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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agenciesand their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 29 MAR 1968.Other requests shall be referred to AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development (Army),Washington, DC 20310.

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[CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON, DC. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (21 Mar 68) FOR 0T KD b/Xl 7-i 29 March 1968

00 N fr*

so

<

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation h,\l<L.\S, 11 rIs Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period 17 - 26 Mav 1%/ 0'

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded as inclosure for roview and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro- priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

^L^d & Aubl* *H4_ 1 Incl as

^ KENNETH G. WICKHAM Major General, USA The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION ; Commanding Generals L

US Continental Army Command US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants US Army War College US Army Command and General Staff College US Army Missile and Munitions School US Army Air Defense School US Army Armor School US Army Artillery and Missile School US Army Aviation School

us S Se.^™ sun*, *■,.», Regraded unclassified when separated US Army Engineer School from Classified InClOSUTe. US Army Infantry School

W^^-^mM^^

A/

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Copies furnished: Office, Chief of Staff, US Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff Chief of Engineers Chief of Research and Development Assistant Chiefs of Staff Research Analysis Corporation (Library) Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD(SA) Defense Documentation Center CG, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

■■:•':■■ ?>'■■* -'■'.-.-

CONHDtNHAL

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SQUADRON UTH ARMORED CAVALRT REGIMENT

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

1* (U) REFERENCES«

a« OPCRD 13^7 (Operation DALLAS (U) dated 16 Hay 1967 to implement in- structions reooived In let Brigade, let Infantry Division OPORD 12*67 (Operation DALLAS) (U) dated 1L; May 1967.

b. Maps, Vietnam, 1*50,000 Series L701U, Sheets 6330 IV, 6331 I, H, in«

2, (U) NAME AMD TIPS OP OPERATION. The name of the operation was DALLAS and was a search and destroy operation conducted in the western portion of WAR ZONE Dc

3. (Ü) DATES OF OPERATION. 170700 May to 260900 Hay 1967 (Squadron parties pation)«

h» (U) LOCATION, The area of operations for the squadron-s phase of the operation was conducted in the western portion of WAR ZONE D. The area was generals ly- northeast of TAN DIEN, in an area bounded by Route 16 to the wast, the Dong Nai River to the south and east, and the Song Be River in the north and west«

5« (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was the controlling headquarters for the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment» The reporting officer for this report is Lieutenant Colonel Martin D. Howell, Command- ing Officer, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment»

Subordinate commanders during the operation were as followst

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron CPT John E. Bailey

Troop A CPT John P# Votaw

Troop B CPT John R. Landry (17 Kay to 22 May)

Troop C CPT George L. Ounderman

Company D CPT William C* Chndboume

Howitzer Battery 1LT Lawrence H. Marino Jr.

1st Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop MAJ Robert N. Troadway

1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company 2LT Anthony T. Power

6. (C) GENERAL.

a« The below indioated organisation waa the aquadrcn'.'j uasic configuration for the operation* Daily modifications were made to permit flexibility, but general- ly os-v Uaa hui across to all elements of their assigned tnalc organisation as out» llnoc'

..» adron Controls

Bouitier Bettor;*

Aftatjen Section

1st P39tocr\, Air Cavalry fraap, :uifc armare^ Oav«)«y f?««LPwnt

lac Plaroen, 9i9th frginetr Company

CONFIDENTIAL &>***** *•#» **•"* ; ot OT mm DOD DIR •*«•

CONFIDENTIAL Tea» At

Troop A (-)

Tank Section« Company D

Team B*

Troop B

3rd Platoon, Company D

Troop C

Tea» Bi

Company B (-)

2nd Platoon, Troop A

b« Artillery* Direct support was provided toy howitzer battery with re- inforcing fires being provided by artillery supporting the 1st Brigade.

o» Army Aviationi

(1) First Platoon, Air Cavalry Troop flew in direct support of the squadron« light and heavy fire teams were used continuously on a dally basis« The squadron aviation section provided daily ccrmand and control coverage over the area of operations.

(a) Qnploymenti

1 Command and control

2 Aerial fire support

2 Column oover

^ ifeconnaisaanoe

| Dawn and dusk patrols of laager areas

6 Mortar watch

7 Suppreaaive fire runs (Aerial Thunder Runs)

(b) Statiatics on support rendered!

1 Sorties fleam « 176 (1*3 combat missions)

? Hours flown - 2l&

(n) ftossltsi Aviation element« were credited Kith two VC KBA (~".C5;. six structures, two aarcpans; destroyed and twen-y-seren itmctune, one rrrrr. lauignd. Amnvrntion ea^etidltaraa) war» 2&VIBD * 1*t>2m* roMVta ',,6 - 2 ""?* . -c.-'i. . 'jVX) - JrCt? i . .-anadss and 160 snoko grenade■

Air Fore». Durii.g Operation DALLAS, nineteen TAC Air sorties were flown. .Urre strikes were preplanned, nine were <mne<H.nt.o« requested for forces <n c«ia« tact and one fiero rhlp was cilldd during a mortar attack.

• CO IOTEU.1 Wi!*:..

i. lnlormation Available to the seu»dr©n. prior to initiation ©J Oar at Ion DAT.FAS had pn*. fly been gathered throjgh agent reports from vsrtsnw ■.nirtes. .Vtauui rfc ure« hed not been penetrated bv allied forced Icr a*m

P»SS 2

COMF1 OEMTIAL

I • < CONFIDENTIAL eigit months, It was difficult to determine how nmoh of the information wsa re- liable» In addition, the squadron was not really eure how much tsv: Jfc movement vould be restricted by tha terrain, mines, roadblooks, and Impending monsoon rains* From experience and limited aerial reoonnaissanoe, the con leruuo of the ground commanders «as favorable« No major changes in methods of tactical em» j&oynent were oontemplated< Attention wt a initially direoted to a known major rice route, east to west, generally through the center of the brigade area of operations! and possible detection and engagement of the VC 273rd Main Force Reg- iment, which was suspected becmiee of the reoent attacks on the FTEN KOI and PHUOC VINH bases. Possible reinforcement by the 271, 272 VC Regiments and the 101st NVA Regiment, meant that the equaoron must increase preparedness in the two areas i

(1) Ability to reinforce the infantry battalions in the event of major engagement!» This was accomplished by continuous aerial reconnaissance of access routes into the infantry*s position and careful selection of daily areas of operations to facilitate immediate reaction«

(2) Protection against possible, large seals mortar attacks« The squadron reviewed and strengthened counter-mortar procedures and, in retrospect this was particularly rewarding,

b« Lastly, the enemy installation target lists provided by brigade in- telligence were extremely valuable and accurate« On 22 Hay the squadron encount- ered significant enemy resistance at exact target list coordinates that had been reoeived through brigade intelligence channels«

8« (C) MISSION, The 1st Squadron attacks north into sootor, seises and secures two artillery support bases« Conducts combat reconnaissance in assigned AO'sj destroys VC/NVA forces and installations in sector.

9« (C) EXECUTION.

a. Manauvorr

(1) The 1st Squadron was pieced under control of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infrjitrj Division on 16 Hay 1967, and moved into a forward asses-ly area at niu LOI on the same date« The squadron's howl tsar battery was emplacel initially at FSB A, vicinity TT9$22$1«

The brigade area of operation was dirided into six subordinate AO's, WACO, HOUSTON, L0N3VIW, AUSTIN, KHIEN, and DRAQOOK (See Annex A«) Initially, the squadron was to operate in AO's WACO, Am!, id KIUEN, thieh placed the squad- ron generally In the center of the brigad: AO, rcll positioned as a rsbile reac- tion force for the Infantry battalions, should they encounter substantial contact« However, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was inserted into AO KILXEN, rather than AO ROUST 0* and lost K2LIE8« Hotdtser Buttery, 1st Squadron, 11 th Armored Cavalry was reemplaeed first at FSB B and Inter at FSB D« This move necessitat- ed limited engineer work on the road betweer the two fire support bases and the squadron aasumod security responsibility for or-Miration convoys along the route»

airing Operation DALUS, the 1st fngsae received two agent reports which located elements of the 273rd VC Main „rce Regiment in the brigade AO. The 1st Squadron reacted in both instance , locating elemsnts of the 2nd Battalion, 273rd 70 Regiment on ZL and 22 Kay 1*67.

(2) There ware no squadron one rations conducted in conjunction "l+h JWI forces caving CfwiiMen .Vtt'/*,

(?) The cquadrer» c.~*u ^i tl>j ^llcrir, ire p erA ^lateen rV:n rrtfl*U*i £'r*-g Operation DALI/S.

(a) Ih'lti-troop . o■■■■ I'm. .ttttf4c ( ,:*cjps/: 1

(z) 'roop si: U. «Btiitu^ sus%lart • "}

.. ■ .rroop si? > IZ emurit| »iaii-T.ci 3

Pag. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

r > ii^^it^ ff If ß^L

(•) Troop «H«''«KB woohnoi»««BM «datiohti

(f) Troop lift oonroy «aoortai

(g) Troop otto anglnear work party aecurityt

(h) Troop Hit routa aaourity aiationa (OPCOBInf)

(1) Troop list reaotion alaaiona«

(J) Platoon tilt March «ad deatroy operational

(k) Platoon (ooapoaite) anginear work party eecurity

(1) Platoon its« night routa olaaranot aiationa (Thunder aunt) t y

TOTAL $1

Squadron elaannte aada oontaot on eight oat of th« ftftguono «lotion« no. Uonad abota« Six of tbeee oontaot« aura light «ad two were nodorat« eontaota, each laatlsg appradnataly throa hoar«*

io. (o) ssmncm Aoncft 17 Hay 1967

Tha «qoadron croeeed the Una of ddpartura «it ITOtfDB May with TOM B leed- lag, folloMd tar TOM A, Troop 0 «ad Ten» 0« Tha lir«t objMtiae, FSB B, m» entered at 07» «ad ooapletely eeoured by TOM • «ad TMJI 0 at OÄ20. Tea» a had eeoured a Uadlaf «OM for tha lot Battalion, 26th Xafantiy, «lent tha root« of edranoe, at 0710H.

At 0929 boure, « Chinook «ad tha aqnadron«« Iff reoeired ground fir« no. lntty aMUPt Tuo platoon« fron Tue» B, ralaforaad with taaka attaokad north to looata «ad daatroy thee« «BMV forM«. At IflLt hoar«, Mllo eloeing la tha ohjaotlTt aratu Tea» B>« load alaaaet «pottad two fO running fron north to «oath vicinity XW23u3. Tht troop net up a «nail MM of fira aad began to aaaault tha woodllM direotly to their tight flank« Alaoat laaadUtaly, OM of tha tanka hit a nlM M tha euneuver alawoat oroaeed a road parallal to their Ml« of odranoe, Thraa nora VC an elghted at 1195934*7, aoalag aaat to Mat» Polio*. tag thla incident, «a lanadUU air atrika «u placed on tha objective art4 and artillery WM utilieed to attaapt to «Ml anaay withorawal rowtM to tha aorta« aaat« During tha Mantndw of hat aoralat «ad afternoon, Troop B ooadootad cporaUoM ia tha general area« A anall but aaap WM found at TT94%3L, with fraah traato loadiag ia fron tha «oath« 300 pounde of pollahad rlea aad eiaty pound« of onlt wara uncovered aad dnatroyad, later, at 13«2 houre« vicinity TT0Oii3U, alononta found «a antitank alM (aatiMtad to ba 10 lbe) aad evacuated it through Intelligence chancel«. Bo further ooataet WM eatablithed«

Troop 0 had attaakad through IBB B to tha aaat to Mlta F3B S« At 1312 hour*, th« tree* eeroneted M antitank «AM wUialty HaAWta* ?\e vehicle en«, teined uiaor deaaga and thara was OM » MIL AX lall haart, tree» 0 round a VC body, with dooaaaaea# M YT0J2J7i» BaMM ef liiieeaati «at* ttm alaaant« off 2nd Battalion, 2?3rd VC Beglaent« At 15J5 Mara, ?-v ' -* * * «*** w*K**u

p*n», vidult/ TTOMJyT* Thara waM no aaaaaltiM and ta* AGIV aaetstnea faxt* eraU daaaga* WMl« «aaapBag tha araa. tree» C found «ad d*ton«t«d a »»««a vtaa at xrOM397,

Th« s«uadron>a hovitaar battary began ataalttaaant fraa VI» C t* riifc J a* miH and cloaad in Poaitlon B at Ule haurt.

Troop A cloaad In PSB P at 1*5* and a MI awl aad aaarab mi «aakTay «aatrakaaus to th« nerth far th« r.««lpd<*r «f th* afUrnoon,

IS hay 1967

Troop» A and C operated la Are»» A and U ellhln AO HftfiO. Taaa % e*n*»rk*l

Pagat

CONFIDENTIAL

. . CONFIDENTIAL tvo platoon else clewing operations north and south of FSB B. Team D conducted reoonnaiasanoe of a tori frt.to, vicinity 7S97$3k79 widoh was to be ueed on the nineteenth duxlnj movement to secure a landing sons for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry*

At 1235 hours, Teem A found three graves vicinity XT05736U» whioh appeared to be a veek old» Thrae bodies, wrapped in pla3tio and dressed in black, were found In the graveo» Again at lh$$ hours. Team A found and evacuated 23,000 pounds of polished rice and 1875 pounds of salt» At 1555 hours, Team B evacuat- ed 130 steel reinforcing rods. 7 to 8 feet long, thirty sheets of tin and 50 pounds of aalt, vicinity TT99o33lu At 1557 hours, Troop C evacuated 3900 pound3 of rice from ooordinatos TT039399«

The only contact of the day ooourred at 17b5 hours, vicinity XI191715» when an observation post from Team A received one round of sniper fire» The oquudron's LFT observed one VC withdrawing from this area, engagod him and was credited with one VC KIA (POCS),

19 Kay 1967

Team A conducted jearoh and destroy operations in Area A, AO WACOj Troop C, search and destroy operations in Area C, AO UaCOi Team 0 secured a landing «one (vicinity XT962#8) and Team B seoured FSB B. The 2nd Platoon, Teem B waa ploood OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 16th Inftntry at 1025 hours,

20 May 1967

Team A conducted eooich and destroy operations in A/19, AO VnCO, Team B secured engineer work parties along the- route from FSB B and D, Trccp. C conducted search and destroy operations in Area C, AO WACO) and Team 0 conducted search and destroy operation? in FSB B» There was negativ* enemy contact during the day«

Troop A found f -osh graves (leas than 72 hours old) vicinity IT023377 at 1115 hours, and a third grave at JT02U3&8 at 11*15 hours»

Troop C hit a nine at 1610 hours, vicinity XT138398, with no OS casualties and miner damage to one AOAV.

During the day, 110 pounds of reck salt, two antitank nines, h pound of documents, foui* barrels of diesel fuel, hOQ p/>inds of polished rice waro recover« ed and ono OOCOM grenade booby trap -»as blowr. in place.

a May 1967

Team B attacked north to locato and destroy major units of the VC (Main Fcrco) 273rd Rogtmein, suspected to be locr.ted vicinity eoordlnates, &97h380»

?üoa /. and Troop C conducted secrch and destroy operations in Areas A/20, odd C/JO, AO HOUSTON, respectively« Teas D conducted local search end destroy ope*/ itions in Aro?. D.

Term B, operating in conjunction with the 1st Battalico, 16th Infantry, searaVi tho entf.ro -napested arcs and access routes a^>uth with icg&Uvo results. tiftMMY. •«. V60& hovru, Tro-p B »«3 ongrrcd by' •*• estimated company of VC bs**iv- ee* to be occupying hasty ubuik positions. Übe ambush waa initiated with revket and automatic weapon» fire, elayssarea ?rd greeadea and apparently was tripped early by the Cavalry unit.. Ixtrtotaly hecey aaaU~alrtrafc fire was received in the area by gunehipa, M#> perfe*VM**e erLrtraft, and raecua choppers« Cne F.Uk) (Super Sabre) crashed taring a nspabt rm: a Ruakle rescue shipper was d.*r.ed by anas* Jtxe. and eventually ba4 to b? de at rayed that night. Two Any gtroahlp* received t2«7asi hits aad bad to re grounded for repairs. The Air Teree pilot was killed («» ■li'-a'-*;, it- » C ta«n H| HA USA>', who Sad h»»u as. signed earlier to-the sajaatraa as a rxc lor epproaiaeUly 6 months balers I*1JV resssigfted to tha 7th AT* %t tttM HQA) These Air force roaeue erewsjsB wwe» wounded and one Anay ganafci» trev-tfcief was lightly wounded. US «round forced sustained ilva WHA, neat tfrt«*i. Enemy casualties ware unknown l*e**let*

CONFIOET« TiAL

CONFIDENHAL

airwtrikee end nlseloas pcxired fir« Into the area nost of the evening, and ar- tillery oontinntd »I fires throutfiout tht Bltfit»

TMH A aid 0 both hit ndntt during tht day, «1th negative friendly oasual* ties and only light damage to vehicles in each oast«

2* Hey 1967

Troop A (•) moved fron WS 0 to aaeara a II for tht lat Battalion, loth In- fantry Md later, assisted in as attack ooodaptad by Teens B and D. Tsear B and D attacked north Into a suspected bate area found during operations the previous day. Troop 0 eondaoted ssarah and destroy operations in Area C/20 - AO H005TCH, olearsd tht roots fron IBB 0 to 183 B and assorted Boniteur Battery and the squad, ron oonaaad post to Position B.

Team B aade iidtie* ocntast with eneny f oroes at OdSl hoars and aodsrate oon- tact was Maintained throughout tht aoming by both faans B and 0« The attack slashed thron* dsnso Jang!*, which had bash raked by airstrikss and artillery

«

pre fires earlier in the earning, to otarmn a ocspany aiss bass soap oesnpiad by an estimated two platoons of list Oong. Contact aaa broken bythe TO at llLl hoars as they fled to the northeast. During thin oontant, tea VO were killed (BO). BS casualties «era OBS Kfla and three VO WA. The sojaadron saptarad one 8KB Carbine, one HPO -2 lsunobcr, one BAR« one Kousur, end one ÜB 1W rifle*

it Ui2l boon* Teen A received an BKfc* round, narrowly mi wing the lead trank« vicinity S962366. At 1*29 hours. Teen A engaged four YO running fron south to north aarosa their front, and killed two. 0B0 runs and artillery ware sailed to block withdrawal routee. Contact was not regained as Team A pushed forward«

23 May 1967

m acnonwmss with tarns of the cease fire, the squadron did not offensive operations on this date« troop 0 aasatsd a fl for the 1st Battalion, löth infantry and Teen B conducted resupply oonvoy runs fron IBB B to IBB a

At 23091« hours, twcntjwthroo rounds of 60 en Barter fire fell to the south. east of the squadron night defensive position at FBI B. Matter alaienta re» parted that anew/ fixe positions appeared to be located to the north of the laager« at a rangt of BOO - 1000 enters« The squadron eaployed all counter-

procedures! there ware no OB oasualtlee.

2a Hay 1967

Teen A and Troop C attacked to tht north to locate end destroy major f oreee of the 273rd noglnont saapasted to be In the general vicinity <* »975377. fe. telligeaoo Information had been received at BM0 hoars fron the 1st Brigade. At 0926 houre, Tuen A esw two ?C vidnity lT9BD3*f took than ander fire, killing one, capturing a CHXCCN Type $6 Carbine.

At 2kl3V howe. Troop C uncovered «BO (100 lb.) bags of pcUehod rice via. irt*? XT96236!*. jLk bags «are evacuated end the rcanlndcf, whi-h hod been hit Y? vtVlUrr» «• destroyed. Ztt the eane general area, 36 aiautec later, Troop C ei*r-»d a «rrll tank killer teen, killing one VCj capturing 'bo WO-2 lavnc'.or v M ,m r^'tfjd.

act its sensing sf 2a hey at 3*1 hcrre, MB B was ait with a acaom* «ertir *ii*tk. Isteaay thru coma acrter reeado and eighteen Una renne* fall wttftrn the perlneter during the a • > minute attack. The e*>ae>ea Sena4iaam>j Uttcl*t»4 c«*at«r-e»rtar procedures which Ineluaal avtSXlary eeumter-aunrtwr flm* j*r letter direct fire, weapene firing, Away Aviation cmamUp ~\lr~ * y e ~ K , /• fl*r*/mittl-tun ml.»loo and an AT Ceenat Pveef cAstian. It «at eetafeUaftwl vV v. in t • 3 adnutoo of the initiattde af the etteem, that semaet wart Jut aas*» «a a targ*t-gun ataeuth of 2300 - 1900 a*la. Da» senket »reel uee tv -4\l*d %ui Itttttad* tea ftc «treated an laejadtate atswtnba and r* *'j>1-w .■*; 9 -U* % >ö •u«p«cted urgst area with unwaews rcevlte* US ceeweltiet wert «lt*>t««e Kkft. MM serteusly. he efulanent was

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAt (\ During tht porioo 2$ - 26 May 1^67» the equadron'a eecond phase of operations

1 (BN Annex B) oomonoed} no enaay oontaot vas aads* Sonsrotta small base oonpe were found and destroyed bat no enary Materials of sipificanoe were uncovered*

ii» (c) HEstmrsi

a« PBPBOJBIOI loosest US vc KA 2 19 and 3 (Pc so).

WHL — —

voc — —

b» Bqulpeaot losses t

d) US lossest Wons

(2) VO Loaeeet

(a) Veaponat

CAPTURED

2

DE-TROTED

1PO-2 Rocket launchor —

CHIOQH Carbine Type 56 1 —

AK-4*7 Aaeaalt Rifle 1 —

Rifle 1 —

BAR 1 -

Mauser 1 —

K-l 1 —

Spare Barrel 1 —

(b) Aaennitlonet CAPTURED EfcsTRGTED

CHXOQH grenades - 25

Gel »30 round« 200 —

Rifle grex-adot 6 —

RTO-2 rounds 23 —

A? rinss u 2

6C*n ncrtar rounds 20 —

AK ^7 (sr-caiinae) 2 -.

Wwt «-*Ulerr S"£V. ... 1»

dm; ttifi CMmf % »

.'** rcr^-u/.'-i

C>f»! 4$ yur^i

Kjtk mU 2JJC Ht tor "i>

ioli chud Ji-A J6*t;o ,_ .. JM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTS (d) Miscellaneousi

Documents

Clothing

& ton track

Civilian type diesel fuel

Steel reinfarcing rods

Copper cable

Tin

cs gat

ARC-Wi radio parts

CAPTURED

10 lb«.

86 lbs.

1

150

DESTROYED

— h - 5$ gal drums

1 ton

1 roll (100 ft)

30 sheets

5 lbs.

2 - 53 gal drums

12. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. Glass It The squadron continued to use a 1«A and 2-C ration meal/ day cycle during the operation.

b. Glass II & IV t At the end of Operation DATIAS, the squadron was still short eight AGAVs.

o. Class lilt The squadron used 31,050 gallons of MCQAS and 9,300 gallons of diesel during Operation DALLAS. All Class HI products were deliver- ed by air*

d. (tlnaa Vt Th« squadron expended the following saounts of amrnmition rliirff« Opumtdon DATlARi

7.62nm

.50 Gal

90nm HE

90m (Canister)

Rand Grenades

550,000 rounds

125,000 rounds

li,500 rounds

30 rounds

318 rounds

1,200

o. Transportationi During Operation DALLAS, the squadron used 150 CH-.'i7 sorties anu eighty-eight UB-1D sorties to »ore apprcadjcataly 1,050,000 lbs of resupply raterlal.

13. (C) CfMKANDSR'S ANALYSIS. *

a. Selective extensions of AG's to exploit intolligonco findings ft t'jnwVoa level*

(1) Problem: 0,\ 21 and 22 Kay 1957, *AY> squadron ras C«;VK' t.v the root ripiif leant contact of Operation DALLAS. Initial contact wa.n o:•**'■ ltrh> ed at 1700 hours on the 21at, An exploitivo attack was launched on tho ?ir.w Ly t/c 6>7ridror. aM rcrtSnMttn n.-mMot was naintainod throughout the rorr.Lnr. Pi..- tief i old «utoliigono© revealed that ths attacking foroa had engagnd an s&fcv .tftd rwps.v eise »lenmt :'ron the 2nd Battrlicn, 273rd IJai). Toaam Raglitont. Do-;u,ncr.ts l\.',-c'X.\ ir/Jeatc* poer'M* nrairwe of supn^rt e>r*'.:t.;« *vm C06V" ";rv-d -.;.l::. •v^o.vfc Ulli*«, i'ui v zs« r.i-o >:v:V •" xv\ : ,vJo\ - ?3r.fti'.'* ». ' 3 , £id not pe.Tüii opw.tlcns <v. tho 2i|thj •»'V.—.r, a'.? li-, *cti^ r p ' : . I-« - to the rtrong poenibil?.ty that a mjor Vu i-«»icl>t\3» exist'.'d f»r*t.io. •■.:> i'v» r rth oas^, vir;irity t-xid (»qnares, rr*)3-, 973$, or t'0o;7. The wji.vJron vouid hr-s

Page 8

CONFIDENTIAL

'«SSI^,-.:

CONFIDENTS ; required ^ estimated one or two day extension to thoroughly search this area and could hove conducted the Operation «1th organic oonbet and oonbet support elanents» However* the squadron «as eommittod to the 0!O DOHO eeeret are«, to the vest« and could not oontinue In this area of lntereett

(2) Disoueeion and Reoomnendations i The squadron'a experience during ten months in-country, has shown that battlefield intelligence reports provide the moat useful information for snored cavalry exploitation* ScheoV uling of cavalry employment must provide sufficient flexibility to permit time- ly and thorough reaction to these battlefield intelligence reports» Our oca- bined arms teen ocsmpoaition, rapid reaction capability, and self sustaining characteristics, facilitate such employment.

b, use of stay behind patrols and enemy target lists» Discussions The squadron's experience has shown that the VO repeatedly use old base camps and consistently returned to sites of oontaot» During the initial stages of an operation, the enemy installation target list is extremely Important, to establish oontaot and verify known installations« Stay behind patrols and HRP's are extremely valuable to reestablish oontaot, trace infiltration and exfiltra- tlon routes, and possibly capture HfJe»

o» Counter-Hortar Fire Procedurest Discussioni The squadron has developed a counter-mortar fire plan, integrating all organic and combat support fire, which was successfully employed during Operation DAILAS on two occasions» Procedures includei Artillery counter-mortar fires, direct fire from perimeter forces (7*62 HQ, 50 Cal MO, 90mm RE delay and H-79), ligit and heavy fire team gun runs, non-stop mortar watch* U'gbtyj, IF fUreMnifun ships» oceibot proof missions, and Immediate airstrikes» Then procedures require detailed planning and exercise» Other tactical considerations ores Enforcement of overhead cover poliolas for all, requirements for LP's/OP's and AP's to obtain cover from peri» meter direct fire weapons, alert teems to provide information on orater analysis, light discipline and establishment of flre-oontrol end medio parties»

d» artillery Support!

(1) Problem areest

(a) Serious maintenance Probleme were encountered with the H-109 Howitsere during the reporting period» The lack of replacement parts pre- sented the most serious problems and a partial list of the most critical of these parts are listed belowt

1 Seals for hydroulio systems»

2 Bore evacuator plugs (150 rd life)»

2, firing looks»

i Detent plungers (1500 rd life)»

(b) Some problem arose on one oeoasion in obtaining permis- sion to hove one oattery, firing (OS) for squadron troops in contact, revert to (£3) role during the duration of the contact»

(2) Dinsuision and recommeTurationss

(a) The naiatenanoo probier» of the IV1C? ftzrl+asr ex. fca alleviated by a «restar input c£ repiaoeaect parts and introaoed u».a oC crinsr-ee contact to«nu with n corresponding Increase in a cense of urgency by the tears. In addition, than all cix tubes arc onerailonal, ifc IS recrraended L>a* one tub*» bo atetai8tMH*kly- dwillrod tnr 12 hoar* out of inzr? 72 hour period, for coa- plet* na'.ntsetra»«

V !n ftf of th* leuedron rseansaiiet llut e*tt%rWi ".'-in;: maneuver battelions/icuadrone^ revert te *W* of tV* bettelte*/stynrir en titabttuft» lag significant contact for the duration of tee «nceuettv» £b*M Ute*r4** ---Ltd revert, to (G3) roles or K?5) of ether maneuver batttUena« Ueuld ems need arSce, by nevs tfttettfive use ef artillery eotaamiestiemi artworks*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL (c. Oaring Operation DALLAS, VT fl«w« «IN used exteneitely v

to cow roods and trails during hours of daftness« These fires supplement \ clearing toons and thunder runs, with considerable success in keeping lines of euuvuiiloatlon open«

(d) During Gpss-aUon DALLAS, w found that initial reser- vations on the nee of I55sn delayed-fute rounds, to open up fortification«

p and Installations, «ere lnocrreot* We initially expeoted to enoounter a higher du<W*tio than would be acceptable* In fact the ratio le about the sane as that with fuse QUICK»

P.- ID

OMIUEIJTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.CONFIDENTIAL

A kr *u> ' '■ ' ; < • , v — Si. :Al>K\>" : ,(V^ > 11 '.4 •'« ' .,' ' ' " .; - '.' V 1' '' c ^ V t ) ' ■- » • **|A> , •' <•>*■• A ' .W - ■* ; *"^

; ~,m--. • * I. -,*,. »—

'« -4, X

f CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B - AHIAS CF CFBUtflON (Phase II),

Cfceratiötl DALLAS

8S

2d L

\A(\\\\y \V i'\ V

91 I

23

\ - Artus worked by the 1st Squadron

CONFIDENT I AL

ftuvet 3 Ih

iiNfiussTnfin ^curir^On^MflcjMion^

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA R&D (Security clmttlllemUmn of Uli», hotly of g|ttjgtf ant» jfHJf«Jfj| mnnolmtlon muni be mUtwd whnn Ihm ovmill trjmti in ttusnl(laih

I. ORIOINATINO ACTIVITY (Conformf mulhor)

fl OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

J«. REPORT «CURITV C L A tSI F IC A 1 ION

Confidential

J. RKRORT TITL«

Combat After Action Report - Operation DALLAS, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U)

4. DttCRIRTIV« NOT«! (Typ» otfpotl mnd fntfiMfYO »ml»»)

a of unit engaged In CQuntcrlnaurgencv operations. 17"26 May 1967, Experiences of unit engagec) AUTMORHI (Ht»t nmm», mtdrft» Initial, Imatnt

CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

• RKRONT DATt

undated

7«. TOTAL NO. Of RAOtt

13 76. NO. Or niFl

ft. RROJICT NO.

N/A

M. ORIGINATOR*« REPORT NUMIIKHI

67X179

•ft. OTHIM RCRORT NOltl (Any olhmr numbmtm that may ft* aflgrrd thlm tmmmtt)

10. DISTRIBUTION tTATKMENT

N/A

»>. lOftTRACf

III. «RONftORINO MILITARY ACTIVITY

0ACSF0R, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13

DD /r..1473 UNCLASSIFIED V... .•..»%• I'l .rv.ll