TNI Interview:Zbigniew Brzezinski

U.S. Fato Isin U.S. HandsNo one disputes that Zbigniew Brzezinskiresides within the circle of America's mostbrilliant and prolific foreign-policy experts.The former White House national-securityadviser under Jimmy Carter has written orcoauthored eighteen books, including hismost recent. Strategic Vision: America andthe Crisis of Global Order, a probing analysisof America's challenges in a fast-changingworld. Brzezinski is a counselor and trusteeat the Center for Strategic and Interna-tional Studies and a senior research profes-sor at the School of Advanced InternationalStudies at Johns Hopkins University. TheNational Interest caught up with Brzezinskiat his csis office for an interview about hisbook and the current state of the world.The interview was conducted by TNI editorRobert W. Merry.

In your hook, you talk ahout the AtlanticWest's grand opportunity for what you calleda "new era of Western glohal supremacy" afterthe Soviet collapse. But it didn't happen. Towhat extent do you think this failure resultedfrom human folly, and to what extent was ita product of forces heyond the control of theAtlantic West or its leaders?

I think both. But the West was fatigued,and Europe, certainly, lost a sense of itsglobal responsibility and became moreprovincial in outlook. That, in part, wasconnected unavoidably with the task ofconstructing something that was called.

originally, the European Community,that led to the European Union (althoughthe two names should have been in adifferent sequence, because the EuropeanCommunity had more coherence thanthe current European Union). And theUnited States embarked on a kind ofself-gratification and self-satisfaction,almost acting as if it really thought thathistory had come to an end. We did notanticipate the new, novel conditions of theworld that were emerging, I think, withincreasing clarity, which I try to address inmy recent book. Strategic Vision.

So these forces were pretty suhstantial, hut towhat extent did some of the decisions of thattime—the Iraq War, for example—lead to thisresult?

You know my views on the Iraq War. Ithink that it was a disaster. A disaster in thesense of undermining American legitimacyworldwide, damaging the credibility of thepresident and of the office of the president,and entailing costs for the United States,which were not insubstantial in termsof lives lost and people maimed, andenormous economically—all contributingto a more unstable Middle East. Becausewhether we liked Saddam Hussein or not,and he was obviously obnoxious, he wasa strong source of containment of IranianMiddle Eastern ambitions. Today, a dividedIraq, an unstable Iraq, a porous Iraq is verysusceptible to Iranian influence and, if needbe, destabilization.

How do you think the world today would hedifferent if we had not gone into Iraq?

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Well, for one thing, the Middle Eastmight be slightly more stable. And I hadno objection to us going into Afghanistan,although I did urge our top decision makersto go in, knock out the Taliban, destroyit if we could, as well as Al Qaeda, andthen get out militarily—not stay in for tenyears with an ambition to build a moderndemocratic state within a medieval andfragmented society. So that's not been very

that it doesn't have to happen. I don't denyfot a minute the vitality of the Far East,of Asia, but I'm also very much aware thatmajor players there have internal difficultiesand potentially very dangerous conflicts indealing with each other. So we have lotsof room for maneuvering, in that respect.But more importantly, for a long timethey are not going to be superior to us inoverall financial and social well-being, or

beneficial, but at least that would havebeen only one conflict. But then we hadtwo conflicts, both very costly and notparticularly helpftil either.

You wrote recently about this consequentialshifi in the center of gravity in global powerand economic dynamism, as you say, fromthe Atlantic toward the Pacific, and you alsowrite that the West can maintain a powerfulposition in this new world. But isn't itpossible that this shifi will simply leave theWest and America behind, irrespective ofwhat we do?

It is certainly possible, but if it shouldhappen, it'll be our own fault in the sense

in standards of living. But of course if weflounder, if we stagnate, if we wallow incrisis, they may get ahead of us.

And I am very worried about the factthat we in the United States have a financialsystem that has become increasinglyspeculative rather than productive, inwhich personal greed rather than socialgrowth is the main motive of the players.We have a tax system that favors the richto a degree that I think is grossly unfairand not economically productive becauseit contributes to greater social disparitiesin our society. And such disparities in thelong run tend to be very damaging andcan even fracture national consensus and

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stimulate class conflicts. We have a political the movement was democratic, and itsystem in which privilege has been melded could construct democracies. I think inwith opportunism. The Congress is a self- many parts of the world today, and theperpetuating body of relatively rich and Middle East is obviously one of them,privileged people who are not above passing you're dealing with a phenomenon that islegislation or making arrangements that somewhat similar and yet different. Thesefavor them as a group. As a result, it's movements are populist. So were the onesincreasingly difficult for us to intelligently in Central Europe. But they're not imbuedaddress both domestic and foreign with democratic values or a widely sharedproblems. understanding of what constitutionalism

I have been watching this presidential and a system of law really entail,election with dismay Of all the elections Therefore, they're much more likely tothat I have been part of, I think this is be driven by either passions or historicalabout the pits. Because in previous narratives that are one-sided, potentiallyelections—in 2000, for example, intolerant, maybe fanatical and in somewhich featured divisions as extreme as, cases even intolerantly religious. So I'm notsay, Goldwater versus Johnson or later so confident that every so-called populistMcGovern versus Nixon—they still uprising against a dictatorship is necessarilyinvolved large, comprehensive issues in a turn toward democracy. It may be awhich the outcomes, for better or worse, rejection of corruption, of arbitrary rule,were predictable. Right now, it's a mess of but then what follows may be eventuallyslogans and total confusion with gnawing equally one-sided,societal anxiety.

In the book you discuss the importanceYou talk in the book about today's of America having an image in the world,

university students around the world, an identity, that contributes to its ability toconstituting—in your words—the equivalent influence other nations and other peoples. Toof Marx's proletariat: "The restless, resentful what extent do you see this as part ofthat, andpostpeasant workers of the early industrial to what extent has that been undermined byage, susceptible to ideological agitation and the war in Iraq and other things that we'verevolutionary mobilization. " You suggest this been doing since the end of the Cold War?is a major force for instability in the world. I do think that we have unfortunatelyDo you think this destabilizing force can be delegitimized ourselves, therefore makingtamed or controlled within the next twenty it easier for some parts of the world driveny^^^^- by historical narratives to be instinctively

I think it depends very much on the hostile to us. We have ignored that, andhistorical context in which these forces we have acted as if we were endowed withmanifest themselves. They did in Central some special mission. George W. BushEurope, but one has to remember that even said, "Our nation is chosen by GodCentral Europe already had experienced and commissioned by history to be athe spring of nations more than a century model to the world." But there's a furtherearlier, in 1848. There was a genuine problem, and so America's not to be blameddemocratic tradition to be brought to for everything. This century, I think, isthe surface and harnessed by outstanding already giving signs that it's going to beleaders such as Lech Walesa in Poland fundamentally different from the previousand Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia. So, century. What was the decisive quality of

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If we are intelligent about it, we are still in positionto be the most influential force in the world.

the twentieth century in terms of globalpower? It was the struggle for dominationand hegemony among major powers, onthree grand occasions that shaped thecentury—World War I, World War II andthe Cold War. We emerged supreme, andthen I think we fumbled it.

But it is not entirely our fault. Weprobably could not have become whatwe hoped to be, a model for the world,because the world has become much morediversified, much more complicated withthe global political awakening making theworld volatile, and then on top of thatthere are new global dangers that we face.We have to start understanding as a nationthat we have to act differently. We haveto rebuild coalitions. This is why I havewritten about a rejuvenated and biggerWest, drawing in Russia and Turkey. This iswhy I wrote about America being involvedin the Far East—but off the mainland, notinvolved in any wars on the mainland butbalancing from outside, acting a little bitlike Great Britain did toward Europe inthe nineteenth century. If we are intelligentabout it, we are still in position to be themost influential force in the world, but wehave to be intelligent. And to be intelligent,we have to have leaders who understandthis, who have a sense of the fundamentalhistorical change that is making this centurydifferent from the preceding one. But moreimportant, perhaps, or at least as important,we have to have a public that has somerudimentary understanding of foreignaffairs.

What really makes me worried is thatour public doesn't understand the world.

It's not even informed about the world.Your magazine is important. But look at itscirculation.

Very small.

Yeah. And most people don't readanything about the world because thenewspapers don't give it to them, exceptthree or four major newspapers. We havea public that's ignorant and susceptible todemagogy. And that handicaps leadership,even if it is intelligent. Of course, itbecomes worse if the leadership is not veryintelligent and itself operates with simplisticslogans.

Dr. Brzezinski, do you think that thisprohlem has increased in recent years? Werewe, as a nation, more aware of the world in aprevious era?

I'll tell you why I think the answer isyes. We are less aware for a very simplereason: because the world is much morecomplex. Americans weren't betterinformed about global history before, andthey are still abysmally informed aboutglobal history. Americans weren't veryinformed about global geography. They'restill basically ignorant, even though thatis scandalous. But they knew that Hitlerwas a global danger. They knew thatcommunism was a menace. They knewthat the Soviet Union was threatening usphysically—talking about burying us andhaving nuclear weapons with which todo it. In that sense, the sentiments of thepublic captured some of the basic essenceof reality. Today, that reality is muchmore complex, much more difficult to

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t

understand. President Obama startedwell, in my judgment, in conveying thosethemes to the public. Then he didn't acton it systematically.

I think today we have a real problem,one, of public education, and two, areal problem in that we need sustainedpresidential dialogue with the countryabout world affairs, explaining some of thepoints that I'm making. I think Obamastarted really great. I had conversations withhim and so forth. I was really impressed bythe fact that he senses this new reality. Andhe gave a number of really good speeches—Cairo, Istanbul, Brandenburg. But thenhe stopped. Of course he had domesticproblems, a financial crisis. He has manyreasons for exoneration, so to speak. Butthe fact is there's a real problem. If youlook at the public discourse about worldaffairs today and you compare it to whatyou publish in The National Interest or

other magazines like yours, the gapis phenomenal.

/ want to talk a little hit aboutthe threat of the debt overhang.You identified that as one of thetop threatening liabilities, as yousay. Aren't these problems becominginsoluble now? And what would ittake for the country to get controlover our debt problem, which ishanging over us like a huge sword ofDamocles?

Well, first of all, I'm not atrained economist, and I don'tpretend to be one. But I thinkwhat it would take is some sharednational consensus about how wedefine a decent and responsible lifein the modern complex world. Idon't think we have that. We haveslogans about being successful. Wehave slogans about "job creators."We have slogans about everybody

having the right to teach the sky in thequest for material self-satisfaction. We havea definition of the good life, which involvesthe accumulation of material goods plusentertainment.

These are clusters of issues that areinterrelated, and it will require a real jolt forus to start thinking seriously about how wecan re-create a healthy society here that isstill the compelling image for the world thatit once was. Then, the American dream waswidely shared. Today, it isn't.

Do you think it's going to take an evengreater crisis to create the consensus that couldfuel a president's ability to cut through theseproblems?

I fear that you're putting it just right. Ihope it's wrong, but I share the concern.

You repeatedly emphasize, in your newbook and elsewhere, the importance of a

14 The National Interest Interview

solution to the Israeli-Palestinian deadlockas a prerequisite to much of what needs to heaccomplished in America's diplomacy in thatregion. To what extent do you see the two-state solution as heing perhaps morihund, andisn't Israel's aggressive settlement developmenteliminating the land needed for a contiguousPalestinian state?

I think that is certainly a problem; it isan impediment to the two-state solution.But I think a two-state solution is morelikely to be an enduring solution to thedifficulty both sides have faced over the lastdecades than the eventual alternative, whichis a one-state approach, in which thereare still such differences, such conflictingnarratives, such bitter memories, that it'shard to imagine how it could work as ademocratic state. It would be one state inwhich somebody would be on top of theother, and whoever's on the bottom wouldtry to gain the top in order to repress thosewho are on the top. So I don't think that's aviable solution.

What I fear is, however, that it maybe becoming too late for the two-statesolution because, in order for the two-state solution to be enduring, it has to bea genuine compromise between the two.That's extremely difficult to achieve incircumstances in which one party is muchstronger than the other and thereforehas no particular incentive to be makingconcessions. Meanwhile, the other partyis so much weaker that it is afraid to makeconcessions. Simultaneously, there's no oneon the outside that is seriously committedto pushing the peace process forward forthis or that reason, mostly because of thedomestic difficulties that it entails for theAmerican president. Yet we are the onlyparty that could move the peace processforward.

I think we're stuck, and I feel sorry for thepeople involved. I feel sorry for Israel. I'm achild of World War II, and I know what the

Jewish people went through. I feel sorry forthe Palestinians. It's a bad situation, and Ithink the growing turmoil in the MiddleEast is increasingly making it more andmore difficult to get a compromise adoptedbecause one or the other side either feelsaggrieved or outraged or endangered.

In the cover story of our previous issue,prominent Israeli journalist Akiva Eldar talksahout the demographic changes in Israel thatare making it increasingly difficult to go fora two-state solution or a liheral sensihility.To what extent do you think that's closing offprospects for peace?

That may be, but I'm not really an experton the social dynamics of either group. Itend to look at it more as an internationalproblem with consequences for the UnitedStates, first of all, but, secondly in thelonger run, with dire consequences forIsrael as well. When I was commissionedby the president—whom I was servingin the seventies at the time of the CampDavid accords—to go and try to convincethe royalty in Saudi Arabia and Jordan toembrace a compromise, I was struck thatsome of them casually referred to the factthat the crusaders were in Jerusalem forninety years, and now there's absolutelynothing left of that. So their sense of timemay be different. If we're driven out of theMiddle East, which I think is beginning tolook increasingly possible, what is the futureof Israel?

/ acknowledge that this is a question thatmight he asked on a cahle channel, hut howdo you assess the percentage chance that theUnited States will attack Iran to delay or stopits nuclear-weapons program, and what ahoutthe chance that Israel would do so?

I think the chance that Israel will do itis greater. I doubt that we would do it justlike that, because I think no matter howdeep our concerns over that issue are, the

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Suppose we do get into a war with Iran. How do we end it?

How long will it last? Who ehe is going to be in it with us to

help us? How will it play domestically over the longer haul?

fact is it's easy to start a war, and we know But if the price of a barrel goes up $200,that it's very hard to end it. Suppose we they'll be sitting pretty The Europeansdo get into a war with Iran. How do we will be totally dependent. The Chineseend it? How long will it last? Who else is will be hurt; so will the Japanese. Thatgoing to be in it with us to help us? How will not help the global economy either,will it play domestically over the longer Secondly, they can certainly attack somehaul? But the Israelis may be guided by of our military faciliries nearby, and theydifferent logic, and certainly [Israeli can destabilize Iraq in no time flat byprime minister Benjamin] Netanyahu and stimularing a Shia-Sunni collision. Next,[Defense Minister Ehud] Barak do convey they can certainly make life uncomfortablethe impression, if not of eagerness, then at for us in western Afghanistan, which hadleast ofimpatient determination to strike. been very stable. That means that our

disengagement from Afghanistan will beIf there were to be such an attack, spin out very costly or difficult and so forth. But

what you think would happen in terms of then there are all sorts of other possibilitiesstability of the region and the world at large. involving terrorism or whatever, which

Well, I have said this publicly I think, will simply mean that the region and thefirst of all, the Iranians will not really United States are going to be intertwined inretaliate very effectively against Israel. warlike instabihty that may last for a longThey'll try, but it's going to be fragmentary, rime,marginally painful but not decisive. TheIranians will be absolutely convinced So the broader inflammation of the wholethat this was done in connivance with Middle Fast region could result?us. They'll retaliate against us, and what That's right. And you certainly haveare their oprions? They may not be able to face the fact that you're not beingto close the Strait of Hormuz, but they'll confionted with a situadon in which youcertainly try We'll keep it open, but the have no choice. We have a choice. We havecost of energy will skyrocket anyway, a choice of avoiding that and of convincinginevitably For one thing, insurance rates the Israelis not to do it. It's not like Pearlwill go up, and there may be some other Harbor, where we were attacked and had todamages. That will be bad for the global respond. Last but not least, I don't excludeeconomy the possibility of negotiations succeeding.

But much worse, we will drive the provided they are real negotiations.Europeans into the hands of the Russians,who will be rubbing their hands. The Which they haven't been so far?Russians are very worried that the price Which they haven't been so far. Theyof energy, which oscillates between $90 have to be based on the principle that Iranand $120 right now, is not sufficiently is enritled as a Nuclear Non-Proliferationhigh to meet their budgetary expectations. Treaty (NPT) signatory to have a nuclear-

The National Interest Interview

energy program, and they have a rightto enrich but at a very low level. I thinksomething along those lines is workable,but if the idea is that the agreement hasto involve some sort of a humiliatingarrangement for Iran that puts it in a cagequite apart from the arrangements for everyother NPT signatory, then they probablywon't accept.

Last but not least, I think we certainlyhave the means and even a moral obligationto do for the people in the Middle East,and particularly for the Israelis, what wehave been prepared over the years to do forthe Europeans, and then for the Japaneseand the Koreans. Namely, we should givethem a really binding, reliable commitmentthat they are fully covered by the Americannuclear deterrent, by stating publicly that"any threat to Israel, or worse, direct actionagainst anybody in the Middle East wouldbe viewed as an action directed at theUnited States, with all of the consequencesthat might entail." We succeeded inprotecting the Europeans and deterring theSoviets. We have protected successflUly the

Japanese and the Koreans. We certainly cando it for the Middle East.

Last question. Could you give our president,Barack Obama, an overall grade in terms ofhis foreign policy?

Well, I've been asked that, so I'm not sureyou even want to do this because I've beenasked and cited in the press about it. I saidA-minus, B-plus.

And could you give me three things thatcontribute to that?

Well, I think he has tried to put theU.S.-Chinese relationship on a stable basisin which the necessity of partnership istempered by the need to be vigilant butbalanced, and that's okay. I think he hasbeen patient, maybe a little too patient butwisely patient, in dealing with the Russians.I think with the Europeans, they know thatwe are still seriously interested in Europe. Ithink the Middle East represents the biggestliability, but that is not entirely his fatilt.

Thank you very much, u

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