TM 44897 Working Group 2 Report - Pages - GNSSN Home Documents/Transport Safety/ISC8 Working...TM‐44897 Working Group 2 Report Report as of Thursday Noon, 11 April 2013 4 participants

TM‐44897 Working Group 2 Report Report as of Thursday Noon, 11 April 2013

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TechnicalMeetingtoProduceConsolidatedDraftsoftheIAEA’sNewTransportSafetyStandardsTakingintoAccounttheResultsofthe2011International

ConferenceontheSafeandSecureTransportofRadioactiveMaterial

WORKINGGROUP2–DENIALOFSHIPMENTS

1. WorkingGroupStructure

Theworkinggroupwasstructuredasfollows:MarioCésarMallaupomaGutierrez–Peru:WorkGroupLeaderRonaldBeckPope–USA:RecordingSecretaryNatanaelBruno–BrazilZhengcaiChen–ChinaMeenamkunnuChandrasekharanDinakaran–IndiaLaurentKueny,FranceBernardMonot,FranceJustinEmmanuelNgaile–UnitedRepublicofTanzaniaJuliusRijpkema,InternationalSourceSuppliersandProducersAssociation(ISSPA)ZsofiaSzepes–Hungary(parttime)JosephLucienRadaorolalaZafimanjato–Madagascar

2. Worktobedone–TermsofReference

TheparticipantsofthisWorkingGroupwererequestedbytheSecretariattoconsider,andprepareaworkinggroupreportonthefollowingissues:

1) Whatrevisionstotheregulationswouldreduceincidencesofdenial?

2) ReviewofDraftSecurityRequirementsDocuments:

a.Ifimplemented,couldthesecurityrequirementsinthedocumentsleadtodenials?

b.Ifso,aretherechangesinthetransportregulationsthatcouldprecludethis?

c.Ifnot,theproposedsecurityprovisionsthatcouldcausedifficultiesintransportshouldbehighlighted.

3) ProvisionsoftheISCactionplanshouldbereviewed.Doanyoftheactionplanprovisionsrequirechangestotheregulations?

TheWGaddressedtheitemslistedintheTermsofReferenceaswellasotheritemsdeemedrelevanttoWorkingGroup’smandate.


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3. FindingsandRecommendationsofWG2

ThefollowingsummarizesthefindingsandrecommendationsoftheWG,eachisidentifiedbythesectionofthisreportwhereitisdiscussedandjustified.

TheWGgenerallydidnotidentifyanychangesthatmightbeneededtotheTransportRegulationsasaresultofD/DOSissues,recognizingthatthecurrentmorecomprehensivereview/revisionprocesscurrentlyunderwaymightproviderecommendationsforchangerelatedtoD/DOSissue.[Section4.1]However,itwasnotedthatconflictsbetweenvariousformsoftheregulationscanincreaselikelihoodofdelayordenial.

TheWGrecommendsconsiderationbegiventoexpandingthesubsectioninChapter3ofSSR‐6dealingwith“Training”toalsoaddress“Education”,ensuringthatallthoseinvolveincarriageofradioactivematerialareproperlyeducated,focusingoneachfunctionalelementinthesupplychain;considerationcouldalsobegiventoexpandingtheguidancedocumentstoreflectthesechanges.[Section4.1]

TheWGrecognizedthatafeedbackprocessisabsolutelyessentialfortheSecretariatandTRANSSC;andthebasisforthechangescausedbydelayanddenialofshipmentsmustbeeffectivelycommunicatedtotheCSS.[Section4.1]

TheWGrecommendsthatconsiderationcouldbegiventowritingaseriesofimplementingguidesandpreparingassociatedtrainingmaterials,similartothosebeingdevelopedforsecuritytransport,structuredaroundspecifictypesofshipments,focusinginpartonhowtointeractandinterfacewithcarriers,customsagenciesandotherentitiesthatcancauseproblemswithdelayanddenial.Thedevelopmentofthismaterialshouldconsiderandtakeadvantageoftheexperienceandtrainingmaterialalreadygainedinregionaltrainingcourses(e.g.thecourseinPanama).[Section4.1]

TheWGconcludedthatNST022couldpotentiallyimpactdelayanddenialinapositive,ratherthannegativefashion;enhancingpropertransferofinformation,educationandunderstanding.[Section4.2]

TheWGdeterminedthatneitherthesecurityofnuclearmaterialintransportdocumentnortheradiologicalcrimescenemanagementdocumentappearedtoposeanydifficultieswithregardtodelayordenialofshipments.[Section4.2]

TheWGrecommendsthat,iftheActionPlanisrevised,thefocusshouldbeonsimplificationandworkability.[Section4.3.2]

TheWGsuggeststhatimplementationofnationalandregionalnetworksshouldgiveprioritytothecreationand/orimplementationofacommunicationstrategy.[Section4.3.4]

TheWGencouragestheestablishmentofthenewinter‐UNagencycommitteeforthelongtermandeffectivemanagementofDOSissues.[Section5]

TheWGsuggestedthattheSecretariatinvestigatewhetherchangestotheradiationprotectionprogrammecouldbeimplementedtoeasedelaysanddenialswithoutsacrificingtheadequacyofradiationprotection.[Section5]


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TheWGconcurredwiththecurrenttransportsafetyworkplanandrecommendedthatitcontinuetobeapplied.[Section6.1]

TheWGrecommendedconsiderationshouldbegivenbytheAgencytosendingaletterdirectedtoallMemberStatesencouragingMemberStatestobecomemembersofTRANSSCandtoappointanNFPiftheyhavenotalreadydoneso.Thisissignificantlyimportantsinceabout2/3rdoftheMemberStatesarenotmembersofTRANSSC.[Section6.2]

TheWGrecommendsthatcollaborativeeffortsbetweensafetyandsecurityentitieswithintheIAEAandelsewhereshouldbeencouraged.[Section6.3]

TheWGnotedthatthenewUNinter‐agencycommitteeforimplementingtheDOSActionPlanneedstobeproperlystructuredandimplemented.[Section6.4]

TheWGfurtherrecognizedthatitmayalsobenecessarytoconsiderfocusingontrainingoftheNFPsandRCs–somethingthathasnotbeenaccomplishedinthepast.[Section6.4]

TheWGrecommendsthat(a)theISCreviewandapprovetheHandbookforAddressingInstancesofDenial/DelaysofShipmentofRadioactiveMaterial,andthen(b)ameetingbeconvenedbytheAgencytoreviewandfinalizethehandbook,andrecommendingthemethodandtimingofpublicationandissuance(possiblyasatechnicalreportoftheIAEA).[Section6.5]

TheWGsupportsinvitingthead‐hocexpandedinter‐agencygroupandTRANSSCrepresentativetothe8thmeetingoftheISCinJune2013.[Section6.6]

TheWGrecommendsthattheISC,workingwiththeAgencyandotherinvolvedagencies,explorewhoshouldbetheownerofthedelay/denialdatabasesandresponsibleforassessmentofthedata.[Section6.7]

TheWGfullysupportsactionsneededtodevelopguidanceforcustomsofficials,whichisespeciallyneededintheareaofradiationprotection,whilenotingthatNSNShasalreadyissuedguidanceforcustomsandborderofficials.[Section6.8]

TheWGsuggeststhattheAgencyshouldconsiderconveningatechnicalmeetingtocollectexperienceonissuesrelatingtocustomsoperationsthathavecauseddelaysordenialsinshipments.[Section6.8]

TheWGsuggeststhatTRANSSCtakeonthistaskaspartofitsTermsofReferencesuchthat,whenitisreviewingdraftsecuritydocuments,theissueofdenialofshipmentsisaddressed.[Section6.9]

TheWGendorsestherecommendationoftheISCwithregardtothenewlyproposedspreadsheetprocess,recognizingthattheprocessneedstobeclarifiedonhowtousetheforms.[6.10]

TheWGrecommendsthatthesafetyandthesecuritystaffattheAgency,workingtogether,evaluateexistingtrainingmaterialstoensuretheinformationpresentedto


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participantsissufficienttoaddressconcernsandactionsneededasrelatedtosafetyandsecurityissuesthatmayaccruefromadelayordenialofashipment.[6.11]

TheWGalsorecommendsthattheSecretariatworkwithintheAgencytodefinetheadequacyoftrainingmaterialfornationalandregionaltrainingneedsandtheabilityofTechnicalCooperationtosupportthiseffort.[Section6.11]

TheWGrecommendsthattheSecretariatmustprovideadetailedsitemapofacountryandregionaltemplatefortheSharePointsite,inordertodefineaharmonizednationalandregionalnetworksothattheMemberStatescanprovidefeedbackearlyinthedevelopmentofthenetwork.[Section7]

TheWGrecommendsthattheAgencyconsiderenhancingthetrainingcourseforcustomsandborderofficialstoincludedelayanddenialofshipments.[Section8]

4. InitialDeliberations

Theworkinggroup(WG)initiateddiscussionsbyconsideringboththetermsofreferencenotedabove,andthedetailedissueslistedonslide7oftheWorkPlanAgendaItem1.

ItwasagreedthattheWGwouldproceedfirstwiththethreeitemslistedspecificallyinthetermsofreference.

4.1. GeneralDiscussiononIssuesRelatingtoDenial–ImpactofRegulatoryRequirements

Regulatoryrequirementsalonedonotcausedenial.However,conflictsbetweendifferentregulatoryrequirementsimposedbycontrollingbodies(e.g.nuclearauthoritiesandmodalauthorities)canresultindelaysordenials.Lackofcommunicationandunderstandingcontributesgreatlytodenialanddelayofshipments.TheseconclusionsaresupportedbytheChairman’sReportofTM‐43560.

Thus,theWGdidnotidentifyanychangesthatmightbeneededtotheTransportRegulationsasaresultofD/DOSissues,recognizingthatthecurrentmorecomprehensivereview/revisionprocesscurrentlyunderwaymightproviderecommendationsforchangerelatedtoD/DOSissue.

However,itwasnotedthatconflictsbetweenvariousformsoftheregulationscanincreaselikelihoodofdelayordenial.Inadditionitwasnotedthatoverzealous,over‐readingandmisinterpretationbynon‐technicalcontrollerscanalsoresultindenialsanddelays.

AnexamplewascitedofaradionuclidesupplierinSouthAfricathatwashavingdifficultieswithitslocalaircarrier,wheremanyshipmentswerebeingdeniedordelayed.Thesupplierworkeddirectlywiththecarrier,educatingthemontheregulations,thetypesofpackagestheyused,theimportanceofthecontentstomedicaldiagnosticsandapplications,andtoagriculturalandindustrialapplications.Theconsignorandthecarriermutuallyagreedonstandardizingthedesignsofpackages,onatrainingprogramthatthesupplierwouldprovidetoitscargohandlers(bothattheoriginlocationandthedestinationlocations),andfurtheragreedthatthesupplierwouldhavea“rapidresponseteam”


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availablewheneverashipmentwasprovidedtoquicklyaddressanyissuesthatmayariseatthedepartureairport.Thismutualcommunicationeffortandtheresultingagreementsandproceduresresolvedtheirdelayanddenialproblems.

Educationandtrainingisimportant,tobuildtrustbetweentheoperatorsandthecarriers.Theyneedtoknowandunderstandtheimportanceofthematerial,whyitneedstobetransported,whatcanbedonetosimplifytheprocess.PossiblytheSecretariatshouldlookatChapter3toseewhatcanbeplacedintheRegulationstoimprovetheproducer/carrierrelationships.

Forexample,theWGrecommendsconsiderationbegiventoexpandingthesubsectioninChapter3ofSSR‐6dealingwith“Training”toalsoaddress“Education”,ensuringthatallthoseinvolveincarriageofradioactivematerialareproperlyeducated,focusingoneachfunctionalelementinthesupplychain;considerationcouldalsobegiventoexpandingtheguidancedocumentstoreflectthesechanges.

StateshavealreadybeenencouragedbyTRANSSCtohaveindividualstatesreportonexperienceswithapplicationoftheTransportRegulations,andhowspecificissuesimpactdelayordenialofshipments.

TheWGrecognizedthatafeedbackprocessisabsolutelyessentialfortheSecretariatandTRANSSC;andthebasisforthechangescausedbydelayanddenialofshipmentsmustbeeffectivelycommunicatedtotheCSS.

TheWGrecommendsthatconsiderationcouldbegiventowritingaseriesofimplementingguidesandpreparingassociatedtrainingmaterials,similartothosebeingdevelopedforsecuritytransport,structuredaroundspecifictypesofshipments,focusinginpartonhowtointeractandinterfacewithcarriers,customsagenciesandotherentitiesthatcancauseproblemswithdelayanddenial.Thedevelopmentofthismaterialshouldconsiderandtakeadvantageoftheexperienceandtrainingmaterialalreadygainedinregionaltrainingcourses(e.g.theregionaltrainingcourseinPanamawithonedaydedicatedtodelayanddenialofshipments).

Educationactivitiesshouldaddressthetechnicalfeaturesofthepackagings,thepurposeandimportanceoftransportingthematerials,theeconomicsinvolved,theneedforadvancedcommunicationwithinvolvedentities,etc.

4.2. GeneralDiscussiononDraftSecurityDocuments

TheNSNSrepresentativereviewedthedraftdocumentspresentedtowhichare:(a) SecurityofNuclearMaterialinTransport(NST017),(b) RadiologicalCrimeSceneManagement(NST013),and(c) ProtectionandConfidentialityofSensitiveInformationinNuclearSecurity

(NST022).

Thediscussionconcernedhow,ifanyofthesedocumentsimpacttransportsafetywhichpotentiallycouldimpactdenialoffutureshipmentslateron.

ItwastheviewoftheNSNSrepresentativethatnoneofthesedocumentshaveasignificantimpactonthedenialofshipmentsofradioactivematerial.Followingpreliminarydiscussion,theWGprovisionallyagreedwiththeAgencyrepresentative’sassessment.


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However,theWGconcludedthatNST022(theNSSdocumentoninformationsharing)couldpotentiallyimpactdelayanddenialinapositive,ratherthannegativefashion.Applicationoftheserecommendationsonprotectionandconfidentialityofsensitiveinformationcouldassistinthepropertransferofinformation,andcouldenhancetheeducationandunderstandingofthoseinvolvedinashipmentchain.Thisdiscussionpromptedelaborationontwoactualscenarios.

InBrazil,arecentconvoyofashipmentofradioactivematerialwasblockedbyasmallcommunity’sactivistgroup.Theactionbythisgroupwastheresultofmiscommunicationregardingthecontentsanddetailsoftheshipment,andresultedinvariousdemonstrationsandproblemsreachingtohighlevelsofgovernment.Demonstrations,causedbyimpropercommunicationsandmisunderstandingscanleadtostoppageswhichcouldthenleadtoadversarieshavingopportunitiestotakeadvantageofthestoppedshipmentinapublicdomainwhereprovidingsecuritycouldbedifficulttoachieve.

ConsideringtheproblemsexperiencedinrecentshipmentsofvitrifiedhighlevelwastefromFrancetoGermany,theprotectionandconfidentialityofsensitiveinformationdocumentcouldpossiblyhelpreducetheimpactofdelaybyestablishingprotocols(whichwouldneedtobeagreedtoandimplementedbygovernments)forproperlymanagingtheconfidentialityofinformation;limitingsuchcommunicationstoonlythosewhohaveaneedtoknow.Properapplicationofsuchprocedureswouldrequireaproactiveapplicationoftherecommendationsbygovernments.

Incontrast,theWGdeterminedthatneitherthesecurityofnuclearmaterialintransportdocumentnortheradiologicalcrimescenemanagementdocumentappearedtoposeanydifficultieswithregardtodelayordenialofshipments.

4.3. GeneralDiscussiononProvisionsoftheISCactionplan

Annex21oftheISCreportwasconsideredbytheWG.

TheChairoftheISCpresentedthefollowingconclusionsbasedontheobjectivesoftheseventhmeetingoftheISC,whichwerethenassessedbytheWG:

4.3.1 ReviewthemilestonesintheimplementationoftheActionPlanandthestatusofimplementationofactionsbymembersoftheSteeringCommittee

Relatedtothesubstanceofthispoint,onthefirstdayofthemeetingthestatusandupdateoftheActionPlanwaspresentedtoallmembersoftheISC.Itresultedintheidentificationofaseriesofweaknessesandstrengthsthatshouldbeconsideredintheupdateoftheactionplan.

Acrucialconsiderationthatwasmentionedwastheneedtoimprovecommunication.Inthisrespect,theexperiencedevelopedbyBrazilwasmentionedwiththecreationofaNationalCommitteeondenialanddelayofshipmentsthatconsideredtheparticipationofvariousstakeholders.Ithaspermittedtobetteridentifythebottlenecksandtofindappropriatesolutions.Thankstotheimplementationofthisstrategyithasbeenpossibletosignificantlydecreaseinstancesofdenialanddelay.


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DiscussionandConclusionbytheWG:

ThisdoesnotgenerallyapplytoconsiderationsoftheWG;however,thetextthatstates:“Itpermittedtheidentificationofaseriesofweaknessesandstrengthsthatshouldbeconsideredintheupdateoftheactionplan”shouldbefurtherconsideredbytheWG.

Withregardtothe2ndparagraph,thisissuedoesnotdirectlyimpacttheregulatoryrequirementsinanywayotherthanhowcommunicationscouldbeenhancedbywayoftheregulatoryrequirementsinChapter3ofSSR‐6;asidentifiedearlierindiscussingSection3.1above.

4.3.2 Reviewandrevise,ifnecessary,theActionPlanonDenialofShipmentsofRadioactiveMaterial

Theactionplanondenialofshipmentsofradioactivematerialwasreviewedandupdated.Someadvanceswereidentifiedaswellassomeactionswhichhavenotbeenimplemented.


Mr.DinakaranreferredtotheActionPlanfromthelastmeeting(February2012),asreproducedfromtheISCreport(seeAnnex1,below;Annex17‐BoftheISCReport),andelaboratedoneachofthe12pointsprovidedinthatplan.

ArethereprovisionsintheRegulationsthatshouldbeconsideredforrevision,baseduponthese12points?Thefeelingofthegroupwasgenerally,thattheansweris“NO”.

Forexample,specificregulatoryprovisionscouldbeconsideredforsimplificationwithaviewtomakingthemmoreunderstandableormoreuser‐friendlywithoutremovinganyconstraintsimposed.

TheWGrecommendsthat,iftheActionPlanisrevised,thefocusshouldbeonsimplificationandworkability,whilenotchangingtheintentandimpactpackagingoroperationsforthepurposesofsafety.

Thequestionthatneedstobeaskedis“arethereactionslistedthatpointtoanyunderpinningtojustifychangingtheregulations?”TheWGfeltthattheanswertothiscouldrequireadetailedreviewoftheRegulations,whichwasbeyondthescopeoftheWG.

4.3.3 Discussspecificactionsfor2012


Thespecificactionsfor2012weredevelopedconsideringtheneedtofocusattentiononsomespecificmainactionsneededforreducingdelaysanddenials,asdevelopedbytheNFPineachcountry.

4.3.4 Adviseonthecontinuationofregionalwork,includingwhetherthereisaneedforupdatingtheRegionalNetworks


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TheWGsuggeststhatimplementationofnationalandregionalnetworksshouldgiveprioritytothecreationand/orimplementationofacommunicationstrategy.Communicationwasconsideredessentialamongstakeholders.

4.3.5 ProvideadditionalrecommendationsforAgencyconsideration.


ProvidingadditionalrecommendationswasnotspecificallyaddressedbytheWGatthistime;however,furtherdiscussionoftheISCfindingswasdirectedtowardsthereportofthelastISCmeeting.ItwasnotedinthatvisuallypresentedreportthatthelastISCmeetingtaskedfiveworkinggroupstoaddressthefollowingareas:1 ThefuturefortheISC;2 TheISCActionPlan;3 Self‐AssessmentTestquestions;4 Anewdenialsreportingmethod;5 DefinethecontentoftheIRPApaper.

5. Generaldiscussionofthesecondday

TheWGleaderinitiateddiscussionusingaofactionsderivedfromthepresentationsmademyMr.BajwaonMonday.ItwasemphasizedthattheWGshouldfocusondevelopingactionsforIAEAconsideration,addressingbothtransportsafetyandsecurity.WG2needstofocusondenialofshipments,andanychangestotheRegulationsthatshouldbeconsideredduringthecurrentreviewcycle,and/oranyadditionalstudiesthatmaybeneededtodetermineifachangetotheregulationsshouldbeconsidered.

Specifically,theWGneedstofocusondefininganyprovisionsthatrequirechangestoregulationsthatcanreducetheincidentsofdenialofshipments.

Forexample,the2011TransportConferenceandthe2011follow‐uptechnicalmeetingdefined11potentialactionsrelatingtodenialofshipmentsaspresentedintheWorkPlanAgendaItem2.1,asfollows:

1. Continuetransportsafetyworkplan

2. UseTRANSSCtodistributedenialreportingforms

3. EffortsshouldbemadetoovercomebarriersattheIAEAandelsewhereincreatingjointsafetyandsecuritynetworksandcollaborationshouldcontinuetobeencouraged

4. ContinueISCactionplanviaproposednewUNinter‐agencycommittee

Utiliseinformationavailableonindustry,IAEA/IMO/ICAO/NGOandcompetentauthoritywebsites

Surveybroadertransportsafetynetworkoncommunicationneeds


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WebbasedregulationaccessreferstoMSsafetyandsecurityregulations

Emphasisoneducationandtrainingatalllevelsimportant

Makeuseofbroadertransportsafetynetworktoencouragedenialreporting5. DistributeconsolidatedISCactionplantowideraudience(safety,securityandinter‐

agency)requestingthattheseactionsbeconsideredintheirworkplans.

6. Invitead‐hocexpandedinter‐agencygroupandTRANSSCrepresentativetothe8thmeetingoftheISCinJune2013.

7. Considerfundingissuesfordatabasetoensureitcanremainoperational

8. Supportdevelopmentofguidanceforcustomstofacilitateshipmentsofradioactivematerialcrossingbordersaswellastrainingmaterial

9. Ensuredenialcontinuestobeconsideredwhendevelopingsecuritydocumentsandinparticulartheirapplication

10. AskIndustrytosurveyportproblemsandreportairandseaproblemstoNationalFocalPoints(NFP) Extendtosupplychain ConsideraspossibleresourcetheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemsurvey

11. Developtrainingmaterialonthesafetyandsecurityimplicationsofshipmentsbeingheldasaresultofdenialfororganizationsinvolvedintransportofradioactivematerial. ConsiderwhetherTechnicalCooperation(TC)cansupportconductofthis

trainingTheWGconsideredTM‐43560Chairman’sreport:(Introduction)‐‐‐presentationbyPaulGrayonsustainability(AgendaItem2.4).TheWGreviewedthispresentationondenialofshipments(DOS)asaguidetoitsdeliberations,presentinganddiscussingthefollowinginsights:

DOSisacontinuingproblem DOSishinderingradioactivesourcereturnsandbeneficialuses EffortstoreduceDOSwillhavebothsafetyandsecuritybenefits ISCwasdevelopedtohelpaddresstheDOSissues,consistsofvariousstakeholders ParticipationofNationalFocalPoints(NFP)hasbeensignificant(morethan80

countriesrepresented),hasresultedinsignificantbenefits RegionalNetworks(RN)–directedtofacilitatedcommunication,withbenefitsof

countriesworkingtogethertoresolvelocaldenialissues ReasonsfordenialperIMOandIAEAfindings

o Negativeperceptiono Costandextentoftrainingo Multiplicityanddiversityofregulations;includinglackofharmonizationof

regulationsbetweenmemberstatesandbetweenmodalorganizationso Lackofoutreach,resultinginlackofpublicawareness

ISCactionplanembodiedsixproposedactivities:


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o Awarenesso Trainingo Communicationo Lobbyingo Economicso Harmonization

FromtheseactivitiesitbecomesclearthatDOSisaglobalproblem,andthereforerequiresaglobalsolution

Problems:o Budgetshavebeen/arebeingreduced,thisimpactstheabilityoftheISCtofunction

properly.o DenialReportDatabase–morethan230reportsindatabase(manyofthesehave

insufficientinformationtodefinerootcause);andthereareseveralhundredadditionaldenialreportsareoutstandingduetoconfidentialityconcerns.

FiveworkinggroupswereformedatthelastISCmeetingo ThegoalwastohaveDOS“insignificant”in2013.o Greaterinvolvementbyinternationalorganizationswasencouraged.o Discussions/integrationbetweenvariousinternationalorganizationswas

suggested.o DevelopmentofaSelfAssessmentTool(SAT)bytheIAEAtoassistmemberstates.o Newmethodforrecordingdenialswassuggested;specificallycollectingdatafrom

shippers.o DiscussissueswithIRPA.

Harmonization–significantnumberofdenialsislackofharmonizationwithregulations;thusintegrationofinter‐agencymodelwouldhelpfacilitateimprovedglobalharmonization.Thiswillrequirecoordinationbetweenvariousinternationalbodies.

RecommendedthatISCbemaintained,andthatanewinter‐UNagencycommitteebeestablishedforlongtermmanagementofDOSissues;wherethecommitteewouldinvolvetheIAEAandtherelevantmodalorganizations.Theestablishmentofthiscommitteeisstillpending,butinthemeantimeanad‐hocworkinggroupisaddressingDOS.Thus,theWGencouragestheestablishmentofthenewinter‐UNagencycommitteeforthelongtermandeffectivemanagementofDOSissues.

ConsideringthelackofconsistencybetweenregulationsattheMSandinternationallevel–needtoo IDvarianceso Resolvedifferenceso Establishacommunicationmechanismo IntegrateRNsandNFPs

ManyrecommendationsweremadetocontinueintegrationandtoutilizethevariousRNsandNFPsandtheISCtoenhancecommunication;andtoaddressconcernsinotherareas.

Analternatereportformwasthendiscussed.Thepresentationofthisformalsoaddressedcommunications(brochure,trainingmaterials,videodevelopmentandawebsite).


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EmphasiswasonhowtodiscussClass7,whereemphasisshouldbeplacedontheimportanceoftheshipmentofthesematerialscanbelifesaving.Thepresentationalsolooksatvariationsinthemodalregulations(primarilyonairandmaritimecarriage).Thesituationwithaircarriageisimprovingbecauseithashigh‐levelsupportofICAOinhelpingtoresolveDOSissues.ItwasillustratedthattheISCforDOSiswellorganized.

DiscussionthenturnedtotheexperienceofonememberstateinapplyingtheguidelinesandprogramoftheISCattheStatelevel.

Next,theresultsofthefirstdaydeliberationofWG4wereintroducedbytheSecretariat.ItwasnotedthattheWG4members’viewisthattheradiationprotectionprogrammerequirementsofSSR‐6couldpotentiallybecontributingtotheDOS.AsaresultofthisinputfromWG4,theWGsuggestedthattheSecretariatinvestigatewhetherchangestotheradiationprotectionprogrammecouldbeimplementedtoeasedelaysanddenialswithoutsacrificingtheadequacyofradiationprotection.

TheSecretariatalsodiscussedthepotentialfutureoftheISC. Thefocusisonensuringthatitisafunctionalinteragencygroup. TheSelfAssessmentToolisupandfunctioning. Thenewmethodforreportingdenialshasbeentestedbyacoupleofcompanies,andit

hasproventobesuccessful. TheIMOisdiscussingtheIMOdatabasethisweek. Harmonization–recenteffortsareaddressingestablishingstandardproceduresfor

addressingshipmentproblemsthroughouttheworld.

6. ConsiderationoftasksfromWorkplanAgendaItem2.1

Withalloftheforegoingdiscussion,theWGreturnedtothelistofelevenitemstaskedbytheSecretariattotheWG(pages7and8ofWorkplanagendaitem2.1);specificallythesesixitemsarelistedanddiscussedasfollows:

6.1 Continuetransportsafetyworkplan

Discussion/Conclusions:

TheTMChairbrieflyoutlinedwhatthetransportsafetyworkplanfortheWG.Basedonthisdiscussion,theWGconcurredwiththecurrenttransportsafetyworkplanandrecommendedthatitcontinuetobeapplied.

6.2 UseTRANSSCtodistributedenialreportingforms


BriefingswereprovidedbytheSecretariatandtheTMChairman,indicatingthatsomeofthemembersofTRANSSCarealsoinvolvedintheISC.

Itwasnotedthat,intheeventthatanNFPhasnotbeenformallyappointed,theTRANSSCmembersessentiallyfunctionastheNFP.DiscussionconcernedhowMemberStates


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shouldbeinformedofthispolicy.

TheWGrecommendedconsiderationshouldbegivenbytheAgencytosendingaletterdirectedtoallMemberStatesencouragingMemberStatestobecomemembersofTRANSSCandtoappointanNFPiftheyhavenotalreadydoneso.Thisissignificantlyimportantsinceabout2/3rdoftheMemberStatesarenotmembersofTRANSSC.

Otherwise,theWGconcurswiththisrecommendation,accordingtothelevelofparticipationofeachMemberStateinTRANSSC(activemember,correspondingmember,ornon‐member).

6.3. EffortsshouldbemadetoovercomebarriersattheIAEAandelsewhereincreatingjointsafetyandsecuritynetworksandcollaborationshouldcontinuetobeencouraged


Suchjointnetworksmayexistinformally,butitmaynotbeappropriatetoformallycreatesuchnetworks.However,TheWGrecommendsthatcollaborativeeffortsbetweensafetyandsecurityentitieswithintheIAEAandelsewhereshouldbeencouraged.

Itwasnotedthat,inmanyMemberStates,theroleofbothtransportsafetyandtransportsecurityisaccomplishedbyoneentity.

ItwasalsoacknowledgedthattheIAEAhasnowestablishedaninterfacegroupbetweensafetyandsecurity,butthisgrouponlyaddressespublicationsissues;whereasthechairsofthevariouscommittees(includingthechairofTRANSSC)areworkingtogethertoenhancecollaborationwithintheAgency.

6.4. ContinueISCactionplanviaproposednewUNinter‐agencycommittee Utiliseinformationavailableonindustry,IAEA/IMO/ICAO/NGOand

competentauthoritywebsite Surveybroadertransportsafetynetworkoncommunicationneeds WebbasedregulationaccessreferstoMSsafetyandsecurityregulations Emphasisoneducationandtrainingatalllevelsimportant Makeuseofbroadertransportsafetynetworktoencouragedenialreporting


Itwasnotedthatthenewplanessentiallymovestheprocessfromvoluntaryactionstoinvoluntaryactions;thusTRANSSCbecomescrucialinmakingtheprocesssuccessful.

TheWGnotedthatthenewUNinter‐agencycommitteeforimplementingtheDOSActionPlanneedstobeproperlystructuredandimplemented.

TheWGfurtherrecognizedthatitmayalsobenecessarytoconsiderfocusingontrainingoftheNFPsandRCs–somethingthathasnotbeenaccomplishedinthepast.

Thereisaneedtostrengthenthenationalnetworksandthecollaborationbetweenthe


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regionalcoordinatorsandtheNFPs.

6.5 DistributeconsolidatedISCActionPlantowideraudience(safety,securityandinter‐agency)requestingthattheseactionsbeconsideredintheirworkplans.


TheWGgenerallyagreeswiththisrecommendationwiththefollowingcaveatsandconsiderations.

Thefocusneedstobewellthoughtout.

Thedistributionoftheactionplanshouldfocusonallinvolvedstakeholders,andshouldbeaccompaniedbyappropriatefollow‐upactions.

TheActionPlan(seeAnnex1)delineatesspecificresponsibilitiesforimplementingthedifferentactivities,andthisshouldbeusedasaguideforeachMemberState.

Abetterstructuredactionplan,adequatebudget,appropriatemanpowerandmechanismsforcontrollingtheactionplanmaybeneeded.

Furthermore,itwasnotedthattheSecretariathaspreparedvariousbriefingpackagestoaddressspecificinvolvedentities.ThesematerialscouldhelpinimplementingtheactionplanattheStatelevel.

Themannerbywhichauthority,atalllevels,forimplementingtheactionplanneedstobeclear;thiscouldbepartlyaccomplishedbyspecifyingthefunctionsandresponsibilitiesoftheNFP.TheempowermentultimatelydependsupontheNFP’sownorganization.

MemberStatesshouldassignresponsibilities,authoritiesandresourcestosupporttheNFP,subjecttoindividualMemberStatesituationsandconcerns.

AllofthesefactorsneedtobeclearlyspecifiedandemphasizedintheHandbookforAddressingInstancesofDenial/DelaysofShipmentofRadioactiveMaterial–currentlyindraftform.ThishandbookneedstobegivenanappropriatelevelofexposurewhichcouldenhanceMemberStateimplementationoftheactionplanattheStatelevel.

Inconclusion,theWGrecommendsthat(a)theISCreviewandapprovetheHandbookforAddressingInstancesofDenial/DelaysofShipmentofRadioactiveMaterial,andthen(b)ameetingbeconvenedbytheAgencytoreviewandfinalizethehandbook,andrecommendingthemethodandtimingofpublicationandissuance(possiblyasatechnicalreportoftheIAEA).

6.6 Invitead‐hocexpandedinter‐agencygroupandTRANSSCrepresentativetothe8thmeetingoftheISCinJune2013.


TheWGsupportsthisrecommendation.


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6.7 Considerfundingissuesfordatabasetoensureitcanremainoperational


Thedatabaseisdefinitelyneededanditneedstobeproperlyfunded.

ItwasinitiallyrecommendedthatthedatabasebeshiftedtotheAgency,andmaintainedbytheAgency;whereeachmodalagencywouldhaveitsownsupplementarydatabase,feedingtheglobalbasemaintainedbytheAgency.However,itwasrecognizedthattheAgencymaynothavethemanpowerandeconomicresourcestosatisfythisrecommendation,norshouldithavethatresponsibilitysincetheDOSissueisnotasafetyissue.

Alternativestofindingthehostforthedatabase(ordatabasesifmorethanoneistobeused)needstobefullyexplored,takingintoaccountpastexperienceandresourcesthatmaybeavailableatvariousentities.Thiseffortshouldreallybedirectedtotheentity(orentities)whereitbelongs,recognizingthattheIAEAmaynotbethatentity.

ConsiderationshouldbegiventohavingeachMemberStatemaintainitsowndatabase.Thisapproachthiswouldimposeasmallburdenoneachcountry,whereasshouldtheAgencybeassignedtheresponsibilityforthedatabase,theburdencouldbesignificant.

AssigningtheresponsibilityforthedatabasetoindividualStateswouldrequirethatastandardizedapproachbefollowedtodevelop,andmaintainandcommunicatebetweentheindividualState’sdatabases.ThisapproachwouldalsocreatemorefocusonDOSattheStatelevel.

Thus,theWGrecommendsthattheISC,workingwiththeAgencyandotherinvolvedagencies,explorewhoshouldbetheownerofthedelay/denialdatabasesandresponsibleforassessmentofthedata.

6.8 Supportdevelopmentofguidanceforcustomstofacilitateshipmentsofradioactivematerialcrossingbordersaswellastrainingmaterial


Thisissuewaspreviouslycoveredindiscussiononthefirstday;e.g.seethediscussioninSection3.1ofthisreport.

TheWGfullysupportsactionsneededtodevelopguidanceforcustomsofficials,whichisespeciallyneededintheareaofradiationprotection,whilenotingthatNSNShasalreadyissuedguidanceforcustomsandborderofficials.

Considerationmayalsobeneededtoprovidingsuchguidancetootherentities,suchascoastguards,portauthorities,variousimportersandexporters,etc.

TheAgencyandsomeMemberStatesarealreadyprovidingtrainingtoportauthorities,etc.fortransportsecuritypurposes;thusconsiderationcouldbegiventocoordinatingwiththeseactivitiesandbuildingDOSissuesintotheirguidanceandtraininginformationtoreducedelaysanddenials.Forexample,theTransportSafetyUnitalreadyprovides


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inputstothecustoms‐relatedactivitiesattheAgency.

TheWGsuggeststhattheAgencyshouldconsiderconveningatechnicalmeetingtocollectexperienceonissuesrelatingtocustomsoperationsthathavecauseddelaysordenialsinshipments.

6.9 Ensuredenialcontinuestobeconsideredwhendevelopingsecuritydocumentsandinparticulartheirapplication.

DiscussionConclusions:

TheWGsuggeststhatTRANSSCtakeonthistaskaspartofitsTermsofReferencesuchthat,whenitisreviewingdraftsecuritydocuments,theissueofdenialofshipmentsisaddressed.

6.10 AskindustrytosurveyportproblemsandreportairandseaproblemstoNationalFocalPoints(NFP)

Extendthesupplychain ConsideraspossibleresourcetheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemsurvey


Inthecurrentreportingsystem,manyoftheincidentshavenotbeendocumentedduetoconfidentialityofinformation,whichthenofcoursedoesn’tmakeitintothedatabase.

Proposednewspreadsheetsweredistributed(seeAnnex2)thataddressthecollectionofdatainaformthatessentiallyeliminatestheneedforincorporatingconfidentialinformation.Theformsfocusoncollectingdatabyindividualmodes(e.g.airandsea).

TheproposednewreportingsystemwasapprovedatthelastISCmeeting.TheISCproposedthatthenewspreadsheetsbeusedbyconsignorsforthecollectionoftheneededdataandthisdatawouldthenbeprovidedtoandcoordinatedwiththeNFPsandRNsonatwiceperyear(everysixmonths)basis.

TheWGendorsestherecommendationoftheISCwithregardtothenewlyproposedspreadsheetprocess,recognizingthattheprocessneedstobeclarifiedonhowtousetheforms.Forexample,theterm“transshipmentrefusal”canbeinterpretedinmultiplewayswhichcouldresultininconsistentdatareporting.The“refusals”canbemotivatedbypoliticalissues,interveneractions;andeconomicssuchaswhencarriersviewthetransportofradioactivematerialassuchasmallmarketthatitisnotworththeircooperation.

TheWGchosetonotaddressissueswithregardtotheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemsurvey;itdoesnotappeartoberelevanttotheDOSproblemduetolimitedresourcesattheIMO.TheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemphilosophywasincorporatedintothenewspreadsheets.Withoutaddedinformation,theWGchosetonotaddressthisissuefurther.


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6.11 Developtrainingmaterialonthesafetyandsecurityimplicationsofshipmentsbeingheldasaresultofdenialfororganizationsinvolvedintransportofradioactivematerial.

ConsiderwhetherTechnicalCooperation(TC)cansupportconductofthistraining


Thediscussionrevolvedaroundthefactthatdenialordelayofshipmentscanhavebothsafetyandsecurityimplicationsshouldapackageofradioactivematerialbedeniedtransshipmentandthepackagegoesoutofcontrol.

TheIMOtrainingcoursewasacknowledged,butitwastheviewoftheWGthatitcouldbeenhancedtobetteraddressdelayanddenialissues.

TheWGrecommendsthatthesafetyandthesecuritystaffattheAgency,workingtogether,evaluateexistingtrainingmaterialstoensuretheinformationpresentedtoparticipantsissufficienttoaddressconcernsandactionsneededasrelatedtosafetyandsecurityissuesthatmayaccruefromadelayordenialofashipment.

TheabilityofTechnicalCooperationtoadequatelyfundthetrainingonthesafetyandsecurityimplicationsofshipmentsbeingheldasaresultofdenialfororganizationsinvolvedintransportofradioactivematerialwillneedtoresolvedbytheSecretariat.

TheWGthereforerecommendsthattheSecretariatworkwithintheAgencytodefinetheadequacyoftrainingmaterialfornationalandregionaltrainingneedsandtheabilityofTechnicalCooperationtosupportthiseffort.

7. ConsiderationonProposalofcountry’stemplateforIAEASharePoint

TheWGthenconsideredanadditionaltopicidentifiedbytheWGmembersthatwasviewedasanissueofhighprioritybecausecommunicationisessentialtosuccessinresolvingtheD/DOSissues.

ThepotentialuseofSharePointcapabilityforeachMemberStateforsharingkeydocumentsamongMemberStatesandwithinMemberStateswasaddressed.

TheWGLeadersharedwiththeWGaconceptofatemplateforpotentialuseonSharePointfortransportingeneral.Thispresentationprovidedaverydetailedsetofwebpages(asapossibletemplate)forconsiderationforuseinSharePoint.Itwouldgiveuserstheopportunitytoexploreforinformationonpackagingandtransportofradioactivematerial,organizations,etc.bycountryorwithinacountry.Insummary,theproposedtemplatecontainedsixmajorelementsasfollows:1. GeneralInformation2. Libraries/Publications3. Lists


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4. Discussions5. Sites(Links)6. PeopleandGroups

TheScientificSecretarythensharedwiththeWGanexamplediagramofwhattheAgencyisconsideringforSharePoint;whichisidentifiedas“OneEntryPoint:“TransportWebPortal”(seeAnnex3).ThisportalwillprovideallinformationthatisavailableatandtotheAgency.

AsillustratedinAnnex3,atthetoplevelitiscurrentlyenvisionedtohavefiveelementsasfollows:

1. CalendarandCurrentEvents2. RegulationsandGuidance3. HotTopics4. MemberStatesPortal5. Tools

TheviewoftheSecretariatisthattheSharePointsitewouldnotduplicatesitesorinformation;itsgoalwouldbetoprovideauser‐friendlytooltoassistMemberStatesincommunicatingwitheachotherandwiththeIAEAandpotentiallyotherinternationalorganizations.

ConcernsoftheWGmembersfocusedaroundthemaintainingofthematerialontheSharePointsite,whatwillbethecommitmentintermsoftime,personnelandcosts.

ThediagramaspresentedbytheSecretariatwasviewedasaverypositivestepforward.

TheWGrecommendsthattheSecretariatmustprovideadetailedsitemapofacountryandregionaltemplatefortheSharePointsite,inordertodefineaharmonizednationalandregionalnetworksothattheMemberStatescanprovidefeedbackearlyinthedevelopmentofthenetwork.ThisshouldbeprovidedwithaviewtoobtaininginputsfromNFPsandRFsandotherstakeholders,asappropriate.

8. CustomsTraining–BriefingbyAgencyStaff

Mr.HazemSumanoftheSecretariatprovidedabriefingontrainingthatisavailableforcustomsandborderagents.Acoursewasdevelopedapproximatelytenyearsago,basedonTS‐R‐1,andhasbeengivenatbothregionalandnationallevelsinvariousMemberStates.Itisaone‐weekcourse.Thefocusisoneducatingcustomsofficerstoproperlydealwithshipmentsofradioactivematerialpassingthroughtheirborder.Itoutlineswhatisneededforradiationsafety.Ithasalsobeenincorporatedtrainingelementsonsecurity.

ItwasmentionedbytheWGthatthecoursemightbeexpandedslightlytoaddressissuesrelatingtodenialanddelayofshipments.Inaddition,thecourseneedstobeupdatedtoreflectSSR‐6.

TheWGrecommendsthattheAgencyconsiderenhancingthetrainingcourseforcustomsandborderofficialstoincludedelayanddenialofshipments.


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Annex1

TheActionPlanfor2012,aspresentedintheISAReport(inAnnex17‐b)isasfollows:


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Annex2

NewReportingFormatforDenialandDelayofShipments


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Annex3

ExampleDiagramoftheAgency’sProposedSharePointSite