-munications with Alexandria. We had takensteps to discourage such a move in the mindof the enemy* and it soon became clear thatthese had borne fruit. The two divisions headednorth and north-north-east, across the very softgoing of the Deir el Agram, and launched aheavy attack on the area where 22 ArmouredBrigade was stationed, around Point 102, a'small feature just off the western end of theAlam el Haifa ridge. This area had meanwhilebeen reinforced by 23 Armoured Brigade whichhad been placed under 13 Corps as soon as thesituation on Ruweisat ridge had been re-estaib-hshed. Our positions were prepared and 13Corps artillery brought concentrated fire to bearwith the result that, when the Germans finallyretired at dusk, over a quarter of their tankswere believed to have been disabled. They didachieve a minor success, however, in that ascore of tanks settled hull-down well forward ina depression from which they could not be dis-lodged until the following night.

7 Armoured Division had withdrawn in faceof the enemy advance south-east and north-east,either side of the Ragil Depression, and hadcontinued to harass the rear of the armouredcolumn. This drew a reaction just beforedusk when part of the enemy armour turnedon 4 Light Armoured Brigade at SamaketGaballa. After a brief engagement the brigadefell back, in accordance with previous instruc-tions, to avoid becoming too closely involvedin their isolated position. When night fell thetask of harassing the enemy leaguers was takenup by the Royal Air Force who flew over thearea continuously, assisted by flare-droppingaircraft of the Fleet Air Arm. 13 Corps artil-lery joined in also and kept one leaguer, esti-mated as made up of about a hundred tanks,under fire all night. At the same time theNew Zealanders, at the hinge of our positions,sent out parties to prevent 90 Light Divisionfrom digging themselves in. In the northernsector the Australians attacked and made agap through which a raiding force was to passafter daylight. The enemy counter-attackedbefore dawn, however, and closed the gap,inflicting heavy casualties on the Australians.

Now that it was clear that the enemy wasmaking a short hook rather than a wide sweep-ing encirclement it was possible to strengthen

* Shortly before the battle Eighth Army allowed tofall into enemy hands, abandoned in a purposelysacrificed armoured car, what purported to be a" going " map of the area It showed an area ofvery bad going extending across the route we didnot wish the enemy-to take and a belt of good goingextending up to the crest of the Alam el Haifa ridgeand thence along the ridge to the railway. FromGeneral von Thoma, whom we subsequently captured,we learned that this ruse had been effective; theenemy had intended to outflank the ridge to thenorth-east but had altered his plan on the basis ofthis false information

846 SUPPLEMENT TO THE TOfrDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

the southern flank still more. Accordingly onist September General Montgomery concen-trated the three armoured brigades in ihearea between 44 Division and the New ZealandDivision, i South African Infantry Brigadewas moved from 30 Corps area to the east endof Ruweisat ridge. Early on that morning theenemy resumed the attempt to batter his wayon to the west end of Alam el Haifa ridge andagain suffered heavily. His tanks first triedanother frontal assault on 22 ArmouredBrigade; when that failed they attempted towork round»either flank of the brigade. Aftertwo hours the enemy drew off to the south.He refuelled and reorganised during the middleof the day and returned to the attack in thelate afternoon, when he began to probe forsoft spots, tapping 23 and 22 ArmouredBrigades in turn. This gave him no encourage-ment and he drew off again without staging aheavy attack.

The first two days of the battle had endedwithout any decisive success for the enemyand this was already a decisive success for us.On 2nd September, Rommel changed his tac-tics. Instead of continuing the attack hedecided to put himself in a posture of defenceand await the counter-attack which he feltconfident that we should shortly deliver; hetherefore massed the bulk of his armour southof Alam el Haifa and threw out a screen ofanti-tank guns in front of them. On the leftof the armour 90 Light and Trieste Divisionsconsolidated their positions to keep open thecorridor through the minefield. It' was notour intention, however, to gratify him by afrontal attack on the Africa Corps but ratherto operate against the two infantry divisionsfurther west in order to close the gap in theminefield behind the main armoured force.Orders for this operation had been issued theprevious day and 5 Indian Infantry Brigadeand 7 Medium and 49 Anti-tank RegimentsRoyal Artillery, from 30 Corps were movingsouth to reinforce 13 Corps. At the sametime 2 South African Brigade was drawn intoreserve. On request of Eighth Army I sentup 151 Brigade from 50 Division at Amiriyato strengthen the south-western end of Alamel Haifa' ridge. Should the plan provesuccessful the enemy would be so weakenedthat an immediate - advance might bepossible; General" Montgomery ordered for-ward H.Q. 10 Corps in case he should need itto command a pursuit force. It was instructedto be prepared to push through to Daba withall reserves available and possibly theAustralian Division. Meanwhi-fe the enemyconcentrations provided an excellent target toour aircraft and artillery which gave them norespite. Armoured car patrols to the southand east observed the enemy closely and 7Armoured Division continued to, attack hisunarmoured vehicles with great success.

Under these various forms of attack, butwithout provoking our armour to descend fromthe ridge and give battle, the enemy lay allday of' 2nd September. A new and seriouscrisis iii his fuel situation had arisen, for wehad been once more successful in our attackson his tankers, sinking three in two days. Asthe day wore on it was evident to him thatthe last hope had failed and,' since it was"impossible to remain in this advanced position,he would have to withdraw. It was the nearest

the Germans ever got to the Delta. At firstlight on 3rd September it was reported thatthey were withdrawing slightly to south andsouth-west. It was still not clear whether thiswas the start of a real retreat or another feintto entice our armour into battle; in any case13 Corps followed up with armoured cars only.By the afternoon there was every indicatiorthat the westward movement was developinginto a withdrawal. 7 Armoured Divisiormoved westwards to the area, between Gaballaand Himeimat to operate against the southernflank of the retiring columns and heavy airaction was organised against the concentrationseast of the minefield.

At 2230 hours on 3rd September the NewZealand Division, with 132 Brigade of 44 Divi-sion under command, began to attack south-wards as the first stage in closing the gap.They were opposed by 90 Light Division to thewest and Trieste to the east; both fought welland the attack was only partially successful.5 New Zealand Brigade on the east gainedtheir objective, 28 (Maori) Battalion fighting aparticularly gallant action. 132 Brigade wereunsuccessful and had heavy losses and to thewest 6 New Zealand Brigade also failed toreach their objective. At dawn and again onthe evening of 4th September the enemy putin heavy counter-attacks against the threebrigades. All were repulsed but during thenight the infantry were withdrawn from theirexposed positions, leaving mobile troops tooperate southwards. Throughout 4th and 5thSeptember -the retreating enemy was assailedfrom the north, east and south by our mobiletroops and. heavily bombed by our aircraft.It was unfortunate that on 4th September an-other dust-storm made observation difficult andflying impossible during the afternoon. By theevening of 5th September the enemy's slow andstubborn withdrawal had brought him backto the area of our minefields. Here he turnedto stand and it was clear that he intended tomake a strong effort to retain this much atleast of his gains. Accordingly at 0700 hourson" 7th September the battle was called offand Rommel was left in possession of a thinstrip of ground which had advanced his posi-tions on the southern flank to a line runningfrom the eastern end of Deir el Munassib toinclude the peak of Himeimat. The latter wasvaluable for the excellent observation whichit gave as far north as Ruweisat ridge.

This meagre gain of some four or five milesof desert could in no way be set off againstthe material losses. Forty-two German tanksand eleven Italian, and nearly seven hundredmotor vehicles, • were abandoned on the field,•together with thirty field and forty anti-tankguns. Casualties were more difficult to assessbut we estimated that the enemy had lost twothousand Italians and two thousand five hun-dred Germans in killed and wounded; threehundred were taken prisoner. Our own losseswere sixty-eight tanks, one anti-aircraft andeighteen anti-tank guns; killed, wounded andmissing numbered sixteen hundred and forty.But the battle^f Alam el Haifa was far moreimportant than would appear from any statis-tics of gains and losses or the numbers involved!It was the last throw of the. German forcesin Africa, their last chance of a victory before,as they • calculated, our increasing strengthwould make victory for them impossible. It

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 847

i

1 was hard to realise it at the time, but the; moment when the Africa Corps -began to re-

treat, slowly and stubbornly, from the sandyscrub of the Deir el Agram, marked the first

/ westward ebb of the tide which had carriedthe Axis arms so far to the east, an ebb whichwas about to begin to the north as well ina few months from then on the Volga Steppeand in the Caucasus. To me at the time thegreat features of the battle were the immediateimprovement in the morale of our own troops,and the confidence I felt in General Mont-gomery, who had handled his first battle inthe desert with great ability. The valuablepart played by the R.A.F. during the battlewas a good omen for future air support. Inow felt sure that we should be able to defeatthe enemy when we were ready to take theoffensive.

Preparations for the Offensive.After the victory of Alam el Haifa the

enemy went at once on to the defensive. Ourown preparations for assuming the offensivewere not yet, however, complete. My inten-tion for the coming battle was to destroy theenemy in his present position where he wasfurthest from his bases and nearest to ours;this was the best opportunity we should have ofdeveloping our full strength and it was vitalto ensure that we forced a decision there atEl Alamein. Eighth Army proposed to useall three Corps Headquarters in the battle, 13and 30 as Infantry Corps (with some armour)and 10 Corps as an armoured Corps deChasse. It was to this that particular attentionwas given at the start of the training period;10 Corps was intended to include i, 8 and 10Armoured Divisions and possibly the NewZealand Division to provide the necessarymotorized infantry. This powerful force wouldneed a good deal of training before it couldbe fit for the decisive test of battle. First ofall the tank crews had to get" used to their newequipment. Three hundred " Sherman " tanksarrived at Suez on 3rd September from theUnited States and I proposed to equip threeof my six armoured brigades with them. Imust express at this point my profound appre-ciation of the statesmanlike vision shown byPresident Roosevelt when, on his personalinitiative, he ordered these new tanks to betaken from the American armoured division forwhich they were intended and shipped roundthe Cape to us in the Middle East. At lastwe had for the first time a tank which wasequal in armour, armament and performanceto the best tank in the Africa Corps. ^

Eighth Army assembled 10 Corps some fiftymiles in rear of the line, where their trainingand- re-equipment could proceed uninterrup-tedly, i and 8 Armoured Divisions werealready there and on i4th September 10Armoured Division was withdrawn from theforward area. The New Zealand Division wasalso withdrawn and reorganized into a " new

.model " division byt the addition of 9 ArmouredBrigade in place of a third infantry brigade.44 Division relieved it in the line. It was notpossible to carry out Eighth Army's originalintention to include three Armoured Divisionsin 10 Corps as there was a shortage of InfantryBrigades to make them up to strength. I was,'therefore, obliged to obtain War Office approvalto disband 8 Armoured Division, which had

no Infantry „ Brigade on its establishment. Ihad enough tanks, however, to maintain theplanned number of armoured brigades and Iplaced 24 Armoured Brigade under command of10 Armoured Division.

The troops previously deployed in the Deltacould now be brought forward to acclimatizethem, such as were new to the desert, to theconditions in which they were to fight. On8th September 51 Division moved from Cairointo reserve on Alam el Haifa ridge to continueits training. On the loth I sent the Head-quarters of 4 Indian Infantry Division with7 Indian Infantry Brigade to Ruweisat ridgeto relieve the Headquarters of 5 Indian Divi-sion and 9 Indian Brigade, which had beencontinuously engaged since the end of May. Afew days later 50 Division with 69 Brigade leftAlexandria to join 151 Brigade in EighthArmy reserve; it was brought up to strengthby the addition of i Greek Brigade. After ashort interval for further training 50 Divisionrelieved 44 Division in 13 Corps sector at thebeginning of October. i Fighting FrenchBrigade came forward about the same time onthe left of 13 Corps where it was placed undercommand of 7 Armoured Division. The latterhad given up its 7 Motor Brigade to i ArmouredDivision but retained 4 Light Armoured and22 Armoured Brigades.

My infantry strength was the greatest wehad yet put in the field, but a high proportionhad had no previous battle experience andwould require a great deal of training. I couldnot make a start on this programme until 6thSeptember but thereafter all formations,whether they were withdrawn into rear areasor kept in the line, underwent intensive train-ing in which the features of terrain and theconditions of fighting they were likely toencounter were as far as possible reproduced.G||ups of all arms who were to fight togetherwere trained together. Special attention wasgiven to physical fitness, the maintenance ofdirection by night, the control of movement,mineliftihg and the use of wireless. We hadalso been strongly reinforced in artillery,,, onwhich I intended to rely heavily for the posi-tional battle which lay ahead. Apart fromseven extra field regiments which constitutedthe divisional artillery of 8 Armoured and 44and 51 Infantry Divisions, two medium regi-ments and six additional field regiments alsoarrived from the United Kingdom and wereplaced under command of the Eighth Armyduring September and early October. I alsoreceived replacements for losses which enabledme to bring existing units up to strength.

During this necessary interval while our train-ing programme got into full swing I proposed toemploy small detachments of the special raid-ing forces in attacks on the enemy's communica-tions. The Royal Navy and the Allied AirForces were already, as I have described,operating with success against his shippingbound for Tobruk and Benghazi (Tripoli wasbeing used only to a very minor extent) butwith the air forces at our disposal and the greatdistances to be covered it was impossible toclose either of them completely. Ever since thewithdrawal from Cyrenaica plans had beenunder discussion for raids by sea and land onTobruk and Benghazi. -If-the oil installationscould be destroyed and the port facilities dam-aged so as to interrupt working even for as

SUPPLEMENT TO THE XONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

little as a week, either before or after a majorengagement on the Alamein line, the J resultmight prove fatal to the enemy. It had beenfound impossible to carry out these operationsm July and August and they had consequentlybeen postponed to the favourable moon periodof September.- As the operations were sure to prove mosthazardous the possible advantages to be gainedhad to be carefully balanced against the chancesof success and the cost of failure. AccordinglyI reviewed the project again on 3rd Septemberwith the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,Admiral Harwood*, and the Air Officer Com-mandmg-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, fThe fighting at El Alamein was then in fullswing Two weeks' reserve of supplies onoperational scales were all that the enemy hadbeen able to accumulate for his offensive and,although there was little hope of doing irrepar-able damage to the ports, a temporary disloca-tion of supplies following the failure of theoffensive (which was now obvious), might wellprove disastrous to Rommel's Army. Even ifthe operations were unsuccessful they would un-doubtedly have an effect on enemy morale andprobably lead him to take precautions againsta future repetition which would diminish thestrength available for the defence of his posi-tions in Egypt. Air Chief Marshal Tedderpointed out that no air support whatever couldbe provided except an attack by bombers tohelp in covering the approach. Fighter coverwas impossible throughout owing to the dis-tance. Admiral Harwood realized that thewhole seaborne force, including the twodestroyers he proposed to use, might well betost, but he accepted the risk. It was finallydecided that the effects of success would be greatenough to justify the risks involved; orders wereaccordingly given for the operations to becarried out as planned.

The raids were launched on the night of i^thSeptember. At Tobruk the plan was to capturethe port by a combined operation from twosides, by sea and overland, and hold it longenough to allow the destruction of the storedfuel and hasty demolition of the port. Thesmall overland force successfully carried out itspart of the operation but very few members ofthe two seaborne forces managed to land andthe attack was a failure. The attack onBenghazi was to be carried out by a smallmotorized column from Kufra, over five hun-dred miles to the south. It reached,its destina-tion successfully but a last-minute alteration inits plans, based on unreliable information,caused an abandonment of the operation afteran attack had been made on a part of the de-fences which was on the alert. A third forceattacked Gialo on the night of I4th September,mainly in order to cover the retirement of thecolumn raiding Benghazi but also in the hope ofholding it for a short while as a base for futureoperations. The oasis was strongly held and itwas impossible to capture it but the operationserved its purpose in that the Benghazi forcewas able to retire unmolested by the Gialo gar-rison. A diversionary raid on Barce was com-pletely successful. From the material point ofview the raids had been a failure and our losseshad been heavy but it is possible that they had

* Now - Admiral Sir Henry Hafwood, K C B ,Q B E- f Now Marshal of the Royal Xir Force Lord-Tedder, G C B

had the psychological effects we had hoped for.They probably helped to keep the Pistoia Divi-sion at Bardia and assisted in divertingRommel's attention to the possibility of sea-borne raids on his long open flank. 90 LightDivision, after the conclusion of the Alam elHaifa battle, was moved back to Daba and em-ployed for defence against a landing and forsome weeks the Pavia Division was retained atMatruh in a similar role. The failure of thesesubsidiary operations had no effect on the plansand preparations for the great offensive whichwas shortly to be launched against the enemy'smain forces.

No further attempt was made to raid theenemy's supply lines by land except for somesuccessful sabotage of the desert railway by theLong Range Desert Group. This standardgauge line, which had been extended to Matruhm 1940, was pushed forward in the summer of1941 towards the Libyan frontier and just be-fore the Gazala battles had reached Belhamedon the Tobruk perimeter. The enemy had nowextended it down to the port and, having re-paired the breaks we had made during theretreat, had brought it into use. Our air force,however, continued to attack the railway andintensified their bombardment of enemy portsTobruk was raided almost nightly to such anextent that a large proportion of enemy ship-ping was diverted to Benghazi, thus increasingthe road haul. Benghazi too was heavilyattacked and all convoys en route to these portshad to run the gauntlet of our,naval and airforces. I must also mention the valuable ser-vices of the air forces in securing informationabout the enemy's dispositions and denying himobservation of our own. Eighth Army was keptsupplied with regular air photographs of theenemy's dispositions on the basis of which mostdetailed maps were constructed and widely dis-tributed. On the defensive side the Royal AirForce established such complete air superioritythat enemy aircraft were unable to interfere withour preparations.

My administrative position was very satis-factory. I found on arrival in Middle East ahighly developed administrative machinealready in existence and staffs well acquaintedwith the problems of desert warfare. Repairedand reconditioned tanks, lorries and guns werepouring' out of workshops; new equipment wasarriving from overseas and being assembled andmodified in Egypt. Men from Great Britainand from hospitals in the Middle East werepassing in a steady stream to the front, farexceeding battle casualties. The reinforcementand repair organisations had been working athigh pressure for many months, but it neededonly the knowledge of the forthcoming offen-sive as a spur to intensify their efforts. Forty-one thousand men joined units at the frontbetween ist August and 23rd October, besidesthose arriving with the new formations. Inthe same period over a thousand tanks, threehundred and sixty carriers and eight thousandseven hundred vehicles were sent to the EighthArmy. Forty-nine pioneer companies weretassembled and equipped to undertake the manymanual tasks that would otherwise have fallenon the fighting troops.

Full preparations were made for the enormousextension of the supply services which wouldbe necessary when the 'enemy hadwtbeendefeated and we turned to the pursuit. There

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE; 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 849

was no difficulty in accumulating large reservesin the initial stage, since distances were shortand we had both rail and road transport avail-able to as great an extent as we could require.But it must be remembered that any advance

\ would be into a desert, completely barren of( any kind of resources beyond some rather in-

f different water, and all supplies would have to$ come still from the same base. This would

mean that very large quantities of motor trans-port woujd be needed. In previous campaignsthere had never been sufficient third-line trans-port to support a strong advance over a longdistance. We were better off now and by 23rdAugust Eighth Army was provided with theequivalent of forty-six General Transport com-panies to carry stores, ammunition, petrol andwater, and six tank transporter companies:seven more General Transport companies wereheld in reserve.* I shall deal with the par-ticular problems of administration as they arosein the course of our advance but I will sayat" once that, in spite of all difficulties ofgeography and enemy demolitions, the provi-sions made were so ample and the problems sowell appreciated that the rate of developmentof ports, roads, railways and pipeline nearlyalways exceeded estimates and we were neverobliged to pause longer than had been calcu-lated for lack of supplies, equipment or rein-forcements.

My administrative staff was headed byLieut.-General (now Sir Wilfred) Lindsell whohad an enormous task in the organisation ofthe Middle East base. At that time the portsof the Middle East were handling fourhundred and sixty-six thousand tons of militarystores per month; three hundred thousandtroops and half a million civilians were em-ployed in all rear services and contractedlabour represented about a million and a.half more. The vastness of the task wasincreased by the fact that the greatmajority of the working force on which werelied for the maintenance of our militaryeffort was not only civilian but oriental, andin large part unskilled, that the countries whereour base was formed were not industrialisedand that the most important was neutral. Inthis connection I must express my appreciationof the assistance I received from Mr. Casey,the Resident Minister,- and from the BritishAmbassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson.f Onmy first arrival, when I stayed at the Embassy,,the latter assured me that he regarded it ashis principal duty to see that the base on whichI relied for my operations should be keptpolitically tranquil. His skill and understandingwere crowned with full and deserved*1 successand I never had any anxieties on this score solong as I was in Egypt. Through Mr. CaseyI kept in touch with His Majesty's Governmentand made sure that there was complete reci-procal comprehension on the military situation.I owe him a great debt for the smoothness andfriendliness which he imparted to theserelations.

* Theoretically one General Transport company canmaintain one division fifty miles from railhead or aport i e for every fifty miles of an advance you needone extra company per division This rule of thumbcalculation is based on working seven days' a weekand ten hours a day, over good roads, in the desertit needs modification and on occasions it took sixcompanies to do the work of one- | NOW The Right Honourable Lord Killearn, P C ,G ' C M G , C B , M V O

Perhaps the-most difficult decision I had toface was the-timing of the offensive. Obviouslythe sooner we could attack the better, for theenemy was strenuously perfecting his defences.When I went down to the desert with thePrime Minister he asked me when I thoughtI should be ready; I replied, as a most tenta- ^tive estimate, for at that time I had only beenin Middle East a few days and had not hadtime to study an offensive operation in detail,that I thought the end of September a possibledate. He asked General Montgomery the samequestion when we arrived at Eighth ArmyHeadquarters and the latter replied to the sameeffect, saying " Not before the first week inOctober " This estimate now needed revision.We had in any case lost a week as a resultof the batle of Alam el Haifa and our losses,though comparatively slight, and the redisposi-tion of troops which that battle had caused hadset us back perhaps another week. I wasdetermined that Eighth Army should have allthe time necessary for training and the assimila-tion of its new reinforcements. Above all Iwanted the armoured divisions of 10 Corpsto have ample time to settle down into a well-drilled and confident 'whole; we were bringingagainst the enemy almost double his strengthin tanks, it was vital to ensure that we wereable to make full use of this superiority. Onthese grounds, therefore, I decided to wait untilas late as possible in October. The actual datewas determined by the phases of the moon.The plan must involve a series of infantryattacks against strong defences to gain posses-sion of the enemy's minefields and make gaps,in them to pass the armour through. For thisa night assault was obviously demanded and ifthe infantry were to be able to lift the minesquickly and accurately they would need goodmoonlight. • Full moon was on 24th Octoberand in agreement with General MontgomeryI atjherefore decided on 23rd October as D-day.

.There was another consideration besides those*I have mentioned which affected our timing:•the battle of Egypt had to be fitted into thegrand strategy of the war, for the Allies wereabout to assume the strategic offensive. I hadbeen informed before I left England of thedecision of the Combined 'Chiefs of Staff to in-vade North Africa from the west and clear thewhole north shore of the Mediterranean; I hadin fact been appointed to command the BritishFirst Army which was, to be the spearhead ofthis operation under General Eisenhower. Itwas a nicely calculated operation, designed toemploy our growing resources in a task justwithin their capabilities, which would, on thefirm basis of our command of the sea, extendthat command in a tighter ring round thefortress of Europe. It involved political calcu-lations as well, for it was appreciated that ifthe French Army resisted we might be in-volved in a long guerilla in the mountainsof Algeria and Morocco, which would allow .theGermans to get a firm hold on Tunisia. Certainsteps were being taken to assure if possiblea friendly reception: the landing was to" beunder United States command and, althoughthe main forces in Tunisia were to be providedby the British First Army and in the Mediter-ranean by the Royal Navy, the operationwas at the outset to be represented as almostentirely American in character. Obviously,however, the most important effect on

850 SUPPLEMENT TO THE ^LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

opinion in French North Africa would beattained if, just before the landings we "couldwin a decisive victory over the Axis forces atAlamein. It was important, also, to impressGeneral Franco, whose attitude was dubious;had he admitted German forces into Spain, andSpanish Morocco the operation would have beenseriously hazarded.

From this point of view it would be an ad-vantage to win our victory as soon as possibleand the Prime Minister expressed disappoint-ment that I had put back the date of >aiyoffensive a fortnight beyond my first very tenta-tive estimate. I called a Commanders-in-Chiefmeeting to discuss the problem, with AdmiralHarwood, Air 'Chief Marshal Tedder and Mr.Casey, the Resident Minister in the MiddleEast. At this meeting I explained the situa-tion fully, pointing out that if the battle was. tohave its desired effect, both in' the militaryand political fields, it must be crushing anddecisive beyond any doubt, and to ensure thatI must have an adequate time for full prepara-tions. I laid particular stress also on the im-portance of having a good moon. TORCH*was scheduled for 8th November. My offensivewas planned to precede it by just over a fort-night and I was convinced that this was thebest interval that could be looked for in thecircumstances. It would be long enough to de-stroy the greater part of the Axis army facingus, but on the other hand it would be too shortfor the enemy to start reinforcing Africa onany significant scale. Bath these facts would belikely to have a strong effect on the Frenchattitude. Ilie decisive factor was that I wascertain that to attack before I was ready wouldbe ito risk failure if not to court disaster. Mycolleagues agreed with this exposition of thesituation and I sent a telegram explaining in fullthe decisions of the meeting. On this basis thedate of 23rd October was definitely accepded.

Before giving the final plan it will be as ''wellto consider the enemy dispositions as they facedus on D-day. The two preceding months hadseen him energetically engaged in strengtheninghis field works. The most important elementin these, as always in the desert, was the mine-field, botih anti-tank and anti-personnel. In thenorth a second line of defended localities hadbeen prepared behind the main forward mine-fields. The two lines were connected with eachother by transverse minefields and the idea wasto lead our attacking forces by preparedchannels into deceptively attractive clear areasentirely surrounded by mines where they couldbe taken under fire from all sides. The effectwas of a belt, between five and eight thousandyards deep, thickly covered with mines and de-fended posts, stretching from the sea to theDeir el Mreir, a deep depression lying south-west of "the end of'the Ruweisat ridge. Northof El Mreir there was a peculiar minefield inthe shape of a shallow S-bend running roughlyeast ito west at right angles to the main positionsand extending for some distance behind them;this was presumably intended as a cover for theright flank of the northern sector of the frontshould we be able to penetrate the southernsector. Behind the main defences in the northa third line of positions, starting just east ofSidi Abd el Rahman, eight miles from Tellel Eisa, and running south for about sevenand a half miles, was still in course of prepara-

* Code name for the North African landings.

tion but already well advanced. The defenceshad been less systematically developed to thesouth of El Mreir, but since ithe capture of ourminefields in September that part of the linealso presented a formidable obstacle. Therewere two lines of defences, based on our oldminefield and the original enemy minefield, \with a gap between them. The going on the Vsouthern flank was bad and from Qaret el \,Himeimat the enemy had excellent observa-tion.

Enemy attempts at reinforcement were lesssuccessful. Many vessels bringing tanks, guns,stores and supplies were sunk or forced to turnback. The unloading of those which didsucceed in making port was a slow process onaccount of the havoc wrought by our bombersat Tobruk and Benghazi and it must be re-membered that even Tobruk was three hundredand fifty miles from the front, over an in-different road. Reinforcements in men arrivedby destroyers and aircraft and, except foroccasional interception, most of these reachedAfrica safely. These arrivals, however, whichaveraged about five thousand men a week, wereunable to keep pace with the very heavy sickrate. Possibly owing to the congestion oftroops on the ground, greater than ever knownbefore in the desert, and to an inadequatemedical and sanitary organization, especiallyamong the Italians, diseases such as dysenteryand infective jaundice were extraordinarily pre-valent among the Axis troops. Some unitssuffered up to as much as twenty-five per cent,of their strength. Thanks to the efficiency ofour own medical services our sickness rate didnot rise above the normal for the time of yearand to nothing like the extent on the enemyside of the line. The most prominent Axiscasualty was the Army Commander.Rommel had been in poor health sinceAugust and in September ihe left forGermany, technically on leave. It appears,however, that he was not intended to returnand he was replaced by General Stumme, whohad previously commanded an armoured corpson the Russian front.* Rommel took advantageof the ceremony at which he was presentedwith his Field-Marshal's baton in Berlin on3rd October to declare: '' We hold the Gatewayto Egypt with the full intention to act. We didnot go there with any intention of being flungback sooner or later. You can rely on our hold-ing fast to what we have got ".

There had been little change in the generalorder of battle of the two Corps holding thefixed defences. XXI Corps in the northernsector "-had received a slight reinforcement inGerman infantry in addition to its two para-chute battalions; otherwise the German 1641!!and the Italian Trento and Bologna Divisionsheld the same sectors. In X Corps sector thePavia Division had been brought forward fromMatruh and added to Brescia and Folgore, onthe extreme south; the other two parachutebattalions of Ramcke's brigade were on thisfront. The main line of defences was thereforeheld by rather more than six divisions. Inreserve were four armoured and two" mobiledivisions, equally divided between German aridItalian. This reserve had been treated as asingle combined force for the purpose of the

* The Commander of the German Africa Corps wasalso a recent arrival from the Russian front1}* Generalvon Thoma, who had succeeded General Cruewell,taken prisoner m June.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZ£T>TEr5 FEBRUARY, 1948 851

battle and not divided by nationalities.' 'Thearmoured ' divisions '^Were organised in twomain groups, a northern one consisting of15 Panzer Division and Littorio and a southernconsisting of 21 Panzer Division and Ariete;these groups were again subdivided each intothree mixed battle groups and disposed at in-tervals all along the rear of the battle front.This was in accordance with the principles forthe use of armour in a defensive battle aspracticed on the Russian front: dispersionrather than concentration in order to ensurethat no part of the threatened area was un-supported by armour. I imagine that thesedispositions were adopted on General Stumme'sinitiative as they differed widely fromRommel's practice of concentrating his armour.Further to the rear still was 90 Light Division,watching the coast in the area of El Ghazal,

.halfway between Sidi Abd el Rahman andDaba, and the Trieste Division round Dabaitself. The system of command of the reserve,as between Headquarters German Africa Corpsand the Italian XX Corps, is obscure but thelatter probably had little real responsibilitybeyond administration. It will be noted thatthroughout these dispositions German andItalian units were closely mingled in order tostiffen the latters' morale.

It is worth while refuting here a legendwhich has grown up about the enemy disposi-tions at Alamein, as it has appeared in almostall'accounts of the battle, including some semi-official accounts.* Briefly this story supposesthat Rommel had planned a trap for us: hehad deliberately weakened his centre, whilekeeping his left and right strong, in order tolure us into attacking that point; in rear hehad concentrated his armour in two blocksnorth and south of his centre so that when weemerged between them we would be crushedby simultaneous attacks on both flanks. Thisis completely contrary to the facts. The centrewas not weakened, on the contrary it wasspecially strengthened by the reinforcement ofthree German parachute battalions. In generalthe troops available were fairly evenly dividedover the whole front, though the northernsector was stronger than the southern as oneof the three divisions there was German; on theother hand Folgore, in the southern sector, wasthe best of the Italian divisions. The field de-fences were strongest in the north, as that wasthe vital sector, and diminished gradually instrength towards the south. Finally thearmoured force was not disposed in two con-centrated groups but split up into battle groupsevenly stationed along the whole front. I donot know the origin of this legend—possiblyan imaginative journalist with a vague recol-lection of Miltiades' alleged stratagem atMarathon—but it was of extraordinary rapidgrowth since it appeared for the first time im-mediately after the battle.

In face of these enemy dispositions one factwas quite clear about the coming battle; that inits early stages at least it would be primarilyan infantry battle. It would be impossible forEighth Army to use its armour in a broad out-flanking movement because neither of theenemy's flanks was open, nor could the armourbreak through the thickly developed enemy

* For example the film " Desert Victory " and theWar Office pamphlet " The Battle of Egypt "

defences frontally except at a prohibitive cost.The" infantry would have to make the gapto pass the armour through and the strengthof the defences was such that the operation ofmaking the gap would involve a battle on thegrandest scale. The operation would begin,therefore, like a battle of the 1914-1918 war,with the assault of an entrenched position hidepth and it would not be until that battlehad been fought and won that we should beable to proceed to the more swift-moving clashof armoured forces which had distinguishedthe decisive campaigns of this war. For-jtunately our infantry was superior both innumbers and, above all, in fighting ability tothe Italo-German infantry and with the ad-vantage of the initiative it could be concen-trated against any chosen portion of the enemyline in very great superiority. In the attackit could be supported by a massed artillerybacked by lavish resources in ammunition.Strong though the enemy defences were I feltconfident of our ability to pierce them.

I had carried out a thorough reconnaissanceof the whole front in my car and had discussedthe plan of attack in all possible aspects withGeneral Montgomery. There were two mainlines of approach to the problem: an attackin the south, where the enemy defences wererather weaker, which would develop into onemore variation on the classic desert theme ofan envelopment of the inland flank, or astraight blow at the north where the defenceswere stronger but the results of success wouldbe more important. The plan which GeneralMontgomery submitted to me was to make themain thrust in the north, with a secondaryattack in the south as a feint to pin down theenemy forces there. This plan was in my judg-ment much the most promising. It was theeasiest for us, since our communications wouldbe shorter and on better ground. More impor-tant still was the fact that a penetration here,along the line of the coast road, would forcethe enemy away from his communications, put-ting all the forces to the south of the breachin imminent danger of isolation, and would pro-duce an immediate threat to his landing groundsand supply centre at El Daba. The hostilefront might be compared to a door, hinged atits northern end; to push at the free end mightcause it to swing back some way before anyserious damage was done but a successful blowat the hinge would dislocate the whole frontand throw the doorway wide open. One ofthe main features of the plan was the concen-tration of the greatest possible number of gunsof all calibres, under centralised control, againstthe principal point of attack. The key to theenemy's position in the northern sector was theMiteiriya ridge. This is a long, narrow ridge,called after the cistern of Sanyet el Miteiriya,rising to about a hundred feet above sea leveland running parallel to the Tell el Eisa ridgeabout four miles further south of it. If wecould break through between these two ridgesand wrest the southern one from the enemy—the northern we already held—we should havea corridor through the enemy's defences pro-tected on either flank by slightly higher groundand the enemy minefield on the other side ofthe Miteiriya ridge would give us additional pro-tection from an enemy counter-attack in thatsector. General Montgomery carried out a longreconnaissance of the Miteiriya ridge from our

852 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

forward outposts and confirmed this plan frominspection of the ground.

The plan for the battle was given the code-name LIGHTFOOT. The attack was to bemade by 30 Corps using, from north to south,9 Australian, 51 Highland, 2 New Zealand andi South African Divisions. The first two weieto drive due west on a line roughly parallel toand below the Tell el Eisa ridge to form thenorthern corridor and the latter two were toattack south-westerly to secure the Miteiriyaridge and to establish the southern corridorthrough the defences. 4 Indian Division, whichwas also under command, was to carry out adiversionary raid along Ruweisat ridge When30 -Corps had formed these two corridorsthrough the full depth of the enemy defences10 Corps, with, from north to south, i and 10Armoured Divisions, was to pass through andposition itself oh ground of its own choosingat the far end of the corridors. It was likelyenough that the enemy would ,counter-attackimmediately with his armour in order to closethe breach. Whether he did or not the infan-try of 30 Corps would proceed -at once withthe methodical destruction of the enemy infan-try first between the two corridors and thenon either of its flanks, working northwards fromTell el Eisa and southwards from Miteiriyaridge. 10 Corps would prevent the enemyarmour "from interfering with these operations.This stage of the battle would be quite certainto provoke a strong reaction from the enemyarmour which could hardly sit and watch itsinfantry being destroyed piecemeal. Thiswould be to our advantage, for we would be-forcing the enemy to attack us on ground whichwe had chosen.

'Simultaneously with the main attack 13Corps, with under command 7 Armoured, 44and 50 Divisions, was to attack in the southernsector. Two thrusts were to be made, one round"the southern flank by i Fighting FrenchBrigade, directed against Qaret el Himeimat,and the other north of Himeimat by 44 Divi-

"sion supported by 7 Armoured Division. Theintention was, if possible, to make a breach inthe enemy positions there as well, throughwhich we might be able to exploit; if theHimeimat operation went well, 4 LighlArmoured Brigade would be passed round thesouthern flank and launched in a raid on ElDaba, to destroy the supply installations thereand seize the landing grounds. But the mainvalue which I expected from the 13 Corps,operation was to distract the enemy attentionfrom the vital thrust in the north and, in par-ticular, to contain opposite it the two armoureddivisions already on that flank. In order toensure that the' process of containment andattrition worked in our favour rather than theenemy's it was firmly laid down that 7Armoured Division must be kept in being andshould not -incur such casualties as would makeit ineffective. 4 Light Armoured Brigade wasnot to be launched on Daba without specificorders.

I attached very great importance to the de-ceptive measures to be taken to conceal ourintentions from the enemy. It was obviouslyimpossible to conceal from him the fact thatwe intended to attack; the most we could hopefor was to deceive him as to the exact date andplace of our attack. We could do this .byshowing him concentrations of troops and

administrative preparations in the southern sec-tor which should be large enough to suggest afull-scale attack there but incomplete, so as tosuggest a later date than the actual. Above allit was important to conceal the preparationsbeing made in the north. I decided that wemust go to all lengths to make this deceptionplan a success and no effort was spared to thatend which ingenuity could suggest. We werefortunate in that our plans had been decidedon over a month in advance of the operation;consequently we could ensure that the appro-priate deception measures were taken fromthe start. The main problems which faced uswere to conceal the concentration in 13 Corps'forward area of .two extra divisions, two hun-dred and forty additional guns and a hundredand fifty additional tanks, and in the rear areasof seven thousand five hundred tons of petrol,stores and ammunition, and the construction of,six additional tracks leading from assemblyareas twenty-five miles in rear up to the actualsector on which the break in was to be made.In 13 Corps we had to conceal the forwardmovement of artillery to "cover the points se-lected for attack. Most important of all was toconceal the move forward of 10 Corps from theirtraining areas to ' their assembly areas in thenorthern sector. . ' .

To conceal the reinforcement of 30 Corpscareful calculations were made to determinewhat the area would look like from the air imme-diately before the battle; the same picture wasthen reproduced by ist October by disposingtransport in the areas which would be occupiedon 23rd October. Dummy lorries were erected inthe areas which would be occupied by the artil-lery regiments so that the guns and limberscould be moved in by night and concealedunder the dummies. The additional dumpswere elaborately camouflaged, for-which pur-pose the hummocky area near El Imayidstation was well adapted. The new trackscould-not be concealed, and they were the mostrevealing indications of our purpose. Theonly solution which offered itself was to delayuntil the last the completion of those parts ofthem which would be most significant to theenemy. In the 13 Corps sector the intendedconcentrations of artillery were first representedby dummy guns which were later replaced byreal guns Most elaborate measures weretaken to conceal the movement of 10 Corps.The two assembly areas were filled by about6th October with approximately two thousandvehicles in each with over seven hundreddummy vehicles to be placed over the tanksof the three armoured brigades. The Corpsmoved from its training area to two stagingareas on igth October; these moves were carriedout openly as training moves. From the stagingareas to the assembly areas the moves weremade largely by night and all tanks and gunsmoved entirely by night. As units moved outof the staging areas they were replaced bydummy tanks, some mobile and some static,dummy guns and transport and by over twothousand real motor vehicles.

Besides these negative measures of conceal-ment positive measures of deception weretaken. A dummy pipeline was built stretch-ing from the real pipeline down towards13 Corps' sector. This was a most realisticproduction made of old petrol tins, with dummypumping stations and reservoirs; it was started

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZEJTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 853

on 27th September and progress was timed ta.suggest 5th November T as the date of com-pletion. A large mo'clc dump was started inthe southern sector on 7th October and thistoo increased at a rate to suggest completionon*5th November. 10 Armoured Division usedas an intermediate staging area a position right,down on the southern flank from where itmighjt be expected to move forward to 13 Corpssector. The westward move to this area wasmade openly in daylight and when the divisionmoved due north after dusk it was representedin the staging area by the measures I havealready described. A wireless network of 10Corps, with all its brigades, was representedas operating in the southern sector up toD-day and from D mimis i onwards occa-sional false messages were sent suggesting amove forward into 13 Corps' area.

To carry out so comprehensive a scheme ofdeception required a minute attention to detailand planning, the employment of large quan-tities of labour, transport and materials, massproduction of dummies and careful control ofthe movements of many hundreds of vehicles.Carelessness in any area might have revealedthe whole plan. In the event the deceptionwas entirely successful; the main direction ofour thrust and the location of our armourwere unknown to the enemy at the time theattack began and for some time afterwards.It was not until D plus 3 that he finally con-centrated all his resources against our realattack.

When all preparations for the battle hadbeen made I felt that I could regard the comingconflict with a certain confidence but never-theless with a sober appreciation of the impor-tance of the event. We had the advantageover the enemy in men, tanks and guns and wehad a vigorous and enterprising field com-mander who knew well how to employ theseadvantages. The Eighth Army was certainly

•the finest and best equipped that England hadput in the field so far but for that very reasonthe test it faced was a crucial one. One thinggave us particular encouragement: the highstandard of morale. From the moment thatthe troops had learned that retreat was nolonger in question morale had begun toimprove; it was raised to still greater heightsby the successful defensive action of Septemberand maintained at that level and even increasedby the sight of the careful, preparations, theheavy reinforcement and the arrival of powerfulnew weapons which had marked the subsequentperiod. The troops well knew that the battle'would be long and costly but they were confi-dent of the outcome and aware of the greatchange that victory would bring to the wholepattern of the war.

The Battle of El Alamein.The night of 23rd October was calm and clear

and brilliantly illuminated by an almost fullmoon. At 2140 hours the whole of EighthArmy artillery, almost a thousand field andmedium guns, opened up simultaneously forfifteen minutes against located enemy batteries;it was an extraordinary sight, reminiscent ofthe previous world war, and the intensity of thefire had the effect of silencing almost all thehostile guns. After a five minute pause firerecommenced at 2200 hours against the enemyforward positions and simultaneously the

infantry of 13 and 30 Corps advanced to theattack.

In the north the enemy's forward defenceswere captured in two hours without seriousopposition. After an hour's halt for reorgani-zation (the attack on the main positions beganat about oioo hours. Much sterner oppositionwas encountered and progress became slow.By 0530 hours 9 Australian Division on theright had secured most of its final objective,nine thousand yards from the start line; theNew Zealand Division had also captured itsfinal objective, the western end of the Miteiriyaridge. In the centre, however, the left brigadeof the Australian Division and the HighlandDivision were held up about fifteen hundredyards short of their objective by enemy strong-points in the middle of what should have beenthe northern corridor and on the left the SouthAfrican Division fell short of the Miteiriya ridgeby about five hundred yards. 10 Corpscrossed their start line according to plan at0200 hours and began to follow 30 Corps. Thework of the engineers, advancing behind theinfantry to clear the minefields for 10 Corps,was greatly delayed; in fact the whole areawas one vast minefield. However, the southerncorridor, leading to Miteiriya ridge, was openedby 0630 hours and an hour later 9 ArmouredBrigade " (New Zealand Division), closelyfollowed by 10 Armoured Division, was on theeastern slopes of the ridge. This was an un-comfortable position, for as day broke theridge came under heavy fire from artillery tothe south-west so that the tanks were unableto cross it without incurring heavy casualties.Meanwhile the deployment of I ArmouredDivision was even more seriously held up, be-cause the northern lane was still blocked byminefields under fire from the enemy strong-points which the Australian and Highland Divi-sions had been unable to overcome. 20 Austra-lian Brigade and two companies on the extremerigffi of the Highland Division captured theirfinal objective soon after dawn; but the rest ofthe enemy strongpoints continued to resiststubbornly and 2 Armoured Brigade was still inthe minefield at daybreak.

This was a serious delay. It was essentialto General Montgomery's plan that 10 Corpsshould debouch and gain freedom of manoeuvre,so that we could enjoy the advantage of ourgreat weight of armour. Moreover it was essen-tial that this should be done at once, so thatwe could benefit by the tactical surprise gained.General Montgomery therefore ordered 10 and30 Corps to clear the corridor without delay.At 1500 hours 51 Division and i ArmouredDivision, with massed artillery support,launched a combined attack which was com-pletely successful. 51 Division secured thewhole of its final objective, although a fewenemy strongpoints continued to hold out inrear until the following day. 2 ArmouredBrigade was then able to emerge with verylight casualties and complete its deploymentunder cover of a night attack by 7 MotorBrigade.

On the left flank meanwhile the SouthAfrican Division had succeeded in capturing itsfinal objective on Miteiriya ridge. Owing to theheavy opposition in this sector, however, theattacks designed to gain more room for thearmour to deploy had to be carried out bynight. The New Zealand Division was also in-

854 SUPPLEMENT .TO XHE ,L< GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1,948

volyed in this south-westerly attack in orderto extend its bridgehead according *to theoriginal plan. The enemy appeared to be readyfor this development and the New Zealandersand 10 Armoured Division came under veryheavy shellfire; by dawn, however, all threearmoured brigades had completed their deploy.-ment and joined hands with 2 ArmouredBrigade on the right. The first phase of planLIGHTFOOT in this sector had thereby beencarried out, but 'twenty-four hours behind thetime-table, largely owing to the extraordinarydensity of the minefields.

13 Corps' operations in the south met withlimited success. The frontal attack on theenemy minefields on the night of 23rd Octoberwas preceded by thirty minutes' intensecounter-battery fire and supported by timedconcentrations on known enemy defensivelocalities in the same way as the main assaull.7 Armoured Division broke through the firstenemy minefield and established 22 ArmouredBrigade in a bridgehead to the west of it. Thesecond minefield, however, was covered byheavy defensive fire and when, by 1000 hours,no breach had been made it was decided topostpone the attempt on it to the followingnight and widen the bridgehead by reducingthe infantry positions on either side of it be-tween the two minefields. These "operationswere very successful and yielded a large numberof prisoners. Meanwhile i Fighting FrenchBrigade, after a long and difficult night march,had reached the escarpment south of Himeimatwhen they were attacked by tanks. Their anti-tank guns had been unable to keep up withthe advance in the soft sand, and the brigadewas forced to withdraw, after suffering a num-ber of casualties.

The failure to take Himeimat had unfortunateconsequences the following night, when 13Corps returned to the attack. 131 InfantryBrigade succeeded in penetrating the secondminefield and formed a narrow bridgeheal tothe west of it; but, as soon as 22 ArmohredBrigade started to go through, the gaps werecovered by heavy fire not only from anti-tank guns and hull-down tanks to the im-mediate front but also by artillery fromHimeimat in enfilade. After several attemptsto overcome this opposition, which only broughtfurther casualties, the two brigades were orderedto retire. It was clear that any further attemptto batter a passage through the minefieldwould result in heavy casualties, which couldnot be accepted. It was equally clear that13 Corps was fulfilling its chief function ofcontaining the southern group of enemy armour,for 21 Panzer Division, as well as Ariete, wasidentified on its front. General Montgomerytherefore instructed 13 Corps to press theattack no further but to go on creating adiversion by limited operations. He laid stresson the vital importance of keeping 7 ArmouredDivision " in being."

By dawn on 25th October we could considerthat the attack had opened well. 30 Corpushad made a breach six miles wide whichdirectly threatened the centre of the enemy'scommunications. 10 Corps had succeeded indeploying in a position from where it couldthreaten the envelopment of the enemy's lineor bring the full weight of its seven hundredtanks and powerful artillery to bear in theevent of the enemy counter-attack which it

. ,hoped to -provoke. The cover plan had been an•unqualified success. Paring the critical hoursof 24th October when 10 Corps was still tryingto deploy the enemy was still inclined tobelieve that the weight of our armour laybehind 13 Corps and launched only a few minorcounter-attacks in the north. So, although 13Corps had failed in its secondary mission, itsassault was sufficiently successful to convincethe enemy that he must keep two armoureddivisions in the south not only on 24th but evenon 25th October. Moreover a naval operationwhich successfully simulated a landing at Ras~el-Kenayis 65 miles west of El Alamein madehim keep 90 Light Division back at Daba.Undoubtedly the death of the Axis Commander-in-Chief had assisted the confusion which wasevident in the enemy camp. General Stummehad gone forward on a reconnaissance on thenight of the 23rd with his Chief Signal Officer;as they were standing close together the latterwas struck down by a sudden burst of machine-gun fire and Stumme, who had apparently beenoverworking in a climate to which he was un-accustomed, was seized by a heart attack ofwhich he died on the spot. It was some timebefore he was missed and his body recoveredand this delayed the assumption of commandby General von Thoma, Commander* of theGerman Africa Corps,

The enemy began a series of counter-attacksin the north shortly after daybreak on 25thOctober. These efforts were not made in greatstrength but by battle groups containing sometwenty to forty tanks each. This was a mistake:10 Corps was well placed to accept counter-attack and. against our armoured brigades instrong concentrations small battle groups stoodno chance of success. I Armoured Division,against whom the attacks were at first directed,destroyed a number of enemy tanks withoutsuffering damage. Later 10 Armoured Divisionwas also repeatedly engaged and able to driveoff the attackers without difficulty, though atsome cost to itself. All this was in accordancewith our plan and it was particularly gratifyingthat the enemy should be employing only thenorthern group of his armour, and using thatup in piecemeal attacks.

General Montgomery was now ready to pro-ceed with the second phase of the attack.Originally, as I have explained, it had beenintended to extend 30 Corps' bridgeheadthrough the enemy's 'positions to both northand south but th*e very fierce resistance whichthe New Zealanders had met when attackingthe previous night showed that the southwardsattack, which was -to have (been the more im-portant, would prove extremely costly. It wasaccordingly decided to begin operations on thenorthern flank instead. The change of plan•was likely to take the enemy by surprise andthe operation would result in the capture of cer-tain ' troublesome positions overlooking theAustralians. The attack, which was made atmidnight on 25th-26th October by 26 Austra-lian Brigade, was completely successful. Manyof the German defenders were killed and manycaptured, and the salient was extended byabout two thousand yards to include the wholeof the Tell el Eisa ridge. I Armoured Divisionhad been ordered to operate in a due westerlydirection on the Australians' left but they wereunable to gain any ground. The enemy hadsucceeded in establishing a good defensive

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948' 855

screen across the end of our northern corridorand we would not toe able to break out thereunless we could widen our hold still further.

The same night 13 Corps carried out a limitedoperation to divert the enemy's attention. Astrong locality in the Deir el Munassib wasselected as the abjective as being both easilyaccessible and sufficiently important to call fora strong effort to retain it. 4 Light ArmouredBrigade demonstrated in the depression to thesouth of the .post in the afternoon and at night•69 Infantry Brigade (50 Division) attacked fromthe north. The enemy were found to be instrong force and well posted and the attack wasnot pressed.

At this point the Eighth Army Commanderdecided to make a pause. The intention wasstill to gain ground to the north of our salientbut it was clear that 30 Corps needed a restafter its exertions. Casualties in infantry hadbeen fairly heavy and in certain formations,in particular the South African and NewZealand Divisions, there were only limited re-placements available. Moreover, since alltjfor-mations were now in close contact with the•enemy it would be necessary, in order to create-a reserve, to draw forces out of the line. Thiscould be done by moving the inter-Corpsboundary further north and ordering 13 Corpson to the defensive. 10 Corps was temporarilyrelieved of responsibility for breaking outfurther and ordered to pass to the defensivewhile 13 and 30 Corps reorganized.* It wasfirst necessary, however, to strengthen andround off the front. On the night of the 26th,accordingly, the South African and NewZealand Divisions advanced about a thousandyards so as to gain more depth in front of theMifeiriya ridge while 51 Division also reinforcedits forward positions. At the same time 7 MotorBrigade at last succeeded after a stiff fight inadvancing down the northern corridor and caprturing Kidney ridge, a strongly fortified risein the ground on the far edge of the enemyminefields. This was the position which hadheld up i Armoured Division the previousnight; in our hands it was to be the key to ournow defensive front.

The decision to reorganize and regroup hadbeen taken on the afternoon of the 26th andthe next two days were occupied by the neces-sary moves and reliefs. 13 Corps' front was•extended to cover the southern half ofMiteiriya ridge; in this sector 4 Indian Divi-sion relieved the South Africans who in turnside-stepped north and allowed the relief of theNew Zealand Division. 51 Division relieveda brigade of the Australian Division to allowthe latter to increase the strength of their north-ward drive. Besides the New Zealandersi Armoured Division was also to be drawn intoreserve and joined by 7 Armoured ^Divisionfrom 13 Corps. This was to be the strikingforce for the new breakthrough when the nor-therly attack should have widened the breachstill further. In order to give it power itwas necessary to regroup extensively to createa force capable of maintaining its momentumin spite of casualties. -131 Brigade was there-fore taken from 44 Division together withsome artillery, and placed under command of

* This pause was misinterpreted by the enemy and,among the Italians in particular, it was thought'thatwe had called the battle off for good, accepting•defeat

7 Armoured Division as a Lorried InfantryBrigade Group. The New Zealand' Divisionwas even more strongly reinforced: besides itsoriginal one armoured and two infantry bri-gades, which had all suffered casualties, it tookcommand of 151 Brigade (50 Division) and 152Brigade (51 Division); later it also commandedfor certain specific attacks 4 Light ArmouredBrigade (7 Armoured Division), 23 ArmouredBrigade and 133 Brigade (44 Division). Theseformations were placed under command of 30Corps but concentrated for the present in re-serve. 13 Corps was ordered to carry out nomajor operations but to keep the enemy onthe alert with raids and artillery fire. TheCorps was restricted to forty rounds per gunfor twenty-five pounders.

While this reorganization proceeded an ap-preciable change hud come over the enemy'sconduct of the battle, due without doubt tothe return of Field-Marshal Rommel, who hadbeen hastily sent back to Africa as soon asStumme's death was known. After arrivingon the 26th he immediately set to work to re-trieve his predecessor's errors by concentratinghis armour and mobile reserves, ordering for-ward the Trieste and 90 Light Divisions andbringing- up 21 Panzer Division by forcedmarches from the south, followed by . theAriete Division. Trieste he put in to plug thegap made in his defences and grouped the re-mainder for a counter-offensive against oursalient. The policy of dispersion had alreadyseriously reduced the strength available forsuch a policy; 15 Panzer Division had beenpractically destroyed already and the LittonoDivision was heavily depleted. Our defensiveposition was strong, with its flanks firmly basedon the two ridges, our artillery well posted andthe air force alert. On the 26th Rommelendeavoured to play once more the card whichhad so often won him victory in the past, amass tank attack in the afternoon out of thesun; but the concentrations were broken upby continuous air, bombardment and heavyshellfire before he could get to grips. On the27th when, in spite of sustained bombing, hemanaged to launch heavy armoured attacksagainst Kidney ridge and the northern shoulderof the salient, all were driven off with heavyloss to the enemy by the stubborn resistance of2 Rifle Brigade and of 26 Australian Brigade.The following day large concentrations wereagain seen to be gathering and it seemed likelythat the attacks would be repeated. But thepreparations were again disrupted by intensivebombing and such tanks as did probe our lineswere held at a distance by the artillery of 10and 30 Corps. Threatening though they wereat times these attacks did not upset ourreorganization, whereas they cost the enemy ,heavy and, worse still for him, disproportionatelosses.

The new Eighth Army plan was given thename SUPERCHARGE. The preparatorynorthward attack by 9 Australian Division wentin at 2200 hours on '28th October but it wasonly partially successful. 26 Brigade on the leftgained its objective, just short of the railway,but 20 Brigade on the right was much delayedby heavily defended minefields. The result wasr*that we had gained a small salient sticking outlike a cocked thumb from the north side of ouroriginal salient, extending to within about halfa mile of the coast road. This formed a corre-

856 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

spending salient in the enemy's line also; itwas full of strongly held positions, in particulara very well-defended collection of strongpoints,just north of Tel el Eisa known as " Thompson'sPost ". The intention was now to clear up allthis area, break out along the axis of the roadand send the New Zealand Division, reinforcedand regrouped as I have described, to captureSidi Abd el Rahman. This would get us rightthrough the enemy's prepared positions andturn his northern flank. Before this plan couldbe set in motion, however, information wasreceived on the morning of the 29th that causedus to alter completely the direction of the attack.

The enemy had realized the probability, andthe danger, of the plan which we had decidedto employ. In order to meet it he moved upto the Sidi Abd el Rahman area 90 Light Divi-sion, leaving the covering of the original gap,where we were now on the defensive, to theTrieste Division. This made it unlikely that weshould be able to obtain a decisive break-throughon the line of the road, but I considered thatthe situation could be turned to our advantageby encouraging the enemy's belief that we in-tended to force our way through to Sidi Abdel Rahman. We would continue the attack bythe Australians, thus diverting his attention tothe sector of the main road; when all his reserveswere engaged there General Montgomery wouldemploy the reserve he had created in a drivedue westwards out of our salient to breachthe hastily reorganized defences and pass ourarmour through well into the enemy's rear.This would finally disrupt his defences and thebattle would become mobile.

On the night of 30th October, therefore, 26Australian Infantry Brigade, supported by agreat weight of artillery, struck north-east andthen east from the salient won by 20 Brigadetwo nights before. Again it was not possibleto clear the whole area in the face of the enemy'sstubborn resistance; this part of the front wasparticularly strong and the defences were sothick that it might almost be called one con-tinuous minefield. However, the Australiansreached and crossed the road and drove towardsthe sea, reducing the corridor to the now en-circled enemy to a very narrow strip along thecoast. In the pocket thus formed there weretwo Italian and two German battalions. Theywere joined next day by a group of about twentyGerman tanks from 21 Panzer Division whichbroke through down the road; this was in manyways a good sign, for it meant that that divisionwas being drawn into the area where we wantedit. Indeed the Germans were now devotingtheir full efforts to counter-attacks on theAustralians. The proposed break-through wouldplace us between this northern group and theremnants of 15 Panzer Division, which wasstill observing the western end of our originalsalient, and would therefore split the enemyreserves in two.

I had hoped we should be able to attack west-wards the same night, 3ist October; but themen were greatly fatigued, time was needed forreconnaissance, and the artillery had to be re-organized after the Australian attack. It wasaccordingly postponed for twenty-four hoursbut, to compensate for the delay, the depth ofttie attack was increased from four to sixthousand yards. It was to be an operationvery similar to that of 23rd October. Advanc-ing due west on a. front of four thousand yards'

151 and 152 Infantry Brigades (50 and 51Divisions), supported by 23 Armoured Brigade,were to drive a lane through the enemy's newpositions, clearing the minefields as they went.At the same time 28 (Maori) Battalion and 133Infantry Brigade (44 Division) were to capturecertain important enemy localities on the flanks,of the advance. 9 Armoured Brigade, followingclose behind the infantry, was then to advancea further two thousand yards beyond theirobjective and penetrate a strong screen of gunsknown to be in position along the Rahman track.The forces mentioned were under command of30 Corps and their action was to be co-ordinatedby the New Zealand Division. 10 Corps was.then to follow up with i Armoured Division (2and 8 Armoured Brigades) leading; it was im-portant that all three armoured brigades shouldreach the open country before first light andGeneral Montgomery issued firm instructionsthat should 30 Corps not reach their objectivesthe armoured divisions of 10 Corps were to fighttheir way through. When the way was clear10 Corps was to launch two armoured carregiments from' the tip of the salient to raidthe enemy's rear. 5 and 6 New Zealand InfantryBrigades were to concentrate in the salientready to exploit success if called on.

The attack was to be supported by a verystrong concentration of artillery fire. As in theopening attack all guns were to be employedbeforehand in silencing enemy batteries. Then,while a hundred and ninety-two guns put down.a creeping barrage over the four thousand yardsof front, a further hundred and sixty-eight wereto shell known and likely enemy positions inthe path of the advance and on either side of it.All available guns were then to be concentratedhi support of 9 Armoured Brigade's attack onthe Rahman track. The strength of thisartillery support was, however, to some extentoffset by an inevitable lack of exact knowledgeof enemy dispositions. Timing was also aproblem. The moon was now on the wane, andzero hour had therefore to be made three hourslater than on ithe opening night of the battle.

When the attack went in at 0105 hours on2nd November the enemy were able to offerrather more opposition than had been ex-pected, having regard to the gruelling artilleryand air bombardment to which they had beensubjected. It was not until 0600 hours that 151Brigade reached its objective. 152 Brigade on.the left reached its objective half an hourearlier, but still two hours later than had beenplanned. Meanwhile 9 Armoured Brigade hadbeen delayed by mines' and still more byartillery fire from the flanks which had causedappreciable casualties. As a result the brigadecrossed its start line half an hour behindschedule. The delay proved very costly for atdawn it found itself on ithe muzzles of thepowerful screen of anti-tank guns on theRahman track, instead of beyond it as had beenplanned. It was here that occurred what hasbeen called the battle of Tell el Aqqaqir,*which was the largest clash of armoured forma-tions in the whole battle. The Tell itself is asmall rise in the ground just beyond the SidiAbd el Rahman track.

All three regiments of 9 Armoured Brigadedisplayed the greatest gallantry.in ithe two hours

* There was a previous battle of Tell el Aqqaqiron 26th February, 1916, in the campaign againstthe Senussi, but this is another place of the same-name, fifteen miles south-east of Sidi Barrani

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE. 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 857

fight which followed the dawn encounter. Theyheld their ground tenaciously in spite of veryheavy losses and though eighty-seven of theirtanks were destroyed they accounted for alarge number of the enemy guns. At this pricethey held open the end of the salient fori Armoured Division to emerge. It had greatdifficulty, for it came under heavy fire at onceand in a short tirrie the enemy armour beganfuriously to engage both flanks of the salient.The armoured brigades turned outwards tomeet these converging attacks, which wereheaviest on the northern flank where 21 PanzerDivision was soon engaged. The situationlooked dangerous at times, but the enemy hadbeen tricked into allowing his armoureddivisions to become separated again and wasonce more compelled to pit his tanks in twoseparate groups against our massed armour andartillery. He fought with the certain know-ledge .that all was at stake and with all the skillof his long experience in armoured fighting.At one moment 21 Panzer Division brokeright into the north flank of the salient;, butslowly as the day wore on the enemy^Vasforced back. His losses were crippling and theAfrica Corps would fight no more as a Corps onEgyptian soil.

The battle of 2nd November was the decisiveaction and it must have been that night thatthe enemy decided to withdraw. Indicationsof a withdrawal came early on 3rd Novemberand increased as the day wore on. Onearmoured car regiment, the Royal Dragoons,had managed to pass round the enemy's gunline in the dawn mist on the 2nd and wasalready raiding his communications and firinghis dumps in rear; but the main body of ourarmour was still penned in to the east of theRahman track. 7 Motor Brigade had made anight attack on the night of the 2nd in anattempt to cut through the gun screen acrossthe track, due west beyond Tell el Aqqaqir, butthe country was completely flat and ithepositions gained would have been untenable byday. At dawn, therefore, 8 Armoured Brigadetried another tack and moved south-west; heretoo it struck ground sown with mines and rakedwith anti-tank fire so that after slow progressit was again held up on reaching the Rahmantrack. 4/6 South African Armoured Car Regi-ment, however, managed to slip past and racedto join the Royals at El Daba. Meanwhilethe full weight of our air attack was switchedto the main road, where slow-moving, close-packed transport already in retreat presentedexcellent targets from Ghazal to Fuka-.

But although the enemy had acknowledgeddefeat and turned to flight he still hoped to beable to conduct an orderly retreat, and of thishe had a reasonable chance as long as he main-tained His blocking position on the Rahmantrack. An infantry assault was essential tobreak through the anti-tank screen, and theinfantry on the spot were exhausted; GeneralMontgomery decided accordingly to employ adetached force from 4 Indian Division whichhad hitherto not been heavily engaged.5 Indian Brigade, composed of Essex, Baluchand Rajputana Rifles, was selected. After anight approach march of extreme difficulty thebrigade attacked at 0230 hours on 4thNovember, about .five miles south of Tell elAqqaqir, behind a hastily organized Jbut .ad-mirably fired moving barrage. The attack °wascompletely successful; by dawn the southern

B 2 '

end of the enemy's gun screen had been forcedback and it now faced south-east, covering thecoast road. Round the end of it the armoureddivisions of 10 Corps now poured. At the sametime the area immediately south of Tell elAqqaqir was cleared up under the direction of51 Division and the Australians in the north,,'advancing into the central pocket, found thatmost of the Germans and Italians enclosedthere had slipped away in the night.

10 Corps had been reorganized and regroupedfor the pursuit and had now under commandall three armoured divisions, ist, 7th and loth.*The New Zealand Division, with 9 Armoured;Brigade, now reduced and reorganized as acomposite armoured regiment, and adding4 Light Armoured Brigade to its command, washeld in reserve under 30 Corps. The threearmoured divisions crossed the Rahman tracksoon after first light on 4th November withorders to make for the road at Ghazal andbeyond it. They had advanced little more thansix miles, however, when they again foundthemselves confronted by the anti-tank gunscreen which had again fallen back to form awide arc covering Ghazal. It was evidentlyRommel's hope to extricate the greater part ofhis northernmost forces in an orderly mannerbehind this screen; but the hope was soonfrustrated for shortly after midday the NewZealand Division, with 4 Light ArmouredBrigade on its right flank, was sent in a widesweep to the south with orders to press on andsecure the escarpment at Fuka.

As this great mass of motorized and armouredtroops was observed pressing westwards to thesouth of the German rearguards Rommel atfirst refused to believe that it was the Britisharmour and to General von Thoma's expostula-tions replied that it could only be the TriesteDivision, for the British could not have got sofar forward in so short a time. The Commanderof the German Africa Corps therefore went for-ward to make a personal reconnaissance toobtain the evidence to convince his superior andwas captured in the process by a British tank.When thus dramatically convinced Rommel sawat once that only by the speediest withdrawalcould he hope to extricate any of his Germantroops. The Italians must be abandoned to theirfate; the majority of them were in any casealready cut off. The whole of X Corps, being with-out any transport, and the survivors of XXICorps in the same plight waited on the battlefieldto surrender. Some attempted to march off to thewest in long, straggling columns and some in-dividuals undoubtedly perished in the desertwhile attempting to find their own way back.Formations from 13 Corps were employed toround up these stragglers. The Headquartersof XX Corps withdrew straight down the roadwithout having taken any part in the battle; the,remains of the Ariete Division followed theirCorps Commander until overtaken by fuelshortage, whereupon they abandoned their re-maining tanks at various points along the road.-

* i Armoured Division with 2 Armoured and7 Motor Brigades, the jth with 22 Armoured and 13 zLorried Infantry Brigades and the loth with &Armoured and 133 Lorried Infantry Brigades. Th&two Lorried Infantry Brigades^were taken from 4^Division; the association of 131 Brigade with fArmoured Division, which began in this purely-fortuitous manner, became permanent and iArmoured retained 7 Motor Brigade, the -original 7Armoured Division Support Group. ' r

858 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

The Littorio Division had been practicallydestroyed and few of the Trieste escaped.

The action around Ghazal on 4th Novemberended the battle of El Alamein. Rather lessthan a third of the original Axis force suc-ceeded in making good its escape. We esti-mated enemy casualties as ten thousandkilled and fifteen thousand wounded; overthirty thousand prisoners were taken, tenthousand of them Germans, and nine Generalswere included in the bag. Of six hundredenemy tanks four hundred and fifty were lefton the battlefield. Over a 'thousand pieces ofartillery were destroyed or captured. Largequantities of ammunition, stores and equipmentof all natures fell into our hands intact in theearly stages of the pursuit. The hostile forcewith which we now had to reckon amountedto little more than one composite division. 90Light Division, upon whom fell the burden ofcovering the retreat, had been reduced to abouta strong regimental group. The survivors of164 Division equalled about another regimen-tal group. Of the hundred and fifty tanks re-maining about seventy belonged to the ArieteDivision and shortly fell out along the road.The remnants of 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions,mustering some eighty tanks between them,formed the armoured component of the force.In reserve there were the Pistoia Division on thefrontier and 80 Spezia Division which had re-cently arrived in Tnpolitania, both as yetuntried.

Our own casualties were not unduly severe—thirteen thousand five hundred killed,wounded and missing, or just under eight percent, of the force engaged. A hundred guns"had been destroyed and, although more thanfive hundred tanks were disabled in the battle,only a hundred and fifty were found to bebeyond repair. It is fitting at this point tomention that it was very largely the high effi-ciency of the repair and recovery organizationwhich enabled us to retain our superiority inarmour throughout the fighting. In 10 Corpsalone, of five hundred and thirty tanks receivedin workshops, three hundred and thirty sevenwere put in service again during the elevendays the battle lasted.

Our casualties were a negligible factor as faras the pursuit was concerned; on 4th Novemberthe Eighth Army could put into the field verynearly six hundred tanks against eighty Ger-man. The main problem was, not to findforces strong enough to defeat the fleeingenemy, but to arrange that the pursuit shouldnot outstrip supplies. Great distances, scarcityof communications and scarcity of water arethe principal attributes of the Libyan Desert.Tobruk is three hundred and fifty miles fromAlamein, Benghazi three hundred miles furtheron and El Agheila, which on two previousoccasions had proved the turning point ofhitherto successful campaigns and which is thestrongest defensive position in the desert, ahundred and sixty miles further still. Thewater sources along the coast as far as the fron-tier were expected to be, and were, thoroughlyoiled*; the water pipeline from* Alexandriac^ould no longer be relied on. The railway ranas' far as Tobruk/but it was not reasonableto suppose that it would be of any service

* The best way of rendering a well unusable, aspractised by both sides, was to pour in bone oil.This is not poisonous, but very nauseating

in the early stages of the pursuit, though pre-parations had, of course, been made to repair itas fast as possible. For the leading troops roadtransport was the only means of supply. Eventhe road was not entirely reliable, since therewere many places, such as the escarpment passat Sollum, where it could easily be demolished,necessitating a long detour. Motor transport,though a great deal more plentiful than inearlier campaigns, was still inadequate tosupply the whole of 10 Corps beyond Matruhand a pause would be necessary before we couldadvance across the frontier. The overridingconsideration of the next phase of the offensive,therefore was to cut off and destroy as muchas possible of what remained of the enemybefore they could withdraw beyond our reach.

The battle of El Alamein had been a stand-upfight, lasting for eleven days but skilful leader-ship and the tenacity of the fighting soldiersand airmen won the day and with it the firstgreat victory for the Allies. It proved to bethe turning point of the war. This greatbattlU was the fore-runner of a series of vic-tories which never ceased until ithe enemy werefinally cleared from the African continent andit had been decisively won four days beforethe Anglo-American Expeditionary Forceunder General Eisenhower landed in FrenchNorth Africa. The world knew that the Axishad suffered a major disaster and there is nodoubt that this knowledge, by its influence onFrench and Spanish opinion, was of vitalimportance in assisting General Eisenhower'smission.

The Pursuit to Agheila.The enemy withdrew from his delaying

positions south of Ghazal during the night of4th November and on the 5th the pursuitproper began. 10 Corps commanded thepursuit force with I and 10 Armoured Divisionsdirected on Daba and 7 Armoured Divisiondirected on Fuka. The New Zealand Division,which had some difficulty in extricating itselffrom the confusion of the battlefield, alsomoved off at dawn on its way to Fuka, passingfrom 30 to 10 Corps; it had 4 Light ArmouredBrigade under command. The importance ofFuka lay in the fact that the road here passesup a three hundred foot escarpment which isalmost impassable except on the axis of theroad and railway. If we could get there acrossthe desert quicker than the enemy could alongthe road we should be able to cut off a gooddeal of his rearguard. 30 Corps, with 51 and9 Australian Divisions, was held in reserve andordered to clear up the coastal area; the taskof clearing the main battlefield was entrustedto 13 Corps.

The first stage of the pursuit went well. Bymidday on 5th November i Armoured Divisionhad taken Daba and was ordered to strikeacross the desert to cut the road west of MersaMatruh. At the same time 10 Armoured Divi-sion fought a sharp but short engagement witha German armoured rearguard at Galal,between Daba and Fuka, in which it destroyedor captured forty-four of the enemy's remainingeighty tanks. After this success the divisionwas ordered to press down the main road toFuka. The enemy reafguard attempted to holdthe Fuka escarpment and the New ZealandDivision was momentarily held up there southof the road; but 4 Light Armoured Brigade

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 859

forced its way past late in the evening and bymidday on 6th November had reachedBaqqush, about thirty miles from MersaMatmh. There they were joined later by therest of the division and by 8 Armoured Brigadewhich had broken through the enemy rear-guard on the road and captured over a thousandmore prisoners, including the headquarters ofthe Folgore Division. Meanwhile 7 ArmouredDivision struck across the desert to the southof the Fuka escarpment and attacked anotherparty of the enemy near Sidi Haneish, on themain road just west of Baqqush. In this actionwe destroyed fifteen tanks and seven heavyguns and took two thousand prisoners. Theenemy's tank strength was now down to aboutthirty.

By the evening of 6th November we hadcleared the road up to a point less than thirtymiles east of Matruh with our main forces, and4/6 South African Armoured Car Regimentwas operating with great success on the roadwest of Matruh where it had taken two thou-sand prisoners and captured or destroyednumerous vehicles. I Armoured Division,advancing through the desert, had drawn levelwith Matruh to the south and was well on theway to cutting the road beyond it. At thispoint, however, the pursuit was broughtabruptly to a standstill. Light rain had begunto fall during the afternoon of the 6th andduring the night it turned into a downpour.The desert became a morass in which tankscould moves only very slowly and wheeledtransport was completely bogged. This atonce stultified the whole conception of thepursuit which consisted in continuously out-flanking through the desert the enemy retreat-ing up the road. The New Zealand Division,'being lorry-borne, was stuck for thirty-six hoursand the motor brigades and the supply echelonsof i and 7 Armoured Divisions were in asimilar predicament. Only the South Africanarmoured cars and the elements of 4 LightArmoured Brigade that were within easy reachof the road were able to move: the latter weretoo weak to overcome the strong rearguardcovering the evacuation of Matruh and a singlearmoured car regiment was powerless to preventthe escape of the main body of the enemy.

As soon as this state of affairs became known10 Armoured Division, which had been haltedat Fuka for administrative reasons, wasordered to push on to Matruh by the road.This turned the pursuit into a direct followingup of the enemy "and gave the enemy rear-guards every advantage. The armour did notreach the outskirts of the town until shortlybefore dusk on the, 7th and, having launchedone unsuccessful attack, could do no more untildaylight. Next morning, after a brief engage-ment, we entered the town to find it evacuated.At the same moment, two thousand milesfurther west, the first assault waves were com-ing ashore on the beaches of French NorthAfrica.

Although we had inflicted very heavydamage on the remnants of the enemy duringthe first two days of the pursuit they had beensaved by the rain from complete encirclementat Matruh. The opportunity was unlikely tooccur again until Agheila, and our prospectsof being able to fight a decisive battle theredepended upon our ability to assemble andmaintain a sufficiently powerful force to, take

the offensive before the enemy had organizedthe position thoroughly an<J received reinforce-ments. The principal object of the next phaseof the pursuit was therefore to capture the twoports of . Tobruk and Benghazi and developthem to their full capacity in as short a timeas possible. This was the task of the pursuitforce, which had to be reduced in strength asthe advance went on, owing to the increasingdifficulties of supply. The pursuit force seizedany opportunity of rounding up the enemy thatoccurred, but the task of striking at the enemy'sretreat was entrusted mainly to the air forces,operating from landing grounds well forward—often, in fact, in advance of the main bodyand protected only by armoured cars.

The pursuit force, consisting of 7 ArmouredDivision and the New Zealand Division (5 NewZealand Infantry Brigade, 9 Armoured Brigadecomposite regiment and 4 Light ArmouredBrigade), under command of 10 Corps, setout at dawn on 8th November with the frontieras the first objective and Tobruk as the next.The pace of the* advance was hot. On thecoast road the New Zealand Division was op-posed east of Sidi Barrani and on the line ofour old minefield at Buq Buq. This opposi-tion, however, was swiftly overcome and, aftera company of infantry had captured HalfayaPass, and six hundred prisoners from thePistoia Division, m a surprise night attack,the division climbed the escarpment on the nthand occupied Capuzzo, Sollum and Bardia.Meanwhile 7 Armoured Division crossed thefrontier on the loth, after a march across thedesert of a hundred and sixty miles by the clas-sic route on top of the escarpment, and swungnorthwest to join the New- Zealanders atCapuzzo. On I2th November , 4 LightArmoured Brigade pressed on and capturedGambut and El Adem and at 0900 hours onthe I3th 131 Lorried Infantry Brigade, fol-lowed by the main body of 7 Armoured Divi-sion, entered Tobruk without opposition.

The main body could proceed no farther untilthe port of Tobruk was open, but it was essen-tial to secure the landing grounds at Tmimi,Martuba, Derna and Mechili, so as to bringour fighter aircraft within range of the GebelAkhdar and Benghazi. There was an evenmore pressing reason for capturing the coastalgroup of landing grounds. No convoys hadsailed to Malta since the previous April owingto the impossibility of providing air protectionand the garrison and people of the island werenow on the verge of starvation. The situationwould be beyond control unless a convoy put-ting out from Alexandria on i6th Novemberarrived safely and of that there was little hopewithout strong fighter protection from the coastof Cyrenaica. It might very well have provedimpossible to supply any further advance, see-ing that 10 Corps had advanced two hundredand twenty miles in six days and that heavydemolitions had been carried out both on theroad and the railway. But the adminis-trative arrangements stood the strain, storeswere landed at Sollum and the harboursof Matruh and Bardia were openedwithin two days of their capture so

]ihat enough supplies were available to allow^4 Light Armoured Brigade to continue. Whilethe main body hastened down the road andsecured Tmimi on i4th November anothercolumn moved across the desert via Bir

86o SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

Hacheim and Rotonda Segnali, so as to out-flank any possible opposition on the road, andoccupied Martuba on the following day. Dernawas reported clear on i6th November. On thatday the Gazala landing grounds were broughtinto use and on the i8th our fighters were ableto cover the passage of the Malta convoy. Its'safe arrival marked the end of the siege andthe beginning of the delivery of the brave garri-son and people of Malta from the greatest con-tinuous ordeal of the war.

The enemy was withdrawing through theGebel and it was a great temptation to imitateour previous strategy by pushing a force acrossthe desert to cut him off at or near Agedabia.General Montgomery was determined, however,not to take any chances, especially in view ofthe difficulties of the maintenance situation, and10 Corps was instructed to despatch onlyarmoured cars by this route. Later, however,when it appeared that the enemy's retreat hadactually been brought to a temporary standstillby lack of fuel, 10 Corps, was ordered tostrengthen, if possible, the 'outflanking force;this proved impracticable in the then existingcircumstances. By very careful organisationof reserves 4 Light Armoured Brigade hadfound it possible to advance to Maraua on i8th•November, in spite of demolitions and mineson the road. The main body of 10 Corps washalted around Tmimi.

In the meantime two mobile columns, con-sisting of ii Hussars and the Royals, withsupporting arms, under command of 7Armoured Division, were directed on Msusacross the desert. By the evening of i6thNovember they,had reported Mechili clear andwere operating within forty miles of Msus.Rain now began to fall again and it took thetwo columns twenty-four hours to strugglethrough sixty miles of waterlogged ground tothe escarpment which 'the enemy rearguardwas holding to cover the evacuation ofBenghazi. On i8th November they engagedthe rearguard at Sceleidima and Antelat, thetwo main passes in the escarpment, but wereunable to force their way past. During thenight the enemy withdrew and the advanceof the two columns was again delayed by badgoing. On the 20th 11 Hussars enteredBenghazi* and found the town and neighbour-hood clear of enemy, and it was not until mid-day of the 2ist that the Royals made touchwith the enemy rearguard again at Agedabia.The administrative position was now becomingeasier and the vanguard of 22 ArmouredBrigade, having raced across two hundred andsixty miles of desert, at once began to turnthe enemy's flank. Thus threatened he lostno time in abandoning Agedabia. The roadsouthwards was heavily mined and the advancewas much impeded; but by 25th Novemberpatrols were in contact with the next enemyposition at Agheila. The whole of Cyrenaicawas now in our hands.

During this phase of the pursuit, when 10Corps was unable to come to grips with theenemy, the work of the Royal Air Force wasparticularly valuable. All the way from Dabato the frontier, and particularly at SollumDJ

* ii Hussars had been the first British troops toenter Benghazi on its first capture m February, 1941;they were also first into Tripoli in January, 1943,and Tunis in May 1943 (with i DerbyshireYeomanry).

where the congestion was greatest, retreatingenemy transport was relentlessly attacked. Onnth November, while the' New Zealand Divi-sion was occupying the frontier area, ourfighters caught up with the enemy air forceand had a specially successful day, shootingdown enemy aircraft not only over the frontierbut also on the enemy's own landing grounds atGambut and El Adem. By the I3th our ownaircraft were based on these same two airfields,bombing and machine-gunning enemy transportin the Gebel Akhdar. On the same day twosquadrons of fighters made a bold move, com-pletely by air transport, to a landing groundonly a hundred and eighty miles east ofAgedabia; well ahead and to the south of ourforward troops, and inflicted considerabledamage on the enemy's columns retreatingrouri'd the bend of the Gulf of Sirte. By i6thNovember the main fighter force was operatingfrom Gazala and destroyed thirty-seven enemytransport aircraft by the use of which the enemywas desperately trying to relieve his fuel shor-tage. After this the air force, like the mainbody of the Army, was temporarily chainedto the Tobruk area until the supply situationimproved and for a few days enemy aircraftwere able to attack our light columns in thedesert on a scale to which we had long beenunused. By 26th November, however, twowings of fighters were established at Msus andour air superiority over the forward area wasrestored.

The Conquest of Tripolitania.At Agheila Eighth Army was facing the

strongest position in Libya. An army advancingfroiruthe east comes first upon a large areaof salt marsh, running roughly north to south,known as the Sebkha es Seghira; there is thena gap of about fifteen miles between this andanother salt marsh to the south, SebkhetGheizel. This gap is filled with soft sand anddifficult going, including large areas of wind-blown crescent-shaped dunes. The south sideof the position is protected by a partly impas-sible escarpment, more sand dunes and moresalt marshes and the rear is entirely coveredby the Sebkha el Kebira. These salt marsheswould be at their most difficult in this com-paratively rainy season. Remoteness was an-other great strength of the position; to buildup sufficient reserves for a proper attack at adistance of a hundred and fifty miles fromBenghazi and three hundred from Tobruk wasa matter of some time. This had in the pastbeen one of the reasons why Agheila had twicemarked the high-water-mark of a Britishadvance into Libya.

On this occasion, however, the enemy wasin no position to reinforce his troops at Agheila.The Anglo-American invasion forces in FrenchNorth Africa had established themselves firmlyin Morocco and Algeria and by the time EighthArmy made contact with the Agheila positionthe vanguards of First Army were withintwenty-five miles of Tunis. All available Axisreinforcements had to be rushed to Tunisia,whose retention was judged by the enemy muchmore valuable than that of Tripolitania, andthere were none available for Rommel. Hehad picked up three divisions on the way backfrom^Alamein; of these the Pistoia and YoungFascists Divisions were inexperienced and 80Spezia Division had lost a large part of its

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 861

artillery on its way across the Mediterranean.With these and the relics of the other Italiandivisions he had little more than twenty-fivethousand Italians to eke out his ten thousandGerman survivors. Tank strength was calcu-lated at between sixty and seventy. In spiteof the strength of the position these forces werenot enough to defend it; the enemy decidedtherefore to hold Agheila only long enoughto force us to deploy in front of itand then to retire, before we could attack, toa position at Buerat, covering Tripoli.

On our side the problem was almost entirelyone of maintenance. The enemy had carriedout heavy demolitions of certain sectors of thedesert railway and of, the pipeline fromAlexandria; the main road had been blown upat Sollum pass and many places in the'Gebel;the water supplies at Bardia, Tobruk andBenghazi had been destroyed; very greatdamage had been caused at Benghazi andTobruk by our own bombing and by enemydemolitions. Nevertheless we had allowed forall this; our assessment of probable damagehad been conservative and the arrangements forrepair proved entirely satisfactory. Railheadwas opened at Capuzzo on 2ist November andat Tobruk on ist • December. By the latterdate three thousand tons of Nile water werebeing delivered daily twenty-five miles west ofMatruh and the water sources at Tobruk andBardia were rapidly put into commission. TheSollum road was repaired within forty-eight

.hours, and in the Gebel deviations were con-structed fast enough to avoid delay to supplycolumns. The first ships entered Tobruk andBenghazi four days after capture, in two weeksTobruk was operating to its full capacity of athousand tons daily and in three weeks twicethat amount was being discharged at Benghazi.Within a very short time sufficient supplies werepouring into Cyrenaica to enable the air forcesto continue uninterrupted their heavy attackson enemy ports and shipping, to allow troopsand reserves to be gathered in readiness for afurther advance, and strong forces to be main-tained in the forward area to ensure an im-penetrable screen of observation. The excep-tionally long road haul to the forward areaand the availability of motor transport, how-ever, were the limiting factors and GeneralMontgomery calculated that it would be themiddle of December before we would be able toresume the advance.

The two weeks which elapsed were fullyoccupied with preparations and reconnaissancefor the attack and with reorganisation. Head-quarters 30 Corps assumed command of theforward area from 10 Corps on 26th November.On 3rd December the Corps moved forward togain close contact with the enemy; 51 Divisiontook over the northern sector with orders tocarry out active patrolling and to maintain pres-sure on the enemy while 7 Armoured Division,stationed farther to the rear, was given the taskof observing and harassing the southern flank.At the same time 8 Armoured Brigade relieved22 Armoured Brigade, which badly needed anopportunity to refit after a continuous advanceof over eight hundred miles. By the gth theNew Zealand Division was concentrated roundEl Haseiat. This is a track junction down inthe desert south-east of Agedabia and well backfrom the enemy positions; trie intention was topass the New Zealanders round the enemy's

inland flank, well to the south in the hope ofavoiding observation, and strike north to themain road well west of Agheila. By i2thDecember 30 Corps was ready to advance. Inthe north the direct blow was to be given by51 Division both along the road and south ofthe Sebkha es Seghira; 7 Armoured Divisionwas to follow up the latter blow .and the onlyreserve was 23 Armoured Brigade south ofAgedabia.

It had been General Montgomery's intentionto launch the attack on i6th December but bythe beginning of the month we were alreadygetting clear indications that the enemy wasnot going to hold.* The Italian infantry wasthe first to go; they had no transport and iftheir evacuation were delayed they might sharethe fate of X Corps at El Alamein. The defenceof the position was thus left to the Germanmobile forces, who could delay their departure.without undue risk until our attack appearedimminent. There was still a chance, however,that the outflanking movement of the NewZealand Division might be able to catch someof his rearguards and the greater the losses wecould inflict on his German troops the lesschance there was of his being able to stand onhis next position. Accordingly the date of theattack was advanced as much as possible ;^ theNew Zealanders started off from El Haseiat onI2th December, 51 Division starting active raid-ing against the positions north and south of theSebkha on the nth to distract attention fromthe move, and the frontal attack was plannedfor the I4th.

During the night of I2th December the enemybegan to withdraw. He relied principally onmines, booby-traps and demolitions to coverthe road, a most effective policy for it was notuntil the evening of the I5th that 152 Brigadehad covered the thirty miles from Mersa Bregato Agheila fort. In view of this slow advance7 Armoured Division, with 8 Armoured Brigadein the lead, was passed through 153 Brigaderound the south end of the Sebkha. Havingfought a successful engagement with the enemyrearguard on the Marada road to the south ofAgheila the armoured brigade followed hard onthe heels of the rearguard until it was held up.by an anti-tank ditch running across the mainroad about twenty miles west of Agheila. Thisobstacle could not be crossed until the morningof the i6th when the enemy retired and 7Armoured Division pressed on to chase him, itwas hoped, on to the guns of the New ZealandDivision which had taken up its position to thewest.

The New Zealanders had fetched a wide cir-cuit round the main position. Their objectivewas the Wadi Matratm, some sixty miles westof Agheila, and they reached it after a mostdifficult march just as night was falling on I5thDecember. A large part of the enemy rear-guard was still to the east and, as the wadi,though not a complete obstacle, is crossed easilyonly in the neighbourhood of the road, itseemed that the manoeuvre had succeeded.The division, however, had some difficulty indeploying in unknown country by moonlightand in registering its guns. Next morning,therefore, the enemy, fully aware of his desper-ate predicament, was able to break up into small

* From, the Ciano Diaries it appears that the de-oision to evacuate had been taken at least by8th December

862 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 .FEBRUARY, 1948

parties and race for safety through the gaps inour deployment, losing a number of tanks andguns but succeeding in getting the main bodyaway. As soon as it was seen that by thesetactics the enemy was escaping 4 LightArmoured .Brigade was sent on to harass thefugitives. But almost every one of the bridgesand culverts over the numerous wadis had beenblown up, and the wadis sown with mines; inaddition the country on either side of the roadwas exceedingly rough, so that the armouredcars were unable to close with the enemy. Inspite of these difficulties the advance guardcovered the forty miles to Nofilia by the even-ing of i6th December. For the next two daysthe Light Armoured Brigade engaged roundNofiha in skirmishes with the enemy rearguard,which began to retire on the igth by stages toSirte. By 22nd December 90 Light and 21 Pan-zer Divisions had joined the main body, whichwas hastily preparing a fresh defensiveposition at Buerat, leaving 15 Panzer Divisionto cover Sirte.

Beyond Nofilia an advance in force was forthe moment impossible for administrativereasons: Nofilia itself is two hundred and sixtymiles from Benghazi, the advanced base, andSirte eighty miles further still. An advancewas essential, 'however, for the sake of theRoyal Air Force, since there were very few land-ing grounds in the area in which we wereoperating and it was vital to secure those atSirte, in order to give close support to theittack on the Buerat line. An armoured carregiment was therefore sent to work round tothe south of the village. Fearful for the lossof half of his remaining tanks the enemy atonce withdrew and shortly after noon on Christ-mas Day the village was entered without oppo-sition. As the enemy had proved so sensitiveto an outflanking movement the manoeuvre'was continued until finally, toy 30th December,he had fallen back before our armoured carpatrols to the main position.

The Buerat position was not particularlystrong and could easily ibe outflanked. East ofthe village was the broad and difficult WadiBey el Kebir and west of it the Wadi Zem Zem;it was on the latter that the enemy establishedhis main position, which was less than twenty-five miles in length. It was a subject of con-siderable conjecture at the time why Rommelshould have decided on standing where he didrather than further back, in particular on thenaturally very strong line from Tarhuna toHorns. The reason, as it now appears, wasthat the Axis had decided to evacuate thewhole of Tripolitania and concentrate all theirresources on the defence of Tunisia. The de-cision had been made by 3ist December.Strategically the intention was sound; the Ger-man High Command believed that it would bepossible to hold a permanent bridgehead inTunisia which could tie down our forces thereand continue to maintain the barrier in theMediterranean communications at the Siciliannarrows. Naturally the more time that couldbe obtained for the purpose of evacuation thebetter and the mobile rearguard would there-fore await our attack as far forward as w^assafe. The Italian infantry divisions began !-tomove back in the first week in January andshortly afterwards the Trieste Division, includ-ing the remains of all the Italian divisionsdestroyed at Alamein, and 21 Panzer Division

were detached from the Army and sent to »southern Tunisia. The rearguard therefore con-sisted mainly of 90 Light and 15 PanzerDivisions.. We were naturally unaware of the enemy in-tention to withdraw right into Tunisia and toall appearance the problem now facing us wasa most difficult one. It would be comparativelysimple to turn the Buerat line but before weattempted that it was essential to be m a posi-tion to advance direct on Tripoli without a pauseand seize the port. Just before we reachedit we should be six hundred miles from ournearest base, at Benghazi, and to maintain anyappreciable force over that distance wouldpresent insuperable difficulties. There was nosuitable port on the Gulf of Sirte and everythinghad to come up by the one road; it would re-quire at least two weeks to build up thereserves, especially the petrol, which would beneeded for the dash to Tripoli. In the mean-time there was a good deal of reconnaissanceto be done. This country was quite unknownto us, except from the not very reliable Italianmaps, and General Montgomery employed theLong Range Desert Group, which I had putunder his command, for an extensive pro-gramme of reconnoitring routes forward andlanding grounds. I cannot speak too (highly ofthe work of this very specialized organizationboth now and on previous occasions; its mem-bers, all picked volunteers, had reduced theproblem of moving across the desert to some-,thing between an exact science and a fine art.

General Montgomery's plan was to attack up-the onain road with 50 and 51 Divisions andmake a wide outflanking movement throughthe desert to the left with 7 Armoured and 2New Zealand Divisions, all under 30 Corps.He was very anxious, however, not to scarethe enemy off his present line prematurely, fora withdrawal would multiply our problems.Accordingly the main bodies of this force wereleft right back and the enemy observed onlywith an armoured car screen from 4 LightArmoured Brigade. 7 Armoured Division wasforty-five miles further east, the New ZealandDivision a hundred miles and 51 Division, ex-cept for 154 Brigade on the Wadi Bey el Kebir,two hundred miles behind the front. This, ofcourse, had the additional advantage of eas-ing the problem of maintenance. Advanceparties were brought forward to reconnoitre theproposed routes of attack and some artilleryregistration was carried out. The intention wasto attack on I5th January if the enemy showedsigns of withdrawing and on the igth if hewas prepared to stand. It was soon clear thatthe former was the more likely; the infantrybegan moving off, Pistoia and Spezia on the3rd and 4th and the Young Fascists shortlyafterwards. At this point, however, an unex-pected difficulty arose. On 4th and 5thJanuary very heavy gales at Benghazi causedsevere damage; the outer mole was breached,four ships, one containing over two thousandtons of ammunition, were sunk and the capa-city of the port was reduced by two-thirds. Theintake of stores had to be supplemented byroad from Tobrak. In order to make up forthis while still sticking to the proposed* dateGeneral Montgomery decided to drop 50 Divi-sion from the attack and leave it and the restof 10 Corps, which he had intended to bringforward to the Agheila area, back in Cyrenaica

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 863

between Tobruk 'and Benghazi. Here theywould be grounded and all their vehicles used tosupplement the transport needed for the extraroad-haul, an additional three hundred miles.

The main bodies of the divisions of 30 Corpswhich had been left in rear moved forward onI4th January and w/ent straight into actionfrom the approach march at 0715 hours on theI5th—a rare example of the " encounterbattle ". On the right 51 Division met its firstopposition (beyond Buerat on the iWadi Kfefwhere it was held up all day. On the left theNew Zealanders and 7 Armoured Division feltwith some caution round the southern end ofthe enemy's anti-tank screen. By the eveningwe had reached the Wadi Zem Zem and seizedthe main crossing at El Faskia. The battleof the Buerat line was now over in a day andthe enemy began to withdraw on his wholefront, making for the hilly country coveringTripoli on the south-east. His mam anxietythroughout was for his desert flank, since hisleft, retreating by the road, had to make a fairlywide circuit through Misurata and Zliten Hewent back fairly slowly, therefore, on his right,pivoting on Bern Ulid until 90 Light Division onthe coast had reached Horns; then he drew hissouthern forces back to Tarhuna and by theigth was again facing south-west on the generalline Horns—Tarhuna. The two divisions on ourleft found great difficulty in coming to gripswith the enemy for the country was very dim-cult and, in the early stages, strewn with mines51 Division, on the coast, met less enemy re-sistance but was delayed by heavy demolitionsand mines all along the road. It was not untilthe early hours of i8th January that the divi-sion entered Misurata and the evening of theigth when it entered1 Horns. We were now inclose contact with the enemy all along his newposition. By this; time too our fighter aircrafthad been installed on new landing grounds atBir Dufan, south-west of Misurata, where theycould attack the enemy in the hill country allthe way to Tripoli.

So far the enemy had not been hustled butwe should now 'be in a position to play on hisfear for his right flank. Accordingly 4 LightArmoured Brigade, which had been operatingfar out on our left, was ordered to edge stillmore to the west; at the same time 22 ArmouredBrigade, which had remained in Army Reservebetween the two thrusts and had not yet beenengaged, was sent due north to the coast roadat Zliten. The intention was that, if the enemyreacted to our threat on-the west, 51 Division,now reinforced with a hundred and fifty freshtanks, should drive hard down the road toTripoli. The ruse was successful: the enemyarmour was kept south-west of Tarhuna to op-pose 4 Light Armoured; Brigade and theRamcke Parachute Brigade was moved acrossto'the same area from Horns. The enemy doesnot appear to have noticed the arrival of 22Armoured Brigade at Zliten.

In spite of this success in misleading theenemy, the difficulties of the terrain west ofHorns made up for the fewness of the defendersin that sector. For the first thirty-five milesfrom Horns the road to Tripoli winds throughravines and it had been demolished in manyplaces with great skill and thoroughnessr.o Arapid advance was impossible over such coun-try and in face of opposition After several

sharp actions with the rearguard, notably mthe prepared 'defences"west of Horns and againat Corradini, 51 Division emerged into the plainof Tripoli and captured Castelverde on themorning of 22nd January. Here they wereonly thirty miles from the town and since thecountry was now more open and suitable forthe employment of armour 22 Armoured Bri-gade was brought into the lead. The rearguardof 90 Light Division made a final stand cover-ing a demolished causeway fifteen miles east ofTripoli and darkness fe'll as the tanks werestruggling in deep, soft sand to work roundthe flanks. There was only one company ofinfantry forward to deal with what was essen-tially an infantry problem. A ibattalion of 51Division was therefore ordered forward, ridingon " Valentine " tanks, to stage an attack inthe full moonlight. The attack was successfuland the infantry and tanks pressed on throughthe night down the main road to Tripoli. 22Armoured Brigade followed, taking the by-passroad to approach the town from the south

The advance-of the left flanking column pro-ceeded at about the same pace. Havingentered Tarhuna on igth January 7 ArmouredDivision was held up throughout the next dayby enemy holding the hills flanking the defilethrough which the road descends into the plainof Tripoli. On the 2ist the armoured cars ofthe division worked round the southern flankand entered the plain; at the same time leadingelements of the New Zealand Division, whichhad been ordered to try the descent furtherwest, found another way down the escarpmentand came up on their left. But the way wasnot yet clear; the enemy rearguard was strongand continued to offer stiff resistance at CastelBenito, Azizia and Garian. Moreover itnecessarily took some time to deploy our mainforces in the plain, as the single road throughthe Tarhuna defile was demolished in severalplaces and the alternative route which the NewZealanders had discovered traversed roughcountry. In the late afternoon of the 22nd,however, the enemy began to evacuate Garian,and shortly after Castel Benito also, *and thesouthern approach to Tripoli was open.

ii Hussars entered1 Tripoli from the south at0500 hours on 23rd January and at about thesame time i Gordons of 51 Division came infrom the west. At 0900 hours the same dayGeneral Montgomery received the formalsurrender of the Italian authorities outside thecity. The last of the enemy's armed forces hadleft some hours before but the entire civilianpopulation remained, in contrast with Benghaziwhich had been evacuated by the Italians.Eighth Army's entry was accepted peacefully;the Italian municipal and police officials re-mained at their posts and the British MilitaryAdministration assumed the government of thecity and province in an atmosphere of calm.A curfew was imposed on military and civilians.Private and civic buildings and establishmentswere little damaged. The public services werestill functioning, but the food supply was re-stricted. This was remedied as occasion per-mitted and British soldiers were forbidden to buy'Civilian food; none of them, except those whoseduties made it essential, were quartered in thetown. Many of the military establishments andinstallations had been wrecked and the damageto the port was particularly widespread. Quaysand wharves were cratered, the mole breached,

864 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

and the entrance to the harbour was blockedwith sunken ships.

By the end of the month the rest of Tripoli-tania had been cleared. In this task we wereaided by a column of Fighting French from theChad Territory which, while Eighth Armywas advancing along the coast, invaded thecountry from the south and conquered theSaharan province of the Fezzan. This repre-sented a great feat of endurance and skill, forthey started from Fort Lamy, fifteen hundredmiles by air line south of Tripoli. The €om-mander was General Leclerc,* later famous asthe commander of 2 French Armoured Division,which liberated Paris.- The Fezzan was held bynumerous Italian garrisons, each disposed tocover a water source, so that failure at any onepoint would have meant the risk of completelack of water for the force. The first gairisonto be overwhelmed was that of Umm el Aianebwhich surrendered on 4th January. Thenorthern garrisons heeded the warning and be-gan to withdraw before the end of the year.The southern garrisons had greater difficulty ingetting away, mainly because of shortage oftransport and fuel and the low morale of theirnative troops. Gatrun, Murzuk and &:iurefsurrendered in swift succession. Ghadames, themost westerly, was attacked on loth January.By the I5th the remnants of the Sahara Com-mand, reduced by desertion and surrender totwo thirds of its original strength of about threethousand five hundred, were gathered at <Mizdaand Ganan and it was they who constituted thegarrison of the latter place until the 22nd. Nextday Mizda surrendered to an attack. Wilh thefall of Ghadames on 29th January the conquestof the Fezzan was completed.

I must mention before concluding this partof the narrative those others under my com-mand in areas where no operations took placebut where our forces were employed in thewearisome round of guard duties and the main-tenance of law and order. Lieut.-General (nowSir George) Holmes, commanding the NinthArmy in Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan,had to deal with a political situation which wasalways delicate and which might in certaincircumstances have become explosive. Hisforces were very small indeed and of variousnationalities but he was entirely successful inthe tasks he had been set. With the flight of

, the enemy from Egypt the task, which had beengiven the Egyptian army of watching the SuezCanal for mines dropped by enemy aircraftbecame superfluous. I visited in the course ofthe winter our garrisons in Syria, Cyprus,Eritrea and the Sudan to confirm by observa-tion the soundness of our existing arrange-ments. It was on small detachments such as•these that the security of our Middle East basedepended and I was glad of the opportunity ofassuring them of the value of their unspectacularassignments.

I should like also to express my appreciationof the assistance I received from my colleaguesof .the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force,Admiral Harwood and Air Chief MarshalTedder. Admiral Harwood had succeeded tothe command of our naval forces in the Eastern51

Mediterranean at a time when our resourceswere at their lowest ebb. Our only two battle-

* He later ad'ded this " nom de guerre "to his family name and is known as General d'ArmeeJ. P Leclerc de Hautecloque

ships in the Eastern Mediterranean had beenseverely damaged in 1941 by a daring assaultby Italian swimming saboteurs in Alexandria•harbour, leaving only light forces in the area.A large part of Alexandria harbour wasoccupied by the former French EasternMediterranean Squadron to whom we had givenrefuge and continued maintenance since July1940; at that time, however, they could not seetheir way to throwing in their lot with theAllies. Our submarines continued to "do mostvaluable work but perhaps I may be permittedto lay particular stress on the support whichthe Navy gave to the Army in our westwardadvance. Their work in reopening demolishedports and the convoying of supplies was ofinestimable value and without it we could nothave maintained our forces in Libya. Air ChiefMarshal Tedder was to be my colleague in manycampaigns still lying in the future. He had themost remarkable grasp of air problems of anyRoyal Air Force officer with whom I haveserved and a comprehension also of the needsof the Army. He organized, with the invalu-able assistance of Air Vice Marshal Coningham,his Air Commander in the Desert throughoutthe campaign, the most complete measure ofair cover for the fighting troops but the ser-vices of the Royal Air Force went beyondthis purely defensive task, vital though it is;reaching out ahead of our advancing forces andstriking the enemy without pause an his re-treat he showed how a tactical air force wellhandled can intervene to effect in the groundbattle. These actions are spectacular andobvious, but I would draw attention also tothe degree of administrative skill which is re-quired to maintain the forward movement of anair force at such a speed as frequently to out-strip the troops on the gtound and seize newbases ever further forward from which to strikethe enemy.

The capture of Tripoli, three months to theday from the opening of our offensive, markeda definite phase in the African campaign.Tripoli had always shone as a far distant goalin the eyes of the Desert Army since the timewhen the first armoured cars crossed thefrontier wire into Libya on the morning of nthJune 1940. When Eighth Army advancedfurther out of Libya into Tunisia it became partof a large machine and a break at this point istherefore appropriate. The desert had been leftbehind; by comparison Tunisia is almostEuropean. And none could doubt that theend of the long years of fighting in Africa wasnow near at hand.-,

PART II.—THE CONQUEST OF TUNISIA.

Formation of Eighteenth Army Group.On i4th January, 1943, a conference of the

Combined Chiefs oi^Staff opened at Anfa nearCasablanca in French Morocco. It wasattended by the Prime Minister and the Presi-dent and by General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. I wasalso summoned to attend and flew from Cairowith Air Chief Marshal Tedder. Among theother decisions taken at this historic meetingwas the decision to reorganize the chain ofcommand in Africa. Eighth Army was tocome under General Eisenhower's commandwhenvit entered Tunisia from Tripolitania. Inorder to co-ordinate the action of the largeforces, of three different nationalities, which

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 865

would then be engaged on the same task, theconquest of Tunisia, an Army Group Head-quarters was to be set up. I was to assumecommand of this, which would involve respon-sibility for the entire conduct of opera-.tions in Tunisia; I was also appointed DeputyCommander-in-Chief, ' Allied ExpeditionaryForce. My Headquarters was known as.Eighteenth Army Group, combining the num-bers of First and Eighth Armies; I proposedto make it a very small and mobile TacticalHeadquarters to direct the battle from closeup. The staff to form this headquarters wasflown round by transport aircraft from Cairo;I myself arrived in 'Algeria on I5th Februaryand assumed command on igth February. Ina directive from General Eisenhower issued onthe zyth* I was instructed that my missionwas the early destruction of all Axis forces inTunisia.

Situation in February, 1943.Before proceeding to summarize the disposi-

tions of our own troops and the enemy at thetime I assumed command it is essential torecapitulate briefly the course of events in thepreceding three months, since the very com-plicated situation then existing was a naturaldevelopment of the confused and varied for-tunes of the fighting during that period. *Theoriginal expeditionary force which had comeashore on 8th November, 1942, was dividedinto three task forces which had landed on thewest coast of Morocco, north and south ofCasablanca, at Oran, and at Algiers. Theformer two were American; the landing atAlgiers, though under American command, in-cluded a British Brigade Group and it wasthe intention to build up into Algiers as rapidlyas possible the advance elements of the BritishFirst Army, under Lieut. nGeneral (now SirKenneth) Anderson. General Eisenhower'smission was first to secure his 'base inthe three assault areas and establish com-munications between them, and then to launchFirst Army eastwards from Algiers intoTunisia to seize the ports of Tunis andBizerta. In accomplishing the former task hehad first to overcome the resistance of theFrench garrison, numbering over a hundredthousand regular troops in Algeria andMorocco. It was believed that these forceswould resist the landings and if that resistancewas prolonged, although after the first fewdays the French would probably have to with-draw to the mountains and conduct a guerillacampaign, we should probably be faced withat least three months' fighting before our baseand communications could be deemed safe.This appreciation, and the danger of venturingwithout air cover into ports which the Germanbombers could reach, were the main reasonswhy the most easterly landing was made atAlgiers, instead of nearer to Tunisia, whichwould have given us a better start in the racefor the Tunisian ports. In order to do thisit would have been necessary to land all threeassault forces inside the Mediterranean, for ourlimited resources, especially in shipping, couldnot be .stretched to produce a fourth assaultforce. But this would mean that our linesof communication would run exclusivelythrough the Straits of Gibraltar which couldbe closed if Spain entered the war on the

* Appendix " B "

side of the Axis. For this, reason it wasessential to employ one of the assault forceson the Atlantic coast of Morocco to secure apossible alternative line of communications.

The French did oppose our landings buton loth November Admiral Darlan agreed toan armistice and ordered all troops in NorthAfrica to cease resistance. This was a tre-mendous gain and reduced the unhappy periodof hostilities with the French from a possiblethree months to two days. And not only didthey agree to cease resistance but also to throwin their lot with us in the fight against theAxis. The Armistice came in for some criticismon the political side but it seems to me verylikely that it may have considerably reducedthe "duration of the war, for if the Germanshad been'given time they could probably havebuilt up sufficient strength in their Tunisianbridgehead to hold out all the summer of 1943.As it was General Eisenhower was able to turnall his attention at once to the task of pushingFirst Army at full speed towards Tunisia. Hehad the great advantage that he could nowrely on the French local authorities to preserveorder and the French communications systemto facilitate his advance. In spite of this therewere still tremendous difficulties to be faced.The distance from Algiers to Tunis is fivehundred and sixty miles, by two roads and anindifferent railway. Almost the whole of thisstretch of country is very mountainous. Com-munications were made more difficult iby thefact, gratifying in itself, that the French weremobilizing an army of thirty-two battalionsand for this had requisitioned almost all avail-able local transport and required the use ofthe railway. First Army, when it began itseastwards advance, consisted only of one in-fantry division, the 78th, reinforced later byan armoured regimental group, two commandoand two parachute battalions.

The decision to make a dash for Tunis,though bold, was undoubtedly correct. Theadvance was pressed by land, sea and air;Bougie was occupied by nth November, Boneon I2th November, by a British parachutebattalion, and by i8th November our advancedforces were operating east of^-Gebel Abiud onthe coast road and Beja on the inland road,about sixty miles from Bizerta and Tunis re-spectively. At both points we were in contactwith German troops. These had begun -toarrive, in the first place by air, on lothNovember, meeting no resistance from theFrench authorities in Tunisia. On I5thNovember a United States parachute battalionoccupied Youks Les Bains and Tebessa, insouth-eastern Algeria, and co-operated withthe French detachments at Gafsa in southernTunisia. Between i7th November and 25thDecember two main .attempts were made tocapture Tunis. The first succeeded in- ad-vancing, on i28th November, as far as Djedeida,on the road between Tunis and Bizerta andonly twelve miles from the former. At thispoint the enemy counter-attacked strongly withtanks and dive-bombers; the latter were ableto operate from good airfieldsD only a shortdistance in rear and our own air forces wereun4ble to give cover, since the rain had putall their temporary landing grounds out ofaction. Our forces on the inland road weretherefore obliged to withdraw to Medjez el Bab.This town, as its name " the Ford of the Pass "shows, is of great strategic importance. It lies

866 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

on the ibroad MedjerdaDriver which breaks outof the mountains at this point to flow intothe plain of Tunis through a defile commandedon the west by the Gebel Ahmera, known toour troops as "Longstop", and on the eastby the Gelbel Bou Aoukaz. The bridge whichhas replaced the ford carries the mam roadfrom Tunis to the west. On 22nd Dece Tiber,as the first stage of a renewed assault on Tunis,a successful attack was made on Gebel Ahmera.At this point the rain, which had alreadycaused severe difficulties of movement, becametorrential for a period of three days. Theoffensive had to be abandoned and on 25thDecember the enemy recaptured GebelAhmera.

This ended the attempt to take Tunis in arush and it was clear that we should have tobuild up forces for a deliberate operatic a. Itwas also clear that the enemy would be able tobuild up faster than we could, for his liaes ofcommunication through Italy and Sicily weremuch more reliable and shorter than ours fromthe United Kingdom and United States andfrom his ports of entry to the front they werevery short and over good roads in flat country.*It was necessary, therefore, to go on to thedefensive in the northern sector though GeneralEisenhower considered the possibilities ofmounting an offensive by United States troopsagainst the southern Tunisian port of Sfax inorder to cut the lines of supply to Rommel'sPanzer Army. This plan was abandoned inJanuary. The next two months were thereforeoccupied in consolidating the northern sectoras far as possible with the limited means avail-able and in beating off enemy attempts to getround our southern flank.

The latter raised difficult problems of com-mand. The area from Pont du Fahs soulhwardalong the mountain range of the Easter a Dor-sale was held by the French troops oi XIXCorps, with some British and United Statesdetachments. Further south the United StatesII Corps was assembling around Tebessa, withdetachments forward co-operating with theFrench. As a result of General Giraud'srefusal to place French troops underthe orders of a British commander, XIXCorps had to come under a ratherindirect command from Allied Force Head-quarters and for this reason II Corps alsoremained under General Eisenhower. Theweakness of this arrangement was show a whena German attack on the French in the Ousseltiavalley, at the northern hinge of the two Dor-sale ranges, made dangerous progress and hadto be halted by the hasty diversion of Britishand American troops from First Army and IICorps. As a result General Anderson wasappointed by General Eisenhower on 2istJanuary to " co-ordinate " the whole front andon 24th January both XIX and II Corps wereplaced directly under his command. At thesame time General Kuter, of the United StatesArmy Air Corps, was appointed to co-ordinateall Allied air support under command ofGeneral Spaatz then Deputy Comma nder-in-Chief Allied Airi Forces.

Such, in brief, were the antecedents, of thesituation that I found on arriving to assume

* Build-up m First Army was as follows. 78Division completed ist December, 6 Armoured Divi-sion 15th December, 46 Division first week inFebruary, 1943, i Division 22nd March, 4 Divisionend of second week in April.

command in Tunisia. At the actual moment ofmy arrival I was met by a serious crisis on mysouthern flank where a battle had been ragingsince I4th February. I was therefore flungstraight into a position where I had to give mymam attention to the needs of the tacticalsituation; but I had already given muchthought to the strategy which it would benecessary to pursue and was confident that,when the immediate dangers had been averted,and after a necessary period of complete re-organization, I should be able to work out thestrategic answer to the problem of Tunisia onthe lines made necessary by the nature of thecountry and the strength and dispositions of theopposing forces.

Tunisia is bounded politically on the westby a frontier running almost due north andsouth and therefore parallel to the sea whichbounds it on the east. The most importantpart of this long north-south oblong is thecoastal plain, known as the Sahel, which is.generally flat and covered with olive groves.In the north, however, the Algerian mountainssend down long spurs which run east and westtowards the sea at Bizerta. West of Tunis theyleave a space for the fertile plain of theMedjerda, after it has burst through the gap atMedjez el Bab, but south of Medjez there is atangle of mountains to the west of the Goubellatplain which culminate in the three massifs ofGebel Mansour, Fkinne and Zaghouan. Theseare a nodal point of a new system of relief;from Gebel Zaghouan a series of mountains ex-tends to the Gulf of Tunis in the north and to-the sea in the east, reaching, after a gap in theGrombalian plain, up to the peninsula of CapeBon; from Gebel Fkirine spring two long ridgestrending south and south-west and known asthe Eastern and Western Dorsales

The Eastern Dorsale is a long, narrow ridge,rising to between two and three thousand feet,which extends almost due south as far as Mak-nassy, where it meets an east—west chainstretching from Gafsa. It is pierced by passesat Pichon, Fondouk, Faid and Maknassy, it isonly at these four points, therefore, that anarmy advancing from the west can break intothe plain of central and southern Tunisia.Round its southern end it is turned by a roadfrom Gafsa to Gabes but this too runs througha difficult and very long mountain defile.Further to the south lies the region of the'' Chotts ''; these are very extensive saltmarshes which narrow the coastal plain to a gapof only fifteen,.piles. The town of Gabes lieson the coast at the southern end of this gap.South of the Gabes gap the flat country is splitby^ the north-west to south-east line of the Mat-mata mountains. To the east is cultivatedcountry, traversed by the main road toMedenine and, eventually Tripoli; to the westis desert, almost entirely waterless and unin-habited. West of the Eastern Dorsale there is-another range interposed across the course ofan advance from the west This at its northernend is known as the Western Dorsale, whichruns south-west from Gebel Fkirine, and fadesout eventually north-west of Gafsa. The rangeis pierced by passes at Maktar, Sbiba,Kasserine and Feriana; it is not so serious anobstacle as Ihe Eastern Dorsale In the souththe divergence of the two Dorsale ranges leavesa wide plain, in parts semi-desert.

The coastal plain is well roaded and, ingeneral, north—south movement is easy. East—

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 867

west movement is canalized by the mountains.Jn the north two roads, from Gebel Abmdand Beja, meet at Mateur and run throughFerryville to Bizerta. In the Medjerda valleythe main road leads to Tunis from Medjez elBab and a secondary road parallels it to thesouth, starting from Goubellat The next east—west road, leaving the Medjez road at Le Kef,crosses the Western Dorsale beyond Maktarand the Eastern Dorsale at Pichon, with aby-pass through Fondouk, seventy miles southof Goubellat. Another road from Le Kef runsthrough Sbiba, Sbeitla and Faid; south of thatthe roads which cross the Western Dorsaleat Kasserme or Feriana have to make a detourthrough Gafsa, from where a good road runsdirect to Gabes and a poor road crosses theEastern Dorsale at the Maknassy defile. Theseeight roads offer the only practicable routes forcrossing a mountain-defended front of sometwo hundred and twenty miles; they can all beeasily blocked with relatively small forces. Onefurther road leads into Tunisia, the road fromTripoli, and to block this the French had con-structed a massive system of permanentdefences, the Mareth line.

On I4th February Allied dispositions wereas follows. 5 Corps commanded the sectornorth of a line from L<e Kef to south of BouArada with under command from north* tosouth 46 and 78 Infantry and 6 Armoured

, Divisions. One American Regimental CombatTeam of i Infantry Division was under com-mand of 78 Division, south of Medjez. Theline in this sector ran from the coast due northof Jefna south through Sidi Nsir station, thensouth-east to cover Medjez and then due souththrough Goubellat and Bou Arada. In thenext sector to the south the French XIX Corpsheld the Eastern Dorsale as far south as Pichon.The northern part of this front was held bythe Algerian Division with i Guards and 36Infantry Brigades under command. Thesouthern part of the Corps sector was entrustedto i United States Infantry Division, less oneRegimental Combat Team, and an ArmouredCombat Command of i Armoured Division.A British Army Group, Royal Artillery, sup-ported XIX Corps throughout the campaign.From south of a line from Thala to Pichonthe United States II Corps commanded thearea of the plain between the two Dorsaleranges, supported by the French ConstantineDivision and part of a British ArmouredCar Regiment. The American forces•consisted of i Armoured Division,less one Combat Command but plus oneRegimental Combat Team from i InfantryDivision, and a Ranger Battalion. II Corpsheld in general the line of the Eastern Dorsalewith the important exception of the Faid pass.On 3oth January the Germans had attackedthis pass with a force which included over sixtytanks and overwhelmed the small Frenchgarrison before the American armour couldcome to its assistance. They then dug in firmlyand resisted all attempts to dislodge them; anaction on 2nd February was costly in Americantanks and II Corps decided to pull back toSidi Bou Zid and observe the Faid area> fromthere. The Germans thus had a gatewaythrougji which, if they chose, they coulddebouch in considerable strength to attack ourtenuously held southern flank. "

In the extreme south 30 Corps, after thecapture of Tripoli, had followed up the retreat-

ing enemy only with light forces. 7 ArmouredDivision (now 23 Armoured and 131 LorriedInfantry Brigades) maintained pressure alongthe coast road but were hampered by minesand demolitions. To hasten the enemy's with-drawal 30 Corps used 4 Light ArmouredBrigade in a series of outflanking movementssouth of the main road. By the end of themonth the enemy had retired to the edge of themarshes which stretch along the Tunisian fron-tier from the coast southwards for about fortymiles. 4 Light Armoured Brigade patrolspressed on into southern Tunisia but enemyresistance lingered on in the marshes, blockingany further advance down the road. GeneralMontgomery therefore decided to throw moreweight into the outflanking movement, using8 Armoured Brigade, which had been restingnear Tripoli and now relieved 23 ArmouredBrigade. Moving round by way of El Assa8 Armoured Brigade secured a bridgeheadacross the marshes and took up positions astridethe track leading to Ben Gardane. The enemyreacted hastily to this move and brought 15Panzer Division forward from Ben Gardaneto support the strongpoint which he had pre-pared at Taguelmit. At this point, however,heavy rain began to fall again and it wasnecessary to build a causeway over the marshesbefore our advance could proceed. As thecauseway was nearing completion the enemywithdrew and on i5th February 30 Corpsentered Ben Gardane, the first important townin Tunisia, without meeting opposition.

Enemy dispositions, like ours, reflected theeffects of circumstances rather than design.At about the same time as the Allies, and forthe same reasons, the Axis also created anArmy Group Headquarters to control all forcesin Tunisia; it was named " Army GroupAfrica '' and was commanded by Field-MarshalRommel. Under it were two Army Head-quarters, representing the forces which hadhurried into the country to oppose First Armyand those which had been driven out of Libyaby the advance of Eighth Army. Theformer were known as 5 Panzer Army, com-manded by General von Armm, and thelatter, having dropped the title of " German-Italian Panzer Army " when Rommel left withmost of his German staff to form the new ArmyGroup Headquarters, were now organized asi (Italian) Army, i Army was commanded byGeneral Messe "(.subsequently promoted toMarshal on the day of his capitulation), one ofthe younger generation of Italian commanderswho had acquired a good reputation in com-mand of an Italian Corps in Russia. It wasorganized into the same three Corps, GermanAfrica Corps, Italian XX and XXI Corps.5 Panzer Army had no Corps Headquartersunder command except the Italian XXXCorps which had been set up at Sfax in theearly days of the campaign but never playedany significant part. The Corps organizationis of very little importance to an understandingof the course of operations and even the Armyorganization was liable to sudden modificationsin the interests of creating an Army Groupreserve; it will be more useful, therefore, tosketch out the divisional dispositions on theground as they were on I4th February.

In the north the sector from the coast toinclusive Mateur was held by the Broich Divi-sion. This was a scratch formation called afterthe commander (and later, when the com-

868 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

mander changed, called ,the Manteuffel Division)which consisted largely of the assorted unitswhich had been the first to arrive in November.Taken by surprise by our North African land-ings the German High Command naturallyturned first to airborne troops and two regi-ments and an engineer battalion were hastilyflown in,* including the Koch Storm Regi-ment and the Barenthin Regiment, formed fromtwo airborne training establishments. Thesetwo regiments, together with various indepen-dent battalions -and spare tank and artilleryunits, made up Broich's command. To hissouth, covering the Medjerda valley, was 334Infantry Division, a newly raised formationwhich arrived in the second half of Decemberand first half of January. On its left, cover-ing the Goubellat plain, was 10 Panzer Divi-sion, a regular armoured division which hadfought in the French campaign; it had arrivedby the middle of December. The greater partof the Eastern Dorsale was the responsibilityof the Italians, under the command of iSuperga Division. This was reinforced withtwo battalions of Italian marines anct'the Ger-man 47 Grenadier Regiment from Crete. Alsoin this general area was a German heavy tankbattalion, the soist, equipped with the newMark Vil " Tiger " tank, and the advanceelements of the Hermann Goering PanzerDivision.

In the centre, behind Faid, the enemy hadaccumulated an Army Group Reserve whichwas intended to strike out at our southern flank.The main strength of this wa's provided by 21Panzer Division, which had been withdrawnfrom Tripolitania in January ahead of the with-drawal of the other forces there and reinforcedin tanks by the absorption of an independenttank battalion which had arrived earlier inTunisia; also included were lhalf 10 Panzer Divi-sion and a detachment of 501 Tank Battalion.Operating on the southern axis from Gabes toGafsa was the Italian 131 Centauro ArmouredDivision and a detachment of infantry andarmour from the German Africa Corps, mainlyfrom 15 Panzer Division. Facing Eighth Armywere XX and XXI 'Corps with four Italian in--fantry divisions, Spezia, Young Fascists, Triesteand Pistoia, plus the German 90 and 164 LightDivisions, and the remainder of the GermanAfrica Corps. The Saharan Group, the remainsof the Italian Saharan command, was operat-ing in the desert west of the Matmata moun-tains, reinforced toy a German reconnaissanceunit. Field-Marshal Rommel's intention, hav-ing abandoned Tripolitania and fallen back tothe Mareth line, was to deal a swift blow atthe Americans in the plain west of Faid in orderto make sure that they would not be able tocome in on his rear when he was heavilyengaged with Eighth Army. He knew he wouldhave time for this, because there must neces-sarily be a considerable interval before GeneralMontgomery would be able to bring reallystrong forces into southern Tunisia and beginthe assault of the Mareth line. His long terrapolicy was defensive: to retain a bridgehead inAfrica, and there is considerable evidence toshow that the German High Command expectedto be abler| to retain at least part of Tunisiafor a long time to come.

* But, contrary to general popular belief at thetime and later, the Germans did not bring in tanksby air

The Axis forces in Tunisia amounted to theequivalent of fourteen divisions, of which abouthalf were Italian, including one Italian andthree German armoured divisions. The Alliedforces at that date in contact with the enemyamounted to nine divisions, including two-French divisions with obsolete and inadequateequipment; two more divisions in Tripoli wouldsoon become available. I expected to be ableto build up to a strength of about twenty divi-sions by May, if all went well, but at themoment Rommel was being reinforced fasterthan I was and his normal intake was albouta thousand men per day. The reason for thiswas that he had a short and easy route of entryfrom Sicily and I determined that my maineffort must be directed to cutting this line ofcommunications. In order to do this it wouldbe necessary to gain air superiority over theSicilian narrows, and for this we should needthe airfields in the Tunisian plain, especiallythose at and around Kairouan. The imme-diate problem was therefore to get EighthArmy through the Gabes gap into the flat coun-try where their armoured superiority wouldhave full play and could be expected to carrythem in one sweep to the 'beginning of themountainous area at Enfidaville. With theenemy once back in a comparatively small peri-meter round Tunis and Bizerta we should beable to establish a tight blockade by sea andair. This would mean that I had the enemyheld in a complete strangle-hold and, with fullcommand of the initiative, could deliver thecoup de grace at the time and place of my ownchoosing.

The Battle of Kasserine.On the morning of I4th February a strong-

German force, estimated to contain about ahundred tanks, emerged from the Faid passand attacked the positions held 'by I UnitedStates Armoured Division at Sidi Bou Zid. TheAmerican division was rather dispersed at thetime the attack was made, with detachmentsat Sidi Bou Zid, on the Gebel Lessouda, anisolated mountain north of the village, atSbeitla and south of Hadjeb el Aioun on theSbeitla-Picihon road. The German armour washandled with great dash and supported by astrong force of dive-bombers. Our forwardbattery positions were overrun and while atank battle raged in front of Sidi Bou Zid an-other enemy force had by 1130 hours cut offthe infantry holding positions on the GebelLessouda. Our tank losses were heavy and thebattle became fluid and difficult to control. Byevening i Armoured Division had concentratedbetween Sidi Bou Zid and Sbeitla, and nextday, the I5th, attempted a counter-attack.This was unsuccessful and the armour drewoff towards Sbeitla, leaving the infantry onGebeJ Lessouda still isolated; some were ableto withdraw but many were taken prisoner.It was now clear that our armour had been toodepleted to hold the plain and a withdrawal wasordered back to the Western Dorsale. To con-form, the Ranger battalion and the DerbyshireYeomanry detachment had been already with-drawn from Gafsa which was entered by theenemy on the afternoon of the I5th ar^i theFrench withdrew in their sector-from the Easternto -the Western Dorsale. This movement wascarried out in good order and the enemy fol-lowed up only slowly. General Anderson

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 869

began to prepare a reserve to restore the situa-tion. 26 Armoured Brigade had moved backto Siliana in order to hand in their " Crusader "tanks in exchange for the " Shermans " withwhich they were to be re-equipped; insteadthey were moved hastily southwards to Maktar,still with their " Crusaders," and two squad-rons of " Shermans" from the replacementpool, with scratch British crews, were orderedsouth to join I Armoured Division, i GuardsBrigade and 39 United States Regimental Com-bat Team (the advanced unit of 9 Division)were ordered to Sbiba, north of Sbeitla.

American losses now amounted to abouteighty-six medium tanks and thirty field gunsand i Armoured Division was therefore veryconsiderably weakened. At midnight oni6th/i7th February the enemy once moreattacked at Sbeitla, in bright moonlight, andafter fighting all that night and next morningbroke into the town. i Armoured Division,withdrew westwards and went into reservesouth-east of Tebessa to re-form. The enemyfollowed up and occupied Kasserine; Ferianahad already been occupied by the force operat-ing from the south which had been joined bythe detachment from the German Africa Corps.II Corps had by this been forced back off theplain into the hills; the loss of the airfield atThelepte, near Feriana, was a heavy .blowbut all aircraft and stores there were eitherevacuated or destroyed. Rommel had now hiswhole force concentrated and halted his troopsduring the i8th to allow for the necessary re-grouping and replenishing. He had driven abig salient into our lines and had the choiceof three roads on which to exploit to turnour flank still further: through Sbeitla andSbiba or through Kasserine and Thala, bothconverging on Le Kef, and through Feriana onTebessa. His forces, though they had sufferedloss, were relatively intact; the Allied disposi-tions for defence had been hastily taken upand suffered from the inevitable interminglingof units of three different nationalities.

This was "the situation with which I waspresented when I landed at Algiers from Tripolion I5th February. After discussions withGeneral Eisenhower I flew on to Telergma,south-west of Constantine. From here I wentstraight to General Anderson's headquartersand set out on a tour of inspection of the front.On the i6th I visited 5 Corps, on the northernfront and on the I7th XIX Corps. I thenwent on to II Corps sector where I spent thei8th and igth. I found the position even morecritical than I had expected and a visit to theKasserine area showed that in the inevitableconfusion of the retreat American, French andBritish troops had been inextricably mingled,there was no co-ordinated plan of defence anddefinite uncertainty as to command. At thefirst pass I visited, the Dernaia pass, I had tonominate on the spot the senior American officeras the responsible commander of the sectorand ordered him to hold his ground to the last.In view of the situation I decided to assumecommand at once, without waiting for the 2oth,the official date,* and after completing thistotir of the front returned for that night toConstantine, where my headquarters had beentemporarily set up. It.was clear, to me thatalthough Rommel's original intention had been

* Eighth Army came under command EighteenthArmy Group from oooi hours, 2Oth February.

merely to give such a blow to II Corps aswould leave his right* rear secure while he pre-pared to meet Eighth Army, he now had muchbigger ideas. From previous experience I knewhim to be a man who would always exploitsuccess by every possible means to the limit ofrashness, and there now glittered before himthe prospect of a great tactical victory. If hecould break through our weak screening posi-tions on the Western Dorsale, at Kasserine orSbiba, he would find few natural obstaclesto an advance northwards; such an advancewould at once take in rear XIX Corps, whoseFrench troops were already shaken by theirlosses in January and their sudden withdrawalfrom the Eastern Dorsale, and if it could besuccessfully pushed to Le Kef he would be inbehind 5 Corps as well. This would disrupt thewhole front in Tunisia and bring on a with-drawal if not a disaster. In face of this threatI issued orders that there would be no furtherwithdrawal and that the front would bestabilized on the present positions.

On igth February the enemy carried outexploratory attacks against all three roads Ihave mentioned, attempting to find out whichwould prove the easiest for an attack. Hismain weight was on the right, against Sbiba;the attack on the pass above Kasserine wasmade by about a battalion of infantry andthe force probing the Dernaia pass aboveFeriana, on the Tebessa road, was only of thenature of a small reconnaissance. South ofSbiba i Guards Brigade held firm and repulsedthe enemy but the attack in the Kasserine passwas more successful and the enemy began toinfiltrate through the American positions.Accordingly on the next day, the 20th, thisthrust was strongly reinforced and the othertwo abandoned; the pa§s was cleared and 21Panzer Division, with the infantry and someof the armour of the detachment from theGerman Africa Corps, pressed on into the basinbeyond. Here Rommel found himself facedwith two alternatives,, for the road, after tra-versing the pass, diverges to west and north.The former direction would take him toTebessa, our main southern base and airfieldcentre, but the road passes through difficultcountry; the other route runs mainly on theflat and leads via Thala to Le Kef. Accord-ingly on 2ist February he passed 10 PanzerDivision battle group* through 21 PanzerDivision in a northward thrust, leaving thescreening left flank to the German Africa Corpsdetachment.

The 2ist was the critical day. Feeling fairlyconfident that, after piercing the Kasserine pass,Rommel would thrust up the northern road Ihad already ordered General Anderson to con-centrate his armour for the defence of Thala.Accordingly on the 20th he brought across tothat area a composite force based on 26Armoured Brigade Group, reinforced by the2/5 Leicesters, and on the 2ist they were joinedby 2 Hampshires and two field artillerybattalions of 9 United States Division, whichwas being brought up by forced marches to thescene of action. The fighting south of Thalawas extremely fierce in relatively open countryand the fortunes of war changeable. At onemoment a few enemy tanks succeeded in forc-ing their way over the low pass south of thevillage but they were shot to pieces by our

* About half the divisional infantry and artilleryand a battalion of tanks.

870 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

field guns at close range. The situation wasexceedingly grave and was only stabilized afterperiods of extreme danger by the energy andinitiative of the handful of gallant troops onthe spot. Subsidiary thrusts were also tried, tosee whether our concentrations at Thala hadweakened us elsewhere At Sbiba the attackwas halted by the opportune arrival of asquadron of " Churchills " from 25 TankBrigade and on the Kasserine-Tebessa roadi United States Armoured Division managedto hold, at Gebel Hamra, the first of themountain passes, the attack of the PanzerGrenadier Regiment Africa. By midday on the22nd Rommel appreciated that his casualtieswere increasing at a disproportionate rate andthat the opportunity for further exploitation hadpassed; he therefore ordered the attack to bebroken off. His withdrawal was, as always,well conducted with a most liberal use of minesand explosive devices to discourage pursuit.He was able to extricate all his tanks with theexception of nine, which were too heavilydamaged and had to be abandoned. SomeItalian Bersaglieri from the Centauroaj»Divisionwere employed in an infantry attack to coverthe withdrawal of the Germans and sufferedfairly heavy losses. Otherwise there was littleopposition from enemy troops and by the even-ing of 25th February the Kasserine pass wasagain ^ in our hands. By the 28th we hadreocciipied Sbeitla, Kasserine and Feriana andthe enemy had withdrawn his main force tothe Eastern Dorsale. He still retained Gafsa,but it was lightly garrisoned by the CentauroDivision and a German battle group.

At ,the crisis of the Kasserine battle, on 2istFebruary, I ordered General Montgomery tocreate as powerful a threat as possible on theenemy's southern flank. He was not as yetwell placed to do this since his administrativeposition was not yet firm; on the other handthere was no immediate risk in advancing aheadof his main strength since the enemy mainforces were fully engaged elsewhere. Medenine,the road junction in front of the Mareth line,had .been occupied by us on the i8th and bythe next day headquarters and one Brigade of51 Division were at Ben Gardane, with the othertwo brigades moving forward from Tripoli. Bythe 24th Eighth Army had two armoured carregiments in contact with the outposts of theMareth line and General Leclerc's force, nowknown as " L " force, had occupied KsarRhilane, a desert outpost thirty miles west ofthe Matmata mountains; 51 Division continuedto move up and all three brigades were forwardof Medenine, but not in contact with the enemy,by the 25th. In the meanwhile I had informedGeneral Montgomery on 23rd February that thesituation at Kasserine was now improved andordered him, while keeping up a display offorce, not to prejudice the future by unduerisks. He replied on the 27th that he had beencareful to keep well 'balanced and consideredhis present position adequately strong.

The Battle of Kasserine had given me manyanxious moments. As in his advance to ElAlamein, Rommel had over-exploited a con-siderable 'initial success to leave himself in aworse position than before; he can hardly beblamed for his attempts to snatch a great vic-tory, for on both occasions he came very nearto it, but the 'result was equally; disastrous forhim. The United States II Corps had been

unfortunate in that their first major battle hadbeen against such experienced troops and sodashing an enemy commander but, as GeneralEisenhower reported on 26th February, theywere resolved to benefit immediately from thebattle experience gained by the intensive train-ing of all formations. Their improvement wasindeed continuous and outstanding throughoutthe campaign. Another result of the battle hadbeen that Allied formations of all three nation-alities were very mixed up over the wholefront and my first intention was to carry out athorough reorganization. On the day I assumedcommand, in an order issued on igth February,I laid down the following principles. SeparateBritish, American and French sectors were tobe organized forthwith under their respectivecommanders. The " bits and pieces " were tobe collected, and' reorganized into their properformations. The front was to be held by statictroops, and armoured and mobile forces with-drawn and grouped to form a reserve strikingforce; all troops were to be extensively trainedand re-equipped where necessary. Finally,immediate plans were to be prepared to regainthe initiative, starting with carefully plannedminor operations to force the enemy to react,but, I added, " there must be no failures ".I organized at the same time an Anglo-American battle school, attended also whenpossible by French officers, where with theassistance of some experienced officers fromEighth Army the tactical lessons of recentbattles were studied.

My strategic intentions I explained in a signalon the 2ist The object of the whole operationwas to destroy the entire enemy force in Tunisiaand the key to this was the capture of .Tunis.The campaign would be divided into twophases. In the first the main object would beto get Eighth Army north of the Gabes gap,where it would gain contact with First Armyand gam freedom of manoeuvre to develop itssuperiority in mobility and striking power. Inthis phase the role of the First Army would beto assist Eighth Army in getting through thegap—as soon, that is to say, as the Kasserinesituation had been stabilized and First Armyhad regained the initiative. The method wouldbe to stage carefully prepared, timed and con-trolled operations aimed at securing dominatinglocalities from which further advances couldbe made, this would force the enemy to reactand draw off reserves which could be usedagainst Eighth Army. These restricted opera-tions, as I have already noted, would have theadditional effect of assisting the training of theless experienced troops in First Army and ofincrea'smg self-confidence and raising morale.In the second phase of operations the effortsof both Armies would be directed towardssecuring airfields which would enable us todevelop the ever-growing strength of our Anglo-American air forces. When we had achievedthat we should be able to co-ordinate to thefall the striking power of all three services indrawing a tight net round the enemy's positionin Tunisia.

i

One *of the main difficulties of the problemwas that 'I was working within severe limita-tions of time. The Casablanca conference haddecided that after Tunisia had been cleared theoperation to open the Mediterranean to ourshipping should be completed by the invasionand conquest of Sicily. In making plans for

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 871

this operation it was appreciated that the cam-paign m Africa must end by the middle ofMay in order to give us a chance to bringthe Tunisian ports into full use. Otherwisethe invasion would have to be postponed untilAugust when the deterioration of weather con-ditions might make the operation impossible.This was a difficult time-table to observe andit was with great satisfaction that I found inthe event that I had Bizerta and Tunis eightdays before the allotted date and that all resist-ance ceased in Africa with two days yet tospare.

Fifth Army Offensive in the North.Before these plans could be put into effect

or any thorough reorganization undertaken Ifound myself faced once more by a new enemyinitiative. As the rearguards of Rommel'sstriking force were trailing back to the EasternDorsale von Arnim attacked with the fullstrength of 5 Army all along the British 5Corps front, from the sea to Gebel Mansour.The four principal thrusts were made towardsJefna, on the northernmost road, Sidi Nsir onthe Mateur-Beja road, at Medjez and north ofBou Arada. No doubt the intention was tokeep us at full strain at a time when it wasknown that the Kassenne crisis had forced usto weaken the northern sector and produceda certain disorganization of our forces; itwould also distract us from the pursuit ofRommel, who now proposed to use his ArmyGroup reserve in a blow at Eighth Army. Itmust, however, have also been the German in-tention to drive us back into the mountains inthe north, if possible capturing Med]ez, in orderto increase their security in this sector and re-lease reserves, especially of armour, for thecoming battle in the more open country ofsouthern Tunisia. The attack came at an awk-ward time for us, for it prevented us fromforming that mobile reserve which I had inmind and forced us to delay still further thenecessary reorganisation; for instance GeneralAnderson saw himself obliged to create anad hoc divisional organization, given the nameof " y " Division, to control 38 Infantry Bri-gade and i Parachute Brigade in the area ofGoubellat and Bou Arada. The fighting washard, and the enemy gained some importantground but were unable to attain any vitalobjectives. The most important feature in ourfavour was that we retained our essential gate-way at Medjez el Bab.

The main- -blows on 26th February were downthe Beja road from Mateur and south of Medjez,the former was made by the Barenthin para-chutists and part, of 334 Divisfon and the latterby the recently arrived Hermann GoeringRegiment, both supported by tanks. An attackon Medjez itself, south of the river, was re-pulsed with heavy losses after small initialsuccess. The attack further south penetrateddeeply into our lines but was beaten backnorth of El Aroussa while our defences roundBou Arada, some ten miles to the west, heldfirm in spite of being threatened from ^ threesides. The attack down the Beja road' wasmore formidable; our outpost at Sidi Nsir wasoverwhelmed after a very gallant resistancebut the time gained allowed' 46 Division tooccupy the pass leading to Beja Very heavyfighting continued here for a week; losses in46 Division were heavy but the defence heldfirm. The enemy were able, however, to ad-vance 4heir positions in the mountains over-

C

looking the Beja-Medjez road from the north,and Medjez now represented the extreme pointof a dangerous-looking salient. There was somefeeling at First Army Headquarters that itwould be advisable to evacuate Medjez, onthe grounds that its fall was almost inevitableand that a withdrawal into the mountains tothe west would place us in a stronger defen-sive position and enable us to economize introops. I was determined, however, to retainour gateway into the Tunis plain and orderedthe town to be held at all costs.

While these attacks on Beja and Medjezwere proceeding with varying success theenemy was finding better fortune m his thruston the northernmost road. The first attackson our positions west of Jefna, mainly byItalian troops, were held; but on 2nd March theoffensive was renewed m this sector with fiveGerman battalions, four of them parachutists,and succeeded in gaining several miles. Onthe 3rd the enemy captured Sedjenane, sometwelve miles west of Jefna. 46 Division wasobliged to withdraw to a fresh position at GebelTamera, abdut eight miles further west. Theenemy's advance on the northernmost road,which had hitherto been of little importancefrom the point of view of ground lost by us,was now becoming more serious as it threatenedGebel Abiod and the vital lateral road fromthere to Beja. 46 Division had been weakenedby continuous losses in men and General Ander-son therefore reinforced it with i ParachuteBrigade and the Corps Franc d'Afrique, aFrench volunteer unit. In spite of this rein-forcement the enemy continued to advance.After a succession of heavy attacks supportedby dive-bombers Tamera was captured on theI7th and by the 2ist we had been forced backto Gebel Abiod. This was bitter mountainfighting in miserable weather; the country eitherside of the road is high and covered with scrub,making the deployment of artillery, our mainstrength, most difficult.

The Battle of Medemne.(While the enemy were .thus vigorously and

persistently attacking in the north, EighthArmy continued to build up gradually in frontof the Mareth line. This famous fortified posi-tion was inspired 'by the same military con-ceptions as produced .the Maginot line inFrance, though the Tunisian line was later indate and incorporated ideas derived from theearlier and larger fortification. It ran for atotal length of about twenty-two miles on acourse roughly north-east to south-west just infront of the small town of Mareth from whichit took its name; one flank rested on the sea,the other on the steep-sided Matmata moun-tains. At the north-east end the Wadi Zigzaouruns in front of the line and, artificiallyscarped, made a first class anti-tank obstacle.The defences themselves consisted of a systemof interconnected strong-points, partly under-ground, reinforced with concrete.* The fireplan was well conceived to cover all parts ofthe front with enfilade fire of all calibres andthe minefields and wire obstacles were thickand well sited. The mountains shielding the

* From the point of view of the Axis, however,there was one disadvantage; the bunkers had beenplanned for the French 25 and 47 millimetre anti-tank guns and were too small to house, the German50 and 75'millimetre pieces which had therefore tobe emplaced an the open.

872 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

western flank are almost impassable for wheeledtraffic and the one poor road which crossesthem was blocked at the pass of Ksar elHallouf. The desert west of the mountainswas considered by the French as completelyimpassable for any significant force; the goingis most difficult and there is very little water.This appreciation had been apparently con-firmed by manoeuvres held before the war.The French therefore calculated that any forcewhich wished to invade Tunisia from Tripoli-tania would have .to assemble in the areabetween Medenine and the line* and launcha frontal attack. When this had been re-pulsed, as was confidently expected, or whileit was still in progress, the defenders woulddeliver a counter-attack from the area of 1heKsar el Hallouf pass on to the left flank andrear of the attackers.

As I have already explained it would besome time before General Montgomery couldassemble sufficient troops for an attack on dieMareth line and he was determined not toattack before he was ready. In the meanwhileField-Marshal Rommel still had his ArmyGroup reserve under his hand, amounting toabout two armoured divisions. They wouldalso need a certain amount of time to recuper-ate from their losses in the Kasserine battlebut after that they could obviously be bestused in a spoiling attack against Eighth Army.The blow at II Corps had won the enemy abreathing space on that side and he couldclearly appreciate that he would be ready totake the offensive again before Eighth Armywas. I signalled to General Montgomery on26th February to say that I thought Rommelwould certainly try to attack him as soon ashe could, following the original French plan;he replied in a letter on the 27th that it wouldbe a very good thing if Rommel did attackand he only feared that he would not. Inany case Eighth Army was well poised andready for anything; on 26th February two divi-sions were forward in position, the 5ist to thenorth of the road with all three brigades upand 7 Armoured Division astride and to Ihesouth of the road. The front was covered withan armoured car screen and the area roundMedenine, juncture of the Mareth and Ksarel Hallouf roads, was being organised as adefensive position.

On 26th February it became apparent thatthe detachment of 15 Panzer Divisionwhich had taken part in the Kasserine battlewas rejoining its parent formation, and on the28th 21 Panzer Division, and that part of 10Panzer Division which was co-operating with it,also began to move south. I considered, there-fore, that my appreciation was confirmed andso informed Eighth Army. Shortly afterwaidsthe enemy began to thin out in Gafsa thoughhe clearly intended .to continue to block theGafsa-Gabes road at El Guettar, a defile whichoffered a very strong position to the defenders.On 2nd March our aircraft on tactical recon-naissance saw large bodies of enemy trans-port moving south from Gabes to .Matmata,at the northern end of the mountains and,although the enemy simultaneously showed usa concentration on the Mareth-Medenine road,with deceptive intent, it was clear that Rommelwas going to follow the French plan and attack

* Where, incidentally, the water, though plentiful,is so full of magnesium salts as to threaten to de-bilitate any troops who had to drink it for long

out of the mountains on to our left. On thesame day the New Zealand Division, which hadsecretly and swiftly been brought forward fromTripoli, concentrated in the area south ofMedenine. On the 3rd a local attack by Italiantroops on the Mareth front, which cost themsevere casualties, was also probably designedto distract our attention from the west butthe signs there were too strong: all that dayand the next heavy movement continued inthe mountains, at Toujane, Cheguimi and Ksarel Hallouf. The enemy rested all day of 5thMarch and on the 6th poured down from themountains to the attack. As the PanzerGrenadiers moved off on the evening of the5th down the steep, winding road from Ksarel Hallouf they defiled past the Army GroupCommander, standing in his open car at thetop of the pass. According to an eye witnesson the spot Rommel was obviously a sick man,with a dirty bandage round his neck where hewas suffering from desert sores; to a partywho stopped near him he said that unless theywon this battle the last hope in Africa wasgone.

Eighth Army -was disposed with three divi-sions forward. On the right 51 Division, with23 Armoured Brigade under command, coveredthe area north of the road, opposite the WadiZigzaou. To the south was 7 Armoured Divi-sion, reinforced by 8 Armoured Brigade and iFighting French Flying Column. The position"round Medenine was held by the New Zealand •Division with 201 Guards Brigade and 4 LightArmoured Brigade under command. The keyposition here was the Gebel Tadjera, a .hillwhich rises abruptly from the plain north-westof the town; this was defended by the GuardsBrigade. The enemy's intention was clearlythe capture of Medenine, which would cut ourcommunications with Tripoli and encircle thegreater part of our forces to the north. Therehad been no time to lay minefields or erectwire and our defences were based'on anti-tankguns well dug in to give a short field of firein enfilade. The enemy attacking forces were21 and 10 Panzer Divisions from the west, witha detachment from 15 Panzer Division andsome additional infantry; the remainder of 15Panzer Division and 90 Light Division wereto hold us by a frontal exploratory attack whichcould be converted into a genuine offensiveif all went well.

The story of the battle can be told verybriefly. The enemy appear to have been un-aware of the strength of our positions—theyexpected to find Gebel Tad] era unoccupied—and probably afso hoped to have escaped ournotice on their long flank march. Their con-centrated attacks were beaten off by the infan-try with anti-tank guns, without the interven-tion of any of our tanks except one squadron;our casualties were light and we lost no tanksat all. The enemy made four attacks duringthe day, the first in the early morning mist,but in none of them was he able to score anysuccess. That evening he drew off with theloss of fifty^two tanks, the greatest total losshe had so far suffered in one day's battle inAfrica. It represented probably a third of thetotal tank strength engaged on the southernfront and, perhaps nearer half of the tanks en-gaged in the actual attack. In many ways thisbattle resembled the battle of Alam el Haifa,before Alamein: for the second time Rommel

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 873

had committed the error of throwing his tanksagainst well-emplaced anti-tank guns. Ourdefensive success was a good omen for theattack on the Mareth line. Medenine wasRommel's last battle in Africa. Shortly after-wards (before igth March) he handed over com-mand of the Army Group to von Arnim. Thelatter was succeeded at 5 Panzer Army Head-quarters by General von Vaerst who had com-manded, without much distinction, 15 PanzerDivision in Africa up to September, 1942.It seems certain that Rommel's return toGermany was genuinely due to sickness, butno doubt also the German High Commandwanted to run no risk of the capture of aGeneral with so great a reputation.

In spite of the failure at Medenine the enemywere unwilling to be forced back on the defen-sive and on loth March launched a sudden andviolent attack against " L " Force atKsar Rhilane. This outpost in the desert westof the Matmata mountains was assuminggreater importance for, as I shall explain,we already had plans for passing anoutflanking force through the desert.The attack was made by the reconnaissanceunits of 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions and someItalian mobile units, assisted by dive-bombers.General Leclerc's force, which included aGreek detachment, stood firm in a stylereminiscent of Koenig's defence of Bir Hacheimand, strongly supported by the WesternDesert Air Force, beat off the attack with sub-stantial losses to the enemy. I think the mainpurpose of this attack was to win some offen-sive success, even a small one, as his persistencein the north showed, the enemy still hoped tokeep us at bay as long as possible by reiteratedattacks * He showed, however, a certainapprehension about our intentions in the areabetween Gafsa and Faid, and drew off thegreater part of his southern group of armournorth of the Gabes gap to watch that flank.

On I4th March I issued a directive on policyto confirm my previous instructions on theway in which I wanted the battle in Tunisiato be fought; it was co-ordinated with a briefstatement on Air Force policy by Air MarshalConinghamf. I had taken II United StatesCorps under direct command on 8th March,leaving the French XIX Corps under FirstArmy, so that I was now dealing with threesubordinate headquarters. I proposed also toform an Army Group reserve to be commandedby Headquarters 9 Corps which had justarrived in Africa; it was intended to consistof 6 Armoured Division, one British infantrydivision and specialist troops such as para-chutists and commandos whom I was anxiousto pull out of the, line. I laid particular stress,for the benefit of First Army, on the policyof not attempting to hold a continuous lineover all the mountainous areas of the frontbut of concentrating on the defence of reallyvital positions and leaving the areas in betweento be observed by patrols. This was for thepresent defensive phase, which I hoped soonto be able to abandon, but even while on thedefensive I ordered an offensive spirit to beshown in small actions to improve our

* In a signal on 12th March, giving my apprecia-tion of the enemy situation, I concluded " ForRommel's general intentions see Revelations XII,12 ", (" The devil is come down unto you, havinggreat wrath, because he knoweth that he hath buta short time.")

f Appendix " C "D

positions. It was an advantage that we hadnow begun to sort out the troops originallyunder General Anderson into their respectivenational units and given a definite sector toeach nationality.

On 15th March I moved my headquartersto a tented site on a well wooded mountainside south of Ain Beida. This was on the mainroad from Constantine to Tebessa, well situatedbetween First and Eighth Armies and close toHeadquarters II Corps, which was nearTebessa. For the present, operations in thesouth were the most important.

The Mareth Line Battles.As a defensive position the Mareth line was

almost as strong as the enemy line at ElAlamein. The Eighth Army plan, therefore,called for a deliberate and well organized attackwith all the forces which we could maintainforward. General Montgomery sent me an ad-vanced copy of his proposed plan on 27thFebruary. For PUGILIST, as the operationwas called, Eighth Army was to be organizedfor the frontal attack in two Corps, 30 Corpswith 50, 51 and 4 Indian Divisions and 201Guards Brigade, and 10 Corps with i and 7Armoured Divisions. The plan was that 30Corps should make a very heavy attack on thenorth-eastern end of the line, near the coast, tobreak into and roll up the line from the right, 10Corps', which would be initially in* Army re-serve, would then be ready to exploit success bypassing through and advancing towards Gabesand Sfax. There was a difference, however,between the situation here and at Alamein inthat we had now proved, thanks to the LongRange Desert Group, that we could move anoutflanking force through the desert west ofthe Matmata mountains. Provision was ac-cordingly made for this in the plan; the out-flanking troops consisted mainly of the NewZealand Division but included aJso 8Armoured Brigade and General Leclerc's " L "Force and for this reason were designated NewZealand Corps. The object of this force wasdefined as to establish itself across the Gabes—Matmata road so as to cut off the enemy andprevent his escape, in order to do this it wouldhave to break through a subsidiary defensiveline, mainly consisting of minefields, which the

' enemy had constructed between the GebelTebaga and the Gebel Melab.

In the plan as fixed on 26th FebruaryGeneral Montgomery stated that D-day for theattack would be 2Oth March. This apparentlylong delay was rendered necessary by hisdesire to have all the logistical preparationsperfect. I sent my Major-General, Administra-tion, Major^General Miller, to Tripoli on6th March to investigate the adminis-trative situation and his report on hisreturn on nth March was very satis-factory. The port was discharging overthree thousand tons per day, to foe shortlyraised to four thousand tons, (on 6th Marchseven thousand tons were discharged, but thiswas exceptionally good); the ration, petrol andammunition situation was therefore good andwe could already assume as certain that theoperation could proceed-according to time-table.Eighth Army was anxious to know, however,what logistical support we could give in thecase that the enemy, after a prolongedresistance on the Mareth line, broke completelyand we should wish to pursue him for a long

874 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

distance. This would impose a heavy stration a force based on Tripoli, over two hundredmiles from Mareth and three hundred milesfrom the next port at Sfax. I had already discussed this point with General Montgomery.In view of the time available I had decidedto employ II United States Corps in a limitedoperation on the extreme right of my line inTunisia; the objects of this were to restoreconfidence after the earlier setbacks by a care-fully planned successful operation, to exertpressure on the right rear of the enemy defend-ing the Mareth positions, and to be ready toopen an alternative line of supply for EighthArmy after they had broken through the GabesGap. I planned, therefore, that II Corps, nowcommanded by General Patton, who hadrelieved General Fredendall, should attackGafsa on or about I5th March with i Armouredand i Infantry Divisions. They would securefirm possession of Gafsa and build up there adump of petrol for the use of Eighth Army,subsequently exploiting down the Gabes road-,and towards the Maknassy defile in order todraw the enemy's attention and provokecounter-attack. General Patton was to try tocapture the El Guettar defile, south-east ofGafsa, but would not operate any strong forcesbeyond that until further orders. The thrustagainst the Maknassy defile was in the initialphase to be of a secondary and subsidiarynature

The American operations against Gafsa weredelayed in starting by very heavy rain whichbogged down their tracked vehicles, tout iArmoured Division moved off at first light on thei6th. There was practically no enemy opposi-tion and next day i Infantry Division enteredthe town, which had been evacuated by theItalian garrison; a German reconnaissance unitforming the rearguard consented itself withkeeping our troops under observation. A Regi-mental Combat Team from i Infantry Divisionpushed on through the town and occupied thehigh ground six miles to the south-east, sendingpatrols towards El Guettar. These showed that,as we had expected, the enemy intended to holdthe defile there, i Armoured Division, thoughagain seriously delayed by the state of theground, moved off down the Maknassy road „and by nightfall had reached a point twenty miles;east of Gafsa against opposition from the airand artillery fire only. The weather continuedexceptionally bad on the i8th but GeneralPatton was able to establish himself in ElGuettar village and make contact with theenemy positions in the defile to the east of it.

On the Eighth Army front preliminary opera-tions to drive in the enemy's outpost positionswere carried out on the nigbts of i6th and lythMarch; they were generally successful at smallcost, except for an operation by 201 GuardsBrigade which suffered fairly heavy casualtieson the first night when it became involved inan enemy minefield. On igth March the NewZealand Corps, with twenty-seven thousandmen and two hundred tanks, started on ilsflanking move from south of Foum Tatahouineand by nightfall on 20th March was only a fewmiles short of the gap between Gebel Tebagaand Gebel Melab; General Montgomery haddecided not to attempt concealment, in the hopeof drawing enemy attention from 30 Corp;'attack. This was scheduled for the night of the20th. Enemy dispositions at that time were as

follows. The north-eastern end of the Marethline was held by XX .Corps with under com-mand the Young Fascists and Trieste Divisionsand the German go Light Division. The south-western end, where the Matmata foothills begin,was under XXI Corps with the Spezia, Pistoiaand 164 Light Divisions. 15 Panzer Divisionwas held in immediate reserve for this part ofthe front. 21 Panzer Division was also inreserve, but further back, in order to be avail-able, if necessary, for the defence of the Tebaga—Gebel Melab gap, the infantry holding thisposition was provided by the Saharan Groupunder General Mannerim, reinforced by variousunits from Italian divisions destroj^ed at ElAlamein. 10 Panzer Division, which had with-drawn to central Tunisia after the battle ofMedenine, was moving south at this time, butit was not destined for the Mareth front; insteadit went to the Gafsa—Gabes road to oppose IICorps.

The main attack by 30 Corps began at 2230hours on 20th March when 50 Division advancedto the assault under cover of very heavy artilleryfire and following an air bombardment. TheWadi Zigzaou, which ran in front of theenemy's positions in this sector, was very deepand steep-sided and the bottom was everywheremuddy and in some places had standing waterin it. It resembled, in fact, the fosse of anold-fashioned fortress and OUT troops advancedto the assault carrying fascines and scaling-ladders as though at the storm of Badajoz. Theenemy's fire, both frontal and enfilade, wasvery heavy and it was only by the greatest dashand courage that our advanced troops succeededin crossing the wadi and establishing themselveson the far bank. Three of the powerful enemystrongpoints were captured and the infantrywere firmly established. Unfortunately it wasproving impossible to reinforce them, for thewadi which they had crossed on foot was quiteimpassable for wheels and almost impassablefor tanks. A few of the supporting " Valen-tines " managed to get across but none of theanti-tank guns could 'be brought forward. Aheavy downfall of rain on the 22nd added toour difficulties. As a result, when the enemyin the afternoon of 22nd March put in a heavycounter-attack, using the whole of 15 PanzerDivision and part of 90 Light, our positionbecame untenable. 50 Division bridge-head was dangerously narrowed down and onthe night of the 23rd our troops fell back oncemore, on orders, across the Wadi Zigzaou,under cover of artillery fire.

The original plan for PUGILIST had there-fore to be abandoned but General Montgomerywas quick to take advantage "of the alternativewhich was open to him. By the evening of the22nd, when it was obvious that our right handthrust could make no further progress, GeneralFreyberg's forces were already engaged withthe enemy west of the Gebel Melab and hadbroken through one line of minefields in anattack the previous night. The enemy hadalready begun to move reinforcements to thisarea, including 164 Division from the westernend of the Mareth line, together with someItalians, and 21 Panzer Division from ArmyGroup reserve. General Montgomery there-fore decided to call off his frontal attack andreinforce his outflanking move with 10 CorpsHeadquarters and i Armoured Division. Theywere to move off after dusk on 23rd March

* SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

/ and were expected to join the New Zealanders/ on 25th March. This would give us a force of

over three hundred tanks with which to attackthe enemy's rear. At the same time 4 IndianDivision, under command of 30 Corps, was tothrust into the mountains to the west of theMareth line. j£s first task was to open the roadfrom Medenine to JBir Soltane via Ksar elHallouf, as a shorter route of supply for 10Corps; subsequently it was to advance alongthe spine of the Matmata mountains anddescend from there to out the Mareth—Gabesroad. This plan, with reminiscences of ElAlamein, was christened SUPERCHARGE.

In view of the development of Eighth Army'sbattle I ordered General Patton late on 22ndMarch to increase his pressure down the Gafsa—Gabes road with i Infantry Division anddown the Gafsa—Maknassy road with IArmoured Division. II Corps was to seize andhold the two defiles on these roads, which it wasnow facing, and operate raiding columns fromthem against the enemy's lines of communica-tion, i Armoured Division had entered Mak-nassy itself without opposition ait 0700 hourson the 22nd but failed to seize a fleeting oppor-tunity and was forestalled at the vital defilesome five miles east of the town; when itadvanced eastwards later in the day it foundthat the enemy had hastily organized a defen-sive position there from a German and anItalian reconnaissance unit. Subsequently abattalion of infantry from 10 Panzer Divisionand some Italian tanks arrived between 23rdand 24th March and with these, reinforced bytwo more infantry battalions and some Germantanks, the enemy succeeded in holding the pass.The advance down the Gafsa-Gabes road wasalso frustrated, for before it could develop theenemy launched a strong attack with the wholeof the rest of 10 Panzer Division. This counter-attack had some initial success but I InfantryDivision held firm and inflicted losses in tankson the enemy. The attacks were renewed onthe 24th and 25th, again without success. Itwas greatly to the credit of II Corps that theythus kept in play the whole of 10 Panzer Divi-sion while the decisive battle was being foughtand won by Eighth Army, and although theywere denied the pleasure of a spectacularadvance into the enemy's rear they made asolid contribution to the success of operationsin southern Tunisia.

While 10 Corps was pressing on across thedifficult desert terrain to join the NewZealanders 4 Indian Division plunged into the -mountains west of Medenine. By the 26th theyhad cleared the road through the Ksar elHallouf pass and turned -northwards to worktowards Cheguimi. In the meantime theadvance of 10 Corps was taking rather longerthan expected and Eighth Army decided topostpone the proposed attack from the 25thto the 26th. The problem was to burst througha long defile between Gebel Tebaga and GebelMelab; the defences in this six thousand yardsbottleneck had been strengthened with minesand on the 25th General Messe moved 15Panzer Division north to this area. This prac-tically stripped the Mareth line of Germantroops and he simultaneously began to thin outhis Italians leaving 90 Light Division, as usual,to conduct the rearguard. While these forceswere got away it was vital for Messe to holdthe flanks of the north—south corridor as firmly

D a

as possible and with two German armoureddivisions and one infantry division facing us,to say nothing of the Italians, it seemed wemight find the task of breaking through diffi-cult. General Montgomery therefore, in con-sultation with Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst,commanding the Western Desert Air Force,arranged for a very heavy air attack employingevery available aircraft to precede the groundattack; as a new feature control was to beexercised from aircraft flying over the battle-field.

Following a favourite enemy plan 10 Corpsattacked in the late afternoon of 26th March,with the sun behind them. For two and ahalf hours previously the Royal Air Force hadattacked the enemy's positions with bombs andmachine-gun fire, creating great destructionamong his guns and transport and having amost serious effect on morale. The NewZealand Division began the attack with 8Armoured Brigade leading and rapidly overranthe enemy's defences, i Armoured Divisionfollowed through and advanced nearly fourmiles before being halted by darkness. Whenthe moon rose they pressed on again. It wasa daring but successful move; in the brightmoonlight they drove straight past the bulk ofthe enemy's armour and at dawn were withina few miles of El Hamma which is only fifteenmiles from Gabes on a good road. A furtheradvance at first light put them within two milesof El Hamma, facing a strong enemy anti-tankgun screen. 164 Light Division was engagedhere, with 15 Panzer Division to its south.21 Panzer Division was still cut off betweeni Armoured Division and the New Zealandersand fought very fiercely to extricate itself. Theefforts of (the three German divisions weresuccessful, in spite of heavy losses, in holding onto El Hamma and keeping open the corridorthrough which the troops from the Mareth linewere withdrawn to the next defensive positionnorth of Gabes. 30 Corps iwas hampered in.following up by many mines and demolitions.10 Corps was also hindered dn its operations;against El Hamma on 28th March and the-enemy evacuated the village that night. TheNew Zealanders entered Gabes at 1300 hours-on the 2Qth and were shortly afterwards joinedthere by the advance elements of 51 Division.The enemy had lost seven thousand prisonersand many tanks and guns.

First Army resumes the Offensive.First Army, like II Corps, had been able to

start on its programme of reorganization andtraining after the enemy's defeat at Thala,though it had been to a certain extent upsetby the enemy offensive which started on 26thFebruary. With the arrival of fresh formationsthis programme was now beginning to showresults: " Y " Division was dissolved on i6thMarch when relieved by 3 Infantry Brigade,the first to arrive of i Infantry Division; theother two brigades of the division took oversectors of the front on igth and 23rd March andDivisional Headquarters assumed command inth.e Medjez area. 78 Division and i GuardsBrigade were relieved and the latter went to>join 6 Armoured Division in reserve. The Ger-mans were also reinforcing simultaneously,though not on the same scale. In the middleof March the second regiment of the HermannGoering Division began to arrive and shortlyafterwards the first troops of a new formation;,

876 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 19481

999 Africa Division, were identified. This wasformed mainly from former residents of con-centration camps and included a few genuinecriminals. In spite of this peculiar origin itfought as well as the average German forma-tion; it was particularly noticeable ithat thepolitical offenders who made up the greatmajority, influenced more by the tradition ofdiscipline and the military virtues of the racethan by their political convictions, fought withgreat skill and stubbornness even in a losingbaittle.

I had ordered General Anderson to take theearliest opportunity of restoring the situationon the northern road and to relieve the pres-sure on Medjez by extending our line here tothe north of the Beja road The first task wasentrusted to 46 Division, using 138 Brigade, 36Brigade from 78 Division and i Parachute>Brigade. It was facilitated by the fact that theenemy had thinned out in this area to reinforceother sectors but even so the dense scrub andthe boulder-covered mountains were mos;serious obstacles. The attack began on 28thMarch in very heavy rain and made steadyprogress, assisted by the Corps Franc d'Afriqueand a Tabor of Moroccan Goumiers on the leftflank. On 30th March we re-entered Sedjenane,and the capture was completed by next day.The enemy was now reinforcing by recommit-ting his carefully husbanded reserves but theywere unable to halt our progress. On 3istMarch we recaptured our former positions eastof El Aouana; shortly afterwards the enemy•withdrew from his positions on Cap Serrat. Bythis advance of 'eighteen miles we had wonback all the ground which the enemy had takenthree weeks to capture; prisoners amounted toover eight hundred and fifty and there is nodoubt that his (losses in killed and woundedwere heavy.

On 5th April 4 Infantry Division assumedcommand in the sector north-east of Beja andon 7th April 78 Division attacked north ofOued Zarga to carry out .the second part of theArmy task. It met opposition from the German334 Division but continued to press forward ona front of about ten miles to a depth, eventual!}',of ten miles. This is a most desolate andbarren area of mountains, with few and scat-tered villages. The most important success wasthe capture on 14th April of Gebel el Ang andGebel Tanngouche, two ridges over three thou-sand feet high eight miles north of Medjez, theenemy recaptured both next day but in a fur-ther attack we recovered Gebel el Ang and partof Tanngouche The mountain village ofHeidous, which the enemy had converted intoa strongpoint, remained in his hands but wasnow threatened from both north and southThe object of our operations had! been achieved.Medjez had been freed from enemy threat ar»dwe were able to build up there, in security, thestores required for our final offensive.

The Battle -of Wadi Akarit.' After his defeat by Eighth Army GeneralMesse withdrew to the northern end of .theGabes gap and endeavoured to make a newstand there, on the very threshold of the Tuni-sian plain. His position was based on the WadiAkarit, a steep-sided obstacle which had beenextended "by an anti-tank ditch to cover the

" whole of the gap between the sea and the Chott^el Fedjadj. This gave him a line of about

twelve to fifteen miles in length. On the northside the wadi is dominated by two mountains,Gebel Fatnassa on the west and Gebed er Rou-mana on the east, extending almost to the sea.The road from Gabes to Gafsa runs round thewestern end of Fatnassa, in a defile betweenthe mountain and the salt marsh', and the roadto Sfax runs along the coast round the easternend of Er Roumana There is a low colbetween the two peaks which is traversed by afew tracks and was thought to be practicablefor our use if the high ground commanding itcould be cleared. Taken all round it was a verystrong position, much stronger by nature thanthe Mareth line.

10 Corps made contact with the enemy's newline on 3oth March with the New ZealandDivision on the right and i Armoured Divisionon the left. 'Having inspected the position theCorps Commander reported that it could notbe carried by assault with his present forcesand General Montgomery decided to wait untilhe could bring up stronger forces in infantry.His plan was to assault with three infantrydivisions, 5oth, 5ist and 4th Indian, attackingthrough 10 Corps as now disposed; after abreach had been made 10 Corps would passthrough, with the New Zealanders leading Itwould take about a week for the attack to 'beprepared. This would give me time to co-ordinate Eighth Army's offensive with twoother thrusts which I had planned. I issued aplan of operations on 3rd April. My objectwas still " to seize and secure airfields andpotential airfields from which we can developthe full weight of our great superiority in theair, thereby paralysing the enemy's supplysystem to an extent which will greatly facilitatethe rapid advance of our ground forces." Thefirst phase was to drive the enemy from theGabes gap iby a frontal attack by Eighth Armyand flanking pressure 'by II Corps. When thisoperation was completed II Corps would bepulled out and transferred to the extremenorthern flank. The second phase was to co-incide with Eighth Army's advance towardsSousse. I had organized an Army Groupreserve under the recently arrived Headquarters9 Corps, consisting of 6 Armoured Division, aBritish infantry brigade and 34 United StatesDivision. At a date after 7th April, and depen-dent on Eighth Army's progress, this force, onorders from me, would secure the Fondoukgap in the Eastern Dorsale and pass thearmoured division through towards Kai-rouan, threatening the rear of Messe's army.Throughout this period 5 Corps and XIX Corpswere to tie down the enemy on their front bythrusts aimed at the capture of importantfeatures.

On 27th March the preliminary stage of thisplan began when 34 United States Divisionentered the village of Fondouk, at the westernend of the defile, and 9 United States Divisionreinforced i Infantry Division at El Guettar.After this I allowed the Fondouk area to remainquiet but tried to press on with II Corps downthe Gafsa—Ga'bes road. In spite of the favour-able development of the Mareth battle verystrong resistance was met to any progress be-yond El Guettar. On 3ist March General Pattontried to push an armoured force down the roadbut it was held up by mines after advancingonly a short distance. He then tried a moredeliberate advance with i Division workingalong the mountains north of the road and

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 877

ft Division doing the same to the south. The""former made a little ground on 2nd April butthe latter was unable to advance. NeverthelessMesse was now thoroughly alarmed by thisthreat to has right flank; 10 Panzer Division,which was at that time by far the strongestof the three, had already been kept fully en-gaged on the El Guettar road and by the 3rdit had (been joined iby 21 Panzer Division. Astrong enemy counter-attack on that day gainedsome ground from 9 Division. The deadlockcontinued ainitnl Eighth Army attacked andbroke through the Wadi Akant line; even onthe first day of that battle, when the positionof the enemy's main forces was alreadydesperate, the two Panzer divisions continuedto resist the American pressure with great stub-bornness. 9 Division suffered1 heavy casualtiesthat day for no gains and i Division only suc-ceeded in advancing two miles. Meanwhile atMaknassy we restricted our operations to feintattacks designed to distract attention from ourmain effort on the El Guettar road.

The plan for the attack on the Wadi Akaritline provided for an infantry assault by allthree divisions of 30 Corps: 4 Indian Divisionagainst Gebel Fatnassa, 51 Division against ErRoumana and 50 Division in the centre. Theenemy forces were disposed in much the sameorder of battle as in the Mareth line with XXCorps (Young Fascists and Trieste) at the sea-ward end and XXI Corps (Pistoia, Spezia and164 Light) at the inland end. 15 Panzer and90 Light Divisions were held in reserve behindthe centre of the line but 10 and 21 PanzerDivisions were nearly forty miles away to thewest, engaged with II Corps, and a strongforce, including a " Tiger " tank battalion, wasobserving i Armoured Division at Maknassy.It is peculiar that Messe should have been .more,anxious about his right flank than his centre,but such seems to have been the case; perhapshe relied on the obvious strength of his positionsat Akarit to cause Eighth Army to delay, orelse he expected us to wait for the moon to beright. He had already, however, begun tomove some of his heavy guns back to the nextdefence line, at Enfidaville, and can have beenunder no illusions as to his ability to hold us inthe south for much longer.

The battle of the Wadi Akarit lasted only aday but the fighting was described by General^Montgomery as " heavier and more savagethan any we have had since Alamein ''. Attackand counter-attack clashed in the hills and bothGermans and Italians showed a quite recklessdetermination and 'unimpaired morale. 30Corps attacked at 0400 hours on 6th April,supported by four hundred and fifty guns. Itwas completely dark at that time and this un-doubtedly assisted us in gaining surprise. Themajor credit for the victory goes to 4 IndianDivision, 51 Division gained its originalobjective but was driven off by a counter-attack and 50 Division in the centre wasseriously delayed by resistance on the line ofthe wadi. The attack on Fatnassa wasbrilliantly successful against great difficultiesof terrain; 7 Indian Brigade, led by the RoyalSussex and 2 Gurkhas, captured all theirobjectives by dawn and 5 Indian Brigade,which then passed through, completed themopping up and was in a position to take inrear the defences which were holding up theCorps' centre and right. At 0845 hours thedivision reported that it had bitten six thousand

yards out of the enemy position and at 1200hours General Montgomery put in 10 Corps.It looked like a complete debacle for the enemy,,but 15 Panzer and 90 Light Divisions, fightingperhaps the best battle of their distinguishedcareers, counter-attacked with great vigour andby their self-sacrifice enabled Messe to stabilizethe situatipn. That night the enemy withdrewand the two Panzer Divisions which had beenfighting a hard but irrelevant battle on the ElGuettar road also broke contact and drew offto the north-east. At 1600 hours on 7th Aprilan American patrol met a patrol of 4 IndianDivision. At last the two Armies, from the eastand the west, had made contact after theirlong and triumphant advances.*

The battle had cost the enemy over sixthousand prisoners and heavy casualties. Therewas no chance of making a stand south ofthe mountain line at Enfidaville and retreatwas essential. Messe showed a not unnaturalsolicitude for his Italian troops, who wentstraight back to the new line, leaving theGermans to form a rearguard for which theywere better suited. The second phase of myplan for interfering with the retreat now cameinto action. 9 Corps, which had been lyingconcealed in the forest of Kessera, east ofMaktar, moved forward to the Fondouk areaand on 7th April launched an attack to securethe pass. The plan was to clear the heightsdominating the north side of the defile with128 Brigade (46 Division) and the heights to thesouth with 34 Division and then pass 6Armoured Division through the middle. Theformer attack went well. We entered Pichonon the 8th and pressed forward to the eastagainst fairly strong resistance. South of thepass 34 United States Division was unableto make any progress on the 7th or 8th.Meanwhile the enemy rearguards in the plainto the east were conducting a very skilful with-drawal in front of Eighth Army Sfax wasentered on loth April by 30 Corps, which hadadvanced up the coast, and 10 Corps to thewest had kept level. 10 and 21 Panzer Divi-sions were withdrawing on the western flank'of Messe's army and I foresaw that they wouldsoon arrive in the Kairouan area. I thereforeordered 9 Corps to disregard 34 'Division'sfailure to the south and launch 6 ArmouredDivision straight at the pass. This gallantattack went in on the afternoon of the gth.The motor battalion of the armoured brigadeadvanced into the throat of the defile underheavy cross fire to make a gap in the minefieldand two armoured regiments then plungedthrough. Unswept mines and anti-tank gunsin enfilade took a toll but our tanks pressedon undeterred and the pass was forced.

On loth April 6 Armoured Division fought asuccessful action against enemy tanks south ofKairouan and entered the holy city next morn-ing at 1015 hours. This was an unwelcomeacceleration to the enemy's withdrawal time-table and 10 and 21 Panzer Divisions sufferedmore losses which in their weakened state wereserious for them. Eighth Army had on lothApril paused for two days, for administrative

* Various parties, from the Long Range DesertGroup and the Raiding Forces, had already madecontact with First Army; but these had come the"long way round west of the Chotts, an impracticableroute foi any large body

878 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

reasons, on a line running east and west throughSfax, sending the armoured cars of 4 LightArmoured Brigade to flood the country to thenorth. On the I2th the advance was resumedagain with 10 Corps while 30 Corps haltedround Sfax. Sousse fell on I2th April andby next day our leading troops were in contactwith the first defences north of Enfidaville.XIX Corps had also joined in the attack,working in close harmony with 9 Corps, andhad driven the enemy from the EasternDorsale as far as ten miles north of Pichon.9 Corps made contact with patrols from EighthArmy on nth April.

Preparations for the Final Assault.I had now achieved my first object in the

capture of the whole of the coastal plain andwe were in a position to exploit from thereour air superiority. A striking demonstrationwas given on i8th April when our fightersintercepted off Cape Bon a large flight ofGerman transport aircraft carrying troops andshot down over fifty of them; it was also a .significant confirmation of the fact that Iheenemy, so far from thinking of evacuation, wasusing every possible means to rash troops intohis now much diminished Tunisian bridgehead.My next object was to complete the destructionof the forces still opposing me as quickly aspossible, in order to obtain the use of theports of Tunis and Bizerta for the invasionof Sicily The enemy positions presented tous two fronts at right angles, facing west andsouth, with the salient angle protected by thetangled mountain country of the Gebel Mansourand the Gebel Fkirine. I decided, for topo-graphical reasons, to make my main attackon the western face of this perimeter. Myintention was to break through to Tunis fromthe west and thereby split the enemy forces intwo. I would then leave the smaller bodyof enemy to the north to be mopped up bythe Allied troops on the spot and, turningsouthwards with the greater part of my forces,drive the larger body of enemy on the rightflank of the penetration against the line firmlyheld by Eighth Army. It was particularlyimportant in carrying out this manoeuvre 1oprevent the enemy establishing himself in thepeninsula terminating in Cape Bon, where hemight have been able to hold out for some time.

I had rejected the idea of making my mainthrust with Eighth Army partly because anadvance against the southern face of the pen-meter would drive the enemy in on themselvesrather than split them and partly because ofthe difficulty of the terrain. From the sea justnorth of Enfidaville to the Gebel Fkirine massifthe mountains present a continuous wall of

- abrupt peaks. This wall is pierced by threeroads, all starting from Enfidaville: the onlygood road follows the coast, with salt marsheson its right and mountains on its left; the othertwo run via Saouaf and Zaghouan through aseries of narrow passes. On the First Army frontthere are also three routes to Tunis, but morewidely separated. The southernmost runs fromBou Arada to Ponf du Fans and thence north-east. This could be blocked by the enemyfairly easily at the Pont du Fahs defile andcommanded from the mountains on the southside of the Bou Arada plain. The second routestarts from1 the Goubellat plain, which givesgood opportunities for deployment. It wouldthen be possible to advance north-eastwards,

north of the salt marshes of Sebkret el Kourzia,and enter the plain of Tunis by various minor \roads running south-west from the city. The ydifficulty here was a belt of broken country <without roads which interposes to the north-east of the salt marshes The third routefollows the axis of the Medjez-Massicault road,the main road to Tunis from the west. Thiswas the most direct route and gave the bestopportunities for the use of tanks; we hadfought all winter for our foothold at its gate.For these very reasons, however, the enemydefences were here at their strongest.

In order to develop their full strength for thedecisive blow First Army had to be more con-centrated and reinforced. For the formerpurpose I had already decided to relieve 46and 4 Divisions on its northernmost flank withtwo divisions from II Corps. On 3rd April Iordered General Patton to be prepared todespatch his 9 Infantry Division to take overfrom 46 Division as soon as Eighth Army hadbroken through the Wadi Akarit line and tofollow as rapidly as possible with the rest ofII Corps. 9 Division, after regrouping and re-fitting, assumed command of the northernmostsector on I4th April and on i9th April i UnitedStates Infantry Division began to relieve 4Division; on the same day II Corps assumedcommand of the area north of the Oued etTine. I intended that simultaneously withFirst Army's offensive and Eighth Army'sholding attack II Corps should also developoperations down the Sedjenane road and theBeja-Mateur road to contain the enemy thereand, if possible, to accelerate the capture ofBizerta. I must mention here that the wayin which four United States divisions weretransferred from one end of the line to theother, crossing at nght angles the lines of com-munication of First Army, was a considerabletriumph of staff work. Reinforcements forFirst Army could only come from Eighth Army.On nth April I informed General Montgomerythat the main effort in the final phase of opera-tions would be by General Anderson andordered him to make available to join 9 Corpsas soon as possible an armoured division andan armoured car regiment, i Armoured Divi-sion and the King's Dragoon Guards werenominated, being well placed on the Faid-Sbeitla road for such a transfer.

On i2th April I ordered General Andersonto prepare a large-scale offensive to captureTunis, with a target date of 22nd April. I in-formed him that I was placing 9 Corps underhis command, reinforced by i Armoured Divi-sion, and that II Corps would simultaneouslybe attacking in the direction of Bizerta. FirstArmy was to give such assistance as should bepossible to II Corps' attack but the latter wasremaining under Army Group command. Iindicated that the area for the main attack,by 5 and 9 Corps with four infantry and twoarmoured divisions, would be on the front fromMedjez el Bab to north of Bou Arada with5 Corps attacking north-east on the axis Med-jez-Massicault and 9 Corps north of the Seb-kret el Kourzia on a parallel axis. XIX Corpswould be prepared in the event of success toadvance towards the Pont du Fahs defile.

After discussion with the two Army comman-ders and General Patton, commanding IICorps, the final plan was worke'd out in thefollowing form as reported by me in a signal

! SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 879

of i8th April. Eighth Aimy was "to start itsattack on the night of igth-20th April with50 Division on the coast, 2 New Zealand Divi-sion just west of Enfidaville and 4 Indian Divi-sion, with " L " Force under command, westof Takrouna. 7 Armoured Division guardedthe western flank, made contact with XIXCorps and was available to exploit success.XIX Corps was to attack three mountain posi-tions commanding Pont du Fahs from thesouth; no date was set for this attack and itwas not to be launched until First Army con-sidered that the enemy in these strong posi-tions had been sufficiently weakened by theattacks on either flank. First Army was toattack on 22nd April. 9 Corps would beginin the early morning with 46 Infantry and iand 6 Armoured 'Divisions. The infantry wereto destroy the enemy positions west of the saltmarshes of Sebkret el Kourzia and the armourwas then to follow through as quickly as pos-sible directed on Gebel Mengoub, an eight hun-dred foot feature fifteen miles from the northend of the marshes and the same distance fromTunis. 5 Corps would attack in the eveningof 22nd April with I and 4 Divisions south ofthe river, directed on Massicault, and 78 Divi-sion in the mountains north of the river withGefbel Ahmera (" Longstop ") as their firstobjective. II Corps' attack was timed for thenext day, 23rd April, with i Division attack-ing on the Sidi Nsir road with its final objec-tive the pass above Chouigui, and 9 Divisionon the axis Sedjenane-Mateur. In order to con-trol the battle I had moved my Headquartersto a wood near Le Kef, after a short period atHaidra, (between Tebessa and Thala.

When speaking of the plans for the finalbattles of the campaign I must take the oppor-tunity of recording my obligations to my Chiefof Staff, General McCreery. He had accom-panied me from the Middle East where he hadfilled the same appointment. Both as a per-sonal friend and as a brilliant Staff Officer hewas invaluable to me in the whole course ofoperations in Africa, and was later to show,both as a Corps and an Army Commander thathe added to his intellectual qualities the highestgifts of command.

General von Arnim still disposed of over twohundred thousand troops for a front of a hun-dred and twenty miles. Messe's Army held thesouthern front with German and Italian in-fantry in line from the sea to west of Tak-rouna: 90 Light Division was responsible forthe coast road and 164 Light Division was onits inland flank; there were various Italianremnants, organized mainly under commandof Headquarters Trieste Division, interspersedwith the German troops and continuing the linewestwards. The German Africa Corps, whichhad now taken under command the SupergaDivision, held the angle between the two fronts.The order of battle of von Vaerst's 5 PanzerArmy was relatively unchanged. The Man-teuffel Division faced II Corps in the northern-most sector, then 334 Division in the mountainson the north bank of the Medjerda and 999Africa Division, now almost complete, astridethe river. In the area of 5 and 9 Corps wasthe Hermann Goering Division, reinforced withadditional infantry and tanks, including partof a very recently arrived heavy tank batta-lion. As soon as Messe was back on his Enfida-ville line von Arnim removed 10 Panzer Divi-

sion, still his strongest armoured formation, andtransferred it to the area between Sebkretel Kourzia and the Medjerda. This was clearlythe most threatened point and it was vital tohave an armoured reserve to cover the plain ofTunis. It was, however, the only reserve thatArmy Group Africa had and it is a little sur-prising that von Arnim made no effort to createa larger one 'by shortening his line at the lessimportant points. Nor did he attempt to con-struct any defensive systems in rear of his pre-sent line except for some not very impressiveperimeter defences round Tunis.

Eighth Army's attack on the Enfidaville ppsi-tion began at 2130 hours on igth April. 50Division captured Enfidaville itself and pushedforward patrols bpT[ond it. The New Zealandersadvanced to a poxnt three miles north-west ofthe town. 4 Indian Division, further west, hada very fierce struggle for Gebel Garci; the enemycounter-attacked continuously and, at the cost

, of very heavy casualties, succeeded in holdingthe attack. It was noticed that the Italiansfought particularly well, outdoing the Germansin line with them. The New Zealanders nextday had an equally bloody struggle for the hillvillage of Takrouna. In spite of severe lossesfrom our massed artillery fire the enemy keptup his policy of continuous counter-attacks andit became clear that it would cost us heavily toadvance further into this tangled mass of moun-tains. General Montgomery therefore decidedlate on the 2ist to abandon the thrust in thecentre and concentrate on forcing the coastaldefile.

This change of plan would involve fairly ex-tensive regrouping and at the same time hewished to send back to the Delta one of thedivisions which would be needed for the in-vasion of Sicily. 50 Division was selected as

,it had been weakened by its losses in the Marethand Akarit battles. It was to be relieved by56 Division, which had had no previous opera-tional experience. The plan was to relieve 4Indian and New Zealand Divisions oppositeGebel Garci and Takrouna with 51 Divisionbrought forward from rest; this division hadalso had fairly heavy losses and was to berestricted to a holding role. The two formerdivisions, with the 56th, were to make the

* assault on the right. The first stage was on thenight 24th/25th April when the New Zealandersand 201 Guards Brigade captured GebelTerhouna, a strongly contested hill feature over-looking the coast about five miles north ofEnfidaville. The main attack was planned for29th April and its object was to establish allthree divisions in the area of Hammamet, atthe base of the Cape Bon peninsula. On the29th, however, I received a signal from GeneralMontgomery saying that, as a result of a failureby 56 Division on that day when coming underartillery fire as it was about to take up positionsfor the attack, he now felt unhappy about thepossibilities of success. As this was not goingto interfere with the plans I was already form-ing for finishing off, enemy resistance in theTunis plain I, authorized the abandonment ofthe attack, i Fighting French Division wasbrought forward on 6th May to relieve 51Division and the Eighth Army front became aholding front except for the western flank wherethe New Zealanders carried outj local opera-tions to assist XIX Corps and attract enemyattention.

88o SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

The Enfidaville line thus marked the culmi-nation of Eighth Army's great advanceacross Africa. This holding and diversionaryrole was not indeed its sole contribution to thefinal victory, for three and a half divisions weretransferred to First Army to give weight to themain attack on Tunis. It is right, however, totake note at this point of the extent of EighthArmy's achievements. In six months they hadadvanced eighteen hundred miles and foughtnumerous battles in which they were alwayssuccessful. This would be an astonishing rateof progress even in a civilized country with allthe modern facilities of transport—the equiva-lent of an advance from London to two hundredmiles east of Moscow—but in a desert it waseven more remarkable. It reflects in particularthe greatest credit on the administrative ser-vices. Their problems might have seemed quiteinsoluble but thanks to the admirable prepara-tions made and the sound basis of experiencegained in earlier campaigns administration had ,kept pace with operations and never failed inits support of the fighting troops.

•Before First Army opened its offensive theenemy gave a last demonstration of tactics thathad become almost traditional in Tunisia, thespoiling attack. On the night of 20th-2ist Aprilhe attacked with sudden violence (betweenMedjez and Goubellat, using a force of fivebattalions and about seventy tanks. Theinfantry came mainly from the HermannGoering Division and advanced to the attackwith great vigour and determination We hadhad little warning of what was imminent andin the early stages of the battle parties of enemysucceeded in infiltrating into our forward posi-tions where the troops were assembling for theoffensive, into the gun lines and as far as 4Division Headquarters. In spite of the dark-ness and the confusion the attack, given the,codename LILACBLOSSGM by the Germans,was a failure; we took over four hundred andfifty prisoners and claimed over thirty tanksdestroyed. Nor were our plans for the offensiveupset or delayed, except to a minor degree on9 Corps front, where 46 Division attack had tobe postponed four hours.

9 Corps' offensive started on the morning ot22nd April when 46 Division advanced to theattack in the area of the Kourzia salt marshes,.

• On the right, south-west of the marshes, thedivision was unsuccessful in face of strongdefended localities and dense minefields whichinflicted casualties on the supporting tanks.The attack on the left, _to the north of themarshes, made .better progress. Ground wasgained steadily and by the late afternoon theCorps commander put in 6 Armoured Divisionto attack through the infantry. This metopposition from 10 Panzer Division and a tankbattle developed. It continued next day'whenthe enemy was reinforced by the tanks of 21Panzer Division and on the 24th when 15Panzer Division also arrived. General vonArnim was clearly worried about the dangerin this area, and concentrated all his armourhere; by the 26th all three armoured divisionswere opposing us between Medjez and BouArada and the Headquarters of the GermanAfrica 'Corps had been brought round to takecommand With these reinforcements hesucceeded in.stabilizing his front in the brokenground north-east of the marshes and althoughi Armoured Division was committed on 24th

April we were unable to score any significantgains. We had, however, caused the enemy toconcentrate almost all his mobile reservesc.gainst this sector, and had inflicted heavylosses on him. It was a good preparation forthe final blow. On 25th April the enemy with-drew from the salient now protruding south ofi.he Bou Arada—Pont du Fahs road, followedup by XIX Corps. The latter were now withinstriking distance of the Pont du Fahs defile,having cleared Gebel Fkirine on 26th April.Tank battles continued on 9 Corps front allday of the 26th but that evening 6 ArmouredDivision was withdrawn into Army reserve.

While the main enemy attention was concen-trated on the battle in the Goubellat plain 5and II Corps had been able to make importantadvances on the whole front from the Med]erdato the sea. Resistance, indeed, was as strongas ever and all our gains were most stubbornlycontested. 78 Division began on 22nd Aprilwith an attack on Gebel Ahmera, the left handbastion of the Medjez gate which had defiedus since the previous December. In very heavyfighting they had cleared all but the north-eastern end by midday of the 23rd and moppedup the remaining enemy pockets on GebelTanngouche. On the same day i and 4 Divi-sions attacked to the south of the Medjerda;the former captured Grich el Oued and thelatter Goubellat. On 25th April 78 Divisioncaptured Heidous and next day Gebel Ahmerawas finally cleared. We were now firmly basedon the left bank of the river and continuedto extend our ground on the right bank. Onthe 26th i Division pushed the enemy's posi-tions bac'k as far as Gebel Bou Aoukaz, adominating feature four miles down streamfrom Gebel Ahmera on the opposite bank and4 Division advanced down the main Tunisroad to a distance of seven miles beyondMedjez. At this point the enemy began tolaunch a series of furious 'counter-attacks.. Onthe 27th he drove back the left flank of 4Division at Ksar Tyr and for the next threedays he continued these attacks with a mixedbattle group from 15 Panzer Division. Heregained a little ground at the point of junc-ture of i and 4 Divisions; his losses were heavybut his troops continued to show an excellentspirit.

On the northernmost sector progress by IICorps was steady and continuous throughoutthis period. The enemy defences were strongand long-established and the terrain, as I havesaid, was particularly difficult; these advan-tages outweighed in the early stages theirnumerical inferiority and the lack of reservesfor the defence, but as position after positionwas wrested away there were increasingly lesstroops to man the positions in rear. 9 and iInfantry Divisions attacked on. the morningof 23rd April on the Sedjenane-Mateur andBeja-Mateur axes respectively. On the firstday 9 Division gained its objective west ofEl Aouana i Division made slightly slowerprogress but by the 25th had reached thehigh ground a mile to the south-east of SidiNsir station. This advance had exposed theleft flank of the division and 34 Infantry Divi-sion was now brought in between the other twoto clear up the area astride the Sidi Nsir-Mateur road. The ridge of hills west of SidiNsir was cleared by 28th April after three daysof concentrated artillery fire and on the sameday the high ground east of the village wascaptured after close and heavy fighting.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 881

/ Further east i Division advanced along the/ long range overlooking the Oued et Tine valley

on the northern side.On 27th April General Bradley relieved

General Patton in command of II Corps andthe latter went to take command of the SeventhArmy which he was to lead in the invasion ofSicily. General Patton had produced, duringhis period of command, what I might almostcall a transformation in the troops of II CorpsBy his influence they had recovered from thenatural depression caused by the early set-backs, they had absorbed with great rapiditythe benefits of the intensive training to whichthey had been subjected and were now'showingin hard mountain righting that they had addedthe skill of the trained soldier to those excel-lent natural qualities which had been previouslyin part obscured by inexperience. GeneralPatton was to score other triumphs in theMediterranean and in North-west Europe butI think this not the least of his achievements.General Bradley had been attached to II CorpsHeadquarters and General Eisenhower nowthought that this would be a good time to givehim experience of actual command in opera-tions before commanding a Corps in Sicily.

The attack by 9 Division on the northern-most road progressed rather more slowly. Theenemy positions at Jefna were particularlystrong and before they could be grappled withthere were many outlying positions, on thehills either side of the road, which had to becleared. Manteuffel's parachutists fought aswell as usual and by 2nd May we were stillheld <up at the immediate approaches to Jefna,though to the north we had outflanked it bysome three miles. Heavy fighting continuedon i Infantry Division front both on GebelSidi Meftah and to the north of it but in anti-cipation of its fall II Corps were now bringingup i Armoured Division to operate on the ex-treme right of the Corps in the valley of theOued et Tine. This valley leads direct toMateur; no road follows it but it is practicablefor armour once •the left flank is freed by secur-ing Gebel Sidi Meftah. 78 Division to theeast of the Oued had gained 'ground north ofGebel Ahmera and north-east of Heidous. On30th April 34 Division scored its most note-worthy success with the capture of GebelTahent (Point 609). This commanding dome-shaped hill, east-north-east of Sidi Nsir, wasdefended by parachutists from the BarenthinRegiment, perhaps the best German troops inAfrica.The Final Offensive.

(By 29th April I had decided that it wasnecessary to reinforce First Army again andchange the point of attack further to the north.The heavy pressure which we had been bring-ing to "bear since the 22nd had gained us afoothold at the entrance to the plain of Tunisand had stretched the enemy's powers of resis-tance almost to breaking point, but if I was tofinish the campaign quickly, to fit in with thetime-table for Sicily, a sudden powerful strokewas necessary. The events of the past weekhad shown that Eighth Army was unable tomake any vital contribution by attacks ontheir front; indeed, in spite of the pressure theyhad kept up, the enemy had found himselfable to withdraw all his armour from thesouthern front. I therefore ordered GeneralMontgomery on 30th April to despatch atonce to First Army the best formations hecould scare to reinforce the main blow from

Med]ez. He nominated 7 Armoured Division,4 Indian Division and 201 Guards Brigade.These were both the freshest and the most ex-perienced formations in Eighth Army. Theywere, indeed, the nucleus around which EighthArmy had grown up, for in 1940 they madeup the whole of the Western Desert Force*.It was particularly appropriate that the twodivisions which had won our first victory inAfrica, at Sidi Barrani, should be chosen forthe mam role in our last victory, the battle ofTunis.

I informed General Anderson on the sameday of these proposed reinforcements and ofmy plan for their employment. The operationsof 9 Corps, though falling short of their originalobjective, had attracted enemy attention to thesouthern part of the Goubellat plain. I in-tended to keep his attention fixed there by re-taining there i Armoured Division, reinforcedwith a large concentration of dummy tanks andtransport, and to make my main blow straightat Tunis along the Medjez-Massicault road.For this I intended to employ,' under commandof 9 Corps, two infantry and two armoureddivisions. They would ibe assisted in the initialassault by the greatest weight of artillery thatcould be made available and by a very heavyair attack in the " blitzkrieg " style. I laidall the emphasis in planning on speed and themaintenance of the objective. The armoureddivisions were to move off behind the infantrydivisions simultaneously with them so thatthere would be no delay or hesitation in push-ing them through the infantry the moment abreak through was achieved. I insisted thatnone of the divisions of 9 Corps should turnaside to mop up isolated areas of resistance orto attempt to roll up the enemy's exposedflanks but were to continue straight for Tunis,ignoring any enemy to left or right. By thismeans they would forestall the enemy on hisdefences round Tunis and split his whole frontin half. If these instructions could be strictlyfollowed I felt confident of turning the German" blitzkrieg " technique on its inventors andpreventing an African " Dunkirk "

This question of an enemy evacuation ofTunisia naturally occupied a great deal of ourthoughts at the time and although our successwas in the event so rapid as to prevent anyattempt being made it is worth while giving abrief study to the subject. From our point ofview it was vital to prevent any substantialevacuation, both because of the psychologicalvalue of complete annihilation and because areinforcement of Sicily by large numbers ofGerman troops would make our next task rSuchmore difficult. I was uncertain whether thewell-known German reluctance to abandon anyposition, however • untenable, would workagainst an evacuation; it now seems likely thatthey would have attempted it had they beengiven a chance. We were, however, by thenin a position to throw a naval and air blockaderound the Tunisian coast which, in spite of theextensive minefields at sea, could be relied on tolet very little pass. In the worst case, assumingthe enemy was able to stabilize a firm bridge-head position, it was calculated that it wouldbe theoretically possible to remove up to* amaximum of seventy thousand men; in theevent only just over six hundred got away andthese were nearly all sailors or dockworkers.

* 201 Guards Brigade was at that time num-bered 22.

882 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

The move of formations from Eighth Army,the redisposition of 9 Corps and the dumpingof ammunition and other stores would takesome time, and D-day for the attack, whichwas given the codename VULCAN, was fixedas 6th May. As a preliminary 5 Corps was tocapture Gebel Bou Aoukaz on the afternoon of5th May in order to free the left flank of theattack from threat from this direction. On themorning of the 6th the 9 Corps attack wouldstart before dawn on a front of three thousandyards with 4 British Division right and 4 IndianDivision left, supported by artillery concentra-tions from over four hundred guns, centrallycontrolled. The infantry were to begin byseizing a line north of the road through thesmall village of Frendj, about six thousandyards from the start line. 6 Armoured Divisionwas to follow 4 British, and 7 Armoured4 Indian. Their first bound was to the area ofSt. Cyprien, twelve miles further on and thesame distance from Tunis, before the enemy,could recover from the shock and occupy theperimeter defences. 5 Corps, which had 46Division north of the river and I and 78Divisions to the south, was to hold the corridoropen and be prepared to support 9 Corps.XIX Corps was to launch an attack againstGebel Zaghouan on 4th May; on the same daythe New Zealanders on Eighth Army's leftwould mount local attacks south of Saouaf toassist the French and pin down the enemy ontheir front. II Corps was to continueVitssuccessful advance towards Bizerta. A

I summed up these orders in a personalletter to General Anderson on 3rd May whichI reproduce here as giving the clearest pictureof my conception of the final plan.

" i. The primary object of your attack is• to capture Tunis. Every effort must be madeto pass the two armoured divisions throughon the same day. as the infantry attack startsso that the enemy is not allowed time to buildup a strong anti-tank screen.

2. 9 Corps must seize a bridgeheadthrough the immediate defences of Tunis asearly as possible, before the enemy has timeto man these defences.

3. The mopping up of localities which theenemy continues to hold on the fronts oi78 and i Divisions must come later.- Thechief task of 5 Corps after the armour haspassed through is to keep open the funnel.

4. Concentration must be maintained andit would not be sound to aim at advancingon too wide a front. For instance, 46Division may well be required toi nourishthe threat and to assist 5 Corps to keep thefunnel open. An advance north of the riverMedjerda would not contribute to the mainobject. Troops north of the river will tieforced to withdraw when you reach Tunisand cut their communications.

5. I consider the best way to prevent theenemy withdrawing a large part of his forcesto the Cape Bon peninsula is to reach Tunisas early as possible, thus cutting off all troopsnorth of Tunis. In any case I do not wishyour operations for the early capture of Tunisfo be prejudiced by preoccupation with pre-venting the enemy withdrawing to CapeBon".

During the period before the offensive openedmy plans for deceiving the enemy as to our

intentions continued and showed evidence ofproducing good results. The enemy did notreinforce the area which I "had selected for mypoint of main effort but left its defence to15 Panzer Division, now in a very weak state.By contrast he retained both 10 and 21 PanzerDivisions in the Kourzia area, opposite myi Armoured Division. Shortly before the attackbegan a battalion from 90 Light Division wasbrought round from Eighth Army front to St.Cyprien but on 4th May, on the other hand,the enemy removed two battalions of heavyanti-tank guns from the Massicault area to thearea north-east of the Kourzia marshes. It wasgratifying to realise that we had been so suc-cessful in obtaining surprise and that the enemyhad split his armour, leaving the stronger partof it away to the south of our point of maineffort

The attack on Gebel Bou Aoukaz by i Divi-sion went in on 5th May at 1700 hours withstrong and effective air support. As I havealready explained the capture of .this mountainwas essential to the whole conduct of opera-tions in order to clear the left flank of theattack. The fighting on the mountain wassevere and the enemy counter-attacked manytimes; major credit for the success must goto i Irish Guards who finally cleared thecrest, at the cost of many casualties, withinthe time table laid down for the operation.Gebel Bou Aoukaz was in our hands by night-fall and all that night the infantry of 4 Britishand 4 Indian Divisions were moving forwardto their assembly areas. On 6th May, at 0330hours, they advanced to the attack side byside on a very narrow front. The massedartillery of First Army, backed by the dumpsof ammunition which we had been nourishingso long for this event, fired concentrations onknown enemy localities. At dawn the air forceswent in. It was their greatest effort in thewar up to that date, over two thousand sortiesof all types. The weight of the attack wastoo much for the defenders, already weakenedphysically and morally by the heavy fightingsince 22nd April. Most of them did their dutybut there were isolated instances of demorali-sation. By 1030 hours the first infantry objec-tives were captured and by 1130 hours thevillage of Frendj was reported clear. The twoarmoured divisions, which were close on theheels of the attacking infantry, at once passedinto the lead. So deep had been our initialpenetration that they found enemy resistance,though gallant and desperate, to be but littleorganised, they met some groups of enemytanks, from 15 Panzer Division, and manyof the 88 millimetre guns withdrawn from air-field defence, but the impetus of the offensivewas so strong that it carried them by nightfallas far as Massicault, half-way to Tunis. 6Armoured Division leaguered for the night tothe south-east and 7 Armoured Division to thenorth-east of the village. The enemy were en-deavouring to form a new defensive position atSt. Cyprien.

The first- day's fighting in the Medjerda valleyhad thus ended in a great success. MeanwhileII Corps to the north was about to reap thereward of its steady and well conducted ad-vance. Under this constant and increasingpressure the German, front^ in trig.,mountainsbroke on the night of 2nd ,May and next dayreconnaissance elements of i Armoured Divi-

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 883

sion entered Mateur. The enemy tried to holda line on the high ground east of the Mateur-Tebourba road and especially the pass leadingto Chouigui, which was strongly defended bythe Barenthin Regiment. North of Mateur,however, i Division to the south and 9 Divi-sion to the north of Garaet Achkel continuedto make progress. The Moroccan Goumsattached to 9 Division were particularly use-ful in the mountains to the north of the lakeThese were strong positions by nature but theGerman defenders had been too muchweakened by their losses round Jefna. On themorning of the yth May resistance broke, on,the edge of the last hills, and the AmericanCorps started the final attack which was tobring them into Bizerta.

At first light on 7th May 6 and 7 ArmouredDivisions moved forward once more fromMassicault. Despite his best efforts the enemyhad been .unable to organise a defence in thearea of the break through, though he washastily summoning back the forces cut off tothe south of our penetration. 6 Armoured Divi-sion fought a stiff action south-east of St.Cyprien while 7 Armoured Division, advancingnorth of the road, captured the village by•0830 hours and pressed on for the suburb ofLe Bardo There was a sharp skirmish at thejunction of the Medjez and Bizerta roads, alittle sniping from isolated houses on the out-skirts but at 1445 hours n Hussars and iDerby shire Yeomanry entered Tunis. The en-thusiasm of the population was unrestrained;it was the first of many experiences we wereto have of the liberation of a great city. Anhour and a half after the British entry intoTunis 47 Regimental Combat Team of 9United States Division entered Bizerta. It wasa happy coincidence that we should havegained our two main objectives simultaneouslyand that both the major Allies should havewon a notable victory on the same day; I hadof course planned this division of the spoilsbut I had not expected so dramatic a climax.

The fall of Tunis and Bizerta clearly cameto the German Command, both in Africa andBerlin, as a most severe shock. It was notuntil the evening of 8th May that the HighCommand issued a statement that Africa wouldnow be abandoned and " the thirty-onethousand Germans and thirty thousand Italiansremaining " would be withdrawn by sea. Icommented in a report to General Eisenhowerthat night that the Navy and Air Forceswould interfere with this programme, which inany event depended on the enemy holding afirm bridgehead in Cape Bon, and remindedhim of Mr. Churchill's words in August, 1940:" We are waiting, so are the fishes ". In factno effort of this sort was made, for the enemy'splans of defence had been completely disrupted.The divided forces were not given a moment'spause to recover. As soon as the situation inTunis was under control 9 Corps split its forcesaccording to the pre-arranged plan and pro-ceded to mop upf to left and right. On theleft 7 Armoured Division was directed north-wards up the Bizerta road towards Protvilleand the Medjerda; simultaneously i UnitedStates Armoured Division was moving towardsthe same area, north of the Protville marshes,from Mateur. The troops entrapped in thispocket consisted of the Manteuffel Division,15 Panzer and 334 Infantry Divisions. They

had little hope of resistance and none of evacua-tion and at noon on 9th May they acceptedunconditional surrender. Six Generals were•among the prisoners, including von Vaerst,the Commander-in-Chief of 5 Panzer Army.

The forces cut off on the south of our wedgeof penetration, between 9 Corps and EighthArmy, were larger than those to the north. Inorder to deal with these the first essential wasto establish ourselves across the base of theCape Bon peninsula, for should they be ableto withdraw into it they might prolong resist-ance unduly. Provided we followed up oursuccess vigorously, however, there could be nochance for them of withdrawing in time.Accordingly 6 Armoured Division, after passingthrough Tunis, wheeled right down the roadwhich runs across the base of the peninsula.It was followed by 4 Infantry Division, andi Armoured Division came up on its right fromthe Goubellat area. The first obstacle encoun-tered was the Hammam Lif defile. At thebottom of the Gulf of Tunis Gebel BouKournine, the sacred " twin-horned " moun-tain of the Carthaginians, rises steeply abovethe road leaving a narrow gap of about threehundred yards between it and the sea shore.The pass was held by some of the remainingtroops of the Hermann Goering Division,strongly supported by heavy anti-aircraft gunswithdrawn from airfield defence. For twodays this exceptionally strong position held 6Armoured Division at bay but on the morningof loth May they broke through by sendinga body of tanks through the very edge of thesurf.

With the forcing of the Hamman Lif defileour advance was rapid and met no furtherobstacles. 6 Armoured Division poured throughthe pass down the main road to the south andby nightfall on the loth had reached Hammameton the east coast. Next day 4 Division sweptrapidly round the peninsula, encountering noopposition and demonstrating that no importantforces had withdrawn 'there. On i2th May 6Armoured Division attacked southwards fromBou Ficha, 56 Division co-operated with shell-ing from the south and after a brief resistancethe enemy raised the white flag. Our encirclingring had joined up and the only enemy stillresisting were in isolated pockets to the north-west of Enfidaville.

Up to this time the enemy facing EighthArmy had held their ground and continued toshow resistance; indeed the front had beenlivelier than ever, for the Germans had greatlyincreased, their artillery fire in order to get ridof as much ammunition as possible.* On theI2th, however, mass surrenders occurred.General Graf von Sponeck, commanding 90Light Division, surrendered to Lieut. -General Sir Bernard Freyberg of theNew Zealand Division, old opponents onmany hard-fought fields. General von Arnim,the Army Group Commander, surrendered tothe Commanding Officer of 2 Gurkhas. He wasbrought to my Headquarters at Le Kef, wherehe still seemed surprised by the suddennessof the disaster. The Italians in the more in-accessible hill-country north of Saouaf held outthe longest, and General Messe delayed hissurrender until the morning of the I3th; shortly

, * Contrary to reports at the time, they were wellprovided with supplies of all natures

884 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948:

before, he had been informed by radio of hispromotion to the rank of Marshal. The troopsin general surrendered to anyone they couldfind willing to accept their surrender. It wasan astonishing sight to see long lines of Germans'driving themselves, in their own transport orin commandeered horse-carts, westwards insearch of prisoner of war cages. Men who had,so short a time before, been fighting like tigersnow seemed transformed into a cheerful anddocile crowd, resigned to the acceptance oftheir fate.

The campaign which culminated in the battleof Tunis was noteworthy not only for the factthat it was the first wholly successful campaignagainst the Axis, the " end of the beginning "in Mr. Churchill's phrase, working up throughchecks and disappointments to the " battlewithout a tomorrow." It was remarkable alsofor the manner of its winning. We had pro-duced m Tunisia a new instrument of victoryin the form of the close collaboration betweenthe Allies, a principle which was to be notonly a battle-winning but a war-winning factor.The importance and the magnitude of thisachievement tend now to be obscured by thefact that this spirit of Allied unity came intobeing so early and grew so rapidly that itseems to have a character of inevitability whichreduces the unique value of its creation Thehistory of previous wars and previous coalitionsdemonstrates that this is far from being thecase. It was not inevitable by any means thatBritish and American troops should show,' inthe first battle they had fought together since1918, such a whole hearted spirit of comrade-ship, nor that British and French, betweenwhom the past three years had thrown manyshadows, should recapture once more the samedegree of trust and mutual respect which hadanimated the old alliance. The credit must goto the soldiers of all three nations and in avery large degree to General Eisenhower whoby word and example inspired those efforts.My relations with General Eisenhower wereof the happiest and I valued them both forpersonal reasons and from the point of view ofthe task in hand: he backed me up in everypossible way and I knew that I could in allcircumstances rely on his complete under-standing, sympathy and support.

Besides this co-operation between the threenationalities involved there is also to be notedthe degree of co-operation achieved betweenthe three services. The battle of Tunis gavethe fullest scope for a demonstration of this,for it was so designed and planned as to en-able the Navy and Air Forces to play theirfull part and produce their full strength simul-taneously with the supreme effort of the Army.They held the enemy in the " Tunisian tip "in a stranglehold while the Army finished themoff. In this respect also the campaign markedthe beginning of a collaboration which was togrow ever stronger until the final victory. TheNaval Commander-m-Chief in the Medi-terranean was Admiral Cunningham,* returningto the scene of his former triumphs. Air ChiefMarshal Tedder was the Air Officer Com-manding-in-Ch'ief The Commander of theTactical Air Force, Air Marshal Coningham,had established a joint headquarters with me.

* Now Admiral of the Fleet The Viscount Cun-ningham of Hyndhope, K.T , G.C B , O M.,D.S.O.

We shared the same mess, worked side by side,,and had collaborated from the first days of thecampaign until the day of final victory. It wasthanks to him that the co-operation betweenthe air and ground forces on the battlefieldwere so close and automatic.

The final victory in Africa was an unusuallycomplete example of the battle of annihilation.Never before had a great army been so totallydestroyed. A quarter of a million men laiddown their arms in unconditional surrender;six hundred and sixty three escaped. Immensestocks of arms, ammunition and supplies of allnatures were the booty of the victors. Our owncasualties in the final battle were less thantwo thousand men. At 1415 hours on i3th MayI sent the following signal to the Prime Minister:

" Sir, it is my duty to report that theTunisian campaign is over. All enemyresistance has ceased We are masters of theNorth African shores." »

APPENDIX " A ".

Directive to Commander-in-Ch\e\, Middle EastCommand.

PART I.Special Responsibilities.

1. Your prime and main duty will be to takeor destroy at the earliest opportunity, the Ger-man and Italian Armies in Libya and Egypttogether with all their supplies and establish-ments.

2. You will discharge or cause to be dis-charged, the duties enumerated ibelow, withoutprejudice to the task given in paragraph i_which is of paramount importance.

General Responsibilities.3. You will command and be responsible for

the administration of all Imperial Land Forces,and such Allied Forces as may foe specificallyplaced under your command in the following,territories:—

Egypt.Libya.Malta.Palestine and Trans-Jordan.Cyprus.Syria (west of the Inter-Command

boundary).Iraq (west of the Inter-Command

boundary).Sudan.Eritrea.

Your Eastern boundary (with Persia andIraq Command) will ibe:—

Inclusive Malatya—exclusive Siverek—RasEl Am—inclusive Hasseche—Garat Mottefo-—thence Syrian-Iraqi Frontier to inclusiveAbu Kemal—exclusive Kasr Muhaiwir thencea line due south to Saudi Arabian Frontier—thence exclusive Riyadh—inclusive Saiala.

4. You will also be responsible for the pre-paration of plans, when required, for the em-ployment of land forces in the following;territories:—

Italian territories in North Africa.Turkey (in conjunction with C.-in-C.,,

Persia and Iraq ••Command).

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 885

The Balkan States (Yugoslavia,Roumanaa, Bulgaria and Greece).

Crete.The Islands in the Aegean.Arabia (in conjunction with C.-in-C.,

Persia and Iraq Command).

5. Subject to the direction of the Chiefs ofStaff and of the War Office in respect of landforces, you are responsible, in conjunction withthe Commanders-in-Chief, Mediterranean andEastern Fleet, and the Air Officer Command-ing-in-chief, Middle East, and C.in-C., Persiaand Iraq, for the co-ordination of the opera-tions of Imperial and Allied Forces under yourCommand m the territories mentioned in para-graphs 3 and 4 above with those of the Alliesof His Majesty's Government.

6. Should you wish to make recommenda-tions regarding the transfer of any formationsor units of the land forces between the MiddleEast and Persia and Iraq Command you willconsult the Commander-in-Chief, Persia andIraq Command, and will, if possible forwardan agreed recommendation. No moves be-tween the two Commands will take place with-out the authority of the War Office.

7. You will be responsible in conjunctionwith the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,Middle East, for the preparation of plans forthe employment of land forces in Aden to meetthe eventuality of major land operations in orbeyond the borders of this Protectorate. Inthat eventuality you will assume command ofthe land forces in Aden. This in no way affectsthe responsibilities of the Air Officer Com-manding, British Forces in Aden, for the con-duct of purely local operations of a minorcharacter.

8. You are responsible for advising HisMajesty's Government as regards their policytowards the armed forces of Egypt Questionsrelating to those forces will be dealt withthrough the channel of His Majesty's Repre-sentative in Egypt except where arrangementsto the contrary have been agreed upon by allconcerned.

PART II.Liaison with Service Authorities.

g. In carrying out these tasks, you will,•where appropriate, consult and co-operate withthe Commanders-in-chief, Mediterranean andEastern Fleet, the Commanders-in-chief, Indiaand Persia and Iraq Command, the GeneralOfficers Commanding-in-chief, East and WestAfrica and the Air Officer Commanding-in-chief, Middle East.

Allocation of Air Forces.10 The allocation of air forces as between

Middle East on the one hand and Persia andIraq on the other will be a matter for the generaldirection of the Chiefs of Staff.

The temporary reinforcement of one Com-mand at the expense of the other is a matterfor the judgment of the Air Officer, Command-ing-in-chief, subject to any directions he mayfrom time to time receive from the Chiefs ofStaff or the Air Ministry and to the closestconsultation with you, the Minister of State,

the Commander-in-Chief, Persia and Iraq, andthe Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Relations with the -Air Officer Commanding-m-Chief Middle East during active opera-tions,

11. When you consider that active operationsare in prospect^ you will, with the approval ofthe Chiefs of Staff, notify the Air Officer Com-manding-in-Chief, Middle East. He will thengive you all possible aid.

Liaison with Civil Authorities.12. You will, either direct* through His

Majesty's Minister of State or through theGeneral Officers Commanding-in-chief, as maybe appropriate, maintain touch with HisMajesty's Representatives in Egypt, Turkey(in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief,Persia and Iraq Command), the GovernorGeneral of the Sudan, the High Commissionerfor Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and theGovernors of Aden, Cyprus and Malta. Youwill also maintain touch with Le Commandanten Chef Delegue General et Plenipotentiairede la France Libre au Levant, either direct orthrough His Majesty's Minister of State.

PART III.Responsibilities in respect of occupied enemy^ territories.'13. Political, administrative and legislative

authority in occupied enemy territory withinyour command is vested in you at internationallaw. You should, however, delegate thisauthority in full to your Chief Political Officer.

PART IV.

Relations with His Majesty's Minister of State.14. You will refer any question requiring im-

mediate decision by His Majesty's War Cabinetto His Majesty's Minister of State, who has theauthonty to take such a decision on behalfof His Majesty's War Cabinet should theoccasion demand.

It is the responsibility of His Majesty'sMinister of State to decide whether, accordingto the degree of urgency, rle will take a decisionor refer it to His Majesty's War Cabinet.

15. You will consult His Majesty's Ministerof State, where appropriate, on all politicalquestions affecting your command.

(Sgd.) P. J. GRIGG.The War Office.

I3th November, 1942.

APPENDIX " B ".

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.February, 1943.

OPERATIONS IN TUNISIA.Directive to Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

To:General the Honourable Sir H. R. L. G.

Alexander, G.C.B.i. In pursuance of the conclusions reached

at the 63rd meeting of the Combined Chiefsof Staff, held on 20th January, 1943, you areappointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of theAllied Forces in French North Africa. Further,

886 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948

you are appointed Commander of the Groupof Armies operating in Tunisia.

2. This appointment takes effect on 2othFebruary, 1943, on which date you will takecommand of all Allied forward forces engagedin operations in Tunisia. These consist of theBritish First Army, which exercises commandover the United Stales and French forcesoperating in Tunisia, the British Eighth Army,and such reserve formations as may be placedunder your command.

3. Your mission is the early destruction ofall Axis forces in Tunisia.

4. You will establish an Army Group Head-quarters initiaDy at Constantine, or other suit-able point of your selection.

5. A naval officer from the Staff of C.-in-C.,Mediterranean, will be located at your Head-quarters to furnish you with such naval adviceand assistance as you may require.

6. An Air Officer Commanding the TacticalAir Force will share your Headquarters andwill direct the Air Forces assigned to him fordirect support of your Armies to the best ad-vantage of the land operations prescribed byyou.

Army support wings will be attached to Firstand Eighth Armies The Wing Commanderswill act as air advisors to the Army Com-manders and will command such Air Forces asmay be assigned to them from time to timeby 'the Air Officer Commanding the TacticalAir Force.

7. Responsibility for supply and maintenanceof the forces under your command will remainas follows:—

Allied Force H.Q. for First Army (includ-ing all United States and French Forcesunder command) and for any reserves andAir Forces found from Allied Forces.

G.H.Q., Middle East, for Eighth Army andfor Air Forces found from R.A.F., MiddleEast.8. The rear ((Western) boundary of your

command will be the line of all inclusive ZribetEl Oued V99—La Meskiana M.go—Dj MesloulaNo3—Point mo No6—Ston De Nador M8g—Boudarouah G8o—road Munier H3i—Le TailH43—Lac Melah H45.

By .Command of General EISENHOWER:W. B. SMITH,

Major General, G.S.C.,Chief of Staff.

Copies to:C.-in-C. Mediterranean.A.O C.-in-C. Mediterranean.

APPENDIX " C".

I4th March, 1943.

EIGHTEENTH ARMY GROUP.Policy.

1. Object—To destroy the Axis Forces, inTunisia as early as possible.

2. Grouping—Eighteenth Army Group willdirectly control: —

Eighth Army,2 U.S. Corps,

First Airay with the French troops (XIXCorps) under- command.

3. Sectors —British, French, and Americantroops will be allotted separate sectors as fara<3 possible under their own commanders.

4. Organisation —Divisions will live, train,and fight as divisions and will not be split upinto" small groups or combat teams.

5 Specialist Troops, such as parachutetroops and commandos, will be withdrawn forrest, refitting, and training, as early as possible.

6. Eighteenth Army Group Reserve:6 Armoured Division ~|One British Infantry Division \ 9 Corps.9 Corps troops Ji Parachute Brigade,i and 6 Commandos.

9 Corps will carry out intensive training foroffensive operations under Commander 9 Corps.

7. Local Reserves.—Corps sectors must aimat having the equivalent of one infantry divi-sion or one armoured division in Corps reserve.

8. Armour.—Tanks will be withdrawn fromthe front line and grouped as local reservesfor the counter-attack role.

9. Firm Bases.—Key positions will be pre-pared and held strongly" as firm bases, andpivots, well supported by artillery and tanks.Areas between these firm bases will be carefullypatrolled and watched. Enemy penetrationinto these gaps in small numbers will be dealtwith by local reserves. Enemy penetration instrength will be dealt with by Corps reserves.

.10. The front will at present be held de-fensively but in an offensive spirit with activepatrolling and minor operations undertaken toimprove positions, train units, and keep theinitiative over the enemy.

11. Training.—Intensive training in tacticsand the use of weapons will be undertaken byall troops, both in and out of the line, witha view to future offensive operations. Atten-tion is called to " Tactical and TrainingNotes " issued down to Company and equiva-lent commanders.

12. Morale.—Everything possible will bedone to raise the morale and fighting spirit ofthe troops to the highest pitch.

13. Administrative.—Everything possiblewill be done to build up reserves of materialand supplies for future offensive operations.

14. Air Forces.—The Air Force organisation-will be parallel to that of the land forces.The policy is to reorganise the air forces sothat the Tactical Air Force H.Q. will controlbalanced formations linked with the opera-tional Armies and Corps comprising Eighteenth-Army Group.

15. Develop the hitting power of the airforces in Tunisia by the creation of a tacticalbomber force for operation in the (battle area.

16. .Co-ordinate the operations of all forma-tions comprising the Tactical Air Force andensure maximum flexibility and mutual sup-port of one another.

17. To provide airfield and supply resources,which will enable the maximum air striking,force to be used where it is most needed.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 5 FEBRUARY, 1948 887

18. To ensure co-ordination with external 20. To build up the Tactical Air Forces toair forces whereby the strategic air-commands the highest possible operational standard forand Malta units may be brought into the any tasks that may be required after comple-approved plan. tion of the African fighting.

19. Whilst doing everything possible in theTunisian land battles to prepare the most effec- H. R. ALEXANDER,tive operations to prevent a successful enemy General,evacuation from Africa. Commander, Eighteenth Army Group.

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1948

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