Tibetan Buddhism Beyond the Monastery

7/23/2019 Tibetan Buddhism Beyond the Monastery

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Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery: Revelation and Identity in rNying ma Communities

of Present-day Kham

The economic and political scenarios that haveappeared in post-Mao China have allowed

Tibetan areas a more overt expression of religious belief and practice. In the past three decades

Tibetans seem to have gradually regained access to many popular practices forbidden in thepast, such as pilgrimages, offerings to monasteries, erection of private shrines at home, and local

ceremonies and festivals. However, the Chinese governments political strategies as applied to

Tibetan areas in the context of the large-scale economic development of the country have at the

same time continued to weaken crucial religious authority from monastic institutions. Particularly

targeted by political control, the historical role of monasteries as guarantors of religious authority,

scholastic legitimacy, and institutional centers of traditional instruction has drastically decreased.

Nevertheless, the Tibetans spirit of adaptation and their struggle for the preservation of their reli-

gious and cultural identity have resulted in a revitalization of alternative forms of religious control

such as visionary activities andTreasure (gter ma) revelation; unconventional religious communi-

ties (chos sgar) have emergedas alternative centers of practice and cultural production.

Le bouddhisme tibtain par del le monastre : rvlation et identit dans les communauts

rNying ma au Kham actuel

Les scnarios conomique et politique qui sont apparus dans la Chine post-maoste ont permis

aux regions tibtaines une plus grande expression de leurs croyances et des pratiques religieuses.

Durant les t rois dernires dcennies, les Tibtains semblent avoir retrouv laccs de nombreuses

pratiques populaires qui taient interdites par le pass, telles que les plerinages, les offrandes aux

monastres, la construction dautels domestiques privs, ainsi que des crmonies et des ftes lo-

cales. Toutefois, la stratgie politique du gouvernement chinois envers les regions tibtaines dans

le contexte dun dveloppement conomique du pays grande chelle a, conjointement, continu

affaiblir lautorit religieuse dterminante des institutions monastiques. Particulirement vis par

le contrle politique, le rle historique des monastres en tant que garant de lautorit religieuse, dela lgimit scolastique et de centres institutionnels denseignement traditionnel sest considrable-

ment amoindrie. Nanmoins, la facult dadaptation des Tibtains et leur combat pour prserver

leur identit religieuse et culturelle a redynamis des formes alternatives de contrle religieux tel-

les que des activits visionnaires et la rvlation de Trsors (gter ma) ; des communauts religieu-

ses non conventionnelles (chos sgar) sont apparues comme de nouveaux centres de pratique et de

production culturelle.


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TIBETANBUDDHISMBEYONDTHEMONASTERY

REVELATIONANDIDENTITYINRNYINGMACOMMUNITIESOFPRESENT-DAYKHAM

Antonio TERRONE

Religious practice, like other forms of cultural systems, is never completelyseparated from its social, political, and historical contexts.1 Once Tibet2became part of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949-1951, Tibe-

tans faced a series of economic and political scenarios that dramatically affectedtheir sociocultural life and jeopardized their unique sense of identity. Thehard-lineanti-Tibet policy promoted by Mao Zedong between 1959 and 1978 put Tibetansthrough two decades of severe hardships. In the post-Mao era,3 Deng Xiaoping

(1904-1997) launched an overall reform of the political and economic system of thecountry, but with the intention of leaving the state apparatus intact.4 These Chineseeconomic reforms, or reform and opening (Ch. gaige kaifang), becameknown associalism with Chinese characteristics, and although their scope was basically ori-

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Matthew Pistono and Sarah Jacoby for theirprecious assistance in the preparation of this article and for their insights provided duringlong conversations on Tibetan culture and religion. I would also like to thank Gray Tuttle forhis useful comments, insights, and critical incisiveness. To them goes also my sincere grati-tude for proofreading and editing early versions of this essay. 2 The term Tibet in this article refers to the ethnic, cultural, and geographical areas

today assimilated within the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and politically and adminis-tratively limited to the Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, and TAR provinces of the PRC.See Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics, Policy Studies 7(Washington: East-West Center, 2004): 1-48, here 32-33, on-line version at http://www.east-

westcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS007.pdf. 3 With the term post-Mao era I intend here the years following the death of MaoZedong in 1976. This period covers not only the end of the Cultural Revolution and of aharsh and hard-line religious and cultural policy towards ethnic groups in the PRC, but alsothe beginning of a period of economic reforms and of a leniency by Beijing leaders towardsethnic minorities under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping. A strategy of dialogue was estab-lished with the community in Tibet and in exile, and a certain degree of relaxation concededto revive the peoples sense of cultural and religious identity. 4 Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) exposed his vision of economic reforms to the Third

Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) inDecember 1978.

Images of Tibet in the 19 th and 20 th CenturiesParis, EFEO, coll. tudes thmatiques (22.2), 2008, p. 747-779


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748 Antonio Terrone

ented towards the creation of a market economy and a stronger domestic economy,theyalso addressed issues of social control such as control of unemployment, infla-tion, and the improvement of Chinese citizens living conditions.

Ironically, in the effortto facilitate the economic development and support thecountrys transition to the market economy, a key side effectwas that the centralgovernment had to soften its stance on the ideological control of its people andadopt a more tolerant attitude towards peoples social lives. In Tibetan areas thisstrategy translated into a more indulgent position towards cultural and religiousactivities. Thuswhile the government has insisted on an overall modernization ofthe education system in Tibet, penalizing the traditionally central role of monasticreligious instruction, it has concurrently allowed popular forms of religious practice

and activities to reemerge. On the one hand, Tibetans have gradually gained accessto many of their centuries-old popular practices that were strictly forbidden in thepast: ritual pilgrimages to sacred sites, the setting upof home shrines and altars,and raising of prayer flags on their houses, and so on. On the other hand, the manypolitical gestures and socioeconomic policies instituted by Chinese Communistleaders over the past four decades have caused major crises within the Tibetancommunity in the PRC. First targeted by a hard-line and intolerant approach andthen by a more moderate line, the socioreligious situation in Tibet has undergonedramatic dynamics, altering muchof the character of the central role of religion in

Tibetan social and political life before 1959.In the contemporary Hu Jintao era,5 ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu) in China

are among the top issues in the political agenda of the government.6 The allevia-tion of ethnic poverty, the improvement of the quality of life, and the progress ofeconomic development are clear objectives of Chinas political leaders. However, thegovernments stance is still very cautious concerning religious freedom. The govern-ment considers religion one of the propelling energies behind social movements andtherefore a root cause of social unrest.

The hard-line struggle against separatist activities (Ch.fenlie huodong) continuesa nightmare for the Communist authorities concerned about the ongoing pres-

5 Hu Jintao (born 1942) was elected president of the Peoples Republic of China on March15, 2003, at the First Session of the Tenth National Peoples Congress, the top legislature ofthe country. In 1985, 44-year-old Hu Jintao was appointed, successively, secretary of the CPCGuizhou Provincial Committee and of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Regional Committeein 1988. He was in Lhasa during the 1989 Tibetan pro-independence uprising to which hereacted with a strong political crackdown resulting in the death of several Tibetan activists. 6 Beside the Han Chinese, which constitute the ethnic majority, the largest and dominantethnic group in the country, China recognizes fifty-five nationalities (minzu) or ethnic minorities(shaoshu minzu) accounting for roughly 8 per cent of the whole population (see http://www.china.org.cn/features/ethnicgroups/node_1126822.htm). There are at least fifteen more ethnic groups in thePRC that are being scrutinized and considered for nationality recognition including the Sherpas andChinese Jews. See Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004): 9. For minorities issues see also Morris Rossabi(ed.), Governing Chinas Multiethnic Frontiers (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press,

2004): 7. The Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the Tibetans are among the most active ethnic groups in thePRC, claiming independence for their countries.


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Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 749

ence of resistance forces among ethnic minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang.7In the Tibetan regions, besides historical claims in support of Tibetan territorialindependence, the situation has been exacerbated by various factors associated withthe development of the western regions, such as market reforms, Chinese settlers,the tourism industry, and the influx of economic migrants.

The history of Tibet in the twentieth century is a complex one. The so-calledPeaceful Liberation of Tibet (1949), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), and theCultural Revolution (1966-1976) spread confusion and destruction not only inChina proper, but also across Tibet, the land of snows. The convulsions of MaoZedongs radical utopias and his Great Leap Forward in the late fifties (which stillneed to be satisfactorily analyzed) caused many thousands of deaths from faminein Tibet.8 The liberalization period resulting from the economic reforms advancedby Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s eventually provided a basis, although still anunstable one, for a renaissance of Tibetan culture and what Chinese propagandacalls the Great Development of the West (xifang da kaifa).9 Currently the centralgovernment seeks the development of Tibet, the well-being of its population, andthe winning of their loyalties by means of massive investments, political reforms,and economic development.

One of the most effective strategies applied by Beijing in its campaign of econo-mic reforms in Tibet was the remodeling of Tibetan life along more modernlines that emphasize a secular rather than religious idea of a nation. Education (and

therefore language and culture) has been aprimary target of Chinese reforms in allTibetan ethnic and cultural areas.10 For example, in addition to a curtailing of theextent to which Buddhist monasteries traditionally dominated access to Tibetaneducation, Beijing has introduced a modern education system, shifting schooling toa secular modern setting.

Buddhism remains, however, the fulcrum of the Tibetan sense of identity andtherefore it is perceived as a potential threat to the authority of the state and to theunity of the PRC. As a consequence monasteries, which in Tibet were the traditionalcenters of religious authority and literary production, have been particularly targeted

7 Since the last dynastic era (Qing dynasty 1644-1912), and the nationalist (guomin) peri-od, Chinese leaders and policy makers have prioritized the attempt to provide a high degreeof national unity (tongjie) for China. As Gray Tuttle suggests in his Tibetan Buddhists in the

Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), control over religionin the early nationalistic period, and in the specific Tibetan case control over Buddhism, wasseen by many Chinese policy makers as a means to acquire a significant opportunity to gainethnic minorities loyalties and provide national unity for the country. 8 For an overview of Mao Zedongs policies in the late fifties see Jasper Becker, HungryGhosts: Maos Secret Famine (New York: The Free Press, 1997). 9 The Great Development of the West was initiated in 1999 by Jiang Zemin (b. 1926),then President of the PRC. This period represented an acceleration of the policies concern-ing ethnic minorities formulated over the fifty years of Communist Party rule. See ChinasGreat Leap West(London: Tibet Information Network, 2000).

10

Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950 (London: Tibet Infor-mation Network, 1998): 10.


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750 Antonio Terrone

by Communist propaganda because of the central role they played in pre-1959 eco-nomic and sociopolitical life in Tibet, as well as the large number of monastics thatthey housed. Accused by Marxist-Leninist theorists of being exploitative of the com-mon people and a hindrance to local economic progress and cultural development,monasteries came under constant and increased inspection by governmental authori-ties and were eventually deprived of their central sociopolitical role.

However, the Tibetans sense of adaptation and cultural identity, inextricably con-nected with religion, predominantly Buddhist, has resulted in the growth of renewedforms of control and maintenance of their religious legacy. As Beijing allowed moreovert types of expressions of religious faith and practice in their attempt to win loyal-ties and pursue economic reforms and development, other forms of religious legiti-macy emerged. In some areas of eastern Tibet, namely Kham and especially mGolog (today classified and Sichuan and Qinghai Provinces of the PRC) some forms ofreligious practice such as visionary activities, Treasure revelation (gter ma), charis-matic leadership, and the formation of less conventional and quasi-monastic religiouscommunities as centers of practice and cultural production have come to characterizecurrent religious trends in contemporary Tibetan communities.

Most present-day religious encampments and mountain retreat hermitages areassociated with the rNying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism. Among the mainschools of Buddhism in Tibet, the rNying ma order is well-known in Tibetan reli-gious and Buddhist history for its extensive use of unconventional Tantric material

(from the point of view of orthodox Tibetan scholasticism) and the adherence toinnovative, although often controversial, strategies of establishing textual authorityand legitimacy. While most of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, such as the dGe lugspa, or the Virtuous Ones, were characterized by strict scholarly rigor, special empha-sis on the monastic discipline (Tib. dul ba, Skt. vinaya), as well as adherence to Indiansources of textual authority, the rNying ma theorists and scholars have been moreexperience-based, contemplation-oriented, and concerned with creative and oftenalternative forms of establishing textual authorship and authenticity, such as the writ-ten material revealed as Treasures.11

In the economics of Tibetan Buddhism the Treasure (gter ma) revelation sys-tem of production and transmission of textual material as advanced by the rNying

ma pa, or the Ancients, seems to have been particularly suitable for reestablish-ing a religious discourse of the continuity of the appropriation and disseminationof religious material.12 Due to its core feature as an intersection of several systems,

11 The question of authenticity and validity ofgter ma, Treasure, revealed texts is a com-plex one. David Germano has written an insightful introduction to the rNying ma collectionof Tantras. See Germano, History and Nature ofThe Collected Tantras of the Ancients (http://

www.thdl.org/ collections/literature/ngb/ngb-history.html ), March 25, 2002. 12 rNying ma, the Ancients, is the customary name of the most ancient school of

Tibetan Buddhism. Its adherents claim their lineage stems from the first religious communi-ties active in Tibet during the eight and ninth centuries. They associate their tradition with

Padmasambhava, an Indian Buddhist master who allegedly traveled to Tibet under the reignof King Khri srong lde btsan and helped him in the diffusion of the Buddhist doctrine in the


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such as ritual authority, the codification of new identities, and the promotion of reli-gious narratives, the revelation system appears as a flexible and innovative deviceto articulate a Buddhist discourse in a new socio-political environment as well asasource of spiritual power for its adherents. Treasure revealers (gter ston) and Tantric

visionaries have becomemore and more visible in the religious and social landscapeof twentiethcentury Tibet. This is particularly true in the eastern Tibetan area ofKham (today politically classified as part of the Qinghai and Sichuan provinces of thePRC) where this breed of religious figures hasbeen intrinsically associated with therise of large religious, namely Buddhist, encampments (chos sgar) and numerous small

Tantric mountain hermitages (ri khrod). Run mainly by monastic and non-celibateTreasure revealers and characterized by a strong charismatic leadership, these reli-

gious communities have become increasingly popular in the negotiation of localcontrol over religious identity and especially in the diffusion of traditional patterns ofreligious education and instruction.

Within the context introduced above, this study attempts to investigate anddefine the modalities by which the activities of some prominent Tibetan religiouspersonalities, monastics and lay alike, have contributed to the maintenance and dif-fusion of Buddhist practice in present-day Tibet.13 More specifically, this essay isconcerned with the activities of a number of Buddhist masters who are leaders of reli-gious monastic centers that operate in the Khamarea.14 Furthermore, it considers the

country. The rNying ma school differentiates between the bka ma, or long transmission of

precepts, and thegter ma, or short transmission of Treasures. The first refers to the lin-eage of a long, uninterrupted transmission of precepts and teachings from master to disciplethrough the centuries. The latter instead claims to be the shortest form of teaching trans-mission since the actual reception of the doctrine, in the form of revealed Treasure, stemsdirectly from the words of Padmasambhava without passing through any succession of teach-er-disciple continuity. Padmasambhava is also the initiator of the Treasure system of teach-ings transmission, which he elaborated in order to protect Buddhist texts from imminent per-secution and to benefit the Tibetans of the future. For my discussion of the Treasure revela-tions see below in this article. For an overview of thegter ma tradition see among others A. I.

Vostrikov, Books from Buried Treasures, in Tibetan Historical Literature (Culcutta, India:Indian Studies, 1970): 27-57; Eva K. Dargyay, The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet (Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass, 1977); Ramon N. Prats, Contributo allo studio biografico dei primi Gter-ston(Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1982); Tulku Thondup,Hidden Teachings of Tibet: An

Explanation of the Terma Tradition of the Nyingma School of Buddhism (London: Wisdom, 1986);Janet Gyatso,Apparitions of the Self: The Secret Autobiographies of a Tibetan Visionary (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1998); Andreas Doctor, Tibetan Treasure Literature: Revelation,

Realization, and Accomplishment in Visionary Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications,2005). For a general overview of the place ofgter ma in the context of rNying ma literarycanon see Germanos History and Nature ofThe Collected Tantras of the Ancients. 13 Much of the information contained and analyzed in this article has been personallycollected during the past eight years (1997-2005) in various fieldwork trips to Kham (Sichuanand southern Qinghai provinces) and Amdo (Qinghai and Gansu). Some of the fieldworksojourn has been kindly supported and sponsored by the Research School CNWS (Centre for

African, Asian, and Amerindian Studies) of Leiden University in the Netherlands. 14 I have dealt with this topic differently elsewhere. See for instance Antonio Terrone,

Visions, Arcane Claims, and Treasures: Charisma and Authority in a Present-day TreasureFinder, in Tibet, Self, and the Tibetan Diaspora: Voices of Difference , ed. Christiaan Klieger


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revival of the Tibetan Treasure tradition as a successful means of asserting Buddhistauthority and religious transmission in eastern Tibetan regions of the PRC as well asits role in the formation of some of the most active and vibrant rNying ma communi-ties in twentieth-century Kham.

The importance of understanding the many facets of Buddhist practice in Tibetlies in its contextualization within the state of religion and religious practice in con-temporary China. In a country where traditional patterns of culture are continuallyunder threat of suppression, and where the government keeps expressions of reli-gious faith under continual surveillance, the fact that more and more Tibetans areunremittingly gathering around charismatic religious figures is a clear sign of theirneed to give voice to their own culture and value to their religious legacy.

Religion in Present-day Tibet

Recent scholarship has emphasized the pressure and the consequences of theChinese government policies on religious practice in contemporary Tibetan regionsof the PRC. On the one hand, some western Tibetologists tend to portray a sortof revivalist atmosphere in religious practice favored by a relaxation in the PRCsreligious policy.15 On the other hand, international human rights organizations and

Tibet-monitoring agencies have provided information about the effects of Chineseeconomic development and modernization among Tibetans in their land that dis-

courages a positive view of Chinas attempts to modernize Tibet.16 Nevertheless,despite a few attempts to describe the contemporary role of Buddhist traditions in

Tibet, the actual phenomenon of the emergence of non-monastic systems of reli-gious leadership and the active function of Treasure revealers in religious communi-ties in the PRC have not received adequate scholarly attention.17

(Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the IATS, Leiden: Brill, 2002): 213-228. Additionally,for a study of the role of mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs in contemporary Tibet, seealso Germano, Re-membering the Dismembered Body of Tibet: Contemporary Tibetan

Visionary Movements in the Peoples Republic of China, in Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet:Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, eds. Melvin C. Goldstein and Matthew T. Kapstein

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998): 53-94. 15 A number of studies have been published recently concerning the state of reli-gion, and especially Buddhism, in contemporary Tibet. Goldstein and Kapstein bring up arange of issues concerning Buddhist and local practices in their Buddhism in ContemporaryTibet. See also Kapstein, A Thorn in the Dragons Side: Tibetan Buddhist Culture inChina, in Governing Chinas Multiethnic Frontiers, 230-269; Ronald D. Schwartz, Renewaland Resistance: Tibetan Buddhism in the Twentieth Century, in Buddhism and Politics inTwentieth-Century Asia, ed. Ian Harris (London and New York: Continuum, 1999): 229-253. 16 Some reports and publications have appeared on this topic in the recent years. Seefor instance Tibet Information Network, Relative Freedoms?: Tibetan Buddhism and Religious

Policy in Kardze, Sichuan, 1987-1999 (London, 1999); Human Rights Watch, Trials of a TibetanMonk: The Case of Tenzin Delek, 2004; International Campaign for Tibet, When the Sky Fellto the Earth: The New Crackdown on Buddhism in Tibet(Washington, 2004), andIncomparable

Warriors: Non-violent Resistance in Contemporary Tibet(Washington, 2005). 17 I use here the term non-monastic to refer to Tibetan religious settlements such as


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Within the general resurgence of religiousactivities, some Tibetan religious leaders are

working actively for the diffusion of Buddhismand the maintenance of traditional practice.In particular, since the early 1980s, there hasbeen an ongoing visibility of Buddhist teach-ers, especially rNying ma Treasurerevealerssuch as Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan(also known as mKhan po A chos) [Fig. 1],Od gsal bde chen rdo rje, Nam sprul Jigsmed phun tshogs, sKu gsum gling pa, andRig dzin nyi ma, to name only a few. Such

Treasure revealers are gaining popularity andrespect, galvanizing large gatherings aroundthemselves, asmonastics and lay devotees aremoved by a desire for religious instructionand spiritual guidance. Additionally, manyamong them have a more and more visiblesocial role within their own land and in main-land China as well, sponsoring the construc-tion of local religious buildings, accepting of

Chinese lay devotees and students, and performing public rituals. My sense is thatthese revived forms of spiritual authority and charismatic leadership are employed, invarying degrees, to address specific claims of authority and legitimacy over the man-agement of Buddhist practice in Tibet today. Many of these leadersare deliberatelyfostering arenewed faith in the Buddhist doctrine among their followers, restoring astructure for religious instruction, and creating centers of religious practice and edu-cation that adapt to the current forms of control as applied by the Chinese govern-ment. Furthermore, in a Tibetan society where the institutional role of many monas-teries has been extensivelydamaged and their educational structure weakened, char-ismatic leaders such as Treasure revealers have found alternative ways to channel reli-gious transmissions of practices and teachings.

As a result of Deng Xiaopings reforms, sociocultural changes have occurredthroughout the PRC. The Chinese governments acknowledgment of the excessesunder the rule of Mao Zedong has allowed the political elite to consider a moretolerant attitude towards religious life and local culture among both Han Chineseand ethnic minority groups.18 However, while the Chinese authorities have allowed

mountain hermitages (ri khrod) and the religious encampments (chos sgar) in most cases leadby non-celibate Buddhist teachers. In these religious encampments the resident populationincludes non only monks and nuns, but also lay people alike. 18 Hu Yaobang was a major architect of the reforms elaborated by Deng Xiaoping. AsParty secretary, Hu Yaobang was the first to admit that the CCP had made serious mistakes

in Tibet and proposed strategies to enhance the economic development to ensure a rise inthe standard of living among individual Tibetans, and foster a revitalization of Tibetan cul-


Fig. 1: The Buddhist teacher and Trea-sure revealer Grub dbang lungrtogs rgyal mtshan at his residencein Ya chen sgar, dKar mdzes (Ch.Ganzi), Sichuan, November 2004.(Photo by A. Terrone)


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some degree of freedom of religious practice in Tibetespecially popular forms ofBuddhist practices, such as ritual circumambulation of religious buildings and holysites, pilgrimage to sacred places, visits to monasteries and masters, and setting up ofhouse altarsa certain intolerance has been declared on separatist activities linkedto any religious activities that might potentially promote religion actively and soencourage a renewed sense of Tibetan identity.19

The monastery is traditionally the institutional heart of the Tibetan Buddhistworld. The harsh policies applied over the years by the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) resulted in the monastery losing its traditional power base. Despite the icono-clastic destruction of monasteries, nunneries, and other religious centers that tookplace in all Tibetan areas especially during the years of the Cultural Revolution(1966-1976), in the past decades the revival has restored most of what was oncedestroyed.20 The population of monastic residents, both monks and nuns, how-ever, has dramatically decreased due to restrictive government policies concerningthe number of resident monastics and the age of enrolment. Additionally, over thedecades since 1959, most of the major religious figures of the land have fled intoexile, following the Fourteenth Dalai Lama bsTan dzin rgya mtsho. Each year morethan two thousand refugee seekers, including monks and nuns, leave Tibet search-ing a new life in exile.21 Furthermore, the actual state of religious practices is con-tinually undermined by political propaganda and patriotic education campaigns in

Tibet, which aim specifically at weakening the authority and the prestige of religious

monastic institutions and their leaders.

ture and religion. For remarks on current Sino-Tibetan policies in the PRC, see Goldstein,Tibet and China in the Twentieth Century, in Governing Chinas, 186-229. See also TseringShakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows (London: Pimlico, 1999), and Tashi Rabgey and

Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects(Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004).

19 For details concerning Chinese governments attitude on separatist (Ch. fenlie) andanti-splittist activities in Tibet see for instance the introduction of Goldstein, in Buddhism inContemporary Tibet, 1-17. 20 Virtually all monasteries and temples in Tibet were in one way or another affect-

ed by the results of iconoclastic rage, especially powerful during the years of the CulturalRevolution. According to a recent count by Matthew Kapstein a hundred and twenty thou-sand monks are today residing in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and some three thousandmonasteries are today active in Tibetan ethnic regions of the PRC. Kapstein, A Thorn in theDragons Side, 263-264, note 3 21 See Refugee Report: Dangerous Crossing2004 Update (Washington DC: InternationalCampaign for Tibet): 2. Nearly 80 percent of the Tibetan community in exile is made upof monks and nuns. The most spectacular and recent flights were the 1998 escape of A kyaRinpoche, head abbot of the sKu bum monastery (Ch. Taersi), which together with Bla brangbkra shis khil, is among the most significant dGe lugs pa monasteries in Amdo, today belong-ing to the Xining area of Qinghai province; and that of the then sixteen-year-old seventeenthKarmapa O rgyan Phrin las rdo rje, from his seat in mTshur pu monastery in central Tibetin 1999. The former now lives in exile in the USA, while the latter has lived in exile in India

since his arrival in January 2000. The formal seat of the Karmapa in India is the DharmaChakra Center in Rumtek, Sikkim.


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Buddhism in Todays Kham

Although systematic control over religious practices by the Chinese authori-ties in Tibet is applied in all Tibetan ethnic areas, the strategies and the modalitiesthey usediffer from region to region and reflect varying local attitudes. While inthe Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) religious practice is constantly marked by fre-quent tensions with the Chinese political leadership, outside the TAR, especially inthe northern and eastern regions of Kham and Amdo, religious practice enjoys vary-ing levels of openness. This disparity is mainly explainable by the fact that although

Tibetans living in the lands now included within the PRC haveshared a common

identity of language, culture, and religion, the same cannot be said for their politi-cal loyalties. A centralized Tibetan government existed and was based in Lhasa.Although predominantly active in Central Tibet, Lhasa government, hierarchicallydominated by local aristocracy and dGe lugs pa monastic estates, extended its pow-ers to Chab mdo in Kham as well since the seventeenth century. The areas of Kham,as well as Amdo, were split offand organized in a series of small kingdoms, local feu-dal estates, and district communities governed by chieftains and local leaders (dpon

po). Geopolitically speaking, the boundaries of Kham were largely based on a com-bination of tribal territorial control and human elements rather than political fac-tors. Borders between communities were very clear at the local level at least in tribalareas where crossing into other tribes territories was very dangerous. Additionally,

distinction and identity were largely based on local dialects and customs, as wellas on clothing and ornamentation.22 However, from the Chinese perspective bor-ders between Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu were decided in 1723-1725 during theQing Dynasty when they were enforced in various ways, often with the work of theambans.23 Several reasons significantly hindered the formation of pre-1950Tibetinto a modernnation state. First of all, the aristocratic families, which had a signifi-cant influence on governmental policy, were largely, if not exclusively, from central

Tibet (dBus gTsang). Secondly, the nebulosity of Tibetan boundaries resulted intheformation and existence of local independent communities rather than clear territo-rial entities.24 Finally, the religious diversity in Kham, in contrast to the dominanceofdGe lugs pa religious and political monastic centers in central Tibet, increased

the difficulty of negotiating concepts of centralized power and unified govern-ment in Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo. While the Dalai Lama and the Tibetangovernment (dga ldan pho brang) that was founded by the Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngagdbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617-1682), in the seventeenth century were a centraland indisputable religious as well as a political focus of legitimate central authority,

22 Carole McGranahan,Arrested Histories: Between Empire and Exile in 20th Century Tibet(PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2001): 22. 23 I have particularly benefited from Gray Tuttles comments in discussing this point. 24 This can be also seen in the fact that the Tibetans themselves never really succeededin defining their borders and territory. As far as I am aware of, the creation of maps or picto-

rial representations of state borders and/or administrative boundaries was hardly a concern ofTibetan policy makers in pre-1959 Tibet.


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The untamable and lively spirit of independence ofthe people of Kham reflectsthisopen behavior, one of the major characteristics of nineteenth- and twentieth-centuryeastern Tibetan society.

The historical events and sociocultural developments that have contributed toshaping the situation of Buddhism and religious practice in Tibet also determineda series of specific relationships in the economy of religious power and spiritualauthority, especiallywhen itcomes to standards of monastic discipline, ethical norms,and moral behavior within the religious community. Communities born aroundcharismatic figures and spiritual leaders have also triggered a series of tensions in thesphere of authority. Ethical, as well as moral, claims such as the importance of thecode of discipline and the maintenance of monastic vows in amonastic environment,

the adherence to non-monastic vows in lay communities, and the often criticizedcontroversial attitude of many non-celibate masters, have fuelled recent under-ground debates in Tibet.27 Lay Tantric personalities and practitioners are oftencriticized for their immoral behavior, fundamentally linked to the sexual practicesconnected with yogic exercises and contemplation practices. For example, the late

27 Since the Chinese authorities monitor publishing houses strictly, some Tibetan religiousleaders have opted to diffuse their ideas and propagate their advice to the faithful through thepublication abroad of pamphlets and books containing their teachings, advice, and sermons.In recent years a few followers coming from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have openedbranches of Tibetan monasteries and encampments in their own countries, often publishing

their teachers teachings. On this see, for instance, the contributions by Henry Shiu and YaoLixiang in this volume.

Fig. 2: Monks outside the main assembly hall of Bla rung sgar in gSer rta (Sichuan),November 2005. (Photo by A. Terrone)


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mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs (1933-2004), who was an ordained monk, an incar-nation(sprul sku) of the famous Treasure revealer Las rab gling pa (1856-1926), thehead of Bla rung sgar in gSer rta and himself a Treasure revealer (gter ston) was alsoknown for his position concerning the maintenance of monastic and non-monastic

vows and criticized immoral behavior among lay Tantric practitioners and teachers.In a collection of advice (zhal gdams) delivered in public that was edited and publishedby his disciples, and circulated in Tibet, mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs specificallyelaborates on morality and ethical behavior, not only amongmonastics (dge slong),but also non-celibate religious figures such as lay householder Tantric practitioners(sngags pa khyim thabs pa), Treasure revealers, and yogin (rnal byor pa). In particularmKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs directs his criticism at non-celibate Tantric special-ists, including the Treasure revealers, for their often ambiguous attitude in terms ofmoral conduct, especially concerning the number of female partners, or consorts,they associate with for their ritual practices.28 As mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogsscomments reveal, the negotiations between celibate monastic life and non-celibate

Tantric lifestyles are still the subject ofongoing internal debates in contemporarysettings in eastern Tibet.29

The reemergence of non-monastic Buddhist centers of traditional education andpractice has raised issues of ethical and moral behavior in some religious circles,especially in connection with monastic discipline and lay Tantric vows, issues thatapparently animate the interaction among religious personalities in the current

sociopolitical environment. Nevertheless, Tibetans are in a situation where voice isonce again being given to their need for religious expression and the maintenanceof traditional patterns of Buddhist life despite the constant threats of suppressionand closure of religious institutions hanging over them. Above all, Tibetans seemto have been given permission to enjoy some degree of freedom in organizing theirreligious practice within the popular sphere.

The cautious concessions granted by the central Chinesegovernment on issuesconcerning social mores and religious practice, especially in the border regions ofKham and Amdo, is a useful tool in the hands of top Chinese government lead-ers, given the ambitious economic goals of the PRC in the world scene today. TheChinese governments perceived leniency from the 1980s onward indeed did allow

28 Chos rje dam pa jigs med phun tshogs byung gnas dpal bzang po mchog gi mjug mthai zhalgdams rang tshugs ma shor/ gzhan sems ma dkrugs zhes pai grel ba lugs gnyis blang dor gsal baisgron me (gSer rta: Bla rung lnga rig slob gling, 2005). I have read and translated the sec-tion of the publication specifically concerned with mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogss ideasconcerning morality and discipline among non-monastic personalities such as Tantric pro-fessionals, yogin, Treasure revealers, and I have recently presented it at the 11th Seminar ofthe International Association of Tibetan Studies (IATS) held in Knigswinter near Bonn(Germany), within a study of modalities to examine Treasure revealers. See also Germanosreport (Re-membering, 71-72) on mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogss attitude towards lay

Tantric practitioners active in todays Tibet.29 For instance see the discussion in Kapstein, The Purificatory Gem and Its Cleansing:

A Late Tibetan Polemical Discussion of Apocryphal Texts,History of Religions28.3 (1989):217-244.


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for a moderate religious recovery which was restricted to some primary expressionsof religious life. However, other major issues that needed attention, especially inthe field of the dissemination of traditional education and religious instruction inmonasteries, received a hostile response. In addition,in terms of social control, suchan attitude helps to camouflage the subtle maneuverings applied by governmentofficials to control potential activities considered subversive and against centralgovernment policies. At the same time, together with the concessions on popularreligious practices, the government turned a blind eye to the restoration of religioussites and buildings, monasteries, temples, and other major architectural structuresthat were often conducted by private donations and support, from both domesticand foreign sources. Such a strategy has enabled Beijing to gain a double score. Thefact thatpopular practices can be reinstated has given local Tibetans the feelingthat they have regained someaccess to their rights to maintain their cultural iden-tity, and it has also increased the tourist industry and favored the local economy.

Meanwhile, another issue has arisen within the religious scenario of modern Tibet.Tibetan religious leaders need to cope with the fact that a reconfiguration of thenecessary spiritual authority is needed to support religious practice and to rebuildthe religious infrastructure within the limits imposed by central governmental poli-cies. The complete reconstruction and reorganization of Tibetan Buddhism in allits previousi.e., pre-1959aspects are highly problematic in present-day Tibet.

The formation of any spiritually or religiously oriented organization and leadership

in the PRC is immediately regarded with suspicion by the political authorities andusually put under tight control, especially if ties or contacts with the FourteenthDalai Lama and his community in exile are suspected. Therefore, whereas Tibet hasexperienced a resurgence of non-monastic religious communities, it is also true thatlocal authorities maintain strict control over these Buddhist centers and the activi-ties performed by their religious leaders.

Recently, especially since 2004, the Chinese government has put renewedemphasis in the organization and administration of religious affairs in the country.

This is particularly evident in the new regulations on religious affairs thatappearedin the PRC in 2005.30 One of the major points emphasized in the document is theobligation for monasteries and any other congregation officially present on Chinese

soilincluding temples, churches, and mosquesto register their presence andactivity with the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB).31 Registration implies compliance

30 In July 2004 the Standing Committee of the State Council passed a directive concern-ing the management of the religious affairs and in March 2005 published it as Regulations onReligious Affairs (Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli). Since then monasteries and nunneries have been putunder pressure for registration with the government. This was later published in April 2005in the form of a book with the same title and distributed to major monasteries and religiousinstitutions around the country. In Tibet this publication has appeared in both Chinese and

Tibetan. For an English translation see Newly Promulgated Religious Affairs Provisions,Chinese Law and Religious Monitor Journal2 (2005): 53-66.

31

The Religious Affairs Bureau (Tib. chos don cus, Ch.zongjiao shiwu bumen) is an officeunder the direct administration of the State Council (Ch. guowuyuan) the central author-


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with the regulations that the government has established and involves accepting aseries of requirements in order for a religious center to operate according to the lawsof the PRC. Therefore monasteries and nunneries, often under heavy pressure fromlocal authorities, are compelled to register their activities withthe local RAB, whichin turn draws to them more monitoring, controls, and influence from the authori-ties. This takes form not only as political indoctrination and patriotic campaigns butalso as strict control on monastic resident population, age of monks or nuns, teach-ing material, and often the type of religious instruction offered at monasteries. Itmust be said, though, that despite the strictness of these regulations, most of theseare enforced especially at large institutions, while smaller ones manage to accept

younger monks and often enjoy a numerous monastic population.In this atmosphere in which religious institutions are attempting to adapt to

the new political context and to maintain a certain degree of autonomy in the dif-fusion and practice of Buddhism, some of the most vibrant religious organizationsare those that have been revived in eastern Tibet in the past two decades. Non-monastic, loosely-formed religious mountain hermitages (ri khrod) and religiousencampments (chos sgar) presently operating in the eastern regions of Tibet wereeither established or gained renewed popularity after the moderate cultural liber-alization of the early 1980s. These reforms and changes of attitude must be viewed

within the wider context of theCCPs plans for massive economic and social devel-opment through an overall transformation of Chinainto a modernized and globally

competitive entity.32

Despite the fact that control is still strictand a hard-line attitude is still appliedinKham and Amdowhich are today classified as Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansuprovinces of the PRCsome relaxation in terms of religious policy has been allowed.

This is due to two fundamental points. First, these regionshad already been colo-nized by the Chinese before 1950.They were geographically closer to China, whichmade it easier for Chinese workers to enter Tibetan ethnic regions and establishthemselves and open their enterprises and for Tibetans to go and work for the PRC.33

The economic reform, however, is largely seen to be encouraging migrants from cen-

ity of the PRC. The major task of the RAB is to provide guidance and supervision in the

administration of regulations concerning religious practice and venues of religious activi-ties (Ch.zongjiao huodong changsuo) in China. In Tibet the office was established in 1965 andthe first religious figure appointed as head of the RAB was sKyabs rje Khri byang rin po che(1900-1981). Goldstein, Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet, 7-8. 32 This general political movement in the PRC is usually referred to as gaige kaifang,or reform and opening, which covered many fields of the Chinese system under Deng

Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. This liberalization, which was at the same time a moderniza-tion movement, was mainly to apply to the economic and social spheres. By the late 1980s,it not only brought China into the modern world, but loosened also the Partys grip on per-sonal, social, and cultural life. Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan (eds.), Protestantismin Contemporary China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 21-65. Seealso Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1997): 61-66.

33 See Charlene E. Makley, The Violence of Liberation: Gender and Tibetan Buddhist Revivalin Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007): 29-30.


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tral China. Second, central Chinese government leaders look forward to softeningthe hard-line stance on central Tibetans by showing them how generating loyalty tothe central government can promote improvement in living conditions and the re-establishmentof local cultural traditions.

The powerful sociopolitical forces unleashed by economic reforms havehadsome positive consequences, especially on the standard of living for the general pop-ulation. However, ongoing pressure hasalso beenmaintained, in particular withinthe religious and cultural spheres. This is due, above all, to the fact that the eco-nomic development so much promulgated and glorified by Chinese leaders did notprove to be as successful in promoting loyalty to China and removing attachment tocultural and religious traditions as they expected.

As has already been stated, the increased popularity of religious encampments (chossgar) and the ongoing attraction they have for many Tibetan Buddhist practitionersare in parta response to pressure applied by the political and cultural environmentand the weakening role of the monasteries as the leading centers of religious instruc-tion and education. However, they have also become popular destinations amongpractitioners, monastic and lay alike, because of the high quality of the education andinstruction they offer, something difficult to acquire in monasteries in the past twodecades. The revitalization of religious communities likethe religious encampmentsand of activities such as Treasure revelation represent a growing need on the part ofBuddhist practitionersto find sources of authority, legitimacy, and prestige in places

otherthan the formal religious institutions recognized by the government.The suppression of traditional education and instruction inmonastic institu-tions, following years of repressive religious policies by the CCP under Marxist-Leninist ideology, often forces religious practitioners, above all monks and nuns,to look elsewhere for reliable and experienced teachers. These circumstances areshaped by three interdependent factors. First, the expulsion of monks and nuns inthe years of the Cultural Revolution, 1960-1977, resulted in a 90 percent decrease inthe number of monastic residents. Second, the political campaigns beginning intheearly 1990s that were aimed at the reeducation of Tibetans in general and of monksand nuns specifically, targeted monastic institutions, and have inevitably dilutedthe quality of religious culture and damaged the basis of Buddhist knowledge in

which scholasticism and contemplation experience are traditionally considered asfundamental aspects of monastic religious curricula. Third, since the assimilation ofTibet into the PRC, a significant portion of the religious population has left Tibet,leading to a lackof experienced and traditionally trained Tibetan religious teachersand scholars. They left behind a land now experiencing a dramatic shortage of pri-mary human sources of traditional knowledge and education.

Religious Identity and the Growing Visibility of Buddhist Encampments

After the emigrations,many monasteries and nunneries were left without theirabbots, leaders, and teachers. Traditional instruction and practice were forbiddenand monasteries doomed to abandonment and decay. In the highlands of Kham and


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Amdo, however, religious encampments aredeveloping as large communities exceed-ing formal monastic centers in both size and resident population. As seen above, thePRC now shows some tolerance towards the rehabilitation of religious practices,above all popular forms of religious activities that carryno threats to the stability andunity of the country, but in Tibet, the priority of the Chinese authoritieshas been tocontrol places of religious activities by every means. The number of novices per year,their education and instruction, the age and the procedures of enrolmentevery-thing has to comply with a rigid and strict set of rules established and dictated by thecentral Chinese government and rigorously controlled by local authorities.34

Coercive measures and religious suppression have been maintained over tradi-tionalmonastic institutions and nunneriesin central Tibet (TAR) and in Kham and

Amdo alike. Secular disciplines of patriotic education and political instruction havebeen forcefully inserted into monastic curricula traditionally considered the only

way to pursue spiritual achievement and religious (both Buddhist and Bon) accul-turation. It is within the framework of thiscoercive cultural stagnation that the reli-gious encampments have gained more popularity as a form of religious gathering.

The development of such monastic or quasi-monastic communities of monasticsand lay people outside the authority of monasteries and nunneries for the traditional

34 Goldstein describes very well the revival of monastic life in central Tibet in his arti-cle with a case study on the revival of religious activities in Bras spungs monastery in Lhasa.See Goldstein, The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung Monastery, in Buddhism in

Contemporary Tibet, 15-52. See Makley, The Violence of Liberation, for a study of Labrang mon-astery in post-Mao eras Amdo.

Fig. 3: A view of the Buddhist center Thub bstan chos khor gling also knownas Lung sngon sgar in dGa bde (Ch. Gande) in mGo log (Qinghai), June2005. (Photo by A. Terrone)


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study and practice of the Buddhist doctrine in the last two decades is one of themost remarkable aspects of the revival of religious expression in eastern Tibet. Some

Tibetan Buddhist masters of the rNying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism, such asNam sprul Jigs med phun tshogs (b. 1944) and bDe chen od gsal rdo rje (b. 1921),have been particularly successful in present-day Kham in their attempt to maintainBuddhist practice and to reconstitute the network of traditional patterns of religiouseducation, especially in accordance with the teaching triad of authorization ofreading(lung), empowerment (dbang), and instruction (khrid) considered fundamental withinthe traditional religious training of the Tibetan Vajrayana system. As an example wehave theinteresting case ofthe teaching activity of the non-celibate Tantric masterPadma gtum po, also known as sKyabs rje sKu gsum gling pa rin po che (b. 1934) whofounded and developed Lung sngon sgar, a religious community in dGa bde (Darpar lag county) that nowadays houses more than three thousand resident monasticsand lay devotees, including HanChinese [Fig. 3]. At Lung sngon sgar, as in many oftodays religious encampments, there is amajor focus on a curriculum of traditionalmonastic disciplines for monks, usually disseminated by a number of residentmkhan

po, or seminary teachers. However, in addition, sKu gsum gling pa rin po che has alsoestablished a Tantric college (sngags pa grwa tshang) where non-celibate Tantric practi-tioners, including a group of young children, study more specifically Tantric mate-rial, such as thesnying thigsystem ofrdzogs chen (the Great Perfection) and especiallythe texts that sKu gsum gling pa has revealed as Treasures.35 This way of conferring

teachings and instruction to Buddhist monastics and laypeople constitutes the back-bone of the religious education system in Tibet, just as the teacher-pupil relationshipforms the only way to access Buddhist Tantric training.36

Religious assemblies of both monastics and lay practitioners around charismaticfigures during periods of teachings, empowerments, or during the establishment ofnew semi-monastic communities is a practice that was quite common in pre-1959

Tibet. Religious encampments (chos sgar) appeared already in the fourteenth centuryin Tibet and were mostly associated with the activities of the Karma bKa brgyudschool of Tibetan Buddhism. It was especially under the leadership of the fourthKarma pa Rol pai rdo rje (1340-1383) that large outdoor religious (chos) encampments(sgar) were organized on the occasion of his public teachings and empowerments and

became known by the name of the great religious encampments of the Karma bKabrgyud (karma pai chos tshogs sgar chen).37 However the particular formation of the

35 For a source on Padma gtum pos life and activities see A bu dkar lo, O rgyan sKu gsumgling pai rnam thar(Hong Kong: Tianma chubanshe, 2003). A shorter version of the biogra-phy written in Portuguese is available on line on the website of the Ddl Phurpa Ling Center(http://kilaya.dharmanet.com.br/brindex.htm). I am currently working on an English transla-tion of sKu gsum gling pas biography (rnam thar), and I have included more on this gter stonin my PhD dissertation. For thesnying thigsystem see below note 54. 36 The Chinese government policies about religion and culture are noticeable also amongother so-called ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu); especially affected are the Uighur peopleof Xinjiang Autonomous Region. For a study of the situation of Muslim communities in the

PRC see Gladney, Dislocating China. 37 For an informative overview of the great religious assemblies of the Karma bKa


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current ones, the sizeof some among them, as well as the growing number found ineastern Tibet are recent phenomena.

In part todays religious encampmentscan also be seen as an adaptation to thestrict controls that have been placed on traditional monasteries and religious prac-titioners in general since the early 1980s and in particular since the 1996 patrioticeducation (Tib. rgyal gces slob gso, Ch. aiguo jiaoyu) campaigns. Government-drivenpatriotic education remains in effecttoday in most of themonasteries and nunneriesof Tibet and is directed towards instructing and testing all monks, nuns and teach-ers in every monastery and nunnery across the Tibetan plateau on the correct

view of religion, law, history, and the Dalai Lama within a socialist theoretical back-ground. Work teams of Communist Party cadre/leaders, both Chinese and Tibetan,conduct study sessions lasting from a few weeks up to three months at the monasticinstitutions. Limits on the numbers of monks and nuns are also enforced by the

work teams. It should be noted that in March 1998, the program was extended toschools and to the citizens of Tibet.

However, the phenomenon of religious encampments alsoneeds to be seen inpart as a natural need for Tibetans to maintain their traditional freedom of move-ment necessaryto continue the transmission of traditional patterns of Buddhist prac-tice and gathering. The requirements of the Chinese government for all Chinese cit-izens to conform to the hukou (Tib. them tho), or household registration system hascontributed to makingthe maintenance of Tibetan monastic system difficult.38 One

of major characteristics of Tibetan Buddhist training and practice is the encourage-ment to receive different teachings during ones spiritual development not only fromthe pupils root teacher (rtsa bai bla ma) in ones home monastery, but also from other

brgyud see Thub bstan phun tshogss Karma pai chos tshogs sgar chen dzam gling zhes paiskor mdor bsdus stam brjod pa [A brief discussion on the Karmapas great religious assem-blies known as the ornaments of the world],Krung goi bod kyi shes rig1 (1993): 52-65. 38 The huji zhidu or system of household registration (also called hukou in Chinese) wasestablished in the PRC in 1950 as one of the early policies in the aftermaths of the formationof the new Republic in order for the Chinese government to apply a stronger control over itspopulation and keep an eye on internal population migrations. Within the new wave of gov-ernment reforms and open market economy the system was weakened and internal migra-tion encouraged, but the hukou system restrictions continue to affect the people of the PRC.

This is especially true for ethnic groups for whom hukou identification is in many cases stillapplied. A number of scholarly studies of the hukou system have appeared both in the PRC andabroad, especially on the impact of the migration from countryside to urban areas of Chinaon the economy of the country. See, for instance, Kam Wing Chan, Zhongguo huji zhidugaige he chengxian renkou qianyi [Chinese hukou reforms and the rural-urban migration],Zhongguo laodong jingji (China Labor Economics) 1 (2004): 108-123. For an English transla-tion of the article see Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban

Migration: Processes and Changes, The China Quarterly 160.1 (1999): 818-855 (available athttp://courses.washington.edu/chinageo/Chan-Zhang-CQ.PDF). The two articles above canbe also downloaded in PDF format at the website of the Congressional-Executive Commissionon China: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/090205/index.php. See also Fei-ling

Wang, Organization through Division and Exclusion: Chinas Hukou System (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2005).


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teachers, specializing in different doctrines or sets of practices, who often live farfrom the monastery or in other regions of the country. With the restrictions imposedby the hukou system of population registration, the Tibetans monastic populationfound itself constrained and limited in its movements across the land and thereforeunable to continue the traditional forms ofreligious education.

With the more tolerant attitude shown by the central government and localauthorities concerning religious practice, Buddhist leaders regained visibility in

Tibet and many began to reconstruct the sacred geographical landscape of theirland and the religious structures that were heavily attacked in the past. In thisatmo-sphere monks and nuns began to regain confidence and move aroundthe country insearch ofauthentic teachers and places for practice. They would thus gather aroundthe teacher and establish themselves in the new setting, starting to build individualhuts and cells in order to attend his teachings and to practice according to hisinstructions. Many monks and nuns living in the religious encampments today staythere for relatively short periods of time, three or four years, but sometimes muchlonger. Bla rung sgar,39 the religious encampment and mountain retreat (ri khrod)center established by mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs,40 offers the title ofmkhan

po (seminary teacher), which is an advanced study degree, to those monksnunscan receive the title ofmkhan mowho, after a period of usually six to seven years,have proved their mastery in certain disciplines, such as basic traditional treatises onlogic and epistemology, philosophy, and monastic discipline.41 One of the main rea-

sons for the success of the religious encampments (chos sgar) in todays Tibet is thatgreat effort and emphasis is put on religious instruction, which is provided accord-ing to a traditional pattern. The triad of empowerment, teachings, and instructionsis respected in order to establish a consistent and gradual way of learning and prac-ticing that is otherwise hard to accomplish.

Despite a degree of tolerance shown by the authorities, repression occurs, as isshown by the history of Bla rung sgar.mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs, one of themost active religious figures in modern Tibet in the maintenance of traditional pat-terns of religious instruction, was born in Kham and when he was still a child he wasrecognized as the reincarnation of Las rab gling pa one of the most famous gter stonof Tibet. After having embraced religious life, he founded the Buddhist center gSang

chen od skur grol bai dben khrod, also known as Bla rung lnga rig nang bstan slob

39 Bla rung lnga rig nang bstan slob gling (Larung Five Sciences Buddhist Academy) liesnearly ten kilometers from gSer rta township in Sichuan in dKar mdzes (Ch. Ganzi) Tibetan

Autonomous Prefecture. 40 For a study of mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs and his religious encampment (chos

sgar) Bla rung sgar see Germanos Re-membering. In the last few years various NGOs andhuman rights agencies have produced reports of the 2001 incidents at Bla rung sgar and thesituation in similar religious encampments in Tibet. See for instance ICT, When the Sky Fellto Earth;and Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), Destruction ofSerthar Institute: A Report, 2002.

41 It represents the peak of scholastic training, in rNying ma academies, for those monks

who complete the study program, which often includes epistemology and philosophy, togetherwith disciplines such as grammar, poetry, composition, but also painting, and often medicine.


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gling or simply Bla rung sgar in gSer rta in 1980. In August 2001 a series of inspec-tion visits by Chinese authorities toBla rung sgar targetednuns and monks who

were found to lackvalid residence permits according to the hukou registration system.Those staying at the encampment without permitswere forced to leave and their cellswere destroyed. mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs was reported ill and was accompa-nied to Chengdu where he was hospitalized until 2002. Repeated checks and demoli-tions occurred through the next few years until 2004, the year when mKhan po Jigsmed phun tshogs died, in an effort bythe authorities to keep a tight control on thenumber of monastics living in the compound. This level of suppression demonstratesthe powerful valence that religious encampments such as Bla rung sgar have taken on for Tibetan cultural and religious identity.

The loose organization of the religious encampments, the absence of a strictset of rules regarding enrolment, monastic affiliation, number of resident monksand nuns, and the eclectic nature of the encampments, contributed to the successof the activities of this kind of religious center as one of the most significant reli-gious movements of Tibet in the twentieth century. Teachings are usually deliveredbymkhan po, who coordinate and provide basic and advanced instruction to smallclusters of monks or nuns, most often segregated according to their place of origin.

Monks and nuns assemblein the main assembly hall of the encampment onlyocca-sionally for formal general teachings by the leader of the encampment. Monks andnuns live in separate quarters, but usually attend the same meetings, sitting in sepa-

rate sections of the main hall.These quasi-monastic religious encampments made up of Tibetan monks andnuns from all across Tibet as well as a significant number of Chinese students anddevotees form around charismatic masters and are often located in remote areasoften far from local government cadres. Usually none of the encampments hasasignificant tie to a pre-1959 monastic institutionhence the lack of any historyof conflict with the central government; they are not re-built monasteries thathad been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. These religious encampmentsare not administered or run as traditional monasteries but rather function more assecluded meditation retreat centers. As a result of the continuous arrival of monksand nuns from their home monasteries and convents, as well as laypeople attracted

by the chance to gain access to the religious education and instruction these placesoffer, most of the encampments have grown by the hundreds every year. The num-ber of monks and nuns at these encampments varies greatly: from a few hundred orfewerin small encampments and mountain hermitages, as in the case of the sKyabsrje Rig dzin nyi mas Tsung shar ri khrod and Nam sprul Jigs med phun tshogsssNyan lung sgar, to five thousand or more as in the case of Ya chen bsam gtan gling(also known as Ya chen sgar) in Khrom thar in dKar mdzes county in Sichuan andan estimated ten thousand monks and nuns that lived in small meditation huts at Blarung sgar in the year 2000.42

42 Among the best known Buddhist encampments are Thub bstan chos skor gling (also

known as Lung sngon sgar [Fig. 4] in dGa bde [Ch. Gande]) led by Padma gtum po (alsoknown as sKu gsum gling pa, b. 1933); sNyan lung sgar in gSer rta sNyan lung led by Nam


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What is found in these encampments is, above all, what we may call spiritualgravitation, a draw for thousands of monks and nuns who cannot find adequateBuddhist instruction elsewhere. Coercive measures such as regular patriotic educa-tion and political indoctrination aimed at religious practitioners have proved to bedifficult to carry out in the encampments ofeastern Tibet. Theyare unconventionalin the sense that they remain outside established patterns of religious institution thatChinese officials are accustomed to controlling. The monastics do not gather for dailychanting sessions as at most other monasteries and nunneries. Rather, the monasticbody gathers as a whole only when teachings and empowerments are being given. Aloose organizational hierarchy prevails at these encampments, as opposed to the morerigid system of traditional monasteries in Tibet. The prominent incarnate lamas whogive religious authority to the encampments try to avoidany administrative role.Nearly all the teachers at the encampments offer teachings in an ecumenical style, asopposed to the sectarianism that is found among some Tibetan Buddhist teachers.

This teaching style allows for a much wider pool of disciples because students cancome from any region and any school (including rNying ma, dGe lugs, Sa skya, bKabrgyud, Jo nang pa, Bon as well as Chinese Buddhists) to study, and then return totheir home areas to practice and often teach younger monks.

The extent to which the religious encampments are apopular destination formonastics interested in enriching their religious training in a traditional and non-sectarian environment in Tibet can be better understood if we reflect on the attention

that they have attracted in the last four years fromChinese authorities concernedabout the dimensions of such religious gatherings, the adherence to traditional andpre-1959 forms of religious transmission and authority, their support ofH.H. theDalai Lama, the potential for development of strong sense of cultural and religiousidentity, and how other similar encampments have developed in Tibet in the past twodecades. Bla rung sgar and Ya chen sgar are examples of what happens when there is aperceived threat to thepoliticali.e., questioning the political authority of the centralgovernment. Both encampments experienced mass expulsion of monks and nuns, andboth saw the demolition of thousands of monastic quarters carried out or ordered bygovernment personnel.43

sprul Jigs med phun tshogs (b. 1944) and the late Tre lha mo (1938-2003); Brug khyung sgar,in Them chen (Qinghai), led by gTer ston Kun bzang grags pa (date of birth not available);and Nyag bla sgar (also known as Nyag bla dgon), established in Go jo by gTer ston Nyag blaByang chub rdo rje (1926-ca. 1978). Other religious centers associated with the Treasure rev-elation tradition, but smaller in terms of size and resident monastic population are rDza merchen dgon in Shar mda in Nang chen county, residence of gTer chen bDe chen od gsal rdorje (b. 1921), Tsung shar ri khrod, founded and run by sKyab rje Rig dzin nyi ma (b. 1931) insNyan lung in gSer rta, Re khe dgon chen o rgyan bsam gtan gling in dPal yul led by A dzomsPad lo rin po che (b. 1971), also known as A dzoms rgyal sras Padma dbang rgyal, and theRal gzhung chu dkar dgon founded and run by the late rDo rung Karma (?-2002) in Jo mda,Chab mdo Prefecture. 43 Major instances of the attention paid by Chinese and Tibetan political leaders touncontrolled religious groups and restriction of religious activities are the cases of mKhan po

Jigs med phun tshogs and the destruction of his gSer rta institute as we have already men-tioned, and that of Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan (also known as mKhan po A chos or


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While suchencampments are among the most popular and growing centers ofreligious practice in Tibet today in terms of numbers of resident monastic popu-lation and lay followers, religious instruction, and their leaders activities, lessknown and smaller religious communities are also currently active in Tibetan areasof northern Kham. There is an indefinite number of religious practitioners andBuddhist teachers who lead a more secluded and therefore scarcely publicly active

way of life, yet who have a following that plays a central social role in their localcommunity. Living mainly in hermitages and mountain retreat centers, the majorfocus of their religious activities is an austere lifestyle characterized by meditationand the performance of a variety of Tantric ritualsoften for the welfare of villagesand individuals for whom they provide spiritual advice.

In short, one can see that the phenomenon of the revival of the religious encamp-ments is closely associated with three responses to the political restrictionsappliedby the government: first, a desire to avoid controls on enrolment in and the contentof instruction; second, a search for teachers to replace those who fled Tibet after1959; and finally, appreciation of the accessibility of the encampments and the diver-sity of instruction offered. Thus the encampments emerge asan alternative form ofreligious gathering, study academies, and adaptation to Buddhist practice.

A phenomenon worth noting when discussing present-day religious encamp-ments and the increased visibility of their leaders is the production and diffusion ofa variety of worship material that in the recent years has contributed to the popu-

larity of Buddhist teachers. Pins, pendants, watches, statues, posters, photos, andpicture books, as well as introductory brochures, manuals of spiritual advice, prayerbooks, and media technology such as audio cassettes, VCDs, and DVDs can befound in many towns and villages of Kham, and nowadays also in Lhasa in somestalls in the Bar skor circular road around the Jokhang temple.44 The distribution ofthese goods and worship items has undeniably increased the popularity of figuressuch as mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs and Lung rtogs rgyal mtshan, as well asadded charm to their activities.

A khyug) the current leader of Ya chen sgar in Khrom thar in dKar mdzes county [Fig. 1].The events which saw the demolition of large portions of the two encampments have beenreported and analyzed extensively in the Western media and in reports by Tibet-monitoringorganizations such as ICT (International Campaign for Tibet), and TIN (Tibet InformationNetwork). For an overview of the events it may be useful also to refer to Tibetan Centre forHuman Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), Destruction of Serthar Institute: A Special Report,2002. For an overview and remarks on the revived monastic activities in Tibet, see Goldstein,The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung Monastery, 15-52. 44 In November 2004 bronze and clay statues representing mKhan po Jigs med phuntshogs, were on sale in a shop selling Tibetan statues along Wuhousi road near the Dar rtsemdoi mgron khang (Kangding binguan) in Chengdu, Sichuan. In the same area wristwatch-

es with the portrait of mKhan po Jigs med phun tshogs were on sale in a small Indo-Tibetangoods store.


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The gter ma Tradition

Besides the factors illustrated above it should not be forgotten that a major fac-tor fostering the popularity of the religious encampments is the charismatic qualityof their leaders. Virtually all of todays leaders of the religious encampments claimto be Treasure revealers (gter ston) and are known for having discovered many dif-ferent Treasure (gter ma) items and revealed various cycles of visionary teachings.

According to the rNying ma tradition the origins of the transmission of Treasuresin Tibet are primarily associated with the deeds and religious activities performedby the Indian master Padmasambhava, known more popularly in Tibet by the

name of Guru Rinpoche (Precious Master), or Padma byung gnas (The Lotus-Born One). The phenomenon of Treasure concealement, therefore, seems to stemfrom the eighth century when the then king of Tibet, Khri srong lde btsan (756-797),45 invited Padmasambhava to Tibet under specific advice of the Buddhist mas-ter ntarakita. The task of Padmasambhava was to remove the negative forcesopposing the kings plan to convert the land to Buddhism by subduing the manyautochthonous deities and demons (lha dre)opposed to the introduction of the newreligion on Tibetan soil. Padmasambhava is generally considered to be not onlytheintroducerof TantricBuddhism into Tibet, but also, especially by the rNying maschool, the second Buddha (sangs rgyas gnyis pa) who conferred empowerments andteachings and established the first community of monastics and lay practitioners

in bSam yas.46 According to traditional sources, it was specifically during his yearsin Tibet that Padmasambhava realized the necessity of hiding numerous religiousitems and implements, and teachings, concealingmaterial objectsin various differ-ent receptacles in Tibet, such as pillars, trees, boulders, caves, and lakes, and trans-ferring verbal teachings into the minds of his disciples.47

45 Chronology is one of the major problems in the study of Tibetan dynastic period andtherefore the dates regarding the dates of birth and death and the reigns of early Tibetankings are subject to debate. Refer to Christopher I. Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central

Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987): 229. 46 Padmasambhava, more popularly known in Tibet by the name of Guru Rinpoche, istraditionally believed by the rNying ma school to have turned the malignant deities of theBon tradition into protectors (chos skyong,srung ma) of the Buddha Dharma and founded thebSam yas monastery in southern Tibet. For an account of how Padmasambhava was invitedto Tibet and the request by King Khri srong lde bstan to subdue the lha dre beings see the

Padma bka thang(Chengdu: Sichuan Natinalities Publishing House, 1987): 267-351. For anEnglish version see Ye shes mtsho rgyal, The Life Liberation of Padmasambhava, ed. Tarthang

Tulku and trans. Kenneth Douglas and Gyendolyn Bays, 2 vols. (Berkeley, CA: DharmaPublishing, 1978). 47 See for instance Thuu bkwan Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, Thuu bkwan grub mtha(Langzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 1984, 67-69): Padmasambhava and some of his autho-rized disciples hid some supreme and extraordinary advices as Treasures (gter du sbas) forthe welfare of the disciples of the future, blessed them without sparing a single one, and

appointed the Treasures to guardians, expressing the hope that fortunate and karmicallypositive beings would find them. Looking at the way signs appear in the suitable discovery


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A crucial expedient in the success of Padmasambhavas enterprise was the formu-lation of the expectation that these teachings would be rediscovered onvariousoccasions in the future by those who were to become reincarnations of his disciplesand that they would retrieve and diffuse the teachings for the specific purposeofsupporting the Buddhist doctrine and the spiritual interests of human beings at

various times.Tibetans refer to this period of introduction of the Buddhist doc-trine in the land as early diffusion (snga dar), as opposed to later diffusion (phyidar) which started in the tenth century, and call early translations (snga gyur)the activities of translation of ancient Indic Tantric material which the rNying maschool laterassimilated into its canon.

The Treasure revelation tradition is associated with the activities of the firstgter ston who appeared between the tenth and twelfth centuriesfigures such asSangs rgyas bla ma (ca 1000-1080), Nyang ral Nyi ma od zer (1124-1192) and lateron with Guru Chos dbang (1212-1273).48 Manygter ston have appeared since thenand most of them have been recognized as great masters. Their revealed works havebeen incorporated into what is known as the rNying ma rgyud bum, the rNying maCanon of Tantric Teachings, of which Ratna gling pa (1403-1478) was one of themost important editors.

Therefore, one of the Treasure revelation traditions most important notionsis the constant reaffirmation of its relation with the semilegendary and idealizedgolden era of Tibetan imperial or dynastic history. With the revelation of the

Mai bka bum, for instance, a historical work whose composition is attributeddirectly to King Srong btsan sgam po (or Khri srong btsan, 618-641) 49 himself andlater revealed by several Treasure discoverers, among them Nyang ral Nyi ma odzer, the Treasure revelation movement began to shape the ideology of continu-ity denoting and claiming direct descent from the imperial past and the dynasticancestry.50 The gter ma revelation movement is particularly attached to the time

at the time of their finding, all the Treasure discoverers (gter ston) have their name, family,and signs inserted in the Treasure list (gter gyi kha byang). One day when human beings gath-er and the Treasure is extracted and diffused to many fortunate ones, this will be known as

Treasure teaching (gter chos). 48 Dargyay, The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet, 97-119. See also Dudjom Rinpoche, The

Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, vol. 1, trans. Gyurme Dorjeand Kapstein (Boston: Wisdom, 1991). 49 Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire, 227. 50 gTer ston Grub thob dngos grub is considered by many Tibetan scholars the principaldiscoverer of theMai bka bum. However the source of the discovery is also attributed at thesame time to Nyang ral Nyi ma od zer and rJe btsun Shkya bzang po. Cf. Matthew Kapstein,Remarks on the Mani bKa-bum and the Cult of Avalokitesvara in Tibet, in Tibetan Buddhism:

Reason and Revelation, eds. Ronald Davidson and Steven D. Goodman (Albany: State Universityof New York Press, 1992): 79-93, 81, and Per K. Srensen, Tibetan Buddhist Historiography: The

Mirror Illuminating the Royal Genealogies. An Annotated Translation of the XIVth Century TibetanChronicle: rGyal-rabs gsal-bai me-long(Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 1994): 8. For referencesconcerning biographical notes ofgter ston see above all Gu ru bkra shis, bsTan pai snying po gsang

chen snga gyur nges don zab moi chos kyi byung ba gsal bar byed pai legs bshad mkhas pa dga byed mngomtshar gtam gyi rol mtsho (Gu bkrai chos byung) (Beijing: Krung goi bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun


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when the numerous tribes and clans of the land were first unified under the rule ofKing Srong btsan sgam po. At that time, thefirst attempts weremade to introduceBuddhism into the land, mainly as a court religion, which was further fostered bythe royal marriage between the king and the Chinese princess from the Tang courtand the Nepalese princess. Under their patronage the first Buddhist statues andconstructions were set upin central Tibet.51

Another crucial aspect of the Treasure revelation tradition is the notion of adarkor degenerate age (snyigs dus) of Tibet, which is often emphasized in the articula-tion of a narrative discourse to provide legitimacy to the tradition itself. The con-cealment of Treasures apparently was motivated by the eclipse of the socio-politicalorder in the ninth century, when the new rule threatened the very existence ofBuddhism itself and the diffusion of its teachings came under strong persecution.

The revelation of the Treasures represents in thefinal analysis attempts to recon-nect, at least ideologically, with the cultural milieu of the early diffusion of theBuddhism in the land, and to revalorize the imperial grandeur of Tibetan civiliza-tion showing, to put it in Giuseppe Tuccis words the yearning for a restoration ofancient times, a proof of national revival.52

Why is Treasure revelation so crucial today? The form of religious continuityoffered by the Treasure tradition and the charismatic power that Treasure reveal-ersare able to generate mirror the need for many Tibetans to connect with theircommon historical past and to maintain a distinctive cultural and religious iden-

tity, especially in times of continual socio-political changes. A growing number ofTibetans consider these charismatic figures high practitioners, scrupulous teach-ers, and gter ma revealers. The term gter ston, Treasure revealer, defines a person

who, by virtue of karmic connections with Padmasambhava and his direct disciplescan retrieve religious items and scriptural teachings as materialearth Treasures (sa

gter) and reveal cycles of teachings as mental Treasures (dgongs gter) through vision-ary activity. Leaving aside the spiritual attainments and the fame of these religiousfigures knowledge and wisdom, much of these leaders charismatic influence stemsfrom their ability to retrieve Treasures items and teachings (gter chos) and there-fore to represent a direct connection with Tibets glorious past and to reestablisha religious narrative associated with Tibets dynastic era and imperial supremacy.

However, in addition to claims of Treasure revelation and thediscovery of seriesof Treasures (gter ma) of various types, their charismatic status is reinforced by thebiographies, autobiographies, and also collected works (gsung bum) of some of thesemajor teachers that arewidely available to the public.53 This is notable because the

khang, 1990, reprint 1998): 372-373. See also f. 41b of Jam mgon Kong sprul Blo gros mtha yas,Zab moi gter dang gter ston grub thob ji ltar byon pai lo rgyus mdor bsdus bkod pa rin chen bai du r.yai

phreng ba,inRin chen gter mdzod chen mo (Paro: Ngodrup & Sherap Drimay, 1976). 51 For an overview of Tibetan empire under Srong btsan sgam po see Chapter 1 in Beck-

with, The Tibetan Empire, 11-36. 52 Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls(Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949): 112. 53 For a biography of Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan, see the third volume of histhree-volume collected works,gDod mai mgon po grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan dpal bzang


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distribution of the biographies of active teachers contributes to the knowledge oftheir deeds and therefore increases their popularity among devotees. By claimingto be Treasure revealers these masters associate themselveswith theperiod of theintroduction of Buddhism in the land of Tibet, giving voice to Padmasambhavaspredicted decline of the doctrine and rise of the teachings through the revelationsof past teachings. They are all known in varying degrees for their revelations of

Treasures in material forms as well as inmental or spiritual forms.They also tend toadopta more syncretistic or eclectic approach than do moreconventional teachersassociated with specific schools. Their contemplation activities adhere mainly to therdzogs chen tradition of religious practice and principallythesnying thigsystem.54

poi gsum bum (Khrom thar, 2004) and Phur pa bKr

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Tibetan Buddhism Beyond the Monastery