TImag10-fall2004

magazine

Fall 2004

tinbergen institute10

Tinbergen Magazine is published

by Tinbergen Institute, the

Institute for economic research of

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

Universteit van Amsterdam and

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

At the helm of Tinbergen Institute

An interview with Maarten Janssen

On commuting

Finance and inequality: Theory and evidence

New column: Letters from Alumni



On commuting



In depth

References

Up close

In short

2

www.tinbergen.nl

3

10

14

17

18

15

magazine

Fall 2004

tinbergen institute10

Tinbergen Magazine is published

by Tinbergen Institute, the

Institute for economic research of


Universteit van Amsterdam and

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.



On commuting


New colu,n: : Letters from Alumni



On commuting



Highlighting ongoingresearch at TinbergenInstitute for policymakersand scientists.

6

15

Letters from Alumni

In this issue

Up close



Beata Bierut

In depth

On commuting

Jos van Ommeren

Finance and inequality

Theory and evidence

Enrico Perotti

Letters from Alumni

Harm Zebregs, IMF

In short

Papers in journals

Discussion papers

Theses

References

Up

close

By Beata Bierut At the helm of Tinbergen Institute


3

Tinbergen Institute’s new General Director, Professor Maarten Janssen, has an excellent

scientific record, is a highly praised pedagogue and has already demonstrated his

management skills as Director of the Economics Group at Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.

The electoral committee strongly believed that his tact and ability will be crucial in guiding

the Institute through the challenges on the horizon: expanding the educational

programme and obtaining the extension of the accreditation granted by the Royal

Netherlands Academy of Sciences in 2000.

I would like to start by congratulatingyou on your appointment as the GeneralDirector of the Tinbergen Institute. I hope youwill enjoy your new responsibilities, whichbrings me immediately to my first question:What exactly are the responsibilities of theGeneral Director of Tinbergen Institute? Howdo they differ from the tasks of the Director ofGraduate Studies, Jaap Abbring?

Thank you very much. Well... TheGeneral Director is ultimately responsible foreverything going on at the Institute. Havingsaid that, I share with Jaap the responsibilityfor the MPhil and PhD programmes, thephilosophy behind them, and their financing.Jaap deals with the daily affairs, admissionsand supervision. I attend to the researchinstitute and fellow appointments, relations

4

tinbergen magazine 10, fall 2004

with the three founding faculties and otherexternal relations.

What is your own vision of your newresponsibilities?

There are two things that I wouldparticularly like to accomplish: to satisfythe wish of the Board of TI on the point ofextending our activities beyond the fieldswe presently cover, and to increase theinternational visibility of the Institute, whichI think is related to the fellows’ attitudetowards TI.

You will understand how much of achallenge the first issue is, once you havelooked back into the history of TinbergenInstitute. Actually, business economics waspart of the Institute in the early days. Then,in the ’90s, TI restricted its scope to a coreprogramme in economics, econometrics andfinance. There are several good reasons for TIto broaden its scope now, as there are moreand more researchers in finance, marketingand organisation that use the same tools asin microeconomics and econometrics.Nevertheless, we must be rigorous insafeguarding excellence in teaching andresearch, and in exploiting synergies with theexisting programme. Personally, I would alsolike to see a more extensive introduction ofother fields of economic science that arecurrently only partially covered by theTinbergen Institute (such as law andeconomics or health economics). I think itwould benefit the Institute to offer courseson these topics and to have top researchersin these fields co-operate with us.

As I mentioned earlier, there is also asecond issue... What I find very important isthat fellows feel as strong an association withthe Tinbergen Institute as with their homefaculties. TI would make an excellent focalpoint for economics in Europe. Look at theInstitute’s research rankings, for example:the Institute itself is not ranked at themoment, while the three departments are–separately. They come out as 10th, 15th and30th in Europe. If the publications of thedepartments were added up, TinbergenInstitute would rank first in Europe and 15thworldwide! By lending an ear to fellows’wishes, I hope that I can make them feel athome here and appreciate TI as their Institute.

Looking at your CV, one has to wonderwhether your day has only 24 hours. You are currently involved in teaching regularly,managing the Tinbergen Institute, running the Economics Group at EUR, working as aconsultant through the Erasmus Competitionand Regulation Institute ECRi, organizingseminar series at the TI, supervising four PhDstudents, conducting your own research, etc.On top of that, you have a family with twoyoung children. What is your secret?

First, management must be doneefficiently: delegate, be clear what you want,and trust the people you work with, that theycan do a good job in working out the details. I have an excellent team here at the Institute,and that helps... The same is true for PhDstudents: I have developed a certain schemefor our cooperation. In the beginning, wework together on a paper, and then graduallythe students work more independently. In thelast two years of their programme, weactually discuss only the ideas for papers,and they work it out themselves... Withteaching, it’s all up to experience. I have nowbeen teaching for fifteen years or so; I knowstudents, and I understand what they mayfind difficult.

You also mentioned consultancy...Actually, until three or four years ago I wasa pure academic-not very keen to work onapplied issues. At some point in 2001 theDutch Parliament wanted to evaluate theUMTS auction (the auction of the 3G mobiletelephony frequencies), which took place inthe summer of 2000. Similar auctions havealso taken place in other European countries,such as England and Germany. In comparison,the Dutch auction generated disappointinglylow revenue. The Parliament wanted to findout whether or not the auction was badlydesigned. This was the first time that I applied economics to a serious real-worldissue. It compelled me to find out whateconomic theory in fact has to say aboutreal life, and it was a real eye-opener. Myacademic research has changed as a result:I’m now much keener to start off with animportant real-life question, rather than witha modification of a theoretical model. Thecombination of research and consultancywork has been both inspiring and fruitful: my recent research still revolves aroundauctions. This time, we analysed theallocation of commercial radio frequencies inthe Netherlands. My latest book is also aboutauctioning public assets.

I have to ask, then: how should weauction public assets?

What makes the kind of auctions I studyparticularly interesting is the fact that thereis a market after the auction. There are twoimportant issues that have to be considered.First, you have to consider the following: howmuch entry can support an efficient after-market? How do you organise the auction tostimulate enough entry? How do you dealwith asymmetries between bidders? Usuallyyou have a few (privileged) incumbents in themarket and some newcomers. How do yougive entrants a fair chance of obtaining thelicense? Another important issue is thespecification of the goals that the governmentwants to achieve. Revenue is one possiblegoal; another might be efficiency in the after-

5

market. It is important to stress that thesegoals usually cannot go together: if you havean efficient (that is, highly competitive) after-market, then profits are low and you cannotget much revenue. In the case of auctioningPrinces Diana’s dress, maximum revenuewould be a good objective, but in the case ofmobile telephony, an efficient after-marketmight be much more important.

We have been discussing your mostrecent work. I have looked at yourprofessional interests, trying to see a broaderpattern, and here it is: you started your careeras a macroeconomist, then you becameinterested in the microfoundations, and finallyyou chose to devote yourself completely tomicroeconomics. Why is that? What is yourstory behind microfoundations?

My interest in microfoundations camewith my interest in the philosophy of science.As you probably know, I obtained a Master’sdegree in the Philosophy of Economics justafter I graduated with a MSc in Econometrics.In the philosophy of science there is someliterature on the relation between theories atthe micro-level and theories at the macro-level. Just to give an example: in physics youhave the ideal gas law, which describesproperties of the gaseous state, and you alsohave theories on how individual moleculesmove and interact... You can ask a question:how is the ideal gas law related to thetheories we have about the behaviour ofmolecules? I thought a similar problem mightbe of interest in economics. It seems thatin economics this issue is much morecomplicated. First of all, the micro theories wehave are sometimes not very accurate indescribing the actual behaviour of individuals,contrary to physics. Then, there are manyexogenous variables at the level of theeconomic system that affect interactionsamong individuals... I am somewhatpessimistic about whether we will ever beable to make the transition from micro tomacro in a fully satisfactory way. I think thatfor the moment we should simply accept thefact that at the macro level certain regularities(which are hopefully quite stable) exist thatwe cannot fully track down to the behaviourof individuals– and that, on the other hand,we have theories on how people behaveindividually.

I am acquainted with both you and Jaap,and sense that you will make an excellentteam, comparable to the Coen Teulings-Maarten Lindeboom duo. Jaap has slightlymore diversified international teachingexperience, while you have substantialmanagement experience. You are bothbrilliant scientists. It looks like a recipe forsuccess...

I couldn’t agree with you more; I think it’sa very nice team. We complement each other.You see, in a team it’s important for eachmember to have different areas of expertise;on the other hand, it’s important to have someoverlap, so that you can communicate witheach other. Jaap and I actually share interest inmodels with incomplete information: I ammore of a theorist, while Jaap has done someapplied research in that field. And as you said,I probably have more management experience,and some experience in consultancy. Jaap hasan excellent international network. I think thatwhile we can really benefit from each other’sexpertise, we share enough common ground toassure smooth cooperation.

Thank you.

My academic research has changed:

I’m now much keener to start off with an important

real-life question, rather than with a modification

of a theoretical model.

6

IntroductionAs the activity that physically connects

the residence and workplace of employees,commuting spatially links housing and labourmarkets. The ubiquity of commuting in oursociety is a relatively new phenomenon: it isa characteristic of industrialised economiesin which firms employ most of the workers.Average commuting time has been quiteconstant over the last decades, whereasaverage commuting distance has been on therise for at least a century.1 Althoughcommuting is relatively unimportant(measured in kilometres) as a travelphenomenon (only 25% of km. travelled aredue to commuting), it attracts a great deal ofattention (and not only by economists)because it is the main contributor to roadcongestion: employees tend to commute atthe same time, and workplaces tend to bespatially concentrated. Road congestion is anegative externality; car drivers thus imposetime costs on each other.

Are commuting costs minimised?The traditional (neo)classical way of

thinking about commuting is that the lengthof the commute is the result of an employee’schoices regarding workplace and residence

locations (White, 1986). Employees thusoptimally choose the commute. Now, supposethat all jobs are identical, and all residencesare identical (apart from their locations).Employees with a long commute must thenbe compensated either in the housing market(through lower house prices) or in the labourmarket (through higher wages),2 and the totalcommuting costs in the entire economy areminimised. One theoretical result suggeststhat the government should address thenegative externalities due to road congestion,but allow the market to determine thelocation of workplaces and residences. Yet,is it realistic to assume that employeesoptimally choose workplace and residencelocations? For example, one requirementwould be that employees have fullinformation about job opportunities and canchange jobs at no cost. The main difficultyhere is that the dominant way of thinkingnowadays about the functioning of the labourmarket is that search frictions are relevant:unemployed and employed job seekers havelimited information about job opportunitiesand must search for jobs. This indicates thatworkers may not be in their optimal joblocation.

●

Dr J.N. (Jos) van Ommeren

is a researcher at the

department of spatial

economics at the Vrije

Universiteit Amsterdam.

Jos received a VIDI

scholarship from NWO

in September 2004, which

allows him to conduct a five-

year research programme on

how employers influence

employee commuting

behaviour.

Jos van Ommeren●

On commutingOn commuting

I n d e p t h

7


A straightforward method to evaluatewhether employees are situated in theoptimal workplace location is to examine therelationship between the length of thecommute and whether the employees searchfor another job (van Ommeren, 1998, 2000).It can be easily shown that a long commuteinduces on-the-job search (see Figure 1).Apparently, employees with a long commuteare worse-off (they are not compensated byhigher wages), and attempt to reduce thelength of the commute by changing job (ormoving house). The main lesson to be learnthere is that search frictions increase thecommute.

In the housing market, search frictionsare probably less important. Residences aremore like a standard commodity. However,the presence of residential moving costsprevents employees from relocating theirresidence to the optimal location (vanOmmeren and Leuvensteijn, 2003). Inparticular, when employees have a temporarycontract, or anticipate moving to another jobwithin several years, they will not reducetheir commute by relocating their residencecloser to the workplace after accepting a newjob. This explains why most studies concludethat commuting is both inefficient and‘wasteful’ (Manning, 2003; Hamilton, 1982).

Personnel policy of firmsEmpirical research on commuting tends

to focus on employee behaviour. Theoreticalstudies pay somewhat more attention tofirms, as they determine wages andworkplace locations. Nevertheless, thepersonnel policy of firms tends to be ignoredin both theoretical and empirical studies–which is strange, since many examplesillustrate the relevance of firm personnelbehaviour for commuting.

Job applicants who receive a job offerare frequently offered a commuting-costreimbursement, or a reimbursement in the

form of a company car, but other successfulapplicants are offered relocation-costreimbursements to move closer to theworkplace. Although firms may be financiallyindifferent between one-time (partial)reimbursements of relocation costs, orcontinuous reimbursements of commutingcosts, the effect on the commute is distinct.Relocation-cost reimbursements increase thelikelihood that employees move residencecloser to the workplace, whereas commuting-cost reimbursements decrease the odds (vanOmmeren, van der Vlist and Nijkamp, 2002).

In Europe, many firms offer companycars as a (fiscally attractive) fringe benefitwithin the compensation package. Firms aremore likely to offer company cars to thoseemployees who must travel during workhours for job-related reasons. These cars maybe owned by the company or leased from alease company. In the Netherlands, 42% ofnew automobiles, 12% of all automobiles, andabout 20% of all automobiles on the road atany given time are company cars. Duringrush hours, the proportion of company carsmay be even higher. Although employeesdriving a company car may receive a lowerwage and pay additional income tax, themarginal monetary costs for the use of thecar are zero. Whether this exacerbates the useof the company car for private or commutingpurposes is the important research questionhere.3

Although the answer to this question isunknown, the Dutch tax system seems tooffer the wrong incentives regarding fringebenefits: whereas the use of the company caris not taxed at its full value, relocation-costreimbursements are taxed as income in theNetherlands (apart from a certain threshold,which is only, on average, 25% of the averagemoving costs for owners).

Government policyGovernment policies influence

commuting behaviour– not only by taxingcommute-related fringe benefits differentlyfrom labour income, but also in many otherways. This article focuses on two types ofgovernment policies that should receive moreattention: road pricing (with its negativeconsequences) and zoning (assigning land tospecific purposes).

Although transport economists haveoffered several ‘solutions’ to the negativeexternalities of road congestion, they tend tofocus on road pricing. To what extent,however, will car drivers switch to publictransport as a result of road pricing?4 Thecommuter selects the mode that willminimise commuting costs, which consist ofa monetary component and a travel-timecomponent (other relevant items may beconvenience, flexibility, etc.). Road pricing

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 >60

15

10

5

0

%

Figure 1. Proportion of Job Seekers as a Function of Commuting Time

8

increases the variable monetary costs, butonly slightly reduces time costs. Commutersseem to regard travel-time costs as relevant,whereas monetary costs seem to be relativelyunimportant (van Ommeren and Dargay,2004). Road pricing will thus have hardly anyinfluence on the choice of the mode of travel.Improvements in public transport, however,may have an influence. This may explain whyin Hasselt (a small town in Belgium), free useof the bus hardly stimulated car users toswitch to the bus. However, an increase in thefrequency of the bus trips (which determinesthe expected waiting-time costs), and in thenumber of routes, seemed to persuade morecar drivers to switch to the bus.

In many European countries,government policies in zoning land forhousing, workplaces, leisure etc. influencethe spatial structure of the economy andtherefore commuting behaviour. Thus, thegovernment and the market both determinethe potential workplace and residencelocations available to employees.

An example in the Netherlands isAlmere, a government-created town not toofar from Amsterdam (and Utrecht). With160,000 inhabitants (expected to grow to300,000 within 20 years), Almere is a largetown by Dutch standards. Many of the town’sinhabitants want to work and thereforesupply labour. By creating this residentialarea, the government has formed a locallabour supply, which is only partially met bylocal labour demand. The typical employeewho lives in Almere therefore tends to workin neighbouring cities, such as Amsterdam.Not surprisingly, the average commute ofworkers living in Almere is relatively long,creating many negative externalities.5 Yet, thecreation of Almere may prove to be optimalin the long run, because over time more jobswill be created in Almere, reducing theaverage commute (thus, jobs follow people).

The Dutch tax system seems to offer the wrong

incentives regarding fringe benefits: whereas the use

of the company car is not taxed at its full value,

relocation-cost reimbursements are taxed as income

in the Netherlands.

9


This adaptation process is extremely slow,however, and in all likelihood it will takeseveral decades at least before local laboursupply and demand are in equilibrium(Vermeulen and van Ommeren, 2004). Thisraises also the question to what extent peoplefollow jobs. Empirical research shows thatthe population is not responsive to shifts injobs to other regions. This result is extremelyimportant: it demonstrates that zoning landfor housing, and in particular for workplaces,is not without cost to society. One majorconsequence would be that the Dutchgovernment should allow the market todecide where to locate residences andworkplaces.

Commuting is a phenomenon of oursociety with particularly importantramifications, due to its contribution to roadcongestion (with its negative externalities).Commuting behaviour may be influenced bygovernment policies directly via road pricingbut also indirectly by influencing firms andemployees in the labour and housingmarkets.

ReferencesHamilton, B.W. (1982), Wasteful commuting, Journal

of Political Economy 90, 1035-1053.

Manning, A. (2003), The real thin theory: Monopsony

in modern labour markets, Labour Economics 10,

105-131.

McFadden, D. (1974), The measurement of urban

travel demand, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 3,

no. 4, 303-328.

Van Ommeren, J.N., G. J. van den Berg and C. Gorter

(2000), Estimating the marginal willingness to pay

for commuting, Journal of Regional Science, 40, 3,

541-563.

Van Ommeren, J.N. and M. van Leuvensteijn (2003),

New evidence of the effect of transaction costs on

residential mobility, CPB discussion paper, The

Hague.

Van Ommeren, J.N, A. van der Vlist and P. Nijkamp

(2002), Transport-related fringe benefits:

Implications for commuting and relocation,

Tinbergen Institute discussion paper 63, 3.

Van Ommeren, J.N. and J. Dargay (2004), The

optimal choice of commuting speed, Tinbergen

Institute discussion paper 92, 3.

Van Ommeren, J.N. (2000), Commuting and

relocation of jobs and residences, Ashgate; UK,

Aldershot.

Van Ommeren, J.N. (1998), On-the-job search

behaviour: The importance of commuting time,

Land Economics 74, 4, 526-548.

Vermeulen, W. and J.N. van Ommeren (2004),

Interaction of regional population and employment,

Tinbergen Institute discussion paper 83, 3.

White, M.J. (1986), Sex differences in urban

commuting patterns, American Economic Review

76,368-372.

Notes 1 The main reason is that employees have become

richer, and their value of time has increased.

Workers have switched from slow but cheap modes of

transport (walking) to faster, but more expensive

alternatives– particularly the car. In the Netherlands,

the average commuting distance (one-way) is

currently about 18 kilometres, which exceeds the

distance of any other European country.

2 How much additional wage would the average

commuter wish to receive as compensation for one

additional hour of commuting? A general conclusion

is that the wage compensation for one hour

commuting is much less than the hourly wage rate.

Van Ommeren, van den Berg and Gorter (2000) find

that the compensation for one hour of commuting is

about half of the hourly wage rate. This information

can be used to calculate the costs of congestion for

the average commuter.

3 The average commuting distance driven with a

company car is about 50% longer than with the

personal car. Any causal relationship between the

use of company cars and commuting distance is not

clear. Company cars are offered particularly to those

job applicants with long commutes (van Ommeren,

van der Vlist and Nijkamp, 2002).

4 The travel mode literature has a long history. Since

the pioneering work of McFadden (1974), a number

of studies have explored the choice of travel mode.

5 Nevertheless, the creation of Almere may have

been a good idea from an economic point of view.

Employees rationally choose to live in Almere, as

they are compensated by lower house prices (as well

as by larger gardens, etc.) for their long commute.

10


IntroductionA key controversy with regard to

globalisation is whether free trade increasesopportunities mainly for more productiveindividuals. Diffused entrepreneurial activityis an important determinant of economicrenewal. Johnson et al. (2003) show that thesuccess of new entrepreneurs determined therelative success of transition countries. Yet, while market reform proponents believethat liberalisation removes barriers foreveryone to participate in broader exchangepossibilities, opponents claim that reformsusually benefit a minority, and that economicinequality often increases after such reforms.If inequity further reduces access toproductive opportunities, then the value ofliberalisation may be brought into question.

BackgroundIn theory, an effective financial system

plays a vital role in economic growth.Improved access to funding may enhancethe equality of opportunities, and reduceinequity. A more developed financial sectorpromotes subsequent economic growth.

Most financial reforms, however, do nottarget financial broadening (which expandsaccess), but instead focus on financialdeepening. Financial deepening emphasisesformal, complex, large-scale institutions

typical of developed economies, such asstock and bond markets, or policiesmaximising capital inflows– with scantattention paid to their distribution or to thepromotion of greater domestic competition.

These deepening reforms favour themore established producers. Particularly ininequitable societies, they offer limitedaccess to funding, and at times producecrises that narrow access to funding stillfurther.

Gains and lossesfrom liberalisationWhat is the underlying mechanism for

this effect of liberalisation? A classic view isthat liberalisation initially favours firms withestablished comparative advantages. Thisappears not to be the case, however.Concentration of funding has not producedbetter returns. For instance, in manyreforming countries losses on larger loanswere much larger than for smaller loans,which suggests connected lending topowerful groups (on Mexico, see La Porta etal., 2002; on Russia, see Laeven, 2001, Gelferand Perotti, 2000, and Perotti, 2002).

While gains tend to be concentrated,losses from liberalisation are oftensocialised. Crises in many developing

Finance and inequality:

Theory and evidence

I n d e p t h

Enrico Perotti is Professor of International Finance at the Universiteit van Amsterdam.

His wide interests range from corporate finance and the theory of the firm, to innovation

theory and the political economy of finance. In this text, Professor Perotti describes some

of his recent research on the political economy of financial development.

11


countries have imposed heavy fiscal costsand have led to the economic disruption ofsociety (such as in East Asia, Russia, Mexicoor Argentina). Extensive misuse of banklending often favoured well-connectedindividuals, while losses were shifted ontothe public safety net (Halac and Schmuckler;de Silanes et al., 2002; Haber, 2004). Defaultcosts were often funded via inflationaryspending or fiscal cuts, hurting weaker socialgroups. The worst impact has not been on thepoorest, however, who hardly participate inthe formal economy and have little to lose;rather, the middle- and lower middle-incomefractions of the population have been thehardest hit.

Why does liberalisation favourestablished interests?Claessens and Perotti (2004) interpret

this top-down approach to financialderegulation as a distortion introduced byestablished interests in countries withpoor democratic scrutiny. A clue to thisinterpretation comes from recent evidencethat initial inequality in such a countryhinders the proper design and implemen-tation of reforms. Established economicinterests may block financial reform, if sucha reform challenges their privileged access tocapital (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Perotti andVolpin, 2004). New theoretical work showsthat even when broadening liberalisation isimposed from outside (e.g. by the IMF),established lobbies may manipulate itsdesign and/or implementation in order tocapture most of its benefits and to socialiseits costs (Perotti and Feijen, 2004). Themechanism is simple: lobbying efforts forweak enforcement of investor rights lead tomost poor entrepreneurs being either unableto raise enough funding, or, because they aremore leveraged, more susceptible to beingdenied essential refinancing in a crisis. Infact, Keefer (2001) shows that liberalisation ismore often followed by banking crises incountries with poor political institutions.

Recent evidence has also shownshockingly high barriers to starting newbusinesses in poor countries. Barriers includean exorbitant number of licenses andregulatory agencies, onerous formalisticrules, high fees and taxes. Such rules appearto be designed to create opportunities forbribery (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Acemoglu(2003) and Perotti and Volpin (2004) showthat political accountability weakens thestrength of elites in blocking entry. Moreover,Klapper et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2003)show that entry barriers are in fact higherin more corrupt and in less democraticcountries. Barriers to economic participationthus ultimately favour established interests,limit growth and increase inequality.

Recent attention has also focused onmeasuring informal barriers (such as poorcontractual enforcement) that obstructfinancing, create predatory behaviour byregulators, and bias contractual enforcement

The middle- and lower

middle-income fractions of

the population have been

the hardest hit.

12


in favour of established producers. Small entrepreneurs often escape suchrequirements by remaining in the informalsector, which undermines their access tofinance, limits their trade opportunities,keeps them dependent on established firmsand generally hinders the growthe.

A key question is whether poorenforcement is simply the result of anhistorically poor legal structure (as inLa Porta et al., 1998), or whether laws areopportunistically enforced. Perotti and Volpin(2004) prove that lobbies of establishedinterests have a natural advantage over

competing lobbies of potential competitors,since restricting new entry produces largerpure rents, and thus generates moreresources for political contributions andbribes. The article goes on to prove that poorpolitical accountability (which fails toconstrain political abuse) and high inequalitywill produce lower entry rates in sectors thatrequire more external finance. Strongevidence obtained to support the modelreveals, in particular, a negative correlationbetween entry and poor legal enforcement.

The final test shows that the qualityof legal enforcement is best explained bypolitical accountability and inequality, evenafter controlling for legal origin. This provesthat it is neither the legal tradition nor thetext of legislation that matter, but ratherwhether enforcement is subject to politicalopportunism. Graphs 1 and 2 illustratethe impact of inequality and politicalaccountability on the quality of enforcement.These results are robust to controlling for percapita income, assuaging the concerns raisedby Glaeser et al. (2004) that institutionalquality increases with economicdevelopment.

Political accountability, a measure of theconcentration of political access, thus hasa direct effect on economic developmentbecause it affects access to resources. By undermining the reliability of laws, lowpolitical accountability distorts access tofinance, and can thus destroy any privatecontractual solution. These results echo theempirical conclusions in Acemoglu andJohnson (2003): constraints on politicalpower have a major impact on growth, whilemeasures of legal efficiency affect financialdevelopment, but do not directly raisegrowth. Thus, while the quality of financialdevelopment is critical for growth, it isendogenous; beyond proper legislation andpolicies, growth also requires properenforcement, which can be undermined incorrupt, inequitable, and undemocraticregimes.

ConclusionsRecent evidence suggests that financial

crises in developing countries often arisebecause of deliberately poor design andimplementation of reforms– itself theconsequence of a highly skewed distributionof wealth and power. In highly inequitablecircumstances, top-down, deepening reformsare simply too vulnerable to abuse. Theconsequences create a political backlash thatundermines the sustainability of valuablereforms– as is happening in Latin America.This situation does not arise becauseliberalisation is inappropriate, but because itis too easily captured and distorted ininequitable societies with poor governance.

13


ReferencesAcemoglu, D. (2003), The form of property rights:

Oligarchic vs. democratic societies, mimeo, MIT.

Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson (2003), Unbundling

institutions, mimeo, MIT.

Claessens, S. and E. Perotti (2004), The links

between finance and inequality: Channels and

evidence, World Bank mimeo, Washington, DC.

Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and

A. Shleifer (2002), The regulation of entry, Quarterly

Journal of Economics 117:1.

Gelfer, S. and E. Perotti (2001), Red barons or robber

barons? Governance and financing in Russian FIGs,

European Economic Review 45/9, pp.1601-1617.

Glaeser, E. L., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and

A. Shleifer (2004), Do institutions cause growth?

Brookings Economic Papers, Washington, DC.

Haber, S. and S. Kantor (2004), Getting privatization

wrong: The Mexican banking system, 1991-2003,

Stanford University mimeo.

Halac, M. and S. Schmuckler (2003), Distributional

effects of crises: The role of financial transfers,

World Bank working paper 3173.

Johnson, S., J. McMillan and C. Woodruff (2003),

The central role of entrepreneurs in transition

economies, Journal of Economic Perspectives 16.

Keefer, P. (2001), Elections, special interests and the

fiscal costs of financial crisis, World Bank mimeo.

Klapper, L., L. Laeven and R. Rajan (2003). The

determinants of firm entry, World Bank mimeo.

Laeven, L. (2001), Insider lending and bank

ownership, The case of Russia, Journal of

Comparative Economics 29, pp. 207-229.

La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.

Vishny (1998), Law and Finance, Journal of Political

Economy 106:6, pp. 1113-55.

La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and G. Zaparripa

(2002), Related lending, Yale University, mimeo.

Perotti, E. (2002), Lessons from the Russian

meltdown; The economics of soft legal constraints,

International Finance 5:3, pp. 359-399.

Perotti, E. and E. Feijen (2004), The political

economy of bank fragility, UvA mimeo.

Perotti, E. and P. Volpin (2004), Lobbying on entry,

CEPR Discussion paper, CEPR, London.

Rajan, R.G., and L. Zingales (1998), Financial

development and growth, American Economic

Review 88: 559-586.

Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny (1993), Corruption,

Quarterly Journal of Economics, August.

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Gre

ThaJor

Pak Idn

Ind

Sng

NZ

Kor

FraIre

USA

Swi

Bel

Twn

Aut GerUK

SpaIta

Bra

PorIsr

CanAusJap

DenNorNet

FinSwe

25 35 45 55 65

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

Mal

Zim

KenEcu

SA

Chl Mex

ColTur

PerNig

Phi

ArgEgy

Sri

Ven

Uru

GreTha

Jor

PakIdn

Sng

NZ

Kor

Fra

Ire

USA

Swi

Bel

Twn

Aut GerUK

Spa

Ita

Bra

Por

Isr

CanAusJap

DenNorNetFinSwe

25 35 45 55 65

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

Idn

Graph 1: Quality of legal enforcement and income inequality (R2= 0.374)

Graph 2: Enforcement and inequality, controlling for political accountability (R2= 0.628)

Regression on the quality of legal enforcement (48 countries)

En

forc

em

en

tEn

forc

em

en

t re

sid

uals

(aft

er

con

troll

ing

dem

ocr

acy

)

Gini coefficient

Gini coefficient

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) - IV

Constant 5.270*** 12.209*** 8.731*** 8.619*** –1.264 7.285***

(0.372) (0.758) (0.941) (1.040) (1.198) (1.241)

Democracy score 0.353*** 0.274*** 0.285*** 0.080** 0.391***

(0.046) (0.050) (0.059) (0.040) (0.066)

–0.021*** –0.075*** –0.071*** –0.029** –0.052**

(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) (0.024)

Commom law –0.291 0.577** –0.494

(0.473) (0.264) (0.469)

Log (Per-capita income) 1.144***

(0.126)

R2 0.510 0.374 0.628 0.633 0.881 0.598

N. obs 48 48 48 48 48 48

14

When I was asked to write a letter for TI Magazine about my working experience afterfinishing my PhD, my mind went back to my first two years at the International Monetary Fund.During those years, I was in the Economist Program working first in the African and later in theResearch Department. I started in a group of eighteen young economists, most of them withfresh PhDs. Every Thursday evening at 6:30 we would meet a few blocks from the Fund to sharea beer and some pizza. We would talk about our new employer and the idiosyncrasies of living inWashington DC. Sometimes you could find us lamenting about how much time we spent doingsuch mundane things as fiddling with Excel spreadsheets and writing minutes, and about themany papers we had to review while being under continuous time pressure. By 8 o’clock, aftera few too many beers, we would be betting who would be the first of our group to leave theFund. Now, several years later, I can safely say that those bets were widely off the mark-perhapsno wonder, given the reputation of economists in this area.

I don’t think our misgivings were specific to our group or the institution we worked for.Rather, I believe it was part of a natural process we went through. After many years in university,where you can let your mind roam and are encouraged to question everything, it requires someadjustment to be suddenly transposed to an environment with short deadlines, wherequestioning everything all the time is simply not practical.

Seven years ago, I came to the Fund expecting to be exposed to the realities of economicpolicymaking in countries across the world, and to have some time to write an occasionalresearch paper. Looking back, I think my assignments have largely lived up to that expectation.I have worked on about eight different countries, each with a unique set of economic problems,and I have dealt with a broad range of topics from fiscal policy to bank restructuring, and frommonetary policy to issues in foreign trade. I must say, however, that I have had less time forresearch than I expected, and most of the papers I have written are more applied than academic.That is a pity, because operational work often yields interesting ideas for research, and the Fundhas a very active seminar and workshop program that allows you to exchange ideas with leadingeconomists from all over the world. Nevertheless, I consider myself fortunate to work with verybright people from many different countries in an organization that brings together virtually alleconomies in the world.

Our ‘group of eighteen’ has notbeen disbanded, but we no longer meeton Thursday evenings. We’ve allbecome busier and, perhaps moreimportantly, over time most of us haveadjusted to our new environment.Several members, often not the oneswe predicted, have left the Fund. Mosthave returned to academia or havejoined think-tanks. Where will I beseven years from now? The bestprediction is probably that I will stillbe at the Fund, but don’t bet yourmoney on it.

Letters from Alumni

The Board of TI

Magazine has decided to

introduce a new feature:

Letters from Alumni.

Beginning with this

issue, the Board will ask

one Alumnus to describe

“life after the PhD thesis

and defense”.

In this first letter,

Harm Zebregs sketches

a picture of his life at

the IMF in Washington

D.C. Harm graduated

in 1998 from TI with

a thesis on International

Capital Movements and

Technology in Economic

Development.

Harm Zebregs, IMF


15


Behind internationaldifferences inmale skill wagedifferentials

Wage inequality differssubstantially acrosscountries, and is larger in theUS than in continentalEuropean countries. This isespecially the case at thebottom of the wagedistribution. Economistsoften debate the causes ofthese differences. Someargue that differences ininstitutions (such asminimum wages, unions andemployment protection)explain most of thesedifferences, whereas othersmake a case for differencesin demand and supplyforces. Previous research hasattempted to test thedemand and supplyexplanation by constructinga skill index based on yearsof schooling and years ofwork experience. This indexis used to construct skillgroups and to compare therelative wages betweencountries. These relativewages are then contrastedwith relative net supply.Following this procedure,researchers have found norelation between the relativewage position of a skillgroup and its relative supply.

The current paper arguesthat this procedure, whichignores differences ineducational systems andpost-school training systemsacross countries, will result

in faulty rankings if thesedifferences matter. Instead ofusing education and trainingoutcomes, the current paperrelies on information fromliteracy and numeracy teststhat were developed with theexplicit aim of beingcomparable across countries.Performing the analysisusing this directmeasurement of skillcompletely reverses thefindings of previousresearch. A larger relative netsupply of a skill group isassociated with lowerrelative wages of that sameskill group. More specifically,low-skilled employees arerelatively worse-off in the USthan their counterparts incontinental Europe are– notbecause they lack theprotective labour marketinstitutions, but becausethere are so many of them.Reducing the supply of low-skilled employees maytherefore– after all –be aneffective means to improvetheir relative wages.

Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek

and Hans van Ophem (UvA),

2004, Explaining international

differences in male skill wage

differentials by differences in

demand and supply of skill,

Economic Journal, 114, 466-486.

To unite orto separate?

When two regions– one largeand one small –are faced bya decision to unite or toseparate, their incentivesmay be considered in termsof a basic trade-off:separation allows eachregion greater influence over

the nature of politicaldecision making, whileunification allows the unifiedregion to exploit economiesof scale in the provision ofgovernment. The findings inthis paper suggest that ifregions have dispersedpreferences, then a smallregion is relatively moreeager to form a union,compared to a large region.The incentives of a largeregion to form a unionincrease with the level ofhomogeneity of itspreferences, however, whilethe reverse holds true in thesmall region.

The paper goes on to explorethe social welfare ofdecisions made on the basisof majority voting in regions.The main finding: majorityvoting leads to excessiveseparation. A discussion ofalternative voting systemsreveals that a majority votingsystem supplemented withunification as a defaultoption mitigates this socialinefficiency to some extent,but still allows excessiveseparation as a possibility.

When the small region is verysmall, the tax burden of agovernment is excessive;this region may then betempted to accept unequalor unconditional union.Under this arrangement,voters of the large regionalone may decide on publicpolicy, but inhabitants ofboth regions pay for thepublic good. Thisarrangement– clearly ofinterest to the large region –will be supported by thesmall region only if theregion is very small.Unequal union is thuspossible only if the regionsare of very different sizes.

The paper relates thesefindings to empiricalevidence on secessionmovements and outcomes ofreferenda (on union andseparation) in different partsof the world in recent years.

Sanjeev Goyal and Klaas Staal

(EUR), 2004, The political

economy of regionalism,

European Economic Review, 48,

563-593.

Information overloadin monopsonymarkets

In the economic literature,market inefficiency is oftenblamed on lack of information,implying that the moreinformation, the better.However, some empiricalevidence suggests thatexcessive informationreduces the quality ofdecision-making, aseconomic agents are unableto deal efficiently with toomuch information. Thispaper argues that modern-day economies mayexperience problems ofinformation overload, atwhich point the cost ofinformation transmissiondecreases sharply, and thehuman ability to process thegrowing quantity ofinformation becomes ascarce resource. The authoraddresses the informationoverload problem in thespecific situation in whichmany applicants competefor a job position, andemployers screenapplications in order toselect the best applicant. The model developed hereborrows standard conceptsfrom the economics ofinformation. A centralassumption is that wheninfinitely many applicationsare processed, then eachapplication provides noinformation about the abilityof the correspondingapplicant. Within thisframework, informationoverload can arise as anequilibrium outcome.

papers in journals

discussionpapers

16


The results show thatinformation overload indeedoccurs when the cost ofapplication is low, relative tothe information-processingtechnology level. In thiscase, it is optimal behaviourfor fully rational employersto neglect some applications.

By Stefano Ficco (EUR),

Information overload in

monopsony markets TI 04-082/1

Dynamics ofChinese comparativeadvantage

The rapid development ofthe Chinese economy isalmost daily headline news.Chinese economic growth(after correcting forinternational pricedifferences) was about 7.25percent per year in realterms in the period 1980-2001, implying a doublingof output every ten years.In the past two decades,China’s GDP moved froma fifth place in the worldranking of 1980 (behind theUS, the Soviet Union, Japan,and Germany) to secondplace (behind the US) in2004. Relative to AmericanGDP, Chinese GDP rose fromabout 25 percent in 1980 toabout 62 percent in 2004.

What caused this rapiddevelopment? A broadconsensus argues thattremendous structuralchanges within the Chineseeconomy are the primaryeconomic forces enablingChina’s rapid economicdevelopment. These include,in particular, the way Chinais interacting with the

outside world in terms ofinternational trade andforeign direct investmentflows. Exports and imports,for example, have increaseddramatically, from about2 percent of GDP in the early1970s to about 24 percenttoday. Unfortunately,traditional statistical tradetools do not accuratelyidentify particular periods ofstructural change.

Such periods of structuralchange may be identifiedusing another method,however: calculating therecently introducedHarmonic Mass index totrace over time thedistribution of comparativeadvantage for a country’sindustries. Application of thistechnique to China (and totwo other Chineseeconomies, Taiwan and HongKong) reveals two importantyears regarding structuralchange: 1980, when Chinastarted to open up tointernational trade flows,and 1985, when the start offoreign direct investmentsinitiated the rise intechnology-intensiveexports. During this periodthe composition of Chineseexports changed structurallytowards more unskilled-labour-intensive andtechnology-intensiveexports, while there was adrastic decline in the exportof primary products.

By Jeroen Hinloopen (UvA) and

Charles van Marrewijk (EUR),

Dynamics of Chinese

comparative advantage

TI04-034/2

Survey non-responseand unemploymentduration

Social surveys are thestarting point of a great dealof empirical research insocial sciences. However, thedatasets compiled from thesurveys are generally

infected by the problem ofnon-response. This paperanalyses how problematicnon-response can be in theanalysis of unemploymentduration. Using a uniquedataset that combines surveyinformation of workers withadministrative records of thesame workers, the paperexamines the bias caused bynon-response. The findingsprovide evidence for bias inresults that are based onsurvey data alone. In thiscase, failing to account forsurvey non-response leads toa downward bias of the exitrate out of unemploymentand an overly optimisticestimation of durationdependence. What is behind thisdownward bias? The paperexplores the data variation inthe timing of the moment ofexit out of unemploymentrelative to the survey date inorder to distinguish betweentwo explanations: selectivityand causal effect. Selectivityoccurs if unobserveddeterminants ofunemployment duration arerelated to non-responsebehaviour. The causal effectarises when the fact thatworkers move toemployment before thesurvey date increases theprobability that they becomenon-respondent. Thefindings suggest that bothselectivity and causal effectsplay a role in such a bias.This result has devastatingimplications for the efficacyof standard methods tohandle non-response bias(imputation, weighting,instrumental variables).

By Gerard J. van den Berg and

Maarten Lindeboom (VU), and

Peter J. Dolton (University-upon-

Tyne, and Centre for Economic

Policy, LSE),

Survey non-response and

unemployment duration

TI 04-094/3

Two approaches tovehicle and crewscheduling

Due to heightenedcompetition in the publictransport market and thepressure on governments tocut expenses, costreductions in publictransportation have beenreceiving increasedattention. Since the mainresources used in publictransportation are vehiclesand crews, the production ofefficient vehicle and crewschedules is an importantissue. This thesis considerstwo variants of the vehicleand crew schedulingproblem: the integratedapproach and the dynamicapproach. In the integratedvariant, vehicle and crewscheduling problems havebeen solved simultaneously,while in the dynamic varianta sequence of optimizationproblems has been solved.The stochastic nature of thetravel times has also beentaken into account in thedynamic vehicle and crewscheduling problem.

To show that the integratedapproach can also be appliedto solve instances with morethan one depot, and in somereal-world applications,several models andalgorithms have beendeveloped. These areextensions and/orimprovements of the modelsand algorithms suggestedearlier in the literature forthe single-depot integrated

vehicle and crew schedulingproblem. Computationaltests demonstrate that theintegrated approachsignificantly outperformedthe sequential approach,where first the vehiclescheduling problem, andafterwards the crewscheduling problem, issolved.

Finally, the thesis considersthe executions of theplanned schedules at the dayof operation. If predeterminedschedules are executed on acertain day, many things cango wrong. A delay at aparticular moment can causehold-ups in other tripsassigned to the samevehicle, which leads to a‘snowball’ effect. To preventthis possibility, a dynamicapproach has beensuggested; this has resultedin the development ofseveral approaches toimprove service to thepassengers and reduce thenumber of delays, while thecosts remain equal.

Thesis: ‘Integrated and dynamic

vehicle and crew scheduling’,

by Dennis Huisman

Published in the Tinbergen

Institute Research Series #325

Retirement,expectationsand realizations.Essays of theNetherlands andItaly

Most economicallydeveloped countries face thechallenge of agingpopulations. The twocountries analysed in thisstudy, the Netherlands andItaly, are no exceptions. If the demographic picture isworrying, the economicoutlook is even worse. In both Italy and theNetherlands, the labourmarket participation of olderworkers has diminisheddrastically. This thesis

presents summary statisticsfor Italy that show that, atthe end of the 1990s,approximately only 30% ofthe over-60 pater familiaswere still active. In theNetherlands, this figure iseven lower: about 15%. Only30 years ago, however, theparticipation of the elderlywas comparable to the

participation of the other agegroups: in the 1970s, 80%of the males over 55 yearsof age were employed.The literature has paid agreat deal of attention tohousehold retirement. This thesis specifies andestimates retirement modelsfor singles and marriedcouples. These models,which are estimated on datafrom the Dutch SocialEconomic Panel and theItalian Survey on HouseholdIncome and Wealth, postulatethat financial incentives area determinant of retirement.For the Netherlands, therecent policy developmentsfor the old-age pensionregulations (AOW) werefound to have theunintended effect oflowering female labourmarket participation, whenwomen cohabit with an olderpartner. Many Dutch peoplealso fear an unexpectedshock in their financialsituation around retirement.The study’s findings suggestthat their fears may beunjustified. In Italy, wheredata concerning retirementexpectations are alsoavailable, pension reforms

seem not only to havemoderately prolongedworking life, but also to haveincreased uncertainty aboutthe future.

Thesis: ‘Retirement, expectations

and realizations. Essays of the

Netherlands and Italy’, by Mauro

Mastrogiacomo

Published in the Tinbergen

Institute Research Series #336

17


theses

18

Theses

333 MATTHIJS VAN VEELEN (20/04/2004), Survival

of the Fair; Modelling the Evolution of Altruism,

Fairness and Morality.

334 ROMDEJ PHISALAPHONG (08/04/2004), The

Impact of Economic Integration Programs on Inward

Foreign Direct Investment.

335 ANNA NÖTEBERG (08/10/2004), The Medium

Matters: The Impact of Electronic Communication

Media and Evidence Strength on Belief Revision

during Auditor-Client Inquiry.

336 MAURO MASTROGIACOMO (17/06/2004),

Retirement, Expectations and Realizations. Essays of

the Netherlands and Italy.

337 EIKO KENJOH (29/06/2004), Balancing Work

and Family Life in Japan and Four European

Countries: Econometric Analyses on Mothers’

Employment and Timing of Maternity.

338 ANGELIQUE H. BRUMMANS (24/06/2004),

Adoption and Diffusion of EDI in Multilateral

Networks of Organizations.

340 ROBERT MOSCH (07/10/2004), The Economic

Effects of Trust. Theory and Empirical Evidence.

341 FELIX ESCHENBACH (01/10/2004), The Impact

of Banks and Asset Markets on Economic Growth

and Fiscal Stability.

342 DEYUAN LI (14/10/2004), On Extreme Value

Approximation to Tails of Distribution Functions.

Papers in TI-ranked journals and chapters in books

published by TI Fellows

AA – ranked journalsGoeree, J.K. and T. Offerman, 2004, The Amsterdam

auction, Econometrica 72, 281-294.

Plug, E., 2004, Estimating the effect of mother’s

schooling on children’s schooling using a sample of

adoptees, American Economic Review, 94(1): 358-68.

Plug, E. and W. Vijverberg, 2003, Schooling, family

background, and adoption: Is it nature or is it

nurture?, Journal of Political Economy 111(3):

611-41.

Teulings, C.N. and P.A. Gautier, 2004, The right man

for the job, Review of Economic Studies 71(2):

553-80.

A – ranked journalsAbadir, K.M. and A. Lucas, 2004, A comparison of

minimum MSE and maximum power for the nearly

integrated non-Gaussian model, Journal of

Econometrics 119(1): 45-71.

Berg, G.J. van den, B. van der Klaauw and J.C. van

Ours, 2004, Punitive sanctions and the transition

rate from welfare to work, Journal of Labor

Economics 22(1): 211-41.

Birdsall, N., S. Claessens and I. Diwan, 2003, Policy

selectivity forgone: Debt and donor behavior in

Africa, World Bank Economic Review 17(3): 409-35.

Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and P. Frijters, 2004, How

important is methodology for the estimates of the

determinants of happiness?, Economic Journal

14(497): 641-59.

Francois, J.F. and W. Martin, 2004, Commercial

policy variability, bindings, and market access,

European Economic Review 48(3): 665-79.

Gerxhani, K., 2004, Tax evasion in transition:

Outcome of an institutional clash? Testing Feige’s

conjecture in Albania, European Economic Review

48(4): 729-45.

19


Goeree, J.K. and C.A. Holt, 2004, A model of noisy

introspection, Games and Economic Behavior 46(2):

365-82.

Goeree, J.K. and T. Offerman, 2003, Competitive

bidding in auctions with private and common

values, Economic Journal 113(489): 598-613.

Goeree, J.K. and T. Offerman, 2003, Winner’s curse

without overbidding, European Economic Review

47(4): 625-44.

Goyal, S. and K. Staal, 2004, The political economy

of regionalism, European Economic Review 48(3):

563-93.

Goyal, S. and S. Joshi, 2003, Networks of

collaboration in oligopoly, Games and Economic

Behavior 43(1): 57-85.

Groen, J.J.J. and F. Kleibergen, 2003, Likelihood-

based cointegration analysis in panels of vector

error-correction models, Journal of Business and

Economic Statistics 21(2): 295-318.

Janssen, M.A., J.M. Anderies and B.H. Walker, 2004,

Robust strategies for managing rangelands with

multiple stable attractors, Journal of Environmental

Economics and Management 47(1): 140-62.

Klaauw, B. van der and J.C. van Ours, 2003, From

welfare to work: Does the neighborhood matter?,

Journal of Public Economics 87(5-6): 957-85.

Kleibergen, F., 2004, Testing subsets of structural

parameters in the instrumental variables regression

model, Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1):

418-23.

Leuven, E. and H. Oosterbeek, 2004, Evaluating the

effect of tax deductions on training, Journal of

Labor Economics 22(2): 461-88.

Leuven, E., H. Oosterbeek and H. van Ophem, 2004,

Explaining international differences in male skill

wage differentials by differences in demand and

supply of skill, Economic Journal 114(495): 466-86.

Sandor, Z. and P. Andras, 2004, Alternative sampling

methods for estimating multivariate normal

probabilities, Journal of Econometrics 120(2):

207-34.

B – ranked journalsAdegbidi, A., E. Gandonou and R. Oostendorp, 2004,

Measuring the productivity from indigenous soil

and water conservation technologies with

household fixed effects: A case study of hilly

mountainous areas of Benin, Economic Development

and Cultural Change 52(2): 313-46.

Asheim, G.B., W. Buchholz and C. Withagen, 2003,

The Hartwick rule: Myths and facts, Environmental

and Resource Economics 25(2): 129-50.

Bartelsman, E.J., 2004, Firm dynamics and

innovation in the Netherlands– A comment on

Baumol, De Economist, 152(3): 353-363.

Beetsma, R.M.W.J. and H. Jensen, 2004, Mark-up

fluctuations and fiscal policy stabilization in a

monetary union, Journal of Macroeconomics special

issue 26(2): 357-76.

Berkhout, P.H.G., A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and J.

Muskens, 2004, The ex-post impact of an energy tax

on household energy demand, Energy Economics

26(3): 297-317.

Beugelsdijk, S., H.L.F. de Groot and A.B.T.M. van

Schaik, 2004, Trust and economic growth:

A robustness analysis, Oxford Economic Papers

56(1): 118-34.

Boumans, M.J., 2004, Review of ‘Marshall’s

tendencies: What can economists know?’ (J. Sutton

2000), Economica 71, (281), 177-178.

Brandts, J., T. Saijo and A.J.H.C. Schram, 2004, A

four-country comparison of spite and co-operation

in public goods games, Public Choice 119, 381-424.

Brannas, K. and J.G. de Gooijer, 2004, Asymmetries

in conditional mean and variance: Modelling stock

returns by asMA-asQGARCH, Journal of Forecasting

23(3): 155-71.

Bun, M.J.G. and J.F. Kiviet, 2003, On the diminishing

returns of higher-order terms in asymptotic

expansions of bias, Economics Letters 79(2): 145-52.

Butter, F.A.G. den and E. van Gameren, 2004,

Employment policy in a dynamic labour market:

Simulations using a multifirm flow model, Journal

of Economic Behavior and Organization 53(2):

283-301.

Butter, F.A.G. den and R.H.J. Mosch, 2003, The Dutch

miracle: Institutions, networks, and trust, Journal of

Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159(2):

362-91.

Claessens, S. and L. Laeven, 2004, What drives bank

competition? Some international evidence, Journal

of Money, Credit, and Banking, Part 2, 36(3): 563-83.

Claessens, S., 2004, The case for GDP-indexed

bonds: Discussion, Economic Policy 0(38): 208-10.

Clements, M.P, P.H. Franses and N.R. Swanson, 2004,

Forecasting economic and financial time-series with

non-linear models, International Journal of

Forecasting special issue 20(2): 169-83.

Diks, C., 2003, Detecting serial dependence in tail

events: A test dual to the BDS test, Economics Letters

79(3): 319-24.

20


Driessen, J., P. Klaassen and B. Melenberg, 2003, The

performance of multi-factor term structure models

for pricing and hedging caps and swaptions, Journal

of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38(3): 635-72.

Driessen, J., B. Melenberg and T. Nijman, 2003,

Common factors in international bond returns,

Journal of International Money and Finance 22(5):

629-56.

Dijk, D. van and P.H. Franses, 2003, Selecting a

nonlinear time series model using weighted tests of

equal forecast accuracy, Oxford Bulletin of

Economics and Statistics supplement 65(0): 727-44.

Dijk, H.K. van, 2004, Twentieth century shocks,

trends and cycles in industrialized nations, De

Economist, 152(2): 211-232.

Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and J.C.J.M. van den Bergh,

2004, A micro-econometric analysis of determinants

of unsustainable consumption in the Netherlands,

Environmental and Resource Economics 27(4): 367-89.

Fischer, C., C. Withagen and M. Toman, 2004,

Optimal investment in clean production capacity,

Environmental and Resource Economics 28(3): 325-45.

Franses, P.H., R. Paap and B. Vroomen, 2004,

Forecasting unemployment using an autoregression

with censored latent effects parameters,

International Journal of Forecasting special issue

20(2): 255-71.

Gerlagh, R. and M.A. Keyzer, 2004, Path-dependence

in a Ramsey model with resource amenities and

limited regeneration, Journal of Economic Dynamics

and Control, 28(6): 1159-84.

Giersbergen, N.P.A. van, 2003, A note on

bootstrapping unit root tests in the presence of a

non-zero drift, Economics Letters 78(2): 259-65.

Gondzio, J., R. Kouwenberg and T. Vorst, 2003,

Hedging options under transaction costs and

stochastic volatility, Journal of Economic Dynamics

and Control 27(6): 1045-68.

Gooijer, J.G. de and A. Vidiella-i-Anguera, 2004,

Forecasting threshold cointegrated systems,

International Journal of Forecasting special issue

20(2): 237-53.

Goovaerts, M.J, R. Kaas, J. Dhaene and Q. Tang,

2004, Some new classes of consistent risk

measures, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics

34(3): 505-16.

Graaff, T. de and P. Rietveld, 2004, ICT and

substitution between out-of-home and at-home

work: The importance of timing, Environment and

Planning A 36(5): 879-96.

Groenewegen, J., 2004, Who should control the

firm? Insights from new and original institutional

economics, Journal of Economic Issues 38(2): 353-61.

Groot, F., C. Withagen and A. de Zeeuw, 2003,

Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe

model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

28(2): 287-306.

Groot, H.L.F. de, 2004, Institutional determinants of

bilateral trade patterns, Kyklos 57(1): 103-23.

Hamelink, F., 2003, Systematic patterns before and

after large price changes: Evidence from high

frequency data from the Paris Bourse, Journal of

Forecasting 22(6-7): 533-49.

Harmon, C., H. Oosterbeek and I. Walker, 2003, The

returns to education: Microeconomics, Journal of

Economic Surveys 17(2): 115-55.

Hartog, J. and R. Winkelmann, 2003, Comparing

migrants to non-migrants: The case of Dutch

migration to New Zealand, Journal of Population

Economics 16(4): 683-705.

Hinloopen, J., 2004, The market for knowledge

brokers, Small Business Economics 22, (5), 407-415.

Hochguertel, S., 2003, Precautionary motives and

portfolio decisions, Journal of Applied Econometrics

18(1): 61-77.

Jacobs, B., 2004, The lost race between schooling

and technology, De Economist, 152(1): 47-78.

Janssen, M.C.W. and S. Roy, 2004, On the nature of

the lemons problem in durable goods markets,

Canadian Journal of Economics 37 (3), 552-589.

Kawasaki, Y. and P.H. Franses, 2004, Do seasonal

unit roots matter for forecasting monthly industrial

production?, Journal of Forecasting 23(2): 77-88.

Kobberling, V. and P. Wakker, 2004, Simple tool for

qualitatively testing, quantitatively measuring, and

normatively justifying Savage’s subjective expected

utility, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 28(2):

135-45.

Laan, G. van der and C. Withagen, 2003, Quasi-

equilibrium in economies with infinite dimensional

commodity spaces: A truncation approach, Journal

of Economic Dynamics and Control 27(3): 423-44.

Marquering, W. and M. Verbeek, 2004, The economic

value of predicting stock index returns and

volatility, Journal of Financial and Quantitative

Analysis 39(2): 407-29.

Noailly, J., J.C.J.M. van den Bergh and C.A. Withagen,

2003, Evolution of harvesting strategies: Replicator

and resource dynamics, Journal of Evolutionary

Economics 13(2): 183-200.

21


Ommeren, J. van, 2003, The unemployed

individual’s marginal willingness to pay for the

remaining entitlement period, Labour 17(2): 271-83.

Ossokina, I.V. and O.H. Swank, 2003, Polarization,

political instability and active learning,

Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105(1): 1-14.

Pels, E. and E.T. Verhoef, 2004, The economics of

airport congestion pricing, Journal of Urban

Economics 55(2): 257-77.

Perotti, E.C. and L. Vesnaver, 2004, Enterprise

finance and investment in listed Hungarian firms,

Journal of Comparative Economics 32(1): 73-87.

Plug, E. and P. Berkhout, 2004, Effects of sexual

preferences on earnings in the Netherlands, Journal

of Population Economics 17(1): 117-31.

Rietveld, P. and R. Vickerman, 2004, Transport in

regional science: The “death of distance” is

premature, Papers in Regional Science 83(1): 229-48.

Sa, C., R.J.G.M. Florax and P. Rietveld, 2004,

Determinants of the regional demand for higher

education in the Netherlands: A gravity model

approach, Regional Studies 38(4): 375-92.

Sandor, Z. and K. Train, 2004, Quasi-random

simulation of discrete choice models,

Transportation Research: Part B: Methodological

38(4): 313-27.

Smit, H.T.J., 2003, Infrastructure investment as a

real options game: The case of European airport

expansion, Financial Management 32(4): 27-57.

Sonnemans, J., C. Hommes, J. Tuinstra and H. van

de Velden, 2004, The instability of a heterogeneous

cobweb economy: A strategy experiment on

expectation formation, Journal of Economic Behavior

and Organization 54, 453-481.

Strachan, R.W. and H.K. van Dijk, 2003, Bayesian

model selection with an uninformative prior, Oxford

Bulletin of Economics and Statistics supplement

65(0): 863-76.

Verhoef, E.T. and K.A. Small, 2004, Product

differentiation on roads: Constrained congestion

pricing with heterogeneous users, Journal of

Transport Economics and Policy, 38(1): 127-56.

(Chapters in) TI-ranked books published by TI Fellows:

Bornstein, G., A. Schram and J. Sonnemans, 2004,

Do democracies breed chickens?, Contemporary

Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas, by R.

Suleiman, D. Budescu, I. Fischer and D. Messick

(eds.). Cambridge University Press, 248-268.

Turner, R.K., J.C.J.M. van den Bergh and R. Brouwer,

eds., 2003, Managing Wetlands: An Ecological

Economics Approach, Cheltenham, U.K. and

Northampton, MA: Elgar, xiii, 318o.

22


Discussion papers

Institutions and DecisionProcesses

04-031/1

Andrea Galeotti, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

One-way Flow Networks: The Role of Heterogeneity

04-033/1

Guido Fioretti, University of Siena, and Bauke Visser,

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, A Cognitive

Approach to Organizational Complexity

04-035/1

Silvia Dominguez Martinez and Otto H. Swank,

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Polarization,

Information Collection and Electoral Control

04-037/1

Phongthorn Wrasai and Otto H. Swank, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Policy Makers, Advisors, and

Reputation

04-041/1

Jordi Brandts, Institut d’Análisi Económica (CSIC),

Barcelona, and Arno Riedl and Frans van Winden,

CREED, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Competition

and Well-Being

04-042/1

Otto H. Swank and Bauke Visser, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Sharing Information

through Delegation and Collaboration

04-043/1

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Universiteit Maastricht,

Gerard van der Laan, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

and Dolf Talman, Tilburg University, The Socially

Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games

04-044/1

Simon Gächter, University of St. Gallen, CESifo, and

IZA, and Arno Riedl, CREED, Universiteit van

Amsterdam, Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems

with Claims

04-046/1

Robert Dur, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and

CESifo, and Amihai Glazer, University of California,

Irvine, CA, USA, Optimal Incentive Contracts when

Workers envy their Boss

04-060/1

Josse Delfgaauw, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

and Robert Dur, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

and CESifo, Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the

Public Sector

04-063/1

Pieter A. Gautier, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

and José L. Moraga-González, Erasmus Universiteit

Rotterdam and CESifo, Strategic Wage Setting and

Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications

04-065/1

Klaas J. Beniers and Robert Dur, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam and CESifo, Politicians’

Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral

Competition

04-068/1

Maarten C.W. Janssen, Erasmus Universiteit

Rotterdam, José Luis Moraga-González, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam and CESifo, and Matthijs R.

Wildenbeest, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

A Note on Costly Sequential Search and Oligopoly

Pricing

04-069/1

René van den Brink and Gerard van der Laan, Vrije

Universiteit Amsterdam, and Valeri Vasil’ev, Sobolev

Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia, On

the Extreme Points of Two Polytopes associated with a

Digraph and Applications to Cooperative Games

04-071/1

Maarten C.W. Janssen, Erasmus Universiteit

Rotterdam, and José Luis Moraga-González Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam and CESifo, Consumer Search

and Oligopolistic Pricing: An Empirical Investigation

04-075/1


Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria

04-076/1


and Miguel Meléndez, University of Alicante, and

University of Málaga, Exploitation and Cooperation

in Networks

04-077/1

Stefano Ficco and Vladimir A. Karamychev, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Information Overload in

Multi-Stage Selection Procedures

04-082/1

Stefano Ficco, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

Information Overload in Monopsony Markets

04-095/1

René van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan and Vitaly

Pruzhansky, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Harsanyi

Power Solutions for Graph-restricted Games

04-098/1

Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden, Universiteit

van Amsterdam, Reciprocity and Emotions when

Reciprocators Know Each Other

04-099/1

Gershon Ben-Shakhar and Gary Bornstein, Hebrew

University of Jerusalem, and Astrid Hopfensitz and

Frans van Winden, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Reciprocity and Emotions: Arousal, Self-Reports, and

Expectations

23


04-101/1

Sandra Maximiano, Randolph Sloof and Joep

Sonnemans, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Gift

Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm

04-108/1

Peter Rodenburg, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Multiple Causation and the Measurement of

Unemployment

04-111/1

Peter Rodenburg, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Models as Measuring Instruments

04-112/1

Gerard van der Laan, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,

Dolf Talman, Tilburg University, and Zaifu Yang,

Yokohama National University, Solving Discrete Zero

Point Problems

Financial andInternational Markets

04-032/2

Jan Frederik Slijkerman, David J.C. Smant and

Casper G. de Vries, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk

04-034/2

Jeroen Hinloopen, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and

Charles van Marrewijk, Erasmus Universiteit

Rotterdam, Dynamics of Chinese Comparative

Advantage

04-039/2

Felix Eschenbach, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

Finance and Growth: A Survey of the Theoretical and

Empirical Literature

04-049/2

Joseph F. Francois, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

and CEPR, and Dean Spinanger, Institute for World

Economics, Kiel, Regulated Efficiency, World Trade

Organization Accession, and the Motor Vehicle Sector

in China

04-050/2


and CEPR, and Ian Wooton, Strathclyde University

and CEPR, Market Structure in Services and Market

Access in Goods

04-051/2


and CEPR, and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Trade Policy and the

Household Distribution of Income

04-055/2

John B. Davis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Identity

and Commitment: Sen’s Conception of the Individual

04-057/2

Karen Watkins, Dick van Dijk and Jaap Spronk,

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Macroeconomic

Crisis and Individual Firm Performance: The Mexican

Experience

04-058/2


and CEPR, Assessing the Impact of Trade Policy on

Labor Markets and Production

04-059/2

Julia Wörz, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and

Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies,

Skill Intensity in Foreign Trade and Economic Growth

04-066/2

Jeroen Hinloopen, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and

Charles van Marrewijk, Erasmus Universiteit

Rotterdam, Locating Economic Concentration

04-084/2

Han T.J. Smit and Ward A. van den Berg, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, and Wouter De Maeseneire,

Ghent University and Erasmus Universiteit

Rotterdam, Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding

Game

04-086/2


and CEPR, and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Household Inequality,

Welfare, and the Setting of Trade Policy

04-088/2

Enrico C. Perotti, Universiteit van Amsterdam and

CEPR, and Paolo Volpin, London Business School and

CEPR, Lobbying on Entry

04-090/2

Ana Ferreira, ISA, Technical University of Lisbon,

Portugal, and Casper G. de Vries, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Optimal Confidence

Intervals for the Tail Index and High Quantiles

04-091/2

Enrico C. Perotti, Universiteit van Amsterdam and

CEPR, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Université de

Lausanne and CEPR, The Political Economy of

Dominant Investors

04-093/2

Carmen Fillat, Universidad de Zaragoza, and Joseph

F. Francois, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and

CEPR, National and International Income Dispersion

and Aggregate Expenditures

04-102/2

Jaap L. Geluk and Casper G. de Vries, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Weighted Sums of

Subexponential Random Variables and Asymptotic

Dependence between Returns on Reinsurance

Equities

24


04-103/2

Sandra Poncet, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

A Fragmented China

Labour, Region and Environment

04-036/3

Joost van Acht, Institute of Innovation Research,

Hitotsubashi University, Joop Stam and Roy Thurik,

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and Ingrid Verheul,

EIM Business and Policy Research, Business

Ownership and Unemployment in Japan

04-038/3

Jan Rouwendal and Arianne T. de Blaeij,

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Inconsistent and

Lexicographic Choices in Stated Preference Analysis

04-040/3

Miguel Portela, Minho University, Rob Alessie,

Utrecht University, and Coen Teulings, Erasmus

Universiteit Rotterdam, Measurement Error in

Education and Growth Regressions

04-045/3

Jos van Ommeren, Vrije Universiteit Rotterdam,

The Commuting Distribution

04-047/3

Cees van Beers, Delft University of Technology,

Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, André de Moor, National Institute for

Public Health and the Environment, and Frans

Oosterhuis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,

Determining the Environmental Effects of Indirect

Subsidies

04-048/3

Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, Evolutionary Analysis of the

Relationship between Economic Growth,

Environmental Quality and Resource Scarcity

04-052/3

Mauro Mastrogiacomo, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy

Analysis, On Expectations, Realizations and Partial

Retirement

04-053/3

Bernard M.S. van Praag, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

The Connexion between Old and New Approaches to

Financial Satisfaction

04-054/3

Simonetta Longhi and Peter Nijkamp,

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Jacques Poot,

University of Waikato, Spatial Heterogeneity

and the Wage Curve Revisited

04-061/3

Carla Sá, University of Minho, Raymond J.G.M.

Florax, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Purdue

University, and Piet Rietveld, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, Does Accessibility to Higher Education

Matter? Choice Behavior of High School Graduates in

the Netherlands

04-062/3

Michiel Evers, Ruud A. de Mooij, and Herman R.J.

Vollebergh, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Tax

Competition under Minimum Rates: The Case of

European Diesel Excises

04-064/3

Bas van der Klaauw, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,

Aico van Vuuren, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,

and Peter Berkhout, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Labor Market Prospects, Search Intensity and the

Transition from College to Work

04-070/3

Chiara M. Travisi, Polytechnic of Milan, and Peter

Nijkamp, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Willingness

to Pay for Agricultural Environmental Safety

04-073/3

Hans Hoogeveen, World Bank, Bas van der Klaauw,

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and CEPR, and Gijsbert

van Lomwel, Tilburg University, On the Timing of

Marriage, Cattle and Weather Shocks

04-074/3

Marco Alderighi, CERTeT - Bocconi University,

Alessandro Cento, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,

Revenue Management Dept, Milan, and Peter

Nijkamp and Piet Rietveld, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, The Entry of Low-Cost Airlines: Price

Competition in the European Airline Market

04-078/3

J. Joseph Beaulieu, Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System, Washington DC, and Eric J.

Bartelsman, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,

Integrating Expenditure and Income Data: What to

do with the Statistical Discrepancy?

04-079/3

Maria Abreu, Henri L.F. de Groot, and Raymond

J.G.M. Florax, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Spatial

Patterns of Technology Diffusion: An Empirical

Analysis using TFP

04-080/3

Joop Hartog, Hans van Ophem, and Simona Maria

Bajdechi, Universiteit van Amsterdam, How Risky is

Investment in Human Capital?

04-081/3

Thomas de Graaff and Henri L.F. de Groot, Vrije

Universiteit Amsterdam, Ethnic Concentration and

Human Capital Formation

25


04-083/3

Wouter Vermeulen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy

Analysis, and Jos van Ommeren, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, Interaction of Regional Population and

Employment

04-085/3

Jan Rouwendal, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and

John Pommer, Connekt, An Indirect Utility Model of

Multiple Car Ownership and Use

04-087/3

Gerrit Müller, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and

Erik Plug, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Estimating

the Effect of Personality on Male-Female Earnings

04-089/3

Ghebreegziabiher Debrezion, Eric Pels, and Piet

Rietveld, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Effects

of Railway Investments in a Polycentric City

04-092/3

Jos van Ommeren, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,

and Joyce Dargay, ESRC Transport Studies Unit,

University College London, The Optimal Choice of

Commuting Speed: Consequences for Commuting

Time, Distance and Costs

04-094/3

Gerard J. van den Berg, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, IFAU-Uppsala, CEPR, IZA, and INSEE-

CREST, Maarten Lindeboom, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, and Peter J. Dolton, University-upon-

Tyne and Center for Economic Policy, LSE, Survey

Non-response and Unemployment Duration

04-096/3

Morten Marott Larsen, University of Copenhagen

and Institute of Local Government Studies, Ninette

Pilegaard, Danish Transport Research Institute,

Lyngby, and Jos van Ommeren, Vrije Universiteit

Amsterdam, Congestion and Residential Moving

Behaviour

04-097/3

Jacob J. de Vries, Peter Nijkamp and Piet Rietveld,

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Exponential or Power

Distance-decay for Commuting? An Alternative

Specification

04-104/3

Justin van der Sluis and Mirjam van Praag,

SCHOLAR, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Arjen

van Witteloostuijn, University of Groningen and

University of Durham, Comparing the Returns to

Education for Entrepreneurs and Employees

04-105/3

Ruta Aidis, University College London, and Mirjam

van Praag, SCHOLAR, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Illegal Entrepreneurship Experience

04-106/3

Simon Parker, Durham University, and Mirjam van

Praag, SCHOLAR, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Schooling, Capital Constraints and Entrepreneurial

Performance

04-107/3

Marco van Herpen, Groningen University and BCG,

Kees Cools, Groningen University and BCG, and

Mirjam van Praag, SCHOLAR, Universiteit van

Amsterdam, Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect

of Promotions

04-109/3

Jos van Ommeren, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,

and Giovanni Russo, Utrecht University, Faculty of

Social Sciences, Sequential or Non-sequential

Recruitment?

04-110/3

Erik T. Verhoef, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,

Second-best Congestion Pricing Schemes in the

Monocentric City

Econometrics

04-030/4

Marc J. Goovaerts, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

Cath. University of Leuven, Center for Risk and

Insurance Studies, Rob Kaas, Roger J.A. Laeven and

Qihe Tang, Universiteit van Amsterdam,

A Co-monotonic Image of Independence for Additive

Risk Measures

04-056/4

Agnes S. Joseph and Jan F. Kiviet, Universiteit van

Amsterdam, Viewing the Relative Efficiency of IV

Estimators in Models with Lagged and Instantaneous

Feedbacks

04-067/4

Martin Martens, Dick van Dijk and Michiel de Pooter,

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Modeling and

Forecasting S&P 500 Volatility: Long Memory,

Structural Breaks and Nonlinearity

04-072/4

Yebin Cheng and Jan G. de Gooijer, Universiteit van

Amsterdam, On the u-th Geometric Conditional

Quantile

26


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Tinbergen Research InstituteFour themes distinguish Tinbergen

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Each theme covers the whole spectrumof economic analysis, from theoretical to empirical research. Stimulating discussionson theories, methodologies and empiricalresults arise from the interaction of theInstitute’s faculty– comprised ofapproximately a hundred research fellows.These fellows are faculty members withexcellent track records in economic research,active in organising research activities,teaching graduate courses and supervisingPh.D. students.

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In this issue At the helm of Tinbergen Institute


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Publications and References

Documents

TImag10-fall2004