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_II

HNF-3553 Annex A, Rev. 0 - Canister Storage Building Final Safely Analysis Report

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. _- -

H N F-SD-SN F-H IE-00 1 Revision 3

Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis Report

Prepared for the US. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management Project Hanford Management Conhador fa the U.S. Department of Energy under Contrad DE-AC069SRL13200

EO. Box loo0 Richland, Washington

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Apprwad for public rdesle; further dissemination unlimited

- I -

HNF-SD-SNF-HIE401 Revision 3

Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis Report

T. 6. Powers Fluor Hanford. Inc.

ECN: 656344

Date Published March 2000

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management

Fluor Hanf ord P.O. Box 1000 Richland, Washington

MAR1 00

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c_

HNF-SD-SNF--001 Revision 3

Abstract: This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Canister Storage Building (CSB) Hazard Analysis to support the final CSB Safety Analysis Report and documents the results.

Key Words: Hazard Analysis, Canister Storage Building

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CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT

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"F-SD-SNF-H1E-001 REV 3

CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT

1 March 2000

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HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-001 REV 3

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CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2.0 SCOPE OF THE HAZARD ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . , . . 1

3.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS . . . , . . , . , . . 3 3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , , . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . 4 3.2 HAZARD EVALUATION , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , . , , . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . 4 3.3 CANDIDATE ACCIDENT SELECTION . . . . , . . , , . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 8 3.4 HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY . . . . . . . . , , . . , . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . 10

4.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACKSTORAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

ANALYSISSCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2 TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS COVERAGE . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . I I 4.3 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD

EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

4.5 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD ANALYSISSUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4.1 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD

4.4 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD BINS . . . 1 1

5.0 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

ATTACHMENTS

A CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING HAZARD ANALYSIS TEAM MEMBERS . . . A-I

LIST OF FIGURES

1 Main Areas of the Canister Storage Building . . . . . , , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . 14

2 Three-by-Three Likelihood and Consequence Ranking Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Much 2000

"F-SD-SNF-HIE-001 REV 3

LIST OF TABLES

1 Hazardous MaterialEnergy Source Checklist: Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2 Hazardous MaterialiEnergy Source Checklist: Trailer Vestibule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3 Hazardous MaterialEnergy Source Checklist: Load-InLoad-Out Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

4 Hazardous MaterialEnergy Source Checklist: Operating Area, Without Overpack (See Table 9 for Overpack Storage), With Tube Vent and Purge Cart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Hazardous MaterialEnergy Source Checklist: SamplingiWeld Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Hazardous MaterialEnergy Source Checklist: Vault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Hazardous MaterialiEnergy Source Checklist: Support Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Hazardous MaterialiEnergy Source Checklist: Outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Hazardous MaterialiEnergy Source Checklist: Off-Normal Multi-Canister Overpack Storage in Overpack Tube, With Tube Vent and Purge Cart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

I O Standard Industrial Hazards: Trailer Vestibule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

I 1 Standard Industrial Hazards: Load-InLoad-Out Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

5

6

7

8

9

12 Standard Industrial Hazards: Operating Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

14 Standard Industrial Hazards: Support Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

15 Standard Industrial Hazards: Outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

13 Standard Industrial Hazards: SamplingiWeld Area

16 Standard Industrial Hazards: Overpack Locations in Operating Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

17 Canister Storage Building Material at Risk (Type. Form. and Quantity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

18 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Trailer Vestibule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

19 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Load-IdLoad-Out Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

20 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Operating Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

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LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

21 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Samplinfleld Area . . . , . . , . , , . . . . . . . , . , 76

22 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Vault . . . . . . , . . , , . , , . , . . , . . . . . , . . . . . . 86

23 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Support Building , . . , . . , . . , . . , . . . , . , , . . 89

24 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Outside . , . , , , . , . . , , . , . , , . . . . . . . . . . , . 90

25 Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors 99

26 Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents . . , . . . . . , . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , . , . . . . , . , . , 106

27 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis: Off-normal Multi-Canister Overpack Storage in Overpack Storage Tube . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .

28 Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents for Off-normal Multi-Canister Overpack Storage , . , , . , , . . . . . , , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . ,

109

123

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LIST OF TERMS

AIChE CSB Canister Storage Building FSAR final safety analysis report MCO multi-canister overpack MHM multi-canister overpack handling machine

American Institute of Chemical Engineers

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CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING HAZA,RD ANALYSIS REPORT

1.0 1NTRODUCTION

This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Canister Storage Building (CSB) hazard analysis to support the CSB final safety analysis report (FSAR) and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with the DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparution Guide for 11 S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Sufity Analysis Reports, and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nticleur Sujity Anulysis Reports.

The hazard analysis process identified hazardous conditions and material-at-risk, determined causes for potential accidents, identified preventive and mitigative features, and qualitatively estimated the frequencies and consequences of specific occurrences. The hazard analysis was performed by a team of cognizant CSB operations and design personnel, safety analysts familiar with the CSB, and technical experts in specialty areas. The material included in this report documents the final state of a nearly two-year long process. Attachment A provides two lists of hazard analysis team members and describes the background and experience of each. The first list is a complete list of the hazard analysis team members that have been involved over the two-year long process. The second list is a subset of the first list and consists of those hazard analysis team members that reviewed and agreed to the final hazard analysis documentation.

The material included in this report documents the final state of a nearly two-year long process involving formal facilitated group sessions and independent hazard and accident analysis work. The hazard analysis process led to the selection of candidate accidents for further quantitative analysis. New information relative to the hazards, discovered during the accident analysis, was incorporated into the hazard analysis data in order to compile a complete profile of facility hazards. Through this process, the results of the hazard and accident analyses led directly to the identification of safety structures, systems, and components, technical safety requirements, and other controls required to protect the public, workers, and environment.

2.0 SCOPE OF THE HAZARD ANALYSIS

The CSB hazard analysis covered normal, intended, CSB operations for handling and storing a sealed multi-canister overpack (MCO). Potential hazards associated with storing an off-normal MCO in an overpack storage tube following undetermined accident recovery actions were also identified and analyzed. Chapter 3.0 ofthis report describes the hazard analysis for normal conditions, and Chapter 4.0 describes the hazard analysis for the off-normal MCO storage.

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The following normal CSB operations and conditions were analyzed using the method described in Chapter 3.0:

Receiving the transporter containing the cask-MCO and moving it into the facility

Moving the cask-MCO to the load-idload-out area and removing the cask lid at the cask receiving pit

Loading an empty MCO into an empty cask and returning the empty cask-MCO to the trailer

Performing MCO handling operations with the MCO handling machine (MHM)

- Transporting the MCO from the load-idload-out area to a storage tube or the samplingiweld area

Transporting the MCO from the sampling/weld area to a storage tube

Removing the MCO from a storage tube and transporting the MCO to the sampling/weld area and returning it to the storage tube after sampling

Removing the MCO from a storage tube and transporting the MCO to the samplingiweld area and returning it to the storage tube after welding

Conducting normal facility operations during MCO sampling, welding, staging and interim storage.

The following abnormal MCO storage operations and conditions were analyzed using

-

-

the method described in Chapter 4.0:

The event or accident leading to MCO damage or MCO out-of-specification has been terminated and recovery actions completed

The off-normal MCO is in place in the overpack storage tube

The overpack storage tube plug cover is installed

An inert atmosphere has been established in the overpack tube.

The hazard analysis was based on the design and operations described in “F-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Projeci Final Sqfev Analysis Report, Annex A, “Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.” The analysis also included review of a draft operating procedure and flow diagram. The following key sources of information were used to evaluate the hazards:

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HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, “Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report”

- Chapters A2.0 and A4.0 for facility design and operations information

Chapter A3.0 for the facility radioactive materials inventory

Chapter A6.0 for evaluating the potential for hazards from nuclear criticality events

-

WHC-SD-SNF-FHA-002, Fire Hazard Analysi.s,for the C’anister Storage Building; A R E S Report 95 1 107-00 1, Canister Storage Building Fire Code Equivalency Evaluation; A R E S Report 95 1 107-002, White Paper I’resenting Recommended Approach to Fire Protection ofthe Operating Area (?f the Canister Storage Building; Letter 965521 8, Project W-379, S)ent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building Request,fiJr Deviationfk~m the United States L)epcrrtment o!f’Ener&y Order 6430. I A ~ Aiitomutic Sprinkler Protection Requirements (Williams 1996a); and Letter 9655233, Project W-379, SjJent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building Kequest,ji,r Exemption from the United States Department of Energy Order 5480.7.4 ~ Automatic Fire Suppression &stem Requirements (Williams 1996b) for fire protection information

HNF-SD-TP-SAW-0 17, Safety Analysis Reporl,for I’ackaging, OIJSlte, Multi-Canister Overpack Cask, for coverage of accidents involving the transportel and transportation cask and for definition of assumptions inherent in defining the transportation window

HNF-SD-SNF-SARR-005, Multi-Canister Overpack 7iJpical Report, for criteria and assumptions related to the MCO design

Representatives from the design authority and from facility operations for details of design, operating modes, and procedures.

3.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS

This chapter presents the methodology used to perform the CSB hazard analysis for normal operations. The hazard identification process systematically and comprehensively identified hazards that can contribute to the uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous materials or that can threaten the safety of facility workers. In addition to DOE Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94, guidance provided in HNF-PRO-704, Hazard arid Accident Analysis I-’roce.ss, and Guidelines for Hnzcrrd~~lcrl~~atiorl Procedures (AIChE 1985) was used to develop

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the CSB hazard analysis process. Specifically, the CSB hazard analysis followed the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) Preliminary Hazard Analysis method and included elements of the Process/Systems Checklist and “What-If’ Analysis methods.

3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The hazard analysis identified hazards associated with CSB design and operations. Hazards were defined as radioactive or hazardous materials, system or process characteristics, or energy sources that represent a potential for an accident that could have an adverse effect on facility workers, the CSB facility, the environment, or the public.

Hazard identification for the CSB was based on examination of the facility and operations descriptions provided in Chapters A2.0 and A4.0 of “F-3553, Annex A; on an operation flow diagram and operating procedures; and on discussions with design representatives from Fluor Daniel, Incorporated. The facility was divided into seven areas (see Figure 1):

1 . Trailer vestibule (TV) 2. 3 . 4. 5. Vault (VL) 6. Support building (SB) 7. Outside (OU).

Load-idload-out area [formerly known as service area] (SA) Operating area, including overpack storage tubes and tube vent and purge cart (OA) Samplingiweld area [formerly known as weld station] (WS)

A standardized checklist, Table 1, was used to identify potentially hazardous materials and energy sources present in each of the seven areas. Tables 2 through 9 show the hazard identification results for each area.

Each identified hazard was assigned a unique designator based on the checklists to allow for tracking. The checklist designators reflect the facility area, type of hazard, and specific situation within the hazard type (e.g., a designator TV-J-06 refers to a hazard in the trailer vestibule found under J. ExplosivesPyrophorics, item 6 Hydrogen). The checklist designators are noted on both the industrial hazard and hazard analysis tables described in Section 3.2. The hazard identification checklists were developed by a subgroup of the hazard analysis team and reviewed and accepted by the entire team

3.2 HAZARD EVALUATION

The hazard evaluation was a structured and systematic examination of the CSB facility and its operations using standard industry (AIChE) hazard evaluation techniques. The hazard evaluation process included screening the identified hazards to determine which ones present standard industrial hazards. The remaining identified hazards, which are those with potential for

hieOO lr3 .wpd 4 March 2000


release of radioactive or hazardous material, were characterized and evaluated to develop potential accident descriptions.

Once the hazards had been identified, the potentially hazardous materials and energy sources were screened for those that presented only standard industrial hazards. These hazards are defined in DOE-STD-3009-94 as those that “are routinely encountered in general industry and construction, and for which national consensus codes and/or standards (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration, transportation safety) exist to guide safe design and operation without the need for special analysis to define safe design and/or operational parameters.” Tables 10 through 16 list by facility area the standard industrial hazards that do not contribute to the uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous material. The standard industrial hazards listed are controlled through the implementation of institutional safety programs as described in the programmatic sections of HNF-3553, Annex A. The hazard analysis team agreed by consensus to the results of the screening for standard industrial hazard items.

The next step was to characterize and evaluate those hazardous conditions, materials and energy sources (Le., materials-at-risk) not identified as standard industrial hazards. A summary of the materials-at-risk, in terms of hazard type, form, quantity, and location, is included in this report as Table 17.

Next, the team met in facilitated sessions to characterize each hazard. Hazard analysis worksheets were designed to capture the required information. Each hazard was assigned a unique identifier for tracking. Using the worksheets and the hazard summary as a guide, each hazardous condition was assessed to identify potential accidents, causes, frequencies, and consequences, and to determine a qualitative likelihood of occurrence of the initiating event and the resulting consequence. The assessment of likelihood and consequence for each hazardous condition was a collective, qualitative judgment made by the hazard analysis team. The assessment estimated the likelihoods and consequences of each hazardous condition scenario in two cases. The first case considered designed passive features only. The second case considered designed passive features as well as credited active features and administrative features.

The completed hazard analysis worksheets, included in this report as Tables 18 through 23, show the results of the hazard evaluation as compiled by the hazard analysis team. The evaluation results are based on the hazard identification results, material-at-risk summaries, reviews of the systems designs and planned operations, existing safety documentation, and the experience of hazard analysis team members. Each column of the hazard analysis tables is explained below to aid in understanding the information contained therein.

Location/checklist entry This column contains each hazard’s unique identifier, which indicates the facility area, the hazard checklist category, and the specific hazard. For example, a designator of TV-F-0 I would represent the trailer vestibule (TV), a linear kinetic hazard (F) from a car, truck, or bus (01).

Hazard energy source/material. This column further defines the specific hazard under consideration (e.g., a moving transporter).

March 2000 hie00 I r3 .wpd 5


Hazardous condition. This column describes the hazardous condition that the energy source or material represents (e.g., transporter collision)

Cause. This column identifies initiators of the potential accident (e.g., transporter collision with facility structure [the potential accident] could be caused by human error on the driver’s part, by mechanical failure of the vehicle, or by misplaced equipment) Typical potential causes include equipment failures, operational errors, abnormal operating conditions, poor operating practices, and environmental conditions. The causes of a potential accident are identified to support a qualitative frequency evaluation.

Potential accident. This column identifies potential accidents that could result from the identified hazardous conditions (e.g., transporter collision with facility structures, systems, or components or with personnel).

Consequence. This column identifies the potential effects of the hazardous condition and potential accident in terms of radioactive or hazardous material releases, and impact to personnel and facility systems, structures, and components.

Credited prevention. This column lists preventive safety features present within the facility that are credited with reducing the frequency of the hazard or accident. The credited features listed in this column (both engineered and administrative) include only the controls the accident analyst required to be implemented to support the actual accident analysis. These preventive controls (along with the mitigative controls) are those controls necessary to meet evaluation guidelines.

Frequency code. Two evaluations of the likelihood of occurrence of the hazardous condition and potential accident are listed in the column labeled “Frequency Code.” The first frequency code subcolumn ranks the hazard and accident frequency by considering the impact of any passive features (e.g., structures, barriers) listed in the table but not the impact of active features or planned controls (e.& valves, shipping restrictions). The second frequency code subcolumn ranks the hazardous condition and potential accident frequency considering preventive controls, including passive controls. The assessment of likelihood was a collective, qualitative judgment made by the hazard analysis team. The likelihood assessments resulted in frequency rankings based on the initiating event frequencies and subsequent failures on a per year basis. The qualitative criteria for likelihood assessments are as follows:

F3 The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is likely to occur during facility lifetime.

The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is foreseeable, but unlikely.

F2

hie001 r3 .wpd 6 March 2000


F1 The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is perhaps possible, but extremely unlikely.

The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is considered too improbable to warrant further consideration.

FO

Credited mitigation. This column lists mitigative safety features present within the facility that are credited with reducing the consequence of the hazard. The credited features listed in this column (both engineered and administrative) include only the controls the accident analyst required to be implemented to support the actual accident analysis. These mitigative controls (along with the preventive controls) are those controls necessary to meet evaluation guidelines. In some cases a control may reduce both the frequency and the consequence of a hazard.

Consequence code. Two evaluations of the potential effects of the hazardous condition on the health and safety of people and on the environment are listed in the column labeled “Consequence Code.” The first consequence code subcolumn ranks the hazard and accident consequence by considering the impact of any passive features (e.g., structures, barriers) listed in the table but not the impact of active features or planned controls (e.g., valves, shipping restrictions). The second consequence code subcolumn ranks the hazardous condition and potential accident consequence with mitigative controls, including passive controls. The assessment of the consequence for each hazardous condition was a collective, qualitative judgment made by the hazard analysis team. The qualitative criteria for consequence assessments are as follows:

s3

s2

SI

so

On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, there is sufficient material and energy available to cause a high or moderate impact to the maximum offsite individual.

On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, there is sufficient material and energy available to cause a high or moderate impact to the maximum onsite individual.

On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, there is sufficient material and energy available to cause an industrial injury, radiological dose, or chemical exposure to one or more facility workers.

On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, there is insufficient material and energy to adversely impact facility workers.

hie00 I r l .wpd

The more severe consequence categories encompass the less severe consequence categories. For example, a hazardous condition assessed as having onsite consequences (S2) is also considered to have facility worker consequences (S 1).

I March- 2000

~-

“F-SD-SNF-HIE-001 REV 3

Defense-in-depth for worker safety features. This column contains any additional controls that will reduce the likelihood or consequences even further, but no specific credit is taken for them in the quantitative analysis.

3.3 CANDIDATE ACCIDENT SELECTION

The hazardous conditions identified by the hazard evaluation have been used to select candidate accidents for a more detailed, quantitative analysis in the CSB FSAR (HNF-3553, Annex A). The general selection criteria used were consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94: “The range of accident scenarios analyzed in a S A R should be such that a complete set of bounding conditions to define the envelope of accident conditions to which the operation could be subjected are evaluated and documented.”

The team used the four-step process described below to identify specific hazardous conditions that, together, represented the “complete set of bounding conditions” requiring further analysis. In summary, the process involved creating representative sets (or “bins”) of hazardous conditions having similar release characteristics, similar initiators, and/or similar controls, and identifying (using a ranking matrix shown in Figure 2) the hazardous condition that represented the most severe consequences and the highest risk in each bin. The highest-ranking hazardous condition in each bin bounded the other hazardous conditions in the bin and, therefore, led to candidate accidents needing hrther analysis. These hazardous conditions and candidate accidents represent the “complete set of bounding conditions” for the CSB accident analysis.

The following four-step process was used by the evaluation team to select the CSB bounding accidents:

I , Initial screening

2. Assignment of release attributes

3. Creation of hazardous material release bins

4. Selection of representative bounding hazardous conditions for each release attribute category.

In order to capture and record the relational nature of the data developed in the four steps, the results have been organized into two tables, Table 25 and Table 26. The following sections describe each step, and identify where in Table 25 and Table 26 the related information is located.

Initial Screening. All hazardous conditions with a frequency of F I (extremely unlikely) or greater and unmitigated consequences assessed as S3 (offsite consequences) or S2 (collocated worker consequences) were chosen for consideration as representative accidents. These hazardous conditions are listed in Table 25, with their frequency and consequence rankings listed under the column entitled “Frequencyiconsequence codes ” There were some hazardous

hic00 lr3 wpd 8 March 2000


conditions assessed as S 1 (facility worker consequences) involving radiological hazards that received detailed consideration only in the detailed accident analysis. The remainder of the S1 hazardous conditions are addressed qualitatively in the CSB FSAR (HNF-3553, Annex A). Hazard conditions having no consequences (SO) were dropped from consideration.

Assignment of Release Attributes. Each S2 or S3 hazardous condition was evaluated and described in terms of certain release attributes related to uncontrolled release of the material at risk. This description was assembled to ensure that at least one candidate accident was selected to represent each unique set of release conditions. The following hazardous material release attributes were used:

Energy available to release the hazardous material (high, medium, or low) (Table 25, “Release energy” column)

Release location (Table 25, “Designator” column)

Release initiator (Table 25, “Hazardous condition and initiators” column)

Creation of Hazardous Material Release Bins. As the S2 or S3 hazardous condition release attributes were identified, each hazardous condition was assigned to a bin category. Assignment to a bin category was based upon the potential accident release characteristics, initiators, and/or proposed mitigative or preventative controls. Table 25 lists the bin category assignment for each hazardous condition under the “Bin” column heading. The final step in creating the release attribute bins was to assemble hazardous conditions having the same bin category into a listing. This listing is the basis for Table 26, in which the hazardous conditions are grouped into their bin categories under the “Candidate accident” column.

Selection of Representative Bounding Hazardous Conditions for each Release Attribute Category. Within each bin category, the most severe hazardous condition, considering consequences, and the highest risk accident were identified using the three-by-three likelihood and consequence ranking matrix described in DOE-STD-3009-94 (see Figure 2) . In Table 26 the bin category hazardous conditions are listed in descending order with the highest ranking hazardous condition at the top. More than one condition may have been required to provide the necessary bounding conditions for a bin. Table 26 identifies the bounding condition, or when necessary, bounding conditions for each bin.

Unique hazardous conditions were identified and selected as a part of the accident analysis process. However, the binning process described here provided the basis for identification and selection of those unique conditions. Briefly, at the completion of design basis accident analysis for each bin category, the results were compared with the other hazardous conditions in the original bin to ensure that no unique and unanalyzed conditions existed.

9 Milrch 2000


3.4 HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY

The final list of candidate accidents includes all hazardous conditions with a frequency of F1 (extremely unlikely) or greater and whose unmitigated consequences were assessed as S3 (offsite consequences) or S2 (collocated worker consequences). Table 26 provides the final list of candidate accidents sorted first by risk ranking and then by release energy. The table also identifies the hazardous condition, or conditions, chosen as representative and bounding of all other conditions listed in the bin.

4.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE

This section presents the methodology used to perform the CSB hazard analysis for off-normal MCO storage as a facility function. The off-normal MCO storage function requires analysis because a potential exists for MCO damage to occur during normal facility operations or during an accident. If an MCO were damaged, it would be declared off-normal and placed into an overpack storage tube. The hazard identification and evaluation process for off-normal MCO storage was essentially identical to the process described in Chapter 3.0; therefore, the process description is not repeated in this chapter. One difference of note, however, is in the hazardous condition frequency and consequences ranking, which is described in Section 4.3.

4.1 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD ANALYSIS SCOPE

The scope of the analysis for off-normal MCO storage operations included the following conditions:

The event or accident leading to MCO damage has been terminated and recovery actions completed.

The off-normal MCO is in place in the overpack storage tube.

The overpack storage tube plug cover is installed

An inert atmosphere has been established in the overpack tube.

This scope is consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, which does not require hazard analysis of accidents and recovery sequences, but does require analysis for anticipated facility operations.

hie00 1d.wpd 10 March 2000

“F-SD-SNF-HIE-001 REV 3

4.2 TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS COVERAGE

Potentially hazardous materials and energy sources associated with the off-normal MCO storage function are identified in Table 9. The hazards associated with off-normal MCO storage for specific facility areas are listed in Table 27 and are identified by their unique designator.

4.3 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD EVALUATION

Table 27 presents the results ofthe hazard evaluation for each of the identified off-normal MCO storage hazards. Standard industrial hazards for this activity were assumed to be identical to those for normal facility operations because no new hazards were identified, and worker activities were similar to normal operations and performed in previously analyzed facility areas.

Frequency and consequence rankings for the off-normal MCO storage function involve two new considerations in addition to those described in Chapter 3.0. These considerations are incorporated into the ranking in Table 27 and are described as follows.

FR FR (frequency of recovery event) describes the undetermined likelihood of the “off-normal hazardous condition” developing following termination and recovery of the initial event. Therefore, the off-normal frequency ranking is a product of FR and the frequency of the initial event (e.g., F3, F2, Fl).

SR (severity of the recovery event) describes the undetermined magnitude of the release caused by the unanalyzed condition of the damaged MCO. Therefore, the off-normal consequence ranking is a product of SR and the consequence of the initial event (e.g., S3, S2, or SI).

SR

4.4 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD BlNS

Table 28 lists the off-normal MCO storage hazardous conditions in bins relative to potential accident type and initiator.

4.5 OFF-NORMAL MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK STORAGE HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY

System and equipment design changes have resulted from early hazard and accident analysis activities lnstallation of these passive preventative features reduces the likelihood of MCO damage @e., drops leading to MCO cracks, which provide an open path to the atmosphere). These preventative design features, when introduced into the hazard analysis process for off-normal MCO storage, reduced the risk ranking to below requirements for further analysis. However, the information is retained in this report for historical reference.

hie00 lr3 .wpd I I March 2000


5.0 REFERENCES

AIChE, 1985, Guidelinesfor Hazard Evaluation Procedures, American Institute o f Chemical Engineers, New York, New York.

ARES Report 95 I 107-001, 1996, Canister Storage Bnilding Fire Code Equiixdency Evaluation, Rev. 0, ARES Corporation, Richland, Washington.

ARES Report 95 1 107-002, 1996, White Paper Presenting KecomnienLl‘ed Approach to Fire Protection vj‘the Operating Area vf the Canister Storage Building, Rev. 0, A R E S Corporation, Richland, Washington.

DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Saf ty Ana+sz.s Reports, U.S. Department o f Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide,for U S . Department of Energy Nonreuctor Nuclear Facility Safety Annlysis Iieyorts, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

HNF-3553, 2000, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Sa$& Analysis Report, Annex A, “Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report,” Rev. 0, Fluor Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

HNF-PRO-704, Hazard and Accident Analysis Process, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-SNF-SAM-005, 1998, Multi-Canister Overpack Topical Repurl, Rev. 1, Draft, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-TP-SAW-0 17, 1997, Safev Analysis Reportfor Puckaging, Onsite, Multi-C’unister Oiwyack Cusk, Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

WHC-SD-SNF-FHA-002, 1996, Phase 2 Fire Hazard Analysis ji,r the Canister Storage Building, Rev. 1, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

Williams, N. H., 1996a, Project W-3 79, Spent Ni~cleur Firel Cmi.ster Storuge Building Request ,for IIeviatIon,froni the llnited States Ileparlment o/l<nernJ Order 6430. IA ~ Antomutic Sfirinkler Profection I<eqnirenient.s (Letter 965521 8 to E. D. Sellers, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, November I4), Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

hie00 lr3 .wpd 12 March 2000


Williams, N. H., 1996b, Project W-3 79, Spent Nucleur Fuel (‘unister Storage Building Request j ? J r Exemption from the U. S. Department rdEnergy Order 5480.7.4 ~ A ulomatic Ftre Suppression System Requirements (Letter 9655233 to E. D. Sellers, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations O&e, November 14), Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

hie001r3.wpd 13 March 2000

3 0

hie00 Irl . ~ p d


Figure I . Main Areas of the Canister Storage Building.

3 0

I1 11 I1 I1 I1 11 I1

3 0

14 March 2000

~ .~


Figure 2. Three-by-Three Likelihood and

F3

F2

F1

s1 52 53

hie00 lr3 .wpd

Combinations that identify situations of major concern

Combinations that identify situations of concern

15 Mach 2000

f ~-


"ooooooooo zooooo % O O O O " 0 0 0 0 0 %oo0uoooooo i o o o o o o o o o i o o o o o i o 0 0 0 i o o o o o i o o o o o o o o o u

" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Z O O O O O O O O O O O O O zooooooo znooooo i o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ~ o o o o o o o o o n o o o i c ~ o o u o u n ? r o o o o o o

hie001rXwpd 16 March 2000


hie00113.wpd 17 March 2000


%.0..0.00. i0.00.0..0

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hie00 113. wpd 20 March 2000

~~ .__


March 2000 hie00 l r3 .wpd 21





hie00 113 .wpd 24 March 2000


H a r d VdkgOly I+azerd type Checklist designator

Iilectricel Crime cabling (for wclding) 'I'V A 2

Tilectricid cquipment (crane) 'IV A 4

IHigh voltage TV A 6

Motors (receiving crane) TV A 7

Puwer tools TV A 9

ScTvicc outlets, fittings TV A 11

Tlanslbrmers (hi- welding) TV A 12

Wiring TV A 15

Other - crane hot rail conductor TV A Ih

I

I Electrical equipmnent

Wrlding, t1)rcIdilrc (maintenance)

Diescl units; exhaust Iincs on vehicles

Power tools

Convective beat from transIioitation cask

Vehicle brakes

'r v 13 2

TV I3 > TV R h

TV B 9

TV B I O

TV B 13

Belts

Bearings

Fans

Gca1-s

Motors

Powcr tools

Corrosives

TV C I

TV C 2

TV c 3

TV C 4

TV C 5

TV c 6

Vehicle battery wid TV L) 1

I Kinetic linear I c&s f < r empty M C O ~ I TV F 2 1

Kinetic - rotational

hieOOIr3.wpd

Crilnc motor v E 2

Pumps (crane hydraulics) TV c 3

I'ws (tiuck) 'IV E 4

Other - power tools, hoist wskm 'T V r: I

2s March 2000

- ~- .

HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-00 I REV 3

Humw effort (dropped items)

Lifts iind cranes (including loads)

Buckct w d lilddcr (maintenance)

Slings (maintenance)

Hoists

Sca&ild imd ladders

Elevated doors

Table 10. Standard Industrial Hazards: Trailer Vestibule. (2 sheets)

TV G I 'r v G 3

TV G 4

'r v G 6

'TV G 7

'I v G 1 0

TV G 12

Mass, gravity, height

Pressui-e - volume Test loops TV H 4 Gas hottles 1 TV H 5

Asphyxiants (exhaust, helium line)

Csrcinugcns

Corrosives (batteiy acid)

Hcilvy nictals (battttay Icad)

Otlicr - used deconlaniinution solution

V M 2

1' V M 4

'TV M 5

TV M 8

TV M 9

I Ionizing radiation SOUTCCS I Radioactive swrces I TV N 4 1

hie00 1d.wpd 26 March 2000

- . ~.

HNF-SD-SNF-HE001 REV 3

1-Iazard categoty Hazard lype Checklist designator

Cable tiins (welding, festooning) SA A 2

I ligh voltage

Motors

Power tonls

Service outlets, fittings

Ti-msfomters (for welding)

Otlier (hlowers, hot rail conductur)

Wiring

SA A 6

SA A 7

SA A 9

SA A 11

SA A 12

SA A 15

SA A 16

27 March 2000

-

CuiTusives


Acids (vent and purge c a l l battery) SA u 1

Decontamination soltilion SA D 4

Motors SA E 2

I’unips (crane and clamp hydraulics) SA E 3

Fans (MIIM, scrvice Lent) SA E 4

Othcr - 5-ton hoist SA E 7

Kinetic - linear Forklifts, dollies, calls (hand trolley) SA F 2

Obstructions (frogs) SA 1’ 4


1 lazardous meterials Asphyxients (helium) SA M 2

l~leavy metals (battey Iced) SA M x lonizing I-aditition Radioactive soti~ces (hand-held equipinent) SA N 4

Comisivcs (batteries) SA M 5

-

Sotrces

Table 1 1, Standard Industrial Hazards: Load-IdLoad-Out Area. (2 sheets)

hie00 1rl.wpd 28 March 2000


Fluzai-d hipc

Battely banks (TV&P carts)

Cable mns (welding, festooning)

I Electrical equipment

Table I2 Standard 1ndustri;tl Hazards Opcrating .Arm (-1 sheerc) Checklist dcsignatoi-

OA A I

O A A 2

OA A 4

Hazard categoiy

Electrical

I'ower tuols (mainteniiiicc)

Seivice outlets, fittings

'Transformers (wcldinp)

Other - lighting, CAMS, cunei-as

Electrical equipment (for wcldinp)

Wiring

Thermal

OA A 9

OA A 1 1

OA A 12

OA A 15

OA A 16

OA B 2

Friction

Exposed components ((in ciii-t) OA B 8

1 High voltsgc 1 OA A 6 1

Ccinvective (licat exchanger (in curt)

Other - operating deck floor

Bearings

Heits

Fans

I Motors I OA A 7 1

OA B I O

OA €3 13

OA c 1

OA c 2

OA c 3

colTosives Uecontaniination solutivn OA 1) 4

Motors

Pumps (TV&P cails, seismic clamp)

Othw - MlKM hoist

Forklifts, dirllics, carts (l'V&I' caits)

Ohstructions (rail fi-ogs, tuhe covers)

I Powcr tools 1 OA c 6 1

0 A E 2

OA I< 3

OA c.: 7

OA F 2

OA rz 4

I Other ihrilkcs vn the MHM slid tube caill I OA c 7 1

Kinetic - linear

29 MarLh 2000

- ~.


Ionizing radiation sources

Heily mclills (led batteries) OA M 8

Kaidioactive sources (hand-held equipment) OA N 4

30 March 2000

_ _ -


Powcr took (grindel-)

Table 13. Standard Industrial Hazards: SamplingiWeld Area. (2 sheets)

ws n 9

Cryogenic (glycol cooling)

Othcr - hl-akcs (MHM, gantiy, huists)

Belts (vent Iin)

Bearings (auto welder, rotaiy drive)

Fans (MHM, fume exhaust)

GCXS (auto welder)

WS 5 12

ws L3 13

ws c I

ws c 2

ws c 3

ws c 4

Motors (auto welder, weld pit; vent [an, gmtq cranc)

I Other - hiakcs on the MI IM and crane I ws c 7 1

WS c 5

Con-osives


Kinctic - Iincilr

hie00 l r3 .wpd

llecon Solution ws D 4

Other -- dyc penetrant cleaner ws I> 6

Motors (auto welder, weld pit) ws E 2

I’unips (weldcr cooler, vacuum pump) ws I? 3

Fans (funic exhaust, h4f-IM) ws E 4

Shop cquipmrnt (crime Iioist) WS E 6

Obstructjons (handrails) ws F 4


Hwerd categoly Hazerd tvpe

Mass, gravity, height Human etfort

Stairs

Scatfold and ladders (MHM access)

Pits and excavations (samplciwcld pit)

Elcvated doors

Checklist designator

ws ti 1

ws ti 2

ws ti I O

ws ti I 1

ws (; 12

Pressure - vnlume

. . .~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~

'Test loops (MHM, silmplc cart) ws H 4

Gas bottles (poitable welder) ws 1-1 5

Hazardous materials

Ionizing radiation sources

Exteiiial Vchiclcs

Vacuum (sample cart) ws 11 8

Confined spaces (b-ench) ws I 1 I 0

Other - glycol in pit ws H 1 1

Asphyxiants (helium, argon) ws M 2

Heavy metals (welding fumes) ws M 8

Kadioaictive soiirccs (hend-held equipment) ws N 4

Truck ws 0 4


Hazard categoly

Elcctricdl

Table 14. Standard Industrial Hazards: Suouort Building. (2 sheets) IIardrd mc Checklist designator

Battety banks (unintenuptihle powei- supply) SR A 1

Electrical equipment SB A 4

High voltage (>600 V) SB A 6

Motors SB A 7

Cubic ruin Sn A 2

HVAC heaters sn A 5

Swltchgedl (440 V)

Thermal

s H A I O

I Pumps I sn A 8 1

Sc i i~ce uutlcts, fittings

I I'ower tools I SA A 9 1

S B A I 1

Welding, torchiarc (maintenance) SB B 5

'I'rmsformers

Wiring

Other (AC iiiveilors)

Electrical equipment

Furnaces, boilers, heatcr

SB A 12

SB A 15

SB A 16

SR B 2

SB R 3

Othn- (soldering in shop)

Fi-iction

SI3 t3 13

Corrosives

Bearings SB c 2

F;ms

GWI3

Motors

Power tools

Acids (hattev hanks)

Decontamination sdu t ion


SB C 3

SB C 4

SB c 5

SR C 6

sn D I

sn D 4

hie00 Ir3.wpd

Motors

Pumps

Fans (HVAC fins)

Other - compressors, power tools

SB E 2

SB E 3

SB E 4

SB E 7

33 Mdrch 2000

-


Table 14. Standard Industrial Hazards: Support Building. (2 sheets)

Mess, gravity, height

I-cssul-e - vu umz

IIVAC = hcating, ventilation, and ail- cunditioning.

hic001r3.wpd 34 March 2000


&Z,drd cakgoly Heard type Checklist desigmator

High voltage

Motors cair haiidlers, rolling gate)

Power tools

OIJ A 6

OIJ A 7

DlJ A 9

Switchgeiir

'Thermal

OlJ A 1 0

Scivicc outlets; littings

Transformers

Trilnsinissioii lines

linderbiound wires

Wiring

Other- lighting, p u n d i n g cable

Ikctrical equipnicnt

011 A 1 1

011 A 12

011 A 13

01 i A 14

0 U A 15

OU A I6

O l J n 2

I Gears I ou c 4 1

Welding Lurchlwc

1 Motors I OU c 5 1

OIJ R 5

I I'ower tools I 011 c 6 1

Friction

I Corrosives I Acids (vehicle batteries) I ou u I I

Exposed compunents 0 lJ n x I'ower lwls OU n 9

Convective 011 n 1 0

Solar- OIJ n I 1

Hclts 011 c I

Hearings 0 1 1 c 2

-

Kinetic - rotational Motors OIJ E 2

Kinetic - linear

hie00 1 r3 .wpd

~

Other (heating, ventilatinn, and air cmditioning unils) Ot I E 7

Cars, trucks, buses OI I F I

Forkliiis, dollies, carts OIJ F 2

Pressure vessel hlowdown (missiles) OIJ I' 6

Crane loads OlJ F 5


Ionirinr rildiution SOUI'CCS

Table 15. Standard Industrial Hazards: Outside. (2 sheets)

I-CSSUK ~ vo iime

Cask-MCO OU N 4

hicOOIr3.wpd 36 March 2000

"F-SD-SNF-HE-001 REV 3

kIa;.ard cntcgory

Electrical

Table 16. Standard Industrial Hazards: Overpack Locations in Operating Area. (2 sheets) I-Iuard type Chccklist designator

Battery hanks (TV&P carts) OA A 1

Cable iuns (welding, fzstouning) OA A 2

Electrical equipment

High voltape

Theirnal

OA A 4

OA A 6

Motors I OA A 7 1

Other - lighting, CAMS, cmeias

Elzetr-ical equipment (for welding)

Heater (sample lines on cart)

Radiuachvc decay heat

Ex~xised components (on catt)

Welding, turcldare

I'owei. tools (maintenancc) I OA A 9 1

~ ~~ ~~

OA A I6

OA B 2

OA B 3

OA B 5

OA R 7

OA B 8

Set-vice outlets. fittings 1 OA A 11 I

Bearings

FUlS

Gews

Motors

I'owcr tools

Wirine I O A A l i I

OA C 2

OA C 3

OA C 4

OA C 5

OA C 6

Kinetic - iriVatiuna1

Convective flieal exchanger on cart) I OA B 10 I

Moturs OA I 2

Pumps (.l.V&P carts, seismic clamp) OA F: 3

Other -MI iM hoist OA E 7

Other - oneratine deck lloor 1 OA I3 I3 I

Forklifts; dollics, caits (TV&P catis)

Ohstructions (rail lriigs, tuhc covcrr

Crane loads (TV&P cdils)

Friction

OA F 2

O A I: 4

OA F 5

I Belts 1 OA C 1 1

Pressure vessel hlowdown (missiles) OA F

1 Otlicr (hrakcs on the MHM and tube cart) 1 OA C 7 1

I Coirosives I ~ccontmina t ion solution 1 OA D 4 1

Kinetic - lineui-

hic00Ir3.wpd 37 Mdrch 2000

HNF-SD-SNF-H1E-001 REV 3

Hazardous rndtcrials

Ionizing 1-adiiition sources

Table 16. Standard Industrial Hazards: Overpack Locations in Operating Area. (2 sheets)

ressui-e - vu urne

Asphyxiants (cart, incrt gas line) OA M 2

Corrosives (butteries) OA M 5

Heavy metals (lead batteries) OA M 8

Radioactive sources (hand-held equipment) OA N 4 ~

h1eOO I f .wpd 38 March 2000

~ .


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39 hie00 l r3 .wpd March 200

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3 3

2 3

4 z

4 z

N 5

0 2 ? a

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m L

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i

u L

c C

" 'a .- ill

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i

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Possible mechanical damage ofMCO 7 due to a shear 7

7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5

Table 26 Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents (2 sheets)

Medium' Medium'

Medium' Medium' Medium' Medium'

LOW Medium Medium

I .ow L O W

Low Low Low LOW

Low Low

Possible mcchanical damage of MCO due to a drop

Pressurized release from MCO 7 Medi urn WS-G-O4b, -06b. -07h

5 Medium WS-F-02, -05 3 High WS-IF-06a. -07. -1 1

T V - G I 3 SA-G-I3a, -13b. -l3c, -13d, -13e Oh-G -13c,-13d WS-G-1311, 13h SA-G-l-if, -13g OA-G-l3b

SA-0-07 SA-F-05 SA-F-07b, -07c OA-E-07 WS-E-07 SA-F-07d SA-F-07e OA-F-07a OA-i. -07b WS-F-07d WS-F-07h

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Hydrogen deflagration Iligh SA-.I-Oha High OA-J-06a Hlgh WS-I 1-0617 I Iigh WS-J-06a

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Candidate accident

Violations of deaign temperature criterin

Violation of design temperature criteria'

Table 26. Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents. (2 sheets)

Release or change encrgyb

(HNF-3553, Annex A, Section A3.4.2.6)

Risk ranking" Reference designator

6 Medium VL-R-07, -10, -1 I

"Thc risk ranking is derived from methodology found in DOE-STD-3009-94, Prri~urutiun Guidr,/iir [I.S. Deportnirnl ' ( E n e r a Nonrruclor Nucleur Fuciliq Suf i@ Analysis Reporlr, which correlates the consequence-freiiulurncy pair using a lignre rcpniduccd in

' 1)efinition ilnd use of energy release catcpries [high, mediun, low) are bascd on guidan DOE-STD-3009-94.

'Energy was considered that could damage an MCO - tilling onto the deck was viewed a s higher energy then Prilling into the service or sample pit with impact absorbers present; falling into the tubc with impact xhsorbers present was viewed as higher energy k a n falling into thc service or the sample pit with an impact absorber presrnt.

dRefore detailed analysis wa evaluated. Subscquent detailed and limitation of watcr and rcsulting temperdture.

MCO = multi-canister overpack.

ned by the hazard an c 3- I of thc SNF Pr0.i

-SD-SNF-HIE-OO I ) to ti single-scnlt: risk r&ng

fomied, thc hazard cvaluiition idcntified WS-H-06b as a scriuus hazard to he has shown that thermal runaway reactions arc not possihlc at the CSB given

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Hydrogcii cxplosions in the overpack slordge tube

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Table 28. Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents for Off-normal Multi-Canister Overpack Storage.

Candidate accident

FKxF3ISRxS2 Medium OA-.l-Ohd t.'KxF2/SRxSZ J+gh OI 7 4 - 0 1 VRxF2ISRxS2 Mcdi uiii VL-.I-(lh FRxl;2ISlixS2 Low OA-I-02

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SR Severity of thc recovery evcnt, which describes thc undetemiincd magnitude of release due to the uiianalyzed condition of the damaged MCO; therefore, the olY-normal consequence ranking i s ii product of SR and the consequence of die initial event (c.g., S 3 , S2, or SI).

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ATTACHMENT A

CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING HAZARD ANALYSIS

TEAM MEMBERS

A- I March 2000

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A-2 March 2000

-.


ATTACHMENT A

CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING HAZARD ANALYSIS

TEAM MEMBERS

The following is a list ofthe hazard analysis team members that have participated in any of the various stages of development of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) hazard analysis over is two years of development. Those members with an asterisk after their name were involved in the finalization of the hazard analysis for the CSB Final Safety Analysis Report.

Walter Alaconis Theodore 2. Anderson Ralph D. Crowe* William A. Frier Richard L. Garrett* Manuel Guzman Danny R. Henry Taber G. Hersum

Maurice J. Higuera James Mathews Richard Hulskamp Jeff Parker Larry D. Kessie Paul Patterson Steve D. Kopelic Dwight E. Krahn* Maryanne Kummerer David L. Scott Barclay S. Lew Yih Justin Liu*

Robert E. Piippo Thomas B. Powers*

W. Todd Watson

The members of the CSB hazard analysis team brought to the study the following experience.

Walter Alaconis

B.S., General Science, The University of the State of New York, Albany. Nearly 27 years of diversified nuclear safety and operations experience in the military, commercial, and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) environments. Obtained registration with the National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologists in 1982. Over 16 years at the Hanford Site supporting major facility modifications and new facility design projects. Co-author of the Process Facility Modification Project Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Managed the development of the Hanford Site Quality Training and Resource Center Root Cause Analysis Training Program and the AccidentEvent Trending Program. Managed the Nuclear EngineeringiSafety Data Management Unit for 4 years. Technical advisor to the Liquid Effluent Services Program at the Hanford Site and the Environmental Restoration Programs at the Hanford Site and DOE-Headquarters. Facilities supported at the Hanford Site include the tank farms (east), PUREX, B Plant, Plutonium Finishing Plant, Treated Effluent Disposal Facility, and Effluent Treatment Facility.

Theodore 2. Anderson

B.S., Mechanical Engineering. More than 24 years experience in facility operations, maintenance and quality assurance, and construction project quality assurance. Twenty years experience in existing nuclear facilities (Analytical Laboratory, fuel processing facilities) and new nuclear construction projects (tank farms, pipelines, spent nuclear fuel handling). Present position

hie00 lr3 .wpd A-3 March 2000


includes project construction quality assurance support to CSB multi-canister overpack handling machine and receiving crane procurements.

Ralph D. Crowe

M.S., Nuclear Engineering and Engineering Management Over 20 years experience in the nuclear industry performing calculations using multidimensional, time-dependent, neutron kinetics and thermal hydraulic codes Six years experience performing safety analysis within the DOE environment for a number of facilities, including high-level waste tanks, Plutonium Finishing Plant, and spent fuel storage.

William A. Frier

Over 21 years experience in nuclear industry. Managed safety-class project upgrades, K Basin seismic analyses, Basins Life Extension Program, and K Basins Roof Repair Program. Current design authority for K Basins structures and cranes and hoists.

Richard Garrett

Seventeen years experience as a manager and lead engineer in safety analysis, regulatory support, and operations support of DOE and commercial nuclear power facilities. This includes 8 years of experience in commercial Boiling Water Reactor and Pressurized Water Reactor facility startup and operations with 9 years of experience at DOE production reactors, spent fuel storage, and high level waste facilities.

Manuel Guzman

Fourteen years experience in the nuclear industry. Started in the bargaining unit as a Chief Reactor Fuel operator at the N Reactor, worked up through the management chain as a shift supervisor responsible for around-the-clock operations loading, packaging, and shipping 120 metric tons of irradiated spent nuclear fuel per month. Transferred to the K Basins in a supervisory role and also served as a shift manager. Presently assigned to the CSB as a plant engineer in the Facility Startup and Operations organization providing input to the CSB design

Danny R. Henry

B.A. degree. Over 19 years of varied Hanford Site work experience as an individual contributor and manager, involving both operational support and oversight functions at reactor, nuclear, and nonnuclear facilities Experience includes positions and training as a firefighter and emergency medical technician, certified control room reactor operator, nuclear process standards engineer, senior reactor outage planner, outage manager at an operating production reactor facility, a

hic0O 113 .wpd A-4 M a c h 2000


Principal Nuclear Safety Department. Responsible for the development and implementation of both a company-wide Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance inspection program and an OSHA-based baseline hazard assessment program for Westinghouse Hanford Company, as well as the coordination of the company programs and activities for gaining acceptance into the DOE/OSHA Voluntary Protection Program. Served as the company contact for the Westinghouse government-owned, contractor-operated subcommittee on industrial safety and as the primary point of contact for discipline-related interface meetings with the DOE counterpart, Designated contact for external audits, assessments, and reviews involving the safety programs Served on special safety task forces, including the review and selection of contracted safety and health services.

Taber G. Hersum

M.S., Nuclear Engineering, registered professional engineer (California). Twenty-six years experience in nuclear safety, reactor physics, fuel loading and power ascension testing, operations, and technical and quality consulting for nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel, and nuclear waste in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Currently a member of the Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc., Nuclear Safety organization providing oversight review of Project Hanford Management Contractor safety basis documents requiring DOE approval. Previously certified as a senior reactor operator and ANSI 45.2.6 Level I11 senior reactor operator test engineer.

Maurice J. Higuera

B.S., Mechanical Engineering; M.S., Program Engineering Management; B.S., Human Biology/Organic Chemistry Twenty-plus years experience in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOE regulatory environment. Areas of expertise include nuclear project management and engineering; environmental, safety, and industrial health; licensing and regulatory compliance; system process, operations hazard, and operability studies; outage planning and scheduling; and startup and testing and commissioning. Currently lead independent safety engineer and lead safety analysis report chapter author, engineering and coordinating input to the safety analysis report for the CSB spent nuclear fuel storage mission.

Larry D. Kessie, ALA

B.S., Architectural Studies, B. of Architecture, Registered Architect. Fifteen years experience in architectural design, design management, cost account management, project management, and construction administration in both the private and government sectors. Positions have ranged from that of a project architect and design offce architect to temporary facility and site infrastructure design authority. Currently serving as consulting architectidesign authority for site infrastructure and temporary facilities for Project W-379, Spent Nuclear Fuel CSB.

hicO0 lr3 .wpd A- 5 March 2000


Steve D. Kopelic

B. S., Mechanical Engineering. Twenty years experience related to commercial pressurized water reactor electric generation stations. Experience includes reactor core design and testing, primary and secondary cooling systems accident analysis, preparation and defense of plant licensing documentation, probabilistic risk assessment, and implementation of design modifications on operating plants. Currently performing safety analyses and preparing safety analysis reports for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project.

Dwight E. Krahn

B.S., General Engineering, field of specialty in Operations Research. Eight years experience in engineering and safety analysis activities. Training includes safety analysis development, root cause analysis, and risk assessment. Most recent work has been in the area of technical safety requirements for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility and the tank farms.

Maryanne Kummerer

M.S., Mechanical Engineering. Fifteen years experience in engineering analysis in the area of heat transfer, multiphase fluid flow, thermodynamics, and chemical phenomena Nine years performing calculations in support of safety analysis for various Hanford Site facilities and providing accident analysis contributions to safety documentation, including safety assessments and safety analysis reports.

Barclay S. Lew

Twenty-five years of nuclear industry experience in safety analysis, engineering applications, and licensing and regulatory affairs for U.S. and international electric utilities, DOE, and international laboratory facilities and universities. Senior manager at Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) in regulatory and safety analysis of PG&E’s pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor facilities. As a consultant, performed risk-based prioritization studies for several DOE facilities to assist in the segregation and focus of issues important to public safety, site worker safety, environmental, and mission. Prepared and evaluated safety analyses and risk analyses related to final safety analysis report limiting conditions for operation requirements, hazard evaluation, and operational conditions, including fire detection and protection, and riskldetectiodreliability studies. Responsible for the development and implementation of light water reactor nuclear analytical methods and analysis for applications to encore physics, criticality analysis, fuel management, thermal-hydraulics, fuel element performance, transient safety, and accident analysis for pressurized water reactors for several U.S. utilities Recently published numerical simulation of multiphase heat transfer and fluid flow and has numerous past publications in safety analysis and regulatory applications

hie00 1d.wpd A-6 March 2000


James Mathews

Over 25 years of experience in the chemical and nuclear industry Sixteen years experience at the Hanford Site working in the Operations, Fuel Handling and Waste and Radiological Control organizations Provided management direction and oversight of daily and special operations. Played an integral role during the K East fuel segregation program and the PUREX fuel shipping programs and later transitioned to managing decontamination and waste control activities after the shutdown of N Reactor. The past 2 years he has been the manager of Project Operations for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project with responsibility for reviewing all designs and safety documentation to ensure that new facilities and components can be operated and maintained safely and efficiently. Certified as a nuclear material custodian, hazardous materialiwaste shipper, hazardous waste coordinator, and an unreviewed safety question evaluator for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project.

Paul Patterson

Senior Reactor Operator, Hanford N Reactor. Seventeen years experience in nuclear power plant and facility operations, training, safety and procedure development. As a Senior Reactor Operator responsibilities included maintaining reactor safety during all modes of operation from the reactor control room. A certified DOE technical trainer and oral board examiner. Instructed reactor operator and senior reactor operator candidates and facility management in reactor process operations, heat transfer and fluid flow, reactor physics fundamentals, and accident analysis and safety basis. As a consultant, facilitator, and writer supporting various Hanford Site and ldaho National Engineering Laboratory projects over the past I O years, led safety document and requirements processes and hazard analyses sessions; participated in operational readiness reviews, designed and developed training and qualification programs; presented specialized training programs; facilitated specialized group processes; and supported process and facility operating procedure development during final stages of engineering and facility start-up.

Robert E. Piippo

B.S., Industrial Technology Eighteen years experience in program management, planning, operations, and engineering within the nuclear and aerospace industry. Positions have included program managerichief engineer, nuclear safety assurance principal engineer, lead aerospace systems engineer, advanced engineering manager for N Reactor hels manufacturing, manager for fuels manufacturing, and lead aerospace manufacturing engineer. Performed nuclear safety oversight as a member of the operational readiness review boards for the startup and operation of the UO, calcination processing facility, N Reactor irradiated fuel element encapsulation, and grouting of low-level liquid waste. Participated in nuclear safety appraisals for PUREX, B PlantNaste Encapsulation and Storage Facility, and fuels manufacturing. Currently performing nuclear safety on the Spent Nuclear Fuel Program.

A-7 March 2000

._


Thomas B. Powers

B.S., Chemical Engineering. Over 23 years of experience, including 1 5 years of experience in systems safety analysis and risk assessment for both nuclear and nonnuclear facilities and operations and 8 years of experience in environmental analysis, engineering design, and testing of nuclear and nonnuclear systems. Worked on N Reactor and Fast Flux Test Facility Level 1 probabilistic risk assessments and performed numerous safety analyses using preliminary hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, fault trees, and event tree methods.

David L. Scott

M.S , Chemical Engineering. Twenty-six years of professional experience in safety analysis, process engineering, project engineering and development work related to the nuclear and petrochemical industries. Over 5 years of experience at the Hanford Site working in safety analysis and risk assessment. Work in other areas includes fluid flow analysis, pump and piping system design, uranium processing, N Reactor modification engineering, N Reactor nuclear he1 manufacturing, and organic chemical production.

W. Todd Watson

M S., Physics (Experimental Nuclear Physics), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Six years experience in the development of nuclear measurement systems, instrumentation, and computer data acquisition and analysis systems. Experience performing computer modeling of radiation transport, including nuclear criticality analyses, dose rate predictions, and nuclear characterization instrumentation response modeling. One year of experience performing criticality safety evaluations for the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant and evaluating the adequacy of criticality accident alarm systems for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. One year of experience performing safety analysis in support of Hanford Site tank farms and the Spent Nuclear Fuel Program.

Others who participated in the hazards analysis meetings and provided information to assist the process included

Jeff Parker, Ares Corporation, facilitator for the sessions

Richard Hulskamp, multi-canister overpack and receiving crane design information

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_. -

To From

Distribution Nuclear Safety Project TitleAKork Order

"F-SD-SNF-HIE-001, Rev. 3 Canister Storage Building Hazard Analysis Report

Page 1 of 1

Date 3-fL-ag EDTNo. N/A ECN No. 656344

Text Name MSIN WithAll

Attach.

Attach" EDTECN only

Textonly Appendix only

Documents

to 01 - UNT Digital Library/67531/metadc... · 3 Full Paper R Report 1 Other E. DocumentNumber HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-001, Rev. 3 C. Title CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT