Environmental problems demanding co-operation in the Eastern Nile basin

Tis Isat Fall/ Blue Nile Fall by Torleif Svensson Source: adopted from Yacob, 2007

MSc. Thesis Development & International Relations

JUNE 2008

Environmental problems demanding co-operation in the Eastern Nile basin

Supervisor:

Jens Muller

Student:Yibabe Demtse

Development & International Relations

DENMARKJune 2008

Acknowledgements

Before everybody else, I praise God for each and every move I made. Everything has been succeeded with the help of him.

It is absolutely correct to thank my parents whose prayers and thoughts have been always with me.

I would like to express my deep whole-hearted gratitude and indebtedness to my advisor Jens Muller, for his guidance and patience.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE: Environmental problem demanding co-operation in the eastern Nile basin

Chapter one: Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1

1.1 Background of the problem ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4

1.2 Description of the study area …………………………………………………………………………………………………………...7

1.3 Theoretical frame work………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………9

Chapter two: Environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia…………………………………………………14

2.1 The extent of deforestation and soil erosion…………………………………………………………………………………………14

2.1.1 Deforestation ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..14

2.1.2 Soil erosion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...16

2.2 The state of the environment in the Ethiopian portion of the Nile basin…………………………………………….19

2.2.1 The Tekeze river basin…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….20

2.2.2 The Abbay river basin……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..20

2.2.3 The Baro-akobo river basin……………………………………………………………………………………………………………21

Chapter three: Slit accumulation and water supply problems in the downstream countries23

3.1 slit accumulation in the downstream countries: its extent……………………………………………………………………23

3.1.1 General explanation………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23

3.1.2 Slit accumulation in the Roseirs dam in Sudan………………………………………………………………………………..25

3.1.3 Slit accumulation in the Khashim El-Girba reservoir in Sudan………………………………………………………….26

3.1.4 Slit accumulation in the Aswan high dam in Egypt………………………………………………………………………….27

3.2 water supply problems in the downstream countries………………………………………………………………………….28

Chapter four: Impacts of environmental degradation ……………………………………………………………30

4.1 Impact on Ethiopia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………30

4.1.1 Impact on production……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………30

4.1.2 Loss of biodiversity…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………32

4.1.3 Drought intensification …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………34

4.2 Impact on the downstream countries………………………………………………………………………………………………….41

4.2.1 Impact of slit accumulation……………………………………………………………………………………………………………41

4.2.2 Impact of drought on the water supply of downstream countries …………………………………………………43

Chapter five: The need for and impediments to cooperation…………………………………………………..46

5.1 The need for co-operation…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….46

5.2 Major impediments to co-operation……………………………………………………………………………………………………47

5.2.1 Unchanged status quo……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………47

5.2.2 Mutually exclusive doctrine of the lower riparian states………………………………………………………………..49

5.2.2.2 Ethiopia’s appropriation doctrine ……………………………………………………………………………………………….56

Chapter six: Tendencies towards co-operation…………………………………………………………………………61

6.1 Current situations in the basin and the world……………………………………………………………………………………..61

6.2 The Nile basin initiative (NBI)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….65

Chapter seven: Analysis ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….75

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………87

List of Acronyms

BCM-Billion Cubic Meters

EFAP-Ethiopia’s Forestry Action Program

ENSAP- Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program

ENTRO-Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office

ESTAC-Ethio-Sudan Technical Advisory Committee

FAO-Food and Agriculture Organization

HAD-High Aswan Dam

IMF-International Monetary Fund

ITCZ-Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone

LDCS-Less Developed Countries

MASL-Meters Above Sea Level

MM3-Million Cubic Meters

MW-Mega Watts

MWR-Ministry of Water Resources

NEL-SAP-Equatorial Nile Subsidiary Action Program

NMSA-National Meteorological Service Agency

RRC-Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

SAP-Subsidiary Action Program

SOL-Southern Oscillation Index

SST-Sea-Surface-Temperature

SVP-Shared Vision Program

WB-World Bank

WMO-World Meteorological Organization

1. CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction

Nile River has been the main cause of suspicion and tensions between Ethiopia and lower basin states

(Egypt and Sudan). The old mistrust and tensions have been centred around the fear that Ethiopia might

block the safe flow of the Nile water in to Sudan and Egypt. Currently, however, nature itself is likely to

impose its own checks on the flow of the Nile (by means of increasing silt accumulation in the dams, river

and irrigation canals, and frequent droughts) due to environmental degradation in the highlands of

Ethiopia. This problem seems beyond any one country’s control, thus necessitating co-operation instead of

competition and conflict. Thus, it is these problems that initiated the study on the topic.

The Nile is the longest river in the world, in terms of its geography, flowing 6,825 km over 35 degrees

latitude from south to north. It is one of the greatest wonders of nature, with unfading legend through the

civilization of olden days, its basin embraces some three million km² encompassing the north eastern Africa

and equatorial lakes region. Included within the Nile basin are: one third of Ethiopia, a significant portion of

Sudan, almost the entire cultivated and settled lands of Egypt, the whole of Uganda, parts of Kenya,

Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda , Congo democratic republic and Eritrea. The basin (3352710km2) is the third in

the world, following those of the Amazon and the Congo.

The Nile water system consists of several tributaries and headwater lakes. Lake Victoria in the equatorial

region and Lake Tana in the north-western Ethiopia are the most important natural reservoirs in the Nile

upstream. Of the four main tributaries, the Abay (Blue Nile) originates from the equatorial lakes region. The

Ethiopian head- water provide 86 per cent of the entire Nile water, while the remaining 14 per cent come

through the White Nile system of the equatorial lakes region.

Egypt and Sudan are net recipient of the Nile water that come from both head-water sub-systems. In view

of the on-going Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) the basin is divided into two sub-systems, namely the eastern Nile

and the equatorial Nile. The two sub-basins provide two contextual realms for strategically conceived

subsidiary scale. The equatorial Nile sub-basin comprises Burundi, DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo),

Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, while the eastern Nile basin comprises Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Egypt and Sudan, as downstream countries relative to both the eastern and equatorial sub-basin system,

are mapped together with two sub-basins. Egypt and Sudan are therefore recipients of water from

upstream areas of the two sub-basin states.

This thesis attempts to assess environmental problems in the Nile eastern Nile basin. Particularly the study

attempts to examine environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia in general and the state of the

environment in the upper catchments of Tekeze/Atbara, Abbay(Blue Nile) and Baro-akobo river basins in

particular as well as the extent of silt accumulation and water supply problems in the downstream

countries.

The result revealed that the upper catchments of Tekeze/ Atbara, Abbay (Blue Nile) and Baro Akobo river

basins (particularly the 1st two) are nearly devoid of forest or vegetation cover. Experiencing severe soil

erosion, and thus severely degraded. Deforestation and its resultant soil erosion in these area is going on

unabated, and has resulted in loss of agricultural production, biodiversity (particularly in the source area-

Ethiopia), silt accumulation in the downstream countries and drought intensification in the eastern Nile

basin. Resource degradation in the sub-basin coupled with rapidly growing population has resulted in

apparent resource (water) scarcity. The results also reveal that environmental problems have become the

common challenge facing the eastern Nile basin states.

Instead of combating this common challenge, the riparian countries in the sub-basin have distanced

themselves by mutually exclusive doctrines and self –serving and hegemonistic tendencies. It is believed

that failure to address core legal and institutional issues may spoil the sprit of cooperation among the

riparian states. The objective of this thesis is to assess the extent

of environmental degradation in the highland Ethiopia and silt accumulation and water supply problem in

the downstream countries, their impacts, and assess the need for and obstacles to cooperation among the

sub-basin states. The specific objectives are to:

1. Assess the extent of environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia

2. Examine the extent of silt accumulation and water supply problem in the downstream countries

3. Explain the impact of environmental degradation and silt accumulation in the sub-basin

4. Assess the need for and major obstacle to concerted actions to solve land degradation problems in

the eastern Nile basin; and

5. Assess possibilities (for the sub–basin states) of coping with these problems.

Further the this thesis concentrate on the three countries, Egypt , Sudan and Ethiopia , which are the

ultimate need of water, considered to be affected by the environmental problem and deals with the

accords involving them, or concluded on their behave, during the colonial period.

Figure 1 Showing the African portion of the Nile basin

Figure 1 Source: Yacob Arsano (2007) “Ethiopia and the Nile dilemmas of national and regional hydro

politics” P.16

1. Background to the problem

Ethiopia (the source of more than 86 percent of the Nile’s water) today is in the state of deepening

ecological crisis due to misguided and unregulated modifications of its environment. As Markos Ezra

(1997:79) noted, ‘the areas of rain-fed agriculture most under pressure from ecological degradation in the

horn of Africa lie in the northern and central highlands of Ethiopia’. The high land Ethiopia (areas of over

1500 masl), which make up about 45 percent of the total land area and support about 85 percent of human

population and two- thirds of animal population as well as produce nearly all the of the countries staple

food and cash crops, are highly degraded (vegetation cover removed, soils eroded, etc) (Tesfaye 1999:104;

Solomon, 1994: Kefialew, 1997:62).

Different writers (Solomon, 1994:4; Thomas, 1991:2) have widely reported that as recently as beginning of

the 20th century, 40 percent of the highlands was covered by forests. According to these sources, the forest

cover around the end of the 20th century was estimated to be less than 3 percent. And forest clearance is

continuing at an estimated rate of ‘about 8,000 ha per annum in the closed forests and 80,000 ha per

annum in the open forests (Markos, 1997:79). On the other hand, EFAP (1994:2) estimated that the annual

loss of the high forest/natural forest area is between 150,000 and 200,000 ha per year. On the positive

side, only 13,000 ha were afforested in the 1980s annually (Markos, 1997:70, Tesfaye, 1999:102). EFAP

(1994:2) exclaims that, if the present rate of deforestation continues, the area covered by natural forests in

the year 2010 may be reduced to scattered minor stands of heavily disturbed forests in the remote/in

inaccessible parts of the country.

Tesfaye (1999:102) reported that the destruction of forest has been spreading from the highly populated,

over cultivated and drought –afflicted northern parts (mainly Wollo and Tigray) to the relatively sparsely

populated and forested southern regions (Illubabor, Wollaga and Kafa) by means of the government

resettlement programs of the 1980s. This implies that population resettlement aggravates land

degradation.

Deforestation is one of the factors that cause increased runoff, which leads to soil erosion and ultimate to

land degradation. As Williams and Bailing (1995: 14) describe, ´the sparser the planet covers, the more

vulnerable the top soil to detachment and removed by raindrop impact, surface runoff and wind´.

In highland Ethiopia, soil degradation has not only been a continuous threat: it is now more serious than

ever before (Solomon, 1994:1). It is serious in its severity, extent and the rate at which it progress.

According to estimate by Constable (1984: xiii), over half of the high lands or 270,000 km² are already

significantly eroded and left with relatively shallow soils; and over 20,000 km² of former or present farm

lands have reached the point of no return to fertility.

Rates of soil erosion are high, though estimates of soil loss from the highland vary widely. It is generally

agreed that erosion causes cropped areas to lose on average 100 tons of soil per hectare every year

(Constable, 1984: XV), even if erosion rates stay at the 1983/84 levels, land covered by soils less than 10

centimeters deep ( and thus incapable of sustaining cropping) will increase five –fold to around 100,000km²

by the year 2010. As soil depth decreases, croplands convert to grass lands and finally to bare rock.

Land degradation affects both natural and man-made water flows and storage regimes so that the extent

and frequency of flooding increase in wet seasons and drought in dry seasons (Constable, 1984: XV).

Dassalegn (2001:42) asserted that land degradation in highland Ethiopia has resulted in: (1) damaging the

effective life of dams and reservoirs in Sudan and Egypt through siltation and sedimentation; (2) increasing

the frequency and the magnitude of drought in highland Ethiopia, both of which affect the quality and

quantity of the Nile waters. These in turn have resulted in the water supply problems in the downstream

countries.

In the past Egypt and Sudan had attempted to secure their water supply by: (1) legal means (establishing

legal regimes between themselves), (2) building high dams (storage regimes) that can store water for the

period of low flow.

Today, however, nature itself is likely to impose its own checks on the flow of the Nile due to the

combination of continued degradation with frequent droughts. Storage regimes, particularly in the Sudan

are being silted up, losing their storage capacity; and Sudan and mainly to land degradation in the source

area-Ethiopia highlands. As a result of this, it seems that the lower riparian states (Egypt and Sudan) are in

confusion with regard to what to do concerning their water security. The choice is between continuing the

old conflict-laden attitudes and trends (though political and diplomatic means) in the basin, While the

former leads to mutual harm, later will lead to mutual benefit.

As stated by Renner (1991:108), environmental degradation is a new force shaping governmental policies

and international relations, both in negative sense (tensions over resource depletion or degradation) and

positive sense (the necessity of new forms of cooperation-rules and institutions-to address common

dangers). In this sense, the eastern Nile basin could not be an exception. This is to mean that environmental

degradation in high land Ethiopia with its impacts on the water supply of the downstream countries can

bring new tensions in the region unless the sub-basin countries co-operate to solve the problem. It means

that the impact of land degradation in the sub-basin can hardly be solved by means other than cooperation.

So far there is no genuine and effective co-operation approaches to the sustainable utilization and

management of the Nile waters. But this does not mean that the impasse in the sub-basin has completely

been broken.

1.1 Description of the study

The high lands of Ethiopia include areas with altitude above 1500masl. They cover about 45 percent of

Ethiopian’s land area, accommodate about 85 percent and 75 percent of human and livestock population,

as well as generate more than 90 percent of the country’s agriculture output (Solomon, 1994: 23).

The substantial portion of this area has slopes in excess of or greater than 20 percent (kefiale, 1997:62).

Getahun Bikora(2001:33), However, has wrote that nearly 70 percent of the Ethiopian highlands have

slopes in excess of 30 percent, creating favorable conditions for accelerated soil erosion.

Climate in the highlands is moderate and annual precipitation ranges from 800 to over 2200 mm (Shibru

and Kifle, 1999:18). Of the total are, 60 percent is reported to be suitable for agricultural purpose (Shibru

and Kifle, 1999:18). It seems that because of this the area is densely populated.

This thesis focus on the north, central and southwest highlands, where most rivers (Blue Nile-Abbay,

Tekeze/Atabra, and Baro-Akobo) originate and flow towards Sudan and hence to Egypt; forming part of the

system of the Nile waters. Stated differently, the study focuses on the upper catchments of Tekeze/Atbara,

Blue Nile/Abbay and Baro Akobo river basins, which forms the Ethiopian portion of the Nile basin. Of these

river basins emphasis will be given to the upper catchments of Tekeze/Atbara and Abbay/Blue Nile because

these catchments are suffering from severe land degradation as compared to the upper catchments of the

Baro-Akobo basin.

The Tekeze/Atbara sub-basin: the Tekeze sub-basin, whose upper stream rise in northern Ethiopia,

replenishes the major Nile north of Khartoum perennially. The rivers Angarab and Guang are the main

Ethiopian tributaries of the Tekeze. At the one part the river marks the Ethio-eriterian border. The Tekeze

sub-system contributes 8.2 BCM to the total annual flow of the Nile waters. The climatic pattern and the

physical environment of the Tekeze sub-system are very alike to those of the Abbay. For this reason, the

river’s headwater area is also prone to a high degree of soil erosion and land degradation, as a result

incurring a loss of 120 million cubic meter topsoil to Ethiopia (Yacob, 2007:50)

The Abbay/Blue Nile sub-basin: the Abbay sub-basin (known as the Blue Nile outside of the Ethiopian

boundary) start off in Ethiopia’s northwestern plateau. Its numerous head-waters include Lake Tana and

the rivers Dabus, Didessa, Fincha, Guder, Muger, Jamma, Wolaka, Bashilo, Birr, Beles, Dinder and Rahad. Its

catchments area of (324,500km square) is more than twice smaller than that of the White Nile, whereas its

water contribution to the main Nile is more than four times as big as that of the White Nile.

The Abbay River contributes 52.62 billion cubic meters (Ethiopia, FDRE, 1999) to the sum annual volume of

the main Nile measured at Aswan High Dam. As there is high degree of seasonal inconsistency in the

Ethiopian plateau, the seasonal flow of the Abbay varies dramatically.

The major rainy season in the Ethiopian plateau is from June to September. The most runoff is in august

and is 60 times greater than the minimum runoff in the month of February. The physical nature of the basin

and the seasonal concentration of the water runoff have resulted in a high amount of soil erosion every

year. This advance results in land degradation in upstream Ethiopia and siltation in the downstream Sudan

and Egypt. According to one recent report, Ethiopia’s annual loss of topsoil is 405 million cubic meters from

Abbay basin. As a result the Khasim El Girba Dam on Atbara lost more than 60 percent of its storage

capacity between the year 1964 and 1997. During the same period the Roseries Dam on the Blue Nile lost

all its dead storage volume to sedimentation, and the live storage was getting depleted (Yacob, 2007:50).

The Baro-Akobo/Sobat sub-basin: emanates in western Ethiopia. Its major tributaries within Ethiopia

comprise the Alwero, Gilo and Pivor River that drain the western Ethiopia plains before they join the main

Baro-Akobo River. The Baro, Pivor and Alwero River make up a 380 km frontier line between Ethiopia and

Sudan. On the Sudanese side of the border this sub-system to the Nile is 23.24 BCM/year.

Compared to other river systems that flow due west, the Baro-Akobo has broad banks and a less irregular

flow course. It is the single navigable river across the Sudan-Ethiopia frontier. At one point there was river

transport by steamboat between Gambella in Ethiopia and Khartoum basin that Ethiopia and Sudan have

ethnic populations with common languages, shared traditions and similar production systems. These

include the Anyuae, the Nuwer, and Bumme. They straddle across the otherwise international frontier in

search of their livelihood that is dependent on riverine resources (Yacob, 2007:51).

The thesis also focuses on the Sudanese reservoirs built on the Blue Nile and Atbara rivers, and irrigation

canals using water from the same rivers. The high Aswan dam in Egypt is also another focus of this study.

Emphasis is given to the extent of slit accumulation in these storage regimes, and water supply problems in

Sudan and Egypt.

Figure 2 showing the Ethiopian portion of the Nile basin.

Figure 2 source Source: Yacob Arsano (2007) “Ethiopia and the Nile dilemmas of national and

regional hydro politics” P.84

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Environment, which comes from the French environner, meaning to encircle or surround, can be defined

as: 1) the circumstances or conditions that surround one organism or group of organisms: or 2) the complex

of social or cultural conditions that affect an individual or community (Cunningham and Saigo, 1995:3).

Obviously, human beings have always inhabited two inter-relating worlds: nature world consists of animals,

plants, soils, air, land, mountains, water, and etc. That perhaps predated human beings by billions of years.

The social world consists for itself using its own inventiveness. Although both worlds are essential to our

lives, the subject matter of this section is the natural world.

The rich diversity of life exists on our –earth, millions of plant and animals species inhabit the earth and

help sustain a habitable environment, as explained by Cunningham and Saigo (1995:3),’ this vast multitude

of life creates complex inter-related communities where towering trees and huge animals live together

with and depend upon tiny life-forms such as viruses, bacteria, and fungi.’ For the natural environment or

ecosystem to sustain itself, the natural and unintervened interaction of these communities must exist. Birch

et al (1996:5)’ succinctly stated this fact by saying that for an ecosystem to be fully functional (and

therefore self-sustaining) there must be representatives from the three metabolic groups: primary

producers (green plants), consumers (animals) and decomposers (bacteria, fungi and protozoa). The

complex interaction of these functional groups enables the natural environment to sustain itself and

support the living beings, including humans.

Human beings are inseparable linked with the natural environment. Obviously the environment is the base

of humanity‘s life because ‘from the environment come our food. Clothing and shelter’ (Thomas, 1991:1;

Neefies 2000:1). In their quest for their basic necessity (as they wholly depend up on the natural

environment). In their quest for their basic necessities (as they wholly depend up on the natural

environment), human beings have succeeded in modifying the environment and shaping nature to their

desires. In fact, the mere (and normal) relationship per se between man and nature cannot be condemned

as wrong. The relationship is said to be bad/wrong when human kind destroys nature (for instance, through

deforestation, soil erosion, gene pool extinction) or when man’s action goes beyond the nature’s carrying

capacity and endanger many of the life- support system. When nature is disturbed, life on earth will be in a

terrible state of affairs.

Deterioration or depletion of environment resources (like soil, water and forest) results in deterioration of

man’s living conditions. Deterioration or degradation of natural resource coupled with their uneven

distribution also results in resource conflict between states (Deudeney, 1992:181).

Bennett (1991:22) defined environment degradation as reduction or deterioration of environmental

resource. Resulting in the alteration of the natural support system upon which humanity lively depends; or

reduction in the longer term productivity of the environmental degradation is a plague that upsets the

traditional balance between people, their habitat and socio-economic system by which they live. Because

environmental degradation disturbs a region’s natural resource base, it promotes insecurity. It shakes the

whole edifice of man-nature relationship, and hence the socio-economic and political system of a state or

region.

Thus, it seems clear that land degradation affects water resource systems. Since water is the key to life, its

reduction or deterioration both in quantity and quality endangers the continues survival of life on the

planet earth. The management of this key element to life (water) is inextricable linked with managing water

resources. Tewolde Berhan, as below has briefly stated this fact:

Water comes as rain from the environment, goes through land, which is the major

Component of the human environment and ends up in the sea or on the land. Managing

water is thus intimately linked with managing the environment, conversely, Water is an

important component of every type of the environmental, Even of the desert, where life is

found. There is thus no such thing as managing water without managing or mismanaging

the environment, and no managing or mismanaging of the environment in which water does

not play a central role (Tewolde Berhan, 2000:239).

The quotation above signifies the fact that natural resource work as a unitary whole, in other words,

natural resources, such as water, soil and vegetation, are strongly bonded to each other. A damage to one

of these means the damage of the system. Similarly it is impossible to develop each resource in isolation (El

Monshid et al., 1997:411).

Moreover, a drainage basin is a systemic whole, which does not recognize National/political boundaries.

Stated differently, river systems are interconnected transport systems, which are often in conflict with the

compartmentalized approach of men (Newson, 1992:22). Recognizing the unitary, systemic and integrated

character of river basins is essential to take both macro and micro decisions for their management.

The unitary character of river basins necessitates unitary development and management irrespective of

political divisions. Lowi (1993) explains this fact as follows:

Geography suggests that by virtue of its physical unity, a river basin should be developed as a

single, indivisible whole, irrespectively of political divisions. This is so, because moving water.

Flowing toward an outlet (outlets), binds land areas together, and Interference with the

water and its movement at any point has repercussions elsewhere in the basin (Lowi, 1993:1).

This in turn, basically necessitates co-operation among or between competing water users. Indeed, since

river basins are considered as common property resources, they should be managed collectively. Efforts to

manage a river basin by one state in international river basins might not bear meaningful fruits; nor could

the pursuit of interests defined in purely nationalistic terms lead to socially desirable outcomes. Hence, as

Lowi( 1993) noted, 'the ideal solution to the satisfaction of competing needs and conflicting interests is

unitary basin-wide development of water resources under some system of supra-national authority or

management' (Lowi, 1993: 1).

Nevertheless, the achievement of co-operative solutions to the provisions of a common property resource

(as is the case in international river basins) remains the main challenge. States hardly relinquish control

over the resources that lie partially or wholly within their territories. Besides, states tend to exploit

resources unilaterally.

Here the question is that why states fail, or are unwilling to co-operate over the common property

resource like river basins? Alternatively, under what circumstances would states give up sovereign control

over the resources within their borders and submit to some sort of legal regime? Moreover

comprehensively, why states tend to choose non-co-operation when (under certain conditions) co-

operation seems to be in their mutual interest? In this specific case, why the Nile basin states fail to create

comprehensive, basin-wide, cooperative legal and institutional framework for the utilization and

management of the Nile?

On these issues, there have been continuous debates in international relations theory between political

realists and liberal institutionalistes.

Political realists argue the political-structural condition of anarchy in international system has an impact on

the willingness of states to engage in cooperation (Lowi, 1993:3). In other words, since ensuring their

security and independence in the self-help context of international anarchy. Central to the realist and neo-

realist project are two assumptions. First that states are likely to be constrained from co-operation by the

anarchic nature of international society. Second that the states formal apparatus and enduring interests are

what shape and transform economic process. International co-operation, from this perspective, only arises

in so far as it supports the political interests of the state (Williams, 1996:50). Political realist discourage

state co-operation in an anarchic international institutional system.

However, liberal institutionalists say, states are becoming increasingly interdependent in economic and

welfare matters. As a result, states rightly consider each other as partner in growth and development (Lowi,

1993:4). From the perspective of liberal institutionalists, since global environment change does not respect

national borders, multilateral co-operation and the intensification of common or shared interests across

territorial units are required if it is to be successfully addressed(Williams, 1996:51). Liberal institutionalists

consider states as partner in every aspect and hence encourage co-operation between states.

These theories are applied to explain why the riparian states in the Nile basin in general and in the eastern

Nile basin in particular have so far failed to establish co-operative frameworks for the utilization and

management of this common resource – the Nile. And finally, I advocates liberal institutionallists theory

and encourage the basin states, or the sub-basin states to use it in utilizing and managing the water

resource of the Nile.

CHAPTER TWO

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN HIGHLAND

ETHIOPIA: IT’S EXTENT

2.1. The Extent of Deforestation and Soil Erosion: General

Introduction

Although the process of environmental degradation encompasses a number of things, this section is mainly

devoted to the discussion of deforestation and soil erosion. This is because deforestation and its resultant

soil erosion, among other things, results in: (1) loss in national economy; (2) downstream sedimentation;

and (3) drought intensification, the latter two affecting the quantity and quality of the Nile waters and

thereby the lives of Egyptian and Sudanese peoples. It seems that this problem can only be solved through

co-operative management of the basin's watershed.

2.1.1. Deforestation

A number of available literature indicate that very little of the natural vegetation of the highlands remain

today. Basing their description on historical sources, many literatures (Leykull, 2001:74; Shibru and Kifle,

1999: 18; Tesfaye, 1999:102; Pankhurst. 2001:13; Markos. 1997:79; Berhanu, 1997:2; Solomon. 1994:4;

EFAP, 1994:21; and RRC. 1985; 14) have indicated that by the beginning of the 20th century about 40

percent of Ethiopia's land area was covered by high forests of either the coniferous or the broad leafed

type which, by the early 1990s, had reduced to less than 3 percent. This process of entire destruction of

forests was accomplished in less than a century. Presently, even this little forest resources remaining are

unprotected; they are subject to total extinction.

Kinfe warns that 'Ethiopia could have no natural forests left by 2020.' This should be accepted with no

doubt because deforestation in Ethiopia is going on at an alarming rate due to land clearance for

cultivation, fuel wood, and uncontrolled forest fires. For instance, in January 2000, forest fires raged for

over three months in southwestern forests of Bale and Borana, in which more than 300,000 hectares of

natural forestland was consumed. This area became the victim spot of fire for the second time in February

2003 ensuring the vulnerability of the remaining forests in Ethiopia. If something is not done to stop this

process. It seems that Ethiopia will soon be turned to be bare land devoid of natural forests ( Kinfe,

2004:133).

Different sources give different estimates for the rate of forest loss in Ethiopia. According to EFAP (1994:2)

and Yonas (2001:59), deforestation in Ethiopia is still continuing at an estimated rate of 150,000 to 200,000-

ha.per annum. On the other hand, Berhanu (1993:7) and Solomon (1994:4) have estimated the rate of

deforestation at 100,000 hectares per year. Still other sources such as FDRE (1997: 1) have estimated the

rate of forest clearance to be between 80,000 to 200, 000 and about 250,000 hectares per year

respectively.

Despite the varying rates estimated, the above literatures unanimously assert the fact that the

disappearance of Ethiopia's forest resources is continuing at a shocking rate. Although about 13,000 ha.

were afforested annually (in the 1980s) under food-for-work programs (Tesfaye, 1999: 102), the gap

between deforestation and afforestation is extremely wide, the former being by far greater than the latter.

EFAP (1994:22) claims that Ethiopia's remaining natural high forests (about 2.4%) concentrated in the less

populated southern and western parts of the country while the central and northern parts are almost

completely deforested. The condition is very much appalling when one notices the fact that these

completely deforested northern and central highland areas of Ethiopia are the upper reaches of Atbara

(Tekeze) and Blue Nile Basins. The damage and destruction done to the vegetation in the upper catchments

of river basins definitely aggravates soil erosion and downstream sedimentation.

The phenomenon of complete deforestation is not confined to the northern and central parts of Ethiopia.

Available literatures are telling us that forest destruction has been spreading from the north to the

southwestern regions. For instance, Tesfaye (1999: 102) reported that the destruction of forests has been

spreading from the highly populated, over cultivated and drought- afflicted northern parts (mainly Wollo

and Tigray) to the relatively sparsely populated and forested southern regions (Illubabor, Wollaga and Keta)

through the government resettlement programmes of the 1980s. Thus, things are getting worse, and not

only external sources but also government sources alike are time and again warning this danger, though

effective actions to halt this danger have not yet been taken.

EFAP (1994:2) exclaims that, if the present (1994) rate of deforestation continues, the area covered by

natural forests in the year 2010 may be reduced to scattered minor stands of heavily disturbed forests in

remote /in inaccessible parts of the country. Therefore, the extent and severity of deforestation in highland

Ethiopia is very much alarming.

Deforestation is one of the factors that cause increased runoff, which leads to soil erosion and ultimately to

environmental degradation.

2.1.2. Soil Erosion

Being a dynamic living system, the soil is capable of supplying plants with all their requirements for growth,

except solar radiation and carbon dioxide. In addition, the soil provides a means of physical support and

anchoring for plants (Birch et al., 1996:8). This important resource is being eroded in highland Ethiopia.

According to RRC (1985: 12), soil erosion has reached exceedingly dangerous levels and is especially

characteristic of the highland regions of Ethiopia, where there are almost no remaining forestlands. The

Ethiopian Highland Reclamation study (EHRS) (Constable, 1984: xiii) reported that about half of the

highland area (that is, about 270,000km²) is already significantly eroded; of which nearly half (that is, about

140, OOOkm²) are seriously eroded and left with relatively shallow soils, Some 20,000km² of agricultural

lands are so seriously eroded that it is now unlikely that they will be able to sustain farming in the future.

Hans Hurni (Quoted in Kefialew, 1997:62) estimated that about 35.4 percent of the highlands have soil

depth of less than 35cm, where as 18 percent are less than 10cm deep. These shallow soils are found

mainly in the old agricultural settlement areas of central and northern highlands, which are nearly

completely deforested, and which command the upper reaches of the Blue Nile (Abbay) and Atbara

(Tekeze) basins.

What is very much alarming in highland Ethiopia is not only the existence of severe and extensive soil

erosion but also the rate at which it is going on.

Different writers gave varying estimates of soil loss from the highlands. According to Myers (1994:60), the

cultivated lands are believed to be losing at least 1 billion tons of soil per year, Humi (Quoted in Dessalegn

Rahmato, 2001:35) claimed that the rate of soil erosion in the highlands was 1.5 billion tons per year,

Constable (1984:5) estimated that nearly 2 billion tons of soil was being removed from the highlands

annually, and that in 25 years time about 18 percent of the country's farmland would go out of production,

affecting the livelihoods of some ten million peasants. On the other hand, EFAP (1994: 7) reported that the

highlands lose a total of 1.9 to 3.5 billion tons of soil annually.

These varying estimates for sure speak one thing: the high rates of soil erosion in highland Ethiopia. It is

quite obvious that at this rate of soil erosion, all the top soils from the country's farmland would almost

completely be washed away within a short period of time. According to Constable (1984: xvi), if present

(1983/84) trends continue, today's children could see over a third of the highlands become incapable of

sustaining cropping while the population triples within their lifetimes. This seems true because no proper

measures are taken to control the process of soil erosion while demographic pressure on land is increasing

from time to time.

The major causes of environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia are believed to be the growth of

human and livestock populations, poor agricultural production techniques result in low agricultural

productivity. This is coupled with inadequate rural land use policy and poverty as well as dependence on

fuel wood (EFAP, 1994:9).

According to the same source, population and livestock growth is expanding at an average rate of 3 and 1.1

percents per year respectively, while the grazing and agricultural lands are shrinking due to degradation.

The severe land-use conflicts between crop farming, animal grazing, and forestry are thus the results of the

increasing gap between the shortage of agricultural and grazing lands and the growing demand for them.

If population growth remains unchecked, 'the population density in the High Potential Cereal crop (HPC)

zone will increase from some 62 persons/km² in 1985 to over 166 Person/km² in 2015’ (EFAP, 1994:9). This

would reduce per capita land holdings to O.6 ha. if all land within this zone is suitable for cultivation,

grazing and other purposes (But this is not actually the case). According to Clarke (1986:21),' the more

people there are, the more pressure is placed on the environment through cultivation, grazing and the

collection of firewood and building materials.’

Available literature has asserted that there is virtually no unused land in the parts of the highlands. This

resulted in the further expansion of agricultural land which in turn reduces grazing areas, pushing livestock

herds further up the hill sides which finally results in the encroachment on traditional forest land. While

stating the condition in Wollo, Timberlake (1986:21) wrote that 'all the land that an ox can climb or a man

stand upon has been cultivated. Farmers even suspend themselves by ropes to sow hillsides too steep to

stand up on.' This had further been corroborated by Getahun (2001: 33) who wrote that 'the serious

shortages of productive (fertile) land in the highland areas, coupled with population pressure, have forced

cultivation of large parts of the steep and moderate slopes which are highly degraded because of soil

erosion.'

The land-thirsty highland farmer (desperate and without alternatives) will then accelerate erosion of the

hillsides, degradation of the rangelands, burning of the forests and the extinction of plant and animal

species (Hurni and Kebede, 1992: xiii). Thus national high forests and plantations are encroached upon and

cleared for cultivation or grazing by local people (EFAP, 1994:49).

The increase in population pressure is also believed to result in the progressive shortening of fallow

periods, hence giving soils less or no opportunity to replenish their humus contents. This aggravates soil

degradation. Timberlake (1986:57) succinctly stated this phenomenon by saying that 'population pressure

is so extreme in the Ethiopian highlands that shifting and rotational cultivation, which require much land

and relatively few people, has become impossible'.

Poor farming techniques characterized by a general lack of conservation practices are also the main causes

of sheet and rill erosion in the highlands (Barber, 1984:51). Poor and archaic farming techniques can be'

one cause for low agricultural productivity which in turn results in the expansion of cultivation on to

marginal and easily erodible land probably by destroying forests and wood land which fosters run-off and

finally land degradation.

The fewer forests that remain are subjected to uncontrolled wood harvesting and rapid rates of clearing to

open up new agricultural land, partly in compensation for land lost through degradation but mostly to

accommodate the rapidly increasing population (Leykun, 2001:71). It is assumed that the demand for fuel

wood increases roughly at the rate of population growth, for household energy in Ethiopia largely comes

from woody biomass fuels.

Therefore, it is not only land clearing for agriculture, which contributes to land Degradation, but also the

reliance on biomass for household energy' (Shibru and Kifle, 1999:20). According to the same source, a

1984 estimate indicates that 94.8 percent of total energy consumption in Ethiopia was made up of biomass

fuels: wood, animal dung and crop residue, where fuel wood accounts for 81.8 percent and animal dung

and crop residue make up 9.4 and 8.4 percent, respectively. 'In the rural Ethiopia traditional fuels make up

99.9 percent of energy consumption and the rural population consumes 86.7 percent of total net energy'

(EFAP, 1994: 16).

Apparently, there is a wide gap between the fuel wood demand and supply in Ethiopia, which serves as a

backing agent for speeding up the process of forest clearance. In line with this, Tesfaye (1999: 103)

reported that ‘in 1992 the fuel wood requirement of the country was estimated at about 45 million M³

while the forest resources were able to produce only 12.5 million M³. The deficient therefore amounted to

32.5 million M³. Further, EFAP (1994: 16) reported that ‘the imbalance between wood demand for firewood

and supply would widen from 34 to 84 million M³ by the year 2014'. If alternative energy sources (like rural

electrification) are not prepared soon. The households will rapidly deplete the present stock of wood

biomass accessible to them in order to satisfy their energy demand.

In addition to a continued reliance on fuel wood, the current practice of substituting animal dung and crop

residue for fuel wood, rather than using these materials as inputs to the soil, gradually undermines the

productivity of agriculture land (EFAP, 1994:17).

Loss of humus in much of the highlands will be more pronounced because of the use of crop residues for

livestock and the use of most of the dung for fuel (Barber, 1986:8). Being the areas, that are heavily

cultivated for corps and where the largest number of human and livestock population are found, the

highland areas of Ethiopia are highly degraded.

Finally EFAP (1994:50) warns that 'with unrestricted population growth, present agricultural technology, a

continued livestock growth and reliance on fuel wood, the situation will reach a crisis level.' The fact,

however, is that these days the situation has already reached the crisis level.

2.2. The State of the Environment in the Ethiopian Portion of the Nile Basin

Although the state of the environment in the Ethiopia portion of the Nile basin is not different from the

general condition of the environment in highland Ethiopia, it seems essential to treat this section separately

so as to enrich the knowledge on environmental degradation in the upper reaches of Eastern Nile basin.

Accordingly, the state of the environment along the Tekeze, Abbay and Baro-Akobo river basins is briefly

presented here.

2.2.1 The Tekeze River Basin

About 70 percent of the Tekeze/Atbara river basin lies in the highlands at an altitude of over 1500 masl. The

upper reaches of the Tekeze/Atbara River are surrounded by mountain ranges, the elevation of which is

over 2,000 masl. The area of land above 2000m elevation covers almost 40 percent of the total basin area

(MWR, 1998:3).

The Tekeze River Master Plan Project of the MWR has reported that 'most of the climax vegetation in the

basin has disappeared. Due to deforestation and soil erosion, severe degradation of soils and watersheds

exist in the basin' (MWR, 1998:31). The project study further asserted that 'a substantial area (about 80-90

percent) of the highlands of the basin has already been taken out of agricultural production' (MWR,

1998:31). The project study also went on to estimate the existence of high erosion potential in the basin

due to:

(1) Exposure of bare soils to rain on any slope: (2) the length of slopes left unprotected : (3)

the direction of ploughing (up and down the slope): (4) the breakdown of the soil

structure by repetitive ploughing: (5) cultivation on steep slopes without protective

measures:(6) the removal of all vegetative matter for grazing or fuel: (7) cultivation

across water ways and depletion of revering vegetation: and (8) annually burning of

grasslands at the end of the dry season(MWR, 1998:79).

2.2.2 The Abbay River Basin

Much of the forest resource of the Abbay/Blue Nile basin has been cleared for agriculture. Fuel wood and

charcoal production and built up areas-like village and towns (MWR, 1999: 11). The basin's forest resources

have been degraded (MWR, 1998: 16). The damage and destruction done to the basin's vegetation has

aggravated soil erosion and downstream sedimentation, thus causing losses in agricultural productivity

(MWR, 1999: 11), Conway also added that 'severe deforestation and enhanced soil erosion in the upper

Blue Nile basin are aggravating downstream reservoir infilling (Siltation).’

The Abbay River Basin Master Plan Project stated the condition of soil erosion in the basin as follows:

The north-east and east of the basin is all area generally acknowledged as severely eroded:

the low-slope areas of the Nile highland area-Gojjam, Awi, and north and west Shewa appear

to have current erosion rates, probably the highest in the basin: and the south-west of the

highlands has many low-slopes and is in the process of development for cultivation (MWR,

1998:59).

Therefore, soil erosion is a critical issue in the Abbay/Blue Nile river basin, and the potential is said to be

high due to: 'high intensity rainfall; erodible soils: steep and long slopes, especially in the highlands; poor

and intermittent vegetation cover over much of the basin: and poor land management practices' (MWR,

1998: 14), This is endorsed by Messele (2000) who pointed out that erosion hazard in the Ethiopian portion

of the Nile basin (including the Abbay basin) is high due to high slope gradients, highly erodible soils, poor

farming practices, high intensity storms and deforestation(Messele, 2000:207), thus, the environment is the

basin is severely degraded.

2.2.3. The Baro-Akobo River Basin

In contrast to many areas in Ethiopia, land degradation (in the Baro-Akobo basin) appears to be less

destructive and spectacular: gullies are rare, soils appear to be deep, and crops appear to grow reasonably

well (MWR, 1997:33). According to the project study the basin contains about 2.2 billion ha. of different

types of forests, which are estimated to constitute more than half (about 60 percent) of Ethiopia' s

remaining forests seriously degraded (MWR, 1997: 13). However, the situation of the remaining forest

resource is said to be critical, where the rate of forest re-growth is less than the loss by exploitation and

uncontrolled burning.

In the Report of the Master Plan Study, the state of forest resource in the basin has been described as

follows:

Although an often-repeated statistics tell us that 60 percent of Ethiopia’s natural evergreen

forests occur in this region: in actual fact, the forest reserves of the project area are meager

and few primary forests remain: those that do remain occur on steep land that is unsuitable

even for shifting agriculture. Those forests that remain appear to follow a sequence of

increasing degradation followed by total disappearance (MWR, 1997:1).

The decline in forest cover in the basin is attributed to the combined actions of civil unrest land conversion

to agriculture, fuel wood harvesting and burning. The refugee population of about 60,000 individuals in the

basin is also considered as another contributing factor for the decline in forest cover in the area for the

refugees inflate fuel wood harvesting fate in the basin. It is thus stressed that with the exception of forests

located on slopes greater than about 60 percent forests in the project area are in serious decline (MWR,

1997:7).

The rate of soil erosion over the basin is reported to be very critical (MWR, 1997: 14). Due to uncontrolled

ploughing, 40 percent of the present cultivated land in the basin is found on slopes of above 30 percent

with no precautions to mitigate erosion (MWR, 1997: 14). This aggravates erosion in the area. Moreover,

soil loss due to removal of vegetative cover is a ubiquitous condition in the upland zones of the basin.

Though the rate of loss varies from zone to zone (MWR, 1997).

Therefore, although the present environment of the basin is less degraded than the above two basins,

Conditions will turn to be worst in the near future if preventive and rehabilitative measures are not taken

soon.

CHAPTER THREE

SILT ACCUMULATION AND WATER SUPPLY

PROBLEMS IN THE DOWNSTREAM COUNTRIES

3.1 Silt Accumulation in the downstream countries: Its extent

3.1.1 General explanation

Human impact on river basins and catchments is an important factor causing downstream sedimentation.

Forest clearance and its resultant soil erosion has created or has been creating chronic problems for dams

and reservoirs constructed in the lower reaches of river basins. Mahmood (1987:149) noted that for the

last century or two, a great deal of the worlds` forests have been cleared for agriculture and urbanization.

This increases the on-site erodibility of soil, loosening it, destroying its protective layer. The general

consensus is that, trees are effective at preventing soil erosion, though topography, soil nature and other

factors also play their own roles. When trees are cut down, heavy rains wash topsoil into the rivers. While

the river flows swiftly, the particles of the soil are held in suspension but when flow encounters a dam, then

it is halted and the particles of silt fall to the bottom (Europe world, 7 December, 2001). Therefore, the

transported soil, as a result of soil erosion from deforestation, is the main source of sediment delivered to

the reservoirs. According to Crispen (7 December, 2001), soil erosion deprives the area of nutrition and

deteriorates the quality of the land; it also silts up dams and dykes. Elevates the riverbed and hence the

water level, which aggravates flood devastation. The same writer further elaborated the situation as

follows:

When a catchment area of a river is heavily forested, the elaborate root system of the trees

acts as a vast sponge, which soaks up rainfall, releasing it only very slowly to the river below.

Once a catchment area has been deforested, the runoff is vastly increased. Thus... when

forested the watershed of one selected river only releases between 1 and 3 percent of the

total rainfall: by contrast, once the area was deforested, between 97 and 99 percent was

released (Crispen, 7 December. 2001).

Obviously, all the sediments carried by water runoff may not enter into rivers and hence may not reach

dams and reservoirs. Some of the sediments may be deposited in the lower lying plain lands (if any) before

they reach streams and rivers. The land topography is thus one that can mitigate or aggravate sediment

transportation. Similarly, the deposit of sediments may not always have negative effects. Since sediments

often have a high nutrient content, sedimentation can be beneficial in increasing land productivity. For

instance, much land in Egypt might never have been cultivated had it not been for sediment deposits

coming from the Ethiopian highlands (EHRS/FAO, 1986:225). Hutchison (1991:96) also enunciated that

sedimentation has an advantage of depositing downstream new layers of soil that recover some of the lost

fertility from years of intensive farming.

When sediment enters into rivers and then to dam reservoirs, it has serious negative consequences. The

consequences can be in terms of water supplies and hydroelectric power production (Barber, 1984:23).

Silted water brings greater wear and tear to hydroelectric turbines (EHRS/FAO, 1986:23). According to

Satyanarayana and Srivastava (1987: 151), 'the process of sedimentation leads to a reduction in the

expected benefits such as irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control, fishing and recreation. It also

progressively impairs the drainage system downstream, reduces the carrying capacity of the irrigation

canals and increases the probability of floods.'

Since the world's dams and reservoirs are filling up with silt, they are losing their Capacity to hold water

(Europe world, 7 December 2001). The same source further indicated that, 'on average, 1 percent of the

water storing capacity (equivalent to some 70km³ of storage capacity) of the globe's reservoirs is now being

lost annually through silting.' In his 1984 research findings on the effects of sedimentation conducted in 200

major dams built from 1940 onward, Myers (1994) had calculated economic impacts of siltation as below:

Merely a 1 percent reduction in capacity will mean a loss of some 148,000 gig watt hours of

electricity by the year 2000. To produce an equivalent amount of electricity by thermal means

would require 3.7 million tons of oil: and at US$ 80 per ton, or US $12 per barrel. Thus

Sedimentation would constitute a direct cost of US 3 billion dollar in electricity output forgone

in the single year 2000 (Myers, 1994:61).

Moreover, in some parts of the world (particularly in tropical areas, where rivers are rich in silt) the rate of

sedimentation is even faster, up to 2 percent (Myers, 1994:61; Europe world, 7 December 2001). Thus,

siltation is becoming the cancer of dams, because it largely determines the life span of a project.

3.1.2. Silt Accumulation in Roseires Dam in Sudan

It has been said that, the original temperate and mountain forests in the Ethiopian highlands have been

disappeared after centuries of improper and intensive cultivation. Particularly, the northern and central

highlands (the upper reaches' of the Blue Nile and Atbara basins), as it has already been stated, suffer from

severe soil erosion.

As noted by Hutchison (1991: 19), the process of soil erosion not only affects downstream sedimentation

but also can change the seasonal hydrological profiles to exacerbate flooding. Stated differently, soil

erosion affects water and drainage regimes through reducing rainfall infiltration and increasing run off. This

in turn results in flooding and sedimentation, which can cause damage in downstream areas (EHRS/FAO,

1986:220).

The reservoirs of Sudan and Egypt are the victims of soil erosion in highland Ethiopia, as the Ethiopian rivers

flowing into these countries carry high sediments due to severe soil erosion associated with rugged

topography of the highlands. In line with this, Humi (1986: 1) expressed his observation, saying, 'Rills,

gullies and brown rivers full of sediment show that a lot of soil is carried away and lost for agricultural

production'.

The fact of sediment concentration in the Ethiopian rivers has also been confirmed by EFAP (1994:5), which

reported that sedimentation and siltation have seriously affected water resources in Ethiopia; this will lead

to reduced life of storage dams and may change the conditions for transport and hydropower production.

Hurni and EI-Swaify (1996) further remarked that:

The Atbarah and Blue Nile rivers are the primary conveyors carrying nearly 53 percent of

seasonal waters, with an average of 11 BCM/year for the Atbara, and 49BCM/year for the

Blue Nile. We estimate that these two tributaries contribute over 90 percent of the Nile's

sediment, although their catchment area is only 332,000km², or about 16 percent of the Nile

basin (EI-Swaify and Humi, 1996: 7).

With particular reference to a reservoir on Blue Nile River, Hutchison (1991:94) wrote that increased topsoil

erosion in highland Ethiopia has resulted in increased siltation, as a result of which the useful life span of

the Blue Nile Roseires dam in Sudan has probably been halved. The same author further expressed his fear

of damage by sedimentation directed against strategic water control and hydropower structures of Sennar,

Roseires and Aswan Dams; together with irrigation areas they serve (Hutchison, 1991:94).

Roseires dam is located at the Blue Nile/Abbay and provides water for irrigation schemes and hydropower

generation for Sudan. The sediment quantities carried by the Blue Nile are monitored by a key station at EI

Deim near the Ethiopian borders, 100kms upstream from the Roseires dam. ’The quantities of suspended

sediment carried by the Blue Nile at EL Deim are estimated to be 140 million tons during the flood period

(July-October)’ (EI-Monshid, 1997:397).

The sediment grain size ranges from sand (grain size diameter > 0.063mm) to silt and clay (grain size

diameter < 0.04mm): and the average percentages are 45 percent sand, 15 percent silt and 40 percent clay

(El Monshid, 1997:397; Ahmed, 2000: 186). Conway (2000: 133), on the other hand gave percentages of

sediment size type for Roseires reservoir of 22 percent sand, 38 percent silt, and 40 percent clay.

These researchers also found that concentrations are increasing and that Roseires has lost 40 percent of its

designed capacity (which was 3 million cubic meters); and the dead storage volume is almost completely

filled with sediment (EI Monshid, 1997:398). Ahmed (2000: 186) also noted that the capacity of Roseires

dam had been reduced from 3 million cubic meters (Mm³) to less than 2.2Mm³ due to sediment deposition

in the dam. Thus, the extent of silt accumulation in the Roseires dam is alarming.

3.1.3 Silt Accumulation in Khashm EI-Girba reservoir in Sudan

Another Sudanese reservoir seriously affected by sedimentation is Khashm EI-Girba, located at the

Atbara/Tekeze River, 150km downstream from Ethiopia-Sudan border. It is estimated that ‘the Atbara river

used to carry 3 kilogrammes of dissolved and eroded material per million cubic meters of water' (Ati,

1992:30). 'As a result of siltation (and evaporation) the reservoir storage capacity gradually started to drop

from the original 1.3Mm³ in 1964 to 0.80 Mm³ in 1972 to 0.64 Mm³ in 1990' (Ati, 1992:29). Based on the

reports of the Sudanese Ministry of Irrigation, the same author explained that the amount of sediments in

the Khashm EI-Girba reservoir has risen from nil in I964 to 0.46 X 109M³ in 1972/73, thus reducing its

storage capacity by about 35 percent in only 8 years (Ati, 1992: 30). While Conway (2000: I33) estimated

that Khashm EI-Girba built on the Atbara has lost 42 percent of its capacity in only 12 years, EI Monshid

(1997:396) remarked that the same reservoir has lost 60 percent of its capacity in 30 years. These research

works signify the continuous reduction in the storage capacity of Khashm EI-Girba reservoir. It seems clear

that if unchecked, the reservoir will completely lose its capacity due to increasing average siltation rate

resulted from severe soil erosion in highland Ethiopia.

Irrigation schemes in Sudan are also being affected by sedimentation. It has been said that sediment

deposition in irrigation canals creates problems both in services and clean out costs and is considered to be

the most serious problem facing the Gezira and other irrigation schemes using water from the Blue Nile and

Atbara rivers (EI Monshid, 1997:398: Conway, 2000: 133). Rasmussen (1992: 91) also noted that in some

places of Sudan, sand dunes up to 40m high reach the villages and the agricultural land. For the

communities living along the Nile of northern Sudan, the severances and amounts of Sand present a new

problem, hence necessitating the invention of new strategies.

3.1.4 Silt Accumulation in the Aswan High Dam in Egypt

Available literature everywhere witnesses the fact that soil erosion in highland Ethiopia is resulting in dam

siltation not only in Sudan but also in Egypt. Salih (1992: 15) noted that '….increased water runoff

contributed to dam siltation and in some cases affected hydropower production, as in the case of Sudan

and Egypt.' Evans (1990: 13) remarked that in the pre-High Aswan Dam period, the Nile Delta actively grew

with the high sediment load carried by the Blue Nile from soil erosion over the Ethiopian Plateau, which

now have been entrapped behind the dam, resulting in serious economic and environmental problems in

Egypt.

The HAD, with a large storage capacity of 164 BCM and a total of 645 Mega Watts installed capacity of

hydropower, can accommodate any flood coming from upstream countries such as Ethiopia. The dam can

also accommodate suspended sediments of varying types and sizes, though much of sediments are halted

by reservoirs in Sudan before reaching the HAD. Nevertheless, the HAD is not free from sedimentation.

Conways reported that 'the total sediment accumulation in the HAD reservoir reached at 594 million cubic

meters between 1987 and 1992, an average of almost 120 million cubic meters per year' (Conway,

2000:132). Waterbury, on the other hand, explained that 'each year the Nile Water has carried about 100-

110 million tons of silt (15 percent), clay (40 percent) sand (45 percent) either to Egypt's fields or to the

Mediterranean Sea. Now nearly all that sediment is being entrapped by the HAD reservoir, where the

"dead storage" capacity available for this purpose is 30BCM' (Waterbury, 1979: 126). This is more or less

consistent with the description of Abu-zeid, who says ' prior to the construction of the Aswan High Dam,

the Nile discharged between 60 and 180 million tons of silt annually into the Mediterranean. Since 1964,

this amount of sediment has been held in the reservoir' (Abu-zeid, 6 March 2003). According to Waterbury

(1979: 126) 'dead storage would be used up after 500 years on the assumption that the average silt load is

60 Mm³ (or 110 million tons) annually.' But, on the basis of average annual silt load estimated by Conway,

that is, 120Mm³, the dead storage would be used up after 250 years unless actions would be taken. Thus,

Presently occurring siltation, or sedimentation deposition follows patterns that had not been

initially anticipated: fortunately, the most significant depositions since construction in the mid

1960s are occurring several hundred kilometers away from, rather than immediately behind,

the structure, it is, of course a matter of time before this phenomena shifts towards the

structure (Said cited in EI-Swaify and Humi, 1996: 12).

In order to prove the inevitable accumulation of sediments in the HAD, two things can be considered:

firstly, a great deal of soils carried away from agricultural areas of Ethiopian highlands and entering into the

Blue Nile/Abbay and Atbara/Tekeze rivers; secondly, the shortage of silt in the once-fertile Nile Delta due to

the holding back of silt laden floods behind the HAD. These can be taken as proofs for the accumulation of

sediments in or behind the HAD.

It has widely been acclaimed that because of the entrapping of silts behind or by the HAD. The Egyptian

lands below the dam are becoming poorer and poorer. In other Words, silt in these lands has become a

scarce resource (Waterbury, 1979:131). Stated differently, water released from the HAD reservoir is silt-

free because silts have been entrapped by the dam (Abu-zeid, 6 March 2003). Rosensweig (25 may, 1999)

explained that with the HAD in Egypt growing time can be increased but yields decreases because soils

became poorer due to the holding back of floods from the once fertile Nile delta. Thus, definitely, the

accumulated silts is not only shortening the life span of the dam but also denying Egyptian farmers of

naturally fertilized soils (Tesfaye, 2001:31).

3.2. Water Supply Problems in the downstream countries

Water supply can be affected by quality and quantity problems. In terms of levels of salinity and pollution

from agri-chemicals, and domestic and industrial uses, the water in the Nile basin is mostly of high quality

(Shapland, 1997: 68). One possible reason for this is that upstream countries have not so far utilized the

Nile's water. In fact water quality problems are significant in Egypt, where upstream uses within Egypt

cause deterioration in water quality which is felt when that water is re-used downstream (Shapland,

1997:68). When upstream countries begin utilizing the water resources of the Nile its quality will be

affected. Since there is soil degradation in highland Ethiopia, the country will use chemical fertilizers, and

this will affect the quality of the Nile waters as they are transported down in the form of sedimentation.

This in turn will result in the water supply problems in Sudan and Egypt.

Water quantity problems can result from siltation and drought. Large quantities of silt deposited in

reservoirs reduce the volume of water, which they can store. For instance, the Roseires dam has

heightened by 10 meters to increase its storage capacity due mainly to the effects of siltation (Shapland,

1997:68). But this technique cannot bring lasting solution to the siltation problems of storage regimes as

the rates of sedimentation are increasing from time to time. Reduction in the storage capacity of reservoirs

means reduction in the volume (quantity) of water that can be used for different purposes. Hence bringing

water supply problems.

Drought in Ethiopia has direct impacts on the hydrology of the Nile system. This is because changes in the

main Nile discharges primarily occur due to changes in the Blue Nile/Abbay discharges and thus fluctuations

in the rainfall over the source area-the Ethiopian highlands (Conway, 1997:267). Further, according to

Schove (1918:38), there is high correlation between the Nile levels and summer rainfall in Ethiopia, the

Sahel and the Indian Ocean countries generally.

In ancient Egypt, periods of famine caused by failure of the summer rains in Ethiopia (and probably the

Sahel) are recorded with low Nile levels (Schove, 1978:38). Since about 86 percent of the Nile waters are

discharged from the rainfall over the Ethiopian highlands, rainfall deficiency (drought) over this area means

low Nile levels. Low Nile levels in turn means an increase in dry spell or socio-economic crisis in the lower

riparian, Nile water-dependent countries, particularly Egypt. For instance, as Schove (1978:40) noted,

'prolonged periods of very low levels A.D. 53/63, 151/170 and 254/265 may haw been partly responsible

for economic crisis in the Roman world.'

In order to prove the correlation between the Nile levels and summer rainfall in Ethiopia, Schove took

series of drought periods in Ethiopia and compared these periods against weak Nile floods reported in

Egypt, and finally, he reached a conclusion that these periods (periods of drought in Ethiopia and periods of

weak Nile floods in Egypt) are in excellent agreement (Schove, 1978). This evidence indicates the fact that

runoff in the Nile basin is highly sensitive to fluctuations in rainfall over the Ethiopian highlands.

CHAPTER FOUR

IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

4.1. Impacts on Ethiopia

4.1.1. Impacts on Production

Land degradation caused by deforestation, soil erosion and the loss of soil fertility, up sets the agricultural

production functions for farmers and leads, other things being equal, to reduced crop yields. It has been

estimated that ‘soil erosion reduces crop yields between 1 and 2 percent per year, while biological

degradation due to the decline in organic matter causes a further loss of 1 per cent’ (EFAP, 1994:14).

Land degradation affects agricultural production in two major ways: first erosion results in loss of soil

depth, which in turn results in the decrease of the capacity of soils to hold water for plant growth; and,

second, the use of animal dung and crop residues for fuel wood purposes disturbs the soil nutrient cycle

and reduces plant production. Besides, soil erosion, by accelerating surface runoff, imposes losses on

agricultural production. EFAP has summarized the quantitative and monetary impacts of land degradation

in Ethiopia as follows:

In1990 reduced soil depth, caused by erosion, resulted ill a loss in grain production estimated

at between 57,000 and 128,000 tons depending on whether the loss of soil depth has

amounted to 3.5 mm or 8 mm. This loss also reflects the impact of 1,000 to 2,500km of

cropland going out of cultivation because the soil depth fell below a minimum critical level.

The foregone production in the livestock sector resulting from soil erosion was estimated to

be between 35,000 and 78, 000 tropical livestock units (TLU). Together these losses represent

financial losses of Birr 18 million (at 3.5 mm soil loss) or Birr 40 million (at 8 mm soil loss),

equivalent to 0.5 percent and 1.1 Percent, respectively of the 1990 agricultural GDP (EFAP,

1994:18).

On the other hand, the Ethiopia's Environmental Policy document, prepared by the FDRE (1997), estimated

the annual loss in grain production and livestock due to soil erosion as below:

In 1990 accelerated soil erosion caused a progressive annual loss in grain production

estimated at about 40,000 tons, which unless arrested, will reach about 170,000 tons by

2010. Livestock play a number of vital roles in the rural and national economy, but according

to one estimate some 2 million hectares of pastureland would have been destroyed by soil

erosion between 1985 and 1995. Land degradation is estimated to have resulted in a loss of

livestock Production in 1990, equivalent to 1. 1million TLU, and unless arrested, will rise to 2.0

million TLU or to 10 percent of the current national cattle herd by 2010 (FDRE, 1997: 1).

Using the figure of 1 billion tons of soil lost per year in highland Ethiopia. Myers calculated that erosion

accounts for a loss of crop output of at least 1 million tons of grain, which is equivalent to two-thirds of all

the relief food shipped to Ethiopia in 1985 (Myers, 1994:61).

In addition to agricultural production losses as a result of soil erosion, the burning of dung and crop

residues caused physical production losses estimated by EFAP to be four (at 3.5 mm soil loss) to eight times

(at 8 mm soil loss) greater than the production lost on account of soil erosion. In financial terms these

losses amounted to '4 and 7 percent of the 1990 agricultural GDP', respectively (EFAP, 1994:49).

The logic behind physical production losses described above is that increasing use of animal dung for

household energy prevents its use as manure or soil conditioner: at the same time the use of plant residues

for the same purpose prevents their use as livestock feed. This in turn leads to breaches in the process of

soil nutrient regeneration, especially nitrogen and phosphorous, leading in turn to declining soil fertility and

so to declining crop yields.

When one considers the combined impact of production losses from soil erosion and the burning of dung

and crop residues. It is very alarming. Stated differently, production losses in Ethiopia due to physical and

biological soil degradation is large, and constitutes a formidable challenge to the society whose livelihood

depends on agricultural products. In line with this, Stahl (1994: 48) stated that ' today, land degradation is

threatening the very basis of East African peasant societies. Degradation has proceeded furthest in Ethiopia

where the northern highlands have become chronically dependent on food aid.’

The total cereal production lost in 1990 was estimated to be equal to about one fifth of an average year's

harvest of 5 million tons of grain. This would have been sufficient to feed 4.4 million people, which

(calculated on the basis of an annual cereal requirement of 220 kgs. per person) to the average farmer, the

financial cost of losses in agricultural production (both crop and livestock) in 1990 prices represented about

12 percent of his income (EFAP, 1994). In general, the financial costs of losses in grain and livestock

production in the period from 1985-1990 would have meant an average yearly decline of between 0.33 and

0.41 percent of the agricultural GDP in 1985 (EFAP, I994:49).

The impacts of physical and biological soil degradation on the agricultural GDP of Ethiopia are likely to

increase. This is because: firstly, deforestation together with its resultant soil erosion and the burning of

animal dung and crop residues are continuing at more alarming rate than ever before: and secondly, there

is no effective measure taken, at either regional or national level, to arrest the process. Thus, land

degradation in Ethiopia remains a serious danger, threatening the continuous survival of the society.

4.1.2. Loss of biodiversity

The Environmental Policy document of Ethiopia asserted that 'renewable natural resources (land, water,

forests and trees as well as other forms of biodiversity) in highland Ethiopia, which meet the basic need for

food, water, clothing and shelter have now deteriorated to a low level of productivity' (FDRE, 1997: 1).

The existence of a diversified topography and climatic zones enabled Ethiopia to accommodate a diverse

range of climax vegetation types (Afro-Alpine, sub-Afro-alpine, forest & woodland savannah), each with its

specific assemblage of animals, birds, insects etc, which famed Ethiopia for its biodiversity. Nevertheless, it

seems that a dramatic reduction in forest cover has posed a serious threat to this biodiversity.

Ethiopia is said to have one of the highest levels of endemism in Africa. 'Out of 5,770 species found in

Ethiopia, 10 percent or about 577 species are said to be endemic. The highlands are also one of the six

cradles of primary plant domestication' (EFAP, 1994:215). For instance, 'of the 16 major crops domesticated

in the country, three (Coffee, Okra, and Castor Beans) are uniquely domesticated in Ethiopia. The country is

also an important centre of genetic diversity for forage species' (EFAP, 1994:21). Moreover, 'some 103

species of mammals and 832 species of birds have so far been identified, of which seven species of

mammals and 25 species of birds are endemic to Ethiopia' (Dept. of Geography, 2001:57).

Ethiopia's richness in biodiversity and hence the fame she has been accorded, however, seems to be

declining, because ecosystems for flora and fauna and, for genetic resources as well as being threatened

due to reduced forest cover and associated impact on land degradation. Deforestation and its associated

impact on land degradation has two-folded effects: loss of plant species, and loss of primary habitats for

animal species and their ultimate extinction/ disappearance.

Orians (1997:20) noted that there is a good deal of evidence that human activity is leading to the extinction

of plants and animals on a broad scale. The possible extinction of plant and animal species in Ethiopia is a

critical threat because it is hardly reversible. Since forest cover in Ethiopia has dramatically been reduced

from 40 percent to 2.4 percent within less than a century; and since the remaining forest resource areas

are being encroached by the local people in every part of the country, ecosystems for plants and animals

are seriously endangered.

Surprising enough, even the so-called National Parks have become the victims of wild fires and forest

clearance for agricultural expansion and for settlement purposes by the local population. Ever since the

period of transition from the Dergue to EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), almost

all National parks in the Country have been encroached by the local people, resulting in evacuation or loss

of animal species and loss/disappearance of plant species from the area. Here, suffices it to mention the

case of Gambella National Park, which is reported to be in danger of extinction. On the basis of the

information from the Head of the Gambella National Park, Girma Mengesha, Kinfe (2004:54) reported that

the 'National park spanning 5,061 km² was facing the threat of destruction by frequent fires started by the

local people and deforestation mainly by refugees from the Sudan. As a result of this, it is said that buffalo,

elephant, roan antelope and other varieties of the 41 animal species in the park were migrating to the

Mago park in Southern Ethiopia, and to the Sudan and Kenya in mass; and failure to offer appropriate

solution will definitely result in further depletion of their number.

From this, one can imagine similar losses in biodiversity in Ethiopia, though precise estimates of the

number of species lost due to deforestation and associated land degradation are not possible due to

absence of species inventory in the country. The general consensus, however, is that there exists loss in

biodiversity in the country so far as there is ecological crisis.

EFAP (1994:8) exclaims that 'a loss in biodiversity ultimately implies economic losses to Ethiopia and the

world.' Indeed, the impact of losses in biodiversity is beyond economic losses. It further results in the

disturbances of natural systems on which human society depends.

Obviously, we need plants for photosynthesis, building materials, and energy. We need water and arable

soils for our survival. These and other ecosystem services are vital to our life. These services can be

obtained in an unspoiled environment. Therefore: for our lives to survive, forests, grassland, soils, &

biodiversity must be protected.

In Ethiopia, however, protecting these natural resources has become a strong national challenge requiring

not only the enactment of appropriate policy and allocation of sufficient budget, but also public awareness

and mobilization.

4.1.3. Drought Intensification

Drought defined

Being a complex phenomenon, drought lacks a universal definition. Its definition varies in accordance with

different perspectives and disciplines. However, water deficiency is central to all definitions. The following

are some of the definitions.

Drought is defined as an 'extended water deficit' (Castelli, 1996:53). World Meteorological Organization

(WMO, 1975:3) defined drought as 'the condition where there is "lack of sufficient water to meet

requirements," the requirements' being dependent upon the distribution of plant, animal and human

populations, their life-style and their use of the land.' Loginov (N.D: 7) on the other hand, defined drought

as 'a sufficiently prolonged period of evaporation excess over rainfall, resulting in soil moisture deficiency

and thus affecting growth of vegetation and then crop yields and pasture vegetations.' In all these

definitions reference to water demand or requirement is made to be central.

Possible Causes of Drought in Ethiopia

Meteorological factors responsible for drought in Ethiopia include, the weakening and dislocation of the

ITCZ, anomaly in the Sea Surface Temperature (SST), EINino events and Southern Oscillation (ENSO),

variation in pressure systems and others (Meskir, 2000: 11), equally important factor responsible for

causing or/and-aggravating drought in Ethiopia, on which this paper dwells much, is increase in surface

Albedo. But before dealing with what increase in Albedo mean, and how it causes or/and aggravates

drought in Ethiopia, it seems mandatory to give a brief account for each of the aforementioned possible

drought causing factors in the country.

The weakening and dislocation of the ITCZ

Studies indicated that during the drought years, the ITCZ the major rain giving mechanism of Ethiopia, are

found to be weak and shifted southwards (Hutchison, 1991: 16). However, the findings of Nicholson

(Quoted in Misiker, 2000: 11) for sub-Saharan Africa contradicted with this assertion and claimed that a

weakened intensity of the rainy season is independent of the ITCZ position and during most drought years

of Ethiopia, the location of the ITCZ seemed to be normal.

Anomaly in the Sea Surface Temperature (SST)

In his research findings, Castelli (1996:56) noted that 'the anomalous warming of the SST over the southern

Atlantic and /or Indian Oceans as Possible cause for drought in Ethiopian highlands.' The possible reason

given for this event, according to Meskir (2000: 11), is that 'the warming of the SST in the two Oceans

(major moisture Sources for Ethiopia) resulted in low-pressure formation in the area and decreases the

moist air advection towards Ethiopia. This is supported by Loginov (N.d: 13) who related the 1984 drought

in Africa with the warming of the SST in the south atlantic ocean. This anomaly in the SST is mainly linked

with the EINino events.

EINino and Southern Oscillation (ENSO)

The modern outlook on certain aspects of the African drought particularly inter annual rainfall variability is

related to and strongly influenced by large-scale atmospheric-ocean fluctuations occurring around the

world (Loginov, N.d: 13). ENSO (abbreviation taken from EINino and Southern Oscillation) cause drought

and flooding at different places (Meskir 2000: 13). The correlation coefficient study of NMSA indicated a

significant correlation between southern oscillation Index (SOI) and seasonal and annual rainfalls of

Ethiopia (NMSA, 1996:36). According to the same source, maximum positive correlation of 0.5 was found

between the SOl of November and annual rainfall in Ethiopia. Loginov (N.d: 13) on the other hand,

indicated the coincidence between the 1972-73 and 1982-83 droughts of Africa and ENSO events, having

first stated a 0.4 correlation between mean sea level pressure at Darwin and equatorial Africa, which

indicate a possible link between SOl and African rainfall.

Variation in Pressure System.

Lamb (1997: 28) explained the subtropical pressure system and indicated that 'the pressure system is

weakened and displaced somewhat towards the equator and brought a tendency of reduced rainfall.'

Schove (1977:41) also found the link between the high pressure in Azores-Scandinavian regions and

drought in the Sahel.

Increase in Albedo

Various studies have indicated that the destruction of vegetation cover due to over grazing and forest

clearance for agriculture changes the colour of the surface of the earth and hence it’s Albedo, which in turn

intensifies the atmospheric processes that produce drought.

Existing literatures asserted that improper human interference could prolong and intensify the dry spells

natural to the climate. According to Timberlake (1986) this could happen in three possible ways:

First over cultivation and deforestation all strip soil of vegetation, bare soil and rock reflect

more solar radiation back into the atmosphere than do grasses, shrubs and trees. ‘Increased

reflectivity (albedo) keeps the atmosphere warmer, disperses cloud and reduces rain. At least,

there is less rain in the several large computer models of the late 1970s and early 1980s

which show that a sharp rise in the albedo over the figure of the Sahara should reduce rain.

Second, computer models suggest that a general lowering of soil moisture could itself

suppress rainfall. Much of the rain in tropical moist forest come outside, as humans change

the landscape so that it holds less water, they may produce a drier local climate …this is

almost certainly the case when rainforest is cleared over large areas.

The third and most controversial possible feedback mechanism involves dust; stripping

vegetation from the soil allows the wind to throw more dust into the air. This dust reduce the

amount of the earth’s surface, which would have the same rain-reducing effect as bouncing

more solar radiation back off the earth’ surface

(Timberlake, 1986:29-30).

The literature of Hutchison (1991), which is mainly devoted to the environmental crisis in the horn of Africa,

strengthened the above position as follows:

Damage to the land brought on by economic and political factors such as over grazing,

warfare, overly intensive farming or deforestation, can affect climate cycles, Scientists, for

example, are recording more frequent dust storms in the Sahal… Increased dust in the

atmosphere is believed by some climatologists to interfere with the production of rain by

conventional systems. Similarly, vanishing ground cover increases the earth's albedo- the

proportion of sunlight that the earth's surface reflects back into space, bare earth, lighter in

colour, reflects more sunlight. The soil no longer retains as much heat and gradually cools

down. Since rain is caused by warm moist air rising. Rainfall is diminishing. Because of its

impact on convection patterns, wind current and rainfall regimes, the albedo effect is a basic

factor in controlling climate (Hustchison, 1991:97).

The same author (Hutchison) further asserted that local climate has a tendency to change as vegetation

cover decreases, and windblown soil entering the atmosphere interferes with the ecosystems.

According to Williams (1995:12) changes in albedo, surface roughness, soil moisture and particulate load in

the atmosphere perturb the background surface-atmospheric energy and moisture exchanges. Brubake

(cited in Castelli, 1996:64) further corroborated this idea using observation-based vapour transport

climatology to estimate that on an annual basis up to 30% of the precipitation over large land areas is

derived from local evaporation.

If forests are cleared resulting in increased runoff and higher potential evapotranspiration rates, soil

moisture will be decreased thus creating local moisture stress, or even precipitation deficiency. In other

words, it is possible to speak, with a justifiable confidence that, land-atmosphere interaction, the limited

extent of land as compared to sea has a strong influence on the change of climate fluctuations at all scales.

Once again it is possible to state the fact that deforestation and soil erosion not only degrades land but also

affects climatic cycles, causing or/and aggravating dry anomaly.

Having understood the role of land-atmosphere interaction in the modulation of climate fluctuations. Many

Ethiopian researchers are blaming mismanagement of land and its resources as a cause for recurrent

droughts in Ethiopia. According to these writers, land degradation has made Ethiopia vulnerable to drought

and famine.

Admussu (1996), for instance, has stated the following:

Degradation of the agricultural resource base, particularly through intensified land use of the

ecologically fragile mountain slopes by a rapidly growing population together with over

grazing, deforestation and soil erosion, has been partly responsible for the increasing

vulnerability of the rural population to drought and famine (Admaassu, 1996:81).

He added that though drought can be assumed as a natural disaster man can make a significant

contribution to it. Thus, indeed, we are making our contribution not to mitigate but to aggravate the

vulnerability of the country to drought.

Tesfaye (1999: 101) also noted that frequent droughts and associated food deficits in Ethiopia are partly

the results of long-term environmental degradation, particularly rapid deforestation and soil erosion.

Further, according to Getahun (2001:33), it is well known fact that soil degradation results in such things as

decreased food production, droughts, ecological imbalance (desertification) and consequent degradation of

the quality of life. According to Getahun's generalization, the rainfall problem in Ethiopia is not expected to

improve as long as environmental degradation continues unabated. Dessalegn (2001) adds:

In the past, drought and famine were considered natural calamities and an act of God, but

from the late 1970s, government sources began to attribute such disaster not just to periodic

environmental shocks but to what was called “uncontrolled human activity:" such activity,

which was thought to have been going on for centuries, was said to be responsible for the

loss of valuable natural resources on a large scale (Dessalegn, 2001:12).

Yeraswork (2000: xxii) also adds that 'after the 1973/74 drought in Ethiopia, the assertion that drought and

famine are the results of environmental degradation became part of the official stance.'

Still another researcher, Kefialew (1997), explained the role of environmental degradation causing or land

aggravating drought in the following manner:

The removal of vegetation cover increases surface runoff and surface reflectivity, reduces

energy receipt at the surface and accelerates evaporation from the soil: alters the local

atmospheric moisture balance and eventually leads to weatherchanges which manifests

themselves in the form of drought (Kefialew, 1997:60).

Darkoh (1994:20) noted that 'when human misuse of land weakened the natural system, drought and

desiccation often lead to desertification." It has been stated that the process of desertification is already

well advanced in many northern areas of Ethiopia since the damage to the environment has been going on

for such a long time (Clarke, 1986:21).

Currently, there is also another assumption that average temperature in the globe is increasing due to the

so-called greenhouse effect. The assumption goes on to say that the greenhouse effect would also increase

the fluctuation of the climate, which could bring droughts to Africa. In line with this, Timberlake's (1986)

explanation is worthy of notice. Thus;

Due to the burning of coal and oil by the industrialized world, carbon dioxide in the

atmosphere increases every year by almost 0.5 percent, and sometime next century, this is

expected to raise tropical temperatures by 2-3 degree c… the blanket of atmospheric carbon

dioxide reduces the heat that the plant radiates out into space, without reducing the heat

received from the sun (Timberlake, 1986:30).

According to the same author, the greenhouse effect would increase both average temperature and the

variability of the climate; and this growing variability could be bringing Africa more droughts (Timberlake,

1986:30).

Destruction of forests certainly contributes to global warming both by releasing the carbon content into the

atmosphere and by reducing the value of trees as carbon sinks.

Since global warming has the effect of increasing average temperature and the variability of the climate

(which could bring drought), deforestation, it can be inferred, is playing its part in causing drought. As

Anderson (1992:52) noted, 'one of the potentially most insidious effects of reduced vegetative cover is its

contribution to global warming, which could cause drought through increasing climate variability’s. '

It is certainly persuasive to speak here that vegetation prevents, or at least mitigates climate variability’s

(both local and global) by maintaining soil moisture and reducing global warming. If climate anomaly is

mitigated, drought occurrence, other things being equal, will be reduced.

Therefore, environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia is partly responsible for recurrent droughts in

the country. The widespread misuse of the land is increasing country's vulnerability to drought. The

continuing deforestation of the remaining forest stock and the high rate of soil erosion in the highlands will

probably turn the country into barren land, if preventive and rehabilitative measures are not taken.

As it is widely known, Ethiopia is one of the most drought-stricken countries in the world. Its name is

inextricably linked with drought and famine. The country has been experiencing periodic droughts since

time immemorial. And the frequency and magnitude of drought is increasing from time to time, not

decreasing.

Investigations proved that since the mid-20th century, Ethiopia has been experiencing one drought per year

(Meskir, 2000:8). Thus, the average drought occurrence frequency in Ethiopia has changed from nearly a

decade before the 20th century to only a year after mid of it. In the past, Ethiopian people used to face a

drought in every 7 or 10 years only. Today, however, this people are facing a drought in every year or two,

because climate conditioners (forests) are cleared and soils became drier. Similarly, 'during the 1990s, the

drought- affected population was on the average, 11.6% while that of the 1970s and 1980s averaged to

about 9.5%. This shows that the magnitude of drought is also higher in the 1990s than it was in the 1970s

and 1980s' (Tesfaye, 1999: 101).

Ethiopia has been hit by frequent droughts since long ago, and it will continue to be hit unless there is

fundamental mobilization of policy-makers and people alike against it. We should properly manage our

land and its resources, Timberlake (1986:31) noted that 'for recurrent drought in Africa, the most useful

and obvious step towards lessening the impact of adverse weather is to control land use: protect land from

livestock, plant forest and shrub stands, and reduce over cultivation,' Indeed, this is the best and possible

alternative at our disposal that we can apply to mitigate drought. This is what Tewolde Berhan expressed in

his interview held with the "Marawa" Bulletin columnist. He asserted that 'drought in Ethiopia can be

mitigated only through revegetation and soil conservation' (kinfe, 2004:6).

4.2 Impacts on the Downstream Countries

4.2.1. Impacts of Silt Accumulation

As it has already mentioned, when the sediment enters into rivers and thence to dam reservoirs, it has

serious negative consequences. The consequences can be in terms of water supplies and hydroelectric

power production (Barber, 1984:23). Silted water brings greater wear and tear to hydroelectric turbines

(EHRS/FAO, 1986:23). According to Satyanarayana and Srivastava (1987: 151), 'the process of

sedimentation leads to a reduction in the expected benefits such as irrigation, hydropower, navigation,

flood control, fishing and recreation. It also progressively impairs the drainage system downstream,

reduces the carrying capacity of the irrigation canals and increases the probability of floods.'

For instance, the reduction in the storage capacity of the Roseires dam in Sudan has resulted, among other

things, in severe restriction of power output. The decrease in Roseires dam storage capacity has created a

number of difficulties, which Ahmed (2000) summarized as follows:

Crossing ferries during the low flow years face difficulties in finding enough navigation depth

to operate: water quality is deteriorating also during the low flow years: the most important

impact is that the stored water may not be adequate to supplement the schemes with their

required irrigation water: the amount of sediment normally pass through the reservoir during

the flood season cause heavy sediment deposition in the canals network of all the irrigation

schemes …also during the flood periods the reservoir is operated at its minimum water level,

hence causing operation problems of the turbines and this leads to reduction in the

hydropower generation problems of the turbines and this leads to reduction in the

hydropower generation at time when it is badly needed (Ahmed, 2000: 187).

Siltation also affects water supply in Sudan, For instance, 'the high silt content of the Blue Nile/Abbay water

has necessitated the installation of special filters in the Khartoum Water-supply system' (Shapland,

1997:69).

Irrigation schemes in Sudan are also being affected by sedimentation. It has been said that sediment

deposition in irrigation canals creates problems both in services and clean out costs and is considered to be

the most serious problem facing the Gezira and other irrigation schemes using water from the Blue Nile and

Atbara rivers (El Monshid , 1997:398: Conway, 2000: 133). The problem is that the deposition of sediments

in irrigation canals results in decreased canal capacities, difficulties in water deliveries, lost production,

increased cut out areas and rising water levels in canals, all of which make water control and distribution

difficult (El Monshid, 1997:398). Siltation of rivers also causes bank erosion with subsequent effects on the

surrounding environment. For instance, due to the sedimentation of the Atbara River, the river bed in 1988

overflowed its normal channel and penetrated protective embankments made round the city of Gedaref to

flood the treatment plant well field, collector pipeline, booster pumps, and the entire system was

inundated. This resulted in damaging two generators, two pumps, and the pre-sedimentation basins used

for primary settlement prior to water treatment, had totally disappeared (Ahmed, 2000: 187). According to

the same author, the main Nile's approximate annual rate of erosion varies from 5 to 20 meters, and the

areas lost vary from few hectares to several hundreds of hectares. Thus Silt accumulation is creating

multidimensional problems in Sudan.

In spite of special management provisions to avoid sedimentation (such as flushing and dredging), it has

been said, reservoirs in Sudan have lost all of their dead storages, and hence irrigation canals and power

stations have been facing water shortages. It has been said that "annual removal of this sediment

consumes over 50 percent of the operation and management budget in Sudan'’ (Ahmed et al., 2000: 186:

Conway, 2000: 133). This economic crisis is a formidable challenge for Sudan, requiring co-operation and

concerted action, particularly, with the upper basin state- Ethiopia from where the sediments originate and

are transported down due to soil erosion caused by deforestation. Insult is added to injury when Sudan

loses 800 million USD per annum for flood mitigation (Mussa, 2003:24).

Silt accumulation in the Aswan High Dam has also resulted in serious economic problems in Egypt.

Generally, the condition of sediment trapping by the HAD and its downstream impacts are summarized by

Ahmed (2000) as follows:

Siltation in Lake Nasser results in corresponding erosion and land loss in the Mediterranean

coastal area: degradation of agricultural soil fertility downstream of the dam: negative

effects on fishers in the Nile system and costal lakes, as the migration of certain types of fish

were dependent on the arrival of turbid flood water, which is now impounded upstream of

the high Aswan dam. This problem can be exemplified by the fact that since the mineral rich

slits that nourished certain fish species have been deposited behind the Aswan dam, sardines,

which breed at the estuaries of the Nile, almost disappeared (Ahmed, 26 April 2000).

Therefore, the available literature indicates that siltation is one of the problems, which Egypt is facing.

Although technologies are available to dispose of sediments, costs are high. The progressive silt up then

requires the diverting of resources from other projects for rehabilitation (Hutchison, 1991:96). The problem

for Egypt is then not only the allocation of huge budgets for the removal of sediments but also the

impossibility of completely cleaning the reservoir (and irrigation canals) from sedimentation, Thus, it is

entirely possible to say that 'unless ingenious solutions are developed, we will lose the struggle to enhance

available water resources' (Mohamood, 1987: 149).

Yet, Egypt is in need of more and more water and soil nutrients for her newly reclaimed dry lands to feed

her rapidly growing population. However, these needs cannot be satisfied unless appropriate solutions are

employed to enhance available water resource and prevent dams from siltation. This mismatch between

demand and supply is a formidable challenge for Egypt. One ideal solution for this challenge seems proper

management of the environment in the upper reaches of the Nile basin, particularly the eastern Nile basin,

managing the environment of the river basin by nature necessitates co-operation between or among

riparian states.

4.2.2. Impacts of Drought on the Water supply of downstream

Countries

Drought affects the hydrology of the local area. When rainfall decreases, surface runoff water becomes

sparse, and ground water is not recharged (Bake, 1989: 144). In other words, the surface water that is

usually available during the wet season will be reduced. seasonal rivers might not carry runoff at all,

streams and wells might dry up, and the recharge of local aquifers may be dramatically reduced. This can

cause water stress in irrigated agriculture, disruption in hydropower generation, shortage in water supply

for domestic and industrial uses and the like. In fact, the severity of the impact depends on the magnitude

of the drought. The severe the drought, the greater the impact will be, and the impact are grave upon the

living beings that inhabit arid and semi-arid lands like Egypt.

Definitely, low-level floods of the Nile River have serious negative economic repercussions in the lower

riparian states, particularly in Egypt. Concerning this fact, Shapland (1997:63) states:

Even the enormous storage capacity of the lake cannot afford the country (Egypt) total

protections against an exceptionally long run of low floods such as occurred during the 1980s.

By 1988 the level of the lake (Nasser) had fallen to the point where there was insufficient

water available to meet all the demands for it. The area of land under rice had to be cut back:

less than two-third of the Electricity generating capacity at the Dam could be used: and the

level the river could not be kept high enough to permit the unrestricted operation of large

tourist boats. Another low flood would have caused serious difficulties for Egypt: the lake

would have fallen to the point where no electricity at all could have been generated at the

high dam, and more severe cutbacks in irrigation would have necessary (Shapland, 1997: 63).

Egypt was faced with an annual deficit of nearly 12 BCM of water in 1998 with no alternative sources to

bridge the gap (Warburg, 2000:233); Erlich (2002:2) strengthened this position by saying that:

After several years of drought in Ethiopia, the water level in Lake Nasser ... was reduced to an

alarming level. The volume of the reservoir had fallen from the normal level of 165-175 meters

above sea level to 153 meters by early July 1988. Had the rains in Ethiopia continued to fail for

another two month, the water would have dropped 147 meters, halting the massive

production of hydroelectric power from the Aswan Dam (Erlich, 2002: 2).

According to Erlich (2002: 2) experts were predicting a horrible catastrophe, that is, they forecasted

another dry year in Ethiopia, when the eternal river would virtually begin drying up, with chaotic

consequences.

Thus drought in Ethiopia, which has been intensified by environmental degradation over the Blue Nile and

Atbara basins, resulted in increased dry spell in Egypt. This may be continued unless controlling

mechanisms are designed jointly. Evans (1990:27) warns that ‘due to the possible intensification of the

drought, it is imperative that water conservation measures are implemented to conserve reservoirs, and

water management techniques improved to alleviate the more damaging effects of reduced Nile

discharges'. The impact of drought in Sudan is also severe. On the issue, El-Zain (2000) has wrote the

following:

Overall, sorghum’s yield per acre decreased by 32.9 percent and the total area under

sorghum cultivation decreases by10.6 percent during the drought of 1984-85, the fall of yield

per acre can be attributed mainly to the decrease in output. The effect of the drought was

more pronounced on millet: a 3.3 per cent increase in the area under cultivation, crop Output

fell by 49. 7 percent, resulting in a 51. 3 per cent decline in yield per Acre compared with

1983-8-1. Wheat's area under cultivation decreased by 67 per cent during 198-1-85 when

compared with the previous year, probably because of the poor rainy season in Ethiopia,

which affected the level of the Nile and the amount of water available for irrigation (El-Zain

2000: 354).

According to the author, the 1980s drought had resulted in the failure of crops and loss of livestock lives as

well as in the collapse of subsistence economies, which in turn had tolld the lives of 250,000 people and

caused population displacement in Sudan.

Therefore, environmental problems both in upstream and downstream countries have become challenging.

Though the degree might vary, currently, both the upstream and downstream countries are facing the

challenges of environmental degradation. Since river basins are interconnected transport systems.

Environmental problem in the sub basin can only be mitigated through joint efforts and co-operation

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NEED FOR AND IMPEDIMENTS TO CO-OPERATION.

5.1. The Need for Co-operation

Environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia has brought about serious problems both in the lower and

upper Eastern Nile basin countries. Since river basins act as a systemic whole, the problems in certain parts

of the basin, particularly in the upper part affects the whole basin. It is by this logic that severe

deforestation and soil erosion in highland Ethiopia have affected not only Ethiopia, but also Sudan and

Egypt.

Soil erosion in highland Ethiopia washes topsoil away from agricultural lands in Ethiopia, causing loss in

production (crop yield). At the same time, this soil erosion results in silting up of dams in Sudan and Egypt,

which means loss in reservoirs' storage capacity and hence insufficient water for agricultural activities,

hydropower, and domestic consumption purposes. Thus this constitutes economic loss in the lower basin

states, too; and thus the challenge for all. Similarly, Environmental degradation is intensifying drought in

Ethiopia. Hydrological drought in highland Ethiopia means deficiency of water both in Ethiopia and lower

Eastern Nile basin states. The impacts of water shortage are clear: crop failure, cut in agricultural areas and

cultivation in general; power shortage and hence reduction of industrial activities, change in patterns of

human settlements and many other interrelated effects. This is the challenge not only for Ethiopia but also

for Sudan and Egypt. Mengistu (1995: 15) observed that environmental degradation has made abnormal

floods and unexpected droughts to increase in Ethiopia, which have caused loses in agriculture, dams and

water reservoirs in Sudan and Egypt, thus damaging the human settlements there. Undeniably, thus,

environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia has brought about serious problems to all the Eastern Nile

basin states.

Moreover, an extended period of dry season low flow means high evaporation and see-page and enhance

water wastage in the lower riparian countries; water wastage increases the gap between demand and

supply factors. Water demanding factors (population increase, urbanization, & the need for ensuring food

security) are rapidly growing in both upper and lower riparian states. On the other hand, water supply is

deteriorating due to recurrent droughts and sedimentation, which can intensify by environmental

degradation in highland Ethiopia. The problem is, therefore, equally challenging the population inhabiting

the Eastern Nile basin. Common problem needs common solution.

The source country, Ethiopia, by her cannot afford to mitigate environmental degradation. The country's

poor economy and scarce skilled manpower are not sufficient to rehabilitate the environment of the Nile

basin. Egypt and Sudan should share the burdens of environmental management so as to maintain and

enhance

Water resource of the Nile, If Egypt and Sudan want to live in a healthy environment and satisfy their water

needs, they must actively participate in environmental rehabilitation programmers’. Stated differently,

Ethiopia must be supported not only to restore the basin' s environment but also to utilize her water

resources on environmentally sustainable basis. Seeking common solutions for common problems, in fact,

by and large needs co-operation among the parties.

However, the environment (legal, Political, Ideological, diplomatic) is not conducive for reaching at co-

operative solutions for these common problems. Stated differently, there are impediments to co-operation

among the sub-basin states. This situation has made the utilization and management of the Nile waters

difficult.

5.2. Major Impediments to Co-operation

5.2.1. Unchanged Status quo

The current status quo in the Nile basin is unfair in that water suppliers, particularly Ethiopia utilize almost

none whereas the lower riparian states (Sudan and Egypt) which add little or nothing to the Nile's water

consume the entire water of the Nile river. The two lower riparian states have ignored the legitimate rights

of the upper riparian states to share in the Nile waters. This status quo, which favored only the rights of the

lower basin states has served as the major roadblock to co-operative approaches for the utilization and

management of this shared resource. Girma Amare (2000: 573) has rightly put this, Thus,

The major impediment on the road towards effective co-operation on the Nile has been the

position of some lower riparian states that are bent on appropriating the entire flow of the

river to the detriment of other rightful States. There seems to be an entrenched desire not to

accept the legitimate rights of other riparian states to share in its bountiful resources (Girma,

2000:573).

As history witnesses, the reasons given for such unfair status quo could be attributed to British colonialism

which had great interest in controlling the Nile for its cotton plantation aimed at supplying its industries in

Europe (Girma, 2000:573). As Zewede (2000:520) noted ' ... to show her (Britain's) appreciation to Egypt,

she bestowed Egypt with "Natural and historical rights" in the Waters of the Nile and thereby created

future misunderstandings among the riparian states as to Whether or not "Natural and historical rights" as

bestowed by Britain on Egypt constitutes legal rights under international law.'

The colonial treaties and the condominium over Sudan mainly favored Egypt's interests in the basin,

because for strategic and economic reasons Egypt had become the most important Nile basin riparian state

for the British colonizers (Elhance, 1999: 68). Consequently, political stability in Egypt acquired paramount

importance for its British administrators (Elhance, 1999: 68). Obviously, political stability in Egypt could be

attained by satisfying Egypt's growing water needs, without much concern to the interests of other basin

states.

After independence, Egypt pursued more or less similar goals in securing the now of the river to meet its

own interests (Girma, 2000:573). Stated differently, the mentality of colonial-era has been inherited by the

rulers of independent Egypt. This has generated the resentments in the newly independent nations.

With the aim of bringing the Nile flow within its own territorial jurisdiction and appropriating a lion's share.

Egypt concluded the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement with Sudan. Under the terms of the 1959 Agreement,

which is called the "Treaty for the Full utilization of the Nile,"' Egypt and Sudan divided the entire annual

flow between them, with 66% going to Egypt, 22% to Sudan, and the remaining 12% allocated to surface

evaporation and seepage at the HAD reservoir (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998:2).

No other riparian states were (and are) party to this accord, and there was no any share in the annual flow

set aside for them (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998:2).

Hence, ‘the 1959 Agreement defined a status quo set in absolute quantities: it constructed a classic Zero-

sum situation: ceteris paribus, any gain in water to an upstream riparian must be a loss to Egypt and the

Sudan' (Waterbury, 1996:8).

Nevertheless, all colonial and postcolonial era treaties and accords as well as Egypt’s right to dictate all

aspects of hydropolitics in the basin have been duly rejected by all the upper riparian states ( Girma, 2000:

573), However, Egypt and Sudan continued to act as if the Nile originates in Sudan and ends in Egypt. They

have refused to respond to the demands by co-basin states for the equitable utilization of their shared

resources (Girma, 2000:573). Particularly, Egypt is unwilling to discuss future water development plans with

all upstream states unless its water allocation of 55.58 BCM specified in the 1959 Nile waters Agreement is

not negotiable (Whittington and McCleliand, 1992: 153). Waterbury (1996: 19) also remarked that ‘thus,

one principle and one negotiating tactic were firmly anchored in Egyptian practice: sharing can only involve

enhanced flow over and above the share laid down in the 1959 Agreement.'

'This uncompromising attitude has always marred relations between the upper and lower riparian countries

of the Nile' (Girma, 2000:573).

Thus, the current status quo in the Nile basin is static for it fails to flexibly adjust itself in the light of a

number of developments in the Nile river states (like population growth, Environmental degradation and

policy changes in upstream states) (Hillawi, 1998).

Hence, the existing status quo in the basin serves as the major roadblock to co-operation, which is required

for solving impacts of environmental degradation in the sub-basin.

5.2.2 Mutually exclusive Doctrines

5.2.2.1. Water appropriation doctrine of the Lower Riparian States

It appears to be clear that the legal validity of the principle of "acquired rights" has invariably been insisted

upon by the lower riparian states. In other words, the principle of "acquired rights" has been the pillar up

on which the lower Nile basin states' hydro political position stands. Egypt claims that it has drawn upon

the Nile to sustain its agriculture since time immemorial. As a result of this, it has a historic acquired right ,

or to priority of appropriation of the river's water that all other riparian’s must honor (Waterbury, 1987:96),

Hence, while conducting hydro politics with the co-basin states, Egypt has mostly stressed the triple

doctrines of primary need, prior use, and acquired rights (Elhance, 1999:69). According to Erlich (2002: 6):

‘the moral dimension behind Egypt's "historic rights" is two fold: first, Egypt has no other option to survive:

second, Ethiopia (and also other upstream states) has lived without the Nile so far and presumably can do

so in the future.’

Thus Egypt wants at least to secure its "acquired right” (that is, 55.5 BCM) of the Nile water (Dinar and

Senai, 1998:14). In other words, Egypt would like Ethiopia to recognize the legal validity of the 1959 Nile

waters Agreement prior to starting any new discussions, but Ethiopia is not willing to do this (Whittington,

1992: 153).

Therefore, the insistent position of Egypt on maintaining the existing unfair but pro-Cairo status quo and

the doctrine of "acquired and historical rights" has served as a roadblock to new negotiations for the

equitable utilizations of the Nile waters. As it is already mentioned in the paper, Egypt has time and again

expressed her position that she will be willing to discuss future development plans with upstream states

only when the legitimacy of the 1959 Nile waters agreement is recognized or the status quo is maintained.

On the other hand, upstream states, including Ethiopia rejected the status quo based on colonial and

postcolonial treaties and agreements, and demanded equitable utilization of the Nile waters, never

explicitly challenged Egypt's position.

Instead of responding to the demands of upstream states, Egypt (in order to substantiate her monopolistic

position over the Nile) went on to lay "facts on the ground" ranging from the construction of HAD, with

huge financial cost, to desert reclamation projects. These seem Egypt’s major strategies for maintaining its

"acquired rights" (55.5 BCM) if pressure for the revision of the status quo increases from the upstream

countries.

With the construction of the HAD, it can be argue d, ‘Egypt has sunk costs in harnessing the Nile within its

national territory which give it a kind of property right to the resource' (Waterbury and Whittington,

1998:3). According to Waterbury (I979: 118) 'preliminary cost estimates of the HAD project in 1964, were

put at 416 million pounds. As a result of the construction of the dam,

Basin irrigation was converted into perennial irrigation with a total area of 983,000 feddans:

arable area increased from 5.8 million feddans to 7.4 million feddans: crops are increased

from 9.8 million feddans in 1952 to about 14 million feddans in 1993 where 80 percent of

agriculture lands are cultivated at the rate of two crops a year and the remaining 20 percent

at three crops a year …. (Mansour, 2001:1).

These are all "facts on the ground" which Egypt would use as bargaining bases against anti status quo

moves in the basin.

Further, Egypt has pursued its mega national project of developing or reclaiming southern and north

western deserts by using the so-called Toshka and EI-Salam (Peace) Canals, The principal objective, as many

would agree, of these projects is strengthening Egypt's bargaining power by creating "facts on the ground."

The southern valley (Toshka) project, with the alleged, aim of creating a new delta in parallel with the old

Nile Delta. ‘Will add 540,000 feddans, establish about 75 new Industrial estates, 44 urban communities, and

7 areas for safari tourism, providing about 1.5 million new Job opportunities' (Mansour, 2001:16: Moustafa,

2000: 200: and An-Nagger, 2001: 39) of the Canal's 168 kilometers, nearly 60 percent had already been dug

by the year 2000 (Erlich, 2002: 214).

For the realization of the Toshka project plan, the biggest pumping station of its kind world-wide is being

constructed on the left bank of Lake Nasser, 8kms to the north of Toshka (Mansour, 2001: 17). The water

will eventually be put into a 70km long main canal called Sheikh Zayed canal which is designed to feed four

branches that provide irrigation water for a total area of about 540,000 feddans under phase one of the

project (Mansour, 2001: 17), The water disposal design capacity of the pumping station is estimated about

25 Mm³ per day to be raised, whenever necessary, to 37 Mm³ per day (Tesfaye, 2001:52; Mansour, 2001:

17). Under this project, Egypt plans to pump 5-10 BCM of water per year from the HAD reservoir, and put it

in the Zayed canal that will transport it to a series of new land reclamation projects in the south western

desert (Waterbury and Whittington,1998: 11).

The joint costs of the canal, and the pumping stations as well as ancillary projects in the New Valley have

been estimated to be between U.S 90 and 150 million dollar at the 1997 exchange rate (Waterbury and

Whittington, 1998: 11). It has been said that the cost is being covered by domestic private sectors, and

foreign Private investors such as Saudi Arabian prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal Bin Abdel Aziz AI-Saud, who

intended to reclaim over 162,000 hectares in the new valley, that is, in the Nubian Desert west or Lake

Nasser (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998: 11).

Another ambitious desert reclamation project launched by Egypt was the E I-Salam (Peace) canal, so named

because the project was designed to reclaim the Sinai desert given back to Egypt from Israeli occupations.

This project is related to the North Sinai Agricultural Development project (NSADP) (Bleier, 28 October,

2002). The digging for the EI-Salaam canal had begun at an estimated cost of $ 1.4 to 1.5 billion. The canal is

intended to carry 12.5 Mm³ a day of fresh water from the Nile, and is planned to leave the Nile 20km south

of the Damietta tributaries on the Nile Delta, passes beneath the Suez canal by means of underground

channels and then move east wards for about 242 km to the north Sinai town of EI-Arish, which is located

only 40 km from the border town of the Gaza strip at Rafah (Kinfe, 1997: 15).

After completion, the project is expected to irrigate from 400,000 to 600,000 acres in the north Sinai

desert, resettle 2.2 Million Egyptians, set up 37 new urban communities and establish five model villages

fully equipped with all services and utilities (Africa Confidential, 1998:3). According to the same source, the

project requires 4 BCM of water per year.

According to Africa Confidential (1998:3), Egypt needs to increase its annual quota of Nile water from 55.5

BCM to 71 BCM in order to supply all of its new schemes, here Egypt needs 15. 5 BCM of additional water.

The basic question, however, is where does Egypt get this much additional water. According to Waterbury

and Whittington (1988:11), Egypt contends that it will find the water supplies needed for the new desert

reclamation schemes by using such methods as efficient utilization of irrigation water, water conservation,

and abstraction of ground water, using reclaimed water, and water shifting from more water intensive

crops to less water intensive crops. Nevertheless, these authors questioned the rationality and practicality

of Egypt’s water saving strategies on a number of grounds.

Firstly, the ground water in the old valley cannot be considered as a different source of water for it is the

water of the Nile recharged by the water of the Nile River.

Secondly, the task of water saving is an expensive business which needs not only huge capital investment

but also modifications in the institutional settings for the management of farm - level irrigation

Thirdly, assuming that upper Nile basin states would use none of the Nile water in the future: and assuming

that some of Egypt's water saving strategies become applicable. Egypt will hardly satisfy the

aforementioned additional water demand to complete her new schemes.

Indeed, so far, Egypt has been able to utilize about 8 BCM of water above its annual quota specified under

the 1959 Nile Waters agreement, benefiting between 2 and 3 BCM from the unutilized Sudanese quota on

'loan basis', another 2 BCM from underground aquifers, and about 4 BCM of recycled drainage water

(Tesfaye, 2001:57).

The question again is what if Sudan utilizes its full quota as it is intending to expand its agricultural lands

due to population pressure and recurrent droughts. Then Egypt will be left with only 6 BCM, which is far

from satisfying additional water demand needed to complete her new projects.

It is on this basis that Elhance (1999:61) remarked that ' ... it ought to be clear to all concerned that the

implementation of the plans is contingent upon the availability of large amount of fresh water which Egypt

currently does not have, nor is it likely to have any time in the foreseeable future.'

Beside, the mystery of water source for the operation of the new desert reclamation Projects, the projects

had been fiercely opposed by the upper riparian countries.

This Egyptian strategy signifies the country's unabated interest to exclusively use the Nile water resources

that belong to ten riparian countries. Hence, 'it may be presumed that Egypt's water strategy unequivocally

symbolizes a relentless aspiration for dominance in the entire Nile basin' (Yacob, 2002:8). Tesfaye (2001:

51) also noted that to make matters worse for the upper riparian states and to perpetuate the zero-sum

game in the basin, the Egyptians are now undertaking ambitious and controversial out-of-basin desert

reclamation programs that are in contradistinction with the tenets of international water laws. This

condition freezes the existing status quo, and blocks the possibilities for co-operation.

Furthermore, in order to prolong their dominance over the entire Nile basin, or to make their so-called

"acquired" and "natural" rights remain unchallenged. Egyptians also argue that their country is desert with

literally no rainfall which deters them practicing rain fed agriculture as compared to Ethiopia and other

upstream state on the white Nile, who, receive enough rainfall to exercise rain-fed agriculture.

However, the hard fact, as noted by Waterbury and Whittington (1998:3) is that even though the upper

basin states have relatively abundant rainfall. It is erratic, seasonally concentrated, and not often in the

regions where the soils are best for agriculture. In the past , using the river water for irrigation was an

option for the upper basin states, but today it become a necessity , matter of survival due to recurrent

drought compounded by rapidly growing population. This is particularly true for Ethiopia whose highland

areas, especially the upper catchments’ of Abbay ( Blue Nile) and Tekeze (Atbara) river basins are hit by the

frequent drought resulted partly from environmental degradation, hence , Ethiopia had no harnessing

water resource found within her boundaries to irrigate drought stricken lands.

This writer is of the opinion that Egypt and Sudan should show willingness to revise the status quo, and

abandon the so called ‘’acquired right and historical right’’ so as to create conducive environment for

cooperation which is required for combating the impact of environmental degradation.

It can be said that since Egypt has established regional hegemony, it has, it has power for immediate

success or delay of new water allocation negotiation. Egypt dominance over the Nile is functional of

influence of colonial agreements, the shifting, yet timely alliance and support from the global superpowers,

and the power of Egypt relatively to the instability of the upstream states’ (Bleire, 28 October, 2002).

As Waterbury (1996:18) put it ‘Egypt made defense of the 1959 status quo its paramount objective, and has

pursued it ever since with relentless consistency…and …it has patiently cultivated the international arena

and the donor community for acquiescence to, if not support for, its priorities’. Particularly, Egypt success

in exploiting western support strengthened her hydropolitical position in two ways. Firstly, Egypt access to

US aid and to the western financial institutions (IMF AND WB) enabled her to defend her interests by

whatever means she could. Secondly, western tacit diplomatic support concerning the Nile heightened

Egypt’s boast in the basin and encouraged her to rely on her age-old tactics of military threats against the

would-be unilateral water utilization moves by upstream states, particularly Ethiopia.

Military boasts on the part of Egypt added noting best to the lasting for the Nile issue except aggravating

tension and mistrust along the co-basin states. Completion and conflict benefits none of the states sharing

Transboundary Rivers. Utilization and management of international rivers requires co-operation and mutual

understanding among co-basin states.

Military threats cannot restrain up-stream states, including Sudan itself, from the harnessing the water

resources of the Nile whenever necessary. Indeed, Egypt’s leverage against Ethiopia in the western financial

institutions is obviously great. Yet, Egypt cannot totally block Ethiopia’s chance to develop her water

resources.

Therefore, the best and lasting solution for the utilization and management of the common water

resources of the Nile is rapprochement, which can build mutual trust and erode suspicion and fear of one

another. ‘Common resource needs co-operation rather than competition, the collective sharing of the

resource rather than the individual attempting to maximize yields’ (Berkes, 1989: VII). Thus, unless there is

co-operation among the eastern Nile basin states, it is hardly possible to manage the environment of the

Nile basin and enhance water availability in the region.

A light in the tunnel was seen in July 1993, when Egypt and Ethiopia signed a framework for general co-

operation that included relating to the Nile. The framework agreement specified that neither Ethiopia nor

Egypt would do anything with the Nile that would cause appreciable harm to the other (Shapland,

1977:81). Further, the two countries agreed to consult and co-operate in mutually advantageous projects

like the projects that would enhance the volume of flow and reduce the loss of Nile water through

comprehensive and integrated development schemes (Shapland, 1997:81). The two countries recognized

comprehensive and integrated development schemes as means for enhancing the volume of flow and

reducing the loss of Nile water. These conceding to the geographical laws concerning international rivers

Nevertheless, in that agreement, no mention was made to the principle of ‘equity’- Ethiopia’s long –held

principle. What was mentioned in the agreement was avoidance of ‘’appreciable harm’’- Egypt’s or sown

stream states principle. The Egyptian would certainly argue that any reduction of flow in the Nile caused by

work in Ethiopia would constitute such harm (Shapland, 19997:81). Thus, the agreement conceded more to

Egypt than Ethiopia. Hence, so far, the issue of new water sharing or revising the status quo remained a red

line that can never be crossed. As it is already mentioned in the paper, the existing status quo serves as the

major impediment to co-operation that is needed for mitigating the impacts of environmental degradation

in the sub-basin.

Sudan has also already entered into a new era of friendship with Ethiopia. On December 23, 1991 Ministers

of the two countries revitalized bilateral relations and 'signed Peace and Friendship Declaration in

Khartoum that included statements relating to the Nile that were apparently made without Sudan's having

consulted Egypt in advance' (Shapland, 1997:81).

In this Declaration, the two countries agreed on the equitable entitlement to the uses of the Nile waters

without causing appreciable harm to one another (Whittington, 1994:16). The two parties also agreed to

establish a joint technical committee that would have the duty of holding consultations, exchanging data

and exploring areas of co-operation (Shapland, 1997:81).

According to Yibeltal (2003), Desk officer of Sudan in the Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), The

Ethio-Sudanese Technical water Advisory Committee (ESTAC) is currently facilitating exchange of hydraulic

information between the two countries, which will have constructive roles in developing common water

resources of the Nile. Since it appeals to the principle of equitable sharing, "the agreement that Sudan

signed with Ethiopia appears to concede more to Ethiopia's position (Shapland, 1997:82). This apparently

implies that Sudan has shown willingness to co-operate with Ethiopia for it is the country affected more by

siltation and flooding than Egypt.

From the perspective of a river basin planning it is said, Sudan has a strong interest in developing a co-

operative relationship with Ethiopia. Thus, the construction of dams on the Ethiopian portion of the Nile

Should be one of Sudan's top priorities in the water sector (Whittington and McClelland, 1992: 153). It is

believed that the regulation of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia would he particularly benefit for Sudan because it

would reduce, if not eliminate, many of the problems currently affecting Reservoirs in Sudan.

The model results of studies conducted by Guariso and Whittington (1998: 113) Show that when there is

water regulation upstream, Roseires reservoir can be filled later, and would essentially function as a

barrage to raise water and as a hydroelectric generation facility. Thus, Roseires reservoir can receive timely

and relatively silt free waters, and this reduces siltation whose annual removal is currently consuming over

50% of the operation and management budget in Sudan.

According to Wahid Belay (2003), Neighboring and Nile riparian countries Acting Director in the MOFA,

Ethiopia, there is a general change of approach on the part of both Sudan and Egypt from the old attitude

of competition and conflict toward cooperation with Ethiopia. The basic reasons for this new co-operative

approach, according to him are two: (1) Ethiopia's firm determination to unilaterally move to utilize the

water resources located in its territory, like for instance, the move for the construction of hydroelectric

power project on the Tekeze river without prior notification to them; and (2) Siltation and other problems

inside Sudan and Egypt. Wahid, however, remarked that this change in approach does not mean complete

change in the hydropolitical positions of Sudan and Egypt and thence the existing status quo.

5.2.2.2. Ethiopia's appropriation Doctrine

In the Eastern Nile basin Ethiopia is the upstream state and hence holds a unique physical geography. Her

western rivers consisting, the Tekeze/Atbara, Abbay/Blue Nile and Baro-Akobo together contribute 86

percent of the Nile waters as measured at Aswan. The lives and civilizations of the people inhabiting the

lower reaches of the Nile basin have flourished because of the waters and alluvial soils which have been

perennially flowing down from Ethiopia's western highlands. As Moorhead (1972:2) precisely put it' had the

Nile failed to flow even for one Season, then all Egypt would have been perished'. Because of its unique

physical geography and the upstream riparian position. Ethiopia could have played a decisive and

significant role in the basin's hydropolitics had she not been, among other things, economically weak and

politically unstable.

Interesting it is, however, that Ethiopia's unique riparian position has since long been recognized by the

Ethiopian rulers, who often pretended to block the flow into Egypt of the Nile in case Egypt stood against

Ethiopia's spiritual values and interests. For instance "the Ethiopian Emperors from Lalibella (13 the

century) to Zara yacob (1434- I468) threatened to divert the course of the Nile and turn Egypt into a desert

whenever Egypt's Moslem rulers were believed to have persecuted the Coptic minorities in Egypt’’

(Yacob,1996:39).

Although the warnings of the then Ethiopian Emperors to divert the natural course of the Nile seemed to

be simple bluffing (for the emperors had neither the means nor the capacity to do so), the warnings imply

two important things; (1) the sense of ownership to the river and the awareness, on the part of Ethiopian

Emperors, of Ethiopia's significant riparian position in the Eastern Nile basin; (2) the intention of the then

Ethiopian Emperors to use the water resources originating in and flowing through their own territories

whenever and for whatever purposes they wish. It is quite understandable that those Ethiopian Emperors

who boldly pretended to divert the natural course of the Nile would have not been refrained from utilizing

the river's water had they been interested in doing so. What they did then was that they simply announced

the right of Ethiopia to do whatever it wishes with its own water resources whenever the need arises. It can

be said that the wordings of the then Ethiopian Emperors can be related to the principle of the "Harmon

Doctrine," 'whereby countries presumably have absolute territorial sovereignty with a given state having

full rights over the area of the river basin within its borders' (Hillawi, 1998: 15).

Except defending their country's absolute territorial sovereignty over the water resource within its borders,

the medieval Ethiopian rulers, like the Modern ones, did not make use of these resources due to various

reasons including financial incapacity. The country's defensive position on the issue of the Nile, however,

can never constitute a tacit renunciation on the part of it of its own 'natural right' to use at least part of the

waters originating in its own territory (Hillawi, 1998: 17).

As historical references do, indeed witness, Ethiopia has since time immemorial made it clear that the

utilization of the Nile waters represents her 'natural' or 'territorial' rights. In other words, Ethiopia, though

reactive, has never given up her 'natural' or 'territorial' right to use water resources originating in and

following through her own national territories. Daniel Kendie (200 1:4) noted that, although the whole

exercise of the colonial agreement was directed mainly to the protection and promotion Egypt's interests

without any reciprocity, Ethiopia had not renounced its own quantitatively unspecified but existing natural

right to the Nile waters in its territory.

Further, Yacob Arsano (2007:108) remarked that the upstream countries including Ethiopia

intend to utilize the water resources of the Nile as long as these are within their territorial jurisdiction. The

same author exclaimed that the upstream countries hold to "riparian" doctrine as opposed to "historical

and natural rights" strongly held by the downstream nations. "The fundamental principle of the riparian

doctrine is that the owner of land bordering a water body acquires certain rights to use the water’'

(Getches, 1997: 15).

Therefore as a matter of fact modern Ethiopia had already, that is, on 6 February 1956, asserted and

reserved its natural and territorial right to utilize the waters of the Blue Nile/Abbay without recognizing any

limitations on its freedom of action (Daniel, 200 1:4). Once again the Ethiopian government made clear the

position and rights of Ethiopia by means of an aid memoire of September 23, 1957 addressed to the

diplomatic missions in Cairo, which in part reads as:

... Just as in the case of all other material resources on its territory. Ethiopia has the right and

obligation to exploit the water resources of the Empire and indeed has the responsibility of

providing the tallest and most Scientific measures for the development and utilization of the

same, for the benefit of the present and future generations of its citizens, in pace with and in

anticipation of the growth in population and its expanding needs, The imperial Ethiopian

government must, therefore, reassert and reserve now and for the future, the right to take

all such measures in respect of its water resources and particular, as regards that portion of

the same which is of the greatest importance to its welfare, namely, those waters provide if

so nearly the volume of the Nile, whatever may be the measures of utilization of such waters

sought by recipient states along the course of that river (Quoted in Whiteman, 1964: 1011-

1012).

Meanwhile, The imperial Ethiopian government had even moved further to the extent of launching a major

study on the water resources of the Blue Nile for irrigation and hydroelectric power by using American

experts, which was begun upon the signing of the August 1957 contract between the U.S Bureau of

Reclamation of the Department of the Interior and the Ethiopian Ministry of Public works and

communication (Collins, 2000:258). Then, after five years of intensive study the Bureau of Reclamation

proposed the construction of four major dams on the Blue Nile (With a combined storage of 51 BCM equal

to the mean annual now of the Blue Nile), twenty nine irrigation with hydropower projects on its

tributaries, with a hydro electric capacity three times that of the HAD (Daniel, 2001: 5; Shapend, 1997:78).

If all the projects were realized, irrigated land in Ethiopia would be equal to 17 percent of the current land

under irrigation in Egypt and would require 6 BCM of Nile Water and hence, would reduce the total annual

flow of the Nile into Sudan by 8.5 percent (Daniel, 2001:5 ; Shapland, 1997:78).

Though not realized due to financial problems, the actions clearly witnessed the determination of Ethiopia

to unilaterally move for the utilization of the water resources located within her own territorial jurisdiction.

The imperial Ethiopian government, time and again, asserted Ethiopia's "absolute Sovereignty" over the

utilization of her own resources located within her national boundaries. In fact, the Emperor (Emperor Haile

Selassie l) never boasted or pretended to divert the natural course of the river as the Ethiopian Medieval

rulers did. He had been modest in His approach for He mentioned that ' ... Ethiopia may be prepared to

share this tremendous God given wealth of hers with friendly nations neighboring up on her, for the life

and welfare of their people ...'(Ethiopia Observer cited in Yacob, 2002:7)

Contrary to this, there was and is no modest and considerate thinking and approach on the part of the

downstream states that excluded the country that adds a lion's share to the now of the Nile from all

negotiations and agreements.

Though verbal, Ethiopia's assertion to use her water resources still continued. For Instance, at the UN water

conference held in Mar Del Plata, Argentina, in 1977. Ethiopia declared its rights to, unilaterally, develops

the water of International River within its territorial Jurisdiction, there was no agreement on the use of

these rivers (Collins, 1994: 123).

Furthermore, in protest to 'Egypt's announcement of its intention to irrigate land in Sinai with Nile Waters,

Ethiopia sent a memorandum to the meetings of the organization of African unity (OAU) held in Lagos,

Nigeria, in June 1980, whereby Ethiopia accused Egypt of misusing the waters of the Blue Nile and

infringing the rights of other riparian states since Sinai lay outside the Nile basin (Collins, 1994: 125).

In summary, Ethiopia’s current water appropriation doctrine is based on the "equitable and reasonable'’

utilization of international watercourse. The basic question that should be answered here is why has

Ethiopia been not able to convert verbal assertions into 'facts on the ground"? In other words, instead of

simply opposing the activities of the downstream states. Why did Ethiopia not enter the scene of

scrambling for the Nile Waters?

Out of about 122 BCM of surface water, Ethiopia has so far developed only 4.3%, of which 0.6% is in the

Abbay (Blue Nile) valley with the Fincha agro-industrial enterprises (Yacob, 2007:109). To date, Ethiopia has

been able to install 453MW, which is only 2% of the estimated total potential; and only 13% of the

population has access to electricity (Ibid). The country is frequently hit by drought and famine. This is the

paradox of water abundance and scarcity in Ethiopia.

The failure by Ethiopia to make use of its water resources is due to many factors, the most important

among which have been financial shortages, lack of skilled man power, lack of prior political attention and

hence absence of appropriate water utilization policy. Today, however, it seems that Ethiopia has decided

to utilize the Nile waters because of its population growth compounded by environmental degradation; and

the relative peace currently prevailed in Ethiopia also enabled the country to divert its attention and efforts

towards national development. Accordingly, in the water sector, 'Master plan studies have been completed

and the final reports published for Abbay Blue Nile, Tekeze/atbara, Baro Akobo, Gibe-Omo and Mereb

basins' (Yacob, 2007:94).

As a matter of fact, following the 1999 Ethiopian Water Resources Management Policy, Ethiopia has

adopted water sector strategy. Water resources development Fund and water sector development

programme for the year 2002-2016 (Yacob, 2007:88). This is great stride forward not only in tackling

development problems but also in creating 'facts on the ground' that considerably enables Ethiopia to

strengthen its bargaining position against the prevailing status quo in the Nile basin. Strong bargaining

power on the part of Ethiopia would hasten the move toward co-operation, which is strongly required for

combating the consequences of environmental degradation in the sub-basin.

CHAPTER SIX

TENDENCIES TOWARDS CO-OPERATION

6.1. Current Situation in the Basin and in the world

We have already seen that environmental condition? in the sub-basin are creating multifaceted problems.

Dramatic deforestation and associated soil erosion in highland Ethiopia is intensifying drought, and

sedimentation of river waters, streams and reservoirs; and unexpected heavy floods have also become

common. Drought and river sedimentation are, among other things, endangering water supply and food

production both in the upper and lower Nile basin states. In this respect Mengistu Wube(1994:520) warns

that 'if present environmental degradation continues, it can lead to severe land degradation, drought,

unexpected heavy floods, and low agricultural productivity, which all lead to mass migration, severe

famine, and human and animal mortality both in the upper and lower Nile riparian countries.' Whittington

et al. (1994: 11) also observed that environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia, which is proceeding at

an alarming rate, is making agriculture unlikely to be able to sustain its present out put and support the

projected huge population increases.

Parallel to rampant environmental degradation in the sub- basin is rapidly increasing population growth.

According to studies conducted by Senai (1995:7) and shapland (1997:83) the average annual population

growth rate for the Eastern Nile basin states ranges from 2.4% (for Egypt) to 2.9% (for Sudan and Ethiopia).

Based on this rate, by the year 2025, the populations of these three principal Nile basin countries are

estimated to be 93.5, 60.6 and 122 million respectively (Shapland, 1997:83).

Environmental degradation associated with demographic pressure alters water demand patterns among

river basin states. Population growth affects the demand for water in many ways. Additional population

means additional water need for human consumption, for livestock, and for industrial and commercial

activities. Again population growth increases the demand for food, and therefore the demand for irrigation

schemes (Whittington and McClelland, 1992: 144). As a matter of fact, eastern Nile basin states are

currently in need of more water to feed their ever-growing population. As it has already been mentioned

elsewhere in the paper. Egypt is currently advancing rather ambitious desert reclamation schemes in the

south (Toshka) and North of the country. Thus, in order to satisfy Egypt's needs or the increased food

supply, Egypt's current land master plan demands reclaiming 0.58 million ha in the near to medium term

future. Hence additional water supplies will be needed to proceed with the overall desert reclamation

programme (Whittington, 1994: 11).

Recurrent drought compounded with demographic pressure has resulted in the collapse of subsistence

economy and mass displacement of population in Ethiopia. The only way for Ethiopia to increase food

supplies is developing irrigation schemes in the western watersheds of the country by using the Nile water

(Whittington, 1994: 11). This is forcing Ethiopia to enter the scene of scrambling for the Nile waters which

until now was exclusively used by the two downstream states.

Sudan similarly has schemes for expanded irrigation. As one observer noted,

In response to the 1990s development (Food insecurity and environmental degradation), the

Sudanese government has designed a complete national strategy for upgrading water resources

including the Atbara River, the Blue Nile, and the main Nile. The strategy includes expanding the

capacity of the Roseires Dam from 3 to 7.7 BCM as well as building two dams (Elsatit and EI-Remila)

on the Atbara river to add to the Hammadab and Kajhar dams (EI-Zain, 2000: 365)

The combined effect of all this will be water shortage. This is because 'the depletion or degradation of

resources shrinks the resource pie, and population growth forces the pie to be divided into Smaller Slices'

(EI-Zain, 2000:352). The basic problem facing the three sub-basin countries is thus lack of enough Nile

water available to complete all the irrigation schemes on the drawing boards of these countries

(Whittington, I994: 12). As a result of this, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia are entering a period of increasing

water scarcity, which makes conflicts over available water resources likely unless a basin wide planning

process is established (Whittington and McClelland, 1992: 154). The same authors added that the period of

water abundance is coming to an end. Water demands are growing due to population and economic

growth, whereas available water supplies appear to be decreasing (Whittington and McClelland, 1992:

144). These are the conditions currently prevailing in the sub-basin. So, what would be the solution?

Waterbury (1997:280) stressed that 'if there are rising and competing demands for the water, it is

imperative that its use and allocation be planned in a basin-wide, integrated manner.' Therefore, it is only

co-operation among the riparian countries that can promote the welfare of people throughout the Nile

basin (Whittington and McClelland, 1991:145). Stated differently, environmental threat can possibly be

alleviated if the upper and lower Nile riparian countries are united (Mengistu, 1994:520).

Thus, today, most international observers as well as the riparian countries themselves have generally

understood the solution to this problem to be a comprehensive agreement on how the average flow of the

Nile should be allocated among the concerned parties (Whittington, 1994: 12). However, this

understanding has not yet been converted into practice.

Internal situations in the sub-basin require that, in order to plan, utilize, develop and manage the common

property resource of the Nile waters in an ecologically friendly manner, there should be co-operation

among the co-basin states. Stakeholders should approach to the common water resource in accordance

with the geographical rules, which necessitate co-operation among them.

In addition to the above internal situations, there are also external actors that are positively contributing to

co-operation in the basin, or in the sub-basin. As an external factor, the end of the cold war provided an

opportunity to the basin states to sit together and discuss their common problems and issues. 'During the

cold war period the political regimes in the sub-basin were-willy-nilly engulfed as the ideological and/or

political strategic proxies of either the "Western" or "Eastern" camp, often on the opposing sides of one or

another power bloc' (Yacob, 1002: 1). Similarly, El Zain (2000:348) observed that the old environment was a

context of tension and mistrust maintained by the dynamics and divide of the cold war where Ethiopia and

Egypt had never been in the same camp. This was the old formula of the Nile basin politics.

Thus the end of the cold war at the beginning of the 1990s brought Egypt and Ethiopia to the same

"western" bloc. The end of the cold war made the sub-basin countries to accept the development

prescription of the international financial institutions (Yacob, 2001:1) and hence served as one positive

factor in mitigating the old mistrust and tension in the sub-basin.

Obviously, to date, there is no comprehensive (all-inclusive) agreement that deals with the utilization and

management of the Nile waters. In fact, there had been several legal instruments that Britain entered with

upstream actors in the colonial era; and currently, there is the 1959 Nile waters Agreement signed between

independent Sudan and Egypt. As it is already said the colonial and post-colonial agreements and treaties

on the Nile secured the interests of one riparian state (Egypt) or to some extent Sudan to the total

exclusion of other riparian states.

Due to absence of all-inclusive legal and institutional framework for the utilization and management of the

Nile waters, fear and suspicion of one another and the intention to maximize one's benefit has been the

reigning ideology of the Nile riparian states. It has become convincing that this kind of old formula could

not serve the current concrete situation in the basin. Sated differently, currently, resources degradation or

depletion on one hand, and increasing demand for the same on the other hand, required the establishment

of appropriate and all-inclusive legal and institutional framework for the utilization and management of the

water resources of the Nile river. It seems true that the internal and external conditions are pushing the

sub-basin states to co-operate on the utilization and management of the shared resource of the Nile,

though the states are not sufficiently responding to the pushes.

Since a river basin is 'a unitary whole' its utilization, development and management should be carried out in

a co-ordinated and integrated manner. Co-ordinated and integrated utilization and management requires

co-operation and participation on the part of the riparian states. Co operation and participation in turn

needs some form of institution with its own legal and technical jurisdiction. In the environmentally fragile

Nile river basin, institutionalized co-operation is the only way to sustain the lives of people inhabiting it.

Erlich et al. (2000) noted that 'the Nile, being a single hydro political unit, calls for unified action, where co-

operation and a shared concept of common all-Nile discourse is not only vital but also perhaps the only

road to survival.'

With the objective of facilitating basin-wide co-operation and establishing institutional framework, various

attempts have been made in the Nile basin since 1960s. The Hydrometeorolgical Survey of the Equatorial

Lakes (the Hydromet), the UNDUGU and the Technical Co-operation Commission for the Promotion and

Development of the Nile (TECCONILE) were some of the attempted institutional frameworks in the basin.

Nevertheless, none of them were all-inclusive and comprehensive in terms of both their agenda and

membership; thus, failed to achieve the required objectives in the basin.

Among the aforementioned attempts for the establishment of institutional frameworks in the Nile basin.

TECCONILE is said to be relatively advanced type of Nile-based organization in terms of embracing

fundamental issues like the equitable entitlement to the Nile waters, as its long-term agenda. Another

important thing is that TECCONILE also initiated series of 'Nile 2002' conferences, which created a

multidisciplinary forum for exchanging views by academics and professionals on the issues of transnational

rivers in general and the Nile water resources, in particular. However, 'due to lack of sufficient funding, it

ceded its unfinished jobs, particularly pending projects, to the successor organization, that is, the Nile Basin

Initiative (NBI)'(Tesfaye, 200 I: 107).

6.2. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)

It was in Dar Es-Salam, Tanzania, in February 1999 that the NBI emerged as a successor to the TECCONLE.

Except Eritrea, all the Nile riparian States are members to the NBI (Yacob, 2007:132). The important

breakthrough with the NBI is that it included the issue of water entitlement as its agenda, which was set

out as a long-term plan in the case of TECCONILE.

The policy guideline of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has five objectives:

These include' (a) developing the water resources of the Nile Basin in a sustainable and equitable

way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its peoples: (b) ensuring efficient water

management and the optimal use of the basin's resources: (c) ensuring co-operation and joint

action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win gains: (d) targeting poverty eradication and

prompting economic eradication: and (e) ensuring that the programme results in a move from

planning to action' (Nile-Com, 2002)

The objectives of the NBI summarized above are pervasive and promising. The initiative embraces issues of

equitable utilization and efficient management of water resource towards poverty eradication and

insurance of prosperity, security and peace for all the peoples of the Nile basin. To see these promising

objectives in the area, which has been stricken by poverty, civil wars, political instability, ecological crisis,

mutual exclusion, fear and suspicion, is by itself a step forward to bright future.

'The NBI is guided by a shared vision to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the

equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile basin water resources' (Foulds, 2002:9). Thus,

unlike the previous initiatives, the NBI is a vision shared by all the basin states. According to El lain

(2000:368) the NBI means that the awareness about the current environmental problems that affected all

riparian states is finally on its way towards institutionalizations.

The NBI is thus believed to facilitate the realization of the principle of equitable distribution of the Nile's

water as stipulated in the so-called 03 project initiated, and financed by the UNDP. Project 0-3 is composed

of three experts from each riparian country with the duty of drawing up the general principles governing

relations between the Nile basin countries on the utilization of the same (Girma Amare, 2000). It was in

1995 that, project 03 was created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to serve as a

forum to maintain and monitor the legal and political dialogue surrounding Nile use (Foulds, 2002:9).

Then the project, with its mission of developing a co-operative framework for the management of the Nile

waters, was transferred to the NBI in 1999 and currently embodied in the Initiatives shared vision program

(SVP) as one of its five broad themes (Nile-Com, 2002). According to Girma Hailu from UNDP, without 03

the NBI would never have been realized (Quoted in Foulds, 2002:9). Thus, it is the project 03 that brought

all the riparian states together unlike the previous Nile-based co-operative attempts.

That is why project 03 is said to be the central pillar or the raisondetre of the NBI. Even the supporting

pillars of this 'roof or 'temple' (project 03) such as (1) confidence building and stakeholders involvement

(pillar C). (2) social-economic, environment and sectoral analysis (pillarD), (3) development and investment

planning (pillar E), and (4) applied training (pillar F) by themselves involve a necessary learning process in

which different levels will contribute (EI lain, 2000).

Thus, these four pillars which support the main pillar (D3) seems to play a role in erasing the old fears,

mistrusts and suspicion; in identifying socio-economic and environmental problems (so as to set priorities);

in producing the necessary skill, particularly for those basin states with few or no trained manpower in the

hydraulic area; and in general, in clearing the ways for the eventualization of project D3. Thus, ‘SVP’s

mission is the creation of a co-odination mechanism and an enabling environment to realize the shared

vision through action on the ground (Foulds, 2002:10).

The shared vision programme of the NBI is thus beneficial to all the riparian states. It is really a promising

vision ever seen in the Nile basin. The vision can represent a diplomatic victory on the part of the upstream

states. Particularly Ethiopia for the equitable utilization of the Nile waters is the principle which has since

long been advocated by it.

The basin-wide shared vision programme has its counterparts, Subsidiary Action Programme(SAP) which

will involve actual development projects, in collaboration with two or more countries at the sub- basin

level, allowing for a move from planning (SVP) to action(SAP)(Fould, 2002:11). The principle of subsidiary is

considered an important approach to co-operative action within a basin-wide framework. It is also designed

to take decisions at the lowest appropriate level to facilitate the development of real action on the ground

(El Zain, 200:368).

SAP currently embraces two sub regional groundings: the equatorial lake subsidiary action programme(NEL-

SAP) embracing the equatorial co-basin states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the DRC;

and the eastern Nile subsidiary action programme (ENSAP) comprising of Egypt, Sudan and

Ethiopia(Tesfaye, 2001: 112).

ENSAP aims at bringing co-operation among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The three ENSAP members states

have already forwarded a total of fifty-sex hydraulic projects including hydropower, irrigation, water and

soil conservation that await funding (Tesfaye,2001:114). The same author stated that out of fifty-sex

projects, about forty-sex (80 percent) (13 for hydropower generation, 8 for irrigation, and 25 for the

watershed management) are proposed by Ethiopia as against ten percent proposed jointly by Sudan and

Egypt. It has been said that the three ENSAP members states have proposed joint projects which include

the eastern Nile simulation project, power pooling between Ethiopia and Watershed Management in the

Baro-Akobo basin (Mekonnen Lulseged, 2003).

Seen on paper, the programme and visions of the NBI are promising. Obviously, everyone benefits from the

initiatives programme, if it will have a-success story. Foulds (2002:7) noted that 'the success of the NBI

would provide security and sustainable water supply for downstream states and development

opportunities for the upstream states like Ethiopia.’

watershed management in the source area can reduce drought occurrence, unexpected heavy floods and

downstream siltation as well as enhance water availability. This benefits not only Ethiopia but also Sudan

and Egypt. Watershed Management in the source area can be realized if and only if all the beneficiaries co-

operate and share burden with each other. Thus since co-operation benefits all, they (Ethiopia, Sudan and

Egypt) must work hard for the realization of the visions and programs of the NBI. Particularly, Sudan and

Egypt must give their full consent to the realization of project 03, for failure to agree on this core issue will

not bring lasting co-operation in the sub basin.

For instance, Ethiopia has made cautious moves in order not to sacrifice her principal objective of attaining

equitable water entitlement in return for this project-by-project approach. In the National Water Resources

Management Policy, it is stipulated that,

In order to develop transboundary waters, Ethiopia fosters meaningful and mutually fair Regional

co-operation and agreements on the joint and efficient use of transboundary water with Riparian

countries based on equitable and reasonable use principle (FDRE, 1999:13).

Thus, Ethiopia's involvement and active participation in the NBI and its project-by project approach does

not constitute Ethiopia's ceding of her demand for equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile's water.

Even Ethiopia has already set out its own domestic means of financing its hydraulic projects in case this

project-by- project approach fails. Hence, Ethiopia has not decided to obtain benefits from the projects

designed under ENSAP at the expense of her long-held principle of equitable water entitlement. Yet, this

does not imply that Ethiopia has not made commitments to the eventualization of the visions and programs

of the NBI. Ethiopia's commitment to the success of basin-wide co-operation can easily be pin pointed in

her Water Resources Management Policy document, transboundary waters section; it is presented as

follows:

… Promote the establishment of all integrated framework for Joint utilization and equitable co-

operation and agreements on tratrsboundary waters: ascertain and promote Ethiopia’s entitlement

and use of transboundary water based on those accepted international norms and conventions

endorsed by Ethiopia; foster meaningful and on a joint and efficient use of transboundary water

with the riparian countries based on equitable and reasonable use principles …(FDRE,1999:13).

The point then is that, Ethiopia is working at its best level for the realization of all the projects initiated

under the NBI and/or ENSAP without sacrificing its major objective of attaining equitable water

entitlement.

Concerning the commitments of Sudan and Egypt, available literatures express doubts. For instance, Egypt

is reported to have begun to implement development projects under the auspices of its new national water

plan (Foulds, 2002: 12). According to the same author, the basis of the new plan focuses on three pillars:(1)

working with the upstream states on both the Blue and the White Niles to develop new water resources,

(2) protecting water quality, and (3) severely rationalizing the usage of Egypt's share of the Nile,

In the previous chapter of this study, it is mentioned that Egypt has launched a huge desert reclamation

project aimed at creating new valley in the South (Toshka) parallel to the old Nile Valley.

One may thus argue that Egypt Will stick to its own mega national project, and will co-operate with

upstream states only on the issue of water enhancement, but not on the issue of new water allocation that

necessitates the dismantling of the status quo. One may even go on saying that Egypt may be following a

two-tier policy in the basin: creating 'facts on the ground' at home, and pretending as active and committed

participant in the NBI.

Why does Egypt pretend as committed participant in the NBI? It may be just to please her western friends

and international donors, which are now facilitating the realization of the NBI. Or just to be a beneficiary of

international aid and investment, which the NBI is hoping to obtain. These and similar others are the

possible hypotheses whose real solutions need sufficient time.

However, the Egyptian writer, Mustafa (2000: 201) Asserts that " unless urgent and effective land

conservation and watershed management measures are taken, food insecurity will continue to be a critical

local, national and regional problem in the Nile basin" It is clear fact that watershed management in the

source area underscores cooperation between or among the co-basin states.

Indeed, the Egyptians themselves know that watershed management cannot be implemented unless and

otherwise they agree and co-operate with the source country, It is also clear that, as to Ethiopia, lasting co-

operation with the lower basin states underscores new water sharing in the sub-basin, But new water

sharing seems to be a taboo among the Egyptians.

These are all incompatibilities rotating round the Nile issue, which are delaying co-operation required for

mitigating impacts of environmental degradation in the sub-basin.

By the same token, Sudan's commitment to the success of the NBI is also questioned, It is reported that

Sudan has designed the strategy of expanding the capacity of the Roseires Dam from 3 to 7.7 BCM as well

as building two dams (EI Satit and EI Remila) on the Atbara to add to the Hammadab and Kajbar dams (EI

Zain, 2000:366). Africa confidential (June 12, 1998) had also reported that Sudan 'wants to construct dams

at Meroe (to generate 1.000 Mega Watts of Power) and at Kajbar near the third Cataract (to generate 300

Mega watts).'

Nevertheless, a number of available literatures, which this writer came across and used in the previous

section, asserted Sudan's dire need for co-operation with Ethiopia due mainly to problems associated with

environmental degradation. Further, it has been stated that the status quo that excludes Ethiopia is for

Egypt, not for the Sudan. These assertions contradict the ones given in the paragraph above.

However, Sudan, so far, has not shown any practical moves towards co-operation with Ethiopia on the issue

of the Nile. Thus, this writer is of the opinion that the Sudanese may be using the NBI as the smoke screen

to win diplomatic and financial support from the international community. In line with this Kidane Assefa

(2003) remarked that although Sudan, by virtue of its centeral location, and geography, benefits most from

cooperation, its position is very unpredictable.

In fact, some say that one need not expect over-night and dramatic change of countries' long held positions

on the use of the-Nile waters. To bring complete change in the hydro political positions of riparian

countries, it needs continuous dialogue and confidence building activities. Indeed, what we should not

forget is the fact that many of the riparian states were and are engaged in actual or psychological warfare

against each other. Thus, old fears, suspicion and mistrust are not yet completely washed away. Hence,

some of the countries in the basin may be in a dilemma between national assertiveness and regional co-

operation.

In one way or another, it has been said that there is heightened upstream-downstream conflict of interests

within the NBl itself. For instance, it has been reported that there appeared some sort of disagreement

between upstream and downstream stances on the draft co-operative framework prepared by an

independent study team and submitted to the Panel of Experts (POE) for discussion and revision. Tesfaye

(200 1) stated that:

The POE did - - - discuss each and every provision of the draft Document and produced a revised

version that has marred with Reservation made by one party or the other. This indicates among

other things, the ascendancy of conflict of interest and locked in positions that had been reigning in

relations among Nile basin states…the Slicking points revolved around two basic issues, namely,

equitable and reasonable utilization of the waters of the Nile' vis-a vis’ no significant harm to

downstream users (Tesfaye, 2001:111).

Equitable and reasonable utilization is the currently reigning principle for the allocation and sharing of

international river basins. The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non navigational Uses of International

water Courses underscored the principle of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization of Transboundary Rivers

first stipulated by the International Law Association (lLA) in its formulation of Helsinki Rules in 1966.

Although not legally binding, the convention on the law of the non- navigational use of international water

courses has contained promising but rather general principles for the utilization of shared waters.

Article 5 of the Convention reads as follows:

5(1) watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an

equitable and reasonable manner, In particular, an international water course shall be used and

developed by water course states with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization

thereof and benefits there from, taking into account the interests of the water course states

concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the water course. 5 (2) watercourse states shall

participate in the use and development of and protection of an international watercourse in an

equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the water

course and the duty to co-operate in the convention (convention on the law of non-navi. Uses of int.

watercourse, 1997: Art 5).

As it is stated above, article 5 contains- the key principle of international law in the area of water utilization

that each basin state in an international river basin has the right to equitable and reasonable use of waters

of that river basin. The logic of equitable use 'argues that all those with access to a resource have some

right to a share in the resources' (Waterbury, 1997:28).

The equitable use principle supports the position of Ethiopia or the interests of upstream states in general

against the ‘acquired' or 'historical rights' of the downstream states. In other words, the equitable use

principle protects those who have yet to harness the resource within their own territories.

Under this principle future claims to water use are taken as legitimate. Put another way, potential use

becomes as important as established use (Waterbury, 1997:281). That is why Sudan and Egypt practically

refused to accept this principle because if the principle of ‘equitable and reasonable’ uses of the Nile

waters was accepted. Ethiopia would have taken a considerable amount of the Nile's water, which is likely

to reduce its now into them.

Equitable use does not necessarily mean equal use. The share of an international drainage basin can be

carried out on the: basis or the criteria set out under Article 6 0f the convention on the Law of the Non-

navigational uses of International Watercourses.

Article 6 stipulates:

1. Utilization of an international water course in an equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of

article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including:

(a) Geographic, hydrographical, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;

(b) The social and economic needs of the water course states concerned:

(c) The population dependent on the water course in each water course states:

(d) The effects of the use or uses of the water courses in one water course state on other water course

states;

(c) Existing and potential uses of the water course;

(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the water course

and the costs of measures taken to that effect;

(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.

The factors set out under art. 6 above are vague and ambiguous. There is no numerical value attached to

these factors to weigh or rank one factor against the other. This will give a loophole to subjectivism. Which

factor takes precedence over which is not clearly known.

Moreover, the factors apparently seem favoring the down riparian states. For instance, it can be seen that

points (d) and (e) implicitly fold considerations of appreciable harm into those of equitable use (Waterbury,

1997:282). Thus, down -stream countries of the Nile would stress these points against upstream demands

for equitable utilization of the Nile. Similarly, Points (c) and (g) can also serve the position of Egypt for she

can argue that her population is totally dependent on the Nile and Ethiopia has alternative source (rainfall)

to practice agricultural activities. In fact, Ethiopia is a country that contributes a lion's share to waters of the

Nile.

This can be the point of argument for Ethiopia, albeit the contribution to the watercourse is not clearly

mentioned by the Convention as one factor for the implementation of the principle of equitable use.

Additionally, Ethiopia can also emphasize the potential use of the river Nile for the social and economic

needs or her population Indeed, this may be reacted by Egypt and Sudan on the grounds that the social

and economic needs of the river is greater in their country than it is in Ethiopia.

In any case, the ambiguity, Subjectivity and apparent bias towards downstream states may necessitate

caution on the part of Ethiopian negotiators.

Similarly, article 7 of the 1997 Convention stipulates:

1. Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate

measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states.

2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another water course state, the states whose use

causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use. Rake appropriate measures, having due

regard for the provisions of articles .5 and 6. in consultation with the affected state, to eliminate or mitigate

such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.

This principle, to a considerable extent, contradicts the principle of 'equitable utilization'; and is closely

associated with the Egyptian principle of "acquired rights". The 'no harm' principle tends to protect the

interests of Egypt and hence certainly freezes the existing status quo in the Nile basin. With regard to the

logic behind the principle of 'appreciable harm' Waterbury (1997) has succinctly stated as follows:

Those riparian’s that first put the water in a basin to use thereby establish a senior claim to it, which

is tantamount to a property right. If another riparian puts forward rival claim to the water, the

property right is put in jeopardy. Moreover, if the senior user has invested heavily in jeopardy, to

harness the resource, and if the user's economy has become reliant upon the established patterns of

explanation of the water, rival claims might cause appreciable harm to those with acquired right

(Walerhury, 1997:281).

Such a scheme (a "no harm' principle), thus, implies acceptance of a first-come-first serve system, with the

users presumably having 'acquired rights' once having 'been first' to utilize the water resources in question

(Hillawi, 1998: 15). This system is definitely against the natural right of upstream states such as Ethiopia in

our case. Thus, the challenge facing the Nile riparian countries is to' ... find a balance between the

upstream countries' support for the principle of 'equitable use' and Egypt's and Sudan's support for the

principle of 'no appreciable harm' (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998:27).

0bviously, Ethiopia has now determined to irrigate her western watersheds by using the Nile waters as her

natural and territorial rights allow. Agricultural Development led-Industrialization (ADLI) has been set out as

Ethiopia's national policy priority. Developing irrigation schemes is set up as the main strategy for ensuring

food-security and attaining food self-sufficiency for her ever-increasing population, as stipulated in the

National Water Resources Management Policy.

The area of irrigated agriculture cultivated so far is insignificant compared to the irrigable potential.

Sufficient food has to be produced to meet the requirement of the lost growing population and

ensure food security or eventualities at household level.

Furthermore, small, medium and large-scale irrigation schemes will have to be developed in order

to enhance reliable agricultural development in Ethiopia to cater for externally marketable surplus

that would earn the country foreign exchange and at the same time provide raw material in

provide for industries (FDRE, 1999:26).

If the principle of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization of the shared water resource is not implemented in

the Nile basin, Ethiopia may be forced to take unilateral actions. This in turn will pave the way for the

mushrooming of the seemingly latent fears, suspicion and tension among the riparian states.

The call is hence for the down riparian states (Egypt and Sudan) to cease their monopolistic control over

the river and to show sincerity and willingness to share the waters of the Nile with the right full users.

Therefore, a balance should be maintained between the principles of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization

and avoidance of 'appreciable or significant harm'. As a matter of fact, the 1997 Convention under article 7(

1) stated that 'watercourse states shall in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all

appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other water course states'. From this

statement it is clear to understand the fact that;

First, a state should utilize an international watercourse in its territory; and while utilizing should take all

appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other users. From this, it is possible to

argue that first Ethiopia should be allowed to utilize international river basin found in her territory, then

Ethiopia will be obliged to take, all the appropriate measures not to cause appreciable harm to the water

uses of Sudan and Egypt. From this argument, two things can be inferred. Firstly, it seems that the principle

of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization is the guiding principle whose application is complemented by the

'no harm' principle.

In other words, equitable utilization has precedence over the ‘no-harm' principle (Mussa, 2003). Thus, the

guiding principle should not be ruled out on the grounds of the complementary one. Rather a balance

should be worked out through accommodation and compromise on the parts of all the parties (Waterbury

and Whittington, 1998:27).

Secondly, the 'equitable and reasonable' utilization by one state may not necessarily cause significant harm

to another state using the same watercourse.

The point, then, is that 'riparian' rights to use the water should be respected: all the parties should

accommodate and compromise their interests to reach at the legal solution for: Sustainable use and

management of the Nile's waters; mitigating environmental degradation; enhancing availability of existing

volume of the Nile's water; and avoiding water scarcity and possible conflicts in the basin.

Thus, unless the basin countries avoid divisive issues concerning core legal and institutional questions, co-

operation in other minor issues will be temporary and short lived that will not break the stalemate in the

basin in general and the sub-basin in particular. According to Kidane Assefa (2003) and Tesfaye (2003),

project D-3 that is concerned with the core legal and institutional issues has been stacked somewhere and

its future is unknown.

Thus the impasse has not yet been broken. But failure to reach at compromising solutions would generate

more mistrust and suspicion among the basin states, frustration on the part of the facilitators, and a full-

fledged unilateralism, which would be a recipe for a conflict over the utilization of the Nile water (Foulds,

2002:7).

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANALYSIS

Being agricultural community, the peoples inhabiting Eastern Nile basin are inseparably Iinked with the

natural environment. In the countries of the sub-basin, agriculture is the primary economic activity, which

employs more than 90 percent of the labor force and accounts for more than 50 percent of the Gross

Domestic Product (GDP). Even in Egypt, Where there is advancement in industrialization and increased

urbanization, agriculture still accounts for 50 percent of the total population, 47 percent of the

employment, about 30 percent of the Gross National product (GNP), and 80 percent of export earnings

(Kinfe, 2004:12).

Agriculture in Egypt (totally) and Sudan (Partially) has been carried out by means of irrigation. In Ethiopia,

too, irrigation agriculture is becoming a matter of necessity due to recurrent droughts and erratic and

seasonally concentrated nature of the rainfall. Agriculture is obviously water intensive activity.

What is more, the three sub-basin countries (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia) have the plan to expand their

agricultural activities in order to ensure food security for their rapidly growing population. The sub-basin's

population is growing at an average rate of nearly 3 percent every year. Under this estimated rate, the joint

population of the three sub- basin states will climb to 276.1 million by the year 2025. The peoples of the

sub-basin are in severe food insecurity.

This means that the sub-basin states have not attained the stage of food self-sufficiency. In other words,

they are now net importers of agricultural commodities; Egypt, for example, 'currently (in 1999) imports

more than one-half of its basic food requirements' (Elhance, 1999:60). Similarly, the decline in productivity

plus the high rate of population growth (3.1 %) forced Ethiopia to import 285.000 tons of grain per year

between 1980 and 1984. This figure has grown still higher during the 1990s (Shibru and Kifle, I999:20).

Nevertheless, for Ethiopia, ensuring food security through food imports is an unimaginable task because of

lack of finance and capital. Nor can Ethiopia hope to meet its large food deficits through rain-fed

production done (Kinfe, 2004:40). For ensuring food self-sufficiency, Clearly, Ethiopia's main strategic asset

is water.

Thus, Ethiopia has already reached the stage where it has no choice other than to utilize the Nile waters for

irrigation, hydropower generation, and other needs. For instance, Ethiopia has already planned to irrigate

275,000 hectares of new land within the coming 15 Years, which bring the total area under irrigation to

472,000hectares within the coming 15 years (Knife, 2004: 44). And generally Ethiopia demands about 54.4

BCM of fresh water.

Egypt has also planned to reclaim her desert lands to open new agricultural and settlement areas for her

rapidly growing population; and, as it has been already mentioned, needs additional 15.5BCM of fresh

water, thus raising her water quota to 71 BCM. Likewise, Sudan has also plans to expand her agricultural

lands and power generation, and 'needs more than 31 BCM of fresh water' (Zewde cited in Mengistu,

1995:20). The water demands of the three countries put together amounts to 156.4 BCM.

Conversely, the estimated available average annual flow of the Nile is 84 BCM as measured at Aswan.

Hence the demand is by far greater than the supply. One may wonder when he hears the news that even

this estimated figure (84 BCM) is persistently declining since mid-1950s and 1960s due to frequent

droughts intensified by environmental degradation in the sub-basin. In fact, the most optimists suggest an

increase of 22 percent by the year 2025 (Shapland, 1997:90). However, even if these predictions of water

increase will come true, it may not satisfy the needs of riparian countries given rapidly growing population,

ongoing environmental degradation, and inefficient water management in the sub-basin.

Rapidly growing population in the face of resource degradation or depletion means nothing but further

resource depletion and hence resource scarcity. This is because resource depletion results in the shrinking

of the pie, and population growth further divides the pie into smaller slices, and hence scarcity. Obviously,

rapid population growth pushes economic and natural resource limits. Hence, with the growth of

population, more and more water is needed to supply farms, factories and households, which results in the

nature's water bodies to become overtaxed (Postel, 1995: 403).

It is possible to say that fresh water in the sub-basin is under two-fold stress: threats from the impacts of

environmental degradation (mainly drought and sedimentation), and increasing demands for agriculture,

industry and domestic consumption. It seems true that nature and human beings are competing for the

scramble of the Nile waters not for conservation but for further depletion. Truly speaking, it is man's failure

to follow nature's law in utilizing natural resources like water that is making nature refuse to give its fruits

to man.

The most ridiculous thing in the sub-basin is the fact that the sub-basin states have been acting in violation

of not only the law of nature but also each other's rights in utilizing the water resources, instead of acting in

unison to combat deforestation. Soil erosion and drought in the sub-basin, Egypt and Sudan have been

working hard for the maximization of their own national quota by ignoring or violating Ethiopia's natural

right to utilize the Nile's water. While crying aloud about the so-called water rights and wrongs, and looking

inimical at each other, the basin states have neither fully recognized the impacts of environmental

degradation nor respected natural laws in utilizing and managing transboundary river-the Nile. It is in this

circumstance that the Nile is saying, "unless you treat me according to the law of nature, would not support

your life’’.

According to the law of nature, natural resources work as a unitary whole. In other words all resources but

especially water, soil and vegetation, are strongly bounded to each other. A damage to one of these means

the damage of the system. Moreover, a drainage basin is a systemic whole, which does not recognize

political boundaries and compartmentalized approach of men. It is here that Myers (1994:65) said, nature

works as a unitary whole, within a seamless web of ecological interactions, and does not recognize the

artificially imposed divisions of humans. Ecologically, the Nile is one, but the users being many, have been

attempting to modify it against ecological rules. The Nile is part of one great ecological system, which

should be treated like wise. Failure to recognize and respect this objective reality would mean failure to

solve problems of environmental degradation and, hence resource depletion, which in turn endangers our

survival.

Running for the maximization of one’s own self-interest in the case of trans-national river basins is contrary

to ecological rules, and may not bear satisfactory fruits. Egypt can definitely maximize it’s, let us say,

military power without co-operating with the upper Nile Basin states. But it can never permanently

maximize its water supply without the inclusion of upper Nile basin states, particularly Ethiopia. It is here

that the state-centric biases of political realist's explanations do not operate.

Realists argue that the political- structural condition of anarchy in the international system has an impact

on the willingness of states to engage in co-operation (Low, 1993:3). In other words, since ensuring their

security is their chief objective, states are pre-occupied with maximizing their power and capabilities, which

are the ultimate bases for state security and independence in the self-help context of international anarchy.

Central to the realist and neo-realist project are two assumptions.

First that states are likely to be constrained from co-operation by the anarchic nature of international

society.

Second that the states formal apparatus and enduring interests are what shape and transform economic

process. International co-operation, from this perspective, only arises in so far as it supports the political

interests of the state (Williams, 1996:50).

Nevertheless, realism's fixation with sovereignty and state power cannot serve as an alternative approach

to hydro politics in the Eastern Nile basin in particular and international water courses in general.

In an attempt to maximize their national water quota, Egypt and Sudan have built gigantic storage regimes.

But today, reservoirs in Sudan are losing their storage capacity due to accumulation of Silts, although the

country uses different sediment removal methods. Thus, Sudan could not permanently maximize its water

supply in ecologically hostile, state-centric manner. Sudan's co-operation with the country at the lower end

of the basin could not bring ecological health to Sudan.

By the same token, the HAD could not protect Egypt from long run of low floods-such as occurred during

the 1980s. Further Egypt's farmlands are suffering from lack of alluvial soil due to accumulation of silts

behind the dam. Thus Egypt today is in shortage of both fertile land and water. This again witnesses the

failure of a country (Egypt) to maximize water supply on a nationalistic basis, more precisely, without the

inclusion of the source country- Ethiopia. Frankly speaking, Egypt's co-operation with Sudan (non- source

country) could not bring expected benefits to Egypt.

Both the silting up of dams and drought occurrences have been intensified by environmental degradation

over the Ethiopian highlands. This is the supranational impact of environmental degradation. Since river

basins constitute one and unitary ecological system, damage to the natural environment at upper basin has

effects at the lower basin outside the country in which it occurs. Thus, impacts of environmental

degradation are border crossing, which require basin-wide /sub-basin-wide co-operation.

Therefore, if Egypt and Sudan want to permanently secure and enhance available water Supply, live in a

healthy environment, and in general, want to bring peace and prosperity to their people, they should come

to terms with Ethiopia-an important ecological unit in the sub-basin. They must acknowledge Ethiopia's

right to utilize the water resource of the Nile, and should co-operate with her in rehabilitating and

managing the basin's watershed.

Even people in Sudan and Egypt must worry about the effects of environmental degradation in highland

Ethiopia for their own self-interested reasons. Undeniably, common vulnerability to environmental

degradation has created interdependence among the peoples of the three sub-basin states. Whether

believed or not, the peoples of these three sub-basin states are united by the Nile system and should act

accordingly. This unifying factor is by far greater than divisive elements existing among the peoples

inhabiting and using the Nile basin. Any stereotypical and divisive elements (ideology, religion, language,

and mutual mistrust) should be put aside for the sake of the Nile, on which the survival of the basin's

peoples depends. Since Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia Share the Nile's ecosystem, they should quickly come to

terms with each other to avoid environmental catastrophes. The three countries should consider each

other as partners in development. As Liberal institutionalists say, states are becoming increasingly

interdependent in economic and welfare matters. As a result, states rightly consider each other as partners

in growth and development (Lowi, 1993:4). From the perspective of liberal institutionalists, since global

environmental change does not respect national borders, multilateral co-operation and the intensification

of common or shared interests across territorial units are required if it is to be successfully addressed

(Williams, 1996:51).

Thus, unilateral actions and attempts to strengthen national institutions could not protect states from the

impacts of border-transcending environmental degradation. The concept of absolute sovereignty does not

work in the case of transnational rivers; nor could it ensure national water security. Water supply security

depends on the good management of watersheds, which in turn underscores cooperation between or

among co-basin states. Without effective legal and institutional cooperation water may be utilized through

depletion, and each country may be left to the mercy of the actions of others in the sub-basin.

Once again, the ideal solution for the sustainable use: and management as well as for the satisfaction of

competing needs and conflicting interests is unitary basin-wide planning and development of water

resources, under some system of independent legal and institutional authority or regime: 'Effective regime

does not supersede or overshadow states but instead create networks over, around and within states that

generate the means and incentives for effective co-operation' (Vogler, 1996:9) International river and its

cross- border imperatives necessitate co-operation and mutual inclusion for the common good.

Thus, the sub-basin states are advised to change their old hostile attitudes to each other and are expected

to 'move from political relations that essentialise the borders of states to ecological ones that essentialise

the river's watershed' (Elzain, 2000:368). Particularly Egypt and Sudan should show willingness, sincerity

and commitment to change their old formula of excluding Ethiopia and maximizing their own national

agenda. This is not for the exclusive advantage of Ethiopia, but just for mutual advantage: watershed

management and regulation of the Blue Nile at its upper catchments will protect Sudan and Egypt from

siltation, unexpected floods and water shortage; and similarly, this will enable Ethiopia to irrigate its

western watersheds and generate more hydroelectric power for domestic consumption and export.

Although the sub-basin states have joined the NBI with the spirit of equitable and sustainable utilization

and management of the Nile waters. The impasse has not yet been broken. Divisive elements are still

persisting, blocking the road to co-operation.

On the other hand, Ethiopia and Sudan are currently working in many areas of mutual Concern, including

transportation, trade and port facilities. 'Trade exchange between the two countries has been gaining

momentum after the opening of the Metema-Gadarif road. Ethiopia has been importing petroleum and

various goods from Sudan while Sudan also begins to import bean, coffee and other commodities from

Ethiopia' (Kinfe, 2004:53). According to the same source, trade exchange between the two countries has

reached 40 million U.S. dollars over the last two months alone. This may erase the old suspicion and

distrust and may create interdependence and friendship between the two countries.

'Roads and railroads, carrying vitally traded goods among riparian states (fuel, fertilizers, grain, etc)

promote mutual dependency' (Waterbury, 1987:103). Accordingly to the same author, navigable stretches

of rivers and lakes (if any) offer similar possibilities, and ports provide still more (Waterbury, 1987:103).

This is what is being between Sudan and Ethiopia, albeit at its infantry stage.

If the two countries strength their economic mutual benefits and establish mutual dependency; and if this

functional co-operation spills over into the sub basin’s hydropolitics, Sudan will have two options: either to

influence and persuade Egypt to accept upstream states’ principle of equitable and reasonable utilization

through the existing NBI, or to unilaterally break links with Egypt in favor of cooperation with Ethiopia: in

fact this latter choice is at the risk of military threats from Egypt.

Similarly, Egypt will have two possibilities: either to accept upstream demand for the equitable utilization,

and co-operation with them, or to avert Ethio-sudanse co-operation by means of military intervention. But

Egypt military intervention in Sudan will (1) bring domestic and regional instability;(2) strengthen southern

Sudan peoples liberation army(SPLA), perhaps to secede from the north and establish its own autonomous

states.

If southern Sudan is separated from the north and controlled or administered by group with no Arab

orientation, Egypt might still face serious challenge to its water security. It can be judged that Egypt never

dares to accept an independent southern Sudan administered by group with no Arab sentiment because of

the Nile waters.

Thus, military intervention on the part of Egypt is detrimental not only to Egypt but also to the sub-basin as

a whole, because it will bring regional instability and will lead to further degradation or depletion of the

sub-basin’s natural resources and socio-economic crisis in general. Hence, the Egyptians should practice a

friendly, appeasing, and fruitful dialogue instead of sticking to the old formula of threats, military

intervention, and ethnic religious subversion.

Let us think the other way round , and say Sudan will not break hydropolitical links with Egypt in favors of

co-operation with Ethiopia: and say that Sudan and Egypt will insist on maintaining the prevailing status

quo, as a matter of necessity, Ethiopia will unilaterally move to irrigate her watersheds by using the Nile

waters. Then, reservoirs and irrigation canals in Sudan and Egypt will continue to be silted up and

unexpected drought-flood cycle will continue, thus endangering water supply and the survival of people in

the sub-basin.

Under this circumstances, water supply in Sudan and Egypt will be threatened both by the impacts of

environmental degradation and Ethiopia's unilateral exercise of its right to utilize the Nile's water. Then, to

secure their water supply, Sudan and Egypt might use military force against Ethiopia directly or through

proxies. But direct military attack against Ethiopia seems impractical because

Sudan is involved to the point of exhaustion with a civil war and could not for the foreseeable future

muster a force to defend its hydraulic interests. And while Egypt has considerable military

strength.... it has not the capacity to embark on campaigns in remote parts of the Nile basin

especially as the returns from such a military investment would be far outweighed by the sheer

economic cost, not to speak of the immeasurable political costs of such a venture (Allan, 1994:

308).

Moreover, Egypt's military capability could not fit to Ethiopia's landscape, as this was proved in 'the Yemen

in the 1960s, where-military operations in rough mountain terrain were not suited to Egypt's military

capabilities' (Waterbury, 1996:14).

Even if direct or indirect involvement in military confrontation takes place, it brings only regional instability

but not permanent solution to the Nile question. Moreover, Sudan and Egypt cannot solve problems of

environmental degradation by military force nor can they mitigate the problems with out watershed

management, which requires cooperation with Ethiopia. This is obvious for every mindful person.

This is the challenge, which the sub-basin states are currently facing with. The dilemma is whether Sudan

and Egypt continue their old trend of competition and conflict with Ethiopia in the face of rapidly mounting

environmental degradation, or change that trend, and co-operate with Ethiopia to mitigate environmental

problems. Obviously, mutual survival lies in effective co-operation, not in competition and conflict. Even the

Egyptians themselves realise the fact that without ecological conservation in the whole Basin, reforestation

of the Ethiopian highlands, and other co-operative enterprises aimed securing more waters, the HAD will

not save their country forever (Erlieh, 2002:218). This understanding must be converted to practical

implementation, up to and including new water sharing.

Therefore, since mutual benefit is rooted in co-operation through legal and institutional Framework, the

sub-basin states should work for the realization of co-operative Framework currently on going under the

NBI. Egypt should stop the trend of 'self-first' principle because if this principle is also adopted by other

riparian sates. Egypt will be affected more than any other basin state for it is completely dependent on the

water of a single river that is shared by nine other states. In the case of full-fledged unilateralism, Egypt will

be the victim of a zero-sum game. In other words, since Egypt is at the end of the line she would be

vulnerable to the actions of the upstream states (Bennett, 1991:96).

Hence, Egypt should totally abandon conflict-Iaden statements and work for confidence building and win-

win solutions. The sub-basin states in particular should avoid the old trend of competition and conflict and

embark on a new trend of friendship, mutual trust and belongingness, They should be committed and

sincere in searching appropriate legal and institutional solutions for the Nile issue: for its equitable and

sustainable utilization, management, and for alternative means of enhancing available water supply. True

cooperation requires compromise and accommodation, and flexibility on the part of the parties involved.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

Currently, the environment of highland Ethiopia is severely degraded. Within less than a century the forest

cover of highland Ethiopia was reduced from 40 percent to less than 3 percent. The upper catchments of

the Abbay/Blue Nile, Tekeze/ Atbara and Baro-Akobo rivers are severly deforested, through the former two

catchments are more deforested than the later one, and forest clearance is continuing at an estimated rate

varying from 8,000 to 20,000 hectares per annum. Thus, even the remaining forest cover of about 2.4

percent is said to be at great risk, hence putting our survival as a nation at danger.

Deforestation is one of the factors that cause increased run off, which leads to soil erosion and ultimately

to environmental degradation, In highland Ethiopia, soil erosion has not only been a continuous threat; it is

now more serious than ever before, it is serious in its severity, extent and the rate at which it progresses.

The rate of soil erosion in highland Ethiopia is estimated to be between 1 billion and 3.5 billion tons per

year. The catchments of Ethiopia's rivers in the western watershed are also experiencing severe soil

erosion, Thus, land degradation is a challenging problem in the country's western watersheds in particular,

and highland areas in general. Due to deforestation and its resultant soil erosion, Ethiopia has been and is

experiencing severe droughts, economic losses and losses in biodiversity.

Land degradation affects both natural and man-made water flows and storage regimes so that the extent

and frequency of flooding increase in wet seasons and drought in dry seasons, As a result of land

degradation in highland Ethiopia (the source of 86 percent of the Nile waters), the reservoirs in Sudan and

Egypt are losing their storage capacities, Silting up of dams creates water shortage in the storage regimes

and thus results in Socio-economic crisis of the countries whose life is based on the waters stored in the

storage regimes, This is true for Sudan and Egypt. Similarly, due to environmental degradation in highland

Ethiopia unexpected drought- flood catastrophes have been endangering the lives of people inhabiting the

lower basin of the sub-basin.

Since, the impacts of environmental degradation are border transcending; they affect the whole of the sub-

basin countries, albeit the degree might vary.

In other words, Ethiopia Sudan, and Egypt have, at varying degrees, been affected by the impacts of

environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia. Thus the challenge of environmental degradation is not

only for Ethiopia but also for Sudan and Egypt too.

On top of environmental degradation and its impacts, there is rapidly growing population in the sub-basin.

It is said that population growth further depletes the resource. The states of the sub-basin need to feed

their rapidly growing population. The three sub-basin states have thus intentions to expand their irrigation

agriculture. Their plan demanded more water than what is currently available. Hence it seems that there is

discrepancy between demand and supply. Obviously, demand is greater than supply What is more, even

available supply is on the trend of declining due to continuous drought in the basin.

The sub-basin states did not show committed attempts to solve the impacts of land degradation. Many

factors, including mutually exclusive doctrines and unfair status quo have distanced the sub-basin states

from seeking co-operative solutions for the problem. Even the sub-basin states have been engaged in

military conflicts either directly or through proxies. One sub-basin state, Egypt, maintained hegemony over

the basin by using its good access to the western money and diplomacy as well as by using its domestic

political and economic stability relative to other sub basin states. However, it is understood that, this will

not be permanent solution for the problems of the sub-basin, though there is (so far) no practical move on

the part of the sub-basin states (particularly Sudan and Egypt) towards genuine co-operation.

Even the recently emerged co-operative forum, the NBI, has not yet shown practical progress towards the

needed end. There is still disagreement on the legal and institutional co-operative framework (project D-3)

between upstream Ethiopia and downstream Sudan and Egypt. The core issue, that is, co-operative legal

and institutional framework has been stacked somewhere. This may soon result in the withdrawal of some

states like Ethiopia from the initiative, and thus may freeze the stalemate, blocking the way to cooperation

required for sustainable utilization and management of the Nile waters.

Since a drainage basin works as a systemic whole, it does not recognize political boundaries: it should be

managed jointly. Joint management and utilization of water resources like that of the Nile, need co-

operation among the co-basin states. Accordingly, Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia should sincerely co-operate to

properly manage and utilize the water resources of the sub-basin. The stability of upstream fresh water

flows depends upon maintaining the integrity of watersheds. This calls for conservation of mountain forests

as they are particularly important to maintaining a steady supply of fresh water to downstream areas.

Realist's view of state-centric approach to maximize one's own interest does not fit the case of river basins

as is seen in the Nile basin. In fact, Sudan and Egypt have beyond state-centrism tried to co-operate

between themselves and maximize their national water quota but failed. This is because the water does not

originate in Sudan and end in Egypt, or vice versa.

They missed the water source country-Ethiopia. Hence, if Sudan and Egypt want to permanently secure

their water supply, live in a healthy environment and bring peace and prosperity to their people, they

should co-operate with the water source country. The three countries have the common cause (the Nile),

which is the base of life, particularly for the lower basin states.

Thus, they have to consider each other as partners for development in the sub-basin. Since they are

partners in the Nile system, they should co-operate for its management and utilization. This fits the theory

of liberal institutionalism, which advises states to co-operate for the common good in this interdependent

world.

For genuine co-operation, what is needed is reconciling mutually exclusive doctrines. Equitable and

reasonable utilization should be accepted and practiced as the guiding principle. "Equitable and reasonable

utilization" should take precedence over the "no harm" principle. This could be achieved through

compromise and accommodation of interests, particularly on the part of the lower sub-basin states. In any

case Ethiopia should be given her riparian right. This would change the existing unfair status quo and

promote co-operation in the sub basin.

If the sub-basin states are really willing to compromise and accommodate each other's interests, and are

committed to true co-operation, they can tackle the apparent condition of water scarcity by using different

mechanisms. There are some available mechanisms, which are suggested by experts on the Nile. For

instance (Shapland, 1997) and (Waterbury, 1996) have suggested the mechanisms for water enhancing in

the sub basin which include, storage of Blue Nile water in Ethiopia and the concomitant operation of lake

Nasser at a lower level: the reduction of losses in the Sudd via the excavation of the Jonglei canal: using

ground water: importing "virtual water": using water saving technologies such as drip irrigation: shifting

from more to less water intensive crops: reutilizing drainage water; water pricing: and other conservation

measures.

The sub basin states should strive to apply workable mechanisms in the basin so as to come to negotiated

solutions for the prevailing problems in the region. The old trends of Power politics could not bring real and

lasting solution for the problems of land degradation in the sub-basin. Rather what is required is genuine

co-operation among the sub-basin states.

The sub-basin states are advised to identify and implement water storage systems for water supply, energy

production, flood control, and irrigation. Special attention should be given to those activities that increase

access by upstream communities to water and its benefits (clean drinking water, water for sanitation,

irrigation water, hydroelectricity, and revenues from water use by downstream consumers).

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